Y 4.F 76/2:S.PRT.110-34 110TH CONGRESS 2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. PRT. 110–34 CHAIN REACTION: AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST Ꭱ E Ꮲ 0 Ꭱ Ꭲ TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE I ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION FEBRUARY 2008 Pennsylvania State University Libraries JUN - 3 2008 Documents Collection U.S. Depository Copy Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations Available via World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/ index.html U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 39-674 PDF For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DEMINT, South Carolina ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director (II) viii clear-armed Iran, and provides policy considerations that would re- duce the chances the state would respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Based on 5 months of research and interviews with hun- dreds of officials and scholars in the United States and seven Mid- dle Eastern countries, this report comes to the following conclu- sions for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey: SAUDI ARABIA (CHAPTER 3) The development of a Saudi nuclear weapon represents one of the most serious and most likely consequences of an Iranian acqui- sition of nuclear weapons. If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, it will place tremendous pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow suit. The only factor that would likely dissuade the Saudis from pursuing a nu- clear weapon would be a restored United States-Saudi bilateral re- lationship and a repaired Saudi perception regarding the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. If the United States does not take deliberate actions in the coming years to achieve both of jectives, an Iranian bomb will almost certainly lead to a Saudi bomb. The vast majority of individuals interviewed believe that Saudi Arabia represents the country most likely to pursue a nuclear weapon in response to an Iranian bomb. Significant disagreement among many parties exists regarding the Saudi's final decision, as well as their capability to obtain a nuclear weapon. However, high- level U.S. diplomats in Riyadh with excellent access to Saudi deci- sion-makers expressed little doubt about the Saudi response. These diplomats repeatedly emphasized that an Iranian nuclear weapon frightens the Saudis "to their core” and would compel the Saudis to seek nuclear weapons. Those who believe Saudi Arabia would not respond to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons by pursuing a weapon of its own usually emphasize one of three arguments. The first suggests the value the Saudis place on their relationship with the United States would dissuade them from taking a nuclear decision that would se- verely damage their most important bilateral relationship. Un- doubtedly, Saudi Arabia values its relationship with the United States. The United States has served as Saudi Arabia's most im- portant security guarantor since 1945. However, Saudi Arabia val- ues its relationship with the United States because the United States has served Saudi Arabia's interests. If Saudi Arabia comes to believe the United States cannot or will not protect the Kingdom and its core interests, the Saudi regime will not hesitate to develop the independent means to deter its enemies. If the United States does not take assertive steps now to restore Saudi faith in the U.S. security guarantee, this will increase the likelihood that the Saudis will respond to a perceived decline in the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and the emergence of an Iranian nuclear threat by pur- suing an independent nuclear deterrent. The second argument frequently cited relates to the character of the regime. Some argue the Saudi regime is too conservative, too timid to take such a bold and controversial step. However, the Saudi regime's undoubtedly conservative and occasionally timid ap- proach to foreign relations has not kept Saudi Arabia from taking covert and controversial measures in the past in order to protect ix its interests. The Saudi acquisition of 50–60 CSS-2 missiles, 10–15 mobile launchers, and technical support from China at a cost of about $3 to $3.5 billion in the late 1980s provides an example. These missiles, which represent some of the longest-range missiles in the world, were acquired by the Saudis after the U.S. decision not to sell the Saudis surface-to-surface missiles. This Saudi move- apparently conducted without the knowledge of Israel or the United States-reflected anything but a conservative or timid ap- proach. While the acquisition of a nuclear weapon would represent a much greater challenge to the bilateral relationship, the CSS-2 affair demonstrates that in order to ensure its own security, Saudi Arabia will not hesitate to aggressively bypass or risk alienating the United States in order to protect Saudi interests. The third argument often cited relates to Saudi Arabia's nuclear technology capabilities. Saudi Arabia lacks the human expertise and the technical knowledge necessary to develop a nuclear weap- ons program on its own. Experts consistently describe Saudi Ara- bia's nuclear infrastructure and know how as far inferior to Egypt and Turkey. However, many individuals emphasize that the U.S. should not underestimate Saudi Arabia's ability to buy the tech- nology required. Many scholars and U.S. diplomats believe Saudi Arabia may have some sort of formal or informal understanding with Pakistan regarding nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Saudi Ara- bia have common interests and complementary assets. Pakistan has a nuclear capability and limited money, while Saudi Arabia has no nuclear capability and virtually unlimited money. While no solid evidence exists to confirm the formalization of such an ment, some circumstantial evidence suggests an agreement or "un- derstanding" may exist. EGYPT (CHAPTER 4) An Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would ignite a heated debate in Cairo as to whether Egypt should pursue nuclear weap- ons. Although such a development in Iran would hasten Egypt's nuclear energy efforts, in the view of almost all of those inter- viewed, Egypt would most likely choose not to respond by pursuing its own nuclear weapons. The potential Israeli response and the impact on Egypt's relations with the United States represent the most important reasons. Two pillars undergird Egyptian national security strategy: peace with Israel and a security partnership with the United States. While both Israel and America remain very un- popular with the Egyptian people, the Egyptian regime relies on peace with Israel and aid from the United States to maintain its security and its power. An Egyptian pursuit of nuclear weapons would destabilize—if not topple-the Israeli and American pillars of Egypt's national security strategy. Egyptian leaders considering a pursuit of nuclear weapons would need to consider the Israeli re- sponse. If the past is any indication, there is no reason to believe a new Egyptian nuclear weapons program would evade Israeli at- tention. Such an Egyptian program and the Israeli response could reignite open hostility between the two states. Additionally, an Egyptian nuclear weapons program could severely damage the bi- lateral relationship between Egypt and the United States. Egypt leans heavily on U.S. aid, as well as U.S. military assistance, and an Egyptian nuclear weapons program would endanger both. Therefore, as long as peace with Israel and a security relationship with the United States remain in Egypt's interest, the disincentives for an Egyptian nuclear weapons program appear to outweigh the incentives. However, two wildcards—the response of Israel and Saudi Arabia to an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon—could decisively shape Egypt's response. If Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon in the next few years, this would represent a major strategic and political shock to Israel. As a result, the Israeli Government would face tremendous domestic political pressure to respond in an ex- plicit and bold way. The nature of the Israeli response could prove decisive in shaping Egypt's response to an Iranian bomb. Secondly, a Saudi acquisition of a nuclear weapon would substantially shift Egypt's cost-benefit analysis regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Egyptians see themselves as the natural leaders of the Arab world, based largely on Egypt's proud history, its dominance of Arab culture and media, its large population, and its relative mili- tary prowess. However, staff frequently encountered a feeling among Egyptian officials and scholars that Egypt's leadership role has deteriorated in recent years. Egyptians view Saudi Arabia as the country attempting to replace Egypt as the leader of the Arab world. While Saudi Arabia has only one-third of Egypt's population, Saudi Arabia's oil wealth and its role as “guardian of the two holy mosques” give it a unique position from which to challenge Egypt's leadership. Within this context of competition between Egypt and Saudi Ara- bia, a Saudi acquisition of a nuclear weapon would represent a uniquely threatening challenge to Egypt's self-conception and re- gional influence. While Egypt would view an Iranian bomb as a negative and disconcerting development, in the end, Iran does not epresent an Arab or Sunni power. Thus, despite Tehran's efforts to blur ethnic and religious differences, it is unlikely that Iran will ever be able to unify Sunni Arab powers beneath its leadership. The same cannot be said of the Saudis. The Saudis are Arab and they are predominantly Sunni, and in sharing these two important characteristics with Egypt, a Saudi nuclear bomb would represent a more proximate and more serious threat to Egypt's prestige and national identity. In short, the manner with which Israel and Saudi Arabia respond to the potential Iranian acquisition of nu- clear weapons will have a potentially decisive influence on Egypt's decision regarding nuclear weapons. TURKEY (CHAPTER 5) If Iran acquires nuclear weapons in the next decade, this would also place significant pressure on Turkey to follow suit. Turkey and Iran do not see themselves as adversaries, but Turkey believes the centuries of peace and relative stability between the two states and their predecessor empires derive primarily from the rough balance of power between them. A nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically tip the balance in Iran's direction. Turkey believes this increased Iranian power would lead to a more aggressive Iranian foreign pol- icy and a marginalization of Turkey. Such a development would significantly undercut Turkey's desired role as a respected and powerful mediator between east and west. In such a scenario, there would be strong voices in the Turkish General Staff, as well as among ultra-nationalist politicians, arguing for Turkey to respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Thus, the possibility still exists that Turkey would respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by developing nuclear weapons as well. At the same time, there are significant disincentives to a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons. First, doing so would severely damage United States-Turkish relations, which represent an essential com- ponent of Turkish national security. Second, such a development would endanger Turkey's good standing in NATO, another key component of Turkey's national security. Third, a Turkish pursuit or acquisition of nuclear weapons would seriously undercut any re- maining chance of Turkish accession into the European Union. Fourth, powerful popular voices within Turkey would likely oppose a Turkish attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Unlike Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, the democratic system in Turkey would enable these popular forces to influence Turkey's decisions on these issues. Staff believes U.S.-Turkey relations and Turkish perceptions re- garding the reliability of NATO will serve as the decisive factors in Turkey's decision regarding nuclear weapons. If the bilateral re- lationship with the United States is poor and Turkey's trust in NATO low, Turkey would be more likely to respond to Iranian nu- clear weapons by pursuing nuclear weapons as well. However, a fully restored bilateral relationship with the United States and a renewed Turkish trust in NATO provide the best means to discour- age a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, staff found evidence of strain in the U.S.-Turkey relations and skepticism regarding the reliability of NATO security assurances for Turkey. Prior to President Bush's meetings with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan on November 5, 2007, Turkish-United States relations were at one of the lowest points in memory. Since this visit, relations between the two countries have begun to rebound, but much work remains. Also, real and perceived delays and failures of NATO in fulfilling its commitments to Tur- key in 1991 and 2003 have contributed to a widespread Turkish disenchantment with NATO. If these Turkish perceptions toward the United States and NATO do not significantly improve, an Ira- nian bomb could lead to a Turkish bomb. CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL LESSONS ON NUCLEAR “ROLL FORWARD” AND “ROLLBACK" If Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapons ca- pability in the next decade, preventing a nuclear chain reaction in the region would represent one of the most difficult and complex challenges the U.S. has confronted in years. Fortunately, a signifi- cant case study history already exists that provides invaluable in- formation on why states make decisions with regard to the develop- ment or relinquishment of nuclear weapons programs. According to a comprehensive study by the National Defense University's (NDU) Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 29 states have pursued nuclear weapons (“roll forward”) since 1945. Of these 29 states, 18 of them willingly abandoned their programs-a deci- sion often called “rollback.”1 This substantial sample size offers four particularly valuable patterns and lessons that can inform U.S. policy in the Middle East. First, there rarely exists a single explanation for a nation's deci- sion to pursue nuclear weapons. According to the NDU study, the most influential “roll forward” factors have been: assessment of threat, breakdown of global nonproliferation norms, national pride and unity, personal leadership, strategic deterrent, and perceived weakening of security alliances. The most influential “rollback” fac- tors have been: foreign pressure, impediments to development, international standing, personal leadership, net loss of security, and a reassessment of the threat.2 While this list clearly under- scores the preeminent role of security calculations in the decision of states regarding the development of nuclear weapons, other fac- tors consistently impact the nuclear decision as well. Scott Sagan, a respected nuclear proliferation scholar, highlights the importance of security considerations in the nuclear “roll forward” decision, but he also emphasizes the influential role of domestic sources. Accord- ing to Sagan, the parochial interests of actors in the nuclear energy establishment, important interests within the professional military, and domestic interests of politicians can increase the likelihood that a country will pursue nuclear weapons.3 Other scholars agree that one can not dismiss the importance of domestic factors, but place greater emphasis on individual political leaders. For example, it is difficult to ignore the pivotal role of Nasser (Egypt), Gaddafi (Libya), Ben-Gurion (Israel), and the Shah (Iran) in their respective 1 The countries that have “rolled back” include Norway, Italy, Indonesia, Egypt, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Yugoslavia, South Korea, Taiwan, Romania, South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Libya. The Iraqi program was discovered and reversed by force and the Iranian program continues. verting Future rimane and Roberntinues. 2 Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons From Rollback for Pre- venting Future Proliferation,” Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Defense University, 27 June 2007). 3 Scott D. Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” Current History (April 1997). (4) the next two decades. A Middle East populated by a Saudi, Egyp- tian, and/or Turkish nuclear weapons capability could dramatically reduce regional security and could significantly endanger U.S. in- terests. The U.S. must take in the next 2 to 3 years to reduce Arab and Turkish threat perceptions and to restore their confidence in the U.S. or U.S.-led security guarantee. Absent deliberate U.S. ac- tion in the next few years, the future Middle Eastern landscape l number of nuclear armed or nuclear weapons capa- ble states vying for influence in a notoriously unstable region. 12 When asked if Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weapons in response to Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, senior and mid- level Saudi leaders echo the official Saudi line, dismissing the no- tion as “ridiculous” and saying Saudi Arabia would be the “last country to get nuclear weapons.” Several senior Saudis suggest that Saudi Arabia would rather rely on a U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, when pressed, some senior Saudi officials candidly state that SAG would seek to obtain nuclear weapons or rely on a nu- clear guarantee from Pakistan while simultaneously buying parts on the market. It is entirely possible that such statements simply represent an effort by the more hawkish members of the Saudi inner circle to promote a U.S. attack on Iran. However, too many other factors suggest Saudi Arabia would take these steps to dis- miss these comments as disingenuous. While the senior members of the Saudi regime have an especially "hawkish” perspective on Iran, in a meeting with sever of the Majilis ash-Shura (the Saudi Parliament), staff found a per- spective quite distinct from the opinions expressed by senior and mid-level officials of the Saudi regime. While these Majilis mem- bers have limited influence over the decisions of the Saudi govern- ment, their views provide some insight into viewpoints outside the royal family. This group of Majilis members unanimously ques- tioned the reliability of U.S. claims that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons (this meeting took place before the 2007 NIE), dismissed the threat posed by Iran, and opposed a U.S. attack on Iran. One Majilis member appeared to summarize the consensus view saying "Haven't we had enough wars . . . war is not in the interest of anyone.” Another member predicted that a U.S. attack on Iran would cause the Shia to “stand with Iran” and would cause the Sunni to hate America even more. Members unanimously decried a perceived U.S. double standard when it comes to Israel and Iran, asking why the United States turns a blind eye to alleged Israeli nuclear weapons while opposing the alleged Iranian nuclear weap- ons program. Members unanimously supported Iran's pursuit of nuclear energy and questioned why the United States would talk directly and unconditionally with the North Koreans, but would not do so with Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Sunni-Shia Dimension While much of the Saudi perspective toward Iran and the Ira- nian nuclear program can be understood from a traditional security and balance of power perspective, a complete understanding of the Saudi viewpoint requires an appreciation of the sectarian dimen- sion as welſ. Despite public diplomatic niceties exchanged between the two powers, Saudi officials view Iran as a “global ideological threat” and a dangerous potential adversary. The Saudis base their view on 3,000 years of history and the events of the last few dec- ades. However, a large portion of the Saudi perception of Iran is rooted in sectarianism. The Saudis view the Iranian threat at least partly through a Sunni-Shia lens. If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, the Saudis will, to a large ex- tent, view it as a “Shia bomb.” The Sunni-Shia divide would rep- resent a major incentive for the Saudis to respond to an Iranian nuclear weapon by pursuing one of their own. To understand how 14 state. However, the 1979 Iranian Revolution dramatically exacer- bated both of these problems. The new Iranian regime questioned the Islamic credentials of the Saudi regime, criticized the Saudi re- gime's relations with the United States, and emboldened the Shia residing in Saudi Arabia. In 1979, encouraged by the Iranian Revo- lution, the Saudi Shia took to the streets in Saudi Arabia's eastern provinces to commemorate Ashura—a Shia rite outlawed by the Saudi regime that mourns the death of Hasan and Husayn. The Saudi regime responded by dispatching 20,000 National Guard sol- diers. The following year, the Saudi Shia held large demonstrations and a series of strikes in Qatif to commemorate the first anniver- sary of Khomeini's return to Iran.. The Saudi National Guard re- sponded aggressively, killing some demonstrators and dispersing the rest. Following these uprisings, the Organization of the Islamic Revolution developed. This clandestine Shia organization rep- resenting the Saudi Shia in the eastern province was comprised primarily of students from the University of Minerals and Petro- leum in Dammam and workers in the oil fields. This organization broadcasted from Iranian radio stations in an attempt to reach the Saudi Shia and opened an information office in Tehran to promote political activism among the Saudi Shia.? The anti-Saudi rhetoric of the Iranian Government promoted agitation among Saudi Shia and escalated tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. war broke out between Iran and Iraq in 1980, Saudi Ara- bia sided with Sunni-led Iraq against the Shia-dominated Iran. Saudi Arabia felt threatened by both states. Both Iran and Iraq had larger populations and more powerful militaries than Saudi Arabia. Saddam Hussein's efforts to promote pan-Arabism and Iran's attempt to export its form of Islamic revolution threatened the Saudi regime. However, Saudi Arabia provided an estimated $25.7 billion in aid to Irag because Saudi Arabia saw Iran's export of Shia Islamic revolution as the greater of the two threats. As the Iran-Iraq war continued throughout the 1980s, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca for the Hajj became another source of reli- giously grounded tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Each year, thousands of Iranians made the trip to Mecca to participate in this important Muslim tradition. While in Saudi Arabia, many Iranian pilgrims would organize demonstrations and denounce the Saudi regime for its relations with the United States. Clashes be- tween the Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security forces became a reg- ular fixture of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca during the decade. In 1987, major clashes occurred between the Saudi security forces and protesting pilgrims in which 400 people were killed, including 275 Iranians. After this incident, tensions mounted dramatically between the Iranian regime and the Saudi Government, with the Iranian leadership calling for the ouster of the Saudi royal family. The Saudi regime responded to the hostile Iranian rhetoric and suspected incidents of Iranian sabotage and subversion by intro- ducing a quota system partly intended to reduce the number of Ira- nian pilgrims in Saudi Arabia during the Hajj. While Saudi Arabia 6 Ibid, 143–147. 7 Ibid, 147. 8 Michael Ross, “Gulf Supply Ship Hits Mine; Sinks Another; Blast Rocks Saudi Plant on Coast; Iranian Sabotage Hinted,” The Los Angeles Times (Aug. 16, 1987). 24 hand, if the United States is not willing to sell Saudi Arabia many weapons systems, this negatively impacts the Saudi per- ception of United States reliability. Second, selling U.S. weapons systems to Saudi Arabia rep- resents much more than a single business transaction. When the United States sells a fighter, tank, or other high-dollar weapons system to a foreign country the benefit is much great- er than a financial windfall for a U.S. company. A logistical, maintenance, and training package that usually extends for the life of the system almost always accompanies the weapon system. In other words, when the United States sells a weap- ons system to a foreign country, it secures a 20-year relation- ship that helps cement the bilateral relationship. Third, selling U.S. weapons to America's allies and friends enables the future interoperability of U.S. military forces and the forces of the nation that purchases American hardware. Ei- ther now or in the future, if the United States seeks to create a seamless defense network with friendly and allied nations, common weapons systems greatly facilitate this objective. Legitimate concerns exist regarding the qualitative military advantage of Israel and some of the weapons included in pro- posed arms packages. However, Congress should understand that stalling or rejecting the sale of selected U.S. military sys- tems to Saudi Arabia will strengthen perceptions in the Arab world that the United States is an unreliable security partner. This is especially true in the case of missile defense systems. This is not to suggest the United States should unquestioningly give the Saudis anything they request. The United States should approach such arms sales in a cautious and judicious manner. However, delay or rejection of Saudi arms purchases will complicate the long-term bilateral rela- tionship and will lead Saudi Arabia to turn to Russia, China, France, or Britain for weapons. 44 few potentially decisive factors in shaping how Turkey would respond to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons.