S. HRG. 110–256
Y 4.F 76/2:S.HRG.110-256
IRAQ: AN UPDATE FROM THE FIELD
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JULY 19, 2007
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It is likely that there will be changes in military missions and
force levels as the year proceeds. If U.S. military leaders, dip-
lomats, and, indeed, the Congress are not prepared for these con-
tingencies, they may be executed poorly, especially in an atmos-
phere in which public demands for troop withdrawals could compel
action on the political timetable. We need to lay the groundwork
for alternatives so that when the President and Congress move to
a new plan, it can be implemented safety and rapidly.
I am encouraged that the President has announced he is sending
Secretary of State Rice and Defense Secretary Gates to the region
to engage in concentrated diplomacy. I would observe this diplo-
macy must be ambitious, sustained, and innovative. It must go well
beyond conferences with allied nations. We have to consider how
diplomacy can change the equation in the region in ways that en-
hance our prospects for success in Iraq.
Regional diplomacy is not just an accompaniment to our efforts
in Iraq, it is the precondition for the success of any policy that fol-
lows the surge. We cannot sustain a successful policy in Iraq over
the long term unless we repair alliances, recruit more international
participation in Iraq, anticipate refugee flows, prevent regional ag-
gression, generate new basing options, and otherwise prepare for
future developments. If we have not made substantial diplomatic
progress by the time a post-surge policy is implemented, our op-
tions will be severely constrained, and we'll be guessing at a viable
course in a rapidly evolving environment.
I believe the most promising diplomatic approach would be to es-
tablish a consistent forum related to Iraq that is open to all parties
in the Middle East. The purpose of the forum would be to improve
transparency of national interests so that neighboring states, in-
cluding Syria and Iran, would avoid missteps. It would be in the
self-interest of every nation in the region to attend such meetings,
as well as the United States, the EU representatives, or other in-
terested parties. The existence of a predictable, regular forum in
the region would be especially important for dealing with refugee
problems, regulating borders, exploring development initiatives,
and preventing conflict between the Kurds and the Turks.
A consistent forum in the Middle East is particularly salient, be-
cause that region suffers from conspiracy theories, corruption, and
the opaque policies of nondemocratic governments. We should be
meeting with states on a constant basis and encouraging them to
meet each other as a means of achieving transparency. We should
not underestimate the degree to which the lack of transparency in
the Middle East intensifies risks of conflict and impedes solutions
to regional problems. A constant, predictable, diplomatic forum
would allow countries and groups to keep an eye on one another.
And such a forum would make armed incursions more risky for an
aggressor. It would provide a means of applying regional peer pres-
sure against bad behavior. It would also complicate the plans of
those who would advance destructive sectarian agendas. If nations
, or groups decline to attend or place conditions on their participa-
tion, their intransigence would be obvious to the other players in
the region.
We know the task of initiating even a partial military redeploy-
ment from Iraq will be an extremely complicated and dangerous


Provincial Reconstruction Team there, to get an assessment of the
kind of damage these attacks do. And they work on fault lines-
political, sectarian, psychological fault lines. And they continue.
So, this is the context, Mr. Chairman, in which the Iraqi Govern-
ment and Iraqi people must deal with their present and their fu-
ture. And it is not at all easy.
I certainly will not try to present the Iraqi Government to you
as a model of smoothly functioning efficiency, because it's not. It
faces considerable difficulties. The stresses, the strains, and the
tensions throughout society are reflected in the government. And if
there is one word that I would use to sum up the atmosphere in
Iraq—on the streets, in the countryside, in the neighborhoods, and
at the national level—that word would be “fear.” This is the fear
with which Saddam Hussein so effectively inculcated the country,
it's a fear that's been intensified by the sectarian strains. For Iraq
to move forward at any level, that fear is going to have to be re-
laced with some level of trust and confidence. And that is what
the effort at the national level is about. That is what the bench-
mark process is about-national reconciliation—which is another
way of talking about some basic level of national confidence. You've
all seen the report. You know that Iraq has a considerable way to
go.
At this stage in the process, many of my efforts are focused on
not only the push to help the Iragis achieve benchm
velop the processes by which the work of the government might be
carried forward, and in which confidence of those in government,
and the people around them, might be further developed.
I will give you just one example, very briefly. That is, the evo-
lution of what the Iraqis are calling the Executive Council. This is
the Presidency Council. The Kurdish President and the two Vice
Presidents, one Shia and one Sunni, are meeting now on a regular
basis with Iraq's Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki. Meetings are
now scheduled every Sunday morning. There is a secretariat to
help staff the four officials. There is an agenda. There are prepared
minutes of the meeting. This brings, in particular, the leader of
Iraq's Sunni community together with the Prime Minister in a
venue where they can deal with the crises of the moment, but also,
we hope, over time, chart a way forward on achieving both the leg-
islative benchmarks and also the spirit of reconciliation that has to
underlie them.
Mr. Chairman, both you and Senator Lugar spoke of the region,
and I would just make a few remarks in that context, and then,
if you'll permit me, come back very briefly to address other
comments you made about levels of government below the central
authority.
As you know, Iraq exists in a tough region. It was precisely to
engage the neighbors in a constructive manner that we supported
the establishment of the neighbors forum, which, as you know, has
now met at the ministerial level, one time in Sharm el-She
the beginning of May, and we look forward to further such meet-
ings. This process also established a set of working groups, one of
which has already met, the energy working group in Istanbul, at
the end of last month, and two others are now scheduled, one on
refugees, in Amman next week, and another on border security, in


grerever, are the
these
And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to take your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN CROCKER, AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is with pleasure that I appear before the committee
for the first time since my confirmation hearing in February. Last week, the Presi-
dent submitted to Congress an interim assessment of the Government of Iraq's
progress toward achieving a number of political, economic, and security bench-
marks.
I believe it is a fair assessment which demonstrates that while the Government
of Iraq is making some progress, there is still much to do and much room for im-
provement. As we approach September, I and other senior-level Embassy officials
are—on a daily basis-personally engaging with the highest levels of the Govern-
ment of Iraq to make clear that progress on the benchmarks is imperative, to sug-
gest ways forward, and to serve as honest brokers to promote compromise. At the
working level, we also maintain daily contact with members of the Iraqi Council of
Representatives, from committee heads to rank-and-file members, to monitor
progress and serve as advocates for agreement on, and passage of, key legislation.
We do much of our work discreetly. Those who would like to see our efforts fail
in the hopes of stalling forward momentum past September 15 are quick to recast
our efforts as U.S. coercion and infringements upon Iraqi sovereignty. Recently,
there were public demonstrations in Iraq's No. 1 “oil city,” Basra, condemning Amer-
ican pressure toward passage of a hydrocarbons law. But discreet should not be con-
fused with ineffective, and we continue to make progress.
I would like to add a general note of caution, however, about benchmarks. The
benchmarks can be a useful metric; but the longer I am here, the more I am per-
suaded that progress in Iraq cannot be analyzed solely in terms of these discrete,
precisely defined benchmarks because, in many cases, these benchmarks do not
serve as reliable measures of everything that is important-Iraqi attitudes toward
each other and their willingness to work toward political reconciliation.
For example, I think if the committee examines the legislative benchmarks, it is
quite possible that Iraq could achieve few of them over the coming months and yet
actually be moving in the right direction. Conversely, I think it is possible that all
the legislative benchmarks could be achieved without making any real progress to-
ward reconciliation. Merely passing legislation without a broad consensus of all
major Iraqi communities will not meet the goals of real or lasting reconciliation.
Moreover, passing laws without the requisite consensus will undermine the political
will for implementation on the ground following enactment. The benchmarks are
useful tools if we remain focused on the broader context—the fundamental reconcili-
ation issues facing Iraq that the benchmark legislation represents.
Furthermore, I would note that the framework of these benchmarks focuses on
the central government's capabilities and does not capture achievements made at
the provincial level. The progress in the provinces, if properly nurtured, could be
the basis for more substantial reconciliation efforts: A grassroots effort that pro-
duces security and prosperity for the citizens of Iraq.
Our Provincial Reconstruction Teams report that local governments are taking
the initiative—meeting the basic security needs of their citizens, planning and budg-
eting for reconstruction projects, and taking control of their futures by resisting
al-Qaeda. It is this kind of activity that provides a level of encouragement that po-
tential shortcomings at the national level may be offset by the affirming activities
of state and local governments. Moreover, Iraqis at the local level are seeing the re-
sults of an improved political and economic process which is critical for a broader
national reconciliation.
Realizing that local government, small business, services and employment must
play a vital part in the stabilization and sustainability of a self-governing Iraq, we
have sharply increased the number of our PRTs, and we are strengthening their
staffs. We have deployed 10 new PRTs this year and 4 more will be coming in early
September. I have to be honest and say we have not yet deployed enough people
in those teams, and we are in the process of expediting staffing efforts.
I know the committee is interested in our New Embassy Compound-a project
which has benefited from your support. Overseas Buildings Operations Director Wil-
liams has assured us, as well as the Congress, that the NEC is on schedule and
on budget for completion in September. We seek to move personnel into the safer


10
characterize all of Iraqi society as tribal. There is also a very rich
urban society of long standing, certainly in Baghdad, but also in
other regional centers, such as Mosul, Kirkuk, and Al Basrah.
And, indeed, at a political level, while there are political move-
ments that may be largely tribally based, there are also others that
are very much crosscutting. The Iraqi Islamic Party, for example,
the largest Sunni party in the coalition, is, to a large degree, an
urban phenomenon, a middle-class urban phenomenon, of long
standing. So, yes, tribal society is very important in understanding
and dealing with Iraqi politics, but it's much more than that.
The CHAIRMAN. I—
Ambassador CROCKER. You are absolutely right, sir—
The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, I'm sorry.
Ambassador CROCKER. You're absolutely right, sir, in my view, to
emphasize the element of fear, because that has permeated all
echelons of the society in this country, whether it's rural or urban,
tribal or cosmopolitan. And that has to be overcome, in my view,
Mr. Chairman. Whatever models the Iraqis choose, I would be con-
cerned that none of them are going to work in the interest of Iraq's
long-term security and stability, unless and until Iraqis, at various
levels-local, provincial, regional, and national-are able to work
through the fear that has been imposed on them into, and toward,
a level of trust that at least permits basic compromises to take
place and a new society to begin to build.
The CHAIRMAN. In the interest of time, if I could interrupt you
to get to a couple more questions, if I may—and I don't disagree
what you've said—with what you've said. But the bottom line here
is that almost 4 million Iraqis, many of them in that middle class
from those urban areas, have either fled internally within Iraq or
left the country. As I understand it, it's close to 1.9 million dis-
placed in the country, 2 million have left the country. I think we're
kidding ourselves if we think you can, from the center—from the
center-build a system that eliminates the fear in the provinces, in
the outside the urban areas. And I have been very disturbed that
this administration's failure to push for the ability of this constitu-
tion to take form has, in my view, led to this continued over-reli-
ance on the idea that Maliki, or anyone else, no matter how well
intended, representing elements of Sunni, Shia, and Kurd, would
be able to, from the center, eliminate this fear.
Now, let me get to my next point. I believe there is no possibility
we will have 160,000 troops in Iraq, a year from now. It's just not
going to be the case. So, time is running out in a big way. And so,
unless we do something, in my humble opinion, like we did in the
Balkans, which you're very familiar with, which is set up a loosely
federated system—we've had 20,000, on average, troops there -
troops there—for 10 years. Not one has been killed, thank
God. It's not a answer to everything. But the genocide is stopped,
and they're becoming part of Europe. To think that we can accom-
plish reconciliation from the center, I find to be well beyond any
reasonable expectation.
And let me get to my last question. You say that the bench-
marks—in your statement-are not a reliable measure. Then, what
is the measure of whether or not political process and reconciliation
is taking place? And I would add, the very progress you show in


20
I hope it is true. I hope those are the long-term consequences for
that region. But I think once al-Qaeda is, in some way, minimized,
our presence there may become the greatest focus of the Sunnis,
who do not like it that we are there. So, I would urge everyone to
not be so sure that Al Anbar is taken care of, any more than
Basrah was taken care of when everybody thought that was done,
or Hillah province, where I was taken, because that's a safe place.
The fact is, these places come and go. And if we are so naive as
to think that, sort of, we're done with a place, we hav
the lessons that caused us to make the mistake in the first place,
of invading a civilization that, frankly, is extremely complex. That
applies to Anbar, as well.
On a different matter, Ambassador, the interim assessment re-
port, released last week, states, “Left on their own, many ISF units
still tend to gravitate to old habits of sectarianism when applying
the law.” Indeed, there have been reports in a number of media
outlets, of ISF complicity in attacks on U.S. forces. Can you discuss
with us the extent to which members of the ISF are participating
in sectarian violence?
Ambassador CROCKER. As the report notes, there are problems of
sectarianism within the Iraqi Security Forces, primarily in the
Iraqi police, and especially the Iraqi national police, less so, as far
as I can determine, in the Iraqi Army, although it does exist there,
too.
This is a major problem, Senator. And, again, one sees it in dif-
ferent parts of Baghdad. I have discussed, before, the sense I get
from people out there, that they're really counting on U.S. forces.
They're the ones who secure a particular neighborhood. They feel
that their army is—has got the right orientation and intention,
they're less sure of the capabilities.
When one asks about the police, a lot of people I've talked to, and
our colleagues have talked to, have very serious concerns, because
they have been involved in sectarian violence themselves. This is
something that the Iraqi Government is aware of. It has taken
some actions. Clearly, it's going to have to take more actions if
there is to be an Iraqi police that truly is involved in the protection
of its—of the Iraqi people, and is perceived as such by those people.
Senator FEINGOLD. Well, what sort of action-
Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, I'd just make one comment on Al
Anbar. Sorry.
Senator FEINGOLD. Go ahead. Well, I was just going to ask, what
actions have been taken
Ambassador CROCKER. I wanted to make one -
Senator FEINGOLD. I'm sorry.
Ambassador CROCKER. There have been arrests of police offi-
cers—some senior, some junior. Whole units have gone back in for
retraining. There are efforts now to monitor the performance and
the orientation, the actions, of police units. But, again, I would not
want to suggest that this is a problem that, by any means, has
been fixed. It is a problem, and it's going to need a lot more applied
attention.
Senator FEINGOLD. And, please, your comment on Anbar.
Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. I certainly wouldn't want you, or
any of the other members, to think that I was going beyond the


23
I know we've had discussions in regional capitals about the im-
portance of these governments, given this is a common enemy, of
taking every step they can to ensure that their young men don't
make this particular trip up to Damascus and then across into
Iraq. I think we're just going to have to keep at them, both collec-
tively, in a regional context, through regional diplomacy, and bilat-
erally.
Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer.
Senator BOXER. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for
your leadership on continuing to push for a political solution, which
I think makes eminent sense.
And, before Senator Hagel leaves, I really have a rhetorical ques-
tion I'm going to ask, which doesn't require an answer. It's really
a way of expressing my own frustration.
As Senator Hagel has pointed out—and, I think, very
straightforwardly—here you have an Iraqi leader who says to the
Americans, “You can go home now. We're fine. Don't stay here on
our account.” So, I guess the question—the rhetorical question I
have is: How many Americans have to die while we're buying time
for an Iraqi Government whose leader says we don't need to be
there?
And so, to answer my own question—it's not a single one should
have to die for that.
And, no—and I hope the people in the audience will not respond
to this, one way or the other. The point is, there's a deep feeling
of frustration and outrage in this country as we ke
dollar after dollar, and life after life, into a place where the people
say they don't really want us there.
Now, al-Qaeda is a serious problem, sir. And, by the way, thank
you so much for your sacrifice and what you're doing for your coun-
try. I can't thank you enough for it. But the bottom line is, 53 Sen-
ators, a majority of the Senate, voted to change this mission, be-
cause we know al-Qaeda's there. They're 15 percent of the problem,
according to the Bush administration. And we're saying, “Get our
troops out of the middle of a civil war, where 85 percent of the
problem is coming from. And, yes, redeploy them out, so they can
be a force to act quickly to go after al-Qaeda.”
And I just have another question, a real question for you, that
deals with one of the comments that you made, and that is that
you, kind of, put aside the benchmarks, really, basically didn't
think they were important. As a matter of fact, this past Saturday,
sir, you said, “I think electricity is more important to the average
Iraqi than all 18 benchmarks rolled into one.”
So, I decided to look at what's happening on the electricity front.
May 16, for the week of May 9–15—and this is State Department
report-national electricity supply was 2 percent below the period
in 2006. May 23, national electricity supply was 11 percent below
the same period in 2006. May 30, national electricity supply was
7 percent below the same period in 2006. June 6, below the same
period in 2006 by 3 percent. June 13, 8 percent below the same pe-
06. June 20, it was unchanged from the same period.


35
I hope that you will review this paper, and the many other recommendations that
have been proposed, as you fulfill the responsibilities of being our Commander-in-
Chief. My prayers are with you and our nation.
Sincerely,
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH,
United States Senator.
Enclosure.
THE WAY FORWARD IN IRAQ
It is in our Nation's security and economic interests to begin to change our strat-
egy in Iraq and initiate a plan for a responsible military disengagement. We have
lost 3,530 lives to military operations in Iraq. We have spent over $378 billion plus
the funds that were appropriated in the most recent supplemental bill. Our national
debt is rising and our government is being forced to abandon critical domestic prior-
ities. Our public image to the world has deteriorated drastically and continues to
suffer. If we proceed on the current path, we will endanger our Nation's long-term
competitiveness and well-being. Moreover, political realities in Washington will force
change. As we approach the 2008 Presidential election campaign, the people of the
United States may choose to elect a President that promises an immediate with-
drawal. This could be very dangerous for the region and American national security
interests. Therefore, it is time to deal with the realities—the inevitability of our
eventual disengagement—and begin the planning for a new way forward in Iraq.
Military Disengagement Does Not Equal Abandonment
It is absolutely critical that we avoid being forced into a precipitous withdrawal,
whether it is because of world events or our own political atmosphere at home. The
dangers of a precipitous withdrawal include the potential destabilization of the re-
gion; the disintegration of United States relations with various allies in the region;
the endangerment of vital energy supplies in the Middle East; and irreparable dam-
age to the credibility of the United States throughout the world (especially if we
leave and a humanitarian crisis ensues). If we lose the opportunity to implement
a responsible military disengagement on our own terms, we may find ourselves un-
able to prevent the aforementioned dangers. Therefore, we must formulate a strat-
egy for disengagement that seeks to prevent these outcomes and protect our long-
term, strategic interests in the region.
While our men and women in the field courageously fight day in and day out,
complex power struggles in the region and among Iraq's religious sects and political
factions continue to undermine American troops. Iraq's elected government has not
yet proved capable of forging a political reconciliation and winning the support of
these groups. Following the second attack on a Shiite shrine in Samarra, Iraq's Gov-
ernment has grown increasingly nervous as political factions split even further.
Shiites are now fighting with Shiites in neighborhoods that were previously calm.
According to the testimony of numerous experts and officials who have testified to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee, Iraq's problems cannot be solved with a military solution alone. Rather,
Iraq's future rests largely on political solutions within the Iraqi Government, its
perceived leaders and Iraq's neighboring countries where American influence is lim-
ited. Currently, the only leverage we have to influence these actors and trigger polit-
ical cooperation is through the presence and/or removal of our military forces from
Iraq.
Unfortunately, the presence of American forces in Iraq is being exploited by Iraq's
political actors, religious sects, and militias, as well as al-Qaeda, other foreign fight-
ers, and Iraq's neighboring countries. Their leaders are not moving quickly to make
responsible decisions and change the situation, because the continued presence of
American forces fuel their arguments and make compromise unnecessary. Therefore,
our best chance of stabilizing Iraq is to develop and implement a strategy for United
States military disengagement that is coupled with a robust diplomatic effort to con-
tain instability and protect our interests in the region. It is time the Iraqi Govern-
ment and its regional neighbors take a greater responsibility in stabilizing this
situation. Military disengagement is the only way to force Iraq's leaders and neigh-
boring countries to make the difficult decisions needed to create stability and pre-
vent a catastrophe in the region. Only by initiating such a strategy can we hope
to achieve all of the following goals:
Compel Iraq's leaders and neighbors to take actions that will support sta-
bility in Iraq and prevent chaos in the region;