7T 4.F 76/1:IR 1/33 BEYOND THE SEPTEMBER REPORT: WHAT'S NEXT FOR IRAQ? JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION Pennsylvania State University Libraries SEPTEMBER 6, 2007 MAR - 5 2008 Serial No. 110–109 (Committee on Foreign Affairs) Serial No. 110–87 (Committee on Armed Services) Documents Collection U.S. Depository Copy Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2007 37-587PDF For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES IKE SKELTON, Missouri JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina DUNCAN HUNTER, California SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JIM SAXTON, New Jersey GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii TERRY EVERETT, Alabama SILVESTRE REYES, Texas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland VIC SNYDER, Arkansas HOWARD P. "BUCK” MCKEON, California ADAM SMITH, Washington MAC THORNBERRY, Texas LORETTA SANCHEZ, California WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California KEN CALVERT, California ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey W. TODD AKIN, Missouri SUSAN A. DAVIS, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia RICK LARSEN, Washington JEFF MILLER, Florida JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOE WILSON, South Carolina JIM MARSHALL, Georgia FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam TOM COLE, Oklahoma MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB BISHOP, Utah DAN BOREN, Oklahoma MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana JOHN KLINE, Minnesota NANCY BOYDA, Kansas CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania PHIL GINGREY, Georgia HANK JOHNSON, Georgia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa THELMA DRAKE, Virginia KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida KATHY CASTOR, Florida VACANCY ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Associate (III) day because I think I see General Jack Keane; I think I see Gen- eral John Batiste; and I think I see Secretary Bill Perry off in the distance. And we hope that your testimony in the speed of sound will reach us in a timely fashion this morning. This is a bit un- usual to have it. Gentlemen, we do thank you for being with us. Our committees are trying to get a clear picture of where the United States policy stands regarding Iraq and what path should be followed there. The testimony provided by the GAO yesterday made clear that, despite the valiant efforts of our military serving in that country, the Iraqi Government has not taken advantage of the opportunity to move toward true national reconciliation. And needless to say, to those of us who heard the testimony yesterday, it was quite disturbing news. It is not clear to me that this reality will change in the coming months. And I suspect General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will have insight on this question next week. But I will appreciate the witnesses today giving us their thoughts on the prospects for political progress in Iraq. Beyond this issue, I am struck with the fact that all three of our witnesses have experience leading the United States military and dealing with the strategic challenges posed by managing our forces. One of my pri- mary concerns, gentlemen, is considering the right way forward for involvement in Iraq and its impact on the effort of the overall read- iness of our forces, particularly on the ground forces. I am con- cerned that the current deployment schedules and overall strain on those serving pose a strategic risk, both now as well as in the fu- ture. We currently have over 160.000 American troops in Iraq patrol- ling the streets and fighting and dying on behalf of the Iraqis. I cannot tell you how much I, and I am sure other members of this committee, appreciate their sacrifice. We are doing the best we can. We simply cannot thank them enough. But to the extent that they are in Iraq, they are not free to carry out other missions. And these troops who are in Iraq are not in Afghanistan pursuing al-Qaeda who attacked us on September 11th. Looking ahead, gentlemen, we know that we cannot see around corners. The threats and miscalculations of tomorrow are not necessarily clear to us today. In my 30 years in Congress we have been in- volved in 12 military contingencies, some of which were major in size, most of which were not foreseen. And I am deeply concerned that our military will not be adequately prepared to prevail in the next conflict, which we don't see, we don't anticipate. But that was the case on some 12 occasions in the past 30 years. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my statement bé placed in the record in toto. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CON- GRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED FORCES The House Armed Services Committee has joined with the Foreign Affairs Com- mittee today to further our exploration of Iraq policy. For the members of the Armed Services Committee, this is the second of four hearings on the subject. I would like to thank Chairman Lantos for taking the lead on this hearing, and the witnesses for agreeing to appear. It's wonderful to see a panel of old friends with us today. Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony and for your service. In this respect, I would appreciate if our witnesses would com- ment on the findings of the NIE that state: “Over the next year, Tehran, concerned about a Sunni reemer- gence in Iraq and Ú.S. efforts to limit Iranian influence, will continue to provide funding, weaponry and training to Iraqi Shia militias.” And the IC now assesses that Damascus is providing support to non-AQI groups inside Iraq in a bid to increase Syrian influence. We must also be careful not to confuse long-term and short-term political progress. In the long term, a national unity government fairly representing all segments of Iraqi society will clearly help en- sure stability. However, in the short term, the assumption that a national unity government is required to pacify the Sunni insur- gency or to challenge Shia militias has turned out to be false. The Sunnis have turned against al-Qaeda and are gradually switching sides in the absence of any oil, federalism or de-Baathification deal coming out of Baghdad. The NIE notes: “Coalition military operations focused on improving population security, both in and outside of Baghdad, will remain critical to the success of local and regional efforts until sectarian fears are diminished enough to enable the Shia-led Iraqi Govern- ment to fully support the efforts of local Sunni groups.” Concurrently, there is evidence of an increasingly moderate Shia block within the central government emerging out of the conflict raging in the south of Iraq. Significant challenges remain, and no one should have anticipated that all of Iraq's problems would be solved by September 15th. The questions we must ask, therefore, and I would appreciate if our witnesses would elaborate on it, are: Has the new strategy succeeded in accomplishing the goals it set out to achieve up to this point, and are the trends positive or nega- tive? I thank the distinguished witnesses for appearing before us today, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to receiving their testi- mony. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. I am now pleased to turn to my good friend and fellow Californian, distinguished rank- ing member of the House Armed Services Committee, Duncan Hunter. Mr. HUNTER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. And what a nice thing to be here with my great chairman, Ike Skelton, and with you and Ms. Ros-Lehtinen and these two outstanding committees. I think this is the first time I have been in a hearing in this big room that accommodates so many people, so many people interested in this very, very critical issue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having the hearing. I want to thank my chairman, Mr. Skelton, for co-chairing this hearing. Mr. Chairman, I have exactly the opposite position, I think, going into this hearing on what I think you stated. The hallmark of the Inter- national Relations Committee and the hallmark of the Armed Serv- ices Committee and I think all committees whose work turns around the testimony of our men and women in uniform is that when people come and sit in that witness chair, as our witnesses do today, two distinguished retired generals and one distinguished former Secretary of Defense, their candor and their integrity is their trademark. And that is what makes us effective; being able to elicit testimony from people that have a lot of experience and a lot of insight and know that we are getting their testimony. Now, you stated a couple of minutes ago that this testimony that we are going to get from General Petraeus will not really be his testimony. I think that is wrong, Mr. Chairman. I think that the trademark of General Petraeus is his candor; the fact that Demo- crats and Republicans can ask him the tough ones and he tells it like it is, regardless of fear or favor. And I think that is the integ- rity and the candor that produced a near unanimous vote when he was confirmed. So the gentlelady to my right, the distinguished ranking member of the International Relations Committee, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, said, "What is the purpose of this hearing?” I hope the purpose of this hearing is not to discredit General Petraeus be- fore he takes a stand. We have all been, over the last 4 years or so as the Iraq operation has unfolded, we have all interacted with former members of the United States military. And I, myself, find myself tempted at times, when people who have worn the uniform don't agree with me, I like to refer to them as "armchair generals,” and then when they agree with me they are “retired statesmen.” And they probably have the same opinion of me. But they are an enormous asset. The two gentlemen sitting in front of us, who have distinctly dif- ferent opinions on this issue, are an enormous asset to this coun- try. Similarly, General Petraeus coming to this body with integrity, with candor, with insight and, most importantly, with war-f capability, is an enormous asset for this country. And I just abso- lutely disagree with your description of this testimony to come as somehow not being his own testimony. Maybe that is a first ques- tion we should ask him. Mr. Chairman, I have looked at these benchmarks with respect to political activity by the Iraqi Government, a government which has freshly stood up, which is clumsy, as most new governments are. But there are a couple of metrics that I didn't see. O was the 74 percent reduction in violence against civilians. One was the reduction of attacks in Anbar province from 1,350 last October to one-fifth of that today. I didn't see any slot for that metric to be manifested. And from my perspective, the most important ele- ment in a successful transition of the security burden in Iraq is this: A reliable Iraqi military; a reliable Iraqi military that can ro- tate into the battlefield and displace American heavy combat forces and allow our forces after they have made that hand-off, to come back to the United States or go elsewhere in CENTCOM where they are needed. Now, I can recall a couple of years ago when my son was in Fallujah and I was out there talking to a couple of his friends and at the first battle of Fallujah, those Marines had brought in some Iraqi forces, brand new green forces, to participate in that battle. And they didn't show up for formation the next day. But when I was there the last time, they not only showed up for forma- By June, the full complement of about 30,000 additional troops were operational in Iraq. Based on reports already available, it ap- pears to me that there are three positive developments in Iraq. First, wherever American troops are present and patrolling in force, violence does subside. This is a great tribute to the courage, discipline and unit cohesion of our troops. But it has come at a cost of almost 2,000 American casualties this summer. Second, violence continues to be at relatively low levels in Kurdistan as the Kurds have managed to stay largely apart from the sectarian violence that has plagued the mixed sectarian regions in central Iraq and the struggle for control between Shia tribes in southern Iraq. And third, a new dynamic had been developing in the Sunni re- gions in the Al Anbar province. A little over a year ago, Sunni trib- al leaders began cooperating with Americans in fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq, which previously had gained a strong foothold in that re- gion. The decision of the Sunni tribal leaders not only has resulted in effective actions against al-Qaeda forces but also in reduced at- tacks against American forces in Al Anbar. All of these are positive developments. The first of them is di- rectly related to the surge. The second is largely unrelated to the surge. And the third was well under way before the surge began. But the additional American forces sent to Al Anbar have likely ac- celerated its progress. But the surge was intended to buy time for actions taken by the Iraqi Government to strengthen their security forces and to effect political reconciliation. So it is fair to ask: How well have they made use of that time, and how much more time will they need? The ĞAO report released earlier this week painted a discour- aging picture of how well the Iraqi Government has made use of their breathing space. Of the benchmarks established well over a year ago by the Iraqi Government, a progress they themselves thought necessary, only a few of the 18 have been met with little or no progress on what I consider the most important of these benchmarks, those that are intended to effect a reconciliation be- tween Shias and Sunnis. If this reconciliation cannot be achieved, all of the progress made at great cost this past summer could be overturned. In particular, the strengthening of the Sunni tribal mi- litias in Al Anbar, which are an important asset in the present fight against al-Qaeda, could become a liability if they were to be turned against Shia militia or even against Iraqi Government forces. These and other negative developments can be prevented as long as there is a strong American military presence. But that raises a fundamental question: How much longer can American forces be kept at or near present levels in Iraq without damaging the readiness of our ground forces? I estimate that if present ground force levels are maintained into next year, they can only be achieved through substantial changes in personnel policies such as further extending deployments, recall- ing guard forces that have already served, or reducing training be- tween deployments. A combination of those policies maintained during the coming year could do substantial damage to our ground forces. 10 It took many years after the Vietnam War to build up our ground forces into the best trained, most effective force in the world, and it could take many years to recover that capability if we were to lose it. Given the uncertain world in which we live, any substantial loss in capability of our ground forces could reduce our capability to deal with plausible military contingencies, while at the same time making those contingencies more likely Next week the Congress will get a report on the surge strategy, including a report from General Petraeus. Let me say that I have no doubt that General Petraeus is an outstanding military officer and is carrying out a well-conceived military strategy in Iraq. But solutions to the violence in Iraq cannot be military alone, nor can they be coming from coalition forces alone. The Iraqi ( Government must be taking political actions on an urgent time scale. And a heavy American military commitment in Iraq cannot be sustained many more months without taking serious risks of reducing the ca- pability of our ground forces, thereby making them less capable of meeting other security problems we face. While it is possible at some future date to make increases in the level of American ground troops, that resource is fixed today and for some time to come. Therefore, we have to choose what risks to take when we determine how to use that resource. We can state rith some confidence the risks to American security if our troop readiness suffers because we have maintained large troop levels in Iraq through 2008. We cannot state with the same confidence the risks to American security if the level of violence in Iraq increases as we begin troop reductions early in 2008. But in the absence of real progress in political reconciliation in Iraq, the level of violence in Iraq is likely to increase whether we begin those reductions 5 months from now or 5 years from now. Let me state that, again, since it is my principal point here: In the absence of real progress in political reconciliation, the level of violence is likely to increase whether we begin those reductions 5 months from now or 5 years from now. Consequently, I suggest that after hearing the Iraq progress re- port next week, that Congress should ask the following questions: First, since the surge began earlier this year, how well has the Iraqi Government used the breathing space it provided? Secondly, how much longer will the coalition forces be needed to provide breathing space for the Iraqi Government? Third, in order to achieve American goals in Iraq, how much longer will American forces be needed at or near present levels in Iraq? Fourth, is the readiness level of American contingency forces today adequate to meet plausible contingencies? And finally, if present or near present levels of troops are needed in 2008 in Iraq, how will the replacement forces be provided, and what will that do to the readi- ness levels of our contingency forces? I believe the continuing congressional support for the surge strat- egy should be based on the answers to those questions and the con- sidered evaluation of how well this strategy meets global American security requirements. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Perry follows:] 12 capability of our ground forces, thereby making them less capable of meeting other security problems we face. While it is possible that at some future date the US will make increases in the level of American ground troops, that resource is fixed today and for some time to come; therefore we have to choose what risks to take when we determine how to use that resource. We can estimate with some confidence the risk to American secu- rity if our troop readiness suffers because we maintained large troop levels in Iraq through 2008. We cannot estimate with the same confidence the risk to American security if the level of violence in Iraq increases as we begin significant troop reduc- tions early in 2008, as recommended by the Iraq Study Group. But, in the absence of real progress in political reconciliation in Iraq, the level of violence is likely to increase whether we begin those reductions five months from now or five years from now. Consequently, I suggest that, after hearing the Iraq progress report next week, the Congress should ask the following questions • Since the surge began earlier this year, how well has the Iraqi government used the breathing space it provided? • How much longer will coalition forces be needed to provide breathing space for the Iraqi government? • In order to achieve American goals in Iraq, how much longer will American forces be needed at or near present levels in Iraq? Is the readiness level of American contingency forces today adequate to meet plausible military contingencies? • If present or near-present levels of troops are needed in 2008 in Iraq, how will the replacement forces be provided, and what will this do to the readiness levels of our contingency forces? I believe that continuing Congressional support for the surge strategy should be based on the answers to those questions, and a considered evaluation of how well this strategy meets overall American security requirements. Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. Our next witness is Major General John Batiste, who retired from the U.S. Army in November 2005 and had 31 years of military service. Between August 2002 and June 2005, General Batiste com- manded the First Infantry Division, conducting peace enforcement operations in Bosnia, and combat operations in Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II. In Iraq, his division included 22,000 soldiers from active and Reserve components from all over the United States. General Batiste is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and the Army War College. He holds a master's degree in financial management from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. General Batiste, we are delighted to have you, and the floor is yours. STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL JOHN BATISTE, USA, RE- TIRED, PRESIDENT, KLEIN STEEL SERVICES, INCOR- PORATED General BATISTE. Thank you Mr. Chairman. As an American citizen, it is an honor to be here today, and it is a distinct pleasure to be on a panel with two gentlemen for which I have enormous respect. On 27 of June of this year, I testi- fied that our national security for the global war on terror lacks strategic focus; our Army and Marine Corps, at a breaking point with little to show for it. The current surge in Iraq is too little too Iraq is incapable of stepping up to their responsibilities. Our Nation has yet to mobilize to defeat this very serious threat with implications well beyond Iraq and it is past time to refocus our national strategy in the Middle East. 13 Since late June, with the exception of the outstanding perform- ance by our military, nothing has changed. Our troops are mired in the complexity of a brutal civil war and we have lost sight of the broader objective of defeating worldwide Islamic extremism. The Iraqi Government is ineffective and exhibits no inclination or capacity to reconcile the Rubik's Cube that defines Iraq. Years ago I was taught that a military organization should only be used for its intended purpose and only within its capabilities. Our Government has yet to articulate a focused Middle East strat- egy and the military is operating with an ill-defined purpose well beyond current capabilities. Our leaders apparently do not appre- ciate that only Iraqis can sort out Iraqi problems and only Islam can defeat Islamic extremism. A successful national strategy in Iraq is akin to a four-legged stool with legs representing diplomacy, political consideration, economic recovery and the military. The glue holding it all together must be the mobilization of the United States in support of the incredibly important work to defeat world- wide Islamic extremism. The only leg on the stool of any con- sequence today is the military. The best in the world, solid tita- nium, high performing. After almost 6 years since September 11th, however, our country is not mobilized behind this important work and the diplomatic, po- litical and economic legs are inconsequential and lack leadership. Most Americans now appreciate that the military alone cannot solve the problems in Iraq. The administration failed to call the Nation to action in the wake of 9/11 and is now virtually dependent on the military leg of the stool to accomplish the mission, and has yet to frame the solutions in Iraq within the broader context of the region to include Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Syria and Jordan. In this situation, the stool will surely collapse. Indeed victory in Iraq is relative in an environment where tac- tical victories can quickly become irrelevant. The real measure of success is whether or not one can venture out at night alone with- out an armed escort. The perceived successes in Iraq today are taken out of context and overstated at best. Despite the unbeliev- able performance of our military, the current surge in Iraq is too little too late. The so-called surge really amounted to nothing more than a minor reinforcement, a number which represented all that our military could muster at the time. Our counterinsurgency doc- trine requires 20 soldiers for every 1,000 in the indigent popu- lation. Assuming there are 6 or 7 million people in Baghdad, the requirement to properly secure the city as a precursor to the rule of law would be over 120,000 combat troops. There are less than 80,000 combat troops in all of Iraq today, even with the surge. What we are seeing is the myth of Sisyphus being played out over and over again. Today's battles in places like Baghdad and Ba'qubah are not new. We have been down this road before but lack the number of coalition and competent Iraqi forces to clear, hold and build. The number of combat troops matter and we have never had the right numbers. Further, success in a counterinsurgency is more about relation- ships, improving people's quality of life, and the hard work to change people's attitudes to give them alternatives to the insur- 14 gency and less about the application of lethal force. Numbers mattered in March 2003 and they matter today. The current administration drove this Nation to war without the military planning and capability required to be successful. Sec- tarian violence continues despite the surge that was supposed to calm Baghdad and set the conditions for national reconciliation. The number of Iraqi civilian deaths in July 2007 was higher than in February 2007 when the surge began. Shia are now dominant in the once mixed capital, a trend that will not be reversed. The coalition is abandoning Basra to a number of militant Shia groups. We are arming and equipping Sunni militant groups in the Anbar province, which is risky at best, equivalent to sticking a sharp stick in the eye of the Shia. Rival Shia militias have killed scores of Iraqis in recent months. At worst, the surge has had little effect on country-wide violence. At best, Iraq is in a holding pattern de- pendent on the United States military to control the violence. This is a no-win situation. When the surge culminates, and culminate it will, the civil war will intensify. The current Government of Iraq is incapable of step- ping up to its responsibilities. According to the recent GAO report, the Maliki government is meeting only 3 of 18 military and polit- ical goals set by our Congress for Iraq. These benchmarks include tough milestones dependent on reconciliation. With respect to the Government of Iraq's responsibility to increase a number of Iraqi security force units capable of operating independently, we ignore the reality that, historically, armed forces in the region have been perpetually ineffective due to sectarian divides, social factors deep- Īy rooted in Arab culture to include secrecy and paranoia, crippling class differences and no individual freedom of action or initiative. Why would we think our efforts in the 21st century would be any different than other nations' efforts in past centuries? Further, the world has committed inadequate resources to build effective Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi Army and police still require heavy weap- ons, helicopters, counter-IED technology, light-armored vehicles and radar-assisted counter battery artillery to control the insur- gency. The Iraqi security forces have taken horrendous casualties but they do not have the tools to replace United States combat for- mations. Whether we can trust these Iraqi formations is another question. Our experience over the past 4 years is that most Iraqi formations will either not show up for the fight or will not hold their ground in the face of the insurgent for a myriad of reasons. America has ignored the lessons of history. The Bush administra- tion strategy lacks focus. General John Sheehan said it best when he recently said, “There is no agreed upon strategic view of the Iraq problem or the region.” The current Washington decision-mak- ing process lacks a linkage to a broader view of the region and how the parts fit together strategically. Our current Iraqi measures of effectiveness fell deep into the details of Iraq's national reconcili- ation and de-Baathification. These measures are incredibly impor- tant for Iraq but may matter little to United States strategic inter- ests in defeating al-Qaeda. When and how will we complete the work in Afghanistan and root out the terror networks in other parts of the world like northern Pakistan? Indeed, history will rate Iraq as a side show that is diluting our focus. Through most of this 17 [The prepared statement of General Batiste follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL JOHN BATISTE, USA, RETIRED, PRESIDENT, KLEIN STEEL SERVICES, INCORPORATED On 27 June of this year, I testified that our national strategy for the global war on terror lacks strategic focus; our Army and Marine Corps are at a breaking point with little to show for it; the current "surge” in Iraq is too little, too late; the Gov- ernment of Iraq is incapable of stepping up to their responsibilities; our nation has yet to mobilize to defeat a very serious threat with implications well beyond Iraq; and it is past time to refocus our national strategy in the Middle East. Since late June, with the exception of the outstanding performance by our military, nothing has changed. Our troops are mired in the complexity of a brutal civil war and we have lost sight of the broader objective of defeating world-wide Islamic extremism. The Iraqi government is ineffective and exhibits no inclination or capacity to rec- oncile the Rubrics Cube that defines Iraq. Years ago, I was taught that a military organization should only be used for its intended purpose, and only within its capa- bilities. Our government has yet to articulate a focused Middle East strategy and the military is operating with an ill-defined purpose, well beyond current capabili- ties. Our leaders apparently do not appreciate that only Iraqi's can sort out Iraqi problems and only Islam can defeat Islamic extremism. The following testimony will address the current strategy, the status of the surge, the impact of sustained deploy- ments on our military, and the way-ahead. A successful national strategy in Iraq is akin to a four legged stool with legs rep- resenting diplomacy, political reconciliation, economic recovery, and the military. The glue holding it all together must be the mobilization of the United States in support of the incredibly important work to defeat world-wide Islamic extremism. The only leg on the stool of any consequence today is the military—the best in the world, solid titanium and high performing. After almost six years since September 11, however, our country is not mobilized behind this important work and the diplo- matic, political, and economic legs are inconsequential and lack leadership. Most Americans now appreciate that the military alone cannot solve the problems in Iraq. The administration failed to call the nation to action in the wake of 9–11, is now virtually dependent on the military leg of the stool to accomplish the mission, and has yet to frame the solutions in Iraq within the broader context of the region, to include Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Syria, and Jordan. In this situation, the stool will surely collapse. Indeed, “victory” in Iraq is relative in an environment where tactical victories can quickly become irrelevant. The real measure of success is whether or not one can venture out at night, alone, without an armed escort. The perceived successes in Iraq today are taken out of context and overstated at best. Despite the unbelievable performance of our military, the current "surge” in Iraq is too little, too late. The so-called surge really amounted to nothing more than a minor reinforcement, a number which represented all that our military could muster at the time. Our counter insurgency doctrine requires 20 soldiers for every 1,000 in the indigent population. Assuming there are 6 or 7 million people in Baghdad, the requirement to properly secure the city as a precursor to the rule of law would be over 120,000 “combat” troops. There are less than 80,000 “combat” troops in Iraq today, even with the surge. What we are seeing is the myth of Sisyphus being played out over and over again. Today's battles in places like Baghdad and Ba'qubah are not new—we have been down this road before, but lacked the number of coalition and competent Iraqi forces to clear, hold, and build. The number of "combat” troops matter and we have never had the right numbers. Further, success in a counter insurgency is more about relationships, improving the people's quality of life, and the hard work to change people's attitudes to give them alternatives to the insurgency, and less about the application of lethal force. Numbers mattered in March 2003 and they matter today. The current administration drove this nation to war without the military planning and capability required to be successful. Sec- tarian violence continues despite the surge that was supposed to calm Baghdad and set the conditions for national reconciliation. The number of Iraqi civilians killed in July 2007 was higher than in February 2007 when the surge began. Shia now domi- nate the once mixed capital, a trend that will not be reversed. The coalition is aban- doning Basra to a number of militant Shia groups. We are arming and equipping Sunni militant groups in the Anbar province which is risky at best, equivalent to sticking a sharp stick in the eye of the Shia. Rival Shia militias have killed scores of Iraqis in recent months. At worst, the surge has had little effect on country-wide violence. At best, Iraq is in a holding pattern, dependent on the US military to con- trol the violence. This is a no-win situation. When the surge culminates, and cul- minate it will, the civil war will intensify. ight, alone context and renes" surgere than a Assuminacy, doctriesented an unted to urrent stated at behe 21 to make some political progress after we are able to provide some economic assistance; and also to buy some time for the Iraqi secu- rity forces. It is not a military solution to the problem in Iraq. It was never intended to be a military solution. It is intended to buy time. The time we are talking about is 12–18 months. There has never been any mystery to this. That is the reality of it. The Presi- dent, I don't think, ever said that. But it was well known to those of us who were dealing with this that this mission was going 12– 18 months, that is it. It was always temporary. . So, sometime in 2008, those forces are coming back to 2006 lev- els, pre-surge levels. That is the reality of it. The issue is: In that period of time, could we accomplish what we set out to do and make some progress so that we could stop that violence and assist the country economically and also in making its political reconcili- ation? And that is at heart the issue here. And you are going to get some pretty frank, direct and very honest answers from Gen- eral Petraeus and certainly Ambassador Crocker, who I have spent a lot of time with. I just returned from a 2-week visit to Iraq and I had been there for 2 weeks in May and 2 weeks in February. The characterizations of my visits are, I spent time with Iraqi and United States officials to be sure, both military and civilian. I spent most of my time on the street. Maybe that is because I grew up on the streets of New York, I don't know, but I am comfortable on the street. So I spend most of my time with the Iraqi people and why—I get all the briefings that you get. But the only way I can judge what is happening is what is happening to the lives of the people; to the women, the children, the grandparents, and what is going on out there in their lives. And that is where my time is and that is where my focus is. So what do I think is happening? Where are we now? Well, I be- lieve there has been remarkable progress. Some of it is quite un- foreseen, to be frank about it, and we have had some disappoint- ments to be sure, and we have got plenty of challenges remaining. We are on the offensive. The enemy was on the offensive in 2006; we were on the defense in 2006. We are on the offensive, and we have momentum. I want to make six points about where we are, and the first one is that security has dramatically improved, not just a little bit, it has dramatically improved. The trends—and the Generals will tell you this, but you can see it as well—the trends are all moving in the right direction. The number of attacks is down. Sectarian killings: 75 percent reduction since 2006. Suicide car bombs are coming down. We knew U.S. casualties would go up because we are conducting a counteroffensive. Normandy was a counteroffensive. Incheon, Korea, was a counteroffensive. The island campaigns in the Pacific were a counteroffensive. When you conduct a counteroffensive, cas- ualties are going to go up because you are on the offensive. We knew that was going to happen. Now the U.S. casualties are starting to come down. We knew they eventually would, and certainly, we would like that to be a trend. We will see. It has been going on for a couple of months. We will see if it is a trend. Our judgment tells us that, over time, this will continue to come down. 26 - terms of what the Sunnis are doing and the conversion that is tak- ing place. Chairman LANTOS. General Keane, could you try to wind up? General KEANE. I will wind up. I will wind up. Chairman LANTOS. Because I want to give equal time to all of our witnesses and I want to get to my colleagues who have ques- tions. General KEANE. I will wind up here. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. There is risk to this operation, for sure, and that risk is that these people can flip back to where they were, but it is much hard- er to do, obviously, given where they are in their involvement in the government and the fact that we have I.D.s on all of them. The Maliki government and some people in this Government are para- noid about this because they think this is just a strategic pause that the Sunnis are doing so they can eventually take over the state. Who knows if that is true or not? I think there will be attempts to take over the state in Iraq for years to come, but we should not turn a deaf ear to this and we should take advantage of it and use the opportunity it presents. That is for sure. The Shia militia in Iraq is still a problem; make no mistake about it. And we are concerned about the Iranian influence. We are concerned about the fact that they are still killing U.S. forces. We are concerned about the sectarian influence in the government and also in the police. A brief word about the Iraqi security forces—and I know General Jones will be here this afternoon, and he will be able to elaborate on it for sure. In my judgment, the Iraqi Army has really made some progress. Ask General Petraeus when the last time was that an Iraqi unit has been a combat refusal in Iraq. Ask him that ques- tion. I am not sure what the answer is, but I think it has been a long time. The Iraqi Army is improving. It has serious logistic infrastruc- ture problems. It has a shortage of leaders, but the progress is real. Look, the transition is already taking place. The Iraqi Army es- sentially runs northern Iraq. I am not talking about the Kurdish region. I am talking about up in Mosul, in that area up there. They are in charge, and we are in a very support role. We are going to pull out of Anbar province here, you know, pretty soon, and they will take charge in Anbar province. And they are in charge in the south. And we have problems in the south and they need to be reinforced to mitigate the British's leaving and some of the challenges that are taking place there. But they are going to be in charge there, and I think they will be able to handle it, with some additional Iraqi special operation forces. In the central region, where the problem is, in Baghdad and in the suburbs, our leaders have plans to transition there. And they want to do that deliberately and methodically based on what the enemy situation is there and also on the capacities of the Iraqis. I think this is a good-news story. It is moving in the right direction. The national police are fundamentally broke—the national police, nine brigades. You know, they fired all nine brigade commanders and 17 of the 24 battalion commanders, and they are still broke after all of that. And I am not sure what the answer is. I think 30 My main concern, gentlemen, is the future. Someday, we will solve Iraq. It may not be pretty and it may work out that we may be very, very lucky, but we do not know what is around the corner. We could not anticipate 11 of the 12 military contingencies we have had in the last 30 years, and, sure as God made little green apples, we are going to have some in the future. It is, hopefully, a long way away. But I am truly concerned about the readiness of our forces both in training and in numbers and in equipment, to handle any un- fores heaven forbid, military contingency. They are out there, and I do not want to even guess as to what they would be. My question of each of you is: Given the present efforts in Iraq, how strained will our forces continue to be that (A) undermine our efforts in Afghanistan to complete the job, the very difficult job, of the terrorists and the Taliban, and (B) to be prepared for those un- foreseen military contingencies that will come to pass? I would ask each of you to comment on that, please. Mr. PERRY. Mr. Chairman, I think we are not now adequately prepared with adequate readiness levels for the kind of contin- gencies you are envisioning. And if we maintain the size of the de- ployment in Iraq through 2008, we will be less prepared. I believe we need to do two things: Phase down the deployment in Iraq and begin the retraining of our forces and, secondly, we have a big due bill on getting our equipment back to an acceptable state of readiness. And both of these need to be focused on in order for us to meet our global contingencies in the world. General BATISTE. Mr. Chairman, in my view, and based on con- tinuous and frequent feedback from a number of soldiers and Ma- rines of all ranks, our current capability will not sustain the strat- egy much longer. We need to be worried about this. The Active component has serious problems. The Reserve compo- nent has even more serious problems. None of us should be content with deploying pickup teams. Pickup teams; that violates a prin- ciple that none of us should walk away from. Unit integrity is im- portant and we have driven our army to do things that I, years ago, would never have done. We have a range of strategic issues out there that we are not prepared to deal with. So I think this is a serious, serious issue. And it gets back to the idea that we do not have the means to do the current strategy. So it is time to rethink our strategy. What an opportunity to rethink a strategy and finally end up with something that is truly focused, not only regionally but glob- ally, to accomplish what we are trying to do, to turn off the myopic approach that we have on Iraq today and get serious about fin- ishing this thing successfully. I am not advocating defeat at all; I want to win this thing. But let us not violate our doctrine and principles of war when we do it. Mr. SKELTON. General Keane? General KEANE. Yes, well, the fact is, I mean, we are fighting two wars, one in Afghanistan and one in Iraq. And obviously, the one in Iraq is at a vastly different scale, and, as a result of fighting two wars simultaneously, our military is being stressed, as it has 34 egui I have looked at the figures and have reviewed them for a decade and a half now, since you were Secretary of Defense in the 1990s, and compared the modernization of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Armed Forces in those days and today. Now, in the 1990s, you averaged in your request to Congress about $45 billion to $48 billion DoD-wide for modernization, for new equipment. The CBO, at our request, told us what they thought needed to be purchased each year simply to replace the old and keep the inventory at a modest state of moderniza- tion. The CBO's analysis was that we needed to be spending $90 billion a year and that the shortfall was approximately $42 billion. At the last of your tenure, you went slightly over $50 billion but still leaving the shortfall at around $40 billion per year. That translated into what General Schoomaker, the recent Chief of Staff of the Army, called the “holes in the yard” of the 1990s. Now, today, we are spending in excess of $90 billion a year on modernization. That means we are meeting at least the metric that the CBO sent us in those days. And so, the first observation I would have is that there did not seem to be a problem with having a 50-percent modernization deficit during the 1990s, and yet, that is being used as a comparison, as an example, of a time of relative readiness for the United States Armed Forces. Now, General Batiste, I looked at your statistic when you said, in an apocalyptic sense, we are having to recruit 42-year-old pri- vates. We just looked at the statistics, and of the 80,000 Army re- cruits over the last 2 years, only 653 of them are over the age of 35. Now, that has led to a pool's being established in which we have got $1 wagers, and one of our members says that he thinks there is no more than five members of the U.S. Army who were re- cruited who were over 42. My wager is that there are at least 10. And I want to let you know, if you want to get in on that, you can. But that is not an example of the 80,000 members of the U.S. Army who were recruited, nor is it an illustration of a bad policy in Iraq. My question would be to General Keane as to a point that I think is the most important issue, at least from my perspective, and that is the reliability of the Iraqi battalions. And I would ask the other gentlemen to comment on this if you would like to. We have 129 Iraqi battalions. We now have a couple more that are stood up, trained and equipped. Please give me, General Keane, your take from your last review of the competency of the Iraqi forces and whether they are being sufficiently rotated into battle - because, as you know, some of them have been stationed in benign areas that have not had a lot of conflict—whether they are being rotated into battle on a fairly even basis so that all of them are get- ting 3 or 4 months' combat experience, if you will, where they can shake out their logistics capability and reinforce their chain of com- mand and, basically, develop military competency. Lastly, General Keane—and I would ask the other gentlemen to comment on this, but I think this is a good question for you, too. We talk about readiness, and that question has different meanings to different people. The implication is—and it is certainly true on paper—that a military division which has never left the confines of 41 have identified today the successes with the Army. I am concerned, obviously, with your estimation with the leaks of other reports about the police, but it has always been my hope for the training of the security forces of Iraq in what is the exit strategy. Can you review again—and I particularly appreciated your com- ments about the Iraqis being in the lead in various parts of the country, but, if you could, be specific about that. Indeed, I had a son serve in southern Iraq. He went on convoys across country, but he is proud of his service and I am proud of it. I am proud of our military. General KEANE. Yes. Thank you. Going back to the comment that you made about the overall strategy in Iraq and its criticality in not losing, regardless of what I think our views are as to whether we should have gone to war in Iraq and what our reasons were at the time, we are very much past all of that. But from the enemy's perspective, the fact that we are in Iraq and it is attempting to establish a fledgling democracy that has some representation of its people, that reality is a dagger to the heart of radical Islam, and the al-Qaeda being one of those instruments. Why is that? Because it is capitalism and democracy that they fear the most. Those big ideas are the ideas that can defeat them, and they know that. And that is why they have declared this being priority one in Iraq, because of what the threat is to their big idea and to their ideology and to the caliphate that they want to estab- lish in the region. To plant that flag of a representative democracy right there in an Arab nation is a huge threat to them, and so they are coming after this with everything they can. The good news is we have made some real progress against these guys, and they have lost their major sanctuaries, and they are on the defensive, and they are on the run. So that is the good news. The other thing is, in reference to the Iraqis' performance again, we have pulled out our forces, by and large, out of Mosul, which was a major area. There is still some al-Qaeda presence in that area, and there has been some other Sunni insurgent activity in that area as well. And the Iraqis are in the lead in that entire re- gion in that area, and we are in a support role. They run the oper- ations day-in and day-out. The British in the south are turning over to the 10th Iraqi Divi- sion operations in the south. They have trained them. They have prepared them for it, and they believe they are ready to deal with it. The British, as you know, are pulling There are problems in the south, nonetheless, and some of those problems are serious because the Shia gangs are fighting one an- other. But it still is an example of the Iraqis taking over. And they have to be reinforced because that 10th Division cannot handle it, particularly with the Brits pulling back the way they are. I do foresee it happening in Anbar province here in the near fu- ture, probably pretty soon, where we will pull back and the Iraqis will be given much more responsibility and probably be in the lead. There are places right now in the central region, where we are most concerned about, in Baghdad and in the suburbs around Baghdad. 50 Mr. PERRY. Just a quick comment. I agree with your statement of agreements. I think you summed that up very well indeed, and I think you have also focused on the right questions. They are very difficult questions to answer. The first step in getting the right answers is to articulate what the right questions are, and I think you have done a very good job at it. Thank you. Chairman LANTOS. General Batiste. General BATISTE. I also would say the same thing, where do we go from here? Again, it is a new strategy focused on the region. Many of the answers come from the combatant commander. But most of them come from an interagency process here in Wash- ington that, to date, has been largely ineffective—not focused, no unity of effort, no one person in charge to support the combatant commander in the field. But once we develop quickly the right strategy to move forward, out of that will fall the military tasks that are necessary to accom- plish. We are in a position now where we can't sustain the current cycle of deployments much longer without doing some serious dam- age to our military, in my view. Chairman LANTOS. General Keane. General KEANE. I think, after 2008, assuming that the progress that we are making now, we are continuing to make that progress in 2008, and in 2008 we are at least at the pre-surge levels, around 130,000, I think if you looked at Iraq during 2008, what you would see is, we would be pulling our United States forces away from the extremities north, west and south and other coalition forces, and we would be focusing in the center, Baghdad and the suburbs. And then in 2009 we would transition in that central region, as well, to Iraqis; maybe not all of it, but probably most of it, I would imagine. And, to me, the al-Qaeda threat, given where it is and where I think it is going in the next 6 months, in and of itself would never justify a sizable force level to deal with the al-Qaeda threat, given where it is heading. That would be something that the Iraqis would be able to handle themselves. We would have more forces committed to the training of Iraqis than we would to the fighting of al-Qaeda. And we have developed their special operations forces, and they are a very good force by the way. And I think that they would be able to transition with our own operational forces to be able to take over that. So we would be moving from a lead role to one of a partnering role in 2008 to a supporting role in 2009. That would be the way I would characterize it. Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Cole of Oklahoma. Mr. COLE. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman. I would be re- miss not to begin by just thanking both of you gentlemen and obvi- ously Secretary Perry for your service and the amount of time you have given us today. Even though I know there are differences be- een you, I know how much you respect one another. And all of you here, we appreciate your service to our country. So thank you extraordinarily much. I am like Mr. Snyder. I think there are actually a number of areas of agreement here in terms of sort of the rhythm of what is 54 erybody sympathized with us. They were all ready to go to Afghani- stan with us to get al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, who destroyed our country with the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon and bringing down our plane that was lost in Pennsylvania. I supported that. But this other war that we decided to go in, we could have had al-Qaeda, we could have had Osama bin Laden, we could have wiped out the extremists if we had put all of these assets into Af- ghanistan rather than to go and decide to start a war in Iraq. And so I think that our whole policy was so flawed because we could have won this war in Afghanistan 3 years ago probably—even be- fore that if we had put all the concentration into Afghanistan like every American and every country around the world was almost ready to do that with us. Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Smith. Mr. SMITH OF WASHINGTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair- man, and thank you for convening this very important hearing. And thank you to the two gentlemen for their service and for tak- ing so much of their time today to talk with us. I do have a couple of questions, and I would urge some caution, General Batiste, in making, in my opinion, what are sweeping and damning statements with regards to the Government of Iraq, say- ing that it is incapable of stepping up to its responsibilities. I would point out that coalition governments, even mature democ- racies, strugglelook at Italy, ask the Israelis, ask others. When governments fall, when members of the cabinet resign, it is almost the nature of a coalition government to have that kind of discord- ance. When you say 60 percent of the people didn't show up on the first day, the members or delegates, members of their Parliament, the question is: Why? Did they have trouble getting there, what was on the agenda? We have trouble getting our members back un- less we have votes scheduled. There are some issues that should not be it needs more context, I think. And also when you say that the GAO report, the Maliki govern- ment is meeting only 3 of the 18 military and political goals, that is true; but you leave out that 4 are partially met according to the GAO. And some, frankly—and I would hope you would give some answer to this—perhaps at the time we should wait and they should be layered. For example, I wonder what you would think about amnesty. Two thousand five hundred people were let out in June, or in 2006, but now the better side of prudence would dictate that an amnesty program should be part of a reconciliation program. So while tech- nically that is an unmet benchmark, perhaps it should not be met. Look at the Northern Irish situation. Amnesty came after the reconciliation, after the Good Friday agreement. There needs to be, I think, a juxtaposition of when things should happen, and delay is not denial. And yet the sweeping statement, the big headline, that only 3 out of 18 are being met has a great deal of surface ap- peal, but it is not very illuminating in terms of the situation on the ground; and, again, you left out the 4 that are partially met. 58 protecting the people in a way that we never did in any holistic fashion for the 3-plus years prior to that that has brought this vio- lence down. And it is not just our commitment; it is also the Iraqi's commit- ment. And overshadowing this is, the Iraqi forces did show up in Baghdad when they were supposed to and, by and large, in the numbers they were supposed to, which did not happen in the past. General BATISTE. Part of the answer is to lead. I think the world expects the United States to lead, to work a regional solution that is supported by friends and allies worldwide, to put the responsi- bility on the regional actors to find solutions: A special envoy, sup- port of moderate Islamic governments, working relationships with other organizations worldwide, like the EU, to come up with solu- tions, to pull these people together in summits, to develop action plans and responsibilities and time lines, to accomplish what needs to be done. Diplomacy. There is a lot of it that needs to kick into very high gear quickly in support of our great military, who are moving heav- en and earth as best they can, but they are out there alone. With respect to the displaced persons, I used to witness this all the time. Kurds moving back into the region of Kirkuk and dis- placing Sunnis. And recently, in the last couple of months in Bagh- dad, the demographics have changed. Sunni neighborhoods are dis- appearing and being replaced by Shias. It is still ongoing. And that explains in some measure why Baghdad now is a bit quieter than it was 6 months ago Things are not as they seem in the Middle East, in particular in Iraq. So, again, a huge caution on how we view things and how we interpret the situation there.. Mr. PAYNE (presiding). The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Kline. Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was just being advised that we are pulling the plug on this thing, so I am caught a little bit off guard and apologize to both the Generals. We have just been paged to vote. You can hear the beepers going off. You have gone through this before. And as you know many of us come and go through these hearings and right now most of us have gone. Just a couple of quick comments. General Batiste, I must admit I was extremely surprised that you were dismayed by the fact that we have young and inexperi- enced lieutenants going to combat. I was just trying to think of a time, certainly not in my 25 years in the Marines, when we didn't have young and inexperienced lieutenants going to combat. I am a little bit concerned that your strategy is for us to turn over to what you call an incompetent Iraqi Government and an incapable Iraqi Army. To turn responsibility over to them, it seems a little bit, may not be the thing we ought to do at this point. But, G al Keane, you have obviously spent a fair amount of time walking around, as you said in your opening remarks, on the streets. And I am sorry, you probably answered this, but could you do two things? Tell us how much time you spent walking around the streets—was it a day or 2, a week?-and when that time frame was. Give us, again, a feel. 59 You talk about the schools and the markets. But what was your interaction with the everyday Iraqi people and what they are thinking right now? General KEANE. Yes. I was in Iraq during the first 2 weeks of August—in my last visit, this previous August and 2 weeks in May, at the end of May, and 2 weeks in February Mr. KLINE. Of 2007, you were there in May and in August? General KEANE. So I have been taking a 90-day snapshot be- cause I wanted to go see some of the same places again to see what kind of progress there was so I could get a feel for it. Even in a Sunni neighborhood where there has been a lot of violence, there has been progress on each one of those visits in terms of the things that I—what I am looking for are the normal patterns and rhythms of life, and if you have a violent situation where security is a prob- lem to a family, to its children, then the patterns of life are not going to be there. So the rhythms I am looking for with people are: Are they going to school? The answer to that is, overwhelmingly, yes. Are the markets open? Overwhelmingly, yes. The markets, are they populated? Yes. Is there commerce taking place? Yes. of those markets are not at full capacity, as I said be- fore. In a Sunni neighborhood where there was a lot of violence in the past, you may find that market at 40 percent, but then when I come back in May, it is at 60, and when I come back in August, it is at a higher percentage, and that is encouraging because the progress continues to be made. Mr. KLINE. Excuse me. May I interrupt for just a minute? What kind of group were you walking around with? General KEANE. I have security people, but I do not wear any armor or battle dress; I am certainly not in uniform. I do not wear any sunglasses, and I take an interpreter. I have security there, but then I separate myself from them as much as possible so I can engage Iraqis and talk to them. So I will go into a clinic and talk to the doctors. I will go into a school and talk with the principal and teachers. Mr. KLINE. Again, I hate to interrupt, but you are not sur- rounded by people. You are just talking one-on-one or— General KEANE. I have to beat it away. I mean they want to be there every time I start with a new—I am in a new battalion area or something, I have got to say, “Guys, I really want to do this by myself. Go stand over there. Let me do this.” I mean they are in the vicinity, and I have to take a guy, and I go over here. I take my interpreter and say, “Give me one guy with a gun, and let's do it, all right?” Listen, I do not believe it is so much—it is not that big a risk, to be quite frank about it, when Americans are in the area anyway, and I know that. I am a military person. So it is not a big deal, to be quite frank about it, but what it does for me is it gives me an opportunity to engage hundreds and hundreds of Iraqis who are at different stations in life, you know, from a work- ing class person to a director of a hospital to a surgeon that I meet at a gas station. It is anecdotal, to be sure, but because there is so much of it, I am able to look at the rhythms and patterns of life and make judgments about it. All of that is improving, and that is the fact of it, and it is very encouraging to see it happening.