CONTENTS
....
WITNESSES
Steven Simon, Ph.D., Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations ..
The Honorable James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense
Policy Center, The RAND Corporation
Michael Rubin, Ph.D., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research ........
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Steven Simon, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........
The Honorable James Dobbins: Prepared statement .....
Michael Rubin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .........
APPENDIX
The Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Illinois: Prepared statement ........
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas: Prepared statement .....
The Honorable Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State
.........................................
of Texas: Prepared statement
(III)


U.S. POLICY OPTIONS IN THE IRAQ CRISIS
TUESDAY, JULY 17, 2007
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:36 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas Lantos (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
Chairman LANTOS. Committee will come to order.
If there was any question about the direction of Congress on
Iraq, it has become crystal clear in the past 2 weeks. With re-
spected Republican leaders like Richard Lugar and John Warner
breaking ranks and firmly stating the need for a change in course,
the pressure on the administration is becoming greater by the day.
Soon the chorus of voices calling for a responsible redeployment
will be impossible for the White House to quell with a veto threat.
For now, the administration remains willfully deaf to these calls.
But even if the President does veto the redeployment bill that I co-
sponsored and that passed the House last week, Congress will send
yet another telegram to the White House-and next time more Re-
publicans will show up to help deliver it. And the time after that,
even more will stand up and be counted.
I hope it doesn't come to that, but I fear that it might. The ad-
ministration astonishingly signaled yesterday that it is considering
a further increase in troop levels in Iraq. The chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, said one of the options on the
table would be to boost the number after General Petraeus' crucial
report in September. This would represent an irresponsible dis-
regard for the strong will of Congress and of the American people.
The administration is fighting against the tide with a misin-
formation campaign. After each damming military report and dev-
astating development, the White House spins a story about partial
progress and the slimmest of successes.
The fact is that Iraq has spiraled into a civil war that cannot be
contained. Four years and four months into the war, the level of
violence is once again flaring, as demonstrated by the ghastly
bombings yesterday in the city of Kirkuk.
In its interim benchmark report, the administration again tried
to sugarcoat the rapidly deteriorating situation on the ground.
Using the most liberal grading standard possible, the administra-
tion could get no more than a 50-percent grade to the Iraqis.
Among the list of the unmet benchmarks were some of the most
critical of all, including the disarming of militias and the ability of
the Iraqi security forces to operate independently.
(1)


12
matum to say that now our troops will come home from battle in
success, and we will remove our troops from Iraq, short of those
who need to remain, and bring home troops to end this dastardly
misdirected war that is not doing anything but continuing to kill
civilians. The treasure of our country deserves courageous acts by
members of the United States Congress to end this war now.
Chairman LANTOS. Before turning to our witnesses, I want to
give my friend from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, a chance to speak.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Just let me say that I do appreciate you holding this hearing. I
think it is important that we vet every aspect of this war and to
look at every potential policy that can lead to an ending of the hos-
tilities, and hopefully a break out of democracy in Iraq.
But I do think it is profoundly unfair and breathtakingly inac-
curate to suggest, as some of my colleagues have just prior to me
speaking, that this was somehow a war of imperialism and colo-
nialism. Nothing could be further from the truth. I don't believe the
President, I don't believe those of us who supported the use of force
as a means of trying to bring some stability, some democracy, some
respect for human rights to Iraq in any way ever even con-
templated that this was somehow imperialism or colonialism the
way my friend and colleague said a moment ago.
The idea was to intervene to try to protect the innocent from
what had been a barbaric regime in Saddam Hussein. We not so
long ago, and I just returned, as you know, Mr. Chairman, from
Srebrenitza where 8,000 men under the auspices of UNPROFOR,
the U.N. protection force, was separated from the women and sum-
marily executed 12 years ago beginning on July 11. I was there for
a solemn remembrance of that terrible genocide that occurred
there.
We intervened in Bosnia, especially as it related to Kosova, be-
cause we believed that innocent people deserve respect for human
rights, and at least an attempt at democracy.
I think it is insulting to posit that a people anywhere on this
planet somehow can't handle democracy. Maybe it would take time,
but I think it is insulting to people of Iraq, notwithstanding their
sectarian differences, to say they can't handle it.
Finally, there are many of us who when we look at Darfur feel
that there ought to be a more robust U.N. presence there as well.
To prevent what? The killing and maiming and the slaughter of in-
nocent people.
So while we are all profoundly upset with this war, I think it is
wrong, as my friend and colleague said a moment ago, to somehow
suggest this was about imperialism and colonialism. We have no
colonial design on Iraq. We want to get out as soon as humanly
possible, and again, if you want to see an example of that look at
World War II.
Unlike many other parties who conquered, in this case a world
t did we do in Japan? We got out of there as soon as we
possibly could, left them with what is now a robust democracy, and
the same happened in Europe, especially as it relates to Germany.
So again, I think that is a wrong headed approach to take. We
have our differences. I want to get out of there as soon as possible


14
For many Sunnis, reconciliation means restoration. This goes be-
yond mere inclusion in power sharing arrangements. It means re-
gaining control of the state. For Kurds, reconciliation means rec-
ognition of Kurdish autonomy and openness to the Kurds' prospec-
tive territorial gains.
These differences will not be reconciled soon. Dethroned elites do
not easily surrender their dreams of a reversal of fortune. The
process resembles the way people are said to grapple with immi-
nent death through stages of denial, anger, bargaining, depression
and acceptance. Well, Sunnis are not yet near the bargaining stage
of dealing with Saddam's overthrow.
It is also worth noting that studies of civil war since 1945 show
that most last 7 to 10 years and they generally end with military
victory of one side or the other, rather than a negotiated settle-
ment. Where power-sharing arrangements have been reached, they
have been short-lived, depressingly, and often led to renewed hos-
tilities. Moreover, civil wars tend to be harder to resolve when the
rebel side is fractured, a point relevant to the current U.S. strategy
of driving wedges in the Sunni insurgency. With or without the
presence of United States ground forces, the Iraqi civil war is likely
to grind on for some time.
Well, what purpose do U.S. forces serve under these cir-
cumstances?
The large presence of United States ground forces has had little
effect on Iraqi politics or on the insurgency. The surge has redis-
tributed insurgent activity but not suppressed it. Ironically, vio-
lence now touches more of the country than before, with a cor-
responding erosion of societal stability and government credibility.
At the same time, the presence of U.S. forces is a godsend to
jihadists. Talk of a Korea-like commitment and an elaborate base
structure, alongside an unwillingness to discuss a timetable for
withdrawal, has fueled suspicion and further energized the jihad.
Meanw! e, given our large presence in Iraq, we are bound to be
held responsible for the awful things happening there, even though
we are unable to prevent them. The U.S. is culpable, but not capa-
ble. Against the background of regrettable but unavoidable battle-
field excesses, the U.S. seems not only ineffectual but cruel. This
image of America is continuously broadcast to the world in the
form of the 900 insurgent communiqués and videos generated from
within Iraq every month.
And why is a near term decision to withdraw essential?
Domestic public support for the war has dwindled. Casualty tol-
erance is weakening and could crack at any time. A U.S. pull-out
precipitated by a sudden collapse of domestic opinion will appear
confused and ill-prepared; the hasty reaction to a sudden reversal.
It is vital that a withdrawal appear, to the extent possible, to be
a matter of volition, not compulsion. We must therefore begin plan-
ning now for a deliberate and orderly redeployment of United
States forces from Iraq.
Now, the administration contends that the hypothetical costs of
withdrawal are necessarily bigger than the demonstrated costs of
staying. Predictions of catastrophe, like President Bush's assertion
that the results of a so-called “precipitous” withdrawal will be "hor-
rific,” have miscast uncertain speculation as unquestionable fact.


22
tive
In Bosnia, in 1995, we succeeded because that was the most im-
portant objective of American foreign policy, and every other inter-
est was subordinated to it, so we sat down with Milosevic and
Tudjman, even though they were guilty of genocide. We worked
with the Russians even though they had been supporting the
wrong side. We decided not to do anything about Kosova in 1995,
that we would just have to wait. We were focused on Bosnia. We
decided not to do anything about democracy in Serbia in 1995. We
let Milosevic win another election by virtue of his relationship with
us, because ending the civil war was our number one priority.
Similarly, in 2001, after September 11 the most important objec-
e of American policy was to topple the Taliban and replace it
with something quick enough so we didn't have to occupy the coun-
try and govern it, and everything else was subordinated to that.
We talked to the Iranians. We forged an alliance with Pakistan
that had been selling nuclear technology to our enemies and pro-
moting terrorism all over the world. We made a number of conces-
sions in order to achieve that objective very quickly. We are going
to have to make the same kind of triage in the Middle East if we
are going to stabilize Iraq.
Now, it doesn't mean that other interests in the Middle East are
indefinitely subordinated, but it does mean that there has to be
some choosing. State craft is about prioritizing, sequencing, and
choosing, and doing what you can do now and postponing what you
can't do now. It has never been likely that the United States could
stabilize Iraq and destabilize Iran and Syria at the same time. It
is simply too much to expect.
Now, in 1995, we ignored Kosova. Then in 1999, we liberated
Kosova, but we left Milosevic in power, and then in 2000, v
threw Milosevic. So you can achieve everything you want but you
can't achieve it all at the same time.
We have got a lot of interests in the Middle East, in creating a
Palestinian state at peace with Israel, in democratizing Lebanon,
in de-nuclearizing Iran, in stopping Syrian support for terrorism
and interference in Lebanon. If we try to achieve all of these simul-
taneously, we are going to do exactly what we have done for the
last 4 or 5 years, which is achieved none of them.
So we are going to have to decide what is more important. In my
judgment, given the level of responsibilities the United States has
assumed in Iraq, stabilizing Iraq should be our number one pri-
ority.
Now, what does that mean for the U.S. military presence?
I think that if we went to the Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi
factions and said, we are re-thinking our policy. This isn't working.
We are going to come to a different policy, a different mission for
our troops, a different number of troops, but we want to hear what
you have to say before we make our decisions, and we are going
to make our decisions based on what you say and the degree you
are prepared to help. I think the end result of consultations like
would be that the Iraqi leadership and most of the neigh-
boring countries want us to leave but not right away; want us to
reduce, but not to zero; want a residual American presence for long
enough to stabilize Iraq.


27
within Iraq should we withdraw. Such a strategy did not work
when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan. It is risky to believe that it
will work in Iraq.
Rather than bring stability or victory, partial withdrawal will en-
sure chaos and defeat. It is ironic that many who once criticized
Donald Rumsfeld because he deployed too few troops to stabilize
Iraq would now counsel replicating his strategy. The major benefit
of the surge is that it creates room to further train and develop the
Iraqi security forces. With fewer United States troops in Iraq, it
will not be possible to continue training at the same level and with
the same rigor. The ability to train sufficient Iraqis to stabilize
Iraq will be the chief determinant of United States success.
Over-the-horizon deployment will place the U.S. military's ability
to conduct missions hostage to the countries in which they are sta-
tioned. When our troops or our allies are engaged in a fight and
need instant response, we should not need to depend on an applica-
tion to the Saudi, Kuwaiti, or Jordanian foreign ministries to cross
borders or clear airspace. Cross-border operations are seldom rapid.
Nor is redeployment into Iraq Kurdistan wise. The Iraqi Kurdish
leadership's declarations that they are America's best regional al-
lies are more rhetorical than real. While Iraqi Kurdish leaders host
visiting American delegations for lavish dinners, they are enable
az-Zawraa, the most virulent anti-American and pro-insurgent tele-
vision, to broadcast from their territory.
Masud Barzani, the regional president, has both enabled the Ira-
nian Revolutionary Guards to increase their presence in the region
and interfered with United States attempts to intercept those plan-
ning attacks on Americans. Barzani has provided safe haven and
arms to PKK terrorists responsible for the deaths in Turkey of
more than 100 people since January alone.
It is tragic that Turkish-American relations have been so rocky
since 2003. This is the result of the politics of a prime minister
whose tenure may end with elections this Sunday. Regardless of
our differences with Ankara, Washington should not turn a blind
eye toward terrorism against such an important NATO ally nor
should it lend protection to those who support such terrorism.
Redeploying troops in Iraqi Kurdistan short of an end to the
PKK's presence in northern Iraq would spark greater conflicts and
could lead to Turkey's withdraw from NATO. Washington should
demand Barzani expel PKK terrorists, renounce any interest be-
yond the borders of Iraq and stop weapons smugglings from Iraqi
Kurdistan into Turkey.
Partition, hard or soft, is unwise. Any partition would require
significant population transfer. But rather than resolve conflict,
ple catalyze it. The Bosnia model does not apply w
Bosnia experienced 3 years of ethnic cleansing and conflict propor-
tionately far more intense than anything in Iraq. The Bosnia civil
war killed 200,000 people and resulted in the displacement of half
that country's population. This would be the proportional equiva-
lent to more than 1.5 million Iraqis killed and 12 million Iraqi refu-
gees.
To advocate for the partition of Iraq would, in effect, involve ac-
celerating civil war and making millions of refugees. But division
along ethnic or sectarian lines will not bring stability. Divisions


41
I support the Iraq study group's recommendations of last Decem-
ber which called the United States to adopt a smaller profile con-
centrated largely on advisors and enablers, leaving the street fight-
ing, urban patrolling and major combat to the Iraqis. I think a
force of that size would probably require somewhere between
40,000 and 60,000 troops. People who are more expert than I would
need to judge on that.
There are certainly dangers with moving toward that kind of
presence. The Iraq Government might collapse entirely. It would
probably engage in large-scale human rights abuses with which we
would be associated, but I still think that is probably better than
leaving altogether.
I tend to think that is more or less where we will be headed by
middle of next year, and then the question is can that be sustained
or will the political processes in both Iraq and the United States
have veered entirely out of predictable control.
Chairman LANTOS. Dr. Rubin.
Mr. RUBIN. Mr. Chairman, there are two scenarios and which is
chosen depends on the Congress. If the surge continues and we can
train the Iraqi security forces, United States forces can be steadily
withdrawn. Basically that option is the short-term surge followed
by long-term withdrawal.
Withdrawal prior to stabilizing Iraq, as the Baker-Hamilton
Commission found, could lead to the necessity to re-engage in Iraq
sooner rather than later. So that scenario is more of a short-term
withdrawal, followed by a long-term deployment.
I would hope that Congress would continue with the surge
through General Petraeus' report with 160,000 plus United States
troops in Iraq, enabling the trainers to do their work. It is simply
not militarily possible only to deploy trainers and not have the
background support to protect them and to create
which for them to do the training. I would hope that we would con-
tinue with the surge until at least we hear from General Petraeus.
Chairman LANTOS. Ms. Woolsey.
Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
witnesses for this very important hearing today.
I have two questions for Mr. Simon and Ambassador Dobbins,
and my colleague talked about the unpopularity of the American
troops in Iraq by the Iraqis, and I would like then to move that
over to the United States population with the sense that about 62
percent of Americans say that we know that we shouldn't have
gone there in the first place. It was a mistake. But they don't know
how to get out, and you know what, why would they know how to
get out? That is not their job. It is our jobs, all of us.
The other reason is, given the sense that every time we talk
about bringing our troops home, that language is parsed into aban-
doning our troops by the press, the media, by the administration,
by both sides of the House, the House and the Senate, and I would
like to change that.
I truly believe, and I would like your opinion about what you
think it would cost and what the timing would be, I believe we can
support our troops, that we fund their coming home safely, that
over a period of time, and I would like you to tell me what you
think that period of time will be, and not only bring our troops


home safely, but then we invest in Iraq, pay for it, fund it, have
the funding available to reconstruct and reconcile, give the Iraqis
back their country, give them their sovereignty, and invest in a di-
plomacy surge. So your opinions on that would be very valued by
me.
Mr. SIMON. Bringing the troops home is entirely a political deci-
sion that needs to be made by the Executive Branch and the Legis-
lative Branches together, taking into account the views of Ameri-
cans because it is Americans who determine what their national in-
terest is. So to me, it is not simply a matter of what can be paid
for and how fast things could be done. Obviously, every day that
the troops are not brought home we lose three more with an addi-
tional 10 being wounded. The cumulative effect is already appar-
ent.
But from my perspective as a witness here today, our withdrawal
has to be based as much as possible on strategic considerations
within the constraints of domestic politics, and perhaps events on
the ground in Iraq. But these are so unpredictable that it seems
to me we need to begin planning for these things and for with-
drawal sooner rather than later or we will be hostage to events
happening over there and happening politically here over which
policymakers have little control.
Ms. WOOLSEY. Ambassador.
Ambassador DOBBINS. I am not sure I have a lot to add. I think
a withdrawal-
Ms. WOOLSEY. Paid for, funded.
Ambassador DOBBINS. I think a withdrawal is technically fea-
sible. The conditions under which one would withdraw are quite
unpredictable. It might be possible to withdraw under reasonably
orderly conditions, but it could be that the American withdrawal
would occasion a further collapse of whatever structure is there,
and the conditions will be quite disorderly, and one might even suf-
fer significant casualties in the course of withdrawing. I don't think
one could exclude that, although I am not particularly recom-
mending it.
My own view is that we ought to be moving to a smaller and
more sustainable deployment, and one of the reasons I say that is
because it is clearly easier to withdraw if you only have 50,000
troops there than if you have 150,000 troops there. So I would like
to try a smaller and more sustainable deployment, and if, as some
have predicted, that turns out to be unsustainable one can then
move to the next unhappy option. But I mean I think the real issue
is not whether or not we can get out, the real issue is what we
leave behind.
Ms. WOOLSEY. Well, speaking of what we leave behind let us talk
about equipment and the training of the security forces. We need
to leave, of course, civilian law enforcement that is established, but
there is a fear that we are arming and training enforcement and
military to then just work against our own American troops.
So what would be your ideas of what we should do with our
equipment and how much more should we invest in training the se-
curity and the military?
Chairman LANTOS. We will let Dr. Rubin go first this time.