4.AR 5/2:IR 1/3
Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility:
Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial
Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan

U.S. House of Representatives • Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations
April 2008
Committee Print 8


On the Cover
Top Left
A soldier from the Asadabad PRT of the Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force is warmly
greeted in Manoi, Afghanistan. (U.S. Army photo/ Spc. Harold fields)
Top Right
E-PRT member Captain Trisha Mustaine attends the first meeting of the newly-formed Hawr Rajab Women's
Committee in Babil Province, Iraq, on February 7, 2008. {Department of State photo)
Bottom Left
Panjshir province Gov. Bahlol Bahij (left) and Brig Gen Bill Hyatt, 455th Air Expeditionary Wing commander,
perform the ribbon cutting of the Panjshir Provincial Printing Press, May 26, 2007. The people of Panjshir
worked with the Panjshir PRT to acquire the printing press and renovate the building which houses it. (U.S.
Air Force photo/ SrA Dilia DeGrego)
Bottom Right
An Afghan engineer talks with USAF Captain Paul Frantz during a visit by the Nangarhar PRT to a local metal
working shop, November 6, 2007. (U.S. Air force photo/ SSgt Joshua T Jasper)





Acknowledgements
We want to thank our fellow subcommittee members and the subcommittee staff. We
would also like to thank all of the members of the House Committee on Armed Services and
the committee staff, particularly: Chairman Skelton and Ranking Member Hunter, and staff
members Erin Conaton, Bob DeGrasse, Robert Simmons, Paul Oostburg Sanz, Andrew
Hunter, Michael Casey, Stephanie Sanok, Julie Unmacht, Aileen Alexander, Mark Lewis,
Loren Dealy, Lara Battles, Christine Lamb, Josh Holly, Linda Burnette, Nancy Warner,
Rebecca Ross, Cyndi Howard, and Derek Scott. We would also like to thank the House
Armed Services Subcommittees on Readiness, Military Personnel, and Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, as well as their staffs. Finally, we want to thank our
own military legislative assistants, fellows, and schedulers: Dan Madden, James Lively, Toby
Watkins, Justin Johnson, Caryll Rice, and Tressa Merola, as well as the rest of the
subcommittee MLAs for all of their assistance.
We also want to thank those outside the committee who assisted in this effort,
including those from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military
services, the International Security Assistance Force, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of State, in particular, the
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Office of Provincial
Affairs, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and the regional bureaus, who responded to
our many requests for hearing witnesses, briefings, documents, and travel support, as we
examined this issue. We also would like to thank the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army
War College, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the Joint Forces
Staff College, the National Defense University, and the Foreign Service Institute for hosting
our visits. In addition, we wTould like to thank the personnel at the 189th Infantry Brigade, the
XVIII Airborne Corps, and the U.S. Army's Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
Command at Fort Bragg, the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, U.S. Joint Forces
Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations
Command, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army Human
Resources Command for their support during our visits. We would like to thank the
Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service, the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned for their
invaluable assistance. We particularly thank the men and women in the legislative affairs and
legislative liaison offices of these organizations, whose work with us throughout this project is
grcady appreciated.
We also need to thank many experts, including those from several non-governmental
organizations, the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
the Center tor a New American Security, the Project on National Security Reform, and the
RAND Corporation. We also would like to thank the students at the Woodrow Wilson School
of Public and International Affairs for sharing the results of their work on PRTs with us.
Agency Stovepipes versus Strategic Agility
7


Our greatest expression of thanks goes to the military personnel and civilians who
have served or are serving on Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. We
think these are a remarkable group of people working within a system that places additional
challenges in their way, limiting both their success and their ability to know what progress they
are making. Many of them aided this investigation immensely by speaking with us, both on
and off the record. This report attempts to ensure that their contributions are recognized,
their challenges addressed, and their insights applied to future interagency endeavors. We owe
it to them to do what we can to help fix the system that is supposed to support them.
Finally, and perhaps, most importandy, we recognize that efforts are underway, both
within and outside of government, to reform interagency integration. As a result of last year's
defense authorization legislation, the Department of Defense contracted with the Project for
National Security Reform to perform a year-long study of the national security interagency
system. We look forward to the assistance their proposals and recommendations may provide
in addressing interagency reform in a deliberate and comprehensive way.
Vic Snyder W. Todd Akin
Lessons We Need to Learn from provincial Reconstruction Teams
8


Introduction:
Of Agency Stovepipes and "Strategic Agility"
America will change our approach to help the Iraqi government.. .We will
double the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These teams bring
together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue
reconciliation, strengthen the moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi
self-reliance. And Secretary Rice will soon appoint a reconstruction
coordinator in Baghdad to ensure better results for economic assistance
being spent in Iraq.
President George W. Bush
Announcing the Iraq Surge
January 10, 2007
The Iraqi people quickly realized that something dramatic had happened.
Those who had worried that America was preparing to abandon them
instead saw...our troops, along with Provincial Reconstruction Teams that
include Foreign Service Officers and other skilled public sen-ants, coming in
to ensure that improved security was followed by improvements in daily life.
Our military and civilians in Iraq are performing with courage and
distinction, and they have the gratitude of our whole nation.
President George W. Bush
State of the Union Address
January 28, 2008
Often, PRTs have been left on their own, with little strategic guidance,
minimal funding, a lack of staff, and overly restrictive security requirements.
The arrival of PRTs in Iraq may be too late to be of real value, and their
presence in Afghanistan may lack critical mass to make a difference. PRTs
will need to change to in order ro fulfill their promise—and too much should
not be expected of them.
Frederick Barton
Center for Strategic and International Studies
HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing
September 5, 2007
Agency Stovepipes versus Strategic Agility
i l


increased to 15. As of March 2008, the Department of Defense reported that the number of
e-PRTs decreased to 13, which may be due to the redeployment of the brigade combat teams
within which they were embedded. During that same timeframe, the number of PRTs
increased from 10 to 11.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams exemplify the type of interagency stability- operations
units deemed by the Administration to be essential to reconstruction and counterinsurgency.
General Petraeus specifically included e-PRTs in his 10-point counterinsurgency guidance and
recognized that to fully use military and civilian capabilities, the e-PRT civilians needed to be
integrated in all aspects of MNF-I operations "from inception through execution."13 However,
PRTs and e-PRTs are not subject to a unified or comprehensive plan for stability, security,
transition, and reconstruction in either Iraq or Afghanistan. The December 7, 2005 National
Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) established the interagency policy framework
for preparing, planning for, and conducting stabilization and reconstruction activities. It
directs the Department of State to lead these USG efforts in close enough coordination with
the Department of Defense "to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S.
military operations across the spectrum of conflict." The Secretary of Defense issued guidance
that the Department should prioritize stabilization and reconstruction activities at a level
comparable to combat operations in the form of DOD Directive 3000.05, published in
November 2005. However, earlier this year, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England
directed the revision of DODD 3000.05. Reportedly, the new directive will incorporate
stability operations into the Irregular Warfare Koadmap}6

Spc. Ashley N. Stermole, a medic with the Gardez PRT, diagnoses children during a MEDCAP
mission at the Gardez Orphanage. (Armyphoto/Sgt. Chuck D. Meseke)
15 David Petraeus, "Multi-National Force - Iraq Counterinsurgency Guidance,"
http.7/www.forceaenenne.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/Contemporary Studies/2U07/2007-Jun/2007-06-06 MNF-
I COIN Guidance-Summer 2007 v7 hasp. Accessed August 29, 2007.
16 "England Commissions Wide-Ranging Irregular Warfare Directive," lnsideDefense.com, February 8, 2008.
Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams
16


How We Did It: Study Methods
In pursuing our project over six months, subcommittee members and staff
participated in 17 congressional and staff delegation trips, including 5 visits to Provincial
Reconstruction Teams and the U.S. Embassies in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the
NATO/ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan. Travel within the United States included trips to:
Central Command, Special Operations Command, and Joint Forces Command Headquarters;
Fort Bragg, where PRT training is conducted; Fort Campbell, home of the 101st Airborne
Division, which is replacing the current U.S. headquarters in Afghanistan; and the
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, National Defense University, and Foreign
Service Institute. While subcommittee members were only able to visit one non-U.S.-led PRT,
run by Turkey in Afghanistan, the subcommittee benefited from concurrent research carried
out by a group at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. This analysis, comparing
U.S. and non-U.S. NATO PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, was supported by interviews with
officials in host nation capitals.18 Finally, staff also met with NATO ISAF personnel in
Afghanistan and in Washington.
The subcommittee held eight hearings on this topic, including three specifically on
interagency integration and national security reform for reconstruction and stabilization
operations. Among the 30 witnesses at these hearings were the senior administration officials
responsible for these operations, as well as leading practitioners, scholars and analysts.
Additionally, members received five briefings, including two panel discussions with former
PRT members. Subcommittee staff received more than 50 briefings, many by USG personnel,
and a number of which were with private volunteer and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) performing relief and humanitarian assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to
reviewing USIP's 2005 survey of PRT members'9 and holding informal interviews and
meetings with PRT members, the Oversight and Investigations staff conducted a formal
survey of more than 95 current and former PRT members who served within the last 2 years
(Appendix C).
Finally, in addition to our work on PRTs, the subcommittee conducted a parallel effort
on the civilians from DOD and other federal agencies who deploy for PRT and other work in
the zones of conflict. Since our findings for that investigation go beyond those specifically
focused on PRTs, we have decided to publish that study separately in order for it to get the
attention it deserves. That report is titled, Deploying Federal Civilians to the Battlefield: Incentives,
Benefits, and Medical Care, and will be posted on the committee website.
17 See Appendix B for details.
18 Nima Abbaszadeh et al, Proiwcial Reconstruction Teams, I Jissons and Recommendations, Woodrow Wilson School of
Public & International Affairs, Princeton University, January 2008.
19 USIP Oral History Project on Stability Operations, http://www.usip.org/library/oh/.
Agency Stovepipes versus Stra'it.gic Agility
17


Leadership: Who's in charge?
There is a lack of unity of command resulting in a lack of unity of effort.
Iraqi officials commonly suffer from something we call interlocutor fatigue,
where a whole parade of U.S. officials—a major, a colonel, a PRT team
leader, a USAID guide, a contractor who works for USA1D—will come in at
various points and will meet with Iraqi leaders. And so, it is very easy to see
how Iraqis get extremely confusedf,] and how PRTs spend an inordinate
amount of time trying to coordinate and still fall short because there is too
much coordination that needs to go on.
Ginger Cru%
Deputy Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing
September 5, 2007
Command and control varies with the leadership of the teams and their related
military commands and civilian supervisors. Essentially, there are multiple chains of
command: through the military, the Office of Provincial Affairs, the embassies, and
Washington-based country representatives of the departments and agencies. The PRTs thus
lack clean lines of authority, and the coordination procedures between civilian and military
personnel are disjointed and incoherent, which can have the unintended effect of making a
PRT's operations personality-driven. In Iraq, U.S.-led PRTs receive operational guidance from
the Ambassador and Commanding General of MNF-I, but all U.S.-led PRTs notionally report
to the Chief of Mission. They receive further policy guidance and support from the Office of
Provincial Affairs, and security and transportation support from MNF-I. In Afghanistan,
PRTs receive policy guidance from the PRT Executive Steering Committee in Kabul, which is
co-chaired by the Afghan Minister of the Interior and the ISAF Commander. Each coalition
country's PRTs are organized and staffed differently. In any case, the Executive Steering
Committee's place in the chain of command, its responsibility, and its authorities appear to be
weak. Operational issues are addressed by a subordinate PRT Working Group, which also
includes the United Nations (UN) and relevant embassy representatives. But, U.S.-led PRTs
receive operational guidance from the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) commander, dual-
hatted as the Regional Command-East commander. This arrangement effectively grants the
sitting maneuver force commander the authority to reassign a PRT's security force to other
missions. The CJTF commander reports to CENTCOM as well as to the ISAF NATO
commander.
The three PRT principals in Afghanistan—the Departments of Defense and State and
USAID—tend to function as partners, but with the military "commander" acting as the senior
partner. While this arrangement works well where a spirit of cooperation and unity prevails,
PRTs will benefit from a more coherent structure that relies less on getting the right
personalities together at the right place and time. Each agency's officer in the tri-partite PRT
leadership reports back through his or her "parent" chain. Civilian leaders also ostensibly
report directly back to the DOS regional bureaus or the Director of Foreign Assistance (dual-
hatted as the Administrator of USAID), rather than the State Coordinator for Reconstruction
lessons we Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams
20


available for PRTs in Afghanistan. However, in fiscal year 2007, CERP obligations in Iraq
increased to $879.9 million while decreasing to $206.0 million in Afghanistan. The rationale
for this trend is unclear, but it could reflect the growing use of CHRP funding in support of
wider counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.
Other actors (BCTs, RCTs, and agencies represented at the Embassy) have funds to
apply to programs similar to those the PRTs typically fund, including humanitarian aid,
governance, rule of law, and development projects. The chart below, provided to the
subcommittee staff at a DOD, DOS, and USAID joint briefing, highlights the complexity
facing PRTs as far as funding is concerned, and highlights why national-level coordination is
needed. PRTs have the greatest access to funding where the circles overlap as between the
Local Governance Program and the Provincial Reconstruction Development Council funds.
They have some, but not direct, access to funds where the circles touch. They do not have
access to the funds where the circles do not touch or overlap. The briefers indicated that this
chart, identifying all of the various U.S. Government funding sources that have an impact at
the provincial level, had to be specially created for the briefing. The briefers told staff the
chart had taken a fair amount of time and consideration to construct because the funds are
not controlled or coordinated centrally; rather, different agencies control the different funds.24
USG Funding Sources with Provincial Impact
r- Program funds are controlled by various agencies
>" Economic Support Fund (ESF) is the primary program funding source for PRTs
r- PRTs serve as a coordination tool to ensure alignment of strategy, minimize duplication, and
maximize synergy

o
= ESF PRDC
•
= QRF
o
= Coordination
Partner
-4 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Department of State, and Agency for International
Development briefings for House Armed Services Committee and House Committee on Foreign Affairs staff,
January 10-11, 2008. Dollar amounts have been deleted.
Agency Stovepipes versus Strategic Agility
23


Findings and Recommendations
Introduction
This section of the report takes the information the subcommittee obtained and organizes
that information into a series of findings and recommendations. Each of these sections begins
with a brief recap of the relevant background material that informs the findings and
recommendations within those sections. The findings and recommendations are made from
three different perspectives, which are broken into three sections:
(1) "Provincial Reconstruction Teams at the Tactical and Field Level"
(2) "Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction - Policy and Guidance for PRTs
from the Combatant Commands and Operational Level; and the services' and
agencies' "Organize, Train, and Equip" Mission"
(3) "DOD Directive 3000.05 and National Security Presidential Directive 44 - Policy and
Guidance at the National Level."
There is a sense that PRTs are having some success connecting with their local
counterparts. However, they are bound by the limits of their expertise and the support they
receive from related military units, embassy country teams, and agencies in Washington. Our
findings and recommendations are meant to outline persistent challenges and ensure that the
people who do this difficult and dangerous mission have the tools and resources they need
and should have.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams at the
Tactical/Field Level
Provincial Reconstruction Teams must have clear objectives against which to measure
success or from which to identify alternate ways and means for achieving success. They must
have a clear, unified chain of command to achieve unity of effort. They must have the right
resources both in terms of funding and in terms of qualified personnel. Funding streams must
make sense so they can be coordinated and deconflicted. Senior military and civilian leaders in
Iraq and Afghanistan must also develop an idea of what PRTs will become as coalition forces
transition from military combat and counterinsurgency missions to overwatch missions.
Ultimately, the United States must define the conditions under which PRTs are no longer
needed and more traditional diplomatic and development platforms can be used.
As mentioned above, the subcommittee was not surprised that PRTs were begun in an
ad hoc manner. However, we were amazed that, after five years, the PRT mission has not been
Agency Stovepipes versus Strategic Agility
31


Recommendation:
The Departments of Defense and State should adopt a Provincial Reconstruction Team
strategy (using an "ends, ways, and means") approach to determine and measure PRTs'
progress, and to determine whether the PRT activities align with overall operational and
strategic goals. The Departments of Defense and State should also adopt a performance
monitoring system that measures the PRTs' effectiveness and performance and their progress
in meeting milestones for clearly defined objectives, including milestones for the eventual
transition of the PRT mission to more traditional diplomatic and development efforts.

Provincial Reconstruction Team (and Stabilization
and Reconstruction) Interagency Unity of Command
Findings:
(1) Neither the stabilization and reconstruction activities, nor the civilian and military
personnel serving on Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq,
enjoy unity of command. This shortcoming inhibits unity of effort, which can result
in uncoordinated, and even counterproductive, outcomes.
(2) Rather than having unity of command, PRTs in both Iraq and Afghanistan operate
under complicated, disjointed and, at times, unclear chain(s) of command and receive
direction from multiple sources.
Recommendation:
The Departments of Defense and State should unify leadership and command of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams to match accountability with authority and to ensure unity of effort.

Use of the Commanders' Emergency Response
Program (CERP) funds in Iraq and Afghanistan
Findings:
(1) The demand for Commanders' Emergency Response Program funds in Afghanistan is
rising. Reasons for this increased demand include: increased military presence and
activity in southern Afghanistan; expanded work and funding needs of Provincial
Agency Stovepipes versus Strategic Agility
35



Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams after
Provincial Iraqi Control and the Expiration of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1790
Findings:
(1) When a province transitions to Provincial Iraqi Control, U.S. military presence is
usually reduced and units move to a posture of operational overwatch.
(2) The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iraq are negotiating a strategic
framework agreement to provide the requisite authorities for U.S. presence in Iraq
subsequent to the expiration of United National Security Council Resolution 1790 on
December 31, 2008.
(3) As the security situation in Iraq improves and the U.S. moves from a United Nations
Security Council Resolution mandate to a strategic framework agreement, U.S.
military presence in Iraq will likely decline and the work of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, with their focus on governance and economic development, will take on
greater importance.
(4) It remains unclear:
a. whether embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams whose brigade combat
teams or regimental combat teams redeploy will remain in place;
b. whether PRTs operating in a province under Provincial Iraqi Control will be
able to carry out their objectives, and whether they will continue to need
significant coalition military support; and
c. whether all or some of the PRTs will remain in place when a strategic
framework agreement takes effect.
Recommendations:
(1) The Secretaries of Defense and State should notify Congress when they disband a
PRT or e-PRT, or merge any combination of PRTs or e-PRTs in Iraq.
(2) The Secretaries of Defense and State should report to Congress on:
a. how the United States provides for the security and support of PRTs, e-PRTs,
and similar units operating in provinces under Provincial Iraqi Control; and
b. how the United States will provide for the security and support of PRTs, e-
PRTs, and similar units, subsequent to the expiration of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1790.
Agency Stovepipes versus Strategic Agility
37


The Department programmed an increase in the CA force from 64 reserve companies
in fiscal year 2007 to a total of 112 in fiscal year 2011. The number of active component CA
companies will grow from 6 in fiscal year 2006 to 16 in fiscal year 2009. Now is the time to
rationalize the relationship between Civil Affairs and PRT or PRT-like efforts.
By now most non-CA organizations involved in staffing PRTs have begun to
understand the importance of specific training for these missions. Training for military
personnel and civilians has improved since 2003 when there was essentially no specific
reconstruction and stability training. Nevertheless this training must still be rationalized and
improved. Organizations should not standardize for standardization's sake. There are benefits
to making Iraq and Afghanistan (and civilian and military training) more similar, and joining
training efforts together to a greater extent would help both the people and their missions.
Training is the keystone of the PRT effort. For U.S-led PRTs in Afghanistan, the
Army conducts training for Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel (active duty, guard, and
reserve) at Fort Bragg. PRT commanders and the PRT's senior military staff receive theater-
specific and mission-specific classroom training for a period of three weeks before their teams
arrive for more general pre-deployment training, which is a combination of classroom
education and field training. Field training resembles that for all military personnel deploying
to theater. Several weeks later, the interagency civilian personnel arrive at Fort Bragg for three
weeks of classroom education and field training focused mostly on survival skills and on
participating in the final mission rehearsal exercise. PRTs are not included in National
Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center Brigade mission rehearsal exercises for
maneuver units.
In addition to the training at Fort Bragg, most of the 2008 PRT military commanders
traveled to Afghanistan to conduct pre-deployment site surveys and meet with the
commanders they would be replacing. The Air Force PRT commanders were also able to
attend the final pre-deployment mission rehearsal exercise at Fort Campbell for the division
headquarters (101st Airborne Division) under whose command they will operate. The
interagency civilian PRT members did not participate in these pre-deployment activities.
There is no PRT-specific training for military personnel going to Iraq. However,
contract role players assuming the role of PRTs are used in pre-deployment exercises at
combat training centers to familiarize maneuver unit commanders and personnel with the
PRT concept. The purpose of this is to emphasize to the maneuver unit commanders that
they must coordinate their efforts with PRTs. Interagency personnel have recently begun to
participate in the design of these role playing scenarios. Military personnel deployed as
individual augmentees and DOD civilians and contractors receive pre-deployment training at
the Combat Readiness Center at Fort Benning, but this training is not PRT-mission specific.
These personnel receive further force protection orientation in Kuwait and Iraq.
The Department of State developed and offers PRT-related classroom training at the
Foreign Service Institute (FSI). The training is currently optional for the DOS personnel who
will serve on PRTs. However, the current Director of the Office of Provincial Affairs told the
subcommittee that she will not accept DOS personnel who have not attended the classroom
Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams
40



Civil Affairs Role in Stability Operations
Findings:
(1) While the Army has increased the number of Civil Affairs (CA) personnel in its force
structure, and the other services have established CA units or are developing civil
affairs capabilities, there is no joint CA effort or command.
(2) Civil Affairs skills closely resemble those needed to conduct stability operations, which
DOD Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05) establishes as a core military mission on
par with combat operations. DODD 3000.05 requires the military to prepare to
perform all stability operations tasks needed to establish and maintain order when U.S.
government civilians cannot do so.
(3) Some Civil Affairs (CA) reservists provide functional expertise from their civilian
experience and education, similar to those required in stability operations. CA units
traditionally have a very high personnel and operations tempo. Army Force
Generation and Army Reserve Expeditionary Force requirements and mobilization
authorities can impact CA units' training and availability for deployment for Provincial
Reconstruction Team and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations.
(4) The Provincial Reconstruction Team experience in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates
that the military could provide personnel to man the PRTs, but the non-Civil Affairs
general purpose forces personnel deployed did not have the requisite training or
desired technical and specialty skills to perform the PRT mission effectively.
Recommendation:
The Secretary of Defense should determine the role Civil Affairs (CA) forces will play as the
Department makes stability operations a core military mission on par with combat operations
and as stability operations are conducted throughout the full spectrum of conflict, including
determining:
a. the overall anticipated CA requirement;
b. whether the programmed CA force structure supports the direction of the
Secretary of Defense to make stability operations a core mission on par with
combat operations;
c. whether proponency for the general purpose CA units is appropriately placed;
d. whether sufficient stability operations competencies are being developed in the
non-CA general purpose forces;
e. whether additional innovative authorities would assist in bringing needed CA
competencies into the force on a temporary basis;
f. whether the active/reserve component mix is appropriate given the continued
demands for CA units and personnel; and
g. whether a joint command structure for CA is appropriate.
Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams
44


POD Directive 3000.05 and National Security
Presidential Directive 44 - Policy and Guidance
at the National Level
At the Washington level, our challenges involve longer-term strategy, larger structures,
and more complex processes. There is a significant amount of activity aimed at improving and
supporting greater interagency integration for missions like PRTs and future stabilization and
reconstruction operations. For instance, the Director of S/CRS, Ambassador John Herbst,
told the subcommittee, "Building civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization is
essential to our national security and I have no doubt that the U.S. Government will have this
capability in the next ten years."34 However, our overriding conclusion is that, after more than
six years of war, and, despite the recognition that our nation's future national security
challenges and opportunities will almost certainly require a "whole of government" approach,
progress in achieving meaningful integration of efforts has been limited and far too slow.
Most importantly, these efforts have not assisted the people the nation has asked to perform
difficult and dangerous missions today nearly enough.
More can be done now. An independent study should be conducted to better
determine the requirements for, and the respective civilian and military roles in, stability
operations as these operations transition through the spectrum of conflict. An independent
study is particularly appropriate because it will both complement the roles and missions study
Congress has required the military services to undertake in 2008 and because it can serve to
clarify issues as the Department reevaluates the relationship of stability operations within the
context of irregular warfare.33 Subordinating stability operations within irregular warfare, as
appears to be the intent of the Department's policy revision, may send an unintended message
of strategic proportions to our adversaries and allies, as well as to our citizens.
Regardless of the Department's ongoing reevaluation, we return to our earlier
observation that non-DOD departments and agencies must have more capacity to deploy and
operate overseas with military forces in all phases of peace and conflict. Consequently,
additional structural changes which, among other improvements, would further empower the
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and increase the number of
Foreign Service Officers and other civil servants who by disposition and position can be
deployed for contingencies, are important. Building capacity and changing structures will not
be enough. Unity of command is missing at the tactical and operational levels. Perhaps more
critically, that absence exists at the national level as well. The result is that there is no
"quarterback" for PRTs. There is no quarterback for stability, security, transition, and
reconstruction planning and operations. There is no quarterback for interagency coordination
and actions. The nation needs these quarterbacks now.
34 Statement of Ambassador John Herbst before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight &
Investigations, October 30, 2007.
35 Section 941, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181).
Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams
50


the course of our study this subcommittee has been pleased with the bipartisan cooperation
and support of related committees at the staff and member level, particularly with the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform. During the course of our investigation, other congressional efforts to more closely
coordinate national security issues have also moved forward, including the Working Group on
National Security Interagency Reform, created by subcommittee members Susan Davis (D,
CA) and Geoff Davis (R, KY), and the House Armed Services Committee Roles and Missions
Panel, which recendy called for more creative thinking about the future of national security
issues. Still, more remains to be done.
Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams
54


Appendix A: Acronyms
BCT
Brigade Combat Team
CA
Civil Affairs
CDR
Commander
CENTCOM
U.S. Central Command
CERP
Commanders' Emergency Response Program
COCOM
Combatant Command
COIN
Counterinsurgency
CORDS
Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
CSI
Civilian Stabilization Initiative
DOD
Department of Defense
DODD
Department of Defense Directive
DOS
Department of State
e-PRT
Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team
ESC
Executive Steering Committee
ESF
Economic Support Fund
EU
European Union
FM 3-0
Army Field Manual 3-0 (Operations)
FOB
Forward Operating Base
FSI
Foreign Service Institute
FSO
Foreign Service Officer
GAO
Government Accountability Office
GPF
General Purpose Forces
HASC
House Armed Services Committee
ISAF
International Security Assistance Force
JCP
Joint Campaign Plan
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC
Joint Force Commander
JFCOM
Joint Forces Command
LGCD
Local Governance and Community Development
MEF
Marine Expeditionary Force
MNC-I
Multi-National Corps - Iraq
MNF-I
Multi-National Force - Iraq
MOF
Ministry of Finance
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA
National Defense Authorization Act
NGO
Non-Governmental Organization
NSC
National Security Council
NSPD
National Security Presidential Directive
OPA
Office of Provincial Affairs
OPCON
Operational Control
OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Agency Stovepipes versus Strategic Agility
57


One respondent noted that, though his PRT had a good relationship with the military, "If
Brigade did not like you it would have been difficult." In addition to insufficient security
during movement, many respondents noted that their already understaffed teams were
responsible for security and administration while on the FOB, further straining their
personnel. Additional force protection was a consistent request across all surveys in both
countries (excluding e-PRTs), and many suggested that a combat maneuver element should be
dedicated to each PRT.
Interpreters: "Country-wide shortage."
Access to interpreters varied across the PRTs. Many reported that while a sufficient
number of interpreters and Bilingual Bicultural Advisors were provided, quality was both
more important, and more inconsistent, than quantity. When asked if his team had a sufficient
number of interpreters, one respondent seemed to summarize the general opinion when he
wrote, "Yes in total, but only a few were well qualified and trustworthy." Some survey
participants reported infighting over who controlled and tasked interpreters. A lack of
qualified interpreters sometimes meant that missions were delayed or documents were not
translated. Specifically, respondents called for additional female interpreters, as well as
interpreters with functional subject matter expertise, validated language skills, and security
clearances.
Strategic Challenges
Strategy, Metrics, and Tracking: "Unclear what everyone was working
towards."
When asked about their mission, survey participants generally believed that it
encompassed reconstruction, security and counterinsurgency, extending the rule of the central
government, and winning hearts and minds. However, they were often surprised by the lack of
instruction given to them or unsure of how their projects fit into the larger mission. One
wrote, "Many of the factors contributing to success or failure were out of the PRT's control,
such as lack of clearly defined role, lack of required subject matter/technical expertise, lack of
specific instructions or standard operating procedures." As a result, many PRTs created their
own plans in conjunction with the BCT and local government officials, with one participant
noting, "We have had to 'write the book' as we go." Some respondents suggested that lack of
planning led PRTs to pursue short-term "feel good" projects (with success measured by
money spent or satisfaction of the local governor) without consideration of larger strategic
and capacity-building implications.
Many respondents noted that PRT effectiveness is hard to quantify, particularly in the
short-term. One wrote, "I'd say most of us use a 'gut' check. Although the work plan
contained an 'Indicators and Targets' column, the PRT did not have what I'd define as
specific, measurable, agreed-upon, realistic, time-sensitive performance standards nor relevant,
verifiable, consistent, easily-interpretable performance measures by which to evaluate
Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams
72