Y 4.AR 5/2 A: 2007-2008/4 [H.A.S.C. No. 110–4] ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY FOR IRAQ COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION HEARING HELD JANUARY 17, 2007 Pennsylvania State University Libraries MAR - 5 2008 Documents Collection U.S. Depository Copy U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2007 37–305 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS IKE SKELTON, Missouri JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina DUNCAN HUNTER, California SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JIM SAXTON, New Jersey GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii TERRY EVERETT, Alabama MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland SILVESTRE REYES, Texas HOWARD P. "BUCK” MCKEON, California VIC SNYDER, Arkansas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina KEN CALVERT, California ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania W. TODD AKIN, Missouri ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia SUSAN A. DAVIS, California JEFF MILLER, Florida RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina JIM COOPER, Tennessee FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TOM COLE, Oklahoma. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam ROB BISHOP, Utah MARK UDALL, Colorado MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio DAN BOREN, Oklahoma JOHN KLINE, Minnesota BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan NANCY BOYDA, Kansas PHIL GINGREY, Georgia PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania MIKE ROGERS, Alabama HANK JOHNSON, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire THELMA DRAKE, Virginia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida KATHY CASTOR, Florida ERIN CONATON, Staff Director ANDREW HUNTER, Professional Staff Member STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member REGINA BURGESS, Research Assistant MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant (II) CONTENTS CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 2007 Page HEARING: Wednesday, January 17, 2007, Alternative Perspective on the President's Strategy for Iraq ......... APPENDIX: Wednesday, January 17, 2007 ............ ......... ..... 55 WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2007 ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY FOR IRAQ STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .... WITNESSES Kagan, Dr. Frederick W., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute .... Korb, Dr. Lawrence J., Senior Fellow, The Center for American Progress ........ Perry, Dr. William J., Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University ......... APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Korb, Dr. Lawrence J. ......... Perry, Dr. William J. ............... DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: Choosing Victory-A Plan for Success in Iraq, Executive Summary sub- mitted by Frederick W. Kagan ......... QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Questions submitted.] (III) ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE PRESIDENTS STRATEGY FOR IRAQ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, January 17, 2007. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:20 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Íke Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTA- TIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The CHAIRMAN. Welcome, ladies and gentlemen. This is the sec- ond Armed Service Committee hearing of the 110th Congress. First, I want to thank the members for doing a good job last week during the first hearing abiding by the five-minute rule. We will continue that effort and five minutes means five minutes, and I ap- preciate your cooperation along that line. I have to shorten up the time because I do know that two of our witnesses, Dr. Perry and Dr. Kagan, must leave at 4:15 and 4:30 respectively, as I under- stand it. And so we can get as many members to ask their ques- tions in their five minutes, we are going to ask the presentations be limited to four minutes, if at all possible. I think you have been contacted on that. My favorite phrase is “Please do it in 25 words or less.” We will take it in a few more than 25. But if you can do that, we will certainly appreciate it. Last week the President appeared before the American people and outlined a plan in Iraq which includes the increase of Amer- ican troops. The next morning, Secretary of Defense Gates and General Pace appeared before us and discussed the Administra- tion's plan in greater detail. Today we will hear perspectives on and alternatives to that plan. Joining us today is Dr. William Perry who was the Secretary of De- fense when President Clinton was President, and, more rece member of the Iraq Study Group; Dr. Lawrence Korb who served as an Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1982 through 1985 and is at the Center for American Progress; and Dr. Frederick Kagan, former history professor at West Point, now a scholar at the Amer- ican Enterprise Institute. You all have their full biographies in front of you, and I am sure you will know that this is a very im- pressive trio that we have, and we look forward to hearing from them. Over the last month or so, I have made a point to emphasize that under my chairmanship, this committee would redouble our efforts in pursuing oversight responsibilities under which we are charged 1 CUIUT (1) by the Constitution. This is an important hearing. It is part of that process. We have heard at some length the Administration's posi- tion on the way forward in Iraq. As we consider that position, it is also our responsibility to explore our alternatives. We must weigh the pros and cons of each. Now, while the President's choice may be limited, it does not relieve us of the obligation to fully ex- plore the ramifications of that policy. Additionally, by challenging the Administration on the specifics of the plan, any plan, we com- pel them to defend it in detail, warts and all. And where those warts are serious flaws, this process will expose them. The light we shine on them will enable us to explore those prob- lems before we ask our service members to execute a flawed policy again. No longer will this Congress allow any vague statement of a half- m this or any other Administration to pass by with- out serious questioning and there will be serious questioning. Furthermore, we are a government for the people and by the peo- ple. A robust hearing and oversight process gives the American people the opportunity to understand the full range of implications inherent in the policies of their government. The war in Iraq is the single most critical issue facing our coun- try today. The outcomes of this conflict will have repercussions that affect United States national security for decades and will rever- berate throughout the Middle East and, of course, the rest of the globe. Therefore, it is important that we proceed in a way that al- lows us to refine our policies and develop the best plan possible while keeping our citizens fully informed. At the hearing last week I was pretty clear about my concerns regarding the type of troop increase. I won't go back through them today, except to note that we have got a real problem on our hands. It is past time for the Iraqis to assume greater responsibility for their own security. And whatever we choose to do, it needs to con- tribute to the overarching goal of reducing our force levels there in the next several months. That is how we will continue to watch out or the welfare of our forces and hedge against strategic risk, which is a real problem before us. Today we are looking forward to hearing what you think about the way forward in Iraq. We should not lose sight of the fact the President has made his choice on what to do and our options in this case are limited. Therefore, I hope you spend some time dis- cussing the implications of his plan, your ideas for improving it, and ways to evaluate its success as we move forward. And before I ask my friend and colleague Mr. Hunter, Ranking Member, for his comments, let me again remind you that I intend to adhere strictly to the five-minute rule, and I know last week you did a very good job in that regard, and I hope that we can do the same today. I introduce now the Ranking Member, Duncan Hunter, my friend from San Diego, California. I got it right. STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. HUNTER. I want to thank my good friend, the Chairman, Ike Skelton, and join with him in welcoming our guests to this very, very important hearing by the committee. Last week President Bush and his advisers met with congres- sional leaders to discuss this new strategy for Iraq, and the Presi- dent then outlined this plan of the American people both in an ad- dress to the Nation and in several media interviews. And after that, Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, Chairman Pace, provided more detail before the commit- tee, including information about the strategy's three key p y pillars. In fact, General Pace referred to the strategy as a three-legged stool, so that if any one of these elements, political, military, or recon- struction is missing, the strategy cannot stand. I agree that to have a chance of success, any strategy or proposed alternative needs to rest on these elements, and I think we have received a lot of infor- mation about each. But I look forward to hearing your assessments of the Administration's new plan in these areas. Gentlemen, from my perspective, we are on the second phase of a basic blueprint that we have used for 60 years to bring freedom to other nations, whether you're talking about Japan or the Phil- ippines or El Salvador, and that is, you stand up the free nation or government, you stand up a military capable of protecting that free government, and, third, if you don't have an external force like the Warsaw Pact backing the division that stayed on the overfold of the gap for so many years, the Americans leave. We are right now in the most difficult part of this challenge, which is standing up an Iraqi military apparatus capable of pro- tecting that free government. And let me just lay out for you what I have taken from the President's statement with respect to the Baghdad plan, and I would hope that you could comment on this perspective and add to it or subtract from it if there are portions that you think we have missed in this plan. But this plan involves the sectoring of Baghdad into nine sectors; the establishment of an Iraqi brigade in each of the sectors. The brigade may have two or three maneuver battalions, and backing up those battalions is an American battalion. And a recommenda- tion that we have made to the President, a number of us have made, is to bring Iraqi battalions from the quiet areas of Iraq—that is, 9 of the 18 provinces that average less than one attack a day- and saddle them up and move them into the night and rotate and move into Baghdad or the Sunni Triangle or Al Anbar. As I understand it, three brigades that will be moving in for the Baghdad operation will, in fact, come from three of these provinces that are relatively quiet. Now, my recommendation has been to the Administration that we could use this blueprint, this idea of having several Iraqi battal- ions in front, in operations in contentious zones, backed by an American battalion and, of course, utilizing embedded American forces to mentor and to advise down to the company level in the Iraqi battalions; but we could use that blueprint to stand up vir- tually the Iraqi force. That is the full 114 battalions that have been described to us by the Department of Defense as having been trained and equipped by U.S. forces. So I would like you to comment on that, on the prospects of using the Baghdad plan as a pattern to stand up the full complement of Iraqi forces. And I think if this works in Baghdad, that that has some promise. You know, I have looked at the—and I am sure other members of the committee have also looked at the other commitments that the Iraqi government has made that the President has reported to us have in fact been committed to, but obviously have not been exe- cuted with respect to consolidation, the division of petroleum as- sets, and of course the modification of the deBaathification plan and other things such as handling the former officers in Saddam Hussein's military. And of course there are a number of elements of this plan that are controlled by the Iraqis and that will require execution by them, and we will see if they deliver on this plan. I would simply say at this time we have a plan that the Com- mander in Chief-as the person who has been elected by the people of this country to carry out our military policies and to put forward those military policies—the President, has come up with this plan, and he is delivering reinforcements in the strength of 21,500 troops to the Iraq theater; 4,000 of those reinforcements to go to Al Anbar Province where the Marines have requested them, and I verified that in talking to Marine commanders. They do feel that they need those additional 4,000 Marines. And, of course, the remainder of the troops to be dedicated to the Baghdad plan and other oper- ations in the Sunni Triangle and the Baghdad area. It is my position that when you have a shooting war and the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief, is moving reinforcements to execute a plan in that war and to execute the strategy in that war, that it would be unthinkable for Congress, ei- ther body, to move to cut off the reinforcements to the American forces that are presently working in the war. So I would like, along with your analysis of how you think this plan is going to work, your own observations as to whether or not you think that that is an appropriate move by the legislative body to move to cut off reinforcements or to cut off supplies for the troops that are in theater or the troops who are arriving in theater. So I want to thank my great colleague, the gentleman from Mis- souri, for holding this hearing. I think it is absolutely timely, and I look forward to your comments. Thank you Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from California. We welcome you, gentlemen, and if you can summarize in four minutes to give us time for questioning, we would certainly appre- ciate it. Dr. Perry. STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY, CENTER FOR INTER- NATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNI- VERSITY Dr. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Would you turn that on, please? tral and provincial governments, distribution of oil revenues, pro- tecting minority rights. Until that process is completed, let me put it very bluntly, we could put a soldier or Marine on every street corner in Baghdad and it will not make a difference. A diplomatic surge would involve appointing an individual with the stature of a former Secretary of State, such as Colin Powell or Madeleine Albright, as Special Envoy. This person would be charged with getting all six of Iraq's neighbors—Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait-involved more construc- tively in stabilizing Iraq. It is important to note that these coun- tries are already involved in a bilateral, self-interested, and dis- organized way. And while their interests and ours are not identical, none of their countries want to live in an Iraq after our strategy deployment backs a failed state, or a humanitarian catastrophe that would lead it to become a haven for terrorists or hemorrhage of millions of more refugees streaming into their countries. This high-profile envoy would also address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the role of Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon, and Iran's ris- ing influence in the region. The aim would not necessarily be to solve all of these problems but, as a minimum, prevent them from getting worse and demonstrate to the Arab and Muslim world that we share their concerns about the problems in the region. I think, finally, that the Congress must take a greater role in shaping Iraq policy. In terms of what Mr. Hunter said in the begin- ning, I think there are things that Congress can do and should do to take a greater role in shaping our Iraq policy. First of all, I think you can require clarification of the law that allows the President to mobilize guards and reserves for up to two years. In my view, the clock should start on 9/11. If a unit has been mobilized two years since then, before mobilizing that unit again, the President should come back to the Congress and demonstrate why that is necessary. I think you should require a new national intelligence estimate (NIE) on Iraq's internal conflict. My understanding is last summer congressional leaders requested that the Director of National Intel- ligence (DNI) prepare an NIE that includes an assessment on whether Iraq is in a civil war. I think you should require recertifi- cation that the war in Iraq does not undermine the war against global terrorist networks. The joint resolution of 2002 that author- ized the use of force in Iraq required the Administration to certify that the Iraq war would not harm the effort against terrorism. And, finally, I think that you should require a transparent, veri- fiable plan that conditions funding for military escalation not for the troops that are already there, but on the performance of the Iraqi leaders to fulfill their commitments and responsibilities. I think that if we go back and we look at the history of our in- volvement in Iraq when historians write about it, they will find that many of us failed in our obligations to speak up, whether it is the Congress, the media, the academic community, and I think it is time for people to speak up now before this problem gets any worse. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 13 As Mr. Korb said, they have to step up to the plate, which is power sharing with the Sunnis, which revenue sharing with the oil is a very difficult thing to do, which they do not want to do. We have to have pressure for them to do that. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Saxton, please. Mr. SAXTON. Dr. Perry and Dr. Korb, you have both indicated in slightly different terms that you favor setting some kind of a sched- ule for pulling out troops in order to put pressure on the majority Shi'a population and government to step up to the plate and do what they said they would do. On the other hand, Dr. Kagan asked a very pertinent question and that is, should we pull our troops out, what is the effect of that? And I think that is a very serious question and one that we ought to contemplate thoroughly. We know that the Shi'a govern- ment—that the majority government, excuse me, is mostly Shi'a. And we know that there is a potential, if not a real level of support, from outside of Iraq; namely, from Iran and perhaps from Syria as well. On the other hand, the Sunni minority finds favor in other coun- tries, particularly to the south, the Saudis and Jordanians, and perhaps Egypt and other countries. And so it seems to me that a pull-out of troops at this point could very well result in a broader conflict, in a more serious conflict than what we are seeing inside of Iraq today. What do you think? Dr. PERRY. Mr. Saxton, I think that the presence of our troops there is indeed holding down the violence. The violence would be greater if they were not there, and that if we pulled them out next week, the violence would increase. My concern is that that would be true if we pulled them out six months from now, a year from now, five years from now, if something is not done to deal with the political problem in Iraq. Until or unless the Sunnis feel that they have some stake in the government and some stake in the oil reve- nues, they are going to continue this—whether you call it sectarian violence or war, whatever you call it, it is causing huge grief in the country. That is the problem that has to be resolved, and anything we do has to be pointed toward resolving that problem. My own belief is the only pressure we have on the Iraqi govern- ment to force them to take that move is the understanding that they are going to have to stand alone at some time in the future. Dr. KORB. Congressman, when our troops leave, and they will have to leave at some date, as Dr. Perry said, we won't leave the region. We still have interest in the region and in the plan which we put forward. We can leave forces in Kuwait. The Kuwaitis wel- come us because we liberated them in 1991. You can have a carrier battle group and Marine expeditionary force in the Persian Gulf, and if you take a look at what happened when we killed al- Zarqawi, the Iraqis gave the information to their forces, they gave them to us, we sent in an F-16 to get rid of them so we would still be able to apply power if something should happen. If Iran should try to invade or something like that, we would be able to take mili- tary action. 16 Mr. McHUGH. Thank you very much. Dr. Kagan, just to follow through on the point you were just making. I read your report. Refresh my memory. Are the numbers you are talking about in line about the current manuals and metrics associated with the counterinsurgency? Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, they are. We looked at the areas that we thought critical to establishing security in Baghdad. We identi- fied 23 districts with a population of approximately 2 million. And we proposed a surge of American forces into Baghdad which would place a total of 50,000 or so combat troops in Baghdad, more when you included the support troops. And remember that support troops are very important in this conflict, and we did not take ac- count of Iraqi forces which will also be there. That is sufficient to generate force ratios that are well within not only what is rec- ommended in the recent U.S. counterinsurgency manual General David Petraeus put out, but were also successful in clear-and-hold operations in Tall Afar in September of 2005. Mr. McHUGH. Dr. Korb, I believe I heard you to say the only le- verage we have is the active redeployment. Don't we as well, though, have some leverage on funding or the lack of funding in the future? Why would you not include that as something that could motivate the Iraqis to step forward and do the things that they need to do? Dr. KORB. If you look at the reconstruction money that we allo- cated, that Congress has allocated, it is $20 billion. Basically, it is very difficult to spend that correctly, as your inspector general has told us. But my view is, as long as you have close to 150,000 Amer- icans there, they are crutched. They know they can keep the vio- lence down. They can postpone the day of reckoning for them. The funding may be marginal. The problem for you is once the troops get in there, you have got to continue to fund them. McHUGH. I understand your point. But let me clarify. Is it not leverage to say to the Iraqis, say through a war supplemental, that we are portioning off that supplemental by, say, half; list some benchmark performance measures that I think all of us agree on, and say we will revisit continuation and fuller funding of that ini- tiative and the completion of it based on your genuine effort? That way it is a future leverage rather than a more immediate one that you are talking about. Would that have no— Dr. KORB. That might have a marginal impact, but I think the only card you have really left in terms of getting them to do these things is the presence of American troops because basically it is a crutch on which they can rely. And if you go back and you take a look since they have had their election, it is over a year and they haven't done anything. And the question becomes why haven't they taken even step one to do what they need to do? And in my view, basically it is because it is dependent on us. Remember that Gen- erals Casey and Abizaid came before the Congress: more troops will increase the dependence. We don't need to do that. Mr. McHUGH. Well, I met with General Casey two days ago. I got back from Iraq yesterday, and he is in support of this. I want the record to show that as well is General Odieno. Whether or not he is right is another issue. That is why we are here today. But 23 Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I do not think it does. I think that the situation is more complex than that, and I think that a lot of peo- ple have been trying to portray Iraq as a country that exists in three divided areas that hold the loyalties of their populations. Something like 10 million Iraqis, I believe is the figure, live in mixed cities. Many of them, especially before the sectarian violence occurred, had been living in mixed neighborhoods, living door-to- door with Shi'a, Sunni, Turkmen, Arab, and so on. Mr. JONES. Dr. Kagan, let me just real quick-because the time will go fast and I do have a lot of respect for you. I might disagree but have a lot of respect. I think it was in the 1920's that the English said, you know, “We have done all we can do.” This was Army General Jay Garner who made that statement, and I think he does bring some credibility because he was the first U.S. official in charge of postwar Baghdad. Now, whether you agree or not, I mean—but the point is that, as Dr. Perry has said and as Dr. Korb has said, if we do not understand that this is not going to be won as a political—it is going to be won politically speaking, rather than with war. And I sit here in amazement of how, after four years, we are still falling over ourselves, not the military—God bless them—and I hope the new leadership in Iraq maybe w bring us some direction so that we can transition to the Iraqis. But I listen to Dr. Korb, and he is saying that, you know, it is hard to motivate these people. Well, I think that is exactly what General Garner was saying. I think that the Iraq Study Group and Dr. Perry—I think you all came forward with some very fine recommendations. I think, Dr. Korb, you have as well in your group, and I just hope and then I want to ask the question and I will stop. I just hope that this Administration, which has said so long that I am going to lis- ten to the military in the field and, yet this surge of 22,000 troops—I do not know what we are doing to these young men and women but making them referees in a civil war. The only thing dif- ferent about being a referee in this war versus a referee on a foot- ball field is they get shot and killed and wounded. I guess my- I will go to you, Dr. Korb. Can you give—I mean, you definitely believe that we cannot mo- tivate because of the differences in the tribes and that what we have to do is to seriously consider some type of redeployment with support? Dr. KORB. Well, I agree this is something we should have thought of before we went in there. And what happened is the way we went in, we unleashed these feelings, these ideas that had been there all along, ever since the British were in there, and now we are having to live with that, and that is why I think two things. One, we have got to put them on notice they have got to move to deal with these things. If they do not, it is going to be their prob- lem, not just ours anymore. And as Dr. Perry said, at some point you have to leave, and if they have not done this, the violence will break out again because they are dealing with disputes that go back over 1,000 years, and we need to realize that. When I was in Iraq, I was talking to somebody in Hilla, and it was at the university, and he said something to me. He said, You are saying the same things that the British said when you came 27 to intervene, the consequences were wider regional problems, ter- rorist spin-offs and a continuing cycle of violence throughout the area. This is a civil war. We do have to be concerned about that. But I do not think that we can simply decide that because it is a civil war, therefore our concerns should end; therefore, that is not some- thing that we should be responsible for. On the contrary, because it is a civil war, it becomes that much more dangerous and that much more urgent that we respond to it effectively. Dr. KORB. I support the increase in the number of troops. I think that is long overdue, something we should have done right after September 11th, because we have overextended the forces now in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, for the President to implement his surge, he is extending the tours of people and sending units over that have not really been home in as much as a year. Dr. Perry that basically we have got to give them an incentive to make these political compromises. Yes, it is true that we went to Bosnia, but before we went there we had the Day- ton Peace Conference, in fact, where we got the parties together to come up with a framework. And in my prepared testimony, I rec- ommended that part of what we should do is get these people to- gether in a Dayton-style conference to begin to iron out their dif- ficulties, because that is the first step. The difference between a civil war—the key about a civil war as opposed to al Qaeda is when we say this is the central front in the war on terror, that is al Qaeda; it is not a civil war. And that is where I think you have to be very careful about what you are talk- ing about. The congressional resolution authorized us to go in and get rid of Saddam Hussein and see if there are weapons of mass destruc- tion. It had nothing to do with settling the 1,000-year conflict be- tween the Sunnis and Shi'as. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Udall, please. Mr. UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding what I think is the first discussion-if not, it is certainly one of the first discus- sions—that considers all of the alternatives that are in front of us in this region of the world. And I think all of us who sit up here on the dais do so today in the interest of, frankly, not having a con- versation about losing or failing or winning, but how do we regain our strength and our status and apply our leverage not only in this part of the world but in other parts of the world. And I want to thank everybody involved today. I think we have set aside most of the sound bites, and we are attempting to have a very substantive discussion. I think Congressman Cooper pointed out we have three very via- ble alternatives worth discussing here today, and I have associated myself more with the Iraq Study Group's recommendations than Dr. Korb’s. But in the interest, Dr. Kagan, of giving you full hear- ing today, there is a school of thought-and picking up on Dr. Sny- der's earlier devil's advocate point of view—that what President Bush has proposed could succeed militarily, but it actually puts us further behind the eight ball politically because it would embolden the Shiite majority. Because we, I think advertently and inadvert- 28 ently, cannot help but pressure the Sunnis increasingly in the plan that is in front of us and that therefore provides the Shi'a with less reason to amend the constitution to bring the Sunnis into the gov- ernment, and we actually, in fact, could push the country closer to civil war and, in the process, push the Sunni into the arms of al Qaeda. Would you care to comment, Dr. Kagan? Dr. KAGAN. Well, yes. I do not think that that is true. I think we have already seen—we have been pressing consistently on the Sunni insurgency. I think we have not been doing it effectively enough. I think it is very important to point out that the purpose of the operation that we propose in our report is not to press on the Sunni community but to bring security to Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi'a neighborhoods in Baghdad. This is not a program of going after the Sunnis. This is a program of ending the violence in the neighborhoods that are suffering most from it right now, and I think that that is a very different thing. And I also think that the reconstruction element of the plan, which we try to highlight in our report, is extremely important be- cause it would have us bring significant reconstruction efforts into Sunni neighborhoods to emphasize that this is not, in fact, an as- sault on the Sunni population, but an effort to bring them security and to improve their quality of life. So, no; on the contrary, I think it will help in the process of bringing the Sunni back into the process, and I think we have seen that already in Al Anbar where we have been consistently pressing on the Sunni insurgency, and we are seeing the movement of some Sunni sheiks to attempt to renegotiate and to reengage. Mr. UDALL. I think it strikes many of us here on the committee that it is a little too late and too little when we hear about recon- struction efforts and job creation because, for the last three years we have heard that those efforts were underway and yet they have borne no fruit. That is an editorial comment from me, obviously. If I might, I would like to direct a question to the entire panel. Experts suggest that we do not have one war, one conflict in Iraq; we maybe have as many as five. And although we hear about the counterinsurgency doctrine being better understood and ap- plied-and incidentally, I think we have to do more of that in a broad-based way. And if I were to hold this Administration respon- sible in that regard, it would be that I do not think the American people fully understand the nature of the global counterinsurgency that we have to muster, which I think is a better way to character- ize what we face instead of the Global War on Terror, but that is another conversation. The counterinsurgency doctrine, Dr. Kagan, that you suggest will work in a counterinsurgency setting; but we have a civil war, and I am not convinced that a counterinsurgency doctrine works in the context of a civil war. And I would be interested if the panel would respond, all three of you. Dr. KAGAN. Well, it seems to me that the first premise of the counterinsurgency that I am focusing on is the question of estab- lishing securi city for the population. I think that applies to counterinsurgency. I think that applies to peacekeeping operations. I think that applies to ending civil wars. It is the approach that 35 whether it is Iraqi, U.S. troops, or even police forces, that you be- lieve you would need, based on the population currently in Bagh- dad, to stabilize Baghdad itself, total forces? Dr. KAGAN. To stabilize the entire city? Mr. FORBES. The entire city. Dr. KAGAN. Well, based on historical forums, you would need a total of about 120,000 troops to stabilize a population of 6 million. We proposed a plan that does it in phases which we think is appro- priate based not only on what forces we can make available but even more on the political situation in Baghdad and the country. Mr. FORBES. After the President's plan, can you tell me the total umber of forces that you believe would be in Baghdad? Dr. KAGAN. According to the President's plan, he is going to be adding-if they add all five brigades, as the President has said they will, that would be approximately 25,000 additional forces to the 25,000 that are already there, which would be 25,000 American combat forces—I am sorry—50,000 American combat forces imme- diately in the city, supported by Iraqi forces, Iraqi police, several tens of thousands. It is very hard to know the precise number. Mr. FORBES. General Pace- Mr. ANDREWS (presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak. Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Doctors, thanks for your time today. I had one quick question, hopefully for each. First, Dr. Kagan, in your executive summary that you provided to us, you said that the political process has failed, and then you turned to the military. It is a military that some have said have been strained almost to the breaking point, and you said that what needs to be accepted is that there be increased, longer deployments for the active forces and more deployment for the National Guard and reserve. You say that the replacement equipment for our troops over there, of which 40 percent of our equipment in the Army is already there, needs to be made up by taking the equip- ment away from our active forces here at home that are not de- ployed at the moment, as well as the guard and reserve forces that are here at home not presently deployed. You then say the military industry needs to gear up urgently and replace all of that equip- ment and that we need to increase our reconstruction fund at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). My understanding is we have got $100 billion sitting over in the OMĚ to come over here in addition to $70 billion already paid this year, so that the cost of Iraq will almost double, not quite, from $8 billion a month to $14 billion a month. General Pace was over here, and there are generals who are ask- ing for more troops in Afghanistan, and when asked about are we still able to meet what we did a few years ago—have an Army, a military, that could deploy nearly simultaneously to two major con- flicts—the general said we could. It would not be pretty. He also expressed concerns about Chad and many, many other issues around the world. At what point do you step back, as you all talk strategically and tactically, and place Iraq in the overarching strategic security glob- al environment of which America is concerned and say, “When does 38 Those are the things that I think the President should certify. And after all of that, I go back and read that that was the intent of Congress, because many in Congress were concerned that Iraq was not the central front in the war on terror, that it was a diver- sion from dealing with groups that caused the problems that led to 9/11. Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. Dr. Kagan, with the polls against the war in Iraq and the surge in Iraq and the media certainly fanning those flames, if you will, do you think the insurgents expected President Bush to go counter to what the polls showed and actually talk about a si Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I do not, and I believe I actually dis- agree also—I am glad you brought this up so I can say that I dis- agree with my colleague's view that the Iraqis think we are going to be there forever. I think, on the contrary, most Iraqis have looked at us as having one foot out the door and ready to go at a moment's notice, and I think you have already seen some of the dominant games, begin- ning within the Shi'a community, about who is going to run the post-U.S. Iraq, which they think is coming very imminently. I do not think that anyone over there expected us to reaffirm our commitment or recommit the necessary troops to succeed. I believe the insurgents will be surprised and dismayed, and I think that it will change the Iraqi political situation fundamentally and in a very positive direction. Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. Gentlemen, your time has expired. The gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Castor, is recognized. Ms. ČASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for your expert testimony today. At the outset of President Bush's war in Iraq, he proclaimed that he would assemble a large coalition force from other countries and that he would ask other countries throughout the world to carry part of the load. And here we are, almost 4 years later, over 3,000 American deaths, and the burden remains primarily on young Americans and National Guard and reserve troops. American tax- payers have now been asked to pay almost $400 billion to support President Bush's effort. The Iraq Study Group explained in the report that most coun- tries in the region are not playing a constructive role at all, and last week, when I listened to President Bush's speech, he did not mention any other nation or even that he would ask any other country to assist in the escalation of forces or in a supporting role, and he continues to resist any diplomatic or political effort. How do you explain this resistance to political and diplomatic ef- forts, and do you view it as another one of these strategic errors that you mentioned early on in your testimony? Dr. PERRY. I do view it as a strategic error from the beginning and an error which has been sustained through the years. We have a coalition in Iraq, but the United States comprises al- most 90 percent of those coalition forces, both in numbers and in casualties, so it is not an adequate coalition, in my mind. At this date, I think it is unrealistic to expect we are going to get other nations to provide troops to Iraq. The allies who are there now are moving in the other direction. They are planning to leave. What we 45 I would like to say I am not certain why we have not been able to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. Seventy percent of the country wants us out of there. Sixty percent say it is okay to kill an American. Now there is internal discipline and external controls, and so far all of the United States has been able to accom- plish are these external controls, and I am not sure why we don't have the internal discipline there after all of the money that we have spent, after all of the efforts our brave soldiers have given. And I would also like to take some offense saying that we never had a mission to secure Iraq, Dr. Kagan, because I think those brave soldiers worked very hard to provide security for the Iraqis. It hasn't happened, and this is a question that I would like to ask each one of you. Is the reason we have been unable to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people because we are perceived as occupiers, that the mission was wrong from the beginning; and is there any chance at all that they are going to stop seeing us as occupiers and work to- gether? And my follow-up question is what and who is the political center for Iraq, and when do you expect them to emerge, if they emerge, to start taking control of the country from the factions? So I would like to ask each one of you to answer that, please. Dr. PERRY. Yes, they do see us—it is not the whole problem, but it is an important part of the problem. I think for us to have a chance for success, we have to be able to, as quickly as possible, to turn the security problem over to the Iraqis. I do not think they are ready to do that now. I think our primary role ought to be strengthening the Iraqi Army so they can take over that security function. Only when they do that, we can start to get out of there, will the image of Americans in Iraqi minds change. Dr. KAGAN. In the first instance I would say I think Iraq-how Iraqis see us is secondary to how they see their own government. I would agree with you we have not achieved success in that meas- ure. I am less interested in the question of how much they like us than whether they can come together to form a government that is stable. So I think we can get a little confused about what the purpose of hearts and minds actually is. I did not mean to imply any denigration of the efforts of our fine soldiers in Iraq. What I have—what I was saying simply was they were not given the correct strategy from the outset. The strategy that they were given was train and transition and stand up and stand down. I would submit to you that is a large part of the rea- son why we face antipathy in Iraq. One of the obligations of an occupying power, and we were one before the sovereign Iraqi government came into being, is to pro- vide security for the people. If you are going to have forces in an- other country, there is going to be a certain amount of resentment. That can be offset if you provide the number one deliverance that those people want, and that is security. We have not been doing that because of the strategic mistake, the decision not to focus on that, and I think as we begin to turn that around and provide the number one deliverable that we can provide that justifies our con- tinued presence in Iraq, I think you will find attitudes in Iraq turn- ing around. 52 Well, we almost made it. We have time for one more Member to question. And if it is any consolation to those that did not get a chance to ask questions, I have been there before, so I know just how you feel So I will call on Ms. Gillibrand, and with that, we will thank the panel, and I will have a closing comment. Mrs. Gillibrand. Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for coming to talk to us today about these very impor- tant issues. This was indeed the number one issue in the 2006 elec- tions, and we were all sent here to find answers, and you are help- ing us to do that. When we had Secretary Gates and General Pace come in to tes- tify, both of them said that the President's plan could not work un- less there was significant progress on the political and on the eco- nomic development of Iraq. And all of you have talked a bit about those issues. And I watch your impressions and thoughts on your best advice to the President right now on how to focus our efforts on the politi- cal and the economic front. Certainly, it has been discussed to have a congressional resolution saying that we won't have permanent bases in Iraq, and we won't have a claim on the oil as a way to set the stage for diplomacy. And we have also had discussion, and the President mentioned in his speech, the issue of the Iraqi oil revenues. We were unable to get clear answers in our last hearing about the current state of the oil revenues and how indeed they will be effectively transferred to the Iraqis, and then, once transferred, how they can be divided among the three sectarian groups, and then there can be some oversight to make sure that that is maintained. And second, the reconstruction contracts. Currently most of the reconstruction contracts are being handled by Americans; if we can shift them effectively to the Iraqis so their 20-year-olds are rebuild- ing the roads and the schools and hotels and working to rebuild their own country. And then third, many of you talked about a regional peace sum- mit to actually bring in our allies and countries that we are not necessarily allied with to begin to participate. Can you speak to how we can increase the likelihood of this transformation taking place, and what actions the President can take on your best recommendation to make this a possibility of suc- cess, because both the general and the Secretary of Defense said it can not succeed if we don't have movement on the economic and the political front. Dr. PERRY. I think my best judgment on how we have our best chance of success in Iraq is really embodied in this Iraq Study Group report, which I helped write and whose recommendations I agree with. All three of the points that you made, I think, are things that are important to do and things that we could do. And, again, I em- phasize that whatever we do there, the emphasis has to be on the political and economic—this problem cannot be solved by the mili- tary alone, certainly cannot be solved by the U.S. military alone, and every general that I have talked with has that view. PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD JANUARY 17, 2007 no nation anywhere in the world can escape the consequences of continued chaos in the Middle East. 5. Further U.S. military escalation in Iraq will not make Iraq more secure. Doubling down on a bad hand as we have done repeatedly by sending more troops to Iraq will not change the outcome. Statements by President Bush and other top officials that the United States is not winning but not losing," are misleading. In asymmetrical guerilla warfare, the insurgents win if the occupying power does not. The situation in Iraq has reached a point at which even former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a leading advocate of invading and staying the course, has acknowledged that military victory is no longer possible in Iraq. The additional 21,500 U.S. troops that would be sent in over the next five months represents a marginal increase in the U.S. combat presence in Iraq, not a decisive number. Even if the United States had the necessary number of men and women with the technical and language skills available to operate as a true stabilizing force or to embed with the Iraqi units--which it does not--the additional troops would likely be unable to significantly improve Iraq's security situation, certainly not without a major shift in political and diplomatic strategy. Iraq now has more than 300,000 members in its security forces which do not lack the necessary training to quell the violence. In fact, some of them have more training than the young soldiers and Marines the United States has sent to Iraq. Iraq's security forces are not tasked with fighting a major conventional war against a significant military power. Rather, what they need to do is essentially police work to stop Iraqis from killing other Iraqis. The central problem with Iraq's security forces is not skill building or training. It is motivation and allegiance. Most of the 10 divisions in the Iraqi Army are not multiethnic. They are staffed and led by members of their own sect. The problem is that the units are reluctant to take military action against members of their own groups who are perpetrating the violence. 75 that the situation in Iraq was positive and in 2006 that we needed a surge of as many as 80,000 more troops. Now many of these same pundits, who apparently seem to have no sense of shame about their previous errors, are telling us to ignore the bipartisan recommendations of the Iraq Study Group to begin to withdraw troops, open a regional dialogue with Iran and Syria, and take a comprehensive diplomatic approach to the region. Instead, they want to throw more good money after bad, by sending more troops to achieve their version of victory in Iraq, i.e. a stable democratic Iraq that will transform the Middle East. 8. The 110th Congress has a Responsibility to the American People. Any new proposal must have the support of the American people and the international community. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. to wage a war of choice effectively if it dos not have the support of the American people. After all it is they who must send their sons and daughters, husbands and wives into the conflict and spend their hard earned dollars on waging this conflict. The American people made it clear in the Congressional elections and in recent public opinion polls that they do not favor further military escalation but want a diplomatic surge, and want us to begin to withdraw. Similarly without international support, the ability of the U.S. to get other nations to share the human and financial burdens declines. Even our closest allies, the British, refuse to join us in the latest military escalation and will continue to withdraw, By May the British will reduce the number of their soldiers and Marines from 7,000 to 3,000. In 2003, there were more than 20,000 coalition troops in Iraq. Today there are less than 10,000. Even when the American people supported the initial invasion they did so on the condition that it be multilateral The president may say that he does not have to listen to the American people. The Congress should not let him ignore this most fundamental principle of democracy. 78 undermine U.S. efforts to defeat the global terrorist networks that attacked the U.S. on 9/11. Choosing this course would be, as Sen. Smith notes, absurd and maybe even criminal. The only responsible path forward is a new, forceful strategy that marshals the right assets for the challenges the United States faces in Iraq, in the Middle East, and around the world and redeploys our forces strategically over the next 18 months. The Center for American Progress has not received any federal grants for the past three years. 14