IRAQI BENCHMARKS: AN OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2007 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:51 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas Lantos (chair- man of the committee) presiding. Chairman LANTOS. This meeting of the Committee on Foreign Af- fairs will come to order. Over the next week our committee will hold three hearings on Iraq. Today, we receive the assessment of the nonparti Accountability Office on Iraq's governance track record based on benchmarks established by Congress. As we undertake this review and others in the coming days, it is imperative that we look at Iraq with the broadest possible lens. What we see is not a pretty pic- ture. The underlying and unspoken assumption of this administration is that the United States and Prime Minister Maliki have parallel objectives for the future of Iraq. As the GAO report shows in great detail, this assumption is fatally flawed. Prime Minister Maliki has run his government like a shadow fac- tional leader. The United States wants to build a strong national Iraqi army. Maliki wants a militia infiltrated force to protect shad- ow power. The United States wants the Iraqi Government to pur- sue a more flexible policy toward low-level members of the Baath party. Maliki has stymied this move at every step, and in so doing has demonstrated to the Sunni population that this government is not their government. Prime Minister Maliki's shadow first policies have contributed di- rectly to the inability of Iraq's leaders to reach agreement on the critical issues facing their nation. Our witness today, GAO Comp- troller General David Walker has called the Iraqi Government dys- functional. I couldn't agree more. One only needs to look at the GAO's careful analysis of the cur- rent state of affairs in Iraq to understand why. The GAO's conclu- sions are extremely sobering. Only three of the 18 benchmarks have been fully met, four have been partially met, with the remain- ing ones not even close to being met. While the White House might have us believe that the troop surge is working, it has become manifestly apparent to all objective observers that it is not, and Prime Minister Maliki's overly sectarian governing style is a key factor in this failure. (1) Some will prefer to criticize the GAO's methodology rather than face the harsh realities of this protracted civil war, but the admin- istration's own recently released national intelligence estimate is as scathing as what we will hear today. Our intelligence community predicts that insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high over the next year; that political reconciliation will remain illusive; and that the Iraqi Government will become ever more precarious. So it is not just the GAO handing out failing grades. The adminis- tration's own nonpolitical experts are every bit as critical. Today, I would like to touch on just four of the most important benchmarks: Sectarian violence, Iraqi troop readiness, control of militias, and the Iraqi reconstruction. The long-awaited administration report next week will undoubt- edly say that sectarian violence is declining. It is not. In a des- perate effort to show the surge is working, the administration has attempted to cook the books by excluding large numbers of Iraqi civilian casualties from its estimates, arguing that only certain types of death are due to sectarian violence, but the families of the dead know better than to write them off that way. According to the Government Accountability Office, overall at- tacks on Iraqi civilians have not dropped, and the administration's own national intelligence estimate states, and I quote: “The level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among civil- ians, remains high.” In the context of this religiously fueled civil war, it is nearly im- possible that Iraq's warring factions will be willing and able to make the tough political compromises essential to a stable and peaceful Iraq. Also on the security front, the Iraqis were due to provide three trained and ready army brigades to support security in Baghdad. Again, this critically important benchmark has not been fully met. The GAO has found that these brigades are trained, but they are hardly ready for battle. Many of the Iraqi force commanders have refused to put aside their sectarian loyalties, spreading deep dis- trust among the Iraqi public. All of the forces remain completely dependent upon American troops for equipment, transportation, and other crucial logistical support. Another benchmark asked the Iraqis to ensure that the Baghdad security plan will not provide a haven for outlaws, but according to the Government Accountability office, the reliability of the police and national security forces to do their jobs in a nonsectarian way continues to be undermined by strong militia influence and polit- ical interference. Recent press reports have suggested that even units of Iraq's armed forces sent to support the so-called security plan are riddled with sympathizers of Muqtada al-Sadr, have refused to come to the aid of our troops under fire, and are effectively promoting terrorist safe havens in Baghdad itself. Finally, the Iraqis were due to allocate and spend $10 billion in Iraqi revenue for reconstruction projects. Again, this benchmark re- mains partially unmet. More than three-quarters of these recon- struction funds, which would help resuscitate Iraq's oil industry and increase electricity generation, have not been spent. The much beleaguered Iraqi people have less electricity than before the war, and efforts at burden-sharing are about to wrap up with the with- drawal of the British troops. Our soldiers' bravery and sacrifice is being wasted on a plan that has been always mostly prayer. The grade F. When the President was campaigning for office back in 2000, he spoke often of what he quotes “as the soft bigotry of low expecta- tions.” It is a catchy phrase, one that implies that many of us were willing to tolerate failure because of our own biases. It is a good point. When it comes to tax dollars, there is no excuse for failure, especially sustained failure. Having seen the report card, we must, as we do with the No Child Left Behind Act, determine that accountability means cutting off the money. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Applause.) Chairman LANTOS. Thank you. The audience will remain quiet or will be ejected. Mr. Pence of Indiana. Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this hearing, and I welcome our distinguished witness, Comptroller General Walker, whom I admire greatly. September is certainly a month of decision for this Congress and this Nation on the subject of Iraq, and this report is timely and helpful. Let me say at the outset I share every American's frustration with the fact that 442 years into the Iraq war effort there is not a completely stable, capable, farsighted Iraqi Government. I have traveled to this nation five times since the initiation of military hostilities. I have said to Iragi leaders and I will say again in this committee today, I exhort the Iraqi Government to redouble its ef- forts to make progress on all of the challenging issues that have been raised in the benchmarks and in this report. What I also want to say, Mr. Chairman, I hope we don't lose sight of how difficult their job is. Resolving sectarian disputes, re- source controversies, potentially rehabilitating Baath party mem- bers, these are all extraordinarily daunting tasks, and while I deeply respect our witness today, with all due respect to him and to this body, I can't help but identify with the statements written by Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute. He has testi- fied with distinction before this committee. He wrote yesterday, and I quote: “Through no fault of the GAO's, the organization was sent on a fool's errand by Congress. Its mandate was not to evaluate progress in Iraq, but to determine whether or not the Iraq Gov- ernment had met the 18 benchmarks. As a result, as the report repeatedly notes, the GAO was forced to fit an extraordinarily complicated reality into a black and white yes or no sim- plicity.” Kagan continued, “One of the most striking things about the GAO report is its failure to take adequate notice of the Anbar awal the general movement within the Sunni Arab community against al-Qaeda in Iraq and toward the coalition. Anbar ap- 11 there is nothing in the report, as you have suggested by the bench- marks, that bring us even closer there, and the fact that you have only said out of 18, they have only met three, possibly partially four, and not met 11 at all, and then you have this very stark con- trast of what the administration is saying, that in itself says we have got a major, major problem, and a major disconnect between the reality lity on the ground and the lack of reality in the White House. Thank you. Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Boozman. Mr. Barrett. Mr. Fortenberry. Mr. Poe of Texas. Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate this hearing, having this hearing, and our witness before us. The question is: Where do we go from here? The question, seems to me, is not whether the GAO report or the military report is the most accurate. The question, based on all information, is: Do we stay or do we just go away? America has to resolve the issue of Iraq, and it seems to me success has never come from withdrawal, and I look forward to your comments. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LANTOS. Gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis. Mr. INGLIS. Mr. Chairman, when I was growing up, I used to tell m, you know, “I am in quite a scrape now," and she would say, “Well, if you hadn't done (such and so), Bob, we wouldn't be here." And I would say, “Yes, I know, but now we are in it.” It is really where we are, right? We are in a challenge. It is an American challenge. It is not a Democrat problem. It is not a Republican problem. It is an Amer- ican problem. And so I hope that here today we start a process of finding solutions to that American challenge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Chairman LANTOS. We are deeply grateful, Mr. Comptroller Gen- eral, for your work, for the outstanding job done by your staff, and we are anxious and eager to listen to you. The floor is yours. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID M. WALKER, COMP- TROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GOVERN- MENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, other members of this distinguished committee. I am pleased to be here to represent the outstanding work that our staff has done in con- nection with Iraq. This is my third hearing on Iraq. I have at least one more this week, and some member briefings as well. I think it is important to note several things at the outset: That we are reporting as required by law on the status of whether or not the Iraqi Government has met its commitments with regard to 18 benchmarks. We were required by law to do this. We were re- quired by law to report by September 1, so we didn't pick to report at a particular opportune time. We are doing what we were asked to do. Secondly, it is important to note that we were asked to note whether or not the status was met or not met on each of these 18 benchmarks. However, GAO must use its independent and profes- sional judgment, and in doing so we also want to try to be fair and 16 GAO United States Government Accountability Office Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m, EDT Wednesday, September 5, 2007 SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States GAO Accountability * Integrity * Reliability GAO-07-1222T 17 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committcc: I am plcascd to appear today to discuss our rcport' on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007? (the Act). Thc Act requires GAO to report on thc status of the achievement of thcsc benchmarks. Consistent with GAO's corc values and our desire to be fair and balanced, we also considered and used a "partially met" rating for some benchmarks. In comparison, thc Act requires the administration to report on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government actions needed to advancc reconciliation within Iraqi sociсty, improve the security of thc Iraqi population, providc csscntial scrvices to the population, and promote cconomic well-being. To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency and Traqi documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; thc Multi-National Forcc-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands; the Defcnsc Intclligcncc Agency: thc Central Intelligence Agency: thc National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General David H. Petracus, Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. We made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007. most recently from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximatcly 100 Iraq-rclatcd reports and testimonics that we have completed since May 2003. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Summary In summary, we found The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclcar whether thc Iraqi goverment will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of GAO, Iriqi Government llas Vor Adet Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks (GA0-07-1195) (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2007). 2Section 1314 of P.L. 110-28. Page 1 GAO-07-1222T 21 Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October 16, 2006. bin December 2006 the Multi-National Force-Iraq and government of Iraq agreed to establish the Joint Security Stations. GAO Assessment of the 18 Benchmarks As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially mct 4, and did not mcct 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, kcy legislation has not been passcd, violcncc remains high, and it is unclcar whcthcr thc Iraqi govcmmcnt will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. Page 3 GAO-07-1222T 25 Mixed Results in Achieving Security Benchmarks Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq's government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and climinating safc havcns for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have not been mct. The government has not eliminated militia control of local security, eliminated political intervention in military operations, ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable of independent opcrations, and ensured that political authoritics made no false accusations against security forces. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased a key security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure perpetrators' intents, and various other measures of population security from different sources show differing trends. As displayed in figure 4, average daily attacks against civilians have remained unchanged from February to July 2007 Page 9 GAO-07-1222T 27 Figure 5: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July 2007 Initial Benchmark Assessment Report assessment GAO Administration assessinent Benchmark 1. Forming a Constátutional Review Committee and then completing the conabtutional review, of progress 2. Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athstication. 3. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure 016 equilable distribution of hydrocarboi'i reaccés ole people of ling without regard to the sector ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing logislation to ensure that the energy 1 resources of trag benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other fragi citizens in an equitable manner. 4, Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form serni-autonomous regions. . 5. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections 6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty... 7. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such secunty forces aro accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq. & Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services commiktoos in support of the Baghdad security placi. 9. Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations. booooooooooooooooo 10. Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to exocute this pian and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation withi U.S. commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue ali extremists including Surn insurgents and Shiite militas, 11. Ensuring that the Iraqi Security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law. 12. Ensuring thal, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said "the Baghdad Security plan vil not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardtess of their sectarian or political affitiation." 13. Reducing the level of seclarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security 14. Eslablishing all of tho planned joint security stations in neighborioods across Baghdad. 15. fcroasing the number of traci secility forces units capable of operating independently 16. Ensuring that the righis of minority political parties in the Iraq legislature are protected. 17. Allocating and spending $10 bilion in fraqe revenues for reconstruction projects, including dekvery of essential services, on an equitable basis 18. Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making fatse accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces. Summary 2 nye are Eustacioxy Met Partially met Not met Satisfaclory 1 Mixed Unsatis'actory Sourca. GAO analysis of UN US and Ingi cala. According to the U.S. State Department, conditions are not present for these benchmarks. Page 11 GAO-07-1222T 41 progress is being made. Furthermore, you also need to consider fac- tors that aren't reflected by these benchmarks, some of which I have already talked about, in trying to understand what is the best way forward from here. Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me just say that it is at what cost that we consider the next steps? More American lives over and over again. So let me suggest that I think we can declare a military vic- tory, success story on the instructions given to our military starting in the spring of 2003, and with that yield the diplomacy and the further political reconciliation to the Iraqi Government and sur- rounding states. It is at what cost do we continue this path, and I think there is no basis for us to continue, and if we look at this report look at the maintaining of the sectarian violence, which is a major criteria for peace in Iraq. I thank the distinguished chairman. I think Mr. Walker for his testimony, and I yield back. Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake. Mr. FLAKE. I thank the chairman. I thank the witness. The surge was basically premised on the need to give the polit- ical actors in Iraq needed space to act and achieve a lot of what we outlined in the benchmarks. In your opinion, or in your report, do you feel that that is giving them that, or if security, or lack thereof, is the major hindrance, or is it something else? Mr. WALKER. Well, first, I think our military is performing bril- liantly. They are doing everything we ask them to do. They are making a difference. But again, they were a means to an end. Mr. FLAKE. Right. Mr. WALKER. They are not an end in and of themselves. Here- ofore, the progress that the military has made, our military work- ing in partnership with Iraq, has not resulted in significant polit- ical progress. Now, the question is: Will it over time? Some will tell you that the Iraqis right now might be able to pass some of this legislation but the price of passing that legislation might be a further alien- ation of the Sunnis, and I think that is something that you may well hear from Ambassador Crocker, and that is something that you need to keep in mind. So in the end, I think there is broad-based agreement that you must achieve a political accommodation in order to achieve unifica- tion if your objective is a unified Iraq that is stable within its bor- ders and can defend itself against its neighbors. I do think, as I said before, Mr. Flake, I think it is time to redefine what is suc- cess. What should our goals be? I am not telling you what they should be. What should they be? What should our roles and responsibilities be to achieve that? How can we ensure that we have incentives, transparency, and account- ability to make sure that we are making progress in connection with those goals and objectives? Mr. FLAKE. Let me just say for the record I think this is a valu- able report. I think Congress; we commissioned GAO to study a lot of things as the ranking minority member mentioned. Some are clear-cut. Some are as easy as the DAR program that we fund every year worthwhile. GAO comes back, says no, it isn't. We con- tinue to fund it. In fact, we raised the funding for it. It happens 46 be if not these 18 benchmarks? These were agreed upon as a part- as had been mentioned before-a political discussion that had taken place on the supplemental funding. They were supported by the administration. If you believe other priorities should be in- cluded or different benchmarks, I would like to hear what they should be. And I am glad to hear that you got to the bottom line on how do we define success and not victory, because the victory, I think, as had been mentioned again before, was achieved in 2003. There is no army to defeat here. There is no navy to sink. We are now in the middle of a sectarian civil war and we are asked to be the policeman on the street. So my eyes just roll when we have these discussions, which I think are political, on whether or not we maintain the surge indefi- nitely, which we know we can't because it has already been st lated. Both those in the Department of Defense and the Pentagon, as well as other experts, indicate that our limitations are fast ap- proaching with our ability to maintain our military commitment. he second false choice is surrender. We are not going to do that. We have a whole reason to be in the Middle East from Iran to the situations with Syria, with Israel and Palestine. We are going to be in that neighborhood for a long time as far as I can de- termine. So let us separate the political rhetoric in terms of these two false choices. We are not going to maintain the surge indefinitely and we are not going to surrender because we are going to be in the neighborhood for a long time. Let us begin to talk about, in a bipartisan fashion, where do we go from here. In that case, when I visited Iraq last year, and I would like to get your take on this, Mr. Walker, Prime Minister Maliki said then what he is saying now, and that is that his unity government is going to eliminate the militias to significantly reduce the violence, to get the economy going, and of course he is still saying that today and I have come to the conclusion he is either incapable or unwill- ing to do what needs to be done. So my question to you is about the role of this government, and part of the benchmarks speak to those roles. It is my sense in a part of the world where I hate to say this, but corruption, and we haven't talked about that yet here this afternoon, corruption in this country, in this part of the world is, if not a way of life, seems to be endemic. Having said that, it seems to me democracy as we look upon it and democracy as the Iraqis look on it is a totally different concept. I mean, I think for the Shia community democracy is a ve- hicle to regain power and wealth, and if I am a Sunni and I am looking at democracy and we are wondering how this government functions, it is a vehicle for paybacks when I was in charge. So I am wondering, do you think this democracy can work with this corruption that continues to be pervasive? Mr. WALKER. Corruption is a major problem in Iraq. Corruption is a problem in other countries in the region. Corruption is a prob- lem in other countries in the world. It is something that I have talked to my counterpart about both in Iraq on more than one occa- sion as well as here in the United States on more than one occa-