sight role. It was in 2004 that we in 2003 that we first told the
CIA, Solomon Ortiz and I, that Muqtada al-Sadr was being funded
by the Iranians with $70 million, and the CIA did not want to hear
it. No one knew the name “Muqtada al-Sadr” back then-today, it
is a household name—just like they did not want to hear about
Iran cooperating with North Korea, their nuclear program and the
other acts of destabilizing Iraq. Today, it is all fact, and it is the
reason why the election was so decisive this past November. This
committee, again, was in the forefront of those issues.
Mr. Incoming Chairman, I have a challenge for you because I
think the ultimate vindication is yet to come for this committee.
There was a book released last week, written by an award-winning
journalist by the name of Peter Lance. I would encourage you all
to get a copy of it. It is 670-pages long. Peter Lance is an award
winner. He received five Emmys when he worked for ABC News
and a Robert F. Kennedy award for journalism, and in his exten-
sive documentation—it took five years—he tells the story that no-
body wanted the American people to hear, that the man that Pat-
rick Fitzgerald called in 1997, and I quote, “the most dangerous
man I have ever met; we cannot let this man on the street” was
at one and the same time an agent for the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI), an agent for the CIA, who joined our military and
was transferred to our Special Warfare Command J.F. Kennedy
School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
So now we have the information out that no one wanted to hear,
the fact that we had him on our payroll in the military, a guy that
Patrick Fitzgerald has said was the most dangerous man in the
world, who today is locked up in a Colorado prison where the Jus-
tice Department will not allow anyone to talk to him, who was at
one and the same time an agent for al Qaeda and bin Laden while
he was working within the military of our government, training our
Special Operations officers at Fort Bragg, a command officer get-
ng access to classified information he should never have had. .
It is all here, and it is all documented in the 670-page report that
is going to shake this country to its roots. And, you know, when
we had that hearing on Able Danger and the staffers did not want
those charts to come out because they said, “Show us the beef!
Show us the beef!” It was not about Mohamed Atta alone, and I
said that then; it was about Ali Mohamed. If you go back and check
the charts—and I have those 1999 charts, and one of them is in
the book—Ali Mohamed is on every chart, and he is linked into bin
Laden.
So the man who was working in our Special Forces Command
training school at Fort Bragg, the man who was an informant for
the FBI, the man who was an informant for the CIA while working
for bin Laden, who is now in jail in Colorado and who Patrick Fitz-
gerald has called the most dangerous man that he has ever met,
is now in jail in Colorado. I do not think he has ever had a trial.
When Peter Lance tried to interview him, both times he was re-
fused, and the response, which is in a letter in this book, says, “We
think it will present security concerns for the country.”
This committee needs to continue to play the aggressive over-
sight role. As troubling as it is, that is the responsibility in the


6
checks and balances of this country that this committee has to be
the champion of.
I am proud to leave this committee and the great members, out-
standing members, who have always done the right thing; and I
am proud, in the 12 years I served as subcommittee chairman, we
never had one vote in any subcommittee that I chaired where a
Democrat had to offer an amendment, not one. Marty, when you
were Chair or a ranking member, Silvestre, when you were, Solo-
mon, when you were, and John, when you were, not one split vote.
That is the way this committee needs to operate, in a bipartisan
manner that lets the Executive Branch understand that we will do
what it takes to get the truth out and to confront those issues that
need to be addressed even if they fly in the face of what is politi-
cally correct in the conventional wisdom that some would have us
believe.
So, with that, I am happy to be here until my good friend arrives,
and I will now turn to my distinguished ranking member, Mr. Skel-
ton.
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
Mr. SKELTON. Curt, thank you for your excellent comments. We
thank you for them. There is a Scottish song that is to the tune
of “When Johnny Comes Marching Home,” and the title of it is
“Johnny, I hardly got to know you."
Curt, thank you for your passion, your knowledge, your persist-
ence, what you have meant to this committee. You have been a
polestar for all of us. I just cannot thank you enough, but most of
all, I know everyone.
I know everyone joins me in saying thank you for your friend-
ship through the years. It has been solid and sincere.
As sailors would say, we wish you fair winds and following seas,
and God bless you.
Mr. WELDON. I thank the distinguished ranking member, and I
would be remiss if I did not mention our staff on both sides of the
aisle. We have the best staff in the Congress. They work well to-
gether. We rely on each other; there is no level of distrust. It is
openness and candor, and that is the hallmark of the Armed Serv-
ices Committee.
I want to especially thank Doug Roach, who has been my lead
staffer. He has been to some crazy places. If I asked any of you
where Kalmykia was, you would say, "I have no idea.” Well, Doug
can tell you where Kalmykia is because it was our stop on the way
to Beslan.
But, Doug, you have been an outstanding professional.
I want to thank my personal staff and put it on the record—Russ
Caso, a former Navy person who is my chief of staff; John
Tomaszewski; Sarah Beatty; Chris Phelen; Margaret Lemmerman;
and Yevgeny Bendersky-fantastic, hard-working individuals.
And, with that, I have done enough of my swan song.
So now we will turn to the business at hand, which is standing
up robust, capable Iraqi forces as our top goal of the coalition of
the Iraqi Government; and today, we have a distinguished panel of
our transition team-Major General George Flynn from the Marine


Corps, Commanding General, Training and Education Command;
from the Army, Major General Carter Ham, Commanding General,
1st Infantry Division; and from the Army, Lieutenant General
James Lovelace, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3.
In a meeting with President Bush this week, Duncan and our
colleagues talked about his getting more Iraqi battalions in the
hotspot areas on an accelerated basis for the combat operations ex-
perience, to test their capabilities and to gain confidence. Too many
Iraqi forces are in relatively calm areas. Only about 35 to 114 Iraqi
combat battalions operate in notoriously violent areas such as
Baghdad and the Anbar Province, while over 30 other units are in
quieter areas that experience 2 or fewer attacks each day.
To ensure that Iraqi Security Forces are positioned for success
and can benefit from much-needed combat experience, Coalition
forces must help Iraqis develop key skills and capabilities. Milita
transition teains are advising the Iraqis on the unfamiliar chal-
lenges of counserinsurgency operations. They are also serving as a
useful conduit to logistic support, intelligence information and com-
bat support such as heavy artillery and air support the Coalition
forces can provide.
If we get the transition team piece right, the effort to produce ca-
pable, battle-tested Iraqi forces stands a greater chance of success.
So the focus of today's hearing is the manning, training and equip-
ping of these teams, and it comes at a time of renewed emphasis
by the services—U.S. Central Command and the Multi-national
Force-Iraq.
Many expertis share the belief that these Transition Teams are
pivotal. The Army, to its credit, has met the demand for hundreds
of Transition Teams. The dedication of an entire infantry division
to train teams underscores the Army's emphasis on this effort.
The Marine Corps continues to shoulder its fair share of this
mission.
In testimony before this committee last month, General Abizaid
of Central Command signaled his intent to expand the size and ca-
pabilities of the teams, and the Iraq Study Group recently rec-
ommended increasing the number of U.S. trainers in Iraq to 10,000
or even 20,000
During his confirmation hearing earlier this week, incoming Sec-
retary of Defense Gates asked a crucial question, and I quote, “If
our focus is on training and bringing up the Iraqi army, do we have
enough trainers to do that job in Iraq? end quote.
So the question before the committee today is just that: How
many transition teams are required, how many personnel, and
what skills do they need, and what training should they receive?
This hearing comes at a good time to take stock of how the transi-
tion teams have evolved over the last two years and to reevaluate
how best to organize this endeavor in the future.
Recent media reports indicate that some team members feel that
they are not receiving or providing the most relevant training or
the right equipment. I hope the committee will hear how we can
help you to strengthen the ability of the advisors to better train
and secure Iraq's security forces. Only when we can successfully
conclude such efforts can we be sure that the departure of Amer-


16
Mr. SPRATT. Do we have a process for determining equipment
that we would otherwise leave behind that can be refurbished and
brought to utility for these Iraqi troops to inherit from us?
General LOVELACE. Sir, they go through a foreign military sales
program no different than what any other country would.
Mr. SPRATT. Oh, okay.
General LOVELACE. Šo that is how they secure it.
As far as leaving behind equipment, U.S. equipment, if it is ap-
propriate and it is excess and in accordance with the law—and the
law only allows us to render any equipment which is in excess. And
so, right now, we do not have—we have some, and that equipment
which is in excess we have then conveyed to the Iraqi forces, sir.
Mr. SPRATT. Let me ask you along a different line of questioning
because time is limited, are you concerned as we shift to this role
of fewer Americans involved in direct combat and more involved in
advisory capacities that our advisors themselves could be in dan-
er, that if we could find ourselves with units on the ground, this
could be Beirut all over again?
Do you have units that are not sufficient to protect themselves
if they were subject to some kind of attack; or they might be in a
hostile situation and might find themselves embedded with a unit,
and somebody within that unit would—that those could be criti-
cally dangerous situations, too?
Does that concern you, and if so, how do we handle that prob-
lem?
General FLYNN. Sir—I will take a shot at that, sir.
I think the key part is to making sure that we train them cor-
rectly and we man them correctly, and they have the right equip-
ment not only for their own force's protection but to be able to be
effective advisors in training.
So it is a high-risk assignment, sir. In many ways, these individ-
uals are out there alone and unafraid. It just speaks to the quality
of the men and women who are in uniform, and it is our respon-
sibility to make sure, before we send them out the door, that they
have all the skills necessary to survive on the battlefield and to
cute their mission, but the mission does come with risks, sir,
and the best we can do is to train them the best we can to mitigate
that risk.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Folks, we have about 5
minutes left on a 15-minute vote.
General LOVELACE. Real quick, just one addendum. Sir, one of
the other important pieces is, that is why then we equip that force
clearly with communications so that it has that life line back to a
QRF, Quick Reaction Force. That is a very mindful piece because
nowhere that the Iraqis are, are they not then close by some kind
of U.S. force that can react and provide that kind of Quick Reaction
Force, sir, so that is another quick addendum piece of information.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.
We will resume in about ten minutes. We have one vote, folks,
with about five minutes left.
[Recess.]
The CHAIRMAN. Okay, folks, we will come back to the hearing
here. And the gentleman, I think it was on the gentleman from
Connecticut, Mr. Simmons, a great veteran of Vietnam in both


ment, to conduct three elections, and to stand up a permanent gov-
ernment.
I think we are doing a great job now of-I think we have the pos-
sibility of doing a great job now of moving from a strictly security
role to a robust advisory role, security to advisory. And I think that
is entirely appropriate. And I think the time is right for that. The
time is right. 'The time wasn't good two or three years ago for this
kind of a program. But I think the time is right for this program.
I have every reason to believe that our military, that I consider
to be the best in the world and certainly the best I've seen in my
37 years of service, is ready to take this on, and I wish you all the
best. Thank you for your testimony.
General LOVELACE. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman and I thank the gen-
tleman for his great service on the committee, as well as the gen-
tleman from Colorado here, Mr. Hefley, and the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon, who spoke a few minutes ago.
And as a-I would just say that I think you probably, as an ad-
viser in the U.S. military and in a combat operation, and your voice
and your experience should be one that we look to in the days
ahead with respect to this issue. Very critical issue for us.
The gentlenian from Texas, distinguished gentleman who has
spent a lot of time in the combat theaters. Mr. Ortiz.
*Mr. ORTIZ. 'Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we have been in
this war for too long, three and a half years. I know its history
about what happened in the beginning, 2003. The Iraqi army was
disbanded in 2003.
Was that a mistake that we made? And was this mistake that
we made, in rny opinion and the opinions of other people, by dis-
banding it, was this made by our civilian authorities like Paul
Bremer who was there, or was this made by the military?
General LOVELACE. Sir, I accept your question, I am not in a po-
sition to answer—I don't have the knowledge, I mean, this is a pol-
icy issue. Things were made decisions were made in theater. I
was not there at the time.
So, I apologize. I am not personally able to address your ques-
tion.
Mr. ORTIZ. And the reason I ask is, because we hope that if this
was a mistake, that we do not make this mistake again. This is
why this is very, very important at least to me.
But how many of the old Iraqi personnel are now fighting coali-
tion forces or now with the insurgents? I am pretty sure that when
you take somebody prisoner or detain somebody, you ask, you ques-
tion them.
Do we have this information as to how many of the old army are
now fighting our coalition forces?
General FLYNN. Sir, I just say one thing on that. I don't think
we have that information. And but the other part I say, I think one
of the things that goes back to the issue raised on disbanding the
Army, one of the key rules that we have learned in counter
insurgencies over the years is, never create more enemies than you
already have. And that is one key part of it.
So I think part of the answer to your question probably lies in
that, is you need all of the friends you can get in counter insur-
ra
LED!


25
rity force. You want that. And so therefore what you—if that is the
case, then what you don't want is that a thought in the transition:
team that they own the performance of—you want them to coach,
and mentor to make them better, but don't own them and ac-
cept it is your responsibility if they did not succeed.
Mr. KLINE. If I could just interrupt for a second. This is a point
that we were discussing earlier. It seems to me that what you don't
want is a tight marrying of the performance of that Iraqi battalion
with the progress reports, if you will, the efficiency reports of those
embedded teams. So that team commander has got to be able
through his U.S. chain of command to say, this battalion really
eds work, it is not doing well, and not have that report reflect
adversely on his own chances for promotion.
General LOVELACE. No, sir. That is exactly right, sir. You helped
me say it much better. Thank you.
Mr. KLINE. I have been thinking about it. Thank you.
And incredibly, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.
And the gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder.
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, and thank you for hav-
ing this hearing. I know of your continued interested in this issue,
Mr. Chairman, but I think that the whole committee and the Con-
gress and the American people will have an ongoing interest in this
topic. And I expected that this hearing today was just going to set
the beginning for what will be a very vigorous ongoing look and
oversight over the next several years.
General Lovelace, at the conclusion of your opening statement
today, you demonstrated the admirable quality of defending your
troops against public criticism. And I assume you are referring to
a couple of press articles that we saw today. And I appreciate your
comments.
On the other hand, I think it is really important that we fully
and publicly air any kind of shortcomings that we may see because
we want this thing to be successful as best it can be. To me it
seems like step one is we have to have the right troops, and you
can have certainly an excellent person in their military occupa-
tional specialty that may not just not be a good trainer, they may
not just be a good teacher, they may just not have the personality,
as Nr. Simmons was talking about, to go native. They may just not
have that temperament. That is part of your job to sort that out.
The second component of that is to have the right training. And
so, for example, when I hear like 40 days of, or 40 hours of lan-
guage training, we are really not kidding anybody here. Basically
you are doing greetings and which way to the bunker and which
way to the bathroom. That is as far as we are going to get with
these languages.
I have some years ago made the comment that we ought to start
language training in boot camp when we actually have a captive
audience and just declare this platoon as Dari and that platoon as
Arabic and have that training stick with people as they go through.
But the third component is—you have the right tro s and the
right training—is you have to set them up with the right oppor-
tunity for success. And again, this has been part of this discussion
of safety. If we start doing this swapping out, pulling back all the


29
Afghanistan, but rightfully so, because that is a very critical region
for our national security. And it captures the kinds of things we
have all been talking about here, so—
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you all for being here and for your extraordinary service. I think
some of the issues that we discussed are ones that were very much
on my mind. And one of the articles that Mr.-I am going to say
this wrong—Mr. Krepinevich wrote some time ago did focus on this
and some of the issues that have arisen over the course of time,
and I wonder if you could just address them.
Partly you have talked about the fact that the ability to promote
individuals who take on this task is more recognized today than it
was, I think, perhaps a year ago. That that has changed.
But one of the other issues that was addressed is to take away
the adviser some of the responsibilities, be it paperwork,
whatever it is, that sort of burdens sometimes our people out in the
field so that they really are freed up to do a different task. And
if you could address that.
But also the ability of them to work with their Iraqi counterparts
so that they can ferret out corruption within the units, and that
they can then hopefully be able to still enable people to do what
they really want them to do.
How does that affect their work in the units? And how are we
training them to work with that issue particularly and perhaps to
take some of that burden away?
The other thing I would just like you to address is our training
of police officers and border agents and whether or not that is also
within this effort with training advisers as well as.
General FLYNN. Ma'am, a couple of things. One of the things that
helps with the training now is now we are starting to see advisers
come back who now have conducted training. And that is one of the
things that are—those skill sets have been able to evaluate some-
body to root out those things that are bad in the unit that you are
in just based on the experience.
We do have a training responsibility. We train—this year we
were responsible for training 10 border transition teams and 4 na-
tional police transition teams. So in addition to the military transi-
tion teams, we are training the others, and that one of the things
we are doing currently right now, for example, on the border tran-
sition teams out on the west coast, we have had them work with
the border patrol to learn how the border patrol does border oper-
ations. So we try to go out and take advantage of skill sets that
already exist so that we can help in the training.
And one of the things when our—when we are working on-
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Excuse me, are any of our border
agents going over to Iraq then and actually being embedded, as
well or our police officers?
General FLYNN. Ma'am, I wouldn't know the answer to that ques-
tion. I am not sure about that at all.
But when we do our training in January, our new revised train-
ing, the mission exercise will be focused on what type of team you
are going to be. So we will be able to evaluate that necessity. And


PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
DECEMBER 7, 2006


50
American forces as quickly as possible—this must be done in a way
that accounts for our interests in the region and allows us to attend
to the current dire state of readiness in the American military.
Since that hearing, we've seen a remarkable evolution in the public
dialogue about the war. First came the leak of the National Security
Advisor's memo to the President, which expressed doubts about
Prime Minister Maliki's capacity to control the sectarian violence
that is wracking Baghdad and other parts of the country. Then,
Secretary Rumsfeld's memo was leaked, and it indicated a
surprising willingness to accept that we have a serious problem -
something that had been sadly lacking for quite some time. His
memo offered a wide set of options for dealing with Iraq, including
several – some offered by Members of this body - that were
dismissed by the Administration earlier. And yesterday, amidst
great speculation, the Iraq Study Group released its report. They
have undertaken a careful, thorough assessment of the situation in
Iraq, and I am reviewing their findings with the same level of
consideration.


53
All of that is just a fancy way of saying that I do not want us to put
together an advisor program and invest a lot of time and resources,
only to find this time next year that we didn't get it right and those
Iraqi forces are no more capable than they are today. I want to get
it right from here on out and through your testimony today,
gentlemen, is how you can help us make sure that this happens.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.