S. HRG. 110–367 Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.110-367 IRAQ BENCHMARKS HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION SEPTEMBER 7 AND 11, 2007 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services AND Pennsylvania State University Libraries AUG 20 2008 COM Documents Collection U.S. Dapository Copy U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 38–716 PDF For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia, JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Republican Staff Director (II) CONTENTS CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES A REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE'S ASSESSMENT OF 18 IRAQ BENCHMARKS SEPTEMBER 7, 2007 Page Walker, Hon. David M., Comptroller General of the United States, Govern- ment Accountability Office 10 THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND PROGRESS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN MEETING BENCHMARKS SEPTEMBER 11, 2007 Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq ............ Crocker, Ambassador Ryan C., United States Ambassador to Iraq ........ 166 192 (III) A REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNT- ABILITY OFFICE'S ASSESSMENT OF 18 IRAQ BENCHMARKS FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2007 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m. in room SH- 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McĆaskill, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Thune, and Corker. Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff di- rector; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and John H. Quirk V, security clerk. Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, re- search assistant; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member. Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A. Cronin, and Benjamin L. Rubin. Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk and Col- leen J. Shogan, assistants to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Bonnie Berge and Richard Kessler, as- sistants to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and Monica Thur- mond, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, as- sistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assist- ant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Greg Gross and Lindsey Neas, assistants to Senator Dole; David Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn; and Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune. (1) OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee wel- comes this morning David Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States, to testify on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) assessment of 18 Iraqi benchmarks for political security and economic progress. Again, we thank Senator Warner for his leader- ship and I think Senator Byrd was also involved in getting this language in the bill, which resulted in this assessment. Senator WARNER. Chairman, I'd like to also credit Senator Snowe. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Senator WARNER. She was very active, I believe, with Senator Bayh, in getting this provision in. Chairman LEVIN. We appreciate the reference to them and we would surely add them. We've all been interested in the benchmarks, and those Senators have taken a leadership role, although they're obviously not alone in this interest. The question of benchmarks has been a question which just about every Senator has become involved in. I will have more to say about what benchmarks we're talking about in a mo- ment. The Comptroller General's assessment is one of two independent reports that Congress required in approving emergency funding for operations in Iraq. The committee received the other congression- ed report yesterday, hearing from retired General Jim Jones, and other members of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq. One of that Commission's findings was that, “Political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq.” Then they said, “The single-most important event that could immediately and favorably affect Iraq's direction and secu- rity, is political reconciliation focused on ending sectarian violence and hatred.” They ended that paragraph by saying, “Sustained progress within the Iraqi security forces depends on such a political agreement.” The Jones Commission report provided a independent assess- ment of the Iraqi Army and police capability. The GAO's report, which is the subject of today's hearing, provides an independent as- sessment of whether the Iraqi Government has met the 18 bench- marks which it, the Iraqi Government, specifically committed to. Fifteen of which, according to the GAO report, were part of the international compact with Iraq and three of which were commit- ments made directly to President Bush. These assessments of the situation in Iraq, along with the testi- mony that we will receive next week from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, and the President's report which is due on September 15, are critical to Congress's understanding. So, the 18 benchmarks, reviewed by the GAO, were not created by Congress. Those commitments were made by the Iraqi Govern- ment as far back as June 2006. In fact, as confirmed by Secretary Rice in correspondence with me, 7 of the 18 benchmarks—those comprising the political, security, and economic benchmarks that are the most important for political reconciliation, had timelines for their completion, between September of 2006 and March of 2007. Now, there's two important facts that I want to single out from that statement. Number one, sometimes Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister of Iraq, says that he's not going to be bound by timelines which the U.S. Congress imposes on him or outsiders impose on him. That is not accurate. The timelines we're talking about were adopted formally by the Government of Iraq. They were approved by the Iraqi Prime Minister and Iraq's Policy Committee on Na- tional Security in September 2006. They were reaffirmed by the Iraqi Presidency Council, consisting of the President and two Dep- uty Prime Ministers, on October 16, 2006. That specific timeline, relative to the seven benchmarks, was a timeline adopted formally by the Iraqi Government and attached to Secretary Rice's letter to me. Now, when President Bush announced his new strategy for Iraq in January of this year, he stated that the purpose of the so-called surge was to provide Iraq's leaders breathing space to make the po- litical compromises necessary for progress. Again, those were com- promises that they had committed to make. In July, the administration provided its initial assessment of whether Iraq was making satisfactory progress toward meeting its political, security, and economic benchmarks, as required by Con- gress. The administration's July assessment claimed that Iraq was making satisfactory progress on 8 of the benchmarks, mixed progress on 2 others, unsatisfactory progress on 6 benchmarks, ar they didn't even provide a rating on 2 of the 18 benchmarks. The unsatisfactory benchmarks included failing to enact and im- plement legislation on de-Baathification, failing to enact and imple- ment legislation to ensure an equitable distribution of hydrocar resources, failing to allow the Baghdad Security Plan to be imple- mented without political interference, failing to ensure that Iraqi security forces provide even-handed enforcement of the law, failing to increase the number of Iraqi security force units capable of oper- ating independently, and failing to ensure that Iraq's political au- thorities are not making false accusations against leaders of the Iraqi security forces. Now, that the administration's own assessment of progress in Iraq. There were no consequences arising from the Iraqi Govern- ment's failure to meet its commitments. Instead, the President said he'd wait until September to judge what to do next. Now, the GAO's Report, which we'll hear today, paints even a more negative picture than the administration's July report. In carrying out its task, the GAO talked to numerous military and civilian officials, and gathered information from a broad range of agencies and orga- nizations, including the Department of Defense (DOD), the Depart- ment of State (DOS), the Department of Treasury, Multinational Forces Iraq, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intel- ligence Agency, the National Intelligence Council, and the United Nations. GAO personnel made multiple trips to Iraq during 2006 and 2007. By the way, while we're on the subject of the GAO personnel, we want to thank you, particularly, Mr. Walker, and your staff for not only the work that they do, which is thorough and comprehensive, but for the risks that they take when they make those multiple trips to Iraq. The GAO report concludes that the Iraqi Government has met only 3 of the 18 benchmarks. Four others have been partly met. Nearly 8 months into the new strategy, 11 of the 18 ber main unmet. The Iraqi Government has met only one of eight legis- lative benchmarks, and partly met one other, according to the GAO report. Key revisions to Iraq's constitution have not been made, laws have not been enacted on de-Baathification, oil revenue-shar- ing, provincial elections, amnesty, and disarming militias. As a matter of fact, the GAO notes that 15 of 37 members of the Iraqi Cabinet have withdrawn from the Cabinet. Of the nine security benchmarks, the GAO finds that only two have been met. It finds that two additional benchmarks have been partly met, that leaves five of the security benchmarks, the major- ity, unmet. The time is long overdue to make it clear to Iraq's leadership that there will be consequences to their failure to live up to their commitments. Failing to hold Iraq to its commitments is the defini- tion of an open-ended commitment on our part. One of the reasons to begin to reduce U.S. forces, is to put in place an action-forcing mechanism, to get the Iraqi Government to meet its own benchmarks and to take responsibility for the future of their country. I thank our witness for coming before the committee today. We look forward to his testimony. Again, special thanks to his intrepid staff for the great work that they do, not only under some risk in Iraq for this report, but also for the work that they do in so many other parts of our Government and for this Congress. Senator Warner. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll ask to place my statement into the record, given that we're about to have a vote in less than an hour. Mr. Walker, I want to commend you, as does the chairman, for your work and that of your colleagues. There are risks to all of us who take these trips over there. But, those trips are essential. I've read through your report. I think it's a constructive, well thought-through contribution to the significant group of factual in- formation that is being put before Congress and equally, if not more important, before the American people. While the President, as Commander in Chief, has to make these tough decisions, it's helpful to have the American people get a broad understanding of the complexities of this situation. I think your report does that quite fairly. So, I commend you. Mr. Chairman, I think we should just get underway. [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Mr. Walker. This Government Accountability Office (GAO) report and this hearing is part of a series of very important reports and hearings that will help shape the setting for the President, as well as Congress and the American people, as we evaluate the complex situation in Iraq at this historic time. Yesterday we received testimony from General Jim Jones and his respected team on the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. Next week, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus will testify before committees in both bodies of Congress and the administration will submit their second report on Iraqi progress to meet congres- sionally-mandated benchmarks. These reports are essential for Congress and the American people to conduct a full and informed appraisal of the situation in Iraq. Eleven months ago, I returned from my 9th trip, and said things were “drifting sideways.” In January, when the President announced his new way forward in Iraq, I was not fully supportive of all aspects of that surge. In May, I had a hand in crafting the benchmark legislation which was intended to set a common starting point and schedule for the upcoming debate. This report fulfills a requirement that is contained in legislation that I had a hand in crafting. The requirement for an independent assessment of benchmarks by the GAO was originally introduced by Senators Snowe and Bayh, and eventually in- cluded in the bill that the President signed into law in May. Public Law 110–28 requires the GAO to provide an assessment of the “status of achievement of the benchmarks.” By contrast, the administration reports whether or not satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the 18 benchmarks. As a result, the GAO assessment, in some cases, differs from the administration report because of different standards of evaluation. If Congress determines to continue this benchmark reporting, then we should ensure to reconcile this difference in stand- ards. Nonetheless, it is a very important contribution to this historic debate, if for no other reason than it comes from the GAO, always regarded as the voice of independ- ence and integrity. Mr Walker, again, welcome back before this committee and I wish to thank you and all of those involved in the preparation of this report on Iraq's benchmarks. We also recognize the personal risks associated with travel in Iraq by those involved in the preparation of this report. Yesterday, General Jones and his team provided a very thoughtful alternative strategy that involved what they called a “strategic shift.” The “strategic shift” would re-task the Iraqis to take more responsibility for daily combat operations while coalition forces would transition to "strategic overwatch” and the active de- fense of the border and critical infrastructure. In addition, I believe the Jones Com- mission report made a very forceful argument that all provinces should be trans- ferred to Iraqi control immediately. I will be very interested in your thoughts on both of those concepts. We always appreciate the benefit of the GAO analysis and look forward to your testimony and the discussions it will generate. SA 1134. Mr. WARNER (for himself and Ms. COLLINS) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill H.R. 1495, to provide for the conservation and development of water and related resources, to authorize the Secretary of the Army to construct various projects for improvements to rivers and harbors of the United States, and for other purposes; as follows: TITLE _--PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY IN IRAQ SEC. 1. FINDINGS REGARDING PROGRESS IN IRAQ, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BENCHMARKS TO MEASURE THAT PROGRESS, AND REPORTS TO CONGRESS. (a) Congress makes the following findings: ... (1) Over 145,000 American military personnel are currently serving in Iraq, like .. thousands of others since March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the United States armed forces, and are deserving of the strong support of all Americans; (2) Many American service personnel have lost their lives, and many more have been wounded in Iraq; the American people will always honor their sacrifice and honor their : families; (3) The United States Army and Marine Corps, including their Reserve components and National Guard organizations, together with components of the other branches of the military, are performing their missions while under enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. These deployments, and those that will follow, will have a lasting impact on future recruiting, retention, and readiness of our nation's all volunteer force; (4) Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating problem of sectarian and intrasectarian, violence based upon political distrust and cultural differences among factions of the Sunni and Shia populations; (5) Iragis must reach political and economic settlements in order to achieve reconciliation, for there is no military solution. The failure of the Iraqis to reach such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly contributes to the increasing. violence in Iraq; (6) The responsibility for Iraq's internal security and halting sectarian violence rests with the sovereign Government of Iraq;. (7) In December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy that includes new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq, that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly; (8) The President said on January 10, 2007, that I've made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not openended" so as to dispel the contrary impression that exists; :.... (9) It is essential that the sovereign Government of Iraq set out measurable and achievable benchmarks and President Bush said, on January 10, 2007, that'"America will change our approach to help the Iraqi government as it works to meet these benchmarks"; (10) As reported by Secretary of State Rice, Iraq's Policy Committee on National ... Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in September 2006 that were (a) reaffirmed by Iraq's Presidency Council on October 6, 2006; (b) referenced by the Iraq Study Group; and (c) posted on the President of Iraq's website; (11) On April 21, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that our (American] commitment to Irag is long-term, but it is not a commitment to have our young men and women patrolling Iraq's streets open-endedly" and that' progress in reconciliation will be an important element of our evaluation"; (12) The President's January 10, 2007 address had three components: political, military, and economic. Given that significant time has passed since his statement, and recognizing the overall situation is ever changing, Congress must have timely reports to evaluate and execute its Constitutional oversight responsibilities. SEC. 2. CONDITIONING OF FUTURE UNITED STATES STRATEGY IN IRAQ ON THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S RECORD OF PERFORMANCE ON ITS BENCHMARKS. (a) IN GENERAL.--(1) The United States strategy in Iraq, hereafter, shall be. .. conditioned on the Iraqi government meeting benchmarks, as told to members of Congress by the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and reflected in the Iraqi Government's . : commitments to the United States, and to the international community, including: (A) Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the Constitutional review; (B) Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Baathification; (C) Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy:.... resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner; (D) Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous : regions; (E) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission; provincial elections law; provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections; (F) Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty; - (G) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq; (H) Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; (I) Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations; (1) Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias; (K) Ensuring that the Iraqi Security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law; (L) Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said ''the. Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of their] sectarian or political affiliation"; (M) Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security; (N) Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad; (0) Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently; (P) Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected; (Q) Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, Page: : 56153] GPO'S PDF including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis; and (R) Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false · accusations against members of the ISF. . ; (2) The President shall submit reports to Congress on how the sovereign Government of Iraq. is, or is not, achieving progress towards accomplishing the aforementioned benchmarks, and shall advise the Congress on how that assessment requires, or does not require, changes to the strategy announced on January 10, 2007. (b) REPORTS REQUIRED.-- (1) The President shall submit an initial report, in classified and unclassified format, to the Congress, not later than July 15, 2007, assessing the status of each of the specific benchmarks established above, and declaring, in his judgment, whether satisfactory progress toward meeting these benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved. (2) The President, having consulted with the Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, The Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, the United States Ambassador to Iraq, and the Commander of U.S. Central Command, will prepare the report and submit the report to Congress. (3) If the President's assessment of any of the specific benchmarks established above is unsatisfactory, the President shall include in that report a description of such revisions to the political, economic, regional, and military components of the strategy, as announced by the President on January 10, 2007. In addition, the President shall include in the report, the advisability of implementing such aspects of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, as he deems appropriate. (4) The President shall submit a second report to the Congress, not later than : September 15, 2007, following the same procedures and criteria, outlined above,...; .... (5) The reporting requirement detailed in Section 1227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 is waived from the date of the enactment of this Act through the period ending 15 September; 2007. (C) TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESS-- mission of by the leader to ira (1) Prior to the submission of the President's second report on September 15, 2007, and at a time to be agreed upon by the leadership of the Congress and the Administration, the United States Ambassador to Iraq and the Commander, Multi- National Forces Iraq will be made available to testify in open and closed sessions before the relevant committees of the Congress, SEC. 3. LIMITATIONS ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS (a) LIMITATION.--No funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the ''Economic Support Fund and available for Iraq may be obligated or expended unless and until the President of the United States certifies in the report outlined in subsection - (2)(b)(1) above and makes a further certification in the report outlined in subsection (2) : (b)(4) above that Iraq is making progress on each of the benchmarks set forth in Section 2 above. (6) WAIVER AUTHORITY.--The President may waive the requirements of this section if he submits to Congress a written certification setting forth a detailed justification for the waiver, which shall include a detailed report describing the actions being taken by : the Unites States to bring the Iraqi government into compliance with the benchmarks set forth in Section 2 above. The certification shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. SEC. 4. REDEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES FROM IRAQ. (a) The President of the United States, in respecting the sovereign rights of the nation of Iraq, shall direct the orderly redeployment of elements of U.S. forces from Iraq, if the components of the Iraqi government, acting in strict accordance with their respective. powers given by the Iraqi Constitution; reach a consensus as recited in a resolution, directing a redeployment of U.S. forces SEC. 5. INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS. (a) Assessment by the Comptroller General. 11 ferent than whether or not the benchmark has been met, or not met, or partially met. It's also inherently somewhat more subjec- tive. But nonetheless, it's important information you need to con- sider, and compare with the report that's coming up. In this work, we received an extensive amount of documents, both classified and unclassified, and we had a team of analysts go to Iraq again in late July, early August. We interviewed numerous officials from DOD, DOS, Multinational Forces Iraq, various intel- ligence agencies, et cetera. These officials included General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Importantly, we have issued over a hundred reports and testi- monies on Iraq since May 2003. Our staff have made numerous trips to Iraq. I, myself, have been to Iraq twice. Therefore, in addi- tion to the work that we did for these 18 benchmarks, our work and any questions that I might answer are informed by these 100- plus reports and testimonies, as well as my personal interaction with my colleagues in Iraq and the Middle East; as well as my former colleagues who are graduates of Capstone, for Flag Officers, from which I was also fortunate to be able to graduate. I think it's important to note that our report does—in no way, shape, or form—serve to diminish the courageous efforts and the accomplishments of our military and those of our coalition part- ners. We're reporting on whether or not the Iraqi Government has met their commitments and to what extent that's been the case. In performing our work we used our independent professional judgment to also use a partially met criteria. I think this is very important. Because when we looked at the facts and when we looked at how best to present where things stood, we felt that there was a number of these benchmarks that we ought to consider a partially met criteria and, in fact, we did for most of them. On four of them, we gave a partially met rating because we think it wouldn't have been fair to say not met, given the substantial progress that had been made, even though clearly you couldn't say that it had been fully met. We've laid out, in our report, clearly-defined, consistently ap- plied, well-documented, and transparent criteria as to how we reached our judgments. We think that's important. Reasonable peo- ple can—and will—differ, but it's important that you be able to make your own judgment based upon what we've done. So now, if I can, let me summarize the report and I will refer to the pages of my testimony where these boards with charts ap- pear. On page 4 of my testimony, this chart shows the origin of the 18 benchmarks that I'm referring to here today. I won't spend much time on it, but they go back to 2006 and they've been reaffirmed at various points in time since then. Next graphic, please. The next one shows, which is on my left over here, shows the result of our evaluation. As a result of this, you will see that in the legislative area, one of the eight bench- marks was met, one was partially met, and six were not met. In the security area, two were met, two were partially met, and five were not met. In the economic sector, none were met, one was par- tially met, and that's all there was, it was the only one in that area. 12 I think it's important to note that we did use partially met rat- ings, in order to provide a fair and balanced view. We also added commentary on the status and in our report, to provide further con- textual sophistication with regard to where things stand. Next one over here on my right represents the status of the legis- lative benchmarks. Obviously yourselves being Members of the United States Senate, you understand that the legislative process has a number of different stages that you have to go through in order to be able to get a bill to be a law. This basically dem- onstrates where things stand, with regard to the key pieces of leg- islation that have yet to be enacted. Some have made more progress than others and hopefully more will be forthcoming. The next one shows the level of violence, specifically the average number of daily enemy-initiated attacks against the Coalition, Iraqi security forces, and civilians, from May 2003 to July 2007. This is important. We used average daily because every month doesn't have the same number of days, and so we want to try to be fair in that regard. We also broke it down between civilians, Iraqi security forces, and coalition forces so you can see the dif- ferences in those trends. These represent the total. This does not separate between sectarian and non-sectarian violence. There is a significant difference of opinion on the sectarian issue. The primary difference between us and the military is whether and to what ex- tent violence has been reduced with regard to sectarian violence. There is one party that maintains that data. That's Multi- national Force-Iraq (MNF-I), General Petraeus' group. They're the only ones that maintain that data. We're aware of that data. That data does show a decline in sectarian violence. Just as you can see here, there was a decline in total violence in July. We haven't seen the final August numbers yet, but you'll get that, presumably next week, from General Petraeus. There was an increase up until July, but a decrease in July. You'll hear next week what the results are in August. We could not get comfortable with MNF-I's methodology for determining what's sectarian versus nonsectarian violence. It's extremely difficult to know who did it, what their intent was, and therefore, we feel more comfortable looking at total violence, and breaking it down by civil- ians versus other segments. But you'll have to make up your own mind, based upon the information that you receive. Next, please. Now, this represents a comparison of GAO's most recent assessment, the one that I'm conveying to you today, and the administration's July assessment. As has been mentioned, they looked at whether or not satisfactory progress was being made, rather than whether or not the benchmark had been met or not met, if you will, so that's a different standard. But if you look at that, you'll see that in the first one, there was significant difference of opinion. The rest of them, either we agreed or we had a one difference in rating. Namely, of the three possible ratings, there was a rating difference of one. Now, next week you're going to hear an updated report. I would hope that their ratings might be better. We'll see, but I think it's important to keep in mind we're rating based on a different stand- ard than they are. You need to consider both. You need to use your 13 judgment and you need to consider both, as well as the Jones Com- mission Report, et cetera. In conclusion, as of August 30, 2007, based upon our extensive work, which included receiving information from the Pentagon right up until the day that we finalized the report, the Iraqi Gov- ernment had met 3, partially met 4, and had not met 11 of the leg- islative, security, and economic benchmarks. Importantly, in late August, Iraqi senior Shia, Sunni, Arab, and Kurdish political lead- ers signed the Unity Accord, signaling efforts to foster greater na- tional reconciliation. The Accord covered draft legislation on de- Baathification reform and provincial powers laws, as well as set- ting up a mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held without charges. Time will tell whether or not this Unification Ac- cord results in progress on the political front, which—as has been mentioned—is deemed to be key by many parties with regard to national reconciliation. As Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, in our view we believe it's important to consider not just our report, but also the reports from General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, and the Jones Commission, among others. You have an opportunity to receive input from a variety of par- ties, to compare and contrast what they're saying, and then to make up your own judgment as to what you feel is appropriate. We also think that it's important to consider, not just the bench- marks, but also military progress and various homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of the United States, including re- gional goals, national goals, and economic status, which is not here, what's going on with regard to economics in the lives of Iraqis on a day-to-day basis. Those are important factors, we think, as well. We made three recommendations in our report about what we thought would be more helpful to Congress going forward, for the administration to provide a more timely, detailed, and useful infor- mation to you. The administration agreed with those recommenda- tions and we, along with yourselves, look forward to receiving that information. Finally, I too, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, would like to thank our team. We have incredibly capable staff at GAO. They're highly educated, very dedicated, courageous—although they don't wear a uniform—and they do a heck of a job for Congress and the country, and they've done a heck of a job here Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY DAVID M. WALKER Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am pleased to appear today to discuss our report 1 on whether or not the Government of Iraq has met 18 bench- marks contained in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 20072 (the Act). The Act requires Government Accountability Office ( GAO) to report on the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. Consistent with GAO's core values and our desire to be fair and balanced, we also considered and used a “partially met” rating for some bench- marks. In comparison, the act requires the administration to report on whether sat- 1GAO, Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks (GA0–07–1195) (Washington, DC: Sept. 4, 2007). 2 Section 1314 of P.L. 110–28. 14 isfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the popu- lation, and promote economic well-being. To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency and Iraqi documents and inter- viewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands; the Defense In- telligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Coun- cil; and the United Nations. These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambas- sador to Iraq, and General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the MNF-I. We made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related reports and testimonies that we have completed since May 2003. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. SUMMARY prosme Iraqi governmies in Iraq's legation, oil rever enacted and milithother sectait to meas In summary, we found: The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 bench- marks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces and progress that has been made in several areas, including Anbar Province. The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of mi- nority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The government has not enacted legislation on de-Baathification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased—a key security benchmark—since it is difficult to measure whether the perpetrators' intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of population security show differing trends. As Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and with homeland security goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of the United States. ORIGINS OF THE BENCHMARKS The benchmarks contained in the act were derived from commitments articulated by the Iraqi government beginning in June 2006 and affirmed in subsequent state- ments by Prime Minister Maliki in September 2006 and January 2007 (see fig. 1). Iraq's commitments to these benchmarks were most recently stated in the May 2007 International Compact for Iraq. 15 Figure 1: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks 2006 2007 May 25, 2007 June Sept. Jan. Jan. Jan. May 24 Point Tragi Prime Minister National Maliki's Reconciliation Benchmarks Plan Additional President Highlights commitments Bush's Now of the Iraq by Prime Way Strategy Minister Maliki Forward 1 Review speech Jan. & Feb. Prime Minister Maliki's speeches Compact commitments by GOI BENCHMARKS Public Law 110-28 11. Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the constitutional review. 2. Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'attification, 3. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to essere that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurtis, and other tragi citizens in an equitable manner. 4. Enacting and implementing legislation on prexedures to form semi-autonomous regions. 5. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorites, and a date for provincial elections. 6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq 8. Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad secunty pian. COM 9. Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations. 10. Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite mililias. 13. Ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law. 12. Ensuring that, according to President Bush. Prime Minister Maliki said "the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation." 13. Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security. 14. Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad. 15. Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces'units capable of operating independently. 16. Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected | 17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iragi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis. 1 18. Ensuring that Iraq's political authonties are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces. Source: GAO analysis of Department of State Department of Defense, and Iragi government data. *Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October 16, 2006. In December 2006 the Multi-National Force-Iraq and government of Iraq agreed to establish the Joint Security Stations GAO ASSESSMENT OF THE 18 BENCHMARKS As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. 16 Figure 2: GAO Assessment of the 18 Benchmarks GAO assessment Status Benchmark 1. Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and completing the constitutional review, Committee formed but amendments not approved by the Iraqi legislature and no referendum scheduled. Laws drafted. 2. Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification, 3 of 4 components drafted; none being considered by parliament. 3. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sector ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds. and other traqi citizens in an equitable manner. 4. Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions. 5. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections. Law enacted; implementation scheduled for 2008. Commission law enacted and implemented; however, supporting laws not enacted. No law drafted. 7. No law drafted. 6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia arnent program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq. 8. Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad security plan, 9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations. Committees established. Forces provided, some of limited effectiveness Political intervention continues. Iraqi security forces engaged in sectarian-based abuses. 10. Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. 11. Ensuring that Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law. 12. Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said "the Baghdad security plan will not provide a sale haven for any outlaws, regardless of (their) sectarian or political affiliation." 13. Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security, Militia infiltration of some security forces enables some safe havens. Militias control some local security; unclear whether sectarian violence has decreased of 34 stations established. 14. Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad. 15. Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently. 16. Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected. 17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis. 18. Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces. Met Partially met Number of independent units declined between March and July 2007 Legislators' rights protected; minority citizens' rights unprotected. Funds allocated but unlikely to be fully spent. Unsubstantiated accusations continue to be made. Not met Source: GAO analysis of UN, U.S., afid irgi data. MOST LEGISLATIVE BENCHMARKS HAVE YET TO BE ENACTED AND IMPLEMENTED The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of mi- nority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The government also par- tially met one benchmark—to enact and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008. Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, a re- view committee has not completed work on important revisions to Iraq's constitu- tion. Further, the government has not enacted legislation on de-Baathification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. The ad- ministration's report cited progress in achieving some benchmarks but provided lit- tle information on what step in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. We provide that information below. the ristoration's repoprovincial elections, ta enacted legislat i revisions to edifically, a re- 17 Figure 3: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative Benchmarks Drafting laws Enacting Implementing Laws drafted and reviewed Ratification procedures Law published in Gazette De-Ba'athificationä Guidance issued by Prime Minister Orders written by Cabinet. Minister other Directives drahed by Director General other Hydrocarbon laws Framework Revenue sharing Ministry of Oil Restructuring fraq National Oil Company Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee Dran placed on calendar by \Speaker's Office First reading completed Draft amendad by Committee: placed on calendar by Speaker's Office Second reading completed Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's Office Third reading completed; vote taken Formation of regions Elections Electoral commission ✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓ ✓ Provincial authorities Provincial election law Provincial election dated Amnesty Disarmament and demobilization - No legislation drafted Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Delense, UN and Iraqi government cala. Notes: "The Iraqi legislature is considering several competing drafts. The Iraqi Constitution exempts the law on formation of regions from following the Presidency Council's ratification process that is set out in Article 138 of the Constitution. The draft deals with broader federal versus provincial powers, according to the United Nations. According to State, the Iraqi government may not need a law to set the election date, though to date this is unclear. other be of local seed enforcemered that powhether ifficult to MIXED RESULTS IN ACHIEVING SECURITY BENCHMARKS Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq's government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad security plan and es- tablished almost all of the planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad. The govern- ment has partially met the benchmarks of providing three trained and ready bri- gades for Baghdad operations and eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of local security, eliminated political intervention in military operations, en- sured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable of inde- pendent operations, and ensured that political authorities made no false accusations against security forces. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has de- creased—a key security benchmark—since it is difficult to measure perpetrators' in- tents, and various other measures of population security from different sources show differing trends. As displayed in figure 4, average daily attacks against civilians have remained unchanged from February to July 2007. 19 Figure 5: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July 2007 Initial Benchmark Assessment Report assessment GAO Benchmark 1. Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the constitutional review. Administration assessment of progress 2. Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification, 3. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sector ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and impementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of trag benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner. 4. Eracting and implementing legislaton on procedures to form ser autonomous rexions 5. Enacting and impementing legislation establishing an independent High Electoral Commission, provincial electons law, provincial council authoxities, and a date for provincial elections 6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty. 7. Enacing and implementing legislation establistuing a strong militia disaratment program to ensure that such security forces are accountadle only to the central government and loyal to the Constituhon of Iraq. bloo oo ooo oo . 8. Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad security plan. 9. Providing three trained and ready tragi brigades to support Baghdad operations. 10. Providing traci commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. commanders, without poklical intervention, to include the authority to pursue al extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shite militias. 11. Ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed enforcernent of the law. 12. Ensuring that, according to President Bush. Prime Minister Maliki said the Baghdad security plan will not provide a saia haven for any outlaws, regardless of their sectarian or political afiriation." 13. Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security 14. Estabiishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad. 15. Increasing the number of traci security forces units capable of operating independently. 16. Ensuring thai the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected. 17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis. 18. Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the tragi security forces. 3.mel 4 partial, and Summary 8 satisfactory 2 mixed, and 6 unsatisfactory Met Met Partially met Not met Satisfactory Mixed Unsatisfactory Source: GAO analysis of UN, U.S., and kao data. *According to the U.S. State Department, conditions are not present for these benchmarks. CONCLUSIONS As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and had not met 11 of 18 legislative, security, and economic benchmarks. The Iraqi government has not fulfilled commitments it first made in June 2006 to advance legislative, se- curity, and economic measures that would promote national reconciliation among Iraq's warring factions. Of particular concern is the lack of progress on de- Baathification legislation that could promote greater Sunni participation in the Na- tional government and comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that would distribute Iraq's vast oil wealth. In late August, Iraq's senior Shia, Sunni Arab, and Kurdish political leaders signed a Unity Accord signaling efforts to foster greater national reconciliation. The Accord covered draft legislation on de-Baathification reform and provincial powers laws, as well as setting up a mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held without charges. However, the polarization of Iraq's major sects and ethnic groups and fighting among Sh'ia factions further diminishes the stability of Iraq's governing coalition and its potential to enact legislation needed for sectarian reconciliation. Reconciliation was also premised on a reduction in violence. While the Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence, it is unclear whether vio- lence has been reduced. Measuring such violence may be difficult since the perpetra- tors' intents are not clearly known. Other measures, such as the number of enemy- initiated attacks, show that violence has remained high through July 2007. As Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of the United States. Future administration reports on the benchmarks would be more useful to Congress if they clearly depicted the status of each legislative benchmark, provided additional quantitative and qualitative in- 24 law as written and perhaps that will help clarify the different pro- cedures by which you proceeded. I note that, having had a hand in writing the basic law, the pro- vision relating to your organization was in the form of an amend- ment. I think if I and others had been a little more alert we would have seen if we couldn't have had a parallelism as to the require- ments. But nevertheless, I think both reports do basically reach much of the same conclusions. Mr. WALKER. Senator Warner, I'd also like to mention that should you desire us to do further work in this area, we would like to work with this committee for possible refinements on what we might be able to do to improve the usefulness to this committee and Congress as a whole. Senator WARNER. We will take that offer. Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Warner. That's kind of my thought too. Mr. Walker, you've done a great job in coming up with the report that you've come up with. I question if it really tells me what I know about the progress that's being made there. What I'm saying, and I'm not being critical at all, but from my under- standing, you were charged with reporting on the various bench- marks as they have been met. I'm not disagreeing with your con- clusions. You've done exactly what you were charted to do. m questioning that if this report provides us with some- thing beyond just a snapshot of where we are today as opposed to what kind of progress that we've been able to make. Focusing on a black and white, yes or no report on benchmarks seems to be a little myopic in its attempt to oversimplify an extremely complex and dynamic situation. Actual progress has not been considered under these standards. Representative Jimmy Saxton (New Jersey, 3rd District) yesterday said, “By solely examining whether each benchmark has achieved without considering the actual progress being made under each area, it appears that this hearing has been set up with a goal of providing a negative picture by failing to accurately reflect the cur- rent activities on the ground in Iraq.” Mr. Walker, you stated Tues- day, I guess it was and I agree with this, you said, “Progress is a highly subjective issue and by definition, one would expect that there would be a better rating that would be achieved if one solely focused on progress.” I agree with that and that's what I focus on. I've had occasion to be, not always in Iraq, but in the Iraqi area of responsibility, 15 times now. Last week was the last time. So as I go through and I see some of the great progress that's being made, I don't see that this report reflects that progress. I think the Iraqi Government, while not agreeing on legislative language, has put into an accumulation of practices, many of the benchmarks. The Iraqi Government is sharing oil revenues, is tak- ing steps towards the de-Baathification, it is giving conditional im- munity to the Baath Party members. There's been a 75-percent re- duction in religious and ethnic killings in the capitol between De- cember and August 7. Along this line, one of the great progresses that I see, and it was reflected from our intel going to the various mosques and their weekly meetings and coming back with the idea that there's been a total abrupt change since this surge took place, in terms of the 25 programs that are given by the clerics and Imans in the mosques. Moreover, prior to January, 85 percent of the services were anti- American, by nature, but since April there hasn't been anything anti-American. I think that accounts for some of the success that we've had. We've doubled the seizure of insurgent's weapons caches between January and August. A rise in the number of al Qaeda killings and captures, Anbar incidents of attacks are down from 40 per day down to 10 per day at the present time. As far as economic growth—I'll talk about that in just a minute but the markets are open, crowded, and stacked. I know that. I've been in the markets. I've also been in the same markets several years, probably each 3 or 4 months. So, it's easy to see the progress when you're looking at that. The large hospital projects in the Sunni triangle are back on track. Three of the provinces were transferred to Iraqi control on May 30. The Iraqi police are in control inside the city of Kirkuk. In Mosul, a mixed population of Sunni and Shia have been turned over to Iraqi control. Only a small U.S. presence remains in that area. Additionally, the Iraqi Army continues to perform very well. Although we tend to look at things by our standards, and some- times that's rather difficult to do. In visiting last week with General Petraeus on the overall pic- ture, he says less than half of the al Qaeda leaders that were in Baghdad when the surge began are still in the city. Half of them are still in the city, less than half. They fled and are being killed and captured. Seventy-five percent reductions in religious and eth- nic killings. The improvised explosive devices (IEDs) decreased by e use of advanced IEDs. In fact, he said the IEDs, really, are dead now, it's the advanced IEDs that we're having a problem with. Ambassador Crocker, when we talked about the markets and about the economy, about the large hospital projects and this type of thing. Well, up in the Multinational Division North, Major Gen- eral Benjamin R. Mixon's, USA, area of responsibility, progress is being made. It's in the right direction up there. The only problem is the city of Diyala is where most of the problems are. I think what's happened is that as the successes in Anbar have taken place, it's kind of squeezed it up into that area, and now it's con- fined to Diyala at the present time. At least that's my conclusion after being up there. Patrol Base Murray, the same thing there. I've had a chance to meet with former Iraqi Army Brigadier General Mustafa Kamel Hamad Shabib al-Jabouri (better known simply as General Mustafa), founder of Concerned Citizens, Iraq now three times, you probably did when you were over there, too. He's the one who talks about the Concerned Citizen's groups and how successful they have been. Your report also shows the success in the joint security sta- tions, 32 of the 34, that benchmark, I think, is pretty healthy. That reflects a lot of progress. Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno talking about the progress in Iraq called it, “Baghdad, back to nor- malcy." All these things are happening. I would also reflect that even earlier—this is about a month or 5 weeks ago—I observed progress, 26 and I think a lot of it is due to the, not the political, but the reli- gious leaders. I've kind of come to the conclusion that they're more important than the political leaders. I remember in a hearing in ittee about a little over a year ago, it was predicted that Ramadi was going to be the terrorist capitol of the world. Well, now it's under control and so is Fallujah. I'd say, the only question I'd have, and you can answer for the record, since I've gone over my time, can you tell us better ways that you suggest to measure this benchmark, and how a snapshot in time can accurately reflect a constantly evolving situation? In other words, provide more depth to the assignment that was given to you. Mr. WALKER. Sure. Let me briefly respond. First, we did what we were asked to do. Senator INHOFE. I said that already. Mr. WALKER. However, we did use “partially met” in an attempt to be fair and balanced and we provided more commentary, because even a “not met” doesn't mean no progress, okay? So, you need to understand that. My personal view and professional opinion as Comptroller Gen- eral of the United States is, that these 18 benchmarks need to be considered, but there are things beyond these 18 benchmarks that you ought to consider. Furthermore, ideally in evaluating any type of progress, including this type of progress, it's good to look at where you stand as of a point in time, what progress you are mak- ing, and how does it relate to the commitments that have been made? I think having all of that information is relevant in order to be able to make the fully-informed view. That would be a suggestion that I would make for your consideration, to the extent that you want to continue to have GAO do something going forward. Senator INHOFE. That's an excellent statement. Thank you so much. Chairman LEVIN. Senator Reed is next, but he has agreed—as he is always so generous—to switch places in the order with Senator McCaskill. So, Senator McCaskill? Senator McCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to tell you that I appreciate the atmosphere in which this report is released, is highly politically charged sure that it could be more politically charged than this particular topic at this particular time with our Government and with our elected leaders. In that environment, I want to compliment what you've done be- cause, as always, what the GAO has done, is you've been a fact gatherer and a fact reporter. I would challenge anyone in the ad- ministration, in DOD, in the military, in this committee, or in Con- gress to find a factual piece of information that you report here that is a mistake. I know that there has been a little controversy over your report in the House, when you testified I think they roughed you up a little bit. Let me tell you from my perspective, being called an auditor is the highest compliment that anyone could ever give you. I appreciate the fact that some of our col- 27 leagues in the House called you an auditor, as if it was a deroga- tory term. I have read the facts and I want to state the obvious here. I have a great respect for General Petraeus too, but I think everyone needs to understand the differences in your positions. Who do you work for? Who do you work for, Mr. Walker? Mr. WALKER. I work for the Congress of the United States. I'm sorry. [Laughter.] Chairman LEVIN. There's no doubt in my mind about that. Mr. WALKER. Believe me, I know. I just didn't know it was a question. Senator McCASKILL. It was a question. Who, in fact, does Gen- eral Petraeus work for? Who is his boss? Mr. WALKER. The President of the United States is Commander in Chief. Senator MCCASKILL. His job is much different than yours. I ap- preciate that he's going to have additional perspective that you could never bring to this discussion. Mr. WALKER. Absolutely. He's management, he's responsible for helping to define and execute the strategy. He's on the ground, he's extremely capable. You ought to seriously listen to what he has to say. Senator McCASKILL. Absolutely. I have looked at the nine bench- marks, I have honed in on the nine benchmarks that President Bush laid out in his speech to the American people in January, “A new way forward.” This was the President's decision to lay out these nine benchmarks. It was his attempt to convince the Amer- ican people that we were going to provide accountability. If we were going to put more lives on the line and go even deeper in debt in order to finance this effort, we were going to require certain commitments of the Iraqi Government. This was not anything Con- gress foisted upon him. These were his nine he laid out in his speech. I've looked at your analysis of those nine benchmarks. You say they have not been met in six instances. You give him partial cred- it, partially met for three of those. Six no, three partial. The Presi- dent, in July, said four of those there had been satisfactory progress, four he admitted no, unsatisfactory progress. So, by his own report in July, four yes, four no, and then he said one partial. So, I tried to go in and look at one of those benchmarks in detail, the one where you say partial and he says it's satisfactory, which concerns the spending of the $10 billion of Iraqi money. Now, there are several reasons I honed in on this. One, I think it will satisfy people because as one House member called you a bean-counter, this is about the finances, this is about the ability of the Iraqi Government to spend their money. Now, when I was in Iraq in June, I asked some of the Missouri soldiers on the ground what was their biggest challenge in one of these Provincial Reconstruction Teams. They said tricity.” They said that these people are getting 1 hour of electricity a day on average in Baghdad. Now, how in the world do we ever get to a point that they have any confidence whatsoever in their government if they can't get electricity. Spending this money on in- frastructure and capital projects, this $10 billion, a very modest 28 amount—I hate to count the billions and billions we've spent- ought to be something that we feel confident that they're moving towards doing. It shouldn't be that hard to spend money. We man- age to do it around here without blinking an eye. I looked to see what, exactly, factually you found and what the President reported. As of the middle of the year, they had spent, according to the U.S. Embassy, $1.5 billion of the $10 billion-24 percent-leaving 76 percent that had not yet been spent. But if you look behind that number, you find the Ministry of Oil's money, you all determined, based on the Special Inspector General's report, that of the $1.5 billion that they're getting credit for spending, $500 million of that, they're not confident that all has been spent. That's because it was just transferred to the Marketing Division. There wasn't really any evidence that it had actually been spent. If you look at the money that's been given to the provinces, there is no confidence that that money is going to be spent. They haven't even spent last year's money yet, much less this year's money, which in this instance, they're not going to be allowed to carry for- ward. I read every word about that benchmark. Now, the interesting thing is, the President said it was satisfactory progress. Now, I would like you to speak about that benchmark, if you would, and talk about the factual basis for the difference between your find- ings. You said partially met, which by the way, I thought was wild- ly generous, because you're saying because they've allocated it. For gosh sakes, allocating money is not spending money. If you would address that particular benchmark and the difference between the President and GAO. I'm trying to figure out where the spin is here and I got to tell you, with this benchmark, I don't think there's much spin on your side. I think you are being wildly generous and I think there's a whole lot of spin going on, on the other side. Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. Obviously you've done a thorough job, again, in reading this re- port. I appreciate that. First, I'm proud to be a Certified Public Accountant, to be an auditor, among other things. What we did here, is we looked at the language. “Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivering of essential services on an equitable basis.” Now, they have allocated $10 billion. They have transferred some of the money, but clearly not most of the money. They've obligated even less and we have a concern as to whether or not this amount is ultimately going to be spent and whether or not it's going to be spent in a manner that will result in delivering essential services on a equitable basis. The best we could get to was partial. We wanted to give them credit for the fact that they had allocated the money, they've trans- ferred some of the money, they've spent some of the money. However, our opinion there has also been formed by work that we've done in many other areas in Iraq, where frankly they haven't spent, historically, a lot of the money that's been allocated. We think that, as I said, we based the work on these 18 benchmarks, not just on what we did in the last couple of months, but what 29 we've done over several years and the track record that has been established there. Senator McCASKILL. But I want to make it clear that the facts indicate, that of the $1.5 billion or 24 percent of the $10 billion, that the U.S. Embassy is saying has been spent, there is not even concrete factual evidence that we could rely on as auditors, that all of that money has actually even been expended, even though it was only 24 percent of the total. Mr. WALKER. Yes, $1.5 billion, of course, would be 15 percent, so there's other money in there, but they've transferred a certain amount, they've obligated a certain amount, they've spent a certain amount, but a significant majority of the funds don't meet any of those criteria. Senator McCASKILL. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCaskill. Senator Warner. Senator WARNER. I'm going to defer down to Senator Collins. Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Walker, I want to talk further with you about benchmark 15, which is a very important benchmark because it's an evaluation of whether the Iraqi security forces can operate independently. Obviously, the scale and the success of the Iraqi security forces directly affects when our troops will be able to come home. Your assessment that this benchmark of increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently, is that it was not met. It's not one where you said there was limited progress or partially met. You say it was not met, and you even say that the number of capable forces has actually declined. This seems at odds with the testimony that we had yesterday from the Jones Commission. I have a great deal of respect for both the GAO and the Jones Commission. I am surprised that the con- clusions seem to be so at odds on such a vital issue. I'd like to have you comment further on why GAO reached such a different assess- ment. Mr. WALKER. First Senator Collins, thank you very much for the question. Because in reality, the reason that we reached a different conclusion is because we had a different metric that we had to evaluate. As Chairman Levin mentioned earlier, if you look at categories one and two of the four readiness categories, you get a different number with regard to how many people, how many units might be able to operate either fully independently or lead. Our require- ment was just to look at those who could operate fully independ- ently. So in other words, category 1, the highest category. We've issued a classified report, which I would commend to you and every member of this committee, that clearly demonstrates why we put this benchmark in the not met category. Basically, we are looking only at category 1, because operating independently is category 1. They either went up, or they went down, or they stayed the same, and that's in our classified report. Senator COLLINS. Sounds like we need to review the classified in- formation, as well. 30 This is an area that Senator Warner has been the leader on get- ting this assessment. I hope that the Jones Commission and GAO can come together on this issue because this is so vital to the ab ity of our troops to be able to turn over responsibility to the Iraqi security forces, and ultimately to their ability to be able to come home. There's a broader issue that I want to raise with you to make sure that this committee fully understands what you mean by each of your assessments. Of the 18 benchmarks that were graded by the GAO, your report states that only 7 received a grade of met or partially met. So, of the other 11 benchmarks, are you implying that there's been no progress at all? That the Iraqi Government is no further along on those benchmarks than they were a year ago? I'm trying to understand the difference between not met—which can be read as no progress at all, which I don't think is really what you're saying—versus partially met. Mr. WALKER. Again, thank you for this question because it helps add contextual sophistication. The biggest problem is in the legislative area. One of the exhibits that we had, which is on page eight of my testimony, illustrates the progress that has been made. So, on these, the ones that been met and not met. So, the fact that they're not met doesn't mean that nothing has been done, but it means that not nearly enough has been done in order to justify a partially met rating. As I mentioned earlier, my professional opinion is, the most meaningful informa- tion for Congress would be, not just to know where things stand of a point in time, but also what type of progress is being made. It's my understanding that Congress may have intended—and I don't know this for sure, Senator Warner and Senator Levin would—that it was contemplated that this might end up being a baseline that could then provide a basis to compare. Even if that was the case, my personal view is you need to look at where do things stand and what progress is being made. You need to look at both in order to be able to consider that. That's not what we were asked to do. Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator WARNER. If I could interject, Mr. Chairman. What amount of time and effort would it take for you to try and reconcile your data and put it into a format that comports with what we tasked the President to do, by way of the benchmark assessment? Mr. WALKER. Well, you asked the President to talk about progress rather than status. First thing we'd have to do is define, we'd have to come up with a definition of what's satisfactory. Senator WARNER. Instead of taking up time getting into detail, do you think that you could take the criteria we laid down for the executive branch and apply your own metrics and come up with conclusions? Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I'd want to consult with my very ca- pable staff on what were those metrics, are we comfortable with those metrics, and what do we think it would take. We will do that expeditiously. Senator WARNER. Thank you. Mr. WALKER. Get back to you later. 31 Chairman LEVIN. Whether those metrics are available to you? Mr. WALKER. Correct. Chairman LEVIN. Senator Akaka. Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say aloha to Mr. Walker and welcome to you to this committee. I would like to first congratulate you and your staff for the excel- lent work you've done on reporting the Iraqi Government's legisla- tive, security, and economic benchmarks. I believe that the GAO conducted an excellent assessment of the Iraq benchmarks and I want to convey my appreciation, again, to you and your staff. The inability of the Iraqi Government to meet its benchmarks is one of the main issues in the overall debate regarding whether to begin redeployment of our troops. This report will provide us with valuable information in our deliberations on any future involve- ment of the U.S. military forces in Iraq. I do have few questions to you, Mr. Walker. The GAO's report states that the Iraqi Government has provided $10 billion in its current budget for reconstruction projects, including delivery of es- sential services on an equitable basis, but that it is unlikely to be spent by the end of this year. As of July 31, the Iraqi Government had only about $1.5 billion of the allocated funds. Now, my question to you is can you tell us what is the under- cause of the Iraqi's failure to use their budgeted resources to rebuild critical infrastructure? In addition to that, could you de- scribe some of the key projects that will likely not be accomplished if the Iraqi Government continues at this current pace? Mr. WALKER. First, whether or not the money will be spent de- pends, in great part, on their willingness and ability to spend that money. We have seen, historically, that amounts have been allo- cated, but not transferred. Of the amounts that have transferred have not necessarily been spent, in the past. Some of the reasons for that are that Iraq does not have a well-established capacity, as it relates to acquisition and contracting. They have a serious prob- lem with regard to having an adequate number of people with the knowledge, the right type of systems and controls to get things done. Some people are concerned about moving too quickly because of the possibility of being accused of corruption or other types of ac- tivities if they don't dot all the Is and cross all the Ts. So, I can't comment on their willingness to spend it. I can comment on the fact that historically they have not had a good track record and some of that is because of the lack of enough people and enough infrastructure to be able to make it happen in a timely manner. I'll be happy to provide, for the record, some examples of things that might not get done. [The information referred to follows:) As we recently reported, the energy sector is critical for Iraq's economy and for rebuilding the country. Experts estimate that over the next few years, $27 billion will be needed for the electricity sector to keep up with needed demand and $20 to $30 billion will be needed for the oil sector to reach production goals. Since most U.S. reconstruction funds have been obligated, the Iraqi Government will need to assume a more prominent role in rebuilding Iraq's electricity and oil sectors. Major challenges to these efforts include continued security concerns, lack of expertise to IH 32 plan for and maintain the infrastructure, and lack of a legislative framework that would encourage international investment. Mr. WALKER. But as Senator McCaskill said before, they include reliable electricity and adequate, safe water, and appropriate levels of oil production. These are basic things that I think are important that they be measured. From a professional standpoint, I believe it's important they be measured and reported on. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, GAO credits the Iraqi Government with meeting benchmark 16, “Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi Legislature are protected.” However, the report then states that because of the security situation, Iraqi legislators interviewed by GAO insisted that the situation in their communities has a direct bearing on their work in the legislature, their freedom of movement to and from the legislature, and their ability to engage fully in Iraq political life. If I understand the report correctly, the Iraqis have met this benchmark because their constitution has provisions guaranteeing minority party rights. However, in practice, this benchmark is not actually being met because minority rights are still being violated. Is my understanding correct? Mr. WALKER. My understanding, Senator Akaka, is the reason we showed this as met is because, in fact, they have enacted a con- stitution that provides for minority rights. There are issues, you talked about two. One, security—whether or not there's adequate security for people to be able to get to the parliament to be able to exercise their rights. Second, there are significant sectarian issues. I mean, there are significant sectarian issues between the Shia, the Sunni, the Kurd, there are also significant issues within those segments, especially the Sunni segment. So, we assessed it, based upon the fact that they've done what they have to do, as a matter of law. But, let me come back to an issue I've mentioned before. One of the issues that they have to think about is how do they execute? The Shia have 60 percent of the population, the Kurds have 20 percent of the population, and the Sunnis have 20. Well, the Sunnis are used to running things on a totalitarian basis for awhile, but now they have only 20 percent in the democracy. On a vote basis, they're not there. I think that's one of the issues that you ought to try to find out more about, as to whether and to what extent that's had a practical problem in being able to move forward in some areas where, otherwise, people might want to, and may even have the votes. Senator AKAKA. I'd like to ask about the impact the surge has had. If we have not improved the protection of minority rights of legislators, then it suggests that a fundamental tenant of the surge is not being met. Is there any evidence that the surge has improved the protection of the rights of minority members of the legislature? Mr. WALKER. We didn't look to that level of detail, Senator Akaka. I think that one can say is the surge has had an impact in at least two areas. First, Anbar Province, and the efforts that we're taking there to combat al Qaeda. Second, in the efforts of U.S. and Iraqi forces to try to be able to provide additional security, in major portions of Baghdad, including these joint security stations and related activi- 33 ties there. Those are the areas where I think the surge has had the most impact so far. But, keep in mind that one of the reasons for the surge was to provide, one of the Senators mentioned, “breathing room,” to make political progress. So far, that political progress has not been made. Hopefully, it can be and it will be, but so far, it has not. Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Walker, for your re- sponses. Chairman LEVIN. Senator Chambliss? Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief so others can have a chance to make comments or ask questions be- fore the vote. Mr. Walker, first all let me thank you for doing a great job. Your staff, too. Most everybody on this committeenot all, but most of us-have been in theater, we know the difficulties that you encoun- ter there, and your staff is to be commended for taking the time, making the efforts, and really getting down to the core of some of the issues that need to be called to our attention, and addressed. It's information like this that, I think, does provide us with the background to be able to make the decisions that we're going to make, relative to the situation in Iraq. That being said, you have highlighted something that has con- cerned me from day one over there, and the more I'm in Iraq, the more I talk with people who are in theater, and I frankly agree with you about the issue of the lack of movement by the govern- ment. That's the weakest aspect of what's going on over there. I was pleased to hear you say that “not met” in your chart, doesn't mean that there's been no progress, because actually, I could probably argue with you, but it's immaterial as to whether or not the “not met” is correct on a number of these. But, the fact is, I think you have fairly stated what's going on over there, from the standpoint of the government not moving forward. By the same token, if you had assessed the commitments made by the current majority back in December, and done an assessment at the end of 6 months, I daresay it wouldn't have looked very posi- tive. It's not just the current majority, you could take the previous majority in any Congress, and assess the activity of Congress, and I don't think we would have scored very well on a points chart, like you've been tasked to do. . So, I think you've done a good job in making the point that they have failed to achieve some of these benchmarks. But, it does ap- pear from your report that they are moving forward. The one chart that you had up there, relative to the level of vio- lence, brings to mind a charge that we saw yesterday from General Jones, that's probably the most significant I've seen relative to the conflict in Iraq. It was a chart which, unlike yours which simply shows the number of incidents of violence, and whether it had gone up or down, and that could be a suicide bomber walking in and blowing up 100 people, or it could be a few rifle shots, on incidents of violence. What General Jones' chart showed was the decrease in violent activity in the City of Baghdad. He took it over a timeframe of sev- eral months. What that diagram showed, that the incidences of vio- lence are shrinking. The area where the incidents of violence are 34 occurring, is shrinking. That bears out exactly what I expect to hear from General Petraeus next week, and what I have personally seen on the ground in Iraq when I've been there, and that is that ng great strides from a military perspective, and that our men and women wearing the uniform are doing a terrific job. General Petraeus is also, I think, going to validate what you have reported to us, that the government has a long way to go. In summary, I just want to say, I think you've done a good job of coming forward with facts, with telling us, you're giving us a re- port of your investigation of the benchmarks that we have tasked you to address. I look forward to seeing additional reports like this, Mr. Chairman, as we move forward, under whatever scenario we undertake, after General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker's re- port. Mr. Walker, thanks to you and your folks. We commend you for a job well done. Mr. WALKER. Senator Chambliss, so I can mention quickly, for your benefit and the benefit of the other members of the com- mittee—this graphic is just total activity, it's not lethality—there's a difference as to what type of casualties might cover. Senator CHAMBLISS. Yes. Mr. WALKER. In our classified report, we do have information on Baghdad, versus overall. I would commend our classified report, as well as a classified report from the National Intelligence Esti- mate (NIE) to you to look at. I think, though, they're both impor- tant. Senator CHAMBLISS. Yes, I agree. I think that's much more meaningful than just a diagram showing spikes up and down. Mr. WALKER. Thank you. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. Senator Reed. Senator REED. Thank you very much. General, let me thank you—not only for your work, and for your staff's work, but your staff is not unaccustomed to dealing with these issues. In fact, not only their expertise individually, bu t their experience over the last 4 or 5 years, with this topic in particular, is outstanding. This is not a drive-by evaluation. These are people, I presume, who are deeply, on a daily basis, involved. They have a perspective, as well as the expertise to look at these issues, and I thank you for that. I think one of the critical issues that we're going to have to ad- dress is the issue of these numbers, the accuracy of numbers. You point out, there's a difference in methodology, that you differ with General Petraeus' command. In that line, there was an article yes- terday in the Washington Post that pointed out that DOD, in their releasing death counts, dramatically shifted the results from last year to this year. They had a report released in March which showed a peak in December 2006 of approximately 1,200 and then they had a June report that showed that to increase. General Petraeus is using that as his baseline, the increased numbers. Can you comment, at all, about the General's methodology, or the issue of whether these numbers are accurate? 36 dominantly Sunni or Shia, you'll see there's been considerable mi- gration, and you'll also know that there is more difficulty in move- ment between one area to another Senator REED. You've anticipated my next line of questioning, which is ethnic cleansing. One of the consequences is perhaps be- cause they succeeded in pushing people out of these neighborhoods, that the intimidation, the violence, the killing has gone down a bit that's not a good sign, that's just a consequence of the facts on the ground, is that the case? Mr. WALKER. Our classified report has more information on it. Senator REED. Can I ask you, this might seem like a dumb ques- tion, but why is this classified? I mean, who are we trying to keep this information from, the American people? Mr. WALKER. Well, we're not the ones that decide whether or not it's classified, and we've expressed concerns in the past as to whether or not there's over-classification. Senator REED. The only people who are not getting this informa- tion, frankly, are the American people, and Congress, in an open session, where we can honestly and fairly debate these issues with people who have access to this information, and can choose to di- vulge what they want, or not. Mr. WALKER. I would respectfully request, Senator Reed, you ought to ask the administration witnesses that. Because the ad- ministration is the one that decides whether or not to classify data—whichever administration it is, that's not new, it's been that way for a long time. Senator REED. Your point about ethnic cleansing was one that I wanted to address, and that is—this might be peripheral to the benchmarks you've looked at. But, I presume from what you've said, your conclusion is that there's been a significant ethnic dis- placement within Baghdad. Mr. WALKER. There's been significant migration within Baghdad, correct. Senator REED. Also, migration out of the country, internal dis- placement, unrelated to Baghdad, all over the country? Mr. WALKER. Correct, and we have data on that, and others have data on that. Again, I think our classified report, and the NIE clas- sified report are two things, for sure, you need to read. Senator REED. I guess the final point, and it's more of a comment than a question, is that, we've had, I think, a very important de- bate about, one, why should it be classified, and two, what's the dif- ference between the different methodologies. My presumption would be that, for the Iraqi citizen, this is all very immaterial. They're living in a very violent atmosphere which undermines their trust in their government, and undermines the ability of the gov- ernment to function, and not much has changed in that regard, even as we debate the nuances of sectarian versus non-sectarian. Mr. WALKER. Well, in my professional opinion, I think one of the things that Congress needs to consider is whether or not the rel- evant benchmark should be sectarian violence or total violence. It's difficult to be able to determine the difference, and to some people, a casualty, is a casualty, is a casualty. Senator REED. Final point-and this might go more for anecdotal responses. My impression is that many of these sectarian, ideolog- 37 ical groups, also engage deliberately in criminal activity, and so that the same person could be taking you out, because he wants your money, and an hour later, taking you out, because he doesn't like your religion, or your politics, or your clothes. Is that, sort of, fair? Mr. WALKER. There's significant criminal activity, there's signifi- cant corruption that exists, as well, in Iraq. Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Walker, you said, just to clarify one point of Senator Reed's that you don't do the classification? Mr. WALKER. That's correct, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LEVIN. Who did the classification of Benchmark 13? Mr. WALKER. DOD. Chairman LEVIN. All right. I think that that was the specific benchmark that you were referring to. Mr. WALKER. I think so, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LEVIN. What we will be doing is making an urgent re- quest to the Secretary of Defense to reconsider the classification of that benchmark, and any other benchmark, or part of that docu- ment which any member of this committee wants to add to the re- quest. So, we're not just limiting the request to one benchmark. So, if by 3:00 this afternoon, any member of the committee wants to seek reconsideration of any part of the classified part of the GAO report, kindly let our staff director, Rick DeBobes, know and we will include that in an urgent request, that over the weekend there be reconsideration of this classification. I briefly looked at this, and I don't quite understand the reason for the classification. Senator REED. Thank you. Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, you're correct, it is number 13. Also, I would point out for 13, there are two levels there, first the level of sectarian violence, and second, eliminating militia control of local security-both the administration and we are in agreement, there has not been elimination of militia control of local security, and we've already talked about the sectarian violence issue. Chairman LEVIN. All right, now, Senator Warner, again, you would be next. Senator WARNER. I'm going to defer to Senator Thune. Chairman LEVIN. Senator Thune, let me ask you—have you voted? Senator THUNE. No. Chairman LEVIN. I don't mean to intrude on your privacy, here. The vote, I think, only is for a few more minutes. I'm happy to rec- ognize you if you want to stay here, but that's a risk that you carry. If not, would you—when you're finished—just simply recess for the call of the chair. Senator THUNE (presiding]. I will be happy to recess it, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General, and your staff for an excellent work product, and for the very thorough and detailed way in which you go about this. The one distinction you made that I think is a very relevant one, when you said that you're tasked with determining status as op- posed to progress. I think that standard is a little bit different for our benefit and use. I think it would be very helpful if you can 38 have apples-to-apples comparisons with this report, and some of the other reports that are being made, and just so that there is some, I guess, standard threshold that we're all using when we evaluate whether or not we are making headway and making progress. There's one in particular that I would like to question, I'd like to draw to your attention, with regard to that issue, and that is, y the committee received testimony from the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) Assessment Commission, the Jones Commission, that the ISF was made up of two parts—the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi police. Benchmark 11 in your report, does that apply to both the Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi police force? I guess my question is, in assessing the benchmark, how did you define Iraqi security forces? Mr. WALKER. My understanding is it's both forces. Consistent with what you heard from the Jones Commission yesterday, there's a much greater problem with the police forces than with the Army. Senator THUNE. In writing your assessment of this benchmark, you said you lumped them together? You put them together? Mr. WALKER. That's correct. Senator THUNE. In other words, you did not differentiate or dis- tinguish between the two, and clearly, I think, in terms of at least their testimony yesterday, there is a very clear difference between the progress that's being made, and the work that's being done by the Iraqi Army, versus the Iraqi police force? Mr. WALKER. Senator, I think one of the things that we would like to have the opportunity to work with this committee on, if you want us to do additional work, going forward, is how these bench- marks might be refined, and how they might be able to be en- hanced, and coming back to where you started—the best type of in- formation that you would have from my professional opinion, would be where do things stand on relevant benchmarks, and what progress is being made? You could require all parties to do the same, and then you have an apples-to-apples comparison that you can deal with and reach your own judgment. Senator THUNE. That would be very useful, and I know, even with regard to the, the violence numbers, the casualty numbers, and there are sort of different metrics that are being used, but I think it would be extremely helpful if there was some way in which these metrics could be applied in the, essentially, same way. Mr. WALKER. I think they can be, they should be, we can help you if you want to do that. But again, we did what we were asked to do, but we did provide more information, in order to help you get a sense as to whether, and to what extent, progress has been made, both in the areas that we assessed as not met, as well as those areas where we assessed as partially met. Senator THUNE. I guess one of the reasons I say that is, at least the way this is being interpreted out there by the media and the public and others, are this report is very much at odds with the other reports. I'm not sure there is as much difference there as is being reported, but it's primarily, in my view, because you were tasked differently than some of these other Commissions have been. Mr. WALKER. We've tried to make that very clear, right up front, at the beginning of the report, on the highlights page, at the begin- 39 ning of my testimony. We stand behind our report. I think next week when General Petraeus comes, and you need to seriously con- sider what he and Ambassador Crocker have to say. The biggest greement will be on the sectarian violence issue. We've already talked about that, and our classified report has a lot more information you need to look at there, I think. Senator THUNE. I appreciate that. I have to run and vote, thank you again for your good work. Mr. WALKER. We'll be in recess, from what I understand. Senator THUNE. I will slam the gavel and put us in recess until the chairman is able to return. Thank you. Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator. [Recess.] Senator WEBB (presiding]. The committee will be in order. We're going to continue the testimony, Senator Graham has another en- gagement. He's asked to give his questions now, so we'll begin with Senator Graham. Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Senator Webb, that's very kind of you. I appreciate you letting me do that so I can catch my flight. Mr. Walker, I'd just add my high opinion of you to the list of peo- ple who said nice things about you. I have to work with you and your staff on Social Security. You all really do a good job for us. Now, your paycheck, I think, comes from Congress, is that right? Mr. WALKER. It comes from the Treasury, but I work for Con- gress. Senator GRAHAM. Work for Congress, and you've come to Con- gress many times, saying things about entitlement reform, I think, that Congress needs to hear. So, the fact that you're employed by this body, I've never once thought for a second that you would say anything other than what, professionally, you've arrived at, and I hope people believe that about General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, because I think you all have that in common. You just have different universes from which you come. But this information you're giving Congress is important, and I think the American people want to know where we're at in Iraq, and what does it look like going forward. Now, the political reconciliation part, is the prize. You can have a million troops in Iraq, it is not going to change things in a per- manent fashion until the government reconciles itself. What is your belief regarding a breakthrough in the next 60 days regarding leg- islation called de-Baathification, or provincial election legislation being passed in Baghdad? Mr. WALKER. Senator Graham, I don't think it would be appro- priate for me to try to give you odds on that. I will tell you, as I noted in my testimony, based on our work, that was part of the Na- tional Unity Accord that's been signed. Senator GRAHAM. That was about 2 weeks ago, right? Mr. WALKER. That's correct. Senator GRAHAM. How do you evaluate that Unity Accord? Is that a significant event for you? Mr. WALKER. It is a significant event, but it states intent, and as you can see from this graphic here, there are lots of steps you have to go through, in the legislative process, in order to make it a reality. 40 no Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree with me, that when Congress really wants to do something, it will do it, and when it finds rea- sons not to, it won't? Mr. WALKER. There are lots of reasons not to move things, but when there is agreement, broad-based agreement, things can hap- pen quickly. Senator GRAHAM. From your visit, did you sense a wa among the Iraqi people that you met with, that they were tired of the killing and the dying? Mr. WALKER. We really were focusing on meeting with officials necessary to do this assessment rather than individual Iraqi citi- zens on the street. Senator GRAHAM. Okay, now when it comes to sectarian violence, whether it's going up or down—I remember very graphically, when it was being reported out of Iraq that sectarian violence is spiraling out of control, about a year ago. Do you remember that? Mr. WALKER. I remember when it was a major concern, in fact, as you remember, Senator Graham, undoubtedly that one of the primary reasons that the President proposed the surge is to try to be able to try to get sectarian violence under control, in order to give breathing space for political progress. Senator GRAHAM. Right. How did we measure sectarian violence then? Mr. WALKER. My understanding is, it was MNF-I, as it is now. But, it's in the classified briefing. Senator GRAHAM. Yes, no one seemed to argue with the fact that s had gone up. I'm just curious as to why somebody would question the same methodology if they show a drop? Mr. WALKER. Yes, I don't know. Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Mr. WALKER. We're not saying they're wrong-we're just not say- ing they're right. It's very difficult to be able to determine. Senator GRAHAM. You could say that about whether or not they'd spiked, I guess. Mr. WALKER. Well, that's true. Senator GRAHAM. Yes, right. Mr. WALKER. If they're using the same methodology now that they were then, which I can't say right now then I would have had the same concerns. Senator GRAHAM. Right, right. Yes, but the bottom line is, if it's the same methodology, one could argue that they were wrong when the numbers went up, you could argue they're wrong when they're coming down, but if it's the same methodology, at least you're com- paring apples to apples. Mr. WALKER. Correct. Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Now, the idea of using the information is, obviously, it's for every Senator to determine how to put this puzzle together, and you're part of the puzzle. General Jones' testi- mony, and then we'll have Ambassador Crocker, and General Petraeus and your report, and we'll have to put this puzzle to- gether. One of the questions that drives me the most is—if we decided now to withdraw a large number of troops at a date certain, and we declared it, that we would reduce our forces by half, say, in 6 41 months—do you have any idea how that would affect future progress? Mr. WALKER. Senator, it would be speculation for me to say that. Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Mr. WALKER. That's beyond the scope of what we were asked to do. Senator GRAHAM. Right, right. Well, thank you very much for your service, and for giving us the information that you've provided to the committee about a snapshot of where we stand, based on some areas. Did you look at the police at all? Mr. WALKER. We did look at the police as it relates to the secu- rity forces, for example, even-handed enforcement of the law—any place where it talked about security forces. Our work, not just with regard to this particular report, but past reports, have shown sig- nificant differences between challenges associated with the police and the Army. Senator GRAHAM. I certainly agree with that. I don't know why the police are more sectarian, why they're so far behind, but they certainly are. Mr. WALKER. In many cases, Senator Graham, it's because the police are hired at the provincial or local level rather than at the national level. Senator GRAHAM. That doesn't bother me, if you have local po- liceman policing the local area, that's okay. But the National Min- istry of Interior seems to have a bias that is unhealthy. Did you look at the judiciary at all? Mr. WALKER. No, we did not look at the judiciary. Senator GRAHAM. Can I ask, Senator Levin, the next time we do a benchmark, that we consider looking at the rule of law from the judicial side? The detention policy side? Because, I have seen some progress, but I'll be honest with you, Senator Levin, there are many concerns there, and this is an area where I think Congress can reinforce some gains we've made, and I'll just put that on the table, that maybe we'll add that to our list next time. Chairman LEVIN (presiding). Senator Graham, you've made that very compelling point for a long time, and I think most of us have, hopefully, soaked in what you and a few others on this committee have talked about in terms of the lacking infrastructure in the jus- tice area. Senator GRAHAM. Right. Chairman LEVIN. Of course, Senator Warner is also the author of the benchmark legislation, but I'm sure the next round it could, and should, be added. The focus of these benchmarks, though, just to kind of remind everyone is that these are the self-adopted benchmarks by the Iraqi government. Senator GRAHAM. Right, I understand, I understand. Chairman LEVIN. So, we were trying to judge them by their own standards. Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely, absolutely, absolutely. Chairman LEVIN. I agree with you that there are other indica- tions, such as yours, which need to be added. 42 Senator GRAHAM. Thank you for sharing this information with us, and to your staff who made it possible, and went over there to Iraq, we appreciate their service, too. Thank you. Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. Senator Webb. Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Walker, I first would like to echo my agreement with some- thing that Senator McCaskill said. There are so many different components here that are being brought forward to us in order to attempt to make an evaluation of the situation that we face. The scope of what you were asked to do, really, is pretty much a result of what the administration laid forward as to what they said they were going to do. I go back, first of all, to the speech that the President made in January when he announced the surge. These are things that the Iraqis said they were going to do. One of the major components of that was—and I'm going to directly quote his speech, that they would “establish its authority, the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November.” Did you see any indication that that actually is going to occur? Mr. WALKER. It's unrealistic to expect that Iraqi Security Forces will take total control of every province by November of this year. Senator WEBB. Did you get any feeling from the reports that you got as to how many of those provinces would be fully controlled by the Iraqi? Mr. WALKER. No, Senator Webb, that was beyond the scope of what we were asked to do. Senator WEBB. O Mr. WALKER. So, we did not. Senator WEBB. One of the other points that I think is important here, at any time that we have these sorts of emotional, and politi- cally-driven debates, it's very important to understand the facts. I think we can argue about conclusions all we want, but I think facts themselves need to be fully understood before we can proceed to the argument beyond them. I'm saying that because yesterday, one of the set of facts that sort of jumped out at me, when General Jones and his Commission were reporting, was they said at least three times in their testi- mony that the Iraqi casualty rate was higher, significantly higher, than the American casualty rate, and they had a chart that showed the same kind of chart that you have on the Average Daily Enemy- Initiated Attack Incidents. But, when I sat down and added up the numbers of Iraqis that they were including, operationally—the Iraqi military, the Iraqi police, the territorial forces, et cetera, the people under their Ministry of Interior—when you added those up, there were 3.6 times as many Iraqis, notionally, at risk as there were Americans in Iraq, and if you played that back into the data, it showed that the Iraqis were not taking casualties at a rate high- er than we were, the American forces, and in fact, I would ven- ture—they didn't have the data available yesterday—but I would venture that if you took the police casualties out of that formula, that you would see markedly higher American casualties actually out in the operating environment. 43 I say that as an example of how we need to really look at facts before we reach conclusions. Now I have a question with respect to the chart, and I know, I watched your opening statement from my office before I came down here, and I saw the caveats that you were putting in to this chart, but I'm just wondering here on the one hand, what we're measuring in your chart, Figure 3, as it's in front of me, the Average Number of Daily Enemy-Initiated Attacks, showing that they went up, and now that, there's a drop at the very end of this chart, that it could be argued that the average number of attacks are down, but how does that play out in terms of casualties? I'm not seeing casualties? The reason that I ask this is—there are two reasons that I ask this, and I think it's very im- portant, at least from my understanding of where we're going on this. The first is that we're seeing more sophisticated methods of attack. In fact, I think you even mentioned that, the sophistication of the IEDs and that sort of thing. I think it was you that had men- tioned that Mr. WALKER. It wasn't me, it was a Senator. Senator WEBB. —but, with a more highly sophisticated device, you're going to have fewer attacks, but they're going to be more ef- fective. So, that doesn't mean that fewer attacks mean fewer cas- ualties. The second reason I'm asking this, is because there was an arti- cle in the Associated Press (AP) about 10 days ago, that said that the average number of civilian deaths in Iraq actually was double this year than last year—went from 30 to 62, according to this AP article. Would you comment on that with respect to your chart? Mr. WALKER. Well, Senator, I would respectfully suggest that you should consider several things. First, our chart, which is on page 10, which talks about the average number of daily enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition or Iraqi security forces and civilians. As you can see, there's a significant difference in the incidents of attacks on the coalition forces, which includes our forces—primarily our forces—versus the Iraqi security forces. There are a lot more attacks on coalition forces than there are Iraqi security forces. Second, I think you also need to consider lethality. In other words, this is the amount of attacks, but there are different na- tures of attacks. Some are more effective than others, so I think you ought to consider that as well, and you ought to break that down based on coalition, Iraqi security forces, and civilians. Senator WEBB. Exactly. That's exactly my point. Now, you have a chart that indicates—this goes a little bit to the point that Sen- ator Reed was trying to make earlier about how we need to be able to articulate actually what's going on in this debate that we're going to have. We have this chart that shows the number, average number of daily attacks, but I don't see a chart that shows the cas- ualty implications. Mr. WALKER. We have some additional data in our classified re- port, but what I would respectfully suggest, Senator Webb, for you and any other member of this committee, if there are things that you don't have in there that you want, let me know, and we'll see what we can do. 44 Senator WEBB. So, you don't have any information that would il- luminate the AP article about the doubling in the number of aver- age casualties? Mr. WALKER. We have some more information in our classified report, and candidly, I'm a little bit uncomfortable in recalling which of this is classified and nonclassified—that's why I'd rather deal with it offline, if we can. Senator WEBB. All right. Thank you very much. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb, Senator Warner. Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to draw the witness's attention to a mat- ter that you and I observed on our trip. I'm not sure that in the course of your work, Comptroller General, that you examined this. But, it's a question of the foreign military sales problem, which Senator Levin and I received a briefing on by the senior ranking officers in Iraq. That this system has failed to deliver in a timely fashion a great deal of essential military equipment, required both by the Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi police. I think I speak for my chairman—both of us were astounded. Because we keep trying to push both of these organizations to train and prepare, and to take up a greater burdendid you have an opportunity to lo look into that issue? Mr. WALKER. Not as part of this engagement, Senator Warner. But I will, as soon as I get back to the office, find out if we're doing anything else on it, outside of this engagement and get back to both of you and let you know. Senator WARNER. Fine. You join me in that request? Chairman LEVIN. I do. As a matter of fact, our staffs have draft- ed for us the letter which we will- Senator WARNER. Letter that we're sending today. Mr. WALKER. It sounds like we will be soon doing work there. It's very worthwhile. Chairman LEVIN. We will send you a copy of that letter, so that you can tell us whether or not you could add to this inquiry, be- cause it is a very serious business. Mr. WALKER. Be happy to do that, Senator. We look forward to taking a look at it. [The information referred to follows:] Foreign Military Sales. CG commits to provide additional information to the com- mittee regarding any ongoing GAO work. The Iraqi Government is making an effort to address longstanding procurement and contracting problems by procuring items for its security forces through the U.S. foreign military sales program (FMS). To date, the Government of Iraq has com- mitted about $3.3 billion for U.S. military sales. According to the Multi-National Se- curity Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), these funds are being used lo procure a variety of items such as small arms, ammunition, uniforms, body armor, vehicles, aircraft, and other items. According to U.S. Government officials, the Iraqi Government has expressed con- cern about the length of time it takes to procure items through the FMS process. However. MNSTC-I and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) officials stat- ed that Iraqi Government officials had unrealistic expectations regarding FMS proc- essing time frames leading to an “expectations gap.” Officials also noted that efforts to expedite the current FMS process are hindered by a number of factors, including Iraq's difficulty in defining military requirements, insufficient U.S. and Iraqi staff- ing, the absence of an Iraqi Government multiyear acquisition strategy to guide fu- ture procurement efforts, and competing demands for similar equipment for U.S. aitted about $3.3990s program (Filing items for its dress longstanding 45 and Iraqi security forces, such as M-16 rifless. To address these issues, the military departments, DSCA, MNSTC-I, and others have initiated efforts lo help the Iraqi Government better define requirements, increased security assistance office staffing and training, and implemented a new tracking system to provide increased visibility over FMS procurements for U.S. and Iraqi Governments officials, among other ef- forts. Senator WARNER. Also, in the report yesterday by that very dis- tinguished group, headed up by General Jones, they talked about the need to have a more rapid transfer of authority, security re- sponsibilities and the like, to the various provincial governments. I think 6 of them, now, have been given the authority, 6 out of the 18. It seems as though the distressing chapters of fact that we have received here in the past week or 10 days, indicate less and less hope respecting the ability to have reconciliation at the top, again to work down, and more the administration and others are putting emphasis on the importance of the small, but nevertheless, signifi- cant, reconciliation that's growing up, particularly in the al Anbar province and elsewhere, amongst the Sheiks and so forth, now working with the coalition forces, and trying to cut down the sec- tarian violence, and reinforcing our efforts against al Qaeda. But, it seems to me, the more we bring upon the Federal system, such as it exists, the Maliki Government, to begin to accelerate the transfer of authority—they call it the Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) Program-down to these regional authorities, the faster this, some- what, interesting growth of bottom-up reconciliation. I tell you the public has to be confused about all of these terms. Because we all started off on reconciliation at the top on January 10, and if we do the surge, and secure the military operations, Maliki will have in place a whole framework of achievements on 'reconciliation down- well, it's not happening. So, back to the question. Did you address the advisability of the PIC Program, and accelerating it to move authority down? Mr. WALKER. That was beyond our scope, Senator Warner. I will note that, as I said before, there has been progress in al Anbar province, in particular with regard to combating al Qaeda. Al Anbar province is about 5 percent of the population of Iraq and is not a mixed population, it's overwhelmingly a Sunni population. Senator WARNER. Also, did you make reference as sort of a benchmark to the important contributions provided by the NIE, which is the consensus of 16 of our intelligence organizations, with regard to certain, they sort of laid them out as benchmarks? Mr. WALKER. We did consider input from the intelligence agen- cies. We did read, were aware, and did consider that, and we also commend to you the classified version of that, which I'm sure you've probably already read. Senator WARNER. Yes. Mr. WALKER. I would encourage other members to read it. Senator WARNER. Oh, yes. Well then, just for this record, I won- dered if we could ask these questions. If your research support the Intelligence Community findings contained in the un- classified key judgments of the NIE on Iraq issued last month. The first one, was the Intelligence Community assesses that “to the ex- tent that coalition forces continue to conduct robust counter- insurgency operations and mentor and support the Iraqi security 46 forces, that Iraq security will continue to improve modestly during the next 6 to 12 months.” Mr. WALKER. We did not, Senator Warner, project where we think things were going from here. Because our task was to assess where things stood as of a particular point in time. Senator WARNER. Right. Mr. WALKER. So that's beyond what we were asked to do. Senator WARNER. All right. The next one, “the Intelligence Com- munity assesses that the Iraqi Government will become more pre- carious over the next 6 to 12 months.” Mr. WALKER. Again, we did not attempt to project where we think things were going. Senator WARNER. All right. Mr. WALKER. We felt that was beyond our scope. I will note for the record, Senator Warner, that there are a number of aspects of the unclassified version of the National Intelligent Estimate on Irag that we do concur with and I'm happy to Senator WARNER. Well, I tell you what. If you could provide for the record those findings of the NIE with which you have concur- rence and, more specifically, if there are findings with which you have a professional differences of view. Mr. WALKER. Within the scope of what we were asked to do? Senator WARNER. Within the scope. Mr. WALKER. We will do that. Senator WARNER. There's one very important one. The NIE also assessed changing the mission of Coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to more of a support role, “Would erode security gains achieved thus far.” Now, that might fall within the parameters of your metrics. Mr. WALKER. We'll take a look at it, Senator, and we will be happy to do what we can. Senator WARNER. I thank you very much. Chairman LEVIN. Just to clarify that request, however, if it doesn't fall within in your scope, make it clear. Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That's a good point. We'll do that. [The information referred to follows:] The Government Accountability Office can provide some additional classified in- formation on this issue. However, this briefing will require codeword clearance. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Senator Bayh. Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to begin by thanking you and, particularly, Senator Warner, for his kind re- marks about Senator Snowe and myself. Senator WARNER. I remember you came up to me on the floor and you felt that this was an important element. Since we're in a posture here in Congress of trying to facilitate the maximum amount of information that can be utilized by Congress in making its decisions—as well as the general public—and hopefully me of these constructive findings by this organization, General Jones, and others can contribute to the President's and synthesis of all this information, and his final remarks with regard to such strat- egy changes as he deems appropriate. 47 Senator BAYH. Well, that was exactly our intent, and I think that is g to be the result of the GAO's report. But it wouldn't have happened without you, Senator, so I want to thank you and the chairman for your support. Since the outset of this undertaking with the weapons of mass destruction situation, we've struggled to get accurate information upon which we can base our decisions. Issues of credibility have been raised because some of the reports previously have been inac- curate about things. Your report is very helpful, serving as an ob- jective marker against which to measure other assessments and to compare other assessments, just as Senator Warner was doing with the declassified versions of the NIE. We're going to hear from Gen- eral Petraeus, as well, and we heard yesterday from General Jones, and so forth. So thank you for helping the American people and those of us as policymakers get access to the facts so we can make the best decisions possible. Mr. Walker, I really enjoyed your interaction with Senator McCaskill, one accountant to another—I'm going to ask you to, per- haps, help us, not only ascertain the facts, but perhaps draw some lessons from them. It may, at times, go close to going beyond the scope of your report, but you're an intelligent man and I'd appre- ciate your opinion, whether personal or official. The first is the progress—as you noted—has so far just not been made on the political front. Everyone agrees that, ultimately, we've made some security gains, our troops are behaving heroically. If success in Iraq was solely up to them, we'd be doing very well. But it's not solely up to them. Ultimately, we can not create a country for the Iraqis. They have to do their part and that involves political reconciliation, and it just hasn't been happening. I'm wondering if you've developed an opinion in the course of compiling this report and assessing that the political progress has not been adequate, why that has been. I mean, their country is at risk of falling apart. They're dying, we're dying. Why not the progress? Where's the sense of urgency? What's holding this up? Mr. WALKER. Well, first Senator Bayh, I would not express a per- sonal opinion because I don't think it's appropriate to separate my position as Comptroller General of the United States from my per- sonal opinion. Therefore, to the extent that I comment, it will be based upon our work and my personal interaction. Senator BAYH. I'm just asking for your assessment to the extent you have one. Mr. WALKER. Yes. I think what I would suggest is, the level of complexity in Iraq is much greater than the level of complexity in the United States with regard to getting things done, because of the sectarian differences, because of the newness of their Republic, and a variety issues. Senator BAYH. Historic enmities, and the cycle of violence, and the neighbors intruding, and the list goes on and on and on. Mr. WALKER. We don't have the type of activity in our streets, thank God. Senator BAYH. Here's the direction I'm going with this question. Is it possible, in your opinion, that in spite of our best efforts, and the heroic sacrifices of our military and others, that since this is ultimately up to them and the process of political reconciliation, 48 given the challenges that they face, it just may ultimately not be doable for them. Mr. WALKER. I think only time will tell. I think one of the things that one has to keep in mind is that with the Sunnis having 20 percent of population, but accustomed to being in charge, with the Kurds having 20 percent, and with the Shia having 60—of which that's not a single block—they may be, and I don't know this for a fact, doing scenario analysis. Each group may be doing scenario analysis as to how do we come out based on this course of action versus an alternative course of action. I can't put myself in their minds. Senator BAYH. It would frankly be reassuring to know that they were going through such a rational process. Mr. WALKER. I can't say whether they are or they aren't, but that's human. Senator BAYH. As I mentioned, this is our third hearing. We're going to have one next week. We sit in rooms like this and talk about decisions that we make and if we do this what will happen, if we do that what will happen. Based upon the information you gleaned in the process of putting together this very good report, shouldn't we have a fair amount of modesty when it comes to our own assessment of our ability to influence events there? I mean, based upon your answer to my previous question. They're making their calculus and their decision based upon a whole lot of factors, in addition to what we do. Now, we can affect things, but shouldn't we be a little bit modest in our assessment of our ability to drive events in Iraq? Mr. WALKER. I'll say it a little bit differently. We have made a difference on the security front, and our military has done every- thing they've been asked to do. We've made a difference there. But part of the reason that we've used our military in that regard, is to provide the space for political progress. Only they can decide that they want national reconciliation and do what it takes to make that happen. Senator BAYH. Well, let me ask you about that. Mr. WALKER. So far they haven't. Hopefully they will. Senator BAYH. That's what I'm driving at here. Let me ask you if you've developed an opinion about what, if anything, we can do to expedite the process of reconciliation, to the extent we can, which in my own opinion is, we can operate at the margins, but ultimately it's up to them. Let me ask you about the conundrum that we've wrestled with here. If we stand by them in an attempt to build up their security and their confidence in the hope that they'll make tough compromises in the process of reconciliation, a sense of urgency seems to dissipate and they back-off, they have kind of a comfort zone there. If on the other hand, we set timelines and insist upon consequences for their failure to act, well then they retreat into their sectarian corners and begin to prepare for the aftermath when we leave. Either way, it seems that our action, ei- ther staying or threatening to go, doesn't expedite the process of political reconciliation. How would you address that conundrum? Mr. WALKER. Let me just say, without getting into details, I found that in order to achieve positive results in a sustainable fashion, you have to have a framework that deals with three 49 things. A plan that provides appropriate goals, objectives, metrics and milestones, and incentives for people to do the right thing. Sec- ond, adequate transparency to provide reasonable assurance that people will do the right thing because somebody's looking. Third, appropriate accountability and consequences if people don't deliver on their commitments. I think there's more that can be done with regard to those elements here without getting into a lot of detail. Senator BAYH. I think that's a very important statement. Gen- eral Jones sitting in the chair that you're occupying today, yester- day, said in his opinion he thought that deadlines would be coun- terproductive. I asked him, “What about consequences, what about accountability?" He's a good man, but there wasn't much of a direct answer to that. Mr. WALKER. I think there's a difference between a milestone and a deadline. I mean, there is a fundamental difference. When you have goals, objectives, metrics, and milestones, if you don't hit the milestones then there should be some explanation and account- ability for why you didn't, and then you'll have to make a judgment as to whether or not things are likely to change. That's different. Senator BAYH. Let me ask you then. We have these benchmarks you've reported on here. Most of them haven't been met, correct? Mr. WALKER. That's correct. Senator BAYH. What are the consequences going to be for them not having been met? Mr. WALKER. Yet to be determined. Senator BAYH. I think the honest answer is none. None that I'm aware of. So we can talk about deadlines or milestones or however we want to split that hair, but ultimately there will have to be some kind of consequences, as you say, otherwise behavior doesn't change. So, we're struggling with what those consequences, if any, should be. Some of us have concluded that we're long past the time where there at least need to be some, otherwise they're not going to take us seriously. Mr. WALKER. Well, and I think one of the things that this com- mittee needs to consider, as well as Congress, is what should our goals be, what should our objectives be, what should the metrics and milestones be, what type of reporting and mechanisms will be there to try to make sure we're making progress. But I think one of the subsets is, what should the role of our military be? I mean, it's going to be there for a while. What should their role be? Con- sistent with the goals and the objectives and all these other factors. Senator BAYH. Just a final couple things, Mr. Walker. I think your last statement there was very important about the three things that you mentioned about how to go about influencing be- havior there. I hope that we'll adopt as the policy of this govern- ment, but to date we've been requesting and suggesting and plead- ing and they've given lip service to that but nothing has happened. There has to begin to be some consequence for that. I think your statement was very important. Two final quick things. General Jones, yesterday, in his testi- mony indicated the belief that the Iraqi security forces over the next-I can't remember the period—6 to 12 months or 12 to 18 months, over a period of either 6 months to a year and a half, would have improved their capability sufficiently that we could 50 begin the process of adjusting, redeploying, however you want to characterize our presence in Iraq. I asked him about his confidence level that they would achieve that sometime next year, that would enable us to begin the process of redeploying. His expressed in his words “a high degree of confidence” in that judgment. Do you share that high degree of confidence? Mr. WALKER. Senator, we did not attempt to project forward as to what we think is going to happen. That was beyond our scope, and I really don't think it's appropriate for me to do that. Chairman LEVIN. Senator, if I could interrupt on that point. At the end of the conversation yesterday with General Jones, he made it clear because I asked him to clarify this question. In an- swering the questions that this could happen, with a high degree of confidence, in 6 to 12 months, that was his task, what could occur in 6 to 12 months. I point blank asked him, "Well couldn't that transition occur sooner than that?” He said, “Yes. I'm not try- ing to imply it can't occur sooner, but my task was to say what could be achieved in 6 to 12 months.” It's a very significant dif- ference. It's like, if I asked you, “Could you be back in Indiana in 6 to 12 months?” Your answer would be, "Sure.” That's what his answer was yesterday. But if the question was, “Does that mean you can't be in Indiana this weekend?” The answer is, “No, I can be there this weekend, too." Senator BAYH. Perhaps he didn't understand my question. I read from the section of his report, quoting the language expressing his beliefs that they would achieve that, and asked him, “Well, what's your confidence level in that assessment?” He said he had a high confidence. Chairman LEVIN. That's correct, but that does not suggest that it can not occur before 6 to 12 months. Senator BAYH. Of course. Chairman LEVIN. Because of what he was tasked to do, that was the way it was phrased. I just commend you on the question, but also that you get that Q&A with him, so there's not a suggestion, which the press kind of picked up, I think, erroneously. Well, that means that it could not happen before 6 to 12 months. That's not what he was saying. Senator BAYH. I understand and I agree. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One last question. Is it possible for you to render an opinion about whether the security gains, which our military, our forces have secured over the last several months, can persist in the ab- sence of political reconciliation? In other words, some of us are try- ing to determine whether the progress on the security front that apparently has been achieved is transitory or whether it is more permanent. Some of us believe that it has set the stage, but with- out political reconciliation—which according to your report, just doesn't seem to be happening—it will either be transitory, or it could only be maintained with an indefinite commitment of our se- curity forces. Mr. WALKER. Well, the unclassified NIE makes it pretty clear the political process is essential in order to ultimately achieve the cur- rent objectives that are outlined by the administration in Iraq. Sec- ond, it also shares our concerns with regard to the lack of political ce. 51 progress. Furthermore, it notes that while the military can make a difference, it can't get the job done. One of the issues that, by itself, no matter how great of effort they do and no matter what the results are there, and they are performing courageously in get- ting results. I think one of the questions you have to ask yourself, and potentially General Petraeus next week is, what has happened so far on the military front. There has been progress, how much of that experience is sustainable and how much of it is transferable is not yet known. I think both are relevant and I think, obviously, he's on the ground, he's in the best position to give you an opinion. I come back to what I said before. We need to rethink about what the goals ought to be, the objectives, what the metrics and mile- stones should be. We need to have the three elements that I talked about. Then when people tell you things, periodically you'll come back and find out what actually happened, and ask them, “Why didn't it happen?” or “Congratulations that it did happen,” or, "What's the reason for the variance?” and “What's going to change in the next 3 months?” We need to get on a track here so that you can make some more informed, timely, and considered judgments. Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Walker. That exhausts my ques- tions. I just want to, again, thank the Chairman and, Senator Warner. I want to thank you for having performed a real public service. Your analytical framework here, the objectivity you've brought to this can really help clarify the decisions that we need to make. So thank you very much. I'm sure it was a real labor for you. Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator Bayh. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Bayh. Senator Sessions. Senator WARNER. If I could say something. You really framed in your last closing remarks, what is so impor- tant. You point out the expectations that we had with regard to benchmarks, to political reconciliation from the top down. That in- formation is now coming up, corroborated, in many instances, by ous panels and sources coming before Congress. It then goes to the President. With no disrespect whatsoever to the Presi- dent-he's faced with one of the most difficult decisions any Presi- dent has ever faced—namely, one of them is that the military wit- nesses have repeatedly said this problem can not be solved by mili- tary force, that political reconciliation from the top down is an es- sential element. I think there's consensus that top-down political reconciliation is no longer a foundation for what strategy we begin to pursue in the next months, days, whatever it may be. I just hope the President will address this because you used the word account- ability. The President has to address that very question. It is at the heart of what we're trying to determine as how America and the other coalition forces, what strategy do they follow in the next 6 to 12 months. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Senator Sessions? Let me interrupt if you're beginning, Senator Sessions. I'm going to have to leave. I want to leave with my thanks to you, Mr. Walk- er. Senator Bayh has to leave, so Senator Warner can take over while, from here on in and if he leaves, Senator Sessions, would you close it off or turn it over to anyone else. Thank you so mu 52 Senator WARNER [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, we'll do that. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much. Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Walker, for your and GAO's contribution to this national discussion that we're having now. We had General Jones ew yesterday. You now are giving your report. We'll have General Petraeus giving his report next week. It's appropriate and fitting that this Nation undertake a national discussion of Iraq, honestly, with the best information we can get and make the tough decisions we have to make that serve our national interest, serve the world's interest, our allies, and our security and safety of the American people. I don't doubt the value of what we're doing. I totally support it. I think all of us need to rise above politics and we need to try to do the right thing for our country at this difficult time. Thank you for participating in this discussion. I would tend to agree with Senator Bayh, who says we should be somewhat modest about creating a government in an area of the world that's never had one before, that's never functioned in a de- cent way before. It's very hard, it's just very hard. Let me ask one thing, for the record. You've complimented the military on a number of occasions and it's something of which I'm proud. They go out every day to execute the policies we ask them to execute. They put their lives at risk for us. But would you tell us, in the hierarchy of command in Iraq, what agencies of our Gov- ernment are responsible for negotiating and encouraging and facili- tating political reconciliation in Iraq, electricity, water, and that kind of thing. Mr. WALKER. It depends upon the issue, Senator Sessions. Re- sponsibility in Iraq is generally divided primarily between DOD and DOS, depending upon what the particular issues are, if you will. That's why it's appropriate that you're going to be hearing, next week, from both General Petraeus, who's our Commander on the ground, but also from Ambassador Crocker. Senator SESSIONS. But the real truth is that it's not our military, our DOD that is charged with the primary responsibility for work- ing with the Iraqi leaders to assist them in creating a more pro- gressive and effective government. That's DOS's responsibility. Mr. WALKER. You raise a good point. One of the concerns that we've expressed, based upon our past work, is an adequate number of advisors, both from the U.S., as well hopefully from the inter- national community, to be able to help Iraq help itself be able to stand up a fully-functioning government that can deliver reliable electricity, enough safe and potable water, safer streets, education, health care. This is really important. In many cases pened is the military has been asked to do things that, quite frank- ly, they're willing to step up to the plate and do what they can, but they don't necessarily have the expertise. The fact that you have somebody in the uniform doing it, even though it's a non-military matter, doesn't necessarily send the right kind of signal, as well. So I think you've touched on an important issue that we've high- lighted in some of our prior work, prior to this 18 benchmark re- port. 53 Senator SESSIONS. Well, if you're looking at it from a manage- ment responsibility, I think you would say that the military is making progress—at least I would and General Jones did—but the areas that are lagging behind are the governmental, which are not the military's primary responsibility. I just kind of want to make that point. Mr. WALKER. I think our report supports that. Senator SESSIONS. Looking at the numbers about violence, we've had an upward trend, according to your chart on page 11—for some time I guess—from January 2006, now to September 2007, a gen- eral upward trend in violence. But it does appear that, according to your chart, that maybe about June, in both attacks on the coali- tion and overall attacks, there has been a decline. Your report ends in July. Maybe July it begins to drop-June, July area-and it does show a rather sharp reduction. How far that will continue, I don't know. You did not evaluate the month of August, as far as violent trends, did you? At least this chart does not. Mr. WALKER. We asked for data and were briefed on data through August 15. We then asked for the data for the month, but it is yet to be provided to us. Hopefully it will be provided to you, next week, when General Petraeus speaks. As you can see, there was a significant decline between June and July, but two impor- tant notes there. Number one, it was primarily attributable to at- tacks on Coalition forces. In other words, that's where most of it was. In the other areas it's roughly about the same, civilian and attacks on Iraqi security forces. Second, the overall level of violence in July 2007 was roughly the same as February 2007. I think it's going to be important for you to be able to get what the numbers are for August. We also have to keep in mind that Ramadan starts this month. Hopefully the past is not prologue with regard to Ramadan. In the past, the tendency has been for somewhat less violence right before Ramadan and escalating vio- lence during Ramadan. Hopefully that won't occur this year, but I just note that, because it is an important fact that you need to keep in mind. Senator SESSIONS. Well, I certainly don't think these are bal- anced numbers that we should be celebrating, or assuming are going to continue indefinitely, this trend downward. But I do be- lieve that the numbers will probably show that August continued a decline, which is certainly better than showing an increase. We ought not to disregard that. The administration evaluated benchmarks and you evaluated, I guess, their evaluation. Was that required by the mandate? Mr. WALKER. Well, not really. What they did is, they looked at the benchmarks in July, and they evaluated them based upon whether or not they felt satisfactory progress was being made. We looked at the benchmarks as of August 30, 2007 and consistent with the statutory mandate, noted whether or not they had met or not met, but used our independent professional judgment to be able to also use some partially met ratings. Furthermore, consistent with some of the language in our mandate, we provided a lot of commentary so you got a sense as to what kind of progress was made. Of the ones that were not met, was any progress there or not? In many cases there was some, but just not a lot. 54 Senator SESSIONS. I think that's fine and I think people here are concerned about it and we want the best information and multiple sources of information, multiple perspectives, and thank you for sharing that. I guess it would be fair to say you did not find, in their report, their evaluation, things that were plainly false or dis- honest in that report? Mr. WALKER. We didn't evaluate theirs. But what we did do is, as I have in one of the exhibits—the last exhibit, I believe, that has been provided as part of my testimony—we did do a comparative analysis of what we found as of August 30, and what the adminis- tration asserted as of July. Now, presumably they're going to give you a new one next week. I would hope that they'll give you a new one next week, and we'll see what's changed on theirs between July and September. Senator SESSIONS. Well, we have a challenge. I think it's, the ad- ministration report was not particularly rosy, either. This is a dif- ficult challenge for America, that's what I understand. I have no doubt of it. It's not going to be easy. We need to be able to draw our troop levels down as soon as we possibly can, but after we've committed so much, we've worked so hard, our soldiers have risked so much, we ought not to do it in a way that is unwise, that's pre- cipitous, that acts based on politics rather than what's in the long- term national interest of America. So, that's where I am. I thank you for your contribution to that effort, and my time is up. Senator BILL NELSON (presiding]. Thank you. Senator WARNER. Well, I would say to my distinguished col- league, I have a high degree of confidence that we will not do any- thing unwise, respecting any withdrawal policy. We owe it to the men and women and their families who've made enormous sac- rifices. I have confidence that the President would not let that hap- pen, and Congress would not let it happen. So, I want to conclude on the note that we might have situation which would be charac- terized as an unwise decision. Senator SESSIONS. I would just say that I think the report yester- day and the report today reflects a good, honest, construct partisan discussion of a difficult challenge this country faces. Senator WARNER. I observe the presence of our distinguished col- league from Florida. The floor is yours if you so like. Senator Levin has had to depart. Senator BILL NELSON. Well, it looks like I'm the cleanup hitter. Senator WARNER. Well, you've been known to do that before, and very admirably. So, take over. I thank you very much, and your staff. Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator Warner. Thank you. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Walker, thank you for your long and dedicated public service. Is this a fair statement that political rec- onciliation in Iraq is a key to reducing the sectarian violence? Mr. WALKER. There are a number of authorities that have come to that conclusion, to say that that is essential. The work that we've done doesn't go forward as to whether or not that's likely to happen, but we've noted the importance of that, and we've noted the lack of progress, to date, in that area. Senator BILL NELSON. Certainly that's what General Jones' Com- mission said yesterday. I have certainly thought that it's the key 55 to reducing sectarian violence, but I will just give an editorial com- ment here, that having observed what's been going on, having been there, having talked to the parties, having read a bit of history, in that this sectarian violence has been going on for 1,327 years, since the Battle of Karbala in 680 A.D., that, I just think it's going to be very, very hard for political reconciliation. If that is the key to stabilizing Iraq, then it seems to me that we have a very difficult time ahead of us. Now, earlier today, you stated that you think that General Petraeus, next week, is going to testify to us that sectarian violence is down. Mr. WALKER. That's correct. Senator BILL NELSON. Then the question, as you earlier dis- cussed this morning is, what is the definition of sectarian violence? Mr. WALKER. Correct. Senator BILL NELSON. As we receive his testimony, how would you recommend that we try to determine that? Mr. WALKER. Well, I think you need to ask him, how does he de- fine sectarian violence and what methodology does he use in order to try to ascertain the rate of sectarian violence and, those are very relevant questions. We could not get comfortable with the method- ology that is used in determining sectarian violence versus non-sec- tarian violence. We're comfortable with overall violence, we're not comfortable with that split. As has been mentioned previously in this hearing, that data went up, it's now gone down. We haven't been confident with how you differentiate during any of the time. So, you should ask him. Senator WARNER. But could I interrupt to clarify? Senator BILL NELSON. Certainly. Senator WARNER. Because at some point, you're talking about the methodology that presumably DOD and therefore, General Petraeus is going to use. Mr. WALKER. It's my understanding, Senator Warner, that the MNF-I, of which General Petraeus is the commander, is the one that maintains this data. Senator WARNER. Correct. Mr. WALKER. It's my understanding that's the basis of whatever he might testify to. Senator WARNER. But did you have full access to the method- ology that they're using? Mr. WALKEŘ. We did, we were briefed on the methodology. We're not comfortable with the methodology and we fully expect that it will show a decline. Senator BILL NELSON. Let me ask you a couple more questions about the readiness of the Iraqi brigades, specifically with regard to the Baghdad operations. You looked at that, and you came to a conclusion different from the administration. What were the dif- ferent standards of readiness that were used? Mr. WALKER. Well first, there's additional information, Senator Nelson, that's in our classified report that I would commend to you on that. Second, with regard to number nine, which I presume you're talking about, which is providing three standing-ready bri- gades to support Baghdad. Is that the one you're talking about? Senator BILL NELSON. Yes, sir. 56 Mr. WALKER. Okay good. There are three issues there. Number one, did they supply the requisite number of troops? The answer is yes. The second question is, what was the level of readiness of those troops? That is in our classified report. Third, what about the reliability of those troops, which in our classified report. Reliability meaning things like even though they may have the capability, are they willing to execute that capability and are they willing to exe- cute that capability in a non-sectarian way, in other words, sec- tarian-neutral manner. Senator BILL NELSON. Your conclusion there was? Mr. WALKER. We had concerns with regard to the last element the most, and the second element the next most. So, the troops were provided, many of them, in fact, have a high level of readiness and that is noted in there. So our concern was really more about the reliability issue than it was the readiness issue. Senator WARNER. That's expressed in your classified annex to the reports we received? Mr. WALKER. Correct, Senator Warner... Senator WARNER. Available to all Senators of the committee to examine. Senator BILL NELSON. So, in putting that in other words, your conclusion would be that those brigades of the Iraqi Army in and around Baghdad would not be capable of operating independent of the U.S. support? Mr. WALKER. That's not what we're saying. In fact, when you look at the classified material, you'll see the level of readiness there. Senator Nelson, there are four levels of readiness from level 1 to 4 and I think it'll speak loudly. We're not saying that, no. Senator BILL NELSON. Well for the public record here, can you give an opinion about their ability to operate independently of the U.S.? Mr. WALKER. Yes. The numbers are classified. There are a sig- nificant number of those units that are in the top category—can't say that? Okay. I would commend to you our classified report. Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Well, then I would just concur with the Chairman and Senator Warner that we need to make that clas- sified report public. I understand that the leadership of this com- mittee has so requested that of DOD. Senator WARNER. That's my understanding, that the chairman intends to do so—I have read through this, and I think it would be beneficial. Senator BILL NELSON. Now, are you reading from the classified? Senator WARNER. I'm not going to read from it. Senator BILL NELSON. No, no. But I mean that's what you're re- ferring to. Senator WARNER. That's correct Mr. WALKER. It has information that is directly relevant to your question, Senator Nelson. Senator BILL NELSON. It's very important for us to know and it's important for the American people to know, because the question is, can Iraq do it on their own? Mr. WALKER. Senator Nelson, earlier when Senator Levin was here he said—and I'm sure the very capable staff of this committee has probably already taken it down that by 3 o'clock today he 57. wanted to know if there was any additional information that mem- bers, such as yourself, wanted to try to seek to have declassified, that is in our classified report. Obviously you're noting at least one piece of information you'd like to be in that category. Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Senator Warner, are you going to adjourn the meeting or am I? Senator WARNER. If I might just ask a question. Senator BILL NELSON. Certainly. Senator WARNER. Then obviously you can, you have the author- ity. I've read so much in the last 48 hours in preparation for Jones' report and this one, that I can't put my hands on this statement in public, that there's a difference in criteria as to casualties. When the authorities in Iraq-be it our military authorities or local or whatever, find a deceased person in the street, which is the unfor- tunate incident that happens daily, unfortunately hundreds of bod- ies are discovered from time to time—some of the metrics being used by certain parts of, I presume whether it's the Iraqi Govern- ment our Government, but I'm going to find out. If the cadaver in- dicates that loss of life was attributed to a bullet that came into the forehead, it is put in the category of, should we say murder, wanton murder. If the skull is penetrated from the rear by a bullet, then that should be put into the category of sectarian violence be- cause there's been certain patterns of how sectarian violence has been carried out, in terms of rendering death to an individual. Have you seen that? Mr. WALKER. I have not personally seen it, but some of my staff has seen it. You're talking about some of the issues that are in our classified report. We couldn't get comfortable with the methodology. Senator WARNER. This is in open literature. This is open lit- erature. Mr. WALKER. I understand. I know what you're talking about now is open, but there are more details in our classified report. You're noting some of the concerns that we have as to how can you reliably say that this type of casualty is sectarian and this type of casualty isn't? Senator WARNER. I don't know. I've had some experience in the past. I used to be a prosecutor and had to go the morgue a number of times to accompany those making analysis. I find that a rather curious thing that I'm going to try to get to the bottom of. That is what you were pointing out. Senator BILL NELSON. I hope you will, Senator Warner Senator WARNER. Well, thank you again, very much. As you may know, Chuck Bowser occupied your position at one time. He and I were in the Navy Secretariat during the war in Vietnam. I may have been the Secretary and he the assistant, but I tell you, he was a power force and one that was highly respected in this profession. You've had a very proud lineage of individuals who have taken on these important responsibilities of the GAO. I commend you and your staff. Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator Warner. He's a friend and ob- viously my predecessor and I'm pleased to say that as of today, Elmer Staats who was his predecessor, is still with us and hope- fully will be for a while, but, at 93. 158 Senator WARNER. I remember Elmer Staats, worked with him many times during those periods in Vietnam. Thank you very much. Mr. WALKER. Thank you. Senator BILL NELSON. The hearing is adjourned. Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator, and I want to just thank our staff for the record. Thank you. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA mine, we requires unde useful to com Iraq. For esalting from sector 2007 beng quires undan violence in Yralence. However, Gee had made sa VARIANCE BETWEEN DOD AND GAO METHODOLOGY 1. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, the media has reported about the dispute between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding the accuracy of DOD's claim that the “surge” has successfully resulted in a reduction in violence. Can you elaborate on the differences in the methodologies used by DOD and GAO to estimate the levels of violence in Iraq? Mr. WALKER. According to the administration's September 2007 report to Con- gress, MNF-I data showed a decrease in sectarian violence, particularly in Bagh- dad, since the start of the Baghdad security plan. The report concluded that the Iraqi government, with substantial coalition assistance, had made satisfactory progress toward reducing sectarian violence. However, GAO could not reliably deter- mine whether sectarian violence in Iraq had been reduced because measuring such violence requires understanding the perpetrator's intent, which may not be known. Instead, it would be useful to consider broader measures of population security when assessing levels of violence in Iraq. For example, the number of attacks tar- geting civilians and population displacement resulting from sectarian violence may serve as additional indicators. As we reported in our September 2007 benchmark report, the average number of daily enemy-initiated attacks against civilians re- mained high relative to attacks on coalition forces. In addition, as we reported in October 2007,1 the decrease in total average daily attacks through September is largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than civilians. Our benchmark report also noted that the violence in Iraq has resulted in a large number of Iraqis displaced from their homes. A report by the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization found that internally displaced persons increased from about 499,000 in February 2007 to about 1,128,000 in July 2007. The United Nations High Com- missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that an additional 1.8 million Iraqi citi- zens were displaced to nearby countries, primarily to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Egypt. The UNHCR predicted that 40,000 to 50,000 people will continue to be displaced each month even if the security plan succeeds in solving the displacement problem. Currently, the number of displaced persons is increasing at an average of 80,000 to 100,000 each month, according to the Red Crescent. The August 2007 Na- tional Intelligence Estimate for Iraq also stated that population displacement result- ing from sectarian violence continues, imposing burdens on provincial governments and some neighboring states. Where population displacements have led to signifi- cant sectarian separation, according to the August 2007 National Intelligence Esti- mate, conflict levels have diminished to some extent because warring communities find it more difficult to penetrate communal enclaves. 2. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, in your opinion, is the DOD methodology for eval- uating the levels of violence in Iraq inadequate for the purpose of identifying trends in the level of violence? If not, why not? Mr. WALKER. As previously stated, it is inherently difficult to judge trends in sec- tarian violence because this requires an understanding of the perpetrator's intent, which may not be known. Instead, as discussed in question 1, broader measures of population security should be considered when assessing trends in violence in Iraq. For example, as we reported in September 28, 2007, MNF-I data on enemy initiated attacks provide a reasonably sound depiction of general security trends. However, according to the DIA, the incidents captured in military reporting do not account for all violence throughout Iraq, such as incidents of Shi'a militias fighting each other or attacks against Iraqi security forces in southern Iraq. i GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues, GAO-08-231T (Washington, DC: Oct. 30, 2007). 59 3. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, General Petraeus indicated in his testimony on September 11, 2007, that the current methodology has been used for over a year, which implies that the methodology was changed just prior to the surge. Did GAO's auditors find evidence that DOD had revised either its methodology for estimating violence or its definitions of the different types of violence? If so, what was DOD's explanation for the revising the methodology? Mr. WALKER. The methodology we assessed took effect in August 2006. We did not assess the methodology used prior to this time. 4. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, does the change in DOD methodology prevent comparisons of the recent data against data from previous years? Mr. WALKER. We have no basis for responding to this question as we did not as- sess the previous methodologies used to assess trends in sectarian violence. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SURGE 5. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, as noted in GAO's report, the purpose of the surge was to reduce sectarian violence and provide the Iraqi government with breathing room to allow them to address political reconciliation. The benchmarks evaluated in this report were identified by the Iraqi government in June 2006. In theory, we should have seen the Iraqi government become more effective once the surge start- ed. Instead, it seems that several groups have recently, or are currently, boycotting the government. It seems to me that its unclear as to whether they can really ac- complish anything right now. Can you tell us how many of the benchmarks that have been completed or partially completed were accomplished by the Iraqi govern- ment since the arrival of additional troops for the surge in February of this year? In other words, did we see any improvement in the government's performance once the surge started? Mr. WALKER. As we recently reported 2 the Iraqi government has made limited progress in meeting eight legislative benchmarks intended to promote national rec- onciliation. As of October 25, 2007, the Iraqi Government had met one legislative benchmark and partially met another. Specifically, the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature were protected through existing provisions in the Iraqi Constitution and Council of Representatives' by-laws. In addition, the Iraqi Government partially met the benchmark to enact and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but will not be imple- mented until April 2008. The benchmark requiring a review of the Iraqi Constitution has not yet been met. Fundamental issues remain unresolved as part of the constitutional review process, such as expanded powers for the presidency, the resolution of disputed areas (such as Kirkuk), and power sharing between Federal and regional governments over issues such as the distribution of oil revenue. In addition, five other legistlative benchmarks requiring parliamentary action have not yet been met. 6. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, would you provide a copy of Figures 1 and 2 from the report revised to show the completion dates for each item shown as complete? Mr. WALKER. Figure 1 - The electoral commission legislation was passed in Janu- ary 2007. Figure 2 - Committees were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan in February 2007. Figure 2 - Joint security stations were established by August 2007. CHANGE OF DEFINITION OF SUCCESS 7. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, footnote 4 for Benchmark 15, “Iraqi Security Forces Operating Independently states, “In 2006, Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF- I) changed the definition of a Level 1 unit. Previously, in guidance provided to coali- tion transition teams for use in evaluating Iraqi security forces, a Level 1 unit was said to be fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent oper- ations. In 2006, MNF-I removed the words 'fully' and 'independent from the defini- tion. DOD officials could not provide a rationale for the change.” Although DOD could not provide an explanation for the change, did GAO determine the net effect on the performance metric? In other words, did the number of Level 1 units go up or down as a result of the change? 2 GAO-08-2311. 60 Mr. WALKER. GAO did not determine how the change in definition affected the performance metric. As of September 2007, MNF-I reported that only about 10 of 140 units of the Iraqi security forces are capable of operating independently. 8. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, when was the change implemented? Mr. WALKER. The new definition of a level-1 unit was implemented in April 2006. IRAQ BUDGET SPENDING 9. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, during the hearing, I pointed out that GAO's re- port states that the Iraqi government has provided $10 billion in its current budget for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services on an equitable basis, but that it is unlikely to be spent by the end of the year. In addition, as of July 31, the Iraqi government had only spent about $1.5 billion of the allocated funds. One of the questions I asked you during the hearing was if you could you describe some of the key projects that will likely not be accomplished if the Iraqi government's spending continues at the current pace. Consistent with your response to my question, could you please provide more specific information on the types of projects not being accomplished due to the Iraqi government's inability to spend their budgeted resources? Mr. WALKER. As we reported in our May 2007 report, Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors (GAO-07– 677), the energy sector is critical for Iraq's economy and for rebuilding the country and the Ministries of Oil and Electricity have budgeted substantial sums for future reconstruction. Experts estimate that over the next few years $27 billion will be needed for the electricity sector to keep up with needed demand and S20 to $30 bil- lion will be needed for the oil sector to reach production goals. Although significant funds have been allocated to the Ministries of Oil and Electricity for critical infra- structure repair, the ministries have had persistent difficulties spending these funds on critical oil and electricity sector projects due to poor procurement and budgeting practices, and the “brain drain” resulting from high levels of violence in Iraq. [Annex: The report from Government Accountability Office, “Se- curing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq,” follows:] 61 GAO United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees September 2007 SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks GAO Accountability Integrity. Reliability GAO-07-1195 62 September 2007 G A O SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ Reliability Highlights Highlights of GAO07-1195, a repon to Iragi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks congressional Committees Why GAO Did This Study Public Law 110-28 requires GAO TO report to Congress by September 1, 2007, on whether or not the government of lraq has niet 18 benchmarks contained in the Act and the status of the achievemen of these benchunarks. The benchmarks stem from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. In comparison the Act requires the administration to report in July and September 2007 on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether the benchmarks have. been met To complete our work we reviewed government documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, the UN; and the government of Iraq. We also made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006, and 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits we have completed since May 2003 What GAO Found The January 2007 U.S. strategy seeks to provide the Iraqi government with the time and space needed to help Iraqi society reconcile. Our analysis of the 18 legislative, security and economic benchmarks shows that as of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. (See next page). Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces. The Iraqi government has met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The government also partially met one other benchmark to enact and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008, Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, a review committee has not completed work on important revisions to Iraq's constitution. Further, the government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, or militia disarmament. The Administration's July 2007 report cited progress in achieving some of these benchmarks but provided little information on what step in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq's government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of local security, eliminated political intervention in military operations, ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable of independent operations, or ensured that political authorities made no false accusations against security forces. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased a key security benchmark-since it is difficult to measure the perpetrator's intent and other measures of population security show differing trends. Finally, the Iraqi government has partially met the economic benchmark of allocating and spending $10 billion on reconstruction. Preliminary data indicates that about $1.5 billion of central ministry funds had been spent, as of July 15, 2007. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it must balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the military progress, homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of the United States. Future administration reporting to assist the Congress would be enhanced with adoption of the recommendations we make in this report. What GAO Recommends In future repons to Congress on the benchmarks, we recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense: (1) specify clearly what A step in the Iraqi legislative process each draft law has reached; (2) identify trends in sectarian violence together with broader measures of population security, and (3) better identify the operational readiness of Iraqi security forces, State and DOD concurred with our recommendations but disagreed with our assessment of certain benchmarks. To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on GAO-07-195. For more information contact Joseph A. Chnstoff at (202) 512-8999 or christot gao go United States Government Accountability Office 63 Benchmark 1. Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and completing the constitutional review. GAO assessment Status Committee formed but amendments not approved by the Iraqi legislature and no referendum scheduled. Laws drafted. 2. Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification. 3 of 4 components drafted; none being considered by parliament. 3. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sector ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other iraqi citizens in an equitable manner. Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions. 5. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections. 6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty. 7. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq. 8. Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad security plan. 9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations. Law enacted; implementation scheduled tor 2008. Commission law enacted and implemented; however, supporting laws not enacted. No law drafted. _ No law drafted. Committees established. Forces provided; some of limited effectiveness. Political intervention continues. _ _ 10. Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. 11. Ensuring that Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law. 12. Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said "the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of (their) sectarian or political affiliation." 13. Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security. Iraqi security forces engaged in sectarian-based abuses. Militia infiltration of some security forces enables some safe havens. Militias control some local security; unclear whether sectarian violence has decreased. 32 of 34 stations established. 14. Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad. 15. Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently, 16. Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected. 17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis. 18. Ensuring that traq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces. Met Partially met Number of independent units declined between March and July 2007. Legislators' rights protected; minority citizens' rights unprotected. Funds allocated but unlikely to be fully spent. Unsubstantiated accusations continue to be made. O Not met Source: GAO analysis of UN, U.S., and Iraqi dala, United States Government Accountability Office 64 Contents Letter Results in Brief Legislative Benchmarks Security Benchmarks Economic Benchmark Conclusions Recommendations Agency Comments Appendix I Benchmark 1-Constitutional Review Issue Status Appendix II Benchmark 2 - De-Ba'athification Reform Issue Status Appendix III Benchmark 3 - Hydrocarbon Legislation Issue Status Appendix IV Benchmark 4 - Semi-Autonomous Regions Issue Status - Appendix V Benchmark 5 - Electoral Legislation Issue Status Appendix VI Benchmark 6 - Amnesty Legislation Issue Status Appendix VII Benchmark 7 - Militia Disarmament Issue Status Page i GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 65 Appendix VIII Benchmark 8 - Baghdad Security Plan Committees Issue Status Appendix IX Benchmark 9 - Iraqi Brigades Issue Status Appendix X Benchmark 10- Commander's Authority Issue Status Appendix XI Benchmark 11 - Iraqi Security Forces Enforcement of the Law Issue Status Appendix XII Benchmark 12 - Safe Havens Issue Status Appendix XIII Benchmark 13 - Sectarian Violence and Militia Control 50 Issue Status Appendix XIV Benchmark 14 - Joint Security Stations Issue Status Appendix XV Benchmark 15 - Iraqi Security Forces Operating Independently Issue Status Appendix XVI: Benchmark 16 - Minority Party Rights Issue Page ti GAO-07-1195 Secaring, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq S ." 66 Status Appendix XVII Benchmark 17 - Allocating and Spending Iraqi Revenues Issue Status Appendix XVIII Benchmark 18 - False Accusations Issue Status Appendix XIX Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks Appendix XX Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July 2007 Initial Benchmark Assessment Report 72 Appendix XXI Objectives, Scope, and Methodology -- - Appendix XXII Comments from the Department of State GAO Comments Appendix XXIII Comments from the Department of Defense GAO Comments Appendix XXIV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements Figures Figure 1: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative Benchmarks Figure 2: GAO's Assessment of Whether the Iraqi Government Has Achieved Security Benchmarks Page iii GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 67 Figure 3: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007) Figure 4: Location of Joint Security Stations and Coalition Outposts in Baghdad Figure 5: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007) Figure 6: Map of Joint Security Stations in Baghdad, as of August 9, 2007 Figure 7: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Page lv GAO-07-1195 Securing, StabfBzing and Rebuilding Iraq 68 GA O 6 GA O Accountability Integrity Redabinty United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548 September 4, 2007 Congressional Committees: Over the last 4 years, the United States has provided thousands of troops and obligated nearly $370 billion to help achieve the strategic goal of creating a democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and be an ally in the War on Terror. These troops have performed courageously under dangerous and difficult circumstances. The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007' (the Act) requires GAO to submit to Congress by September 1, 2007, an independent assessment of whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement of the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the population, and promote economic well-being. The benchmarks contained in the Act were derived from benchmarks and commitments articulated by the Iraqi government beginning in June 2006. (See appendix XIX for information on the origin of these benchmarks.) The January 2007 U.S. strategy, The New Way Forward in Iraq, is designed to support the Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence and foster conditions for national reconciliation. The U.S. strategy recognizes that the levels of violence seen in 2006 undermined efforts to achieve political reconciliation by fueling sectarian tensions, emboldening extremists, and discrediting the Coalition and Iraqi government. Amid such violence, it became increasingly difficult for Iraqi leaders to make the compromises necessary to foster reconciliation through the passage of legislation aimed at reintegrating former Ba'athists and sharing hydrocarbon revenues more equitably, among other steps. Thus, the new strategy was aimed at providing the Iraqi government with the time and space needed to help address reconciliation among the various segments of Iraqi society. Section 1314 of Public Law 110-28. GAO is providing this report to Congress on September 4", 2007, the first business day following September 1st. Page 1 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 69 As required by the Act, this report provides 1) an assessment of whether or not the Iraqi government has met 18 key legislative, security, and economic benchmarks, and, 2) provides information on the status of the achievement of each benchmark. Among these 18 benchmarks, eight address legislative actions, nine address security actions, and one is economic-related. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to report in July and September 2007 on the status of each benchmark, and to provide an assessment on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether the benchmarks have been met. In order to meet our statutory responsibilities in a manner consistent with GAO's core values, we decided to use "partially met” criteria for selected benchmarks. See appendices I-XVIII for information on our assessment and the status of the achievement of each benchmark, and appendix XX for a comparison of GAO's assessment with the administration's July 2007 initial benchmark assessment report. We are also issuing a separate, classified report on selected benchmarks. To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-1) and its subordinate commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General David H. Petraeus, Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-1). We also reviewed translated copies of Iraqi documents and met with officials from the government of Iraq and its legislature. As part of this work, we made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Irac-related reports and testimonies that we have completed since May 2003." We provided drafts of the report to the relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment. We received formal written comments from State and Defense and technical comments from the Central Intelligence Agency and National Intelligence Council which we incorporated as appropriate. This letter and each appendix describe the detailed criteria we used in making our assessments of the 18 benchmarks. As required by the mandate, we made a determination of whether all 18 benchmarks had been met. For 14 of the 18 benchmarks, we developed criteria for For example, see GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GA0-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2007). See GAO's website at http://www.gao.gov for a complete list of GAO's Iraq-related reports. Page 2 GA0-07-1195 Secaring, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq assessing whether the benchmark was "partially met." For the remaining 4 benchmarks, we determined that they should be judged as “met" or "not met" because the nature of the individual benchmarks did not lend themselves to a partially met" assessment. Although we analyzed classified data, including the August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq, this report only contains unclassified information, as of August 30, 2007. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix XXI contains a detailed description of our scope and methodology. Results in Brief As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall we found that: The constitutional review process is not complete, and laws on de- Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, and amnesty have not passed; Violence remains high, the number of Iraqi security forces capable of conducting independent operations has declined, and militias are not disarmed; and Funding for reconstruction has been allocated but is unlikely to be spent. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi government benchmarks with the military progress, homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of the United States. In addition, future administration reports on the benchmarks would be more useful to Congress if they depicted the status of each legislative benchmark, provided data on broader measures of violence from all relevant U.S. agencies, and assessed the performance and loyalties of Iraqi security forces. Page 3 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 71 Legislative Benchmarks Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met one of the eight legislative benchmarks and partially met another.' Specifically, the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected through existing provisions in the Iraqi Constitution and Council of Representatives' by-laws; however, minorities among the Iraqi population are vulnerable and their rights are often violated. In addition, the Iraqi government partially met the benchmark to enact and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008." Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. The benchmark requiring a review of the Iraqi Constitution has not been met. Fundamental issues remain unresolved as part of the constitutional review process, such as expanded powers for the presidency, the resolution of disputed areas (such as Kirkuk), and power sharing between federal and regional governments over issues such as distribution of oil revenue. In addition, five other legislative benchmarks have not been met. Figure 1 highlights the status of the legislative benchmarks requiring legislative enactment and implementation. *For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as “met” if all components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met' as having not met the requirements of "met" or "partially met." For the constitutional review, we would have considered the benchmark as met if, in accordance with Article 142 of the Iraqi Constitution, (1) the Constitutional Review Committee had been formed; (2) the Council of Representatives had voted on the recommendations of the review committee; and, if approved by the Council, (3) a national referendum had been held on the proposed amendments to the constitution. We would have considered the benchmark partially met if the first two steps of the constitutional review process were completed. "Because this law will not be implemented until April 2008, publication in the Official Gazette has been deferred, according to State officials, who assert that a delay in implementation is in the best interest of Iraq. Page 4 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Irag Figure 1: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative Benchmarks Drafting Enacting Implementing WHEN culis feled art volerted to Council of Representatives Committee EL 6.25 Speaker Olie First reading completed on calendar by Speakers Office Draft amended by Committee placed on calendar by Speakers Office Third reading completed, yote taken ran placed on calendar by Dran amended by Committee, pla Second reading completed Ralfication procedures Law oubished in Gazette 1. Chers worn by cabine Ministerforeren Gans another De-Ba'athification Hydrocarbon laws Framework Revenue sharing Ministry of Oil Restructuring Trag National Oil Company Formation of regions S Elections Electoral commission Provincial authorities Provincial election law Provincial election dated Amnesty Disarmament and demobilization No legislation drahed Source: GAO analysis of Department of State Department of Defense, UN and Iraqi government data "The Iraqi legislature is considering several competing drafts. "The Iraqi Constitution exempts the law on formation of regions from following the Presidency Council's ratification process that is set out in Article 138 of the Constitution. The dratt deals with broader federal versus provincial powers, according to UN. 'According to State, the Iraqi government may not need a law to set the election date, though to date this is unclear. Page 5 GA007-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 73 As figure 1 shows, legislation on de-Ba'athification reform has been drafted but has yet to be enacted.' Hydrocarbon legislation is in the early stages of legislative action; although three key components have been drafted, none are under active consideration by the Council of Representatives.' Although the government of Iraq has established an independent electoral commission and appointed commissioners, the government has not implemented legislation to establish provincial council authorities, provincial elections law, or a date for provincial elections. No legislation on amnesty or militia disarmament is being considered because the conditions for a successful program, particularly the need for a secure environment, are not present, according to U.S. and Iraqi officials. Prospects for additional progress in enacting legislative benchmarks have been complicated by the withdrawal of 15 of 37 members of the Iraqi cabinet. According to an August 2007 U.S. interagency report, this boycott ends any claim by the Shi'ite-dominated coalition to be a government of national unity and further undermines Iraq's already faltering program of national reconciliation. In late August, Iraq's senior Shi'a, and Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders signed a Unity Accord signaling efforts to foster greater national reconciliation. The Accord covered draft legislation on de-Ba'athification reform and provincial powers laws, as well as setting up a mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held without According to U.S. and other officials and documents, enacting legislation generally includes the following steps, though the process is evolving: The Presidency Council and the Council of Ministers have authority to draft laws, and the Iraqi legislature either a committee or 10 members-has the authority to propose laws. Laws drafted by the Presidency Council or Council of Ministers are reviewed on legal soundness and subject matter by the Shura Council, an institution in the Ministry of Justice Laws drafted by the legislature must first pass through its Legal Committee. The legislation then proceeds through three readings. The legislation is presented at the first reading. The relevant committee may amend the law and the Speaker's Office places it on the calendar. After the first reading, the legislature discusses the proposed law at a second reading. At the thind reading, a final vote is taken article by article. Laws that receive an affirmative vote are sent to the Presidency Council, which can disapprove the law. The legislature can override the disapproval with a three-fifths majority. This ratification process only applies during the transition period when the Presidency Council is in existence. Final laws are published in the Official Gazette and become effective on the date of publication in the gazette unless stipulated otherwise. The Prime Minister issues an order to implement the law. Laws are implemented by the appropriate ministry, commission, or government office and implementing guidance is written. "For additional information on Iraq's hydrocarbon sector, see GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Serious Challenges Impair Efforts to Restore Iraq's Cit Sector and Enact Hydrocarbon Legislation, GA007-1107T (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2007). Page 6 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabikzing and Rebuilding Iraq charges. However, these laws need to be passed by the Council of Representatives. (See appendices I-VII, and XVI for further information on these legislative benchmarks). The Administration's July 2007 report cited progress in achieving some of these legislative benchmarks but provided little information on what step in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. Future reporting should provide this important detail, as we display in figure 1. Security Benchmarks Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met two of the nine security benchmarks. Specifically, it has established political, communications, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad security plan and, with substantial coalition assistance, 32 of the planned 34 Joint Security Stations across Baghdad. Of the remaining 7 benchmarks, the Iraqi government partially met 2 and did not meet five. (see fig. 2) *In February 2007, the Iraqi government created the Executive Steering Committee and six subcommittees to coordinate political, economic, and military activities and make decisions in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. According to a State department official, the executive committee's major objective was to increase the coordination and capacity of the Iraqi government to improve the quality of life of Baghdad's population as part of the Baghdad security plan. We defined this benchmark as "met" if the committees were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; defined this benchmark as "partially met" if at least half of the committees were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; and defined this benchmark as "not met“ if less than half of the committees were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. For additional information, see appendix VIII. ”Joint Security Stations are staffed by Iraqi local police, national police, and army personnel, as well as coalition forces. According to the administration's July 2007 report, the security stations are designed to improve population protection by providing a 24-hour security presence in Baghdad neighborhoods. We defined this benchmark as "met" if nearly all of the planned Joint Security Stations were established. We defined this benchmark as "partially met” if half of the planned Joint Security Stations were established. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if less than half of the planned Joint Security Stations were established. For additional information, see appendix XIV. Page 7 GAO-07-1195 Securing. Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq Figure 2: GAO'S Assessment of Whether the Iraqi Government Has Achieved Security Benchmarks Assessment Benchmark Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan.. Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad. Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security. Providing three trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations. Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said "the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of (their) sectarian or political affiliation." Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. Ensuring that Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law. Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating independently. Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the tragi security forces. Met O Partially met O Nor met Source: GAO analysis of UN, U.S., and Iraqi data. The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark of providing three trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations. Since February 2007, the Iraqi government deployed nine Iraqi army battalions equaling three brigades for 90-day rotations to support the Baghdad "We defined this benchmark as “met” if the Govemment of Iraq had provided three trained and ready brigades, or an equivalent number of battalions, to support Baghdad operations; as "partially met" if some of the units were trained and ready to support Baghdad security operations; and as "not met" if none of the units provided were trained and ready to support Baghdad security operations. The assessment was based on each unit's transition readiness assessments and intelligence reporting on their reliability. Page 8 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq Security Plan. The administration's July 2007 report to Congress noted problems in manning the Iraqi brigades, but stated that the three brigades were operating in support of Baghdad operations. Our classified report provides additional information on the readiness levels and performance of these units, which supports our assessment of this benchmark. The Iraqi government also partially met the benchmark of ensuring that the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation." Even though the Baghad Security Plan is aimed at eliminating safe havens, and U.S. commanders report satisfaction with the coalition's ability to target extremist groups, opportunities for creating temporary safe havens exist due to the political intervention of Iraqi government officials (see discussion in appendix X) and the strong sectarian loyalties and militia infiltration of security forces. The Iraqi government has not met the benchmark to reduce sectarian violence and eliminate militia control of local security. As discussed in appendix XIII, militia control of local security forces remains a problem. Several U.S. and UN reports have found that militias still retain significant control or influence over local security in parts of Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. On trends in sectarian violence, we could not determine if sectarian violence had declined since the start of the Baghdad Security Plan. The administration's July 2007 report stated that MNF-I trend data demonstrated a decrease in sectarian violence since the start of the Baghdad Security Plan in mid-February 2007. The report acknowledged that precise measurements vary, and that it was too early to determine if the decrease would be sustainable. Measuring sectarian violence is difficult since the perpetrator's intent is not always clearly known. Given "We defined this benchmark as “met" if Iraqi government policy did not allow safe havens and none existed; defined this benchmark as “partially met” if Iraqi government policy prohibited safe havens yet some existed; and defined this benchmark as "not met” if the Iraqi government had no stated policy on safe havens. ?We defined this benchmark as "met” if there was clear and reliable evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced and militia control of local security was eliminated; defined this benchmark as "partially met" if there was clear and reliable evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced or if militia control of local security was eliminated, but not both; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if there was no clear and reliable evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced and that militia control of local security was eliminated. Page 9 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 77 this difficulty, broader measures of population security should be used in judging these trends. The number of attacks targeting civilians and population displacement resulting from sectarian violence may serve as additional indicators. For example, as displayed in figure 3, the average number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the last six months. The decrease in total average daily attacks in July is largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than civilians. Page 10 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 78 Figure 3: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May. 2003-July 2007) Number of average daily attacks per month 200 180 160 140 120 100 & DO . July May June Oct. NOV. Dec. Sopt. A July May Juno Oct. NOV. July Aug. Sept. June Pri Aug. Oct. sapi. Feb. Mar, Apr. May Apr Juno Aug. Sept. Oct. Fob. Mar. Apr May GO \June Na DOG Feb. 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 - Total average daily attacks ••••• Average dally attacks on coalition ---Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces Average daily attacks on civilians Baghdad security plan Source: GAO analysis of OIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data, tuly 2007. While overall attacks declined in July compared to June, levels of violence remain high. Enemy initiated attacks have increased around major religious and political events, including Ramadan and elections. For 2007, Ramadan is scheduled to begin in mid-September. Our classified report provides further information on measurement issues and trends in violence in Iraq obtained from other U.S. agencies. The unclassified August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq reported that Coalition forces, working with Iraqi forces, tribal elements, and some Sunni insurgents, have reduced al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) capabilities and restricted its freedom of movement. However, the NIE further noted that the level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among "Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. Over the past 4 years, Ramadan began about October 27, 2003; October 16, 2004; October 5, 2005; and September 24, 2006. Page 11 GAO-07-1196 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Irag 79 civilians remains high and AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks. For the remaining four unmet security benchmarks, we found that: The Iraqi government has not always allowed Iraqi commanders to make tactical and operational decisions without political intervention, resulting in some operational decisions being based on sectarian interests." • The government had not always ensured that Iraqi security forces were providing even-handed enforcement of the law, since U.S. reports have cited continuing sectarian-based abuses on the part of Iraqi security forces.15 Instead of increasing, the number of Iraqi army units capable of independent operations had decreased from March 2007 to July 2007.18 Iraqi political authorities continue to undermine and make false accusations against Iraqi security force personnel. According to U.S. government officials, little has changed since the administration's July 2007 report." (See appendices VIII-XV, and XVIII for further information on these security benchmarks). "We defined this benchmark as “met” if Iraqi commanders did not face political intervention in executing the plan and making tactical and operational decisions. We defined this benchmark as "not met” if Iraqi commanders faced political intervention in executing the plan and making tactical and operational decisions. We defined this benchmark as “met" if Iraqi security forces provided even-handed enforcement of the law. We defined this benchmark as “not met* if Iraqi security forces did not provide even-handed enforcement of the law. We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq increased the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating independently. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if the government of Iraq did not increase the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating independently. "We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was no evidence of undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force personnel. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if there was evidence of undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force personnel. Page 12 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 80 Economic Benchmark The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark to allocate and spend $10 billion because it allocated $10 billion in reconstruction funds when it passed its 2007 budget in February, 2007. The New Way Forward in Iraq cited Iraq's inability to spend its own resources to rebuild critical infrastructure and deliver essential services as an economic challenge to Iraq's self-reliance. Iraqi government funds represent an important source of financing for rebuilding Iraq since the United States has obligated most of the $40 billion provided to Iraq for reconstruction and stabilization activities since 2003. However, it is unclear whether the $10 billion allocated by the Iraqi government will be spent by the end of Iraq's fiscal year, December 31, 2007.18 Preliminary Ministry of Finance data reports that Iraq's central ministries spent about $1.5 billion, or 24 percent, of the approximately $6.5 billion in capital project funds allocated to them through July 15, 2007. The remaining funds from the $10 billion were allocated to the provinces and the Kurdish region. (See appendix XVII for further information on the economic benchmark) Conclusions As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. The Iraqi government has not fulfilled commitments it first made in June 2006 to advance legislative, security, and economic measures that would promote national reconciliation among Iraq's warring factions. Of particular concern is the lack of progress on the constitutional review that could promote greater Sunni participation in the national government and comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that would distribute Iraq's vast oil wealth. Despite Iraqi leaders recently signing a unity accord, the polarization of Iraq's major sects and ethnic groups and fighting among Shi'a factions diminishes the stability of Iraq's governing coalition and its potential to enact legislation needed for sectarian reconciliation. Reconciliation was also premised on a reduction in violence. While the Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence, measuring such violence may be difficult since the perpetrator's intent is We defined this benchmark as "met" if the funds had been allocated and either they had been spent or there was a high likelihood that they would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We defined this benchmark as partially met" if funds were allocated but it appeared questionable or unlikely that the funds would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We defined the benchmark as "not met* if the funds had not been allocated. · Page 13 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq not clearly known. Other measures of violence, such as the number of enemy-initiated attacks, show that violence has remained high through July 2007. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it must balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the military progress, homeland security, foreign policy and other goals of the United States. Future administration reports on the benchmarks would be more useful to the Congress if they clearly depicted the status of each legislative benchmark, provided additional quantitative and qualitative information on violence from all relevant U.S. agencies, and specified the performance and loyalties of Iraqi security forces supporting coalition operations. Recommendations In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase transparency on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we recommend that; 1. The Secretary of State provide information to the President that clearly specifies the status in drafting, enacting, and implementing Iraqi legislation; 2. The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other appropriate agencies, provide information to the President on trends in sectarian violence with appropriate caveats, as well as broader quantitative and qualitative measures of population security, and 3. The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other appropriate agencies, provides additional information on the operational readiness of Iraqi security forces supporting the Baghdad security plan, particularly information on their loyalty and willingness to help secure Baghdad. As discussed below, State and DOD concurred with these recommendations. - Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense, the National Intelligence Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The National Intelligence Council and the Central Intelligence Agency provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Department of State provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix XXII. State also provided us with technical comments and Page 14 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 82 suggested wording changes that we incorporated as appropriate. State agreed with our recommendation to provide the President with additional information on the specific status of key Iraqi legislation in preparing future reports to Congress. State suggested that we note the standards we used in assessing the 18 benchmarks differ from the administration's standards. The highlights page and introduction of our report discuss these differing standards. State also suggested that we take into consideration recent political developments in Iraq, such as the communiqué released by Iraqi political leaders on August 26, 2007. We added additional information to the report about this communiqué and related developments. The Department of Defense also provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix XXIII. DOD also provided us with technical comments and suggested wording changes that we incorporated as appropriate. Defense agreed with our recommendations to provide, in concert with other relevant agencies, information to the President on trends in sectarian violence with appropriate caveats, as well as broader quantitative and qualitative measures of security. Defense also agreed to provide the President with additional information on the operational readiness of Iraqi security forces supporting the Baghdad security plan. DOD also provided additional oral comments. DOD disagreed with our conclusion in the draft report that trends in sectarian violence are unclear. Further information on DOD's views, and our response, are contained in our classified report. However, the additional information that DOD provided did not warrant a change in our assessment of “not met.” We note that the unclassified August 2007 NIE stated that the overall violence in Iraq, including attacks on and casualties among civilians, remains high, Iraq's major sectarian groups remain unreconciled, and levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high over the next six to twelve months. DOD disagreed with our initial assessment of “not met" for the training and readiness of the Iraqi brigades supporting operations in Baghdad and provided additional information on this issue. While acknowledging that some of these Iraqi units lacked personnel, fighting equipment, and vehicles, the U.S. commander embedded with the units attested to their fighting capabilities. Based on this additional information, and our classified and unclassified information, we changed our rating from “not met” to “partially met.” DOD did not agree with our initial assessment that the benchmark related to safe havens was not met. DOD provided additional information Page 15 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 83 describing MNF-I efforts to conduct targeted operations in Sadr City. For example, from January to August 2007, Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces conducted over eighty operations that span each sector of Sadr City. However, due to sectarian influence and infiltration of Iraqi security forces, and support from the local population, anti-coalition forces retain the freedom to organize and conduct operations against coalition forces. Based on this additional information, we changed this assessment to "partially met." We are sending copies of this report to appropriate Members of Congress. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me on (202) 512-5500 or Mr. Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8979. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are included in appendix XXIV. Xe M-Wahr David M. Walker United States Comptroller General Enclosures Page 16 GAO-07-1195 Securing. Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 85 The Honorable Tom Lantos Chairman The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen Ranking Member Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives The Honorable John P. Murtha Chairman The Honorable C.W. Bill Young Ranking Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives The Honorable Nita M, Lowey Chairwoman The Honorable Frank R. Wolf Ranking Member Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives The Honorable Henry A. Waxman Chairman The Honorable Tom Davis Ranking Member Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of Representatives The Honorable John F. Tierney Chairman The Honorable Christopher Shays Ranking Member Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of Representatives Page 18 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 86 Appendix I: Benchmark 1 - Constitutional Review Forming a constitutional review committee and completing the constitutional review. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met Issue Iraq's Constitution was approved in a national referendum in October 2005, but did not resolve several contentious issues, such as claims over disputed areas including oil-rich Kirkuk. Amending the Constitution is critical to reaching national agreement on power sharing among Iraq's political blocs and furthering national reconciliation, according to Iraqi leaders, U.S. officials, and the Iraq Study Group report. Status Although the Iraqi legislature formed a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) in November 2006, the review process is not yet complete. First, the review committee's work is not finished. In a May 23, 2007 report, the CRC recommended a package of constitutional amendments to the Iraq Council of Representatives. However, the package did not resolve the powers of the presidency; disputed territories, including Kirkuk, and the relative powers of the regions versus the federal government. The CRC received an extension until the end of August 2007 to help resolve the outstanding issues, but, according to the chairman of the CRC, Iraq's major political groups need to reach agreement on these issues. Second, once resolved, the Iraqi legislature must approve the package of amendments by an absolute majority vote. Finally, if a package of amendments is For the constitutional review, we would have considered the benchmark as met if, in accordance with Article 142 of the Iraqi Constitution, the Constitutional Review Committee had been formed, the Council of Representatives had voted on the recommendations of the review committee; and, if approved by the Council, a national referendum had been held on the proposed amendments to the constitution. We would have considered the benchmark partially met if the first two steps of the constitutional review process were completed. See benchmark 2 for a description of the criteria for meeting legislative benchmarks. The constitutional review process consists of the following: (1) the Council of Representatives forms a review committee, which presents to the Council a report on recommendations of necessary amendments that could be made to the Constitution; (2) the proposed amendments shall be presented to the Council all at once for a vote upon them and are approved with the agreement of an absolute majority of the members of the Council; and (3) the articles amended by the Council shall be presented to the people in a referendum within two months from the date of approval by the Council and the referendum will be successful if approved by the majority of voters and if not rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates. Page 19 GA0-07-1198 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 87 Appendix 1: Benchmark 1 - Constitutional Review approved, the Iraqi people will need to vote on the amendments in a referendum within 2 months after the legislature approves them. Completion of the Constitutional Review First Requires Political Accommodation To complete a package of necessary amendments to the Constitution, Iraq's major political groups need to reach agreement on the following three contentious issues. Power of the presidency. The Deputy Chairman of the CRC, a member of the Sunni bloc, believes that the presidency should have greater power. The Constitution gives the presidency such powers as accrediting ambassadors. It also gives the presidency council the power to approve or disapprove legislation in the current electoral term." However, the legislature can adopt any disapproved legislation by a three-fifths majority vote. In contrast, the prime minister, selected from the legislature's largest political bloc, is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, names the ministers for each ministry, and directs the Council of Ministers. The Council directs the work of all government ministries and departments, develops their plans, and prepares the government budget. The high- ranking Sunni official said that giving the presidency more power could allow for better power sharing among Iraq's political groups. Disputed areas, particularly Kirkuk. Article 140 of the Constitution addresses the issue of disputed areas. It requires a census and a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed areas by December 31, 2007 to determine the will of its citizens. According to the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) prime minister, Kirkuk represents the Kurdish region and must be returned to Kurdistan. Under the former regime's policy of Arabization-removing Kurdish families from Kirkuk and replacing them with Arab families areas of Kirkuk were given to other governorates, according to a Kurdish committee. KRG officials want the referendum held by the date specified in the Constitution. Other Iraqi legislators believe that the Kirkuk referendum should be deferred because of the disputes over the borders of Kirkuk and continuing displacement of people in the area. According to the Iraqi Constitution, in the current electoral term, which is 4 years, a presidency council consisting of a president and 2 vice-presidents is in place and exercises the powers of the presidency. If these constitutional provisions are not amended, at the start of the next electoral term, power will revert to a single president and the power to approve and disapprove legislation that is explicitly granted to the presidency council will lapse. The president will then have the power to ratify and issue laws passed by the legislature, although such laws are considered ratified 15 days after the president receives them. Page 20 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 88 Appendix I: Benchmart I - Constitutional Review Power of the federal government versus regions. The CRC proposed several amendments to the Constitution to clarify the powers of the federal government and the shared powers with the regions, but has not achieved compromise among major political factions on these amendments. In particular, the CRC proposed amending Article 111 of the Constitution to clearly state that the federal government shall collect oil revenues and distribute them equally to all Iraqis in accordance with the national budget law. According to the United Nations, this amendment would provide the federal government exclusive authority for oil revenues. In contrast, the existing constitutional framework is widely interpreted as allowing regions to define how and whether they share locally generated oil revenues. For this reason, the Kurdish bloc opposes the CRC-proposed amendment. Procedural and Logistical Challenges Confront Completion of the Review If agreement is reached on a package of constitutional amendments, the Iraqi legislature must vote on the package. The amendments will be considered approved if an absolute majority of the legislature votes for the package. One challenge is simply holding a vote. Despite Iraqi leaders signing a unity accord, as of August 29, 2007, several Iraqi parties were boycotting the government, including Iraq's largest Sunni bloc. Although the other parties in the legislature could form an absolute majority to pass a package of amendments, it would defeat the purpose of trying to reach a broad political accommodation. If the legislature approves the constitutional amendments, the government must hold a national referendum within 2 months of approval. According to the United Nations, before a referendum can occur, the Iraq Electoral Commission must develop a valid voting roster, educate the public about *Under the existing Constitution, if there is a contradiction between regional and national law with respect to a matter outside the exclusive authority of the federal government, regional law takes priority and regional powers have the right to amend the application of the national legislation within that region. Page 21 GAO-07-1195 Secaring, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 89 Appendix I: Benchmark I-Constitutional Review the proposed amendments, print referendum ballots, and locate and staff polling places. In a July 2007 report, the Iraq High Electoral Commission stated that it faced challenges to developing a valid voting roster because of the large movement of displaced persons an estimated 800,000 since February 2006. _ _ _ United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Humanitarian Briefing on the Crisis in Iraq, May 2007. Page 22 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 90 Appendix II: Benchmark 2-De-Ba'athification Reform Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification reform. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met' Issue Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 1 dissolved the Ba'athist party, removed Ba'athist leaders and senior party members from government, and banned them from future employment in the public sector. The CPA further provided for investigation and removal of even junior members of the party from upper-level management in government ministries, universities, and hospitals. Most of Iraqi's technocratic class was pushed out of government due to de-Ba'athification and many Sunni Arabs remain angry about policies to de-Ba'athify Iraqi society, according to the Iraq Study Group report. Status Although Iraqi leaders have drafted several pieces of legislation to reform de-Ba'athification, none has sufficient support among Iraq's political factions to have a first reading in the Iraqi legislature, according to U.S. officials. No consensus exists on reforming the current de-Ba'athification policy and many Iraqis are concerned by the prospects of former Ba'athist tormenters returning to power. However, according to an August 2007 U.S. interagency report, Iraq's senior Shi'a and Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders signed a Unity Accord, including consensus on draft legislation on de-Ba'thification reform. Such a law would need to be drafted, passed by the Council of Representatives, and implemented. According to U.S. officials, reforms to the law would more likely promote reconciliation if the reforms target Ba'athists who had command responsibility within the party or committed human rights violations or For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as “met” if all components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented, defined the benchmark as partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or "partially met." Page 23 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 91 Appendix ll: Benchmark 2-De- Ba'athification Reform other crimes.? Removing individuals based purely on party membership increases the chances that segments of the Iraqi public will see the system as unfair, according to these officials. Draft legislation on de- Ba'athification reform, dated July 2007 before the Unity Accord, provides for a special commission, a panel of judges to make decisions, and the right to appeal the panel's decisions. The draft legislation also specifies that the commission will be dissolved 6 months after the law is passed. The doctrine of command responsibility holds that individuals can be liable for actions they did not actually commit if: (1) they issued orders to those who committed the human rights violations or crimes; (2) they should have known or should have been in a position to know that their subordinates were committing human rights violations or crimes; or (3) they did not take reasonable measures to prevent the human rights violations or other crimes or did not punish the perpetrators. Page 24 GAO-07-1195 Securing. Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 92 Appendix III: Benchmark 3 - Hydrocarbon Legislation Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met' Issue The importance of oil revenues for the Iraqi economy is widely recognized, as is the need to create a new legal framework for the development and management of the country's oil sector. The oil sector accounts for over half of Iraq's gross domestic product and over 90 percent of its revenues. The timely and equitable distribution of these revenues is essential to Iraq's ability to provide for its needs, including the reconstruction of a unified Iraq. Status The government of Iraq has not enacted and implemented any of the four separate yet interrelated pieces of legislation needed to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources. As of August 2007, the Iraqi government had drafted three pieces of legislation: (1) hydrocarbon framework legislation that establishes the structure, management, and oversight for the oil sector; (2) revenue-sharing legislation; and (3) legislation restructuring the Ministry of Oil. However, none of the legislation is currently under consideration by Iraq's parliament (Council of Representatives). A fourth piece of legislation establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) has not been drafted, according to State officials. Hydrocarbon framework legislation was approved by the Iraqi cabinet (Council of Ministers) in February 2007, and sent to the Oil and Gas Committee of Iraq's parliament for review in July 2007. However, before the legislation was submitted to the parliament, the Iraqi government 'For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as partially met" if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or "partially met." Page 25 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabiltzing and Rebuilding Iraq 93 Appendix III: Benchmark 3 - Hydrocarbon Legislation amended the draft to address substantive changes made by the Shura council. According to State, the Shura council reviews draft legislation to ensure constitutionality and to avoid contradictions with Iraq's legal system, including Islamic law. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) did not agree to the council's revisions. Accordingly, the Oil and Gas Committee chairman is taking no legislative action until the Iraqi cabinet and the KRG agree on a new draft, according to State. It is not clear if this legislation will include annexes intended to allocate the control of particular oil fields and exploration areas to either the central or regional governments. According to the Iraqi government, the annexes remain under consideration. Revenue-sharing legislation is intended to ensure the equitable distribution of Iraq's financial resources, including oil and gas revenues. The central government and the KRG agreed on draft revenue-sharing legislation in June 2007. However, the Iraqi cabinet has not yet approved the legislation and submitted it to Iraq's parliament for consideration. This draft legislation is linked to proposed amendments to the Iraqi Constitution regarding the role of the federal government and regions and the management of oil revenues. Under the existing Constitution, if there is a contradiction between regional and national law with respect to a matter outside the exclusive authority of the federal government, regional law takes priority and regional powers have the right to amend the application of the national legislation within that region. As oil revenue sharing is not a power exclusively reserved for the federal government in the existing Constitution, according to officials, regions may determine . how and whether they share locally generated oil revenues with the remainder of Iraq, regardless of what is stated in the federal law. In response, the Iraqi Constitutional Review Committee has proposed This legislation is also referred to as the “Law of Financial Resources" and the "Revenue Management Law." The Kurdistan National Assembly (Kurdish Regional parliament) has passed a “Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law" (also referred to as the “Petroleum Law of the Kurdistan Region - Iraq"), in August, 2007, which conditions cooperation with the federal authorities in the oil sector on a set of comprehensive conditions. According to the UN, it would likely take time for full agreement on these arrangements to be reached and for implementation of national revenue sharing to begin. It is unclear how this will affect the national debate on revenue sharing or the hydrocarbon framework legislation at this time. According to the State Department, the United States continues to believe that Iraq's interests are better served by the adoption of a single set of national oil and gas laws, which will help foster national unity and promote reconciliation. Page 26 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 94 Appendix III: Benchmark 3 - Hydrocarbon Legislation amendments to the Constitution that would provide for the national collection and distribution of oil revenues. Legislation restructuring the Ministry of Oil has been drafted but has not yet been submitted to the Council of Ministers, according to State. Legislation establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) is being drafted, according to State. Page 27 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 95 Appendix IV; Benchmark 4 - Semi-Autonomous Regions Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi- autonomous regions. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met' Issue Iraq's Constitution requires the Council of Representatives to enact a law that defines the executive procedures needed to form regions within 6 months of the date of its first session. Some Iraqi legislators believe that the right to form regions, with authority similar to the Kurdistan region, would help protect their rights. Status In October 2006, the Iraqi legislature passed a law establishing procedures to form regions, but the law delays implementation for 18 months.” According to U.S. officials, this means that no steps to form regions, such as holding provincial referendums, can be taken before April 2008. According to State, this is in the best interests of Iraq as it will allow the government to deal with some outstanding issues. The United Nations has identified two issues that may impact implementation of this law--the ongoing review of Iraq's Constitution and the capacity of new regional governments. According to members of Iraq's Constitutional Review Committee (CRC), the law on procedures to form regions was delayed for 18 months to allow the constitutional review process to be completed. Some of the proposed amendments to the constitution would clarify the powers of the federal government versus regions and governorates For example, according to the United Nations, the CRC proposed amendments that would give federal law priority over regional law with respect to water, customs, ports, and oil and revenue sharing. Other proposed amendments would 'For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as "partially met” if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or "partially met." "Iraq has 18 governorates and the Iraqi Constitution states that one or more governorates have the right to organize into a region. Article 117 of the Constitution further recognizes the region of Kurdistan, which consists of three provinces in northern Iraq. The final version of the law on executive procedures regarding the formation of regions states that a region consists of one province or more. Page 28 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 96 Appendix IV: Benchmark 4 - Semi- Autonomous Regions give the federal government exclusive power over electricity generation, railways, and pension funds. Moreover, the constitutional review could also help resolve the status of disputed areas, which could impact regional boundaries. Until the constitutional review is completed and the constitutional referendum is held, residents in areas considering regional formation may not have all the information they need to make decisions. The capability of the regions to govem themselves will also impact implementation of the law. Article 121 of the Constitution accords significant executive, judicial, and management authorities to the regions. The regions have responsibility for maintaining their internal security forces, administering allocations from national revenues, and maintaining representational offices in embassies and consuls. Moreover, the law on formation of regions provides that once formed, the regions must undertake to create elected provisional legislative councils. According to the United Nations, this will require a substantial investment of resources and significant management responsibility. GAO has reported on significant shortages of competent personnel in national ministries charged with delivering services to the Iraqi people; moreover, these shortages are greater at the provincial level of government, according to State and USAID officials. We have also reported that the poor security situation and high levels of violence have contributed to the continued and The lack of clarity about power sharing between federal and regional governments is highlighted by problems over power generation. As of the summer of 2007, a number of provinces have been ignoring the federal government's shared authority over power generation and distribution by failing to provide their required allocations of power to Baghdad, contributing to national blackouts. In August 2007, these provincial authorities were threatening to disconnect their local power generating sources from the national electricity grid. Page 29 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabuizing and Rebuilding Iraq 97 Appendix IV: Benchmark 4 - Semi- Autonomons Regions accelerating “brain drain" of professional Iraqis that would be needed to manage the new regional administrations. 'GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GA007-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9. 2007); GAO, forthcoming Stabilizing and Rebuilding Trag: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforis and Manage Risk, GA0-07-903 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007). Page 30 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 98 Appendix V: Benchmark 5 - Electoral Legislation Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met Issue When provincial elections were first held on January 2005, many Sunnis boycotted the election, resulting in largely Shi'a and Kurd provincial councils in provinces with majority Sunni populations. To redress the under-representation of Sunnis in provincial councils, Iraq needs to hold new provincial elections, but must first establish an electoral commission, write provincial election laws, define provincial powers so voters know the stakes, and set a date for elections. Status Although the government of Iraq has enacted and implemented legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), it has not enacted and implemented legislation establishing a provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, or a date for provincial elections. Although the government of Iraq has enacted and implemented legislation to establish an IHEC, certain steps still remain in establishing the commission. According to the U.S. government, the Council of Representatives (COR) passed the IHEC Law on January 23, 2007, and subsequently appointed the nine IHEC Commissioners, as required under the law, in a process the UN deemed in compliance with international standards. However, a provision in the IHEC law requires the COR to nominate and the Board of Commissioners to appoint the directors of the Governorate Electoral Offices in each province. Twelve of these positions are vacant, but, according to State, the process of appointing the directors is progressing. The law also requires the IHEC to establish and update a voter registry in collaboration with the Governorate and Regional Electoral Offices. However, before they can complete an update of the voter registry (which was last updated in mid-2005), an election law must 'For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as "partially met if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or "partially met." Page 31 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 99 Appendix V; Benchmark 5 - Electoral Legislation be enacted that defines the residency and voter eligibility requirements. Finally, the IHEC still needs a budget to fund its activities. Iraq has not enacted and implemented legislation for provincial elections. According to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the Prime Minster's office is drafting legislation governing provincial elections, including setting a date for elections to occur. However, according to the Embassy, some key political parties are hesitant to hold provincial elections due to concerns that they will lose representation, potentially to more extreme parties. Additionally, several parties are demanding that any election law ensure that eligible refugees and internally displaced persons be allowed to vote. • Provincial powers legislation, which will define the authorities and structures of local governments, has not been enacted and implemented. According to the U.S. government, the draft legislation has been approved and submitted to the Council of Representatives, where it has had two of the three required readings. However, the U.S. government reported in July 2007 that changes were being considered, particularly related to the powers of the governor and the authority of the federal government at the local level. The U.S. Embassy cited key issues with the draft, including that it cedes most power to the provinces. The United Nations pointed out that the draft fails to clarify the role of the governorate and that the draft law does not deal adequately with the effective delivery of public goods and services in the governorates. According to the U.S. Embassy, on July 8, 2007, the relevant COR Committee presented a report outlining suggested changes to the law, some of which the Embassy supported. The government of Iraq has not set a date for provincial elections. The Iraq Study Group emphasized the need for provincial elections at the earliest possible date. The Embassy is urging the Iraqi government to take the legislative and administrative action necessary to ensure timely and fair elections. According to the U.S. Embassy, it is intensively engaged with the Iraqi government and the COR at all levels to expedite legislation or amendments to existing legislation that will allow provincial elections to take place and secure funding for elections. In comments on this appendix, State said that this benchmark should be partially met since the Iraq High Electoral Commission has been established and the benchmark calls only for its establishment. However, the benchmark requires more than the establishment of the IHEC, and Iraq has not enacted and implemented a provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, or a date for provincial elections, as required by the benchmark. Page 32 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Irag 100 Appendix VI: Benchmark 6 – Amnesty Legislation Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met' Issue Iraqi government officials believe that amnesty for insurgents and others who have not committed terrorist acts is an important tool to promote reconciliation and could help pacify insurgents. In addition, the Iraqi government and coalition forces hold thousands of detainees, some of whom could be eligible for an amnesty program when conditions are right. Status The Iraqi government has not drafted legislation on amnesty, according to U.S. officials, and the conditions for a successful program are not present. As figure 2 in the cover letter shows, many steps remain in the legislative process, including drafting the legislation and obtaining approval in the Iraqi cabinet and Council of Representatives. However, the government of Iraq is not pressing for the development of amnesty legislation. Little Progress Made in Considering Amnesty Legislation Although amnesty was proposed as part of the Prime Minister's national reconciliation plan in June 2006, little progress has been made. The plan called for issuing amnesty to prisoners not involved in crimes against humanity or terrorist acts. At that time, the Iraqi government announced that it would release 2,500 detainees; 2,500 prisoners were subsequently released. According to U.S. officials in Baghdad, no large-scale releases have been made since 2006, and there has been little discussion of amnesty since then. However, the Prime Minister's office and Iraq's Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Committee sponsored a workshop on amnesty in May 2007. The workshop recommended that amnesty should not proceed, but rather should result from national reconciliation and that the government's military has to be superior to armed groups as a condition for offering amnesty. For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met” if all components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as "partially met” if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or "partially met.' Page 33 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 101 Appendix V): Benchmark 6 - Amnesty Legislation The scope of an amnesty program is also an issue. The United Nations takes the position that in considering the categories of perpetrators to be included or excluded in amnesty, international law does not allow amnesty to be granted to those who committed genocide, crimes against humanity, or other serious violations of international humanitarian law. In addition, Iraqi government officials have recommended that an amnesty program consider all detained individuals held by Iraq and by coalition forces, There are currently thousands of detainees, including over 24,000 held by coalition forces. According to multinational force officials, there could be considerably more detainees in the future as the Baghdad security plan progresses. The Coalition's Task Force 134 is building and expanding prison facilities to accommodate additional detainees. Page 34 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 102 Appendix VII: Benchmark 7 – Militia Disarmament Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met' Issue Militias contribute to the high levels of violence in Iraq, are responsible for sectarian killings, fuel ongoing corruption, and have heavily infiltrated the Iraqi army and national police. Efforts to dissolve or bring militias under control have been ongoing since 2004. In March 2007, 77 percent of Iraqis in a nationwide poll agreed that militias should be dissolved. Status The Iraqi government has not drafted legislation on disarming militias. CPA Order 91, issued in 2004, prohibited armed forces and militias within Iraq, except for those allowed under the Order. Multiple steps are needed to enact and implement further legislation to disarm militias. More importantly, according to U.S. officials, conditions are not right for a traditional disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program (DDR); accordingly, there is currently no momentum in the government of Iraq for such a program. Thus, militias pose a severe challenge to stability and reconciliation in Iraq. EN Militias Pose a Challenge, but Little Progress Has Been Made in Demobilizing Them Militias have contributed to the high levels of violence in Iraq. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, the Jayash al-Mahdi (the militia associated with Muqtada al Sadr), often operates under the protection or approval of Iraqi police to detain and kill suspected Sunni insurgents and civilians. A June 2007 Defense Department report further notes that many Jayash al-Mahdi fighters have left Baghdad as a result of expanded coalition and Iraqi presence. They now engage in ethnic and For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented; defined the benchmark as "partially met” if the law has been enacted but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or "partially met." Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight. Issues (GA0-04-902R, Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004). Page 35 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 103 Appendix VII: Benchmark 7 - Militia Disarmament sectarian violence in northem and central Iraq and have increased conflict with the Badr Organization in southern Iraq leading to a significant increase in attacks against the coalition in Basrah, The June 2007 report also states that Shi'a militia infiltration of the Ministry of Interior is a problem. Militia influence impacts every component of the Ministry, particularly in Baghdad and other key cities. Despite the challenge the militias pose, little progress has been made to disarm and demobilize them. Nine parties, with militias numbering an estimated 100,000 fighters, agreed to a transition and reintegration process in 2004. The Coalition Provisional Authority estimated that 90 percent of these fighters would complete the transition and reintegration process by January 2005. However, according to the administration's July 15, 2007 report, no armed group has committed to disarm. Moreover, according to U.S. officials in Baghdad, the Iraqi DDR commission has not developed a plan for DDR and has not received funding for its work. Conditions for Traditional DDR Do Not Exist A May 2007 UN assessment on DDR for Iraq states that minimum requirements for a successful DDR program in Iraq include a secure environment, the inclusion of all belligerent parties, an overarching political agreement, sustainable funding, and appropriate reintegration opportunities. GAO's reports and analysis show that these conditions do not exist in Iraq. For example: As figure 2 in the cover letter shows, the overall level of attacks against Iraqi civilians, coalition personnel, and Iraqi security forces has risen since 2003, creating a poor security environment. Classified and unclassified GAO reports provide further information on security in Iraq. In June 2006, the prime minister sought to include insurgent groups as part of his reconciliation plan. However, according to administration and DOD reports, efforts at reconciliation have stalled. In addition, Iraqi officials reject terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda in Iraq, and a report done for the U.S. Embassy comments that some groups cannot be reconciled. Also, the support of external actors is an important element of disarmament and *GAO, Stabilizing Iraq. Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces, GAO-07-612T) Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007); GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Irag: Key Issues for Congressional Översighi, (GA0-07-308SP) Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2007; GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, (GA0-06-217C) Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2005. Page 36 GAO07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Irag 104 Appendix VII: Benchmark 7 - Militia Disarmament demobilization, but according to U.S. reports, some external groups are not helpful. For example, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard provides deadly arms and funding to Iraq's militias and contributes to the ongoing instability. The Iraqi government provided $150 million for DDR in its 2007 budget and the Congress has made available up to $156 million from the Iraq Security Forces fund, to be used to assist the government of Iraq for this purpose. However, Iraq has prepared no plan for DDR and has not made progress in enacting legislation. Thus, it is uncertain whether such funding is needed at this time. Page 37 GAO-07-1195 Securing. Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 105 Appendix VIII: Benchmark 8 – Baghdad Security Plan Committees - Establish supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met' Issue The U.S. and Iraqi governments began the current Baghdad security plan? in mid-February 2007 to stem the violence in Baghdad and surrounding areas. During the summer of 2006, MNF-I and the Iraqi security forces implemented two other plans to secure Baghdad, but these operations failed to reduce violence for a variety of reasons. Unlike the earlier operations, the current Baghdad Security Plan encompasses political, economic, and security activities that the Iraqi government needed to coordinate at the national level. Status In February 2007, the Iraqi government created the Executive Steering Committee (the executive committee) and six subcommittees to coordinate political, economic and military activities and make decisions in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. According to a Department of State official, the executive committee's major objective was to increase the coordination and capacity of the Iraqi government to improve the quality of life of Baghdad's population as part of the Baghdad Security Plan. Each of the subcommittees addresses one of six issues related to the plan's implementation: economics, services, political, communication, popular mobilization, and security. The executive committee and subcommittees meet on a weekly basis. The committees consist of Iraqi and U.S. participants. The Iraqi Prime Minister chairs the executive committee, while senior-level Iraqi ministry officials chair the various subcommittees. For example, a deputy prime minister chairs the economic subcommittee and the services subcommittee. Representatives from the relevant Iraqi ministries serve on each subcommittee. Two senior U.S. officials are observers to the : 'We defined this benchmark as “met" if the committees were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; defined this benchmark as "partially met if at least half of the committees were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; and defined this benchmark as "not met" iſ less than half of the committees were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. The current Baghdad security plan is also known as Operation Fardh al-Qanoon. Page 38 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 106 Appendix VIII: Benchmark 8 - Baghdad Security Plan Committees executive committee and attend its weekly meetings. A senior MNF-I or U.S. embassy official is also assigned to each subcommittee. This official provides advice on the subcommittees' agendas and other support when called upon. According to a Department of State official, the executive committee and subcommittees have worked to ensure that the Iraqi government provided sufficient Iraqi forces to assist MNF-I in implementing the Baghdad Security Plan. For example, when the Iraqi Army provided brigades that were not at full strength, the executive committee and security subcommittee identified forces from other parts of the country to move to Baghdad. The committees also found ways to house and feed the Iraqi troops supporting the security plan. In addition, the communication subcommittee has helped publicize the security plan's goals and the other subcommittees' efforts to get resources to Baghdad districts that have been cleared of insurgents. We did not assess the effectiveness of the executive committee or subcommittees in providing overall coordination and supporting the implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan. However, the administration's July 2007 report to Congress stated that the effectiveness of each committee varied. Page 39 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 107 Appendix IX: Benchmark 9 - Iraqi Brigades Provide three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met - Issue During the summer of 2006, a large number of Iraqi security forces refused to deploy to Baghdad to conduct operations in support of the previous Baghdad Security Plans. In January 2007, the President said that the Iraqi government had agreed to resolve this problem under the current plan and had committed three additional Iraqi brigades to support the new plan. Status Since February 2007, the Iraqi government deployed nine Iraqi army battalions equaling three brigades for 90 day rotations to support the Baghdad Security Plan. In the July 2007 report, the administration stated that the Iraqi government had difficulty deploying three additional army brigades to Baghdad at sufficient strength. In commenting on our draft report, DOD stated that current present for duty rates for deployed units is 75 percent of authorized strength. However, the July 2007 administration report stated that the government has deployed battalions from multiple Iragi Army divisions to provide the required three brigade-equivalent forces to support the Baghdad security plan. After the initial deployment of the required brigades, the Iraqi government began the rotation plan. 19 units have currently deployed in support of the Baghdad security plan. Several of these units voluntarily extended, and others were rotated every 90 days in accordance with the plan. In addition, all of the Iraqi units had pre-deployment training to support operations in Baghdad. The administration's July 2007 report states that progress toward this benchmark has been satisfactory, and the overall effect has been satisfactory in that three brigades are operating in Baghdad. However, in commenting on this report, DOD stated that performance of the units currently supporting Baghdad operations has been varied. Some 'We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq had provided three trained and ready brigades, or an equivalent number of battalions, to support Baghdad operations; as "partially met* If some of the units were trained and ready to support Baghdad security operations; and as "not met" if none of the units provided were trained and ready to support Baghdad security operations. The assessment was based on each unit's transition readiness assessments and intelligence reporting on their reliability. Consequently, our determination of "partially met" was based largely on classified information. (see classified appendix). Page 40 GAO 07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 108 Appendix IX: Benchmark 9 - Iraqi Brigades units had performed exceptionally well, proven themselves and raised their readiness ratings. Others had marked time and slowly regressed over their 90-day deployment. Of the 19 Iraqi units that had supported operations in Baghdad, 5 units had performed well while the remaining had proven to be problematic for several reasons: lack of personnel, lack of individual fighting equipment and lack of vehicles to conduct their assigned missions. We obtained classified information that indicates other problems with these Iraqi army units. Our classified briefing report provides more information on this benchmark. Page 41 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 109 Appendix X: Benchmark 10- Commander's Authority Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shi'ite militias. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met' Issue As stated in the President's January 10, 2007, speech on the Baghdad security plan, previous Baghdad security plans failed, in part, because Iraqi political and sectarian interference prevented forces from taking action against militias. According to the administration's initial assessment, Iraq's Prime Minister stated that political or sectarian interference in the affairs of the Iraqi security forces will not be tolerated, and actions have been taken to address political intervention. Status In July 2007, the administration reported that the government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute the Baghdad security plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. commanders without political intervention. The report noted that political intervention in the conduct of some security operations continues even though new rules of engagement for the Baghdad Operational Command have come into effect and commanders have been given the authority to attack insurgents and militias. According to U.S. officials and other experts, sectarian and political interference in the conduct of military operations continues. Tribal and ethno-sectarian loyalties remain strong within many Iraqi military units, hindering efforts to take actions against militias. These loyalties are often the basis for relationships between key officers in units and higher-level authorities who are not always in the direct chain of command. For example, sectarian militias control many local police. Additionally, some army units sent to Baghdad have mixed loyalties, and some have had ties to Shi'a militias making it difficult to target Shi'a extremist networks. 'We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi commanders did not face political intervention in executing the plan and making tactical and operational decisions. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if Iraqi commanders faced political intervention in executing the plan and making tactical and operational decisions. Page 42 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 110 Appendix X: Benchmark 10 - Commander's Authority Further, according to DOD, evidence exists of target lists emanating from the Office of the Commander in Chief that bypassed operational commanders and directed lower-level intelligence officers and commanders to make arrests, primarily of Sunnis. In addition, sectarian bias in the appointment of senior military and police commanders continues, giving rise to suspicions that political considerations may drive Iraqi commanders' decisions about which operations to undertake or support. In commenting on this benchmark, DOD noted that all 9 of the brigade commanders and 17 of the 27 national police battalion commanders have been replaced for failure to command or enforce non-sectarian operations. Page 43 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 111 Appendix XI: Benchmark 11 - Iraqi Security Forces Enforcement of the Law _ Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met Issue During 2006, according to a Department of State human rights report, the Iraqi security forces committed serious human rights violations in Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. These actions added to the increasing violence against the civilian population during 2006. In support of the Baghdad security plan, the Iraqi Prime Minister pledged to provide even- handed enforcement of the law. Status According to U.S. reports, the government of Iraq has not ensured that the Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law. In May 2007, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom reported that Iraq's Shi'a-dominated government bears responsibility for engaging in sectarian-based human rights violations, as well as tolerating abuses committed by Shi'a militias with ties to political factions in the governing coalition. According to the commission, the Iraqi government through its security forces has committed arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without due process, targeted executions, and torture against non-Shi'a Iraqis. In committing these abuses, the security forces target Sunnis on the basis of their religious identity, as well as terrorists and insurgents. Furthermore, the commission reported that the Iraqi government tolerates and fails to control religiously motivated attacks and other abuses carried out by Shi'a militias, specifically Jayash al-Mahdi and Badr Organization, These militias have targeted Sunnis on the basis of their religious identity We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi security forces provided even-handed enforcement of the law. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if Iraqi security forces did not provide even-handed enforcement of the law. 'U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (Washington D.C.: May 2007). The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom was created by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) to monitor violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief abroad, as defined in IRFA and set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international instruments, and to give independent policy recommendations to the President, Secretary of State, and Congress. Page 44 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 112 Appendix XI: Benchmark II - Iraqi Security Forces Enforcement of the Law and have committed such abuses as abductions, beatings, targeted killings, intimidation, forced resettlement, murder, rape, and torture. According to the commission's report, relationships between these militias and leading Shi'a factions within Iraq's ministries and governing coalition indicate that the Jayash al-Mahdi and Badr Organization are parastate actors operating with impunity or even with governmental complicity. In mid-August 2007, Department of State officials stated that the Iraqi government and security forces continue to engage in sectarian-based abuses. State's March 2007 human rights report cited widely reported incidents of unauthorized government agent involvement in extrajudicial killings throughout the country. These incidents included Shi'a militia members wearing police uniforms and driving police cars in carrying out killings and kidnapping in the southern city of Basra. In addition, death squads affiliated with the Ministry of Interior targeted Sumnis and conducted kidnapping raids in Baghdad and its environs, largely with impunity. The administration's July 2007 report stated that the Iraqi government and many Iraqi security force units are still applying the law on a sectarian basis when left on their own. The report attributed any progress made by the security forces in enforcing the law more even-handedly to the presence of coalition units and embedded training teams, rather than to the Iraqi government. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007). Page 45 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 114 Appendix XII: Benchmark 12 - Safe Havens maintain only one Joint Security Station on the border of Sadr City, with none within the city itself (see fig. 4). In addition to Joint Security Stations, MNF-I established about 30 coalition outposts throughout Baghdad, including one on the border of Sadr City. Page 47 GA0-07-1196 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 116 Appendix XII: Benchmark 12 - Safe Havens temporary safe havens still exist in Baghdad, which supports a rating of partially met. A June 2007 DOD report describes some of the conditions that allow safe havens to exist. For example, the Shi'a militia continues to function as the de facto government in Sadr City. Further, militia influence impacts every component of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, particularly in Baghdad and several other key cities, according to the DOD report. Our classified briefing report provides more information on the existence of safe havens. Page 49 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 117 Appendix XIII: Benchmark 13 – Sectarian Violence and Militia Control Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met' Issue During 2006, according to State and UN reports, insurgents, death squads, militias, and terrorists increased their attacks against civilians, largely on a sectarian basis. In addition, the number of internally displaced persons in Iraq sharply increased following the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra mosque, primarily as a result of sectarian intimidation and violence that forced many people from their homes. By the end of 2006, according to the UN, many Baghdad neighborhoods had become divided along Sunni and Shi'a lines and were increasingly controlled by armed groups claiming to act as protectors and defenders of these areas. In January 2007, the President announced that the United States would increase force levels in Iraq to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to reduce sectarian violence and bring security to Baghdad. Status While it is not clear if sectarian violence has been reduced, militia control over security forces has not been eliminated and remains a serious problem in Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. According to the administration's July 2007 report to Congress, MNF-I data showed a decrease in sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad, since the start of the Baghdad security plan. MNF-I counts sectarian incidents and 'We defined this benchmark as “met" if there was clear and reliable evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced and militia control of local security was eliminated; defined this benchmark as "partially met” if there was clear and reliable evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced or if militia control of local security was eliminated, but not both; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if there was no clear and reliable evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced and that militia control of local security was eliminated. 'U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007); UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Report (Sept. 1-Oct. 31, 2006); UNAMI, Human Rights Report (Nov. 1-Dec. 31, 2006). According to State's human rights report, an overall campaign aimed at forcibly displacing citizens was the main reason for the increasing polarization of areas within and outside Baghdad during 2006. State noted numerous reports that indicated a Shi'a militia, the Jayash al-Mahdi, was responsible for a growing number of raids and killings of Sunni citizens in Baghdad and other parts of the country during the year. Page 50 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 118 Appendix XIII: Benchmark 13 - Sectarian Violence and Militia Control murders in determining trends in sectarian violence." The administration's July 2007 report concluded that the Iraqi government, with substantial coalition assistance, had made satisfactory progress toward reducing sectarian violence. The report acknowledged that precise measurements vary, and it was too early to determine if the decrease would be sustainable. GAO cannot determine whether sectarian violence in Iraq has been reduced because measuring such violence requires understanding the perpetrator's intent, which may not be known. The number of attacks targeting civilians and population displacement resulting from sectarian violence may serve as additional indicators. For example, as displayed in figure 5, the average number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the last six months. The decrease in total average daily attacks in July is largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than civilians. *DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, D.C.: June 2007). Page 81 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 120 __ Appendix XDI: Benchmark 13 - Sectarian Violence and Militia Control security will continue to improve modestly, but that levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high over the next 6 to 12 months. Similarly, recent March and June 2007 United Nations reports state that attacks against civilians persist and the continuing systematic, widespread attacks against the civilian population in Iraq are tantamount to crimes against humanity and violate the laws of war. The violence in Iraq has resulted in a large number of Iraqis displaced from their homes. A report by the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization found that internally displaced persons increased from about 499,000 in February 2007 to about 1,128,000 in July 2007. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that an additional 1.8 million Iraqi citizens were displaced to nearby countries, primarily to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Egypt. The UNHCR predicted that 40,000 to 50,000 people will continue to be displaced each month even if the security plan succeeds in solving the displacement problem. Currently, the number of displaced persons is increasing at an average of 80,000 to 100,000 each month, according to the Red Crescent. The August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq stated that population displacement resulting from sectarian violence continues, imposing burdens on provincial governments and some neighboring states. As the International Organization for Migration and the UN recently reported, most of Iraq's internally displaced persons are moving from mixed areas' to seek refuge in homogeneous areas, largely because of direct threats or forcible displacement from their homes due to their religious and sectarian identities. Where population displacements have led to significant sectarian separation, according to the August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, conflict levels have diminished to some extent because warring communities find it more difficult to penetrate communal enclaves. Our classified report provides further information on trends associated with violence in Iraq. 'According to a UN report, sectarian violence was most pronounced in areas with diverse ethnic and religious groups or where such groups were located in close proximity to each other, such as in Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, and Mosul Anbar province, where attack levels have decreased significantly over the past several months, is a predominantly Sunni Arab province. Page 83 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Irag 121 Appendix XIII: Benchmark 13 - Sectarian Violence and Militia Control Militia control over local security forces - the second part of the benchmark-has not been eliminated. Numerous U.S. and UN reports have stated that militias still retain significant control or influence over local security in parts of Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. For example, in July 2007, the administration reported that militia presence is still strong and will likely remain so until the security situation begins to stabilize. The report stated that the Iraqi government has made unsatisfactory progress towards eliminating militia control of local security, which continues to negatively affect the public perception of the authority and fairness of the Iraqi government. In addition, DOD's June 2007 report to Congress called militia influence of local police a significant problem and added that some security forces remain prone to intimidation by, or collusion with, criminal gangs. Further, the Department of State's human rights report characterized Iraqi police effectiveness as seriously compromised by militias and sectarianism, with rampant corruption and a culture of impunity. Finally, in March 2007, the United Nations reported cases of possible collusion between armed militia and Iraqi security forces in raids and security operations, as well as the failure of these security forces to intervene and prevent kidnapping and murder and other crimes. | Page 54 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabibzing and Rebuilding Iraq 122 Appendix XIV: Benchmark 14 - Joint Security Stations Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met Issue Past Baghdad security plans failed, in part, because the coalition and Iraqi forces did not hold neighborhoods after clearing them of insurgents. The current Baghdad security plan and the related increase of U.S. and Iraqi forces into Baghdad is intended to clear insurgents, militias, and organized criminal gangs from neighborhoods; maintain a security presence in those areas; and provide for follow-on assistance efforts. As part of this effort, MNF-I and Iraqi security forces are establishing Joint Security Stations across Baghdad to improve population protection by providing a continuous presence in Baghdad's neighborhoods. Status As of August 9, 2007, the Iraqi government, with substantial coalition assistance, had established 32 of the 34 planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad (see fig. 6). This figure includes Joint Security Stations that had achieved initial or full operational capability. 'We defined this benchmark as "met" if nearly all of the planned Joint Security Stations were established. We defined this benchmark as "partially met" if half of the planned Joint Security Stations were established. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if less than half of the planned Joint Security Stations were established. Page 55 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 123 Appendix XIV: Benchmark 14-Joint Security Stations Figure 6: Map of Joint Security Stations in Baghdad, as of August 9, 2007 Art As of August 9, 2007 Adhas New Baghdad vionsour Kharada Se 23 & West Rashid - Baghdad security district District Joint Security Station (USS) Satellite Joint Security Station Source: Multinational Division Baghdad. Note: Figure 6 shows the 28 joint security stations that were located in Baghdad's security districts as of August 9, 2007. Three additional joint security stations are located in Baghdad but are outside of the security districts, and another joint security station has been transferred to tragi control. Page 56 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 124 Appendix XIV: Benchmark 14-Joint Security Stations Joint Security Stations are staffed by Iraqi local police, national police, and army personnel, as well as coalition forces. According to the administration's July 2007 report, the security stations are designed to improve population protection by providing a 24-hour security presence in Baghdad neighborhoods. They also allow greater oversight of Iraqi security forces by U.S. military personnel. Page 57 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 125 Appendix XV: Benchmark 15 - Iraqi Security Forces Operating Independently Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating independently. GAO Assessment: Not met __ ___ Issue In August 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved the Iraqi military and began the process of rebuilding the Iraqi military and police. Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to train and equip about 350,000 Iraqi soldiers and police officers, in an effort to develop Iraqi security forces, transfer security responsibilities to them and the Iraqi government, and ultimately withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq. The coalition began embedding transition teams with Iraqi security forces in 2005 to help develop their ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations. These teams use the Operational Readiness Assessment process to evaluate the readiness of Iraqi security force units to conduct operations with or without coalition support. Status While the Iraqi security forces have grown in size and are increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations, the number of Iraqi army units operating independently decreased between March 2007 and July 2007. According to the administration's July 2007 report, an Iraqi unit can be considered independent if it has achieved an Operational Readiness Assessment rating of level 1, which means it is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations. Manning shortages as well as logistics and sustainment shortfalls have contributed to the decrease in the number of Iraqi battalions capable of 'We defined this benchmark as “met” if the government of Iraq increased the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating independently. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if the government of Iraq did not increase the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating independently. The Operational Readiness Assessment was previously known as the Transitional Readiness Assessment process. *As of May 2007, the Iraqi arıny had established over 100 battalions. *In 2006, MNF-I changed the definition of a level 1 unit. Previously, in guidance provided to coalition transition teams for use in evaluating Iraqi security forces, a level 1 unit was said to be fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations. In 2006, MNF-I removed the words “fully" and "independent" from the definition. DOD officials could not provide a rationale for the change. Page 58 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 126 Appendix XV: Benchmark 15 - Iraqi Security Forces Operating Independently operating independently, according to DOD reports. Sectarian and militia influences further complicate the development of Iraqi forces. In June 2007, DOD reported that while coalition forces are the target of most enemy attacks, Iraqi security forces and civilians account for the majority of casualties, contributing to the decline in the readiness of some Iraqi units. Attrition also has affected the Iraqi security forces. Annual attrition is estimated to be between 15 and 18 percent for the Iraqi army and between 20 and 22 percent for the police. In addition, according to a June 2007 report from DOD to Congress, only about 65 percent of authorized Iraqi personnel are in the field at any given time due to a liberal leave policy and absences without leave. To increase the number of soldiers on hand for operations, the Iraqi government and MNF-I decided that they will increase manning to 120 percent of authorization levels. Due to Iraq's immature logistics systems, many Iraqi military and police units will continue to depend on MNF-I for key sustainment and logistics support until December 2008. DOD reports that the Iraqi forces' limited capacity in these areas hinders their ability to assume missions from MNF- I and requires continued development in some key areas through the end of 2008. For instance, DOD has set a December 2008 goal for the Iraqi government to provide day-to-day items such as food, water, and electricity to the Ministry of Defense's National Depot. In addition, the Ministry of Interior aims to become self sufficient in procuring and managing repair parts by the end of 2008. MNF-I and the Iraqi government continue to struggle with sectarian and militia influences while trying to develop the Iraqi security forces. Because of the sectarian leaning of some national police units, MNF-I is providing continuing oversight of Iraqi security forces. In addition, militia influence affects every component of the Ministry of the Interior, especially in Baghdad and other key cities, according to DOD. This influence, along The administration's July 2007 interim assessment stated that the number of units assessed at level 1 had decreased, in part, due to a 20-percent increase in unit authorization levels. Page 59 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 127 Appendix XV: Benchmark 15 - Iraqi Security Porces Operating Independently with corruption and illegal activity, constrains progress in the development of Ministry of Interior forces. Page 60 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 128 Appendix XVI: Benchmark 16 - Minority Party Rights Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met' Issue Minority parties or groups had no rights under the former Ba'athist regime. Ensuring the rights of minority parties was a key Iraqi goal to ensure broad representation and fairness in the new Iraq. Status The rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected through provisions in the Iraqi Constitution and the Council of Representatives' by-laws. However, in practice, the rights of minorities throughout Iraq remain unprotected. Rights of Minority Political Parties in the Legislature Are Protected The Iraqi Constitution and the Council of Representatives' by-laws include provisions to ensure the full participation of minority political parties within the Iraqi Council of Representatives. These provisions include: • Article 39 of Iraq's Constitution, which guarantees the freedom to form and join associations and political parties and also prohibits forcing any person to join in any party, society, or political entity or to continue membership in it. Article 3 of the Council of Representatives by-laws, which guarantees the freedom of expressions, opinions, and thoughts of all members of the Council of Representatives. This guarantee is made regardless of a representative's party or political affiliation in a way that does not contradict the provisions of the Constitution, including the freedom of objective opposition, constructive criticism, and achieving cooperation between the Council of Representatives and other constitutional institutions. We considered this benchmark as "met" if the Iraqi government had laws or regulations ensuring the rights of minority parties in the legislature and minority parties received these rights; considered this benchmark as "partially met" if the Iraqi government had such laws but did not protect these rights; and considered this benchmark as "not met" if the Iraqi government had no law or regulation protecting minority party rights. Page 61 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 129 Appendix XV]: Benchmark 16.- Minority Party Rights According to Iraqi legislators from minority parties, their rights in the legislature are protected and they are not physically intimidated. The legislators also said that they have the right to speak before Parliament, and to offer legislation even though they are often not consulted on legislative issues. According to the U.S. government, the electoral system-provincial proportional representation that was used to elect the current Council was chosen in 2005 to balance a number of factors, including the ability of women and small minority parties to gain representation. The Council of Representatives elected in December 2005 includes members from the Shi'a, Sunni, Kurdish, Turkmen, Chalda- Assyrian Christian, and Yazidi communities. Human Rights of Iraqi Minorities Across Iraq Remain Unprotected Although the rights of minority parties are protected in the legislature, widespread violence across Iraq has seriously compromised the government's ability to protect human rights. According to the United Nations, attacks against religious and ethnic minorities continued unabated in most areas of Iraq, prompting these communities to seek ways to leave the country. The conflicts reportedly bear the mark of sectarian polarization and “cleansing" in neighborhoods formerly comprised of different religions. According to a non-governmental organization, all of Iraq's minority communities have suffered violations that include destruction and defacement of religious buildings; mass murder of congregations gathered in and around them; abduction, ransoming, and murder of religious and civic leaders and individuals including children; and forced conversion to Islam using tactics such as death threats, rape, and forced marriage. In comments on this benchmark, State wrote that GAO should not refer to the general human rights problems of Iraqi minorities because to do so goes beyond the scope of the benchmark and State addresses these problems in other reports. We disagree. We assessed this benchmark as met based on our interpretation of the benchmark and our criteria. However, we believe it is important to provide some context of minority rights in Iraq. Iraqi legislators we interviewed insisted that the situation in 'UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Righis Report, Jan. 1- Mar. 31, 2007. Congressional Research Service, Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis? (Washington D.C.: Mar. 23, 2007). *Preti Taneja, Minority Rights Group Intemational, Assimilation, Exodus, Eradication: Iraq's Minority Communities Since 2003 (United Kingdom: February 2007). Page 62 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 130 Appendix XVI: Benchmark 16 - Minority Party Rights their communities has a direct bearing on their work in the legislature, their freedom of movement to and from the legislature, and their ability to engage fully in Iraq political life. Page 63 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 131 Appendix XVII: Benchmark 17 – Allocating and Spending Iraqi Revenues Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services on an equitable basis. GAO Assessment: Partially met Issue The President's New Way Forward in Iraq identified Iraq's inability to fully spend its own resources to rebuild its infrastructure and deliver essential services as a critical economic challenge to Iraq's self-reliance. Iraqi government funds are a necessary source of financing for Iraq's rebuilding effort, particularly since the United States has obligated most of the $40 billion it provided to Iraq for reconstruction since 2003. However, the government of Iraq has had difficulty spending its resources on capital projects. In 2006, the government spent only 22 percent of its non- provincial capital projects and reconstruction budget. Furthermore, in the critical oil sector, which provides over 90 percent of Iraq's revenues, the government spent less than 3 percent of the $3.5 billion allocated for oil reconstruction projects in 2006. In its 2007 budget, Iraq committed to spending $10 billion on capital projects and reconstruction. Status The government of Iraq allocated $10 billion of its revenues for capital projects and reconstruction when it passed its 2007 budget in February 2007, including capital funds for the provinces based on their populations. However, available data from the government of Iraq and analysis from U.S. and coalition officials show that, while spending has increased compared with spending in 2006, a large portion of Iraq's $ 10 billion capital projects and reconstruction budget in fiscal year 2007 will likely go unspent.” Iraq's Financial Management Law generally requires budgeted funds to be spent by the end of the fiscal year. The Ministry of Oil and the provinces (excluding the Kurdistan region) were allocated almost half of the government's 2007 capital projects and reconstruction budget; however, they are unlikely to spend a large share of their budgets in 2007, 'We would have considered this benchmark as "met" if the funds had been allocated and either the funds had been spent or there was a high likelihood that they would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We would have considered this benchmark as "partially met” if funds were allocated but it was not clear that the funds would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We would have considered the benchmark as "not met" if the funds had not yet been allocated or if funds were allocated but clearly not spent. ?Iraq's fiscal year begins on January 1st. Page 64 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 133 Appendix XVII: Benchmark 17 - Allocating and Spending Iraqi Revenues instead shifted them to its subsidiaries, such as the State Oil Marketing Organization, which have responsibility for spending much of the Oil Ministry's capital projects and reconstruction budget." In addition, the government provided over $2 billion, or over 20 percent of the 2007 capital projects and reconstruction budget, to the provinces (not including the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region) based on their populations. These funds are in addition to $2 billion 2006 provincial funds for capital projects, most of which had not been transferred to the provinces until November and December of 2006.* U.S. and foreign officials stated that the provinces have little experience planning and executing infrastructure projects and are likely to spend little of their 2007 capital projects and reconstruction budgets. According to information 'Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress (Arlington, VA, July 30, 2007). The Kurdistan region received a separate allocation of $1.56 billion, or 16 percent of the total 2007 capital projects and reconstruction budget. U.S. officials believe the Kurdistan region is able to execute its budget successfully because of its years of experience as a semi-autonomous region. "The $2 billion in 2006 capital project and reconstruction funds for the provinces did not include the Kurdistan region, which received a separate allocation. The government of Iraq permitted the provinces to carry over $1.3 billion in unspent 2006 funds. Unspent 2007 capital funds for the provinces may not be carried over, according to U.S. officials. Page 66 GAO-07-1195 Securing. Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 134 Appendix XVII: Benchmark 17 - Allocating and Spending Iraqi Revenues collected and reported by Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the provinces had committed 44 percent of their 2007 allocation to contracts for capital projects, as of July 15, 2007,' However, it is not clear whether the value of committed contracts is a reliable indicator of actual spending. Given the capacity and security challenges currently facing Iraq, many committed contracts may not be executed and, therefore, would not result in actual expenditures. The Government of Iraq is undertaking a number of initiatives, including budget execution training sessions, to help provincial officials spend their capital budgets, according to U.S. officials. "This percentage differs from preliminary Ministry of Finance data provided by the U.S. Department of the Treasury indicating that the provinces "spent and committed" 18 percent of their 2007 allocations for capital projects and reconstruction, as of July 15, 2007. The term "commitment" in Iraq is similar to an obligation under the U.S. budget process, although the government of Iraq's official expenditure data, as reported by the Ministry of Finance, does not include commitments or obligations. Page 67 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 135 Appendix XVIII: Benchmark 18 - False Accusations Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces. GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met' _ Issue According to U.S. government reporting, qualified Iraqi officers may be discouraged from operating in a professional, non-sectarian manner if Iraq's political authorities undermine or make false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Status Iraq's political authorities continue to undermine and make false accusations against members of the ISF. According to U.S. government officials, little has changed since the U.S. Administration's July 2007 Initial Benchmark Assessment. Each month the U.S. government receives reports alleging wrongdoing by ISF members considered by MNF-I to be non- sectarian in their approach to security. The U.S. assessment further stated that in most cases the U.S. government was unable to determine the validity of these allegations but believed them to be untrue. The assessment concluded that these accusations undermine the independence and non-sectarianism of the ISF and that the Iraqi government does not adequately address the accusations. According to MNF-I officials in Baghdad, some cases resulted in detention of military officers, but the cases did not provide justification or specific charges against the officers. Further information is classified. The U.S. government further reported that anecdotal evidence suggests that Iraqi political authorities may not be pursuing allegations even- handedly. According to U.S. government reporting, the de-Ba'athification Commission fabricated charges to cleanse Sunni officers from military units, and the Office of Commander in Chief has issued questionable judicial warrants as a more recent technique to target Sunni commanders. In addition, the ISF's formal command structure is compromised by 'We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was no evidence of undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force personnel. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if there was evidence of undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force personnel Page 68 GA0-07-1195 Secaring, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 136 Appendix XVINI: Benchmark 18 - False Accusations influential sectarian leaders linked to the security ministries. These actions have reportedly led to the arrest and detention of several military officials. According to U.S. officials, this tactic is primarily used against Sunni Ministry of Defense officials and does not occur at the predominantly Shi'a Ministry of Interior. The U.S. government also reported that some Sunni politicians have made unsubstantiated claims against ISF officials. Moreover, Iraqi government support for the ISF has been uneven. Some members of the Council of Ministers and Council of Representatives have publicly supported ISF leaders while behind the scenes they continue to ignore sectarian activities, according to the U.S. government. Page 69 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 137 Appendix XIX: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks Figure 7: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks 2006 2007 May 1 Compact endommer by GOR May 25, 2007 June | Sept van Jan Jan. Jan Feb. | 24 Point bagi Prime Minister] Addisona President Highlights Prime National Malki's I commitments Bush's New of the Irag | Ministar Asconciation Benchmarks by Prime Way Strategy Mallki's I BENCHMARKS Public Law 110-28 e Plan sene Minister Malik) Forward | Review speeches D E R speech 1. Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the constitutional review. 2. Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification. 3. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner. 4. Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to torm semi-autonomous regions. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections. 6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty, 7. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq. 8. Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad security plan. 9. Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations. d .peldun.................................................. 10. Providing Iraqi commanders with ali authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. 11. Ensuring that the tragi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law. 12. Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said 'the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of (their) sectarian or political affiliation." 13. Reducing the level of sectarian violence in trag and eliminating militia control of local security. 14. Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad. -- - 15. Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating independently. 16. Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the tragi legislature are protected. 17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis. 18. Ensuring that lrag's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces. Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Detense, and Iraqi government data. Page 70 GAO-07-1195 Securing. Stabilizing and Rebnilding Iraq 138 Appendix XIX: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October 16, 2006. 'In December 2006, MNF-1 and the government of Iraq agreed to establish joint security stations. Page 71 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 139 Appendix XX: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July 2007 Initial Benchmark Assessment Report ___ _ _ __ _ GAO Administration's assessment report assessment Benchmark 1. Forming a Constitutional Reviaw Committee and then completing the constitutional review, 2. Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification, 3. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other traqi citizens in an equitable manner. 4. Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions. 5. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, I provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections. 6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty. 7. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq. B. Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad security plan. 9. Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations. 10. Providing Iraqi commanders with ał authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. 11. Ensuring that the fragi Security Forces are providing even-handed entorcement of the law. oooooooooooooooooo 12. Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said the Baghdad security plan will not provide a sale haven lor any outlaws, regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation." 13. Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security. 14. Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad. 15. Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of operating independently. 16. Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the tragi legislature are protected. 17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis. 18. Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces. Darth 20 O sasior Tono Summary Met Partially met Not met Satisfactory Mixed . Unsatisfactory Source: GAO analysis of UN, U.S., and lagi data. *According to the U.S. State Department, conditions are not present for these benchmarks. Page 72 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 140 Appendix XXI: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007' (the Act) requires GAO to submit to Congress by September 1, 2007, an independent assessment of whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the Act and the status of the achievement of the benchmarks. This report (1) provides an assessment of whether or not the Iraqi government has met 18 legislative, security, and economic benchmarks, and (2). provides information on the status of the achievement of each benchmark. These benchmarks address 8 legislative, 9 security and I economic-related action, To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General David H. Petraeus, Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). We also reviewed translated copies of Iraqi documents and met with officials from the government of Iraq and its legislature. As part of this work, we made multiple visits to Irag during 2006 and 2007, including a visit from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits we have completed since May 2003. We provided drafts of the report to the relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment, which we incorporated as appropriate. Although we analyzed classified data, this report only contains unclassified information, as of August 30, 2007. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Legislative Benchmarks To determine if the Iraqi government is completing actions related to review of the Iraqi Constitution; enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification, the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources, procedures to form semi-autonomous regions, the independent high electoral commission, provincial elections, provincial council authorities, amnesty, and militia disarmament; and ensuring that the rights of minority Section 1314 of Public Law 110-28. ?For example, see GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversighi, GA0-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2007). See GAO's website at http://www.gao.gov for a complete list of GAO's Iraq-related reports. Page 73 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 141 Appendix XXI: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected, we took a number of actions. Specifically, we interviewed and reviewed documentation from the Iraqi government, Iraqi legislators in Baghdad, UN, U.S. Institute for Peace, IFES , the Independent High Electoral Commission, non- governmental organizations, and the Departments of Defense and State in Washington, D.C. and Baghdad, Iraq. The documents reviewed included the administration's July 2007 initial benchmark assessment, the Iraqi Constitution, draft laws related to each of the benchmarks, the International Compact with Iraq 2007 Mid-Year Progress Report, and UN analyses of the laws addressed by the benchmarks. For our assessment of the status of the hydrocarbon legislation, we relied on prior GAO reporting and updated information where appropriate. We interviewed and reviewed documentation from the Iraqi government, UN, U.S. Institute for Peace, and State Department in Washington, D.C. and Baghdad, Iraq. We compared central government draft oil laws with the Iraqi Constitution and the Kurdistan Regional Government Oil and Gas law. Additionally, to determine if the Iraqi government is ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected, we obtained and reviewed the Administration's report on progress in Iraq, the Iraqi constitution, and the Council of Representatives Bylaws. We interviewed Iraqi legislators in Baghdad, Iraq, including the leader of the Iraqi Minority Council. We also reviewed human rights reports from nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations, and the U.S. government to determine whether the rights of minorities throughout Iraq are protected. Security Benchmarks To determine if the Iraqi government is (1) establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; (2) providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations; (3) providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute the Baghdad Security Plan without political IFES was formally known as the International Foundation for Election Systems. "GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Serious Challenges Impair Efforts to Restore Irag's Oil Sector and Enact Hydrocarbon Legislation, GAO-07-1107T (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2007) and Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore frag's Oil and Electricity Sectors, GA0-07-677 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2007). Page 74 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 142 ALL VAN Appendix XXI: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology intervention; (4) ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are providing even- handed law enforcement; (5) eliminating safe havens; (6) reducing the level of sectarian violence and eliminating militia control of local security; (7) establishing all planned joint security stations; (8) increasing the number of security units capable of operating independently; and (9) ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces, we took a number of actions. Specifically, we examined U.S. Department of State cables and other documents that discussed the establishment of the supporting committees. We reviewed classified and unclassified documents and reports showing the Iraqi Army units that had deployed to Baghdad and analyzed the U.S. Department of Defense Operational Readiness Assessments (ORA) formerly known as Transitional Readiness Assessments, for these units. In addition, we reviewed classified and unclassified assessments of the authorities granted to unit commanders, the level of sectarian influence and levels of militia infiltration of army and police units, and reports of incidents where Iraqi officials interfered with the chain of command. To understand the range of methodological issues associated with measuring levels of sectarian violence, and to collect information related to broader trends in population security, we interviewed officials from the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense in Washington, D.C., and Baghdad, Iraq; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; the United Nations; and the International Organization for Migration in Washington, D.C., Baghdad, Iraq, and Amman, Jordan. We also met with these officials to discuss the other benchmarks. Economic Benchmark To assess the extent to which the government of Iraq is allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services on an equitable basis, we interviewed U.S. government officials and contractors, and obtained and analyzed supporting documents. We interviewed officials in Washington D.C. and Baghdad with the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the U.S. Agency for International Development; the Embassy Iraq Transition Assistance Office; and consultants to the Ministry of Finance. To assess progress in allocating and spending Iraqi revenues we reviewed official Iragi Ministry of Finance capital budget and expenditure data for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 provided by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and unofficial Ministry of Planning and Development Page 75 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 143 Appendix XXI: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Cooperation data on capital expenditures reported by Multinational Force- Iraq. We also reviewed unofficial unreconciled data on capital budget execution by the provinces in 2006 and 2007 collected by U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We compared 2007 capital allocations to the provinces with their populations to assess the equity of capital funding allocations. We discussed the reliability of allocation and expenditure data with U.S. Treasury officials and contractors advising the Ministry of Finance. We also reviewed relevant reports by DOD and State, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, World Bank, IMF, public accountants and Iraqi government budget implementation documents. We found that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of showing trends in budget expenditures. Page 76 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Irag 144 Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix. United States Department of State Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial Officer Washington, D.C. 20520 AUG 2 9 2007 Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers Managing Director International Affairs and Trade Government Accountability Office 441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548-0001 Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "SECURING, STABILIZING AND REBUILDING IRAQ: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks,” GAO Job Code 320511. The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact William Cavness, Iraq Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at (202) 647-5211. Sincerely, Suduty Bradford R. Higgir cc: GAO- Judy McCloskey NEA - C. David Welch State/OIG - Mark Duda Page 77 GA0-07-1198 Secaring, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 145 Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report SECURING, STABILIZING AND REBUILDING IRAO: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks (GAO-07-1195. GAO Code 320511) Thank you for allowing the Department of State the opportunity to comment on the draft report "Securing. Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. General Comments: Different standards of evaluation As noted in the draft report (p.3, para 1), the legislation requiring the GAO and administration reports sets different standards for the two reports: the GAO is required to assess whether the Iraqi govemment has met 18 key benchmarks, while the administration is required to assess whether the Iraqi government is making "satisfactory progress" toward meeting the benchmarks. The GAO refines this further with its definitions of legislative benchmarks as “met," "partially met," or "not met" (footnote 4, pp. 4-5). See comment 1. As a result, the GAO assessment in some cases differs from the administration's assessment focusing on “satisfactory progress." For example, on benchmark (v) regarding the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and provincial elections, Embassy Baghdad and State assess the first component (establishment of the IHEC) as "satisfactory.” The law creating the IHEC has been passed, members have been appointed and approved, and the process of recruiting and training provincial staff is underway. Because the process is not complete, however, GAO assesses this component “not mer." See comment 2. We believe that it is important for the GAO to highlight the differing standards and the effect of this on its conclusions. Page 78 GAO-07-1195 Secaring. Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraa 146 Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State Timing of the report See comment 3. The GAO report states that its information will be current as of August 30, 2007, It should therefore take into consideration recent political developments, such as the communiqué released by Iraqi political leaders on August 26, 2007. The communiqué included compromises on a number of key issues, e.g., de- Ba'athification, provincial powers, and power sharing. Treatment of hydrocarbons and revenue management legislation See comment 4. The omission of any mention by the GAO of the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) new oil law could be misconstrued as a tacit U.S. government approval of that KRG initiative. In fact, U.S. government policy seeks to achieve unified national hydrocarbons and revenue management legislation. We are suggesting amended language to that effect in the attached matrix. Budget execution See comment 5. In our view, GAO's focus on unspent funds in Iraq's reconstruction budget ignores the progress that Iraq has made in this important area. This is another arca in which the GAO's different standard of assessment leads to an outcome than State's view of "satisfactory progress." We will provide GAO with detailed comments on its assessment of benchmark (xvii). Treatment of human rights See comment 6. Benchmark (xvi) deals only with protection of minority political parties in the Council of Representatives. There is no basis for including other human rights issues in this report, and that language should be removed. Response to Recommendation(s) Recommendation: In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase transparency on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense provide information to the President that: (1) Clearly specify the status in drafting, enacting and implementing Iraqi legislation. Page 79 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 147 Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State Response: The Department of State provides information on the status of key legislation in various reports to the Congress, and can provide additional details on the drafting, enaoting, and implementing of that legislation in future reports. Page 80 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 148 Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State DEPARTMENT OF STATE UNCLASSIFIED GAO Draft Report Securing. Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Secunty and Economic Benchmarks See comment 7. See comment 8. See comment 9. COMMENT RESOLUTION MATRIX Page Para# Type (ASC) Recommendations Comment / Rationale FormaVinformal | (S) Formal Status chart benchmark xvi refers to citizens' The benchmark legislation refers only to rights rights of minority parties in the Council of Representatives. The reference to citizens rights should be eliminated, along with all other language in the report related to minority rights not specifically referring to minority parties in the Council of Representatives (C) Forma! GAO makes general reference to minority See comment above for p. 1. GAO should rights in Trag. eliminate reference to minority rights. (1) (C) Format First and second butlets make categorical The judgments as written are too sweeping and statements about government interference and are therefore inaccurate. We recommend for bias. the first hullet "has not always allowed and for che second bullet "has not always assured." (S) Formal ) GAO evaluated status as "not met." The July report gives the status as "Satisfactory progress, based on the formal establishment of the CRC and the operational definition of "satisfactory progress" we are using, i.e.. "present trend data demonstrates positive trajectory." We stand by our July assessment. (S) Formal (iii) GAO evaluated status as "nox met." The GAO report does not mention that the Kurdish National Assembly passed an oil law in August that is at variance with important See comment 10. See comment 11. Page 1 of 5 Page 81 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Irag 149 Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State See comment 12. (S) Formai (iv) GAO comments on attitude of Iraq's political leaders toward regions law. provisions of the framework law and oil revenue management law under consideration by the Council of Representatives. The United Stales continues to believe that Iraq's interests | are better served by the adoption of a single set of national oil and gas laws, which will help foster national unity and promote reconciliation. The wording of the last sentence in para (1) implies that all Iraqi political leaders support the right to form regions. This is not the case, and was a factor in delaying the implementation of the legislation for 18 months. This sentence should be deleted The July report rates part one of benchmark I (establishment of IHEC) as "satisfactory" and "Qol satisfactory on the other three parts. The | IHEC has been established, and, while it may not have completed all tasks assigned to it, e.g. appointment of directors of directors of provincial Govemorate Election Officers, this does not merit the GAO's "not met: assessment. The benchmark calls only for establishment of the HEC. Selection/traning of the new election officers has been underway for some time. In our view, the GAO assessment on this element of the benchmark could therefore be "partially met." (S) Formal (v) GAO evaluated status as "not met," and, of particulat note, progress on establishing THEC as "nor met." See comment 13. GAO assessments on remaining three elements Page 2 of 5 Page 82 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 151 Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State See comment 19. (C) Formal (xvii) GAO assesses status as "partially met the benchmarks report and should be deleted The July report indicates "satisfactory progress." NOVE ADOLESCENTE From the U.S. government perspective, the most important point is that the Iraqis are making steady progress, and will significantly ! improve over last year's performance on budget exocution, though the exact amount remains unclear. Indeed, the 001 ministries have already spent more of their 2007 capital budget than their total spending in all of 2006. Anomal, pero Provincial performance on budget execution is particularly noteworthy, considering that provincial officials have little prior experience with planning and executing their own budgets. To date, provinces have committed 100 per cent of the 2006 funds and 47 per cent of their | 2007 funds, with most of this work being done during 2007. It is difficult to make a definitive judgment in September regarding how much of the capital budget will be spent, given that: 1. The budget was passed at the end of February, and there was the money allocated until March. 2. Performance usually accelerates during Page 4 of 5 Page 84 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq GA007 152 Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State the last half of the year. 3. There are significant lags in the official GOI data - Ministry of Finance data Currently go only through May. See comment 20. (S) Formal Suomary chart, benchmarks (vi) and (vii). describes State assessment as "NA." This is not correct. More on human rights in Iraq Suate will provide a detailed response on the GAO text directly to GAO. GAO should use State's formula of prerequisites apt presenta or equivalent language, but not "NA." Request GAO delete last sentence since the statement goes beyond the required scope of the report. 66 (3) 1 (C) Formal See comment 21. A Adminisrative; S «Substantive, C-Critical • Formal -recommends comments should be published as part of official State response to GAO. * Informal -recommends comments should be provided 10 GAO but not be published in report. Page of 5 Page 85 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 153 Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State The following are GAO's comments on the State Department's letter dated August 30, 2007. GAO Comments 1. We agree with State that legislation on the Iraq High Electoral Commission has been enacted and implemented. However, our assessment of “not met" on the electoral benchmark is based on the Iraqi government not enacting and implementing three of four components of this benchmark-legislation on provincial authorities, provincial elections, and an election date. 2. We have highlighted the different standards of assessment between our report and the administration's reports. We also specify our assessment criteria in the cover letter and each appendix to make our judgments fully transparent. 3. We have included information about the recent communiqué in the cover letter and appendices as appropriate. 4. We have included information about the Kurdish Regional Government's new law and the U.S. position on it in the appendix on hydrocarbon legislation. 5. Our report acknowledges the progress that the Iraqi government has made in allocating and spending $10 billion of fiscal year 2007 funds on capital projects and reconstruction. While these funds have been allocated, our report also notes that a large portion of these funds will likely go unspent. Consequently, we rated this benchmark as “partially met." 6. We disagree with State's comment. We assessed this benchmark as "met.” However, Iraqi legislators we interviewed insisted that the situation in their communities has a direct bearing on their work in the legislature, their freedom of movement to and from the legislature, and their ability to engage fully in Iraq political life. Thus we included additional relevant information about minority human rights in Iraq. 7. See comment 6. 8. See comment 6. oooi 9. We revised our text. 10. Under our criteria, we considered the benchmark as "not met" because the Constitutional Review Committee was still continuing work on Page 86 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 154 Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State devising a package of necessary amendments, the Iraqi legislature had not voted on the package, and a referendum had not been held. 11. We added information to our already existing reference to the Kurdish National Assembly legislation. 12. We revised this sentence. 13. Under our criteria, this benchmark was not met. 14. We revised the text to reflect State's comments. 15. We revised the text to reflect State's comments. 16. Our paragraph provides context for the committees' work and the text makes it clear that these actions were in the past so we retained our original language, 17. See comment 6. 18. See comment 6. 19. See comment 5. 20. We revised the text. 21. See comment 6. Page 87 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq . 155 Appendix XXIII: Comments from the Department of Defense _ Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AUG 30 2007 Mr. Joseph Christoff Director, International Affairs and Trade U.S. Goverment Accountability Office 441 G Street N.W. Washington, DC 20548 Dear Mr. Christoff: See States response in appendix XXII. The Department of Defense appreciates the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report, GAO-07-1195, "SECURING, STABILIZING AND REBUILDING IRAQ: Iragi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks,” dated August 27, 2007 (GAO Code 320511). DoD's response covers the last two of the draft report's three recommendations. The Department of State has agreed to respond to the first recommendation. The GAO recommends that in preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase transparency on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks: Recommendation 2: The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other appropriate departments and agencies, provides information to the President on trends in sectarian violence with appropriate cavcats, as well as broader quantitative and qualitative measures of security. DoD concurs. Recommendation 3: The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other appropriate agencies, provides additional information on the operational scadiness of Iraqi security forces supporting the Baghdad security plan. DOD concurs. Attached is a matrix with comments on the upclassified report. A comment matrix for the classified briefing will be provided under separate cover. Page 88 GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 156 Appendix XXIII: Comments from the Department of Defense DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment. If you have any questions concerning these comments, my point of contact is Mr. James Stahlman at 703-571-2526. Sincerely, Hakt. kat Mark T. Kimmitt Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Attachments: As stated Page 89 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebnilding Iraq 157 Appendix XXIII: Comments from the Department of Defense See comment 1. Prze # August 30, 2007 Department of Defense Comments on: UNCLASSIFIED GAO Draft Report Sccuring. Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security and Economic Benchmarks COMMENT RESOLUTION MATRIX: FORMAL COMMENTS Para Recommendation Comment/Rationale Change "help the Iraqi govemment achieve these Accuracy Strategy was por designed to solely benchmarks" to "support Iraqi efforts to quell | achieve benchmarks Benchmarks are Iraqi sectarian violence and foster conditions for Iraqi government inputs necessary to achieve strategic national reconciliation." goals, they are not the goals. Change "eliminating safe havens" to "ensuring that Accuracy. There is no benchmark for achieving safc the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe havens." Recommended change is the correct haven for any oudaws, regardless of (their) sectarian benchmark la political affiliation." bullet Add "always" to make sentence read: "The Iragi Accuracy. As written, all tactical and operational govemment had not always allowed..." decisions were influenced by political intervcation. This is not accurate Chart Change labels to read monthly attacks" instead of Accuracy. average daily attacks." Add "parts of after "influence over local security in" Accuracy See comment 2. See comment 3 See comment 4. See comment 5 Delete "sectarian and mihlia influences" as a factor contributing to the decrease in the number of Iraqi battalions capable of operating independently. Accuracy. No unit is assessed to have regressed on the basis of "sectarian and militia influences." See comment 6 Paragraph says, "only about 65% of authorized Iraqi personnel are in the field at any given time." Should say, "only about 71% of authorized Iraqi personnel are in the field at any given time." Accuracy. Ausborized Iraqi persoanel in the field at any given time is 71%, nor 65%. See comment 7. Page 90 GA0-07-1198 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 158 Appendix XXIII: Comments from the Department of Defense The following are GAO's comments on DOD's letter dated August 30, 2007. GAO Comments 1. We have revised the text. 2. We have revised the text. 3. We have modified the sentence by adding not "always." 4. We have replaced this chart. 5. We have qualified the sentence by adding “parts of." 6. We disagree with DOD's comment. The Iraq benchmark calls for increasing the number of Iraqi security units capable of operating independently. A key impediment to Iraqi training and readiness, particularly of the police, is sectarian and militia influence. DOD's June 2007 report to Congress states that sectarian bias has constrained the development of MOI forces. 7. DOD commented that 71 percent of Iraqi authorized personnel are in the field at any one time, compared to 65 percent, which we report. We are retaining the 65 percent in our report because it is from a published DOD source and we do not have further documentation on the new figure. Page 91 GA0-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq 159 Appendix XXIV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements GAO Contacts Joseph Christoff (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov Staff Acknowledgements Steve Lord, David Brino, Howard Cott, Tim Fairbanks, Mattias Fenton, Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring, Bruce Kutnick, Judy McCloskey, Tet Miyabara, and Kathleen Monahan. In addition, Robert Alarapon Ashley Alley, Monica Brym, Lessie M Burke- Johnson, Joe Carney, Miriam Carroll, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern, Debra Chung, Joyee Dasgupta, Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Muriel Forster, Patrick Hickey, Michael Jenkins, Sona Kalapura, Jeremy Latimer, Mary Moutsos, Mimi Nguyen, Sidney Schwartz, Jena Sinkfield, Audrey Solis, Cynthia Taylor, and Christina Werth provided technical assistance. 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RECYCL D PAPER : [Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the committee adjourned.] THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND PROGRESS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN MEETING BENCHMARKS TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2007 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:14 p.m. in room SH– 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor, Webb, McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe, Ses- sions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, Martinez, and Corker. Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff di- rector; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Brian F. Sebold, receptionist. Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Mark R. Jacobson, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, re- search assistant; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, mi- nority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Nie- meyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and Dana W. White, professional staff member. Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A. Cronin, and Jessica L. Kingston. Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; David E. Bonine and James Tuite, assistants to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey and Vance Serchuk, assistants to Senator Lieberman; Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Sen- ator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Terri Glaze, assistant to Sen- ator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson and Michael Sozan, assistants to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., assistant to Senator McCain; Sandra (161) 162 Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants to Senator Sessions; Jan Alonso and Mark J. Winter, assistants to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke and Russell J. Thomasson, assistants to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune: Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; and Paul B. Palagyi and Bradford T. Sellers, as- sistants to Senator Corker. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN Chairman LEVIN. Good afternoon, everybody. Today we welcome General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker for their update on the situation in Iraq. We thank both of you for your service to this country, the men and women that you both command and lead. You're doing so under very, very difficult circumstances. We ask both of you to pass along to the men and women who you do lead in this endeavor, our heartfelt thanks, particularly those who risk their lives on a daily basis. While people here have different views on the war and will con- tinue to vigorously debate the strategy, tactics, and policies relat- ing to the war—we are united in our admiration and appreciation for those who serve there, for their families who love them, and who support them. There's much disagreement relative to the facts on the ground in Iraq, on the issue of whether or not the surge has produced signifi- cant progress in terms of security. Recent public opinion polls in Iraq indicate that Iraqi citizens feel even less secure than before the surge. According to an ABC News analysis, “The surge broadly is seen to have done more harm than good, with 65 to 70 percent of Iragis saying it's worsened rather than improved security in surge areas, security in other areas, conditions for political dialogue, the ability of the Iraqi Government to do its work, the pace of reconstruction, and the pace of economic development.” Is Baghdad, itse safer for citizens to go about their normal business? Or are large sectors of Baghdad, in electricity and fuel distribution, controlled by the Mahdi Army and neighborhood militias as detailed in last Sunday's New York Times? While the facts relating to security are debated and are debat- able, there seems to be little dispute on three key points that go to the heart of the matter. First, the stated purpose of the surge, to give Iraqi politicians breathing space to work out a political settlement, has not been achieved. Second, there will be no end to violence until Iraqi's national leaders work out their political differences. As the Commission headed by General Jones reported last week, political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq. Third, the Iraqi politicians haven't done that. They haven't kept the commitments that they made a year ago, to set the date for provincial elections, to approve a hydrocarbon law, to approve a de- Baathification law, and to submit constitutional amendments to a referendum. 163 & prob- General Petraeus said 3 years ago that Iraqi political leaders were, “Stepping forward, leading their country courageously and making progress,” in his words. Well, if they were, progress sure has stalled politically. Ambassador Crocker told Congress yesterday and today that Iragi leaders have the “will” to tackle the nation's pressing p lems and “approach the task with the deep sense of commitment and patriotism,” even though those leaders ignore their own bench- marks. The Ambassador inappropriately compares Iraq's sectarian strife and slaughter to this Nation's Civil Rights movement. So the administration's message to Iraqi leaders continues to be that they're doing just fine. That's exactly the wrong message to send the leaders who dawdle while their nation is torn apart by sectarian strife and while their people are killed and forcibly eject- ed by sectarian militias or killed if they refuse to be ethnically cleansed. The Iraqi politicians dawdle while our casualties and our expenditures keep climbing. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) told us last week that most of the key promises of Iraq's political leaders, the bench- marks that they set for themselves, with relevant timetables, have been ignored by those leaders. On January 14 of this year, President Bush said, “America will hold the Iraqi Government to the benchmarks that it has an- nounced.” Those words ring hollow. There have been no con- sequences for the Iraqi political leaders' failures to do what Presi- dent Bush said they must do. Year after year, the President and the administration have touted progress in Iraq and called for pa- tience. It has been a litany of delusion. Just listen to President Bush's repeated claims of progress. October 2003, he said, “We're making progress about improving the lives of people there in Iraq.” Sep- tember 2004, the President said, “We're making steady progress in implementing our five-step plan.” In October 2005, the President said, “Iraq has made incredible political progress.” In May 2006, the President said, “We're making progress on all fronts.” In March of this year, the President said, “There's been good progress.” On July 4, the President said that, “Victory in this struggle will re- quire more patience.” Well, there's been little progress on the political front and the American people's patience with Iraq's political leaders has run out. Success in Iraq depends on Iraqi leaders finally seeing the end of the open-ended American commitment. Success depends on doing what James Baker, Lee Hamilton, and the rest of the Iraq Study Group said we should have done a year a ago, that the United States “should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq. If the Iraqi Government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi Government.” That was before the surge level was increased. Success also depends on a transition of missions. According to the Iraq Study Group, "By the first quarter of 2008, subject to un- expected developments in the security situation on the ground, all 164 combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.” At that time, the Iraq Študy Group said, “U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue.” Finally, presenting Iraq's political leaders with a timetable for transition of our forces, from mainly combat to mainly support roles, as opposed to a timetable for ending the surge—which is a fact of life, which is going to happen by necessity anyway-pre- senting those political leaders with a timetable for transition is the only hope that Iraqi leaders will realize that their future is in their hands, not in the hands of our brave men and women who proudly wear America's uniform. Establishing a timetable for the transition of missions will also recognize another fact of life, that the stress on our forces, espe- cially the wear and tear on the Army and Marine Corps, must be reduced. Telling the Iraqis that the surge will end by the middle of next year, and then we will make a decision as to whether to reduce our troop level from the basic pre-surge level of 130,000, does not change our course in Iraq. İt presents an illusion of change to prevent a real change of course from occurring. It is aimed at taking the steam out of the engine of change. I hope we are not deterred from continuing to press for true change and that the momentum for true change of course is not dif- fused. It must continue until, by our deeds, we get the Iraqi polit- ical leaders to understand, that for our security and theirs, the American presence in Iraq needs to be significantly reduced after 442 years of U.S. sacrifice, and that the future of their country is in their own hands. Senator McCain. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses. All of us are aware that you've terally nonstop testifying for the last day and a half, and we thank you for your willingness, not only to discuss with Congress, but with the American people, this very critical issue. With your testimony, a debate of historic proportions begins in the United States Congress. The choices that we make now, wheth- er to build on the success of the surge and fight for additional gains, or whether to set a date for American surrender in Iraq, will affect the security of all our countrymen for decades to come. As we all know, the American people are saddened, frustr and angry over our past failures in Iraq. I, too, have been made sick at heart by the terrible price we've paid for nearly 4 years of mismanaged war. Some of us, from the beginning, warned against the Rumsfeld strategy of too few troops, insufficient resources, and a plan predicated on hope, rather than on the difficult business of stabilization and counterinsurgency. We lost years to that strategy and we lost that which is most precious to us—the lives of the brave men and women who fight on our behalf. But the question today is not whether we can recover those 4 years—we cannot—but whether we end this effort in frustration trated, 165 and accept thereby the terrible consequences that will ensue. I be- lieve we cannot choose to lose in Iraq and I will do everything in my power to see that our commanders in Iraq have the time and support they request to win this war. The distinguished strategist Ralph Peters summed up the state of affairs well in a column today, noting that Congress's failure to support General Petraeus, “would be a shame, since after nearly 4 years of getting it miserably wrong in Iraq, we're finally getting it right.” We're getting it right, because we finally have in place a strategy that can succeed. A counterinsurgency strategy which some of us have argued we should have been following from the beginning, which makes the most effective use of our strength, and does not strengthen the tactics of our enemy. We must, as General Petraeus intends, keep this strategy in place. It is the only approach that has resulted in real security im- provements in Iraq. Anyone who has traveled recently to Anbar, or Diyala, or to Baghdad can see the improvements that have taken place over the past months. As our witnesses will testify, violence is down, com- merce is on the rise, and the bottom-up efforts to forge counter-ter- rorism alliances are bearing tangible fruit. There are many challenges remaining, and the road ahead is long and tough. The Maliki Government has not seized the oppor- tunity presented by our efforts to move ahead with reconciliation, and is not functioning as it must. Violence, having declined signifi- cantly, remains high. As Ambassador Crocker has noted, no one can be certain of suc- cess. We can be sure, however, that should the United States Con- gress succeed in legislating a date for withdrawal, and thus sur- render, then we will fail for certain. Make no mistake, the consequences of American defeat in Iraq will be terrible and long-lasting. There is, in some corners, a belief that we can simply turn the page in Iraq, come home, and move onto other things. This is dangerously wrong. If we surrender in Iraq, we will be back in Iraq, and elsewhere, in many more desperate fights to protect our security, and at even greater cost in American lives and treasure. Last week, General Jim Jones testified before this committee and outlined what he believes to be the consequences of such a course. A precipitous departure which results in a failed state in Iraq, he said, will have a significant boost in the number of extremist jihadists in the world, who will believe that they will have toppled a major power on earth, and that all else is possible. I think it will only make us less safe, it will make our friends and allies less safe, and the struggle will continue. It will simply be done in different, and other, areas. Some Senators would like to withdraw our troops from Iraq so we can get back to fighting what they believe to be the “real” war on terror, which is taking place somewhere else. This too is inac- curate. Iraq has become the central front in the global war on ter- ror, and failure there would turn Iraq into a terrorist sanctuary in the heart of the Middle East, and a host for jihadists planning at- tacks on America. The region could easily descend into chaos, wider 166 war and genocide, and we should have no doubt about who will take advantage. The Iranian President has stated his intentions bluntly, saying, “Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course, we are prepared to fill the gap.” We cannot allow an Iranian-domi- nated Middle East to take shape in the context of a wider war and terrorist safe havens. All of us want our troops to come home, but we should want them to return to us with honor—the honor of vic- tory that is due all of those who have paid the ultimate sacrifice. General Petraeus and his troops ask just two things of us: the time to continue this strategy, and the support they need to carry out their mission. They must have both, and we should fight to en- sure that they do. Soon this debate will move from hearing rooms to the Senate floor, where we'll see again attempts to legislate a withdrawal from Iraq. Given the enormous human and strategic costs such a defeat would impose on Iraq, the region, and Americans for years to come, Congress must not choose to lose in Iraq. I will do everything in my power to ensure that we do not. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. Our welcome to both of you, our thanks to both of you, and to your families that provide essential support for you in extraor- dinarily difficult circumstances in which you both work. We're indebted to you for your appearance here today, and for the fact that this is the third of three long hearings for you. General Petraeus! STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, MULTINATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to pro- vide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq. Chairman LEVIN. May I interrupt you for one moment? General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Chairman LEVIN. If you choose, both of you, or each of you, may reduce and summarize, if you so choose, because of the fact that your statements have been given in full before the other commit- tees. I'm not asking you to do that, we'll leave that up to you. General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, I've actually cut it down a bit. Chairman LEVIN. All right. [Laughter.] It didn't take much suggesting, then, to do that. General PETRAEUS. But it's still Chairman LEVIN. That's fine do it as you wish. General PETRAEUS. Thank you for the opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq, and to discuss the rec- ommendations I have provided to my chain of command for the way forward. As I stated in testimony to the two House committees yesterday, and to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning. , this is my testimony. Although I have briefed my assessment and the recommendations in it to my chain of command, I wrote this state- ment myself, and did not clear it with anyone in the Pentagon, the White House, or Congress. 167 Today, I will provide a summary of the full written testimony to each of you, and for the record. As a bottom line, upfront, the mili- tary objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met. In re- cent months, in the face of tough enemies, and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, coalition and Iraqi security forces have achieved progress in the security arena. Though improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents has declined in 8 of the past 12 weeks. During this time, ethno-sectarian violence has also been re- duced, and the number of overall civilian deaths has declined, al- though both are clearly still at troubling levels. The progress is a result of many factors—coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt significant blows to al Qaeda-Iraq, and have dis- rupted Shiite militia extremists. · Additionally, in a very significant development, we and our Iraqi partners are being assisted by tribes and local citizens who are re- jecting extremism, and choosing to help secure Iraq. Iraqi security forces have also continued to grow, and to shoulder more of the load—albeit slowly—and amid continuing concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in their ranks. Based on all of this, and on the further progress we believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer, withdrawing one-quarter of our combat brigades by that time, without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve. Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult, and sometimes downright frustrating, I also be- lieve that it is possible for us to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time, though doing so will be neither quick, nor easy... Having provided that summary, I would like to review the nature of the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation before the surge, describe the current situation, and explain the recommendations I have pro- vided to my chain of command. The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition will take place. The question is whether it is re- solved more, or less, violently. This chart shows the security challenges in Iraq-foreign and home-grown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists and criminals all push the ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Malign actions by Syria, and especially by Iran, fuel that vio- lence, and lack of adequate governmental capacity, lingering sec- tarian mistrust, and various forms of corruption add to the chal- lenges. In January 2007, in response to the horrific ethno-sectarian vio- lence that spiraled out of control in 2006, and to an assessment in December 2006 that we were failing to achieve our objectives, a surge of forces began flowing into Iraq, focusing on protecting the population, and reducing sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad. În so doing, these forces have employed counterinsurgency prac- tices, such as living among the people they are securing. In mid- June, with all of the surge brigades in place, we launched a series of offensive operations in partnership with Iraqi security forces. 168 These operations focused on expanding the gains achieved in the preceding months in Anbar Province, pursuing al Qaeda in the Diyala River Valley and several other areas, clearing Baqubah, sev- eral key Baghdad neighborhoods, the remaining sanctuaries in Anbar Province, and important areas around Baghdad. With coali- tion and Iraqi forces located among the populations they are secur- ing, we have sought to keep areas clear, and to help Iraqis in re- building them. All the while, we have engaged in dialogue with insurgent troops and tribes, leading to additional elements standing up to oppose al Qaeda and other extremists. The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi counter- parts has—as I noted at the outset-been substantial. While there have been setbacks, as well as successes, and tough losses along the way, overall our tactical commanders see improvements in the security environment. We do not, however, just rely on gut feeling or personal observa- tions. To gauge progress and determine trends, we also conduct rig- orous and consistent data collection and analysis. In fact, two U.Š. intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology, and con- cluded that the data we produce is the most accurate and authori- tative in Iraq. As I mentioned up front, and as the chart before you reflects, the level of security incidents has decreased significantly, since the start of the surge of offensive operations in mid-June, declining in 8 of the past 12 weeks with the level of incidents in the past 2 weeks the lowest since June 2006. Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural causes, have also declined considerably, by over 45 percent Iraq-wide, since the height of the sectarian violence in December. This is shown by the top line on this next chart, and the decline by some 70 percent in Baghdad is shown in the bottom line. Periodic mass casualty attacks—car bombs by al Qaeda-have tragically added to the numbers, outside Baghdad, in particular. Even without the sensational attacks, however, the level of civilian deaths is of serious concern. As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths, an important subset of the overall civilian casualty figures, has also declined significantly since the height of the sectarian violence in December. Iraq-wide, as shown by the top line on this chart, ethno-sectarian deaths have come down by over 55 percent. In Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, ethno-sectarian deaths have declined by some 80 percent since December. This chart also displays the density of sectarian incidents in various Baghdad neighborhoods, and it both reflects the progress made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence, and identifies the area where more work must be done. As we have gone on the offensive in former al Qaeda and insur- gent sanctuaries, and as locals have increasingly supported our ef- forts, we have found a substantially increased number of arms, am- munition, and explosive caches. As this next chart shows, we have so far this year already found and cleared over 4,400 caches, nearly 1,700 more than we discov- ered in all of last year. This may, in fact, be a factor in the reduc- 170 As this next chart shows, other tribes have been inspired by the actions of those in Anbar, and have volunteered to fight extremists, as well. Over 20,000 such individuals are already being hired for the I olice, thousands of others are being assimilated into the Iraqi Army, and thousands more are vying for a spot in Iraq's secu- rity forces. As I noted earlier, Iraqi security forces have continued to grow, to develop their capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burden of providing security for their country. Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics and supporting institutions, and an insufficient number of qualified commissioned and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), Iraqi units are engaged around the country. As this next chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi Army, national police, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those capable of taking the lead in oper- ations, albeit with some coalition support. Although their qualitative development have not always kept pace with their quantitative growth, all of Iraq's battalions have been heavily involved in combat operations that often result in the loss of leaders, soldiers, and equipment. Despite the losses, a num- ber of Iraqi units across Iraq now operate with minimal coalition assistance. In order to take over the security of their country, the Iraqis are rapidly expanding their security forces. In fact, they have some 445,000 assigned to the Ministries of Interior and Defense now, and we believe that they will be close to 480,000 by year's end. Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will—as in 2006—spend more on its security forces than it will receive in security assistance from the United States. In fact, Iraq is becoming one of the United States' larger foreign military sales (FMS) customers, committing some $1.6 billion to FMS already, with the possibility of up to $1.8 bil- lion more being committed before the end of the year. Here, I'd like to say that I appreciate the attention that the chairman and other members of this committee have recently given to speeding up the FMS process for Iraq. To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving, and Iraqi elements are slowly taking on more of the responsibility for prote ting their citizens. Innumerable challenges lie ahead, how- ever, coalition and Iraqi security forces have made progress toward achieving sustainable security. As a result, the United States will be in a position to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead. Two weeks ago I provided recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq to the members of my chain of command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The essence of the approach I recommended is cap- tured in its title, "Security While Transitioning: From Leading, to Partnering, to Overwatch.” This approach seeks to build on the se- curity improvements our troops and our Iraqi counterparts have achieved in recent months. It reflects recognition of the importance of securing the population and the imperative of transitioning re- sponsibilities to Iraqi institutions and Iraqi forces, as quickly as possible, but without rushing to failure. It includes substantial support for the continuing development of Iraqi security forces. It also stresses the need to continue the 171 counterinsurgency strategy that we have been employing, but with Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the load. It highlights the im- portance of regional and global diplomatic approaches. Finally, in recognition of the fact that this war is not only being fought on the ground in Iraq, but also in cyberspace, it also notes the need to contest the enemy's growing use of that important me- dium to spread extremism. The recommendations I've provided were informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations in- clude recognition that military aspect of the surge have achieved progress, and generated momentum. Iraqi security forces have been slowly shouldering more of the security burden in Iraq. A mission focused on either population security, or transition alone, will not be adequate to achieve our objectives. Success against al Qaeda- Iraq and Iranian-supported militia extremists requires conven- tional forces, as well as SOFs, and the security in local political sit- uations will enable us to draw down the surge forces. My recommendations also took into account a number of stra- tegic considerations. That political progress will only take place if sufficient security exists. Long-term U.S. ground force viability will benefit from force reductions as the surge runs its course. Regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success, and Iraqi leaders, understandably, want to assume greater sov- ereignty in their country, although, as they recently announced, they do desire continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq in 2008, under a new U.S. Security Council resolution, and following that, they want to negotiate a long-term security agreement with the United States and others. Based on these considerations, and having worked the battlefield geometry with Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, to ensure that we retain and build on the gains for which our troopers have fought, I have recommended a drawdown of the surge forces from Iraq. In fact, later this month, the Marine expedition, our first unit de- ployed as part of the surge, will depart Iraq. Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved, this will be followed by the with- drawal of a brigade combat team without replacement in mid-De- cember, and the further redeployment without replacement of four other brigade combat teams, and the two surge Marine battalions in the first 7 months of 2008, until we reach the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008. Force reductions will continue, beyond the pre-surge levels of bri- gade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008. In my pro- fessional judgment, however, it would be premature to make rec- ommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading, and even hazardous. In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an ade- quate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008, until about mid-March of next year. We will—no later than that time-consider factors simi- lar to those on which I based the current recommendations, having by then, of course, a better feel for the security situation, the im- 172 provements in the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation. This final chart captures the recommendations I have described, showing the recommended reduction of brigade combat teams as the surge runs its course, and illustrating the concept of our units adjusting their missions, and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqis as the situation and Iraqi capabilities permit. It also reflects the “no later than” date for recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer, and it provides a possible approach we have considered for the future force mission set in Iraq over time. In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note, again, that like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq's problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solu- tions. Although we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recog- nizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating consequences. That assessment is supported by the findings of a August 16 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq, and produce a number of dangerous re- sults, including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi security forces, rapid deterioration of local security initiatives, al Qaeda- Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver, a marked in- crease in violence, and further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows, alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with inter- nal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals, and exacerbation of already-challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran. Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment, and be- lieve that the best way to secure our national interests and avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our oper- ations on securing the Iraqi people, while targeting terrorist groups and militia extremists and, as quickly as conditions are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements. Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for our support of our men and women in uniform in Iraq. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsman with whom I'm hon- ored to serve are the best-equipped, and very likely the most pro- fessional force in our Nation's history. All of us appreciate what you have done to ensure that these great troopers have had what they have needed to accomplish their mission, just as we appreciate what you have done to take care of their families, as they, too, have made significant sacrifices in recent years. The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and in- dividual equipment, in munitions, in command, control, and com- munications (C3) systems, and intelligence, surveillance, and recon- naissance (ISR) capabilities, in vehicles and counter-IED systems and programs, and in manned, and unmanned aircraft, have prov- en invaluable in Iraq. 173 Additionally, your funding of the Commander's Emergency Re- sponse Program has given our leaders a critical tool with which to prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign. Finally, we appreciate as well your funding of our new detention programs and rule of law initiatives in Iraq. In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier, again, in Iraq, with America's new greatest generation. Our country's men and women in uniform have done a magnificent job in the most complex and challenging environment imaginable. All Americans should be very proud of their sons and daughters serving in Iraq today. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA Mr. Chairman, ranking members, members of the committees, thank you for the opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq and to dis- cuss the recommendations I recently provided to my chain of command for the way forward. At the outset, I would like to note that this is my testimony. Although I have briefed my assessment and recommendations to my chain of command, I wrote this testimony myself. It has not been cleared by, nor shared with, anyone in the Pen- tagon, the White House, or Congress. As a bottom line upfront, the military objectives of the surge are, in large meas- ure, being met. In recent months, in the face of tough enemies and the brutal sum- mer heat of Iraq, coalition, and Iraqi security forces have achieved progress in the security arena. Though the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents in Iraq has declined in 8 of the past 12 weeks, with the numbers of incidents in the last 2 weeks at the lowest levels seen since June 2006. One reason for the decline in incidents is that coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt significant blows to al Qaeda-Iraq. Though al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq remain dangerous, we have taken away a number of their sanctuaries and gained the initia- tive in many areas. We have also disrupted Shiite militia extremists, capturing the head and numer- ous other leaders of the Iranian-supported Iraqi Special Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran's activities in Iraq. Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce ethno-sectarian violence, as well, bringing down the number of ethno-sectarian deaths substantially in Baghdad and across Iraq since the height of the sectarian violence last December. The num- ber of overall civilian deaths has also declined during this period, although the num- bers in each area are still at troubling levels. Iraqi security forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder more of the load, albeit slowly and amid continuing concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in their ranks. In general, however, Iraqi elements have been standing and fighting and sustaining tough losses, and they have taken the lead in oper- ations in many areas. Additionally, in what may be the most significant development of the past 8 months, the tribal rejection of al Qaeda that started in Anbar province and helped produce such significant change there has now spread lo a number of other locations as well. Based on all this and on the further progress we believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve. Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult, and sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe that it is possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time, though doing so will be neither quick nor easy. Having provided that summary, I would like to review the nature of the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation before the surge, describe the current situation, and ex- plain the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command for the way ahead in Iraq. 174 THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition will take place, and its resolution is key to producing long-term stability in the new Iraq. The ques- tion is whether the competition takes place more-or less-violently. This chart shows the security challenges in Iraq, Foreign and home-grown terrorists, insur- gents, militia extremists, and criminals all push the ethno-sectarian competition to- ward violence. Malign actions by Syria and, especially, by Iran fuel that violence. Lack of adequate governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and various forms of corruption add to Iraq's challenges. THE SITUATION IN DECEMBER 2006 AND THE SURGE In our recent efforts to look to the future, we found it useful to revisit the past. In December 2006, during the height of the ethno-sectarian violence that escalated in the wake of the bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra, the leaders in Iraq at that time—General George Casey and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad- concluded that the coalition was failing to achieve its objectives. Their review under- scored the need to protect the population and reduce sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad. As a result, General Casey requested additional forces to enable the coalition to accomplish these tasks, and those forces began to flow in January. In the ensuing months, our forces and our Iraqi counterparts have focused on im- proving security, especially in Baghdad and the areas around it, wresting sanc- tuaries from al Qaeda control, and disrupting the efforts of the Iranian-supported militia extremists. We have employed counterinsurgency practices that underscore the importance of units living among the people they are securing, and accordingly, our forces have established dozens of joint security stations and patrol bases manned by coalition and Iraqi forces in Baghdad and in other areas across Iraq. In mid-June, with all the surge brigades in place, we launched a series of offen- sive operations focused on: expanding the gains achieved in the preceding months in Anbar province; dealing Baqubah, several key Baghdad neighborhoods, the re- maining sanctuaries in Anbar province, and important areas in the so-called “belts” around Baghdad; and pursuing al Qaeda in the Diyala River Valley and several other areas. Throughout this period, as well, we engaged in dialogue with insurgent groups and tribes, and this led to additional elements standing up to oppose al Qaeda and other extremists. We also continued to emphasize the development of the Iraqi secu- rity forces and we employed nonkinetic means to exploit the opportunities provided by the conduct of our kinetic operations—aided in this effort by the arrival of addi- tional Provincial Reconstruction Teams. and we our kinruction T CURRENT SITUATION AND TRENDS The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi counterparts has, as I noted at the outset, been substantial. While there have been setbacks as well as successes and tough losses along the way, overall, our tactical commanders and I see improve- ments in the security environment. We do not, however, just rely on gut feel or per- sonal observations; we also conduct considerable data collection and analysis to gauge progress and determine trends. We do this by gathering and refining data from coalition and Iraqi operations centers, using a methodology that has been in place for well over a year and that has benefited over the past 7 months from the increased presence of our forces living among the Iraqi people. We endeavor to en- sure our analysis of that data is conducted with rigor and consistency, as our ability to achieve a nuanced understanding of the security environment is dependent on collecting and analyzing data in a consistent way over time. Two U.S. intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology, and they concluded that the data we produce is the most accurate and authoritative in Iraq. As I mentioned upfront, and as the chain before you reflects, the level of security incidents has decreased significantly since the start of the surge of offensive oper- ations in mid-June, declining in 8 of the past 12 weeks, with the level of incidents in the past 2 weeks the lowest since June 2006 and with the number of attacks this past week the lowest since April 2006. Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural causes, have also declined consider- ably, by over 45 percent Iraq-wide since the height of the sectarian violence in De- cember. This is shown by the top line on this chart, and the decline by some 70 percent in Baghdad is shown by the bottom line. Periodic mass casualty attacks by al Qaeda have tragically added to the numbers outside Baghdad, in particular. Even 175 without the sensational attacks, however, the level of civilian deaths is clearly still too high and continues to be of serious concern. As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths, an important sub- set of the overall civilian casualty figures, has also declined significantly since the height of the sectarian violence in December. Iraq-wide, as shown by the top line on this chart, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by over 55 per- cent, and it would have come down much further were it not for the casualties in- flicted by barbaric al Qaeda bombings attempting to reignite sectarian violence. In Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by some 80 percent since December. This chart also displays the density of sectarian incidents in various Baghdad neighborhoods and it both reflects the progress made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital and identi- fies the areas that remain the most challenging. As we have gone on the offensive in former al Qaeda and insurgent sanctuaries, and as locals have increasingly supported our efforts, we have found a substantially increased number of arms, ammunition, and explosives caches. As this chart shows, we have, so far this year, already found and cleared over 4,400 caches, nearly 1,700 more than we discovered in all of last year. This may be a factor in the reduction in the number of overall improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in recent months, which as this chart shows, has declined sharply, by about one-third, since June. The change in the security situation in Anbar Province has, of course, been par- ticularly dramatic. As this chart shows, monthly attack levels in Anbar have de- clined from some 1,350 in October 2006 to a bit over 200 in August of this year. This dramatic decrease reflects the significance of the local rejection of al Qaeda and the newfound willingness of local Anbaris to volunteer lo serve in the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service. As I noted earlier, we are seeing similar actions in other locations, as well. To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across Iraq, as is shown by this chart depicting violence levels in several key Iraqi provinces. The trend in Ninevah province, for example, has been much more up and down, until a recent decline, and the same is (rue in Sala ad Din province, though recent trends there and in Baghdad have been in the right direction. In any event, the overall trajectory in Iraq-a steady decline of incidents in the past 3 months—is still quite significant. The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also declined in each of the past 5 months, from a high of some 175 in March, as this chart shows, to about 90 this past month. While this trend in recent months has been heartening, the number of high profile attacks is still too high, and we continue to work hard to destroy the networks that carry out these barbaric attacks. Our operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress against al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq. As this chart shows, in the past 8 months, we have consider- ably reduced the areas in which al Qaeda enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutral- ized 5 media cells, detained the senior Iraqi leader of al Qaeda-Iraq, and killed or captured nearly 100 other key leaders and some 2,500 rank-and-file fighters. Al Qaeda is certainly not defeated; however, it is off balance and we are pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively. Of note, as the recent National Intelligence Esti- mate (NIE) on Iraq explained, these gains against al Qaeda are a result of the syn- ergy of actions by: conventional forces to deny the terrorists sanctuary; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to find the enemy; and special operations elements to conduct targeted raids. A combination of these assets is necessary to prevent the creation of a terrorist safe haven in Iraq. In the past 6 months we have also targeted Shiite militia extremists, capturing a number of senior leaders and fighters, as well as the deputy commander of Leba- nese Hezbollah Department 2800, the organization created to support the training, arming, funding, and, in some cases, direction of the militia extremists by the Ira- nian Republican Guard Corps' Qods Force. These elements have assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi Governmental leaders, killed and wounded our soldiers with ad- vanced explosive devices provided by Iran, and indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the International Zone and elsewhere. It is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Qods Force, seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq. The most significant development in the past 6 months likely has been the in- creasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting al Qaeda and other extrem- ists. This has, of course, been most visible in Anbar Province. A year ago the prov- ince was assessed as “lost” politically. Today, it is a model of what happens when local leaders and citizens decide to oppose al Qaeda and reject its Taliban-like ide- ology. While Anbar is unique and the model it provides cannot be replicated every- where in Iraq, it does demonstrate the dramatic change in security that is possible n the pas creation ofargeted room assets teeny the terQaeda are umber of an Departme some cases Force in the Iraqi lica Grouphe Iraqi stopment if citizens Anbar P 176 with the support and participation of local citizens. As this chart shows, other tribes have been inspired by the actions of those in Anbar and have volunteered to fight extremists as well. We have, in coordination with the Iraqi Government's National Reconciliation Committee, been engaging these tribes and groups of local citizens who want to oppose extremists and to contribute to local security. Some 20,000 such individuals are already being hired for the Iraqi Police, thousands of others are being assimilated into the Iraqi Army, and thousands more arc vying for a spot in Iraq's security forces. IRAQI SECURITY FORCES As I noted earlier, Iraqi security forces have continued to grow, to develop their capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burden of providing security for their coun- try. Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics and supporting institutions, and an insufficient number of qualified commissioned and noncommis- sioned officers, Iraqi units are engaged around the country. As this chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi Army, National Police, and Special Operations Forces Battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support. Beyond that, all of Iraq's battalions have been heavily involved in combat operations that often re- sult in the loss of leaders, soldiers, and equipment. These losses are among the shortcomings identified by operational readiness assessments, but we should not take from these assessments the impression that Iraqi forces are not in the fight and contributing. Indeed, despite their shortages, many Iraqi units across Iraq now operate with minimal coalition assistance. As counterinsurgency operations require substantial numbers of boots on the ground, we are helping the Iraqis expand the size of their security forces. Currently, there are some 445,000 individuals on the payrolls of Iraq's Interior and Defense Ministries. Based on recent decisions by Prime Minister Maliki, the number of Iraq's security forces will grow further by the end of this year, possibly by as much as 40,000. Given the security challenges Iraq faces, we support this decision, and we will work with the two security ministries as they continue their efforts to ex- pand their basic training capacity, leader development programs, logistical struc- tures and elements, and various other institutional capabilities to support the sub- stantial growth in Iraqi forces. Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend more on its security forces than it will receive in security assistance from the United States. In fad, Iraq is becoming one of the United States' larger foreign military sales (FMS) customers, committing some $1.6 billion to FMS already, with the possibility of up to $1.8 billion more being committed before the end of this year. I appreciate the attention that some Members of Congress have recently given to speeding up the FMS process for Iraq. To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving, and Iraqis elements are slowly taking on more of the responsibility for protecting their citizens. Innumerable challenges lie ahead; however, coalition and Iraqi security forces have made progress toward achieving sustainable security. As a result, the United States will be in a position to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead. pand the elementsragi forces will, as in 2 the Unitedes (FMS) cu TO $1.8 RECOMMENDATIONS Two weeks ago, I provided recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq to the members of my chain of command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The essence of the approach I recommended is captured in its title: "Security While Transitioning: From Leading to Partnering to Overwatch.” This approach seeks to build on the se- curity improvements our troopers and our Iraqi counterparts have fought so hard to achieve in recent months. It reflects recognition of the importance of securing the population and the imperative of transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi institutions and Iraqi forces as quickly as possible, but without rushing to failure. It includes substantial support for the continuing development of Iraqi security forces. It also stresses the need to continue the counterinsurgency strategy that we have been em- ploying, but with Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the load. It highlights the importance of regional and global diplomatic approaches. Finally, in recognition of the fact that this war is not only being fought on the ground in Iraq but also in cyberspace, it also notes the need to contest the enemy's growing use of that impor- tant medium to spread extremism. The recommendations I provided were informed by operational and strategic con- siderations. The operational considerations include recognition that: • military aspects of the surge have achieved progress and generated mo- mentum; 177 • Iraqi security forces have continued to grow and have slowly been shoul- dering more of the security burden in Iraq; • a mission focus on either population security or transition alone will not be adequate to achieve our objectives; • success against al Qaeda-Iraq and Iranian-supported militia extremists requires conventional forces as well as Special Operations Forces; and • the security and local political situations will enable us to draw down the surge forces. My recommendations also took into account a number of strategic considerations: • political progress will take place only if sufficient security exists; • long-term U.S. ground force viability will benefit from force reductions as the surge runs its course; • regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success; and • Iraqi leaders understandably want to assume greater sovereignty in their country, although, as they recently announced, they do desire continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq in 2008 under a new U.N. Security Council Resolution and, following that, they want to negotiate a long-term security agreement with the United States and other nations. Based on these considerations, and having worked the battlefield geometry with Lieutenant General Ray Odierno to ensure that we retain and build on the gains for which our troopers have fought, I have recommended a drawdown of the surge forces from Iraq. In fact, later this month, the Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed as part of the surge will depart Iraq. Beyond that, if my recommendations are ap- proved, that unit's departure will be followed by the withdrawal of a brigade combat team without replacement in mid-December and the further redeployment without replacement of four other brigade combat teams and the two surge Marine battal- ions in the first 7 months of 2008, until we reach the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008. I would also like to discuss the period beyond next summer. Force reductions will continue beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008; however, in my professional judgment, it would he premature to make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, our ex- perience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous. The events of the past 6 months underscore that point. When I testified in January, for example, no one would have dared to forecast that Anbar Province would have been transformed the way it has in the past 6 months. Nor would anyone have predicted that volunteers in onetime al Qaeda strongholds like Ghazaliyah in western Baghdad or in Adamiya in eastern Baghdad would seek to join the fight against al Qaeda. Nor would we have anticipated that a Shia-led government would accept significant numbers of Sunni volunteers into the ranks of the local police force in Abu Ghraib. Beyond that, on a less encouraging note, none of us earlier this year appreciated the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we and Iraq's leaders all now have greater concern. In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008 until about mid-March of next year. We will, no later than that time, consider factors similar to those on which I based the current recommendations, having by then, of course, a better feel for the security situation, the improvements in the ca- pabilities of our Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation. I will then, as I did in developing the recommendations I have explained here today, also take into con- sideration the demands on our Nation's ground forces, although I believe that that consideration should once again inform, not drive, the recommendations I make. This chart captures the recommendations I have described, showing the rec- ommended reduction of brigade combat teams as the surge runs its course and illus- trating the concept of our units adjusting their missions and transitioning respon- sibilities to Iraqis, as the situation and Iraqi capabilities permit. It also reflects the no-later-than date for recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer and provides a possible approach we have considered for the future force structure and mission set in Iraq. One may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq is to change the Multinational Forces-Iraq mission from one that emphasizes population security, counterterrorism, and transition, to one that is strictly focused on transition and counterterrorism. Making that change now would, in our view, be premature. We have learned before that there is a real danger in handing over tasks to the Iraqi security forces before their capacity and local conditions warrant. In fact, the draft- ers of the recently released NIE on Iraq recognized this danger when they wrote, 178 and I quote, “We assess that changing the mission of coalition forces from a pri- marily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent al Qaeda-Iraq from estab- lishing a safe haven would erode security gains achieved thus far.” In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note again that, like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq's problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions. Though we both believe this effort can suc- ceed, it will take time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recog- nizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating con- sequences. That assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August Defense Intelligence Agency report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results, including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi security forces; rapid deterioration of local security initiatives; al Qaeda- Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver; a marked increase in violence and further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows; alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain advantages over their ri- vals; and exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, especially with re- spect to Iran. Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment and believe that the best way to secure our national interests and avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our operations on securing the Iraqi people while targeting ter- rorist groups and militia extremists and, as quickly as conditions are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements. CLOSING COMMENTS Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for your support of our men and women in uniform in Iraq. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen with whom I'm honored to serve are the best equipped and, very likely, the most professional force in our Nation's history. Impressively, despite all that has been asked of them in recent years, they continue to raise their right hands and volunteer to stay in uniform. With 3 weeks to go in this fiscal year, in fact, the Army elements in Iraq, for example, have achieved well over 130 percent of the reenlistment goals in the initial term and careerist categories and nearly 115 per- cent in the mid-career category. All of us appreciate what you have done to ensure that these great troopers have had what they've needed lo accomplish their mission, just as we appreciate what you have done to take care of their families, as they, too, have made significant sacrifices in recent years. The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and individual equip- ment; in munitions;.in command, control, and communications systems; in intel- ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; in vehicles and counter-IED systems and programs; and in manned and unmanned aircraft have proven invalu- able in Iraq. The capabilities that you have funded most recently—especially the ve- hicles that will provide greater protection against IEDs—are also of enormous im- portance. Additionally, your funding of the Commander's Emergency Response Pro- gram has given our leaders a critical tool with which to prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign. Finally, we appreciate as well your funding of our new detention programs and rule of law initiatives in Iraq. In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier again in Iraq with Amer- ica's new “Greatest Generation.” Our country's men and women in uniform have done a magnificent job in the most complex and challenging environment imag- inable. All Americans should be very proud of their sons and daughters serving in Iraq today. Thank you very much. the AONALE MULTI-NATIO ÁRCE-IRAS Multi-National Force-Iraq Charts to accompany the testimony of GEN David H. Petraeus 10-11 September 2007 180 00000000000SSSSSSS TURKEY PKK Major Threats to Iraq PKK Tal Alar Mosul Foreign Fighter Flow AQI SYRIA Kirkuk RAN Insurgents AQI/Sunni Anti-AQI Tribal Success AQI/Insurgent & Shi'a Militias Baqubah Baghdad Fallujah AQI/Insurgent & Shi'a Militias Ramadi Lethal Aid, Training, Funding An Najar putea Intra-Shi'a Violence 100 mi An Nasiriyah Basrah Shi'a infighting Over Power/Resources SAUDI ARABIA 181 1200 200 1600 1800 00 2000 20020000 . 22-Oct-04 12-Nov-04 03-Dec-04 24-Dec-04 14-Jan-05 04-Feb-05 25-Feb-05 18-Mar-05 08-Apr-05 29-Apr-05 20-May-05 10-Jun-05 01-Jul-05 22-Jul-05 12-Aug-05 02-Sep-05 23-Sep-05 14-Oct-05 KARA 30 Jan 05 Iraqi elections Mortar and Rocket Attacks u Bombs (IEDs), both Found and Exploded 15 Oct 05 Sniper, Ambush, Grenade, and Other Small Arms Attacks Iraqi referendum u Attacks Against Iraqi Infrastructure & Government Facilities 15 Dec 05 elections, Parliamentary 22 Feb 06 bombing mosque Samarra Rose SSSSSSSSSSSSSS wwwww 25-Nov-05 16-Dec-05 06-Jan-06 27-Jan-06 17-Feb-06 10-Mar-06 31-Mar-06 21-Apr-06 12-May-06 02-Jun-06 23-Jun-06 30338888 3333333 2008 3382 830 08333 3 SO $33888888 23 2 8383 03038 301 BOB 323 008 BOOS 333333333333333333 33 Overall Weekly Iraq Attack Trends . MAS ARRARA 15 Feb 07 Security Plan Baghdad 23 04-Aug-06 25-Aug-06 15-Sep-06 06-Oct-06 27-Oct-06 17-Nov-06 08-Dec-06 29-Dec-06 19-Jan-07 09.Feb-07 02-Mar-07 23-Mar-07 13-Apr-07 04-May-07 25-May-07 15-Jun-07 06-Jul-07 27-Jul-07 17-Aug-07 07-Sep-07 32 1 October 2004 - 7 September 2007 29922900822990000 88393 238398328382083 33 30 16 Jun 07 offensives Surge of 888888 182 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 Source: Coalition and Host National Reporting Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 -- Iraq Baghdad DERE 90-ins 2 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 28 Iraq Civilian Deaths As of 31 Aug 07 [w] Aug-07 THE 183 Ethno-Sectarian Violence Majurity Shia Majority Sunni Mixed Majority Shia Majority Sunni Mixed Majority Sta Majority Sunni Mixed DEC 06 FEB 07 MAY 07 2500 Iraq Ethno-Sectarian Deaths AUG 07 2000 .... . -10 Baghdad Security Districts 1500 1000 500 Wwwwwwwwwww DOOOO Most Density plots are of incidents where deaths occurred from any means that were clearly ethno-sectarian in motivation, to include car bombs May-06 90-unr 90-inr Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 90-AON Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 20-ins Aug-07 As of 31 Aug 07 4 184 Caches Found & Cleared Anbar Iraq 2111 4409 Year 1 JAN 07- 7 SEP 07 2006 2005 2004 1222 2726 3091 692 2691 185 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 90-ins Aug-06 Sep-06 Total IED Anbar Total IED Baghdad Total IED Iraq Total IEDs = IED explosions * IEDs found +IED hoaxes Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 188 High Profile Attacks 200 wwwxxx bi glas 180 160 140 Total High Profile Attacks Car Bomb Suicide Car Bomb Suicide Vest ESTER SENSES 120 100 ws . www . w ww May-06 Jun-06 90-inr Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 90-AON Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 20-uns Jul-07 Aug-07 As of 31 AUG 07: High Profile - Car bombs suicide car bombs + suicide vests MARGAR 189 JAN OZI State of Al Qaeda Iraq Senior traq AQI Leader | Mlilary bmli Sniper Cell Leader AQI EmWor Mosul cada tanaw Military Emir SRET Cify AQI Samarra Financier Emir of Sinjar Second in Command Kaumah Emir gleda Jan Special Goud/ Media Network Secunty Emir for Executions Financial Emi in Jazirah Kidnapping Cell Leader NOR Media Network Jordan AUG 07 Facilitator VBIED Cell Logistics Emir Emit of Amiltyah Emir ol Arat Jay Admin Emit TANK AREA ******* Strategic Detention/EKIA 15 June to 5 September 07 Emirs of: Media Cells: Yusafiyah Ramadi N. Iraq Ghazaliyah Samarra Baghdad Mosul Baqubah Diyala Samarra North Karkh Tarmiyah Arab Jabour Hay al Andullah Sinjar July to September 2007 Military Advisor ********* ONWAY Killed Captured ANA A6 SKANABIY AX MW NUMANY 190 Tribal Engagement Tal Afar O Mosul Local Security Forces 29.8K Vetted 28.4K In hiring process for Iraqi Security Forces Baqubah Ramadi Falluja Baghdad Karbala Al Kut An Najaf An Nasiriyah . Basra Security Volunteers | Sunni U Mixed Shi'a 191 60 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 SO-AON Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 90-unr 90-inc Iraqi Army Battalions, National Police Battalions, and Special Operating Force Battalions Levell - Fully Independent Level || - Iraqi Lead with Coalition Support Level III - Fighting Side by Side Level IV - Unit Forming Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 90-AON Dec-06 Iraqi Security Forces Capabilities Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 194 Iraq as well as its politics. Extensive displacement and widespread sectarian killings by al Qaeda and other extremist groups have gnawed away at the already frayed fabric of Iraqi society and politics. It is no exaggeration to say that Iraq is- and will remain for some time to come—a traumatized society. NATIONAL POLITICS It is against this backdrop that developments in Iraq must be seen. Iraqis are fac- ing some of the most profound political, economic, and security challenges imag- inable. They are not simply grappling with the issue of who rules Iraq-but they are asking what kind of country Iraq will be, how it will be governed, and how Iraqis will share power and resources among each other. The constitution approved in a referendum in 2005 answered some of these questions in theory, but much re- mains uncertain in both law and practice. Some of the more promising political developments at the national level are nei- ther measured in benchmarks nor visible to those far from Baghdad. For instance, there is a budding debate about federalism among Iraq's leaders and, importantly, within the Sunni community. Those living in place like al-Anbar and Salahaddin are beginning to realize how localities having more of a say in daily decision making will empower their communities. No longer is an all-powerful Baghdad seen as the panacea to Iraq's problems. This thinking is nascent, but it is ultimately critical to the evolution of a common vision among all Iraqi leaders. Similarly, there is a palpable frustration in Baghdad over the sectarian system that was used to divide the spoils of the state in the last few years. Leaders from all communities openly acknowledge that a focus on sectarian gains has led to poor governance and served Iraqis badly. Many claim to be ready to make the sacrifices that will be needed to put government performance ahead of sectarian and ethnic concerns. Such ideas are no longer controversial, although their application will be. Finally, we are seeing Iraqis come to terms with complex issues not by first pro- viding a national framework, but instead by tackling immediate problems. One such example is how the central government has accepted over 1,700 young men from the Abu Ghurayb area west of Baghdad, including former members of insurgent groups, to be part of the Iraqi security forces. Another is how the government, with- out much public fanfare, has contacted thousands of members of the former Iraqi army, offering them retirement, return to the military, or public sector employment. So without the proclamation of a general amnesty, we see amnesty being granted, and deba'athification reform in advance of national legislation. In both instances, the seeds of reconciliation are being planted. We have come to associate progress on national reconciliation as meaning the pas- sage of key pieces of legislation. There is logic to this, as the legislation we are urg- ing the Iraqis to produce does—in one way or another—have to do with the question of how to share power and resources among Iraq's many communities. This legisla- tion also has to do with the vision of the future Iraqi state. The oil and revenues sharing laws, for instance, deal with deeper issues than simply whether Iraqis in oil producing areas are willing to share their wealth with other Iraqis. What is dif- ficult about the oil laws is that they take Iraq another step down the road toward a Federal system that all Iraqis have not yet embraced. But once again, we see that even in the absence of legislation there is practical action as the central government shares oil revenues through budget allocations on an equitable basis with Iraq's provinces. In many respects, the debates currently occurring in Iraq-de-Baathification and provincial powers—are akin to those surrounding our civil rights movement or struggle over states rights. On de-Baathification, Iraqis are struggling to come to terms with a vicious past. They are trying to balance fear that the Baath party would one day return to power with the recognition that many former members of the party are guilty of no crime and joined the organization not to repress others but for personal survival. With provincial powers, they are grappling with very seri- ous questions about what the right balance between the center and the periphery is for Iraq. Some see the devolution of power to regions and provinces as being the best insurance against the rise of a future tyrannical figure in Baghdad. Others see Iraq, with its complex demographics, as in need of a strong central authority. In short, we should not be surprised or dismayed that Iraqis have not fully re- solved such issues. Rather, we should ask whether the way in which they are ap- proaching such issues gives us a sense of their seriousness and ultimate capability to resolve Iraq's fundamental problems. Is the collective national leadership of Iraq ready to prioritize Iraq over sectarian and community interests? Can and will they come to agreement about what sort of Iraq they want? but for persos about what devolution is for Iraq. Somabout what the richincial powers, they sa 196 last year. Doing the best are the provincial authorities, in the process gaining expe- rience with making plans and decisions, and running fair tenders. In so doing, they are stimulating local business development and providing employment. Over time we expect the experience with more responsive local authorities will change Iraqi attitudes towards their elected leaders, and of the provinces towards Baghdad. At two conferences in Dubai in the last 2 weeks, hundreds of Iraqi businessmen met an equal number of foreign investors newly interested in acquiring shares of businesses in Iraq. An auction of cell phone spectrum conducted by Pricewaterhouse Coopers netted the Government a better-than-expected sum of $3.75 billion. The Minister of Finance plans to use the funds, along with all the country's oil revenue, to apply to its pressing investment and current expenditure needs. Overall, however, the Iraqi economy is performing significantly under potential. A lack of security in many parts of the countryside raises transport costs and espe- cially affects manufacturing and agriculture. Electricity supply has improved in many parts of the country, but is woefully inadequate in Baghdad. Many neighbor- hoods in the city receive 2 hours a day or less from the national grid, although power supplies for essential services such as water pumping stations or hospitals are much better. The Minister of Electricity said last week that it would take $25 billion through 2016 to meet demand requirements, but that by investing the $2 bil- lion a year the Ministry is now receiving from the government's budget, as well as private investment in power generation, that goal could be met. We are deploying our assistance funds to make a difference to ordinary Iraqis and to support our political objectives. Military units are using Commanders Emergency Response (CERP) funds to ensure that residents see a difference when neighborhood violence declines. U.S. Assistance for International Development Community Sta- bilization Funds provide tens of thousands of jobs. With the recent apportionment of 2007 supplemental funds, we are putting “Quick Response Funds” in the hands of our Provincial Reconstruction Team leaders to build communities and institutions in post-kinetic environments. Vocational training and microfinance programs are supporting nascent private businesses. In Baghdad, we are increasing our engage- ment and capacity building efforts with ministries. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS On the diplomatic front, there is expanding international and regional engage- ment with Iraq. In August, the UN Security Council, at Iraq's invitation, provided the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) with an expanded mandate through U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1770. The work of the Inter- national Compact with Iraq moves forward, jointly chaired by Iraq and the U.N. Seventy-four countries pledged support for Iraq's economic reform efforts at a Min- isterial Conference in May. The U.N. has reported progress in 75 percent of the 400 areas Iraq has identified for action. Later this month, the Iraqi Prime Minister and the U.N. Secretary General will chair a ministerial-level meeting in New York to discuss further progress under the Compact and how UNSCR 1770 can be most ef- fectively implemented. Many of Iraq's neighbors recognize that they have a stake in the outcome of the current conflict in Iraq, and are engaging with Iraq in a constructive way. A neigh- bors' ministerial in May, also attended by the P-5 and the G-8, has been followed by meetings of working groups on security, border issues, and energy. An ambassa- dorial level meeting just took place in Baghdad, and another neighbors' ministerial will be held in Istanbul in October. Against the backdrop of these new mechanisms, the business of being neighbors is quietly unfolding. For the first time in years, Iraq is exporting oil through its neighbor, Turkey, as well as through the Gulf. Iraq and Kuwait are nearing conclu- sion on a commercial deal for Kuwait to supply its northern neighbor with critically needed diesel. Jordan recently issued a statement welcoming the recent leaders' communiqué and supporting Iraqi efforts at reconciliation. Saudi Arabia is planning on opening an Embassy in Baghdad—its first since the fall of Saddam. Syria's role has been more problematic. On one hand, Syria has hosted a meeting of the border security working group and interdicted some foreign terrorists in tran- sit to Iraq. On the other hand, suicide-bombers continue to cross the border from Syria to murder Iraqi civilians. Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state. In doing so, the Iranian government seems to ignore the risks that an unstable Iraq carries for its own interests. 197 of in Iraet the united Stathave ding our derstoodi be- LOOKING AHEAD 2006 was a bad year in Iraq. The country came close to unraveling politically, eco- nomically, and in security terms. 2007 has brought some improvements. Enormous challenges remain. Iraqis still struggle with fundamental questions about how to share power, accept their differences and overcome their past. The changes to our strategy last January—the Surge—have helped change the dynamics in Iraq for the better. Our increased presence made besieged communities feel that they could de- feat al Qaeda by working with us. Our population security measures have made it much harder for terrorists to conduct attacks. We have given Iraqis the time and space to reflect on what sort of country they want. Most Iraqis genuinely accept Iraq as a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian society—it is the balance of power that has yet to be sorted out. Whether Iraq reaches its potential is of course ultimately the product of Iraqi de- cisions. But the involvement and support of the United States will be hugely impor- tant in shaping a positive outcome. Our country has given a great deal in blood and treasure to stabilize the situation in Iraq and help Iraqis build institutions for a united, democratic country governed under the rule of law. Realizing this vision will take more time and patience on the part of the United States. I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. I do believe, as I have described, that it is attainable. I am certain that abandoning or drastically curtailing our efforts will bring failure, and the consequences of such a failure must be clearly understood. An Iraq that falls into chaos or civil war will mean massive human suffering—well be- yond what has already occurred within Iraq's borders. It could well invite the inter- vention of regional states, all of which see their future connected to Iraq's in some fundamental way. Undoubtedly, Iran would be a winner in this scenario, consoli- dating its influence over Iraqi resources and possibly territory. The Iranian Presi- dent has already announced that Iran will fill any vacuum in Iraq. In such an envi- ronment, the gains made against al Qaeda and other extremists groups could easily evaporate and they could establish strongholds to be used as safehavens for regional and international operations. Our current course is hard. The alternatives are far worse. Every strategy requires recalibration as time goes on. This is particularly true in an environment like Iraq where change is a daily or hourly occurrence. As chief of mission in Iraq, I am constantly assessing our efforts and seeking to ensure that they are coordinated with and complementary to the efforts of our military. I believe that, thanks to the support of Congress, we have an appropriate civilian posture in Iraq. Over the coming year, we will continue to increase our civilian efforts outside of Baghdad and the international zone. This presence has allowed us to focus on capacity building, especially in the provinces. The number of Provincial Reconstruc- tion Teams has grown from 10 to 25 this year. In support of these goals, we will be asking Congress for additional economic assistance including additional quick re- sponse funds for capacity building. We will also seek support for two significant pro- posals that hold the prospect of creating permanent jobs for thousands of Iraqis. One would be the establishment of an “Iraqi-American Enterprise Fund,” modeled on our successful funds in Poland and elsewhere in Central Europe. Such a fund could make equity investments in new and revamped firms based in Iraq. The sec- ond would be a large-scale operations and maintenance facility based on our High- way Trust Fund. On a cost-sharing basis, such a fund would train Iraqis to budget for and maintain important public sector infrastructure (power plants, dams, roads). Over time, the cost-sharing would phase down and out, leaving behind well-trained professionals and instilling the habits of preventative maintenance. We will continue our efforts to assist Iraqis in the pursuit of national reconcili- ation, while recognizing that progress on this front may come in many forms and must ultimately be done by Iraqis themselves. We will seek additional ways to neu- tralize regional interference and enhance regional and international support. We will help Iraqis consolidate the positive developments at local levels and connect them with the national government. Finally, I expect we will invest much effort in developing the strategic partnership between the United States and Iraq, which is an investment in the future of both countries. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LEVIN. That's your call, Ambassador. Thank you. General Petraeus, General Jones and his very distinguished Commission, and very experienced and independent Commission 198 said that political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian vio- lence in Iraq. Do you agree? General PETRAEUS. I do, yes, sir. Chairman LEVIN. The Commission also said that Iraqi armed forces, excuse me for interrupting myself here—but I will say that we'll have an 8-minute first round of questions—this is for our col- leagues, I've talked to Senator McCain about it, we have a huge night, I think everyone is probably here today, so we'd all like more time, but we'll limit the first found to 8 minutes. General, let me ask you another question, then, about the Inde- pendent Commission which was headed by General Jones. They also wrote that the Iraqi armed forces are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq. Do you agree with that? General PETRAEUS. I do. I would want to talk about which units, but that is correct. Chairman LEVIN. Now, in your testimony and your charts indi- cate that there are approximately 95 of the Iraqi battalions-Army, police, and SOFs battalions that are capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support, is that correct? General PETRAEUS. That is correct, yes, sir. Chairman LEVIN. I believe from our own statistics given to us by the Department of Defense (DOD) under section 9010, that 89 of those battalions are in the Iraqi army, does that sound about right? General PETRAEUS. That sounds about right, I don't know if they have the Special Operations elements in that, Chairman LEVIN. I think they are. General PETRAEUS.—but I think that's about right. Yes. Chairman LEVIN. I think they are, that includes Special Oper- ations. General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Chairman LEVIN. Now, after talking with soldiers during a re- cent visit to Iraq, it was my impression that many of the Iraqi units that have the capabilities to be in the lead, are not yet in the lead. From their testimony last week, I believe that General Jones, and Jawr, speaking for that Independent Commission, agree that there are many Iraqi units that have that capability of being in the lead again, with support from the coalition, that are not yet in the lead. Would you agree with that? General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir, I think I would, right. Chairman LEVIN. Can you tell us, about how many of the 89 Iraqi units that are capable of taking the lead with the support of the coalition are not yet in the lead? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I can not. If I could take that for the record. [The information referred to follows:] As of September 2007, there were two Iraqi Army battalions that had recently reached Operational Readiness Assessment Level 2 that had not yet assumed Iraqi Army Lead. The status of these two battalions had recently been upgraded and once the conditions on the ground and opportunities permit, these battalions will be placed in the lead. It remains our policy to ensure that units are rated as capable of operating in the lead or of conducting their own independent operations before being given re- sponsibility for their own battlespace. Once they are rated as such, we transfer re- sponsibility as soon as conditions allow. 199 Chairman LEVIN. It's a very important point. General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Chairman LEVIN. Obviously, for those of us who believe that we have to begin to reduce our forces, and to turn over responsibility to the Iraqis, both politically and militarily, where they have that capability that is still not being used. I would appreciate that, if you would promptly get us that number for the record. General, British troops withdrew from Basra to a position out- side of the city. Now, of the 40,000 British troops that were de- ployed to Iraq after the invasion, only 5,500 remain, and they are, again, posted outside of the city of Basra. Prime Minister Gordon Brown called the move part of a British strategy to shift from com- bat to an overwatch role. The role of securing the four provinces in the region, then, is left to the Iraqi security forces. Did you agree with the British decision to redeploy their troops out of Basra? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I did, and they had already withdrawn from Maysan Province, that was transitioned to provincial Iraqi control some months ago. The Australian forces are in one of the other four provinces, Dhi Qar and Al-Muthanna Province transitioned to provincial Iraqi control, actually, last year. So, they really are, what it really is, transitioning the security of the palace in Basra City to Iraqi elements that were trained and equipped and certified for that. Chairman LEVIN. Did you agree with the reduction in British troops? General PETRAEUS. I did, ves, sir Chairman LEVIN. General, there was a lengthy article in last Sunday's New York Times that assessed the surge, I don't know if you've had a chance to read that article? General PETRAEUS. I have not, sir. Chairman LEVIN. The article was a result of work of 20 reporters who repeatedly visited 20 neighborhoods in Baghdad. They found that of the residents had been killed or driven away from their homes in Baghdad, more than 35,000 Iraqis had left their homes since the surge began, that of nearly all of the Shiite-dominated areas of Baghdad, the Mahdi Army has expanded and deepened its control of daily life in Sadr City. The residents say the Mahdi mili- tants control neighborhood security, gas stations, water supplies, and real estate, and now Baghdad residents say the market is now controlled by the Mahdi Army in Sedia-once middle-class and mixed, and relatively peaceful-crackdowns in nearby Sunni areas led to an influx of hardline Sunni insurgents. Shiites turned to their own militias, principally the Mahdi Army. Most residents have left, fleeing death squads from both sides. One of the most alarming findings of the article is that Sunnis and Shiites fear each other at the top levels of the government, and in the sweltering neighborhood of Baghdad, hatreds are festering, not healing. Do you have any reaction to that summary? It's a long article, but you didn't mention any specifics about the provinces. I'm just wondering if anything I read strikes you as being erroneous? General PETRAEUS. No, there are certainly all of those situations to be found in Baghdad, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LEVIN. All right. Now Ambassador Crocker, in your opening statement for the record, you provided a positive judgment 200 on the Iraqi political leaders, including Prime Minister Maliki. Yet, according to Joe Klein, in an article in the September 3rd edition of Time Magazine, you told him that the fall of the Maliki Govern- ment, when it happens, might be a good thing. Were you accurately quoted? Ambassador CROCKER. What I have said, when I have been asked that question—and it's come up several times—is that in Iraq now, with its democratically-elected parliament, questions about any government—the Maliki Government or any other, are going to be determined by the Iraqi people. There is a mechanism for voting “no confidence” in their parliamentary system, there are several ways they can do that, and it's up to them. Chairman LEVIN. I think we all agree with that. But that's not my question. My question is, were you accurately quoted when you were quoted as saying that it might be a good thing if the Maliki Government falls? Is that an accurate quote? Ambassador CROCKER. My answer is that when I have been asked that question, I respond in the manner that I just laid out for you. Chairman LEVIN. Are you saying, then, that you did not say that when it happens, it might be a good thing? Ambassador CROCKER. I do not recall saying that, no, sir. Chairman LEVIN. Now, Mr. Ambassador, the New York Times re- ported that Prime Minister Maliki flew to Najaf to meet with Grand Ayatollah Sistani on September 5, 2 days after Mr. Maliki met with the President in Western Iraq. Mr. Maliki is quoted as having stated that, “I raised before Ayatollah Sistani my view- points to form a government of technocrats.” Now, did you discuss that with Mr. Maliki, that conversation that he had with Ayatollah Sistani? Ambassador CROCKER. I did not discuss that conversation, be- cause I was on my way back here that night. I have had discus- sions with the Prime Minister on questions of how the government functions, the problems in governmental functioning—there is a lot of frustration over that, on our side, of course, and on the part of Iraqis, and including the Prime Minister himself. He has pre- viously spoken of one alternative, being the formation of a techno- cratic government. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, my time is up. Senator McCain. Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, again, thank you. General Petraeus, you have stated that Iraq is now the central front in the war on terror, is that a correct quote? General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir. Senator MCCAIN. Why is that? General PETRAEUS. It is based on my conversations with the Di- rector of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Lieutenant General McCrystal, the Joint Special Operations Command Com- mander who has assessed that it is a central front for al Qaeda, and they have based that on communications and other things. It is possible that the loss of momentum—to some degree-in Iraq by al Qaeda may be shifting that, we've actually been looking at that to see if there are indicators of a reduction in support for 201 al Qaeda-Iraq or not, and there is not something conclusive yet, but it is certainly something that we are looking at very hard. Senator MCCAIN. Ambassador Crocker, in my statement I men- tioned, and I'm sure you heard the Iranian President stated, “Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course we are prepared to fill the gap.” Did you hear that comment? Ambassador CROCKER. I did, I did hear that comment, yes, sir. Senator McCAIN. Your conclusion from that? Ambassador CROCKER. At least the President of Iran has one vir- tue of being honest. Because that is already very apparent to those of us in Iraq, as Iran's intention. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, it's astonishing the number of things that people come up with, one of the latest statements is that the surge had nothing to do with Anbar Province, and the rather stunning success we've had there. How do you respond to that? General PETRAEUS. The success in Anbar Province, correctly, is a political success. But, it is a political success that has been en- abled, very much, by our forces, who have been enabled by having additional forces in Anbar Province. The tribes, indeed, stood up, started outside Ramadi last October or so, Colonel McFarland of the Army with some great Marine forces and some Army forces in Ramadi made the decision to back him, that began to build some momentum, got some Iraqis trained, and all of a sudden by mid- March, they felt that they could go ahead and launch a Senator McCAIN. Could it have happened without the surge? General PETRAEUS. It would not have happened as quickly with- out the surge, and I don't know whether we could have capitalized on it in the way that we have without the surge. Senator McCain. Ambassador Crocker, there's now a lot of con- versation about a “soft partition” of Iraq, and that Baghdad is al- ready partitioned, and Kurds are doing things locally—and others. What is your response to a proposal to a “soft partition” of Iraq? Ambassador CROCKER. Iraqis have to figure out what their state will look like in the future. One of the promising indicators we're seeing right now is, in fact, a discussion among all Iraqis—includ- ing Sunnis—about a decentralized federal system. These will be their choices to make. That kind of outcome which is provided for in the constitution, is not soft partition, it's not partition of any form. Partition, in my view, is not a viable outcome for the situa- tion in Iraq. Baghdad-in spite of all of the violence it has seen, and all of the population displacements—remains a very mixed city. Sunnis and Shiite together. Any notion that that city of over 5 million can be neatly divided up, or painlessly cleansed of a huge number of people, is just incorrect. Senator MCCAIN. Some argue that that ethnic cleansing is al- ready taking place? Ambassador CROCKER. There clearly has been a substantial dis- placement of—mainly of Sunnis—but also of Shiite. You know to be candid, there is still some of that going on, as the New York Times article suggests. That is going to be one of the challenges ahead for the Iraqis, and for us in support of them. Senator MCCAIN. Why not let it just continue? 202 Ambassador CROCKER. Because this is occurring in its current form, pushed by militias and death squads, at a tremendous human cost. We've brought that down. The surge has brought that down, but it hasn't ended it. To simply say, “This is a good thing," would be, I think, in both practical and moral terms, roughly equiv- alent to some of the ethnic cleansing we saw in the Balkans. Senator McCAIN. General Petraeus, we agree that the national have been a colossal failure. What are we going to do about it? How many people are we talking about in the context of the overall national police force, as it is? General PETRAEUS. Senator, there's no question that certain na- tional police elements were hijacked by sectarian interests—par- ticularly during 2006—and became part of the problem instead of part of the solution. The Ministry of Interior has recognized that, this Minister has taken steps, and we have supported those steps, needless to say. But it includes replacement of the overall national police commander, both division commanders, all 9 of the brigade commanders, and 17 of 27 battalion commanders. In addition, there has been a retraining process for them of a month-long course, where they're pulled out of the line, literally, and sent to a location Southeast of Baghdad for retraining. With some of the units, this has appeared to work, there are some others about which we still have continuing concerns. I believe that Prime Minister Maliki himself has gotten much greater concern about mi- litia activity in general, and has publicly said now that the militias must be dissolved over time. I am going to bring in some individuals to take a look at this, together with the Ministry of Interior, in fact, shortly after I get back. Senator MCCAIN. There's an argument that the success in Anbar Province, because it's strictly Sunni, cannot be replicated through- out Iraq. General PETRAEUS. Sir, it can't be replicated exactly, except of course in locations that are exactly Sunni-Arab. Now, actually, there are neighborhoods in Baghdad where this has been rep- licated, in other areas, including Abu Ghraib where some, well over 1,500 men have been put on hiring orders by the Ministry of Inte- rior, almost all Sunni-Arab, I assume, and some are former insur- gents, Jaish al-Islami—the Iraqi Government knows this, they did it with their eyes wide open, because they saw that it would be bet- ter to have these individuals fighting al Qaeda, instead of part of al Qaeda. Senator McCAIN. So, this can be and is being replicated through- out Iraq? General PETRAEUS. It can be replicated in a number of different locations where it's needed to be replicated. The truth is, in some areas you have sufficient security forces now to combat-and it's not just al Qaeda, it's also, of course, militia extremists. But, if you look at the province of Dhi Qar, for example, one of the four prov- inces for which the British are responsible, in that province, there's a pretty strong Iraqi element, and each time the militia has gotten out of hand, that element has been able to deal with it-on some occasions with some help with a special forces team, that is in that area, and that can provide some close air support, as required. 203 Senator MCCAIN. Ambassador Crocker, what is your degree of confidence that the Maliki Government can do the things that we've been asking them to do for a long time? Ambassador CROCKER. My level of confidence is under control. We saw in the course of the summer a serious effort on the part of Prime Minister Maliki and other leaders to try to work out some of the national level issues among them, and that led to a communiqué on August 26 in which they announced agreement in principle on two pieces of legislation-de-Baathification reform and provincial powers—committed themselves to convening regularly to deal with issues of strategic significance to the nation, and also an- nounced agreement on issues relating to detainees and armed groups. These are modest achievements, but I nonetheless find them somewhat encouraging as an indication of, certainly, the intention of the leaders of the three main communities to work together, and their ability to produce some results. Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for their service. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. Senator Kennedy. Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, as others do, for your service. Ambassador Crocker, you've given us a rather ominous pre- diction, when you say that your level of confidence in terms of the political resolution decision, reconciliation is—you used the words "under control.” We've heard from General Petraeus, we've heard from General Jones, we've heard from the President of the United States, that military action and political reconciliation have to go hand-in-hand—you'd agree with that, would you not? Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I would agree that political rec- onciliation has to be the end state, but I would not, myself, suggest that they go hand-in-hand. Senator KENNEDY. All right. Ambassador CROCKER. I think the military surge can create the conditions under which political reconciliation is possible. Senator KENNEDY. All right, well they can create the conditions. The real issue and question is, with the surge, are those conditions being created? General Petraeus pointed out in his counter- insurgency statement and book published last December, “the tac- tical actions that must be linked, not only to strategic and oper- ational military objectives, but also to the host nation's essential political goals. Without those connections, lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain." Without those connections—military and political-lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain. So, General Petraeus, in looking at the surge, and being mindful of the GAO report, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report, that point out that the most important benchmarks that are essen- tial to achieve national reconciliation, end the violence, have not been met, and are not likely to be met any time soon-how do we have any real confidence that these political judgments are going to be made by the Iraqi political leadership? The Iraqi political leadership—they're the ones that are going to have to make the 204 judgments on political reconciliation. We've had the surge now. We've read the GAO report, we know what President Bush has said, that if the benchmarks have not been achieved, he's going to hold the Iragis accountable—we've seen no evidence of that. I'd suggest that the Iraqi political leadership is holding hostage Amer- ican service men and women in Iraq. If they are not going to move, if they're not going to make judgments, if they're not going to make a decision, what I hear from you is that the American commitment is going to be open-ended. It's going to be open-ended into the fu- ture. I'm not sure the American people are willing to buy into that. General PETRAEUS. Senator, what gives me some confidence is actions beyond those of the inability to gain agreement on the benchmark legislation. An example is the fact that, although there has not been agreement on the oil revenue-sharing law, although they have actually sent it forward, I believe is the latest status- they have been, in fact, sharing oil revenue. In fact, giving prov- inces budgets that are commensurate with what they likely will be given if this law were passed. Similarly, in terms of—there is no general amnesty law, but there is, essentially conditional immunity that Prime Minister Maliki—through the National Reconciliation Committee-has fos- tered in reaching out to these groups that have raised their hand to support al Qaeda, and supporting them by putting them through training, and on the payroll of the Ministries of Interior and De- fense. Senator KENNEDY. Just to remind ourselves, the NIE, which I think most of us have had the opportunity to read, said the polit- ical reconciliation—I think they used the word “elusive"—the GAO, the establishment of benchmarks which are basically benchmarks by the Bush administration have not been effectively achieved and accomplished. We hear now that Ambassador Crocker says that he has called the idea of political reconciliation, he is keeping “under control” his degree of enthusiasm, or interest, or belief that that's going to happen. We have to know why we should believe that the Maliki Government or the politicians in Baghdad are going to make the tough judgments or decisions that are going to provide the national reconciliation and the political stability of that coun- try, which—as you pointed out in your book-says is absolutely es- sential if we're going to end violence, and have a country that's going to have some degree of independence. Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I described a few minutes ago the efforts that Prime Minister Maliki and other members of the leadership made in the course of the summer that does give me some encouragement, both of their resolve and, to a certain degree, their ability to get things done. There are other indications, Senator KENNEDY. They're not in the GAO report. My time is just going out—General, if I could ask you, on your last chart that you have over here, this is the last chart? General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Senator KENNEDY. It shows the gradual reduction of American personnel over the period—these are the numbers, the brigades that are going down, this has it eventually flattening out to vir- tually nothing, it's the chart over here. What is the timeline be- 205 tween these various bars that we have in this chart that's on this- on the chart that you have over here, and that you've distributed here? General PETRAEUS. Senator, as I mentioned in my testimony, the next decision-per my recommendations, at least, it would be in mid-March, which would be to recommend the subsequent draw- down—the pace of the subsequent drawdown beyond reach when we had hit the 15 brigade combat teams. We would continue to do that as we go along. Senator KENNEDY. So, we shouldn't conclude, we shouldn't draw any conclusions from that chart over there on the phasing down, in terms of the American troops, what those bars mean, and when the years will come out—do you have any estimate? General PETRAEUS. I cannot offer you that. What that does rep- resent is our thinking on conceptually, how we would adjust our mission set, and also the numbers of brigade combat teams over time. Again, the over time—my best professional military advice is that, again, I have to do that as we get closer to each of those times. Senator KENNEDY. My time is up. Thank you very much. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. Senator Warner. Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to join all of us in saying that I have felt your appear- ances—which I've followed very carefully, I was in attendance at the House yesterday—have been very productive. They've been forceful statements, they've been objective statements, and I think, very credible statements, and I commend you for this public service that each of you are performing. This is a critical time in our contemporary history of this coun- try, and we're on the threshold of a very important message that our President will deliver regarding the forward strategy. He'll de- liver that, presumably, in the coming few days. General Petraeus, I've followed with great interest your career and I've gotten to know you quite well. I value our professional as- sociation. You wrote a letter to your troops, it says as follows, “Many of us had hoped this summer would be a time of tangible, political process at the national level, as well. One of the justifica- tions for the surge, after all, was that it would help create the space for Iraqi leaders to tackle the tough questions, and agree on key pieces of national reconciliation legislation.” You concluded with this simple sentence: “It has not worked out as we had hoped.' On what facts did you predicate the hope that you had? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I guess on the projections that were made by—in many cases—those who came before us. There were plans laid out of when certain pieces of legislation would be dealt with and the plain and simple fact is they were not, and I needed to level with our troops, and tell them that was the case. Senator WARNER. Good. Let me go on, quickly. You value intel- ligence, as a military man. General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. 207 ation was a concept, it was a building block to justify going forward with the surge. I do not think that the forward strategy that will be announced by the President in a matter of days can once again use the concept of top-down reconciliation as a building block for that strategy he will announce to our Nation. Do you agree or disagree with that? Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, as you and others of your colleagues have remarked, and as we have said, and national reconciliation, political reconciliation is ultimately what success will be all about in Iraq, if it's achieved. So, I think whether it is top-down or bot- tom up, or—which is actually the case, both, that remains critically important. I'd make just a couple of quick points—first, as General Petraeus said, Iraq is hard, and reconciliation is hard, particularly when you're looking at it against the backdrop of the levels of violence the country has experienced over the last year and a half. Senator WARNER. Simply, do you think it's going to be a part of the fundamental factual basis of support for the new strategy? We're betting on it happening at some point in time. Ambassador CROCKER. I think that the essence of success in Iraq, for Iraqis, as well as for our own goals, centers around a suc- cessful national reconciliation process that is going to have both bottom-up and top-down elements. Senator WARNER. That's what's been said at this table for a long time, sir. I respect you, but it hasn't happened. I want to ask one last question to the General. Again, with my respect for you, and how I've come to know you, you feel very deep- ly about every single soldier, airman, marine, and sailor that you have under your command. I think back about George Marshall in World War II, when he was faced with decisions in every respect, you face the same tough decisions that he and Eisenhower and oth- ers faced in that per He said in his diary, “I was very careful to send to President Roosevelt every few days a statement of our casualties. I tried to keep before him, all the time, the casualty results. Because you get hardened to these things, and yet you have to be very careful, to keep them always in the forefront of your mind.” Interesting, fas- cinating. I'm confident that you do that. You're advising our Presi- dent now on a strategy, and we don't know what it will be. But I hope that if—in any way you disagree that you will so advise him. Second, I hope in the recesses of your heart, that you know that strategy will continue the casualties, the stress on our forces, the stress on military families, the stress on all Americans. Are you able to say at this time, if we continue what you have laid before Congress here as a strategy, do you feel that that is making Amer- ica safer? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I believe that this is, indeed, the best course of action to achieve our objectives in Iraq. Senator WARNER. Does that make America safer? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I don't know actually. I have not sat down and sorted out in my own mind. What I have focused on and been riveted on, is how to accomplish the mission of the Multi- national Force-Iraq (MNF-I). I have not stepped back to look at the—and you've heard with other committees, in fact, I've certainly 210 to report on? The benchmarks originally proposed by the Iraqis themselves? Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, the benchmark process has been deeply frustrating, certainly to us, and frustrating to a lot of Iraqis. At the same time, I think we have to maintain a certain flexi- bility in our approach, and note that in some respects, we're seeing action on the objectives of the benchmarks, without actual national legislation. We've mentioned, for example, revenue-sharing taking place without a revenue-sharing law. It's being done on a reasonably eq- uitable basis to all of Iraq's provinces—that's all oil revenue that's being shared. De-Baathification reform—there is not yet legislation in place, yet the government has reached out to a number of former military officers, many of whom were members of the Baath party to offer them reinstatement in the service, to offer them pensions, or to offer them the choice of other public sector employment. So, that is, indeed, progress on reconciliation, without achieving the na- tional benchmark. Similarly, on amnesty, as General Petraeus mentioned. The fact that the Government of Iraq was prepared to bring 1,700 young men from the Abu Ghraib area, just west of Baghdad into the po- lice force—even though some of those individuals had been involved with Sunni insurgent groups in the past—is, if not a general am- nesty, it's clearly a conditional immunity. So, while I certainly cannot tell you when Iraq will achieve these benchmarks, formally, I can tell you that we're seeing some inter- esting progress on the objectives behind the benchmarks, which is reconciliation. Senator BYRD. Thank you Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, General Petraeus. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Byrd. Senator Inhofe. Senator INHOFE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, having been over and visited with you on the ground over there on a cou- ple of occasions, I have to say here, publicly, that you two are the right people at the right time. Í listened to your testimony, General Petraeus, and I'm not sure why I did I knew, pretty much, what you were going to say when you came here, because these are things that we experienced, those of us who have been over there particularly who have been over there recently. You talked about Ramadi—there's no question that the successes there, no one would have believed a year ago when they declared that that very likely was going to be the terrorist capitol of the world, and Fallujah, as we all watched with great anxiety, the door-to-door Marine operations, and now Fallujah is secure, just like Ramadi is. But the interesting thing is, it's secured by the Iraqi security forces, as opposed to ours. You talked about Patrol Base Murray, south of Baghdad, where they're doing things, the neighborhood programs that are providing for their own security, the volunteers that are there on the ground, we watched these programs, with the concerned citizens programs 211 take place in Anbar province, now it's reaching some of the other areas, so that the successes are not confined to Anbar province. The citizens who go out and mark the undetonated IEDs—they're taking a risk. This is something that wasn't happening just a few months—well, it wasn't happening before the surge. What's happening in the mosques is just really remarkable, while the Imams, the clerics, and the mosques had been giving their anti-American reports—I think we said that 85 percent o messages were anti-American, and we really haven't had anti- American messages since about April. Now, I think that's having a huge effect on the people over there in the region, we're getting so much of the cooperation that we weren't getting before. Joint security stations, even a very critical report said that we were almost to the anticipated number of 34, we have 32 now. When you talk to the troops, and when you talk to the Iraqi troops about the relationships that are being developed, it's a huge suc- cess story. Ambassador Crocker, you talked about some of the economic vic- tories that were there, you talked about the markets, about the kids in the playgrounds and these things. Some of us have been there, and we've gone through the markets, so we know that those successes are very real. I have to say—and to apologize to the two of you for what you've had to undergo—the moveon.org was bad enough, but I think we know who was behind that, but when my old friend, Congressman Tom Lantos, came out and said, “We cannot take any of this ad- ministration's assertions about Iraq seriously anymore, no amount of charts and statistics will increase its credibility," I think it's ap- propriate for you to repeat something that you're probably tired of repeating. That is, the report that you've brought to us and to the American people and to Congress that you've been able to articu- late in the last couple of days. Just one more time, tell us the gen- esis of that report—who put it together, and who's responsible for it. General PETRAEUS. Senator, I have a brain trust of bright guys, they wrote two drafts of it, and I took control of the electrons last week, or 2 weeks ago and basically rewrote it, and wrote that my- self. Obviously, I shared it back and forth with them, but what I delivered here today was very much, by and large, my testimony, and it certainly had not been cleared with—nor even shared with anyone Senator INHOFE. At the Pentagon, the White House, or Congress. General PETRAEUS. The White House, the Pentagon, or Congress. Senator INHOFE. All right. General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that, very much. I say to both of you that the adversaries, those who had been op- posed to the war, those who are, generally, opposed to this Presi- dent, have been very outspoken for a long period of time. But, I also noticed that some of the adversaries, once they go over there, and they see firsthand what we have seen, change their minds. I was really shocked when I saw the article in the paper by Mi- chael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack, in the New York Times on the 30th of July. These are two journalists, fine people and all that, 215 by most counts responsible for the murder of hundreds of American soldiers and thousands of Iraqi civilians and soldiers. Ambassador Crocker, I know you've met twice with the Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad. I know that some of my colleagues and others have called for a diplomatic surge with Iran, to engage in negotiations with them. In your view, based on those two meetings, are the Iranians responding to that diplomatic initiative that you commenced with them? Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, we have seen nothing on the ground that would suggest that the Iranians are altering what they're doing in support of extremist elements that are going after our forces, as well as the Iraqis. Senator LIEBERMAN. General, do you feel that you have all of the authorities that you need, from a military point of view, to deter, disrupt, and respond to the Iranian attacks on our troops, and Iran's efforts to destabilize Iraq? General PETRAEUS. I do, Senator. Again, keeping in mind that my area of responsibility is limited to Iraq. So, it does not include going into Iran. Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you about that, because I know your military spokespeople in Baghdad have made very clear that we have evidence that Iran is taking Iraqi extremists to three training camps outside of Tehran, training them in the use of ex- plosive, sophisticated weapons, sending them back into Iraq where they are responsible for the murder of American soldiers. Is it time to give you authority, in pursuit of your mission in Iraq, to pursue those Iranian Quds force operations in Iranian territory in order to protect America's troops in Iraq? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think that really the MNF-I should just focus on Iraq, and that any kinds of operations outside the bor- ders of Iraq would rightly be overseen by Central Command (CENTCOM). Senator LIEBERMAN. My time's up. Thank you both. God bless you in your extraordinary service, and we all wish you well and success. Thank you. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. Senator Sessions. Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank both of you for your service to America, your commitment to executing the policies, not only of the President, but of this Congress, as we voted, over three-fourths voted to authorize the actions in Iraq. I think it's a healthy discussion, I really do. Last week we had General Jones' Commission, where 20 experienced people came and gave their views. We had the GAO give us their evaluation of where we are, and today you front-line officers, representing the government, are sharing your thoughts with us today, and we thank you for that. Ultimately, it is Congress' role to decide whether or not to fund this activity. I hope after this discussion, we can reach a bipartisan agreement, even though maybe it won't be a unanimous vote, but once an agreement is reached, I hope that we can all work together in a way that helps us achieve the decided-upon policy, and does not in any way make it any more difficult to achieve the policy that this Nation will have decided upon in this democratic fashion. 216 think Bing West has been to Iraq a number of times and written exten- sively about it, I believe two books—recently said this, General Petraeus, and I think you should be complimented, he said, “The new military team has infused the effort with energy and strategic clarity, and seize the initiative. In this war, the moral, psycho- logical element outweighs the physical by 20 to 1. On the two pri- mary battlefields—Anbar and Baghdad—I see a common char- acteristic, U.S. momentum.” I think that's indicated in your com- ments, and I just wanted to share that, because some things have happened there. General Petraeus, you haveafter having two full tours in Iraq, you came back and completed writing the ĎOD Counterinsurgency Manual—I see a copy of the big manual over there someone has. Would you tell us some of the tactics and principles you're applying that might have been different from those before, t can be effective against insurgents? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think one of the most important initia- tives has been to ensure that the idea of securing the population by living among it, is one of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that we practice. This manifests itself in the form of the joint secu- rity stations that are combinations of Iraqi and coalition forces, jointly manning, generally commanding control, and also, typically some forces there as well. Locations are in Baghdad, they're also in a number of other cities. There are also, however, patrol bases and combat outposts that have been established—again, to ensure that our soldiers and Iraqi forces are in the neighborhoods, are in the areas. You cannot com- mute to this fight. You can't secure a population by driving through it a few times in a day. You have to be there 24/7. This has, in fact, had positive developments. The intelligence that you get from this can actually be overwhelming at a certain point when they realize you're there to stay. It's worked exceed- ingly well in Ramadi and Fallujah, and in a number of other cit- ies- Senator SESSIONS. Speaking of intelligence, this is when the local people give information of value to the American, or the Iraqi sol- diers? General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. In fact, that's a big factor in the number of additional weapons caches. The locals are helping us to those, we also have more forces on the ground, we also have more presence throughout the countryside, throughout cities, and so forth. Particularly, as the locals sense a degree of momentum, then they want to get on board, they're now happy to have the mortar cache in their vegetable garden taken out, as it's no longer needed. So, those are the types of practices that we have sought to em- ploy, and a number of others in terms of this fusion of the intel- ligence a lot of these are evolutions. But, I do think that, yes, we have made mistakes along the way, we have learned lessons very much the hard way, but I think that our institutions—the Army, the Marine Corps, the other Services—have made a number of changes that have helped ensure that our leaders not only have the experience to draw on that many of them have already had in Iraq, sometimes one or two tours before—but also have had a prepara- 218 if we continue it? Or, in your opinion, do we have a realistic chance to be successful in this very important endeavor? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I believe we have a realistic chance of achieving our objectives in Iraq. Senator SESSIONS. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, when I asked General Jones last week, did a single member of his 20-member Commission believe that our effort in Iraq was hopeless, and that we should withdraw promptly, he indicated not a single one did. So, I believe the American people are concerned about that ques- tion, and I value your honest answer to it. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions. Senator Reed. Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General Petraeus, have you ever recommended or requested the extension of troop tours to 18 months, or the accelerated deploy- ment of National Guard and Reserve Forces? General PETRAEUS. I've certainly never recommended extension beyond 15 months. In fact, General Odierno and I put out a letter that said that unless things got completely out of control, that we would not even think of extending beyond 15 months. Senator REED. Having done that, doesn't that virtually lock you into a recommendation of reducing troops by 30,000, beginning in April, and extending to the summer? Regardless of what's hap- pening on the ground? General PETRAEUS. Depending on what can be taken out of the Reserves. I don't know what is available in the National Guard and e Reserves. I do know that the Active-Duty Army, in particular, that the string does run out for the Army to meet the year-back criteria. Now, what we have done, of course, as I mentioned, Senator, is actually, in fact, to take some elements out short of their 15-month mark, because of our assessment of the situation- Senator REED. I understand that, and I think basically, my sense is that the overriding constraint you've faced is not what's hap- pening on the ground in Iraq, but the reality—unless you did rec- ommend, request, and succeed—that unless tours were extended, 30,000 troops are coming out of there beginning in April of next year, regardless of the situation on the ground. General PETRAEUS. Again, certainly the active brigade combat teams were going to come out of there. Again, I'm not aware of what is available in terms of battalions, brigades, or what have you- Senator REED. My sense is that the Reserve and National Guard Forces are not available to— General PETRAEUS. I think that's the case, but again, I don't know because I have not asked. Senator REED. Let me go to an issue which I think is essential to, not only where we are, but where we're going—that's the revers- ibility of the progress you've reported with respect to the surge. I think in that context, I look at the situation in Basra, which the Chairman alluded to. The British conducted Operation Sinbad for about 6 months, goals very similar to the surgereduce the violence in Basra, the second-largest city in Iraq, bring down the level of violence, prepare 219 9 for redeployment of forces. They've begun their redeployment, and yet the situation in Basra, I think, has deteriorated significantly. İs that accurate? General PETRAEUS. Actually, in the last month, the level of vio- lence has come down fairly significantly. In part because as I men- tioned, there's been a four-star general put in place there several months ago, changed the police chief, and again, reached some po- litical accommodations among the three parties that are down there. Also, did some release of some Jaish al-Mahdi detainees, as well, who are not ones—by the way—who are in league with Iran. Senator REED. But, the presence there of Iran is quite significant in the southern part, particularly in Basra. General PETRAEUS. There is a very real concern about Iranian activity in the southern provinces, and in Basra, in particular. Senator REED. Yet, you've agreed—as you said earlier to the chairman—that the reduction of British forces was appropriate. In that regard, too, do the current British forces have a population protection mission? . General PETRAEUS. They do not. Really, Operation Sinbad was very different from our surge, in the sense that it was conducted to reach some relatively short-term goals, and actually all along, intended to come back to their bases. They did, then, train-for ex- ample—the force to secure the palace over the course of the last couple of months, it's certified, took it over, and in fact has done an adequate job in maintaining security of that palace there. It has been the stand-up of some additional Iraqi forces down there, in- cluding Iraqi SOFs. There are additional forces literally, as we speak—that are moving there to strengthen the position of General Mohan, the four-star general there. Senator REED. If the British forces are operating there with, es- sentially, a force protection mission, and you've described in your terms-progress because of political adjustments, why can't U.S. forces begin to adopt a force protection counterterrorism mission, and nonpopulation protection mission? Or, alternatively stated, why do certain elements in your command-American units—have a population protection mission, and the British don't? General PETRAEUS. It's largely because that's a Shiite area, and there has not been the kind of sectarian violence, there's just basi- cally one sect. There is a pocket of Sunnis down there, but there has been general co-existence down there, by and large. So you, lit- erally, just don't have the same that particular challenge-in Basra, or in the other southern provinces. There is intra-Shiite fighting that goes on, but that is something that, in general, the Iraqis have shown an ability to resolve in a way that they have not been able to deal with, the very heightened sectarian violence, in particular, that took off in the next areas, in the wake of — Senator REED. But let me return to my initial—you've argued that lately, at least, that the progress in the south seems to be tak- ing some hold. Principally because of the non-sectarian element. Yet, out where you are operating, where you will reduce forces next spring, there is a significant sectarian Shiite-Sunni clash. Yet, you're still confident that these gains will stand up? General PETRAEUS. There are a number of areas in which we are actually doing fine in mixed areas—or, in which, a better more ac- 220 curate to say, Iraqi security forces are holding their own, are shoul- dering their share of the burden. Again, not to come back to Anbar, but Anbar is one of them, certainly. You see, not only were we going to bring the Muhone out of there, and not ask for it to be replaced, but we actually moved an Army battalion out of Anbar Province, as well, to another area, in fact, where it was needed more. But there are other locations like that—Kirkuk, Mosul to a degree other locations where you can thin, because of the addi- tional in many cases—local volunteers who have seen what has happened in Anbar Province, and have sought to have some of that in their areas. Senator REED. Any strategy has objectives and resources to gain those objectives. Included in that is timed troops. So, given the resent strategy that you've adopted, how long, and at what max- imum strength, do you anticipate American forces being in Iraq? General PETRAEUS. What I can see so far, with any clarity in terms of time, as I said, is to the mid-July figure of 15 brigade com- bat teams. We have the concepts to take us beyond that, but as I mentioned in my testimony, I can't—with any confidence or clar- ity—then project beyond that time, other than to say that we will draw down. What I cannot say is the pace of the drawdown, beyond that 15 brigade combat team structure. Senator REED. Ambassador Crocker, to date the nation-building effort in Iraq has faulted, dramatically. It seems the emerging strategy is one based on tribalism. Do you think that is a long-term and appropriate approach to stabilize the country? Ambassador CROCKER. Again, Senator, it's hard to do nation- building or reconciliation in the face of widespread sectarian vio- lence, which has been the situation over the last 18 months. As you've seen from General Petraeus' charts, it's really just been in the last few months that we've seen a significant reduction in that. I think that nation-building, reconciliation in Iraq is going to take a lot of forms. In certain areas, the tribal dimension is key. If you're dealing with Anbar, you're dealing in tribal terms, and what is interesting, and somewhat encouraging to me there, is those tribal elements that have emerged have shown a considerable interest with linking up with the central government in Baghdad. About 10 days ago, the leader of the Anbar Awakening, Sheikh Sittar, came to Baghdad, I spent some time with him, and his main purpose, though, was to meet with the Prime Minister, and estab- lish a relationship, and see what might develop out of that. In other parts of the country, it's going to be a somewhat dif- ferent story. Diyala, for example, the Baqubah area, you have trib- al elements, but given the inner-mixture of Sunni, Shiite, and Kurds—unlike Anbar which is all Sunni-you also have a very complex sectarian element. So, the dynamic is going to work dif- ferently in Diyala. Similarly, in the south, there is a tribal dimension there, it has a different form and shape than the tribal dimension in the pre- dominantly Sunni areas. But there, too, we're seeing some signs of a desire on the part of Southern Shiite tribes, to connect with us, to connect with their own central government in the face of violent extremism practiced by elements of Jaish el-Mahdi. 221 In Baghdad, the tribal dimension is less dominant, although in many areas, still present. But, we're also seeing—as General Petraeus has pointed out, in some Sunni Baghdad districts, the same kind of backlash against al Qaeda, the same desire to step up, and cooperate with our forces, and then to go the next step, for these neighborhood watches to link up with their own central gov- ernment, and come under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. So, again, it's very complex. It's going to vary from place to place. The tribes are part of it, different areas are going to have different dynamics. Senator REED. Thank you. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Now, I'm going to call on Senator Collins. We are in the middle of a roll call vote. There apparently are—how many minutes left, 10 plus 5 left in the roll call vote. After Senator Collins' turn, of 8 minutes, we will automatically stand in recess 20 minutes to give our witnesses a break. They haven't asked for one, but we're going to provide it anyway. [Laughter.] So, Senator Collins, then we'll stand in recess until 20 minutes to 5 p.m. Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I will say that we've had this experience before, for those who were on the Governmental Affairs and Homeland Security Committee, and I hope the vote really iş going to go the full amount of time. Senator WARNER. I'll go down and protect you. Senator COLLINS. I hope I'll be protected on that, since I've never missed a vote. General, Ambassador, let me begin by thanking you for your cou- rageous service. General, you've testified three times now that, “The fundamental source of conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources.” As you've stated in your confirmation hearing—and reaffirmed here today—success in Iraq requires a political, as well as a military, component. So, let's look ahead a year from now. If a year from now the Iraqi Government has still failed to achieve significant political progress, what do we do? How long should we continue to commit American troops, American lives, American treasure, if the Iraqis fail to make political gains that ev- eryone agrees is necessary to quell the sectarian violence? I'm going to ask both you and the Ambassador this question. General PETRAEUS. Senator, if we arrived at that point a year from now, that is something I would have to think very, very, very hard about. That is my honest answer to you right now. That would be a very, very difficult recommendation to make at that point in time. Because, on the one hand, we have very real national interests that extend beyond Iraq. They are true American national interests. On the other hand, there clearly are limits to the blood and treasure that we can expend in an effort. I am keenly aware of that, and, as I've mentioned a couple of times, that awareness did in fact contribute to these recommendations. Senator COLLINS. Ambassador? Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, what I said in my testimony yes- terday and today, is that it is my judgment that cumulative trajec- 222 tory of political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq is upwards, although the slope of that line is not steep. As we move forward, I will be constantly reviewing and assessing—with myself, my team, General Petraeus and members of his command-how we see things developing on the political level. I can't say what I'll be seeing a year or even 6 months from now, but what I can tell you is that I will make the same objective, honest objective, honest as- sessment that I've tried to do for this testimony. Again, if I should—at some future point-come to the judgment that, instead of a slight upward trend, we have a line moving in a downward direction, I'll be clear about it. Senator COLLINS. Ambassador, the first chart that General Petraeus showed us listed the major threats to Iraq. It talked about foreign fighters coming in from Syria, the possibility of Tur- key coming in, and the concern about the Kurdistan Worker's Party. From Iran, we've had lethal aid training and funding, there are also foreign fighters coming in from Saudi Arabia. The Iraq Study Group's major recommendation—in addition to a change of mission—was for a diplomatic surge. To undertake a major diplomatic effort, to involve Iraq's neighbors, and to deal with all of these threats. I know that you have met with the Ira- nians, but there really has not been a consistent, ongoing effort to engage all of Iraq's neighbors. Should we be doing more on the dip- lomatic front? Ambassador CROCKER. It's a great point, Senator, because the re- ality is that while Iraq's problems in their own context are extraor- dinarily difficult, Iraq also exists in a region, and as that slide demonstrates, the neighbors can make a hard situation that much worse. That has to be part of the overall strategy. We're doing two things on that. One is the neighbors initiative, if you will. There was a ministerial meeting in Sharm El Sheikh in May that involved all of Iraq's neighbors, plus the P-5 and the G-8. Since then there have been meetings of three working groups, among the neighbors, to focus on border security, refugees, and en- ergy. We were observers at those. There was a meeting of the neighbors representatives in Bagh- dad, at the level of Ambassadors, on September 9, and there will be another ministerial at the end of October, or the beginning of November in Istanbul. There is also a proposal out there to establish a permanent secre- tariat, so that there will be an ongoing, coordinating mechanism for some of these difficult issues. So, that's at one level. * The other thing we're doing is—and we coordinate together on this—bilateral initiatives—demarches, and capitols, and so forth, and we will continue to do that, as well. Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I am going to go run for the vote. Senator Akaka, I believe is here, and I think-okay, we're going to recess until 4:40, I believe. Thank you very much. General PETRAEUS. Thank you. [Recess.] Chairman LEVIN. The committee will come back to order, and Senator Akaka is next. Senator Akaka. Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 223 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I've been very concerned about placing the responsibility of the new Iraqi Government back in the hands of the Iraqi people. In his speech on January 10, the President said, “I've made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commit- ment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi Government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people, and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act. The Prime Minister must understand this.” The Presi- dent further stated, “America will hold the Iraqi Government to the benchmarks it has announced.” Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, can you explain to me why we are not holding the Iraqi Government accountable for failure to meet their benchmarks, as the President said we would? We've heard reports from the Commission and reports from GAO pointing this out. But we have not heard about what we're going to do about it. I'm asking the question, why are we not holding the Iraqi Government accountable for this? Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, the benchmark exercise, the fail- ure of the Iraqi Government to fully implement a number of the benchmarks has been very frustrating to us, to me personally. It's frustrating to the Iraqis, it's frustrating in the Iraqi Government. These are, in many cases, very complex legislative initiatives that are difficult to do, particularly in conditions of significant violence. It's really been in the last few months that we've actually seen the violence trend down in a substantial way. My own view is that while the benchmarks are clearly impor- tant—while they are Iraq's own benchmarks, they are the ones who established them—the reality has been that in many cases, it has been simply too hard to do as a straight-up, national-level, legisla- tive initiative. That doesn't mean that they should quit, or that we should stop pressing them. Neither is the case. It's a regular part of our discussions with the Iraqi leadership. But I think we have to be realistic here. They haven't been able to do them in the time that they and we agreed they should. They have done, as I dis- cussed earlier, some practical things, creating the effect of bench- marks without having a national-level legislation. We see that in amnesty and de-Baathification and in revenue-sharing, just to mention three. So, I guess the final point I would make, sir, is that we have to keep in mind that benchmarks themselves are a means to an end. That end is reconciliation. If reconciliation is being achieved with- out full implementation of benchmarks, we should not lose sight of that as a measure of progress. Senator AKAKA. General? General PETRAEUS. Senator, let me talk, if I could, about the se- curity-related benchmarks. Frankly, the Iraqis have done better there. They did provide the three brigades worth of forces. Yes, they're not all operational readiness assessment (ORA) #1 because some of them are short equipment, or short NCOS, or something else, but they are in the fight in Baghdad, those forces are there. They are involved. In fact, some of them have really gained a good bit of respect of our coalition forces. Interestingly, one from Basra that is actually operating in the Sunni area. So Shiite, predomi- 227 DEO Senator CHAMBLISS. Is there any consideration given to, or being given to, establishing a larger military presence, in the form of some sort of small base? General PETRAEUS. Sir, there's actually a very large base already at Kut. It's a base that had been used by the Multinational Divi- sion Center South, and that is, in fact, where the Georgian Brigade has deployed. We have a small U.S. headquarters there that works with them as well, a Provincial Reconstruction Team standing up and then some border transition teams also working out of that lo- cation. We may well put a patrol base or a combat outpost just to the west of the border crossing in that area as well to assist and to get eyes on, really, what is being done at that border entry point. Senator CHAMBLISS. My time is up, but I thank both of you again for being very straightforward and honest in your assessment, as well as your presentation over the last 2 days. Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, sir. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. Senator Bill Nelson. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Ambassador, earlier today I asked you about Iran. Does Iran support, in your talks with the Ambassador, do you get any indication that they support the Shiite government in Iraq? Ambassador CROCKER. Their stated policy is to support Iraq's new government and the efforts of that government to build a se- cure, stable, democratic Iraq. Their actions run pretty much to the contrary and that is a fact that the Iraqi Government itself is aware of. The Foreign Minister of Iraq, speaking at a gathering of Iraq's neighbors on Sunday, publicly spoke over his concerns on intervention by the neighbors, by some of the neighbors in Iraq with a negative security impact, and it was clear that he was talk- ing about Iran. So again, you have a stated policy of support that simply is not borne out by reality on the ground. Senator BILL NELSON. General, if I may, earlier in conversation that you had with Senator Reed, the question was raised, can you sustain 130,000 troops, which you have set as a benchmark at the end of next summer. Can you sustain that? You tell me if I'm cor- rect. I understood your answer to be, you would have to be able to sustain that, not with the regular Army, but with the Reserves. General PETRAEUS. No, sir, I was talking about the surge. Had we, if I had requested to extend the surge forces, the Active brigade combat teams in the Army could not, with a 15-month tour lane, have sustained that beyond, again, the 15 months of those par-. ticular deployments. Senator Bill NELSON. Okay. General PETRAEUS. It would have taken forces from another com- ponent, from either the Reserves or the National Guard. I'm just not familiar enough with what the two Services—the Army and Marine Corps—have available in that regard, and I haven't re- quested it. Senator BILL NELSON. As the field commander, do you think that if you have a 15-month requirement for soldiers, that there should be 15 months off? 228 General PETRAEUS. Senator, as I mentioned this morning, what I want as a field commander is the maximum possible, but again, my job is not to determine the dwell time for the Army or the Ma- rine Corps, it really is to establish the requirements for the achievement of the objectives that we are trying to achieve. Senator BILL NELSON. Certainly, I would assume that you would have an opinion on that, because it would affect morale, rest, and recuperation. General PETRAEUS. Sir, again, if I said the longer the better, I mean again, the longer the better, but again, it's just something that's not on my plate. Senator BILL NELSON. Okay, I understand. So, let's assume that Congress enacts a requirement that if you're going to have 15 months in-country, you have to have 15 months that you're not in- country. So now, looking down the road at your goal of 130,000 by the end of next summer, can you sustain that? Can you sustain that 130,000? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I don't know. I'm not- Senator BILL NELSON. You don't know. General PETRAEUS.—again, the service chief, I've seen discus- sions of this. My sense is that we could not, but again, I'm not the one to ask about that, I'm afraid. That's really a question for the Army Chief of Staff. Senator BILL NELSON. We will certainly ask that and there's no mystery that the Reserves and the National Guard had difficulty with regard to enlistments. eral PETRAEUS. Sir, could I clarify one point as well? Because that is—again, I'm not sitting here saying we're going to sit at 130,000 again, what I have said is that we will continue to come down. What I don't know is what recommendation I can make about the slope of that line, if you will. Senator BILL NELSON. Correct me if I'm wrong, I clearly got the impression this morning that you think what we will have is 130,000 of our U.S. troops over there by the end of next summer. General PETRAEUS. Sir, what I have said is we will have 15 bri- gade combat teams and then we'll have to shape what the rest of the force is at that time because we've actually had to bring some additional forces in above and beyond this because of detainee op- erations, IED Task Force, and some other things that are there. What I want to do is to get as low as we can. I've already charged the chief of staff of the MNF-I to pull together the teams, to start determining where we can achieve savings and combining of the two headquarters, the logistics, a whole host of other areas, wherever we can, we want to send folks home, and not keep them over in Iraq. Senator BILL NELSON. Can you venture a guess or a wish- General PETRAEUS. Sir, I have not- Senator BILL NELSON.—by the end of the year? Not this year, the end of— General PETRAEUS. I cannot, sir. Senator BILL NELSON.—after the summer? General PETRAEUS. I cannot, sir. Again, what I've said is that, with any confidence at all, I cannot predict the level of the contin- ued force drawdown beyond that point in mid-July. But that's what 229 I've pledged to do, is to assess that and make a determination, rec- ommendations no later than mid-March. Senator Bill NELSON. Of course, a lot of that would depend on whether or not there's political reconciliation. General PETRAEUS. That's an important factor, both nationally and locally, and other factors as well, obviously. Senator BILL NELSON. Do you see any indication, thus far, of po- litical reconciliation? General PETRAEUS. What I've seen, again, as I mentioned earlier, Senator, is the Prime Minister himself, in his office, reaching out again, to Sunnis in Anbar Province—we haven't talked at all about what he did in Salah ad Din Province. We actually flew him up to Tikrit the other day, he got off, went and met with a number of Sheiks up there, and have a similar initiative to what has gone on in Anbar Province. Now, it's going to take a while for that to reach critical mass, it's at the very early stages. But that is an important accommodation, if you will, and it is a tangible representation of a form of national reconciliation, short of, certainly, the legislative items that represent national reconciliation. We've talked about the fact that there's no oil revenue-sharing law, but there is oil revenue-sharing going on. It's actually pretty decent. In fact, when I left Iraq in 2005, the provinces had no budg- ets whatsoever. I came back in the early part of this year. They ac- tually had fairly substantial budgets and, in fact, even better, be- cause last year they didn't spend them. They didn't spend about $10 billion. This year they're spending them, which—and again, in a country that is really a command economy in many respects, cer- tainly there's some free market areas, but the government spend- ing is just hugely important in Iraq, because that is what does so much good for the people in a country with an enormous social safety net, but one that has had a lot of holes torn in that safety net because of the sectarian violence, sectarian activities, and so forth. Senator BILL NELSON. Looks like my time is up. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Senator Graham. Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm not so sure 2 days of this is Geneva Convention-compliant, but we'll keep going. Let's just put on the table as honestly as we can, what lies ahead for the American people and the U.S. military if we continue to stay in Iraq. Now, I know you can't predict with certainty the num- bers we're going to have, but can you agree with this statement, General Petraeus? It's highly likely that a year from now, we're going to have at least 100,000 troops in Iraq. General PETRAEUS. That is probably the case, yes, sir. tor GRAHAM. Okay. How many people have we been losing a month, on average, since the surge began, in terms of killed in action? General PETRAEUS. Killed in action is probably in the neighbor- hood of 60 to 90, probably on average 80 to 90, average, killed in action. Senator GRAHAM. Right. General PETRAEUS. That does not include the American soldiers, for example, tragically killed last month in a helicopter accident. 230 Senator GRAHAM. But here's what lies ahead for the American military. If we stay in Iraq and continue to support the surge through July, we're going to lose somewhere in the neighborhood of 60 military members, most likely hundreds more. General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Senator GRAHAM. We're spending $9 billion a month to stay in Iraq, of U.S. dollars. My question for you, is it worth it to us? General PETRAEUS. The national interests that we have in Iraq are substantial. An Iraq that is stable and secure, that is not an al Qaeda sanctuary, is not in the grips of Iranian-supported Shiite militia, that is not a bigger humanitarian disaster, that is con- nected to the global economy, all of these are very important na- tional interests. Senator GRAHAM. Would that be a yes? General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Sorry. Senator GRAHAM. So you're saying to Congress that you know that at least 60 soldiers, airmen, or marines are likely to be killed every month from now to July, that we're going to spend $9 billion a month of American taxpayers' dollars, and when it's all said and done, we'll still have 100,000 people there. You believe it's worth it, in terms of our national security interests, to pay that price? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I wouldn't be here and wouldn't have made the recommendations that I have made if I did not believe that. Senator GRAHAM. Don't you think most soldiers who are there understand what lies ahead for them, too? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I believe that's the case and I have dis- cussed the reenlistment rates there. They know the sacrifice that may be required of them during the tour of their next enlistment. Senator GRAHAM. Knowing what's coming their way, how is mo- rale? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I, as a general characterization, let me just say that it's solid. Because, and you've heard this before, I be- lieve that morale is an individual thing. Morale is the kind of day that you are having. If you lost a buddy that day, if I was the com- mander, if we have sustained losses that day, it's not a good day and morale's not great. But that doesn't mean that you don't have enormous determination and commitment to this very, very impor- tant endeavor, one which they all recognize as hugely important to our country. I think that one reason that they do reenlist, it's not just these tax-free bonuses, trust me. Those are wonderful, we are very grateful to Congress for funding those, but this is about con- tinuing to commit yourself to something that is bigger than self. Senator GRAHAM. General, I hear this statement more than any other statement from troops. “The reason I'm here is I don't want my kids to have to come back.” Do you hear that? General PETRAEUS. I do, sir. I have a kid who, as you heard,- Senator GRAHAM. Who's going to go, probably. General PETRAEUS.—pin jumplings on and he may well. Yes, sir. Senator GRAHAM. There's no “may well.” He'll either be in Iraq or Afghanistan. You know that, don't you? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I do. 232 the global economy, depending on what happens, obviously, with the flow of oil. Senator GRAHAM. Why do you think Bin Laden's so worried about the outcome in Iraq? General PETRAEUS. I think again as I mentioned earlier, it has been regarded by al Qaeda Senior Leadership, AQSL, as the cen- tral front. They are trying to give us a bloody nose, which would be an enormous shot of adrenaline in the arm of international jihadists. If they had a sanctuary that close, where they could, again, export elsewhere, I don't know what would happen, in terms of the fighters who are there, whether they would then turn to Af- ghanistan in a bigger way or go to source countries or—again, that's a good question for the intelligence folks. But a lot of these scenarios are obviously pretty grim. Senator GRAHAM. Thank you both for your service. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. Senator Ben Nelson. Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me add my appreciation, publicly, to you both for your serv- ice. Before the surge in Baghdad, do we know what the mix was of residents of Sunnis, Shiites, and others, approximately? General PETRAEUS. What we have, Senator, is a map that shows reasonably where there were predominantly Sunni, predominantly Shiite, predominantly mixed, and we have continued to track that. Tragically, one of the outcomes of the ethno-sectarian violence has been hardening of those certain areas into either more exclusively Shiite or Sunni and the diminution of some of the mixed neighbor- hoods. Senator BEN NELSON. In addition, has it resulted in a loss of Sunni residents in Baghdad, as well? General PETRAEUS. There have been displacements of Sunnis from Baghdad, throughout the sectarian violence and of course, again, this is why we have focused on that subset that I mentioned, of overall deaths, the ethno-sectarian deaths, because that is the cancer that just keeps eating at the fabric of Iraqi society and it won't stop if it is not stopped. It's not going to stop until something does, in fact, stop it. In this case, it is coalition and Iraqi forces sta- bilizing those neighborhoods and then trying to achieve a sustain- able situation for the way ahead. Senator BEN NELSON. Do we know what the percentage of loss of Sunnis is, in the Baghdad area? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I don't have the- Senator BEN NELSON. Is it a 10 percent, 20 percent loss? General PETRAEUS. I could not hazard a guess. There have been substantial Sunni-Arab displacement from Baghdad. There has also been a tragic displacement of Assyrian Christians from Bagh- dad. Those two probably most of all. Senator BEN NELSON. Out of the south, out of the southern Shi- ite region as well, it's my understanding there's been an exodus of Christians from the south. Were you aware of that? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I am less aware of that and more aware of the challenges to Assyrian Christians in Baghdad and also in some of their former areas in northern Iraq. 234 benchmarks, we should try to evaluate whether or not they're achieving success. Would you agree that there are three things that you need to look for, in connection with that? Is there a commitment to do it? Is there effort being made to do it? Because it's quite possible there's a commitment and there's effort, but the results become more difficult, because as you both have said, Iraq is hard. It's hard for us, and it's obviously hard for that government. But, can we make that analysis, is there commitment to reconciliation? I've talked to some, and I've heard from others that they question whether that is the case. It's “winner-take-all” in many respects. Now, you're suggesting, General, that the Prime Minister's getting outside of Baghdad and going into other areas, I think that's a very positive, positive step. But isn't it the case that in Iraq they're going to have to have a Sunni, a Shiite, or a Kurd somewhere in the top position. While they may not believe that they get an honest broker, will they be satisfied with an effective broker, that seeks equity among all of the groups. Is that fair? Ambassador CROCKER. That's a great point. There has been ef- fort—the trip with the Prime Minister up to Tikrit, Saddam's old hometown, additional budgetary resources for Anbar, and the visit of the Shiite Vice President and the Kurdish Deputy Prime Min- ister to Anbar, illustrate that. Then going to your main point there. The question came up ear- lier as to whether the reports were true that when Prime Minister Maliki visited Ayatollah Sistani a few days ago, that he had raised the possibility of a technocratic cabinet. The minister's chosen—not because of their sectarian or ethnic identify, but because of their ability to do their jobs. Senator BEN NELSON. That would be more equitable in dealing with the people—would you agree? Ambassador CROCKER. Absolutely, sir. One thing we have seen is a lot of frustration among the Iraqis, and even within the Iraqi Government, over where this heavy focus on sectarian and ethnic balance in cabinet has taken the country, in terms o ernance. So, if it has brought them to the level of frustration, where the key leaders are prepared to say, “Good governance is more impor- tant than strict sectarian and ethnic balance.” That I would con- sider progress. Senator BEN NELSON. You used the word “if several times there, so I suspect that it's hypothetical at the moment, but hope for re- sults in the future. Finally, let me say that as we look at the surge, several of us didn't necessarily support the surge going into Baghdad. I think I communicated that when we met. No reservations about going into al Anbar with the surge. What are your thoughts about transitioning the mission out of Baghdad, in terms of the troops for over a 6-month period to draw- down-out of Baghdad, not withdrawing or anything of that sort, but standing up the combat-capable troops that Iraq has, to begin to take over that responsibility, so that they can secure themselves, 235 they can govern themselves. Again, if not, it's not going to be very difficult. Then, make the mission stronger in going after the bad guys in the north, where we're having cooperation from the local Sheiks, tribal leaders, and others. Also, because as we've driven al Qaeda and the bad guys out of Baghdad, they've gone elsewhere, go after them. Then go to the south and work diligently to get the local forces there, to work with us in reducing the sectarian violence, and the other violence that just comes from Shiite versus Shiite to the constant militias. What are your thoughts about that suggestion? General PETRAEUS. Senator, as I mentioned, the title of the rec- ommendations, if you will, "Security While Transitioning,” captures the idea that we certainly want to hand off as quickly as we can. But, as was stated in the December 2006 assessment that was done by Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey, when they deter- mined that the effort at that time was failing to achieve the objec- tives, the emphasis that it put on was reducing the sectarian vio- lence, in Baghdad in particular—because of that being the center of gravity for so much of Iraq. So, what we want to do, certainly, is to try to achieve sustainable situations in these neighborhoods, and then obviously to hand off over time. I don't think that we need to put U.S. forces in southern prov- inces, other than, say, some SOF teams or occasionally sending something down to help out. But, by and large, in the south what we want to do there is to develop these special units, if you will, in each province—and every province has them, the special tactics unit in Nasiriyah, for example, which is supported by one of our SOF teams, although they don't live with it, but when that unit, on occasion, a couple of times in the last, I don't know, 6 or 7 months has needed some assistance, and then our team links up with it, if it's close air support or what have you, unmanned vehicle or whatever it may be it provides that enabler, but otherwise that force on the ground has been capable of doing what it's needed to do. We're trying to do that in other areas, as well, without increasing the conventional combat footprint in those particular areas. Senator BEN NELSON. In the process of doing that, it's quite like- ly that your force needs will reduce in Iraq. What are your thoughts in terms of having a second piece of that phasing-out of Baghdad, also establishing the residual force that is going to be there for a significant period of time, as in the case of Korea, Japan, and Germany—I don't know that it's time to establish what it is in its entirety—but moving to the borders for border protec- tion, protecting our assets there, both the private assets of the con- tractors that are rebuilding, protecting the Iraqi Government and continuing to support them in the development of their security forces—including, perhaps as the Jones Commission report said, firing all of their police officers and starting over. It's a major job, but it's going to be an ongoing job for a long time, and could re- quire a smaller force, ultimately, which I think would enable a re- duction in the number that are there, take pressure off the oper- ational tempo, to get to a level where it is sustainable in the fu- ture. 236 General PETRAEUS. Sir, the CENTCOM Headquarters, my boss Admiral Fallon—and with, very much, our support from the MNF- I staff, because we're frankly where a lot of the expertise, needless to say, resides—did a recent look at the request of the Secretary of Defense at what a long-term force might look like, literally, that down at the lower end there in that stair-step that you saw. So, we have looked at that, looked at the force mix, looked at the task mix, and so forth—the challenge is getting there from here, and trying to do it as expeditiously as we can, but again without rushing to failure along the way. Senator BEN NELSON. I think we'll have to leave that there. Thank you. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Senator Dole. Senator DOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, you're coming up on 8 hours of testimony, today alone. I thank you very much for your excellent presentations, and I thank you both for your tremendous service, and your leadership in our country. Let me say at the outset that all of us here, and all Americans, want to see our brave young men and women come home as soon as possible. My home State of North Carolina, for example, has 37,000 currently-deployed troops, a total of 151,000 personnel have been deployed. Our shared heartfelt concerns in the Senate for our troops and for the safety and security of our country should draw us toward consensus. But, as we all know, a conspicuous gap exists between two policy positions—namely, a long-term military com- mitment on the one hand, and mandated withdrawal on the other. Gentlemen, we must seek common ground based on a set of shared principles. A growing number of our fellow Americans oppose a long-term U.S. military commitment. At the same time, many understand the profoundly negative long-term security implications for our coun- try, and for the Middle East of a premature withdrawal, before Iraqi security forces are able to independently conduct security op- erations across their country. The difficulty of the current American and Iraqi situation is root- ed, in large part, in the Bush administration's substantial failure to understand the full implications of our military invasion, and the litany of mistakes made at the outset of the war. Regardless, our task must be to see the way forward, to agree upon a policy that the majority of Americans will support, and one that provides the American and Iraqi people with the greatest op- portunity for success. I believe that a requisite level of security must be a precondition for political reconciliation, and we know that security has improved in substantial areas of the country. The continued failure of the Maliki Government to achieve reconciliation, and the fact that cur- rent U.S. force levels are not sustainable beyond next spring, com- pels me to support what some have called “action-forcing meas- ures.” General Petraeus, I strongly agree with your recommendation to begin withdrawal of the equivalent of six brigades between this month and next July. I would hope—consistent with your security 238 have critical equities on how things turn out in Iraq, and are mov- ing beyond the state they've been in for the last several years, of just not wanting to engage to accepting that, the outcomes are im- portant to them, and they can affect the outcomes. General PETRAEUS. Senator, Jordan, first of all, has always been really quite supportive, and has worked very hard to limit foreign fighter flow to ensure that support for al Qaeda is disrupted as much as possible from there. Syria may have taken some steps against some of the foreign fighter facilitators in its country—it is something that we are literally looking at very hard to see how much they have done. But, they do recognize, we believe, that al Qaeda poses a very serious threat to them. That, should al Qaeda have success in Iraq, the next one you turn on might be that mi- nority government in Damascus. We see signs that they recognize that, and have taken some steps, again, to make it more difficult. As the Ambassador mentioned, some of the source countries have made it more difficult for military-aged males also to travel on a one-way plane ticket to Damascus. But again, the more that can be done in that regard, or at large, in any way, to limit the flow of individuals from source countries through Syria, in particular, into Iraq, is something that helps Iraq enormously. Because a num- ber of these end up being the suicide bombers that have created such horrific casualties on certain occasions in Iraq. nator DOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Dole, thank you. Senator Bayh. Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you. I want to express my appreciation for your service to our country. In a democracy, having a dialogue like this, questioning your rec- ommendations, even your judgment, is entirely appropriate. I don't believe that questioning your integrity is. So I appreciate your can- dor, and your service, and your presence here today. Let me begin—you've had to go for 8 hours, this is our fourth hearing over the last several days—we heard from the GAO, from General Jones, we heard about the NIE, and now we have the ben- efit of your thinking. Let me give you what I have concluded is the collective bottom line in all of this, and get your response. The bottom line in all of this is, the American people particularly our service men and women, but also our taxpayers—will be required to continue to sac- rifice in Iraq for an indefinite period of time to allow Iraqi politi- cians to get their act together to make the tough decisions that only they can make to hopefully begin the process of reconciliation. What's your reaction to that? Ambassador CROCKER. There is a process underway that we've talked about in the course of the afternoon. It's bottom-up, to some degree, it's top-down to some degree, and it's linkages between them. It's the beginnings, if you will, of a reconciliation process that obviously needs to go much farther, if it is to carry Iraq to a position of security and stability over the long run. Senator BAYH. Ambassador, there's a question behind my obser- vation, and you mentioned the process, bottom-up, top-down, so let me get to it. 239 For several years now, the progress has not been adequate, I think we'd all agree on that. The theory has been, “Look, i k, insecure people don't make hard decisions. We need to try to increase their confidence, their security, so that perhaps they'll begin to make the hard decisions.” It just doesn't seem to have worked that way. They dither, they delay, and so we face this dilemma. If we stand by them, they tend to take our support for granted, and seem a little more comforted by that, and don't make the hard decisions. Yet, your advice as I understand it is timelines would not be helpful. So, my direct question to you is—what about accountability for taking these hard steps? What about consequences if they don't? Sixty to 70 troops every month, $9 billion to $12 billion every month—they're not doing what they need to do, when do we say, enough already? Have some consequences when they don't? Ambassador CROCKER. Again, it's important to bear in mind the recent past—2006 up through early 2007 was an extremely bad pe- riod in Iraq, and not only were things not moving forward, they were sliding back, in political terms, economic terms, and above all, security terms. Iraq came pretty close, I think, to just unraveling in the course of that year that began with the February bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra. Senator BAYH. There is some history in Iraq before that time- frame you just mentioned, and they weren't making progress then, either. Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, the challenges are immense, the failures are there, too, on the Iraqi side. It is frustrating to me, I'm out there. We are pushing them constantly in all sorts of ways. But, I have to be honest—this is going to take more time. Senator BAYH. I think we all need to be honest with ourselves, Ambassador, and I've appreciated the General's comments about modesty in making predictions is in order, and overe our ability to control events needs to be guarded against. Isn't it possible, at the end of the day, in spite of all of our efforts, support and encouragement—this just may be beyond them, for a variety of reasons outside interference, historic enmities, a lack of leader- ship, all of those kinds of things. Don't we constantly need to be evaluating their capabilities and whether they can get this done, to justify the continuing sacrifices that we're making? Ambassador CROCKER. I think, clearly, that's the case. We're here before you today to give our best assessments in four lines of operation, where we see things standing now. Senator BAYH. What you're hearing from a lot of us is, so often these last several years, we've tried to give their political leader- ship the benefit of the doubt, and now only doubt remains. So there we are. General, I hope—but I think you have to be a little skeptical about it at this point, too, and that's why I come down on the side of consequences, some accountability, because a gentle encourage- ment doesn't seem to have gotten the results that we want, if in fact, they can be gotten. General, I'd like to turn to you, I thought you had an excellent, very candid response to Senator Warner's questions, and that was-he asked you, going forward, the recommendations that you're making, will that make America safer? You said that you 242 me—and, in fact, all Members of the United States Senate—will join together, without regard to partisan affiliation, and condemn this ad, and restate our confidence in General Petraeus, the same confidence that was manifested when he was confirmed by a unani- mous vote of the United States Senate this last January. It's a pretty tough environment, I know you're working in Iraq- it's a pretty tough environment here, in Washington, in another way. General, when you were confirmed in January, you were an- nounced not only as a new leader there, you announced a new strategy in Iraq, something people had been calling for, for a long time. People had been asking for some signs of progress in the se- curity situation. You've come back here today as the Jones Com- mission did last week, as did the NIE did in August, and report that some security progress being made in Iraq, positive news in any other context. You've announced here today that you would likely recommend significant cuts in troops over the next year—something that peo- ple in this room and on Capitol Hill have been calling for, for a long time. You would, again, think that that would be met with some appreciation, some gladness. Ambassador, there have been those who have said that we weren't doing enough to talk to the people in the neighborhood, Iran, Syria, and others. Indeed, since that time since January, since General Petraeus was confirmed—that's happened, and you've reported on that. Here again, something I would think that would be met with an appreciation for the progress, or at least the effort that entails. Then, of course, there were those, General, that announced short- ly after the President announced the surge of troops into Iraq, they announced it a failure, or predicted a failure at the outset, before the surge had even occurred, and I guess it just goes to show that it's a bad bet to bet against the men and women of the United States military, because it has demonstrated some significant suc- cesses. So, I guess this is an unusual case, General and Ambassador, where you come bringing what otherwise might be regarded as good news, or at least progress, and it's the first case I've seen, I guess, of shooting the messenger for bringing good news. It's a strange time we find ourselves in, it's a strange environment here in Washington. But my question, what I want to ask you about in particular, are the consequences of failure. Because it seems to me there, too often, is a debate in the abstract about what's happening. General, you've already said that you believe what we're doing in Iraq is making us safer here at home, but I would like to ask, if we em- braced the suggestion of some, here on Capitol Hill, that we would pull out our troops before the Iraqis are able to govern and defend themselves, what the consequences would be? I know we've talked about providing a failed state, a power vacuum into which al Qaeda would fill, you've talked about Iran. But, in particular, I'd like to get your assessment General, and Ambassador, about the humani- tarian crisis that would like occur. Could you speak to that, please? General first? 243 General PETRAEUS. Senator, first of all, there has already been a humanitarian crisis in Iraq. The estimates run as high as 2 mil- lion that have left the country, and perhaps that number that has been displaced within the country. So, this is already a tragic situa- tion. One of our areas of focus has, as I mentioned, been to try to sta- bilize and to reduce the ethno-sectarian violence that is really the engine of that displacement. Some of that has continued. Some has risen to the level of cleansing. But in many areas, again, it has sta- bilized it, and has kept it from continuing. Because, this is not something, again, that just stops of its own accord. It doesn't reach the highway to the airport, let's say, and say, “That's it.” It then hops over and keeps on going. So, that has been a big effort, and we have a lot more work to do in that regard, as I mentioned up front, very clearly. We're not at a point that is at all satisfactory, but the trend line, again, is good. But, the level to which that could go if it got out of hand again, and got even worse, obviously could be horrific. Senator CORNYN. I believe the figures I recall, off the top of my head, about genocide in Darfur, roughly 400,000 people killed there. Would this be, would rival or exceed the magnitude of that sort of death by ethnic cleansing? Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, it's obviously very difficult to predict. My previous experience, for example, in Lebanon in the early 1980s, I was there at the time of the massacres and the Palestinian camps following our withdrawal in 1982. When those massacres took place, I knew that some very bad consequences were likely to be set in train, but I couldn't have begun to predict where we'd be a year later, for example, with the resurgence of Hezbollah, and the bombing of both the embassy and the Marine barracks with hor- rendous consequences for us. I had a failure of imagination. I don't think in the intervening years, my imagination has gotten any more accurate or strong. But, I would be very concerned that in a context in which the United States was seen to be definitely backing away—and backing sense that projected a signal in Iraq and elsewhere that we were not coming back, there's not going to be a second surge, it's over for us, I think the prospects of a truly catastrophic hu- manitarian disaster would be considerable. Senator CORNYN. In the order of hundreds of thousands, or mil- lions? Ambassador CROCKER. It could be that, sir. Because it could be a situation that would be so, so dramatic, that it would bring in neighboring states. Then you would have a failed state. You would have, basically, a meltdown inside Iraq, and the ensuing violence within Iraq, plus ambitions of some of Iraq's neighbors, like Iran, could bring these states in, and we could be looking at regional con- flict, as well as a horrific humanitarian disaster. I can't say that's going to happen, I can't predict that's going to happen, but it cer- tainly is something that could happen. Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LEVIN. Senator Cornyn, thank you. Senator Clinton. 244 Senator CLINTON. I want to thank both of you, General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, for your long and distinguished service to our Nation. Nobody believes that your jobs or the jobs of the thousands of American forces and civilian personnel in Iraq are anything but incredibly difficult. But today you are testifying about the current status of our pol- icy in Iraq, and the prospects of that policy. It is a policy that you have been ordered to implement by the President, and you have been made the de facto spokesman for what many of us believe to be a failed policy. Despite what I view as your rather extraordinary efforts in your testimony both yesterday and today, I think that the reports that you provide to us really require the willing suspension of disbelief. In any of the metrics that have been referenced in your many hours of testimony, any fair reading of the advantages and dis- advantages accruing post-surge, in my view, end up on the down- side. I started my morning today at ground zero in New York City, where once again, the names of the nearly 3,000 victims of the at- tack on our country were read solemnly in the rain. We have seen Osama bin Laden reappear on our television sets, essentially taunting us. We have the most recent reports out of Germany of terrorists plotting against American assets who have been trained in Pakistan. We get very little comfort from the fact that the mas- termind of that mass murder is at large, neither captured nor killed, and that the Taliban and al Qaeda are resurging in Afghani- stan, and their network is certainly-if not tightly organized, a loose confederacy—that has grave consequences for us. With respect to Anbar province, a lot has been made of the coali- tion's work with the Sheiks, but that was going on before the surge. General, in your testimony during your confirmation hear- ings, you referenced the fact that the Sheiks were coming over, that there was already a decision by a lot of the tribal leaders that they would no longer tolerate the extraordinary brutality of the al Qaeda elements in al Anbar province. With respect to violence in Iraq, although the charts tell part of the story, I don't think they tell the whole story. If you look at all of the evidence that's been presented, overall civilian deaths have risen. The number of car bombings is higher. May was the dead- liest month in 2007 with 1,901 civilian deaths. American military casualties are greater in every month in 2007 than in the same month in 2006, leaving us with a total thus far, through August, of 739 Americans killed. The Iraqi reconciliation process is now described as relying on bottom's up efforts, which are anecdotal, which have very little hard evidence to support what needs to be accomplished. Senator Warner's very specific questions of what is happening from top- down, certainly lead to the conclusion that not very much is occur- ring that can give us comfort that the Iraqi leadership is yet ready to put aside their sectarian, commercial, and personal interests for some kind of greater Iraqi political reconciliation. Iraqi public opinion, according to an ABC, BBC, NHK poll re- leased September 10, shows that since the escalation began, Iraqi opinion has starkly turned against the occupation, as most Iraqis 245 see deepening dissatisfaction with conditions in Iraq, lower ratings for the national government, growing rejection of the U.S. role there. For example, 65 to 70 percent of Iraqis say the escalation has worsened, rather than improved, security. Thirty-nine percent say their lives are going well, down from 71 percent in November 2005, and 47 percent now favor immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces, a 12 point rise since March. Overwhelming majorities give negative ratings to electricity, jobs, and access to health care. e you tremendous credit for presenting as positive a view of a rather grim reality, and I believe that you and certainly the very capable people working with both of you, were dealt a very hard hand. It's a hand that's unlikely to improve, in my view. General, I want to ask you about what appeared to be a con- tradiction in your testimony. Earlier today you were asked by Sen- ator Biden if, in fact, the circumstances on the ground are exactly what they are today in March of next year, will you recommend the continuation of somewhere between 130,000 and 160,00 troops being shot at, killed, and maimed every day. Your answer, "I would be hard-pressed to recommend that at that point in time.” In response to Senator Collins, who asked, I thought, a very im- portant question about what if, in a year from now, there has b very little progress, your answer was, “Well, we would have to con- sider what to do at that time.” General, don't you think the Amer- ican people deserve a very specific answer about what is expected from our country in the face of the failure of the Iraqi Government to pursue its own required political agenda, that they have essen- tially been unwilling or incapable of doing so? General PETRAEUS. Senator, I don't see quite as big a difference in the answer, but I will stand by the answer that I gave earlier, which is that I would be very hard-pressed at that time to rec- ommend a continuation. This policy is a national policy that results from policies put for- ward at one end of Pennsylvania Avenue with the advice and con- sent and resources provided at the other. I would, obviously, pro- vide recommendations to that. Again, I would just say, I would be very hard-pressed, at that time—it's an awfully big hypothetical, and it is not something that I would want to try to determine right here, right now, about a year from now without having some sense of all of the other variables, that I think, understandably, would go into a huge recommendation like that. Senator CLINTON. Ambassador, it's not only the Iraqi Govern- ment that, in my view, has failed to pursue a coherent strategy, I think our own has, as well. You've been tasked—as I understand it—with carrying the only contact with the Iranians and others in the region, and many of us have long-advocated that our govern- ment needed to be much more engaged in a robust diplomatic ef- fort. Do you believe that if the full force and effect of the American government were brought to bear on the region, and more broadly on countries that have a stake in the future of Iraq, even beyond the region, that there was some process established that could begin to try to sort out what was or wasn't possible, that that would be an additional benefit to your efforts, going forward in Iraq? 246 Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, engaging the region and the international community more broadly in support of Iraq is impor- tant. That is ongoing and it's accelerating. This fall we'll have at least two ministerial-level meetings on Iraq, the one that I men- tioned involving the neighbors, plus the P-5 and the G-8 in Istanbul, and then in a little less than 2 weeks, in New York, the Secretary General of the U.N. and Prime Minister Maliki will joint- ly chair an international ministerial-level meeting to review progress on the international compact with Iraq, and also to focus on how the new U.N. mandate for Iraq, the expanded mandate for Iraq, can most effectively be implemented. So, I think we're seeing an increase in regional and international diplomacy in support of Iraq. We're also starting to see, I think, some change in attitudes. I talked a little bit earlier about some positive developments among some of Iraq's Arab neighbors. I think we're also seeing a new look at Iraq on the part of at least some of the European states. During a 10-day period, for example, at the end of August, we had the visits of Bernard Kouchner, the Foreign Minister of France, and then right after that, Carl Bildt, Foreign Minister of Sweden—the first time, really, since 2003, we have seen major Eu- ropean states send their foreign ministers into Iraq to assess where Iraq is, and how they can, perhaps, more effectively engage for the future. So, I think we're seeing that kind of diplomatic initiative now gain some further momentum. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Clinton. Senator Thune. Senator THUNE. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your ex- traordinary service, and thank you for your indulgence in being here today. I know both of you, Ambassador and General, are run- ners. I know, General, you are a marathon runner, and I want you to know that when you get to this point at the dais at a hearing, you're like on mile 23 in a marathon, you're almost there. We ap- preciate very much your patience. also want to convey our appreciation to the men and women who serve under your command. Please let them know how grate- ful we are for their service. They are the best of the best. What I would like to do, General, is Senator Graham asked a question about the morale of our troops over there, which you an- swered—and by the way, your testimony here and report has prob- ably been the most hyped event in this city for a long time. Many of us for months now, have been saying that we're waiting to hear this report, and I will have to say that you have not disappointed. Your report has been full, it's been comprehensive, it's been factual, it has been objective and independent, and you've not sugar-coated things. I think that we appreciate very much your willingness to give us an assessment, an honest assessment on where things stand. I want to hone in on the whole question of the Iraqi troops, in general, what is the morale of the Iraqi troops? Are they taking ownership of this mission? General PETRAEUS. As I mentioned in the testimony, sir, there is an unevenness to it. The Iraqi forces range from extremely good 247 to high-end, Iraqi SOF brigade with a counter-terrorist force com- mando battalion that is now multiplying. The National Emergency Response Unit, the Special Tactics Unit—these forces are abso- lutely superb, they are in operation just about every night, if not more—and every day—and we are now positioning them around the country, as well, including some in Basra. There are other special forces in just about each of the provinces. Again, as I mentioned in many cases, how our own SOF teams work with them, and those are viewed very highly, as well. The Army, by and large, a professional force, national force, again-by and large and performing credibly and in a number of areas, in many cases, literally by themselves already, regardless of their ORA. Again, that does not hold up the provincial Iraqi control process completely, it is a factor in it, but in many cases those forces are doing quite well. Then it goes all the way down to—as you heard from General Jones' Commission concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements still in the national police. We continue to have con- cerns about several of the units there . Again, we have raised those to the Prime Minister, those are—and the Minister of Interior- really, who is grappling with this issue, and working their way through the change-out of leaders, the retraining of a number of the organizations, and now even bringing in the Italian Carabinieri to train some of them. At some point, there may be a point at which some of those units will have to be disestablished, that is certainly not where Iraq wants to go right now, given just the sheer need for forces and for boots on the ground in a host of dif- ferent areas, which is one reason why they're expanding so rapidly. But, so again, it runs the gamut-all the way and there is a sub- stantial effort ongoing to improve the leader development in the Iraqi security forces to build the institutional structures that are, frankly, very hard to build, the military academies, junior and sen- ior staff colleges, war colleges, and these may not sound all that exciting, but they are the types of institutional assets that have made our own Army and Marine Corps and other Services the truly professional forces that they are, and it takes that level of in- vestment. That is ongoing, but again, it is something that does take time. It just doesn't spring out of the desert floor with infrastruc- ture and structures and all of the support for it. But that is ongo- ing. Senator THUNE. The first time I met with you was in Iraq, I think, back in February 2005 when you were leading the training mission there. I think you talked about the need to build leader- ship capacity within the Iraqi security forces. General PETRAEUS. Right. Senator THUNE. But that-are they, to me, this doesn't work until that really happens. Is that happening? General PETRAEUS. It is happening, but frankly, some of this took a step backward-in some cases a substantial step back- ward-during the height of the sectarian violence. When certain units, literally, were taken over by sectarian interests, and became part of the problem instead of part of the solution. Retrieving some of those units is still ongoing in some cases, and again, of course, a big part of that had to be to reduce the level of sectarian 248 and threats, and so forth, so that these individuals didn't feel as though they had to side with one or the other, but could be truly professional, all commissioned and NCOs. That is something, again, that Prime Minister Maliki is very much concerned about confronting and dealing with. In fact, as I mentioned earlier, replacing wholesale, the facility protection secu- rity force that guarded the medical city. So, there are numerous challenges out there like that, but there are also just dozens and dozens of Army battalions and special op- erations units in particular, that are doing very credible work, and are very much going after the enemy. I mentioned the example of the unit in Mosul that killed the Emir of Mosul with its own intel- ligence, in fact, it was actually the intelligence officer who we be- lieve was the one that fired the shot that did kill this individual where there was a confrontation. Senator THUNE. I know that they've prevented some attacks in Mosul, they have acted rapidly in restoring security in Karbala, they've had some successes, and I guess my question is—if and when the Iraqi security forces are ready to take responsibility for the security of Iraq, if that happens before the political process has yielded a political solution, is our job done there? General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, let me just- Senator THUNE. Those aren't on the same tracks. General PETRAEUS. Sure, let me just be clear—they have already taken over. Senator THUNE. In some areas. General PETRAEUS. Again, in these provinces that have transitioned to provincial Iraqi control, there are no coalition forces in Maysan Province, Muthanna, Karbala, Najaf and some others. Karbala will go to provincial Iraqi control in about a month. Then there are some others who are very much, certain areas where we still have to be in the lead. Again, we can hand off as long as that local situation is suffi- ciently connected to Baghdad to enable us to do that. That's what we have done, again, in a number of cases, regardless of the fact that there may not be the agreement on the laws that we see as so important to ultimate national reconciliation. But, the fact is, there's a Ministry of Defense, there's a Ministry of Interior, there are varying degrees of functionality in different areas, and cer- tainly, we're still having to help a great deal on the logistical arena, especially, because that's just proven very difficult. Senator THUNE. I understand that, and I know we've made head- way, and I know that there are areas that are now totally under the control of the Iraqi security forces, and in some cases we're in the lead and they're supporting, or they're in the lead and we're supporting. But, I guess the bigger question is, is the mission complete when they can take over the fight, even if the political component, if we haven't gotten some Western-style democracy imposed in terms of a political solution there are we done? Is that where we can say, "mission accomplished”? General PETRAEUS. Again, it depends how far along you are. I think we obviously have to have some degree of confidence that it wouldn't unravel. So, again, I think you have to ask where are we? 250 the EFPs, and some mortars, to items that certainly may have come from the Saddam weapons storage sites, or have come in from other countries over time. Senator PRYOR. I assume you're seeing a fairly healthy mix of Iranian weapons caches? General PETRAEUS. Again, there are certain ones that are signa- ture weapons, without question—the EFPs. The rockets, mortars, the rest is, it's just hard to tell where it came from. Senator PRYOR. I understand, okay. Let me ask about the second graph I wanted to ask about and that's your Iraqi security forces capabilities, and that's number 12. Down at the bottom this, in most cases, the shortest part of the bar graph where they're fully-independent forces, and then you see this yellow band on top. I assume one of the fundamentals that you're talking about here in your report this week in Washington, is you're trying to have a yellow to green policy, you're trying to turn this yellow area into green areas, is that fair to say? General PETRAEUS. It is, and candidly, it is proving very difficult, because the requirements to be green in terms—they can get the strength up, that is not really an issue now. They're starting to— I think, strength for most Iraqi Army units is really quite good and it is climbing The challenge is the fill of NCOs and commissioned officers. As the number of units grows, as they take casualties and tough com- bat, they're very challenged to find those experienced soldiers who can step into those positions, they just don't have a large pool of that, and that's a limiting factor. Also, the equipment, again, when they take losses, they do not have a good resupply, and that's fairly absolute. So, if you don't have a certain mix of equipment, you're just not going to be ORA-1. The truth is, it doesn't mean that you may not be conducting independent operations—this is very impor- tant, because it's something we work to. Obviously, we want to get them the right mix of equipment, we want to help them develop the leaders, the strength, again, and so forth, and to fix their logistical systems. But, the fact that they're not ORA-1 does not mean that they may not be operating independently. Again, there are places where that actually happens. Senator PRYOR. That's one of the things that concerns me, is really, there isn't a clear trend that the green is going up and the yellow is going away. General PETRAEUS. It's a tough standard to meet. Especially when you're in combat, and losing soldiers, equipment, and leaders. Senator PRYOR. Do you have sense General PETRAEUS. Don't have a great logistical support struc- ture. Candidly, this is something that Senator Levin and Senator War- ner are helping us with. They have put a lot of stock in FMS, and we have to come through for them. We talked to Senator Levin about that, and to Senator Warner when he was chairman—we really have to take this on. This cannot be a peacetime approach to FMS. I mentioned, they've put about. I think it's $1 ready into it, it could be that much and a bit more by the end of the year. But we have to come through for them, and it can't be business-as-usual. It has to be, really, moved very quickly. 251 Senator PRYOR. I guess it's hard to say how long it will take you to go from yellow to green, but you're trying to get there as quick- ly- General PETRAEUS. We are trying to get there. You can see they took steps backward, because, again, the hard fighting that took place to get this, to deal with the sectarian violence, and then to get it down. That's the unknown, unfortunately, is just what kind of losses will they take, what kind of equipment will they lose. Senator PRYOR. Let me change the question, here, if I can, Gen- eral Petraeus, and let me just see if you agree with this. First, I'd say our military efforts in Iraq are very important, and our men and women in uniform in Iraq are doing an outstanding job in some very difficult circumstances, would you agree with that? General PETRAEUS. Certainly, yes, sir. Senator PRYOR. Our military efforts are only part of the solution there. We must work very hard on four broad fronts-diplomatic, economic, military, and political. Would you agree with that? General PETRAEUS. In fact, those are the Lines of Operation (LOOs) in our Joint Campaign Plan. There is an MNF-I Embassy Joint Campaign Plan, and those are, in fact, the LOOs in it. Senator PRYOR. Ambassador Crocker, do you agree with that, as well, that we need a broad effort—not just on military—but also on diplomatic, economic, and political? Ambassador CROCKER. Absolutely. Senator PRYOR. My fundamental concern with the surge strategy, is that if we don't have the diplomatic, the economic, the political efforts, and progress in place, then the surge, I'm afraid, won't make a long-term difference in Iraq. So, that's a concern I have. In August, all of us went home to our home States, and I spent all month in Arkansas, and my sense of the Arkansas' general pub- lic their view of Iraq would be this: First, they're very patriotic. Second, they want to support—they're going to support the war fighter, regardless, no questions asked. Third, I'd say, they want for the United States to leave Iraq in a better condition than what we found it. They also need some assurance that the sacrifice we're making, that this country's making, is worth it. They need that as- surance from the President, first and foremost, and from Con and from you all. But, I'll say this, too—there's a sense with people I talked to back home is that the goal posts keep moving in Iraq. I do have a concern about the report, and the stuff that we're hear- ing today, is that the goal posts have moved again. We talked about the surge, initially, being maybe 6 months, and now it looks like it may be a year-plus before we get back down to the pre-surge numbers, so I think people want to support what we're doing there, but they need some assurance on it, and they also desperately want to make sure that when we leave Iraq, we leave it in a better con- dition than what we found it. Last thing I have, Mr. Chairman, is a number of us, 15 of us in the Senate have been working on a bill to try to implement the Iraq Study Group recommendations. I just want to leave a copy of this bill with you all, it's an effort in working with the Iraq Study Group and bipartisan group of Senators, 15 of us—I believe it's 8 Democrats, 7 Republicans. From my standpoint, it's really the only truly broadbased, bipartisan bill in Congress, in the House or Sen- 253 (2) The United States Institute of Peace was designated as the facilitating organization for the Iraq Study Group with the support of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, the Center for Stra- tegic and International Studies, and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice Univer- sity. (3) The Iraq Study Group was composed of a bipartisan group of senior individuals who have had distinguished careers in public service. The Group was co-chaired by former Secretary of State James was me A. Baker, III and former chairman of the Ilouse Foreign Affairs Committee Lee II. IIamilton, and the other members were former Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger; Vernon E. Jordan, Jr, the Senior Managing Director of Lazard, Freres and Company; former Attorney General Edwin Meese III; former Supreme Court Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor; former White House Chief of Staff Leon E. Panetta; former Secretary of Defense Wil- liam J. Perry; United States Senator Charles S. Robb; and United States Senator Alan K. Simpson. (4) On June 15, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on •S 1545 IS 255 forts, to stabilize Baghdad or to speed up the mis- sion of training and equipping Iraqis if the United States commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective. (7) The report of the Iraq Study Group in- cludes a letter from the co-chairs of the Iraq Study Group, James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, which states, “Our political leaders must build a bi- partisan approach to bring a responsible conclusion to what is now a lengthy and costly war. Our coun- try deserves a debate that prizes substance over rhetoric, and a policy that is adequately funded and sustainable. The President and Congress must work together. Our leaders must be candid and forthright. with the American people in order to win their sup- VUI port." rea (8) The Republicans and Democrats who com- prised the Iraq Study Group reached compromise and consensus and unanimously concluded that their recommendations offer a new way forward for the United States in Iraq and the region, and are com- prehensive and need to be implemented in a coordi- nated fashion. •S 1545 IS 256 1 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF 2 IRAQ STUDY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS. 3 It is the sense of Congress that the President and 4 Congress should agree that the way forward in Iraq is to 5 implement the comprehensive set of recommendations of 6 the Iraq Study Group, particularly those specifically de- 7 scribed in this Act, and the President should formulate 8 a comprehensive plan to do so. 9 SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN 10 IRAQ. It is the sense of Congress that, consistent with the 12 recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, the United 13 States Government should- (1) establish a "New Diplomatic Offensive" to deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region; (2) support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq; (3) encourage other countries in the region to stop the destabilizing interventions and actions of ICO Iraq's ncighbors; (4) secure the borders of Iraq, including through the use of joint, patrols with neighboring countries; (5) prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond the borders of Iraq; •S 1846 IS 257 (6) promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, and, if possible, military as- sistance for the Government of Iraq from non-neigh- boring Muslim nations; (7) energize the governments of other countries 10 to support national political reconciliation in Iraq; (8) encourage the governments of other coun- tries to validate the legitimate sovereignty of Iraq by resuming diplomatic relations, where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad; (9) assist the Government of Iraq in estab- lishing active working embassies in key capitals in the region; (10) help the Government of Iraq reach a mu- tually acceptable agreement on the future of Kirkuk; (11) assist the Government of Iraq in achieving certain security, political, and cconomic milestones, 12 13 14 15 20 16 including better performance on issues such as na- tional reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil rev- enues, and the dismantling of militias; (12) encourage the holding of a meeting or con- ference in Baghdad, supported by the United States and the Government of Iraq, of the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab League, both to assist the Government of Iraq in promoting national •S 1545 IS 258 reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplo- matic presence in Iraq; (13) seek the creation of the Iraq International Support Group to assist Iraq in ways the Govern- ment of Iraq would desire, attempting to strengthen Iraq's sovereignty; (14) engage directly with the Governments of Iran and Syria in order to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other re- gional issues; (15) provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan including resources that might become available as United States com- hat forces are redeployed from Iraq; (16) remain in contact with the Iraqi leader- ship, conveying the clear message that there must be action by the Government of Iraq to make substan- tial progress toward the achievement of the mile- stones described in section 11, and conveying in as much detail as possible the substance of these ex- changes in order to keep the American people, the Iraqi people, and the people of countries in the re- gion well informed of progress in these areas; (17) make clear the willingness of the United States Government to continue training, assistance, •8 1545 IS 260 groups not under the control of the Government of Iraq; and (24) ensure that reconstruction efforts in Iraq consist of great involvement by and with inter- national partners that actively participate in the de- siyn and construction of projects. 7 SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON SECURITY AND MILI- TARY FORCES. mu 9 It shall be the policy of the United States to formu- 10 late and implement with the Government of Iraq a plan, 11 consistent with the recommendations of the Iraq Study 12 Group, that- 13 (1) gives the highest priority to the training, equipping, advising, and support for security and military forces in Iraq and to supporting 14 counterterrorism operations in Iraq; and (2) supports the providing of more and better equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the Government of Iraq to accelerate its requests under the Foreign Military Sales program and, as United States combat brigades redeploy from Iraq, provides for the transfer of certain United States military 23 cquipment to Iraqi forces. •S 1545 IS 263 12 exert more authority over local police forces, and to give sole authority to the Ministry of the Interior to pay police salaries and disburse financial support to local police; (5) proceeds with efforts to identify, register, and control the Facilities Protection Service; (6) directs the Department of Defense to con- tinue its mission to train Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi Border Policc, which shall be placed within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense; (7) directs the Department of Justice to pro- ceed with the mission of training the police forces remaining under the Ministry of the Interior; (8) provides for funds from the Government of Iraq to expand and upgrade communications equip- ment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service; (9) directs the Attorney General to lead the work of organizational transformation in the Min- istry of the Interior and creates a strategic plan and standard administrative procedures, codes of con- duct, and operational measures for Iraqis; and (10) directs the Attorney General to establish courts, train judges, prosecutors, and investigators, and create strongly supported and funded institu- tions and practices in Iraq to fight corruption. •8 1545 IS 264 13 1 SEC. 8. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON OIL SECTOR IN IRAQ. 2 It shall be the policy of the United States to formu- 3 late and implement with the Government of Iraq a plan, 4 consistent with the recommendations of the Iraq Study 5 Group, that, (1) provides technical assistance in drafting ley- islation to implement the February 27, 2007, agree- ment by Iraq's Council of Ministers on principles for the equitable sharing of oil resources and revenues; (2) encourages the Government of Iraq to accel- erate contracting for the comprehensive oil well work-overs in the southern fields needed to increase oil production, while ensuring that the United States no longer funds such infrastructure projects; (3) supports the Iraqi military and private secu- rity forces in their efforts to protect oil infrastruc- ture and contractors; (4) implements metering at both ends of the oil supply line to immediately improve accountability in the oil sector; (5) in conjunction with the International Mone- tary Fund, encourages the Government of Iraq to worn reduce subsidies in the energy sector; (6) encourages investment in Iraq's oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies; •S 1545 IS 266 15 Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian agencies; (2) creates a new Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq reporting to the President, with the authority to bring interagency unity of ef- fort to the policy, budget, and implementation of economic reconstruction programs in Iraq and the authority to serve as the principal point of contact with United States partners in the overall recon- struction effort; (3) gives the chief of mission in Iraq the au- thority to spend significant funds through a program structured along the lines of the Commander's Emergency Response Program, with the authority to 11- rescind funding from programs and projects- (A) in which the Government of Iraq is not demonstrating effective partnership; or (B) that do not demonstrate substantial progress toward achievement of the milestones described in section 11; (4) authorizes and implements a more flexible security assistance program for Iraq, breaking down the barriers to cffective interagency cooperation; and (5) grants authority to merge United States as- sistance with assistance from international donors •S 1546 IS 267 16 1 and Irayi participants for the purpose of carrying 2 out joint assistance projects. 3 SEC. 10. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON BUDGET PREPARA- TION, PRESENTATION, AND REVIEW. It shall be the policy of the United States to formu- rec- 6 late and implement a plan, consistent with the rec- 7 ommendations of the Iraq Study Group, that- (1) directs the President to include the costs for the war in Iraq in the annual budget request; (2) directs the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence to provide United States military and civilian per- sonnel in Iraq the highest possible priority in obtain- ing professional language proficiency and cultural training; (3) directs the United States Government to provide for long-term training for Federal agencies that participate in complex stability operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan; (4) creates training for United States Govern- ment personnel to carry out civilian tasks associated with complex stability operations; and (5) directs the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to devote greater ana- lytic resources to understanding the threats and •S 1545 IS 269 18 Baathists who were not leading figures of the Sad- dam Hussein regime. (3) Enacting legislation or establishing other binding mechanisms to cnsure the sharing of all Iraqi oil revenues among all segments of Iraqi soci- ety in an equitable manner. (4) Holding free and fair provincial elections in Iraq at the earliest date practicable. (5) Enacting legislation or establishing other mechanisms to ensure the rights of women and the rights of all minority communities in Iraq are pro- tected. 13 SEC. 12. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES FROM IRAQ. It is the sense of Congress that, (1) with the implementation of the policies specified in sections 5 through 11 and the engage- ment in the increased diplomatic efforts specified in section 4, and as additional Iraqi brigades are being 22 (leployed, and subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all United States combat brigades not necessary for force pro- tection could be redeployed from Iraq by the first quarter of 2008, except for those that are essential for •S 1545 IS 271 Despite times that deplored a tempoand gradual security conditi placing pricean; manys pite the difference oyed to Iraq this increase of coalitiof security respond ten- while placing greater emphasis on: (1) training, advising, and equipping the Iraqi security forces; and (2) conducting counterterrorism operations. Early this year, the President's New Way Forward established a different strategy, placing priority on protection of the Iraqi population to establish the security conditions that would en- able economic and political progress and gradual transition of security responsibil- ities. This strategy required a temporary increase of coalition combat power—the surge of forces that deployed to Iraq this past spring. Despite the difference in prioritization outlined above, we have still implemented many of the ISG’s recommendations. Of the 79 ISG recommendations, 40 are within the purview of MNF-I and United States Mission-Iraq either to implement or to in- fluence the Government of Iraq to implement, and 36 of those 40 recommendations are effectively being implemented. More detailed information on the status of those 36 recommendations is as follows: a. Diplomatic. Recommendations 1-12 focus on a comprehensive Diplomatic Offensive and an Iraq International Support Group. No such support group has been formed, but the elements of the diplomatic offensive are being pursued in multilateral, bilateral, and international (to include the U.N.) frameworks. Par- ticularly important are the Neighbors Working Groups on Borders and Security, Refugees, and Energy and Fuel. Membership of these groups includes Iraq's neighboring states and other regional Arab partners as well as the five perma- nent members of the U.N. b. Political. The coalition's current campaign plan establishes the primacy of the Political Line of Operation and effectively implements the ISG's rec- ommendations regarding political action. i. Recommendations 19–31 deal with legislative initiatives, including con- stitutional review, de-baathification reform, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty/reconciliation, and the status of Kirkuk. Joint Campaign Plan 07 outlines the aforementioned initiatives as priority political goals. Recommendation 24 states that these milestones should be complete no later than first quarter of 2007. While we did not meet that target date, the coalition continues to assist the Government of Iraq in working to achieve resolution of these difficult legislative issues. ii. Recommendations 35–36 and 38–39 deal with engaging Iraqis of all sects and supporting disarmament, demobilization, and reconciliation. Simi- larly, Joint Campaign Plan 07 emphasizes engagement, transition, and re- integration of militias. c. Economics. Recommendations 62–63, 65, and 68 deal with improving Iraq's oil industry and improving coalition reconstruction programs. Through mecha- nisms such as the Energy Fusion Cell and by assisting in the creation of Iraqi Army Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, MNF-I is effectively implementing the recommendations relevant to the oil industry. The coalition is also imple- menting recommendations in reconstruction through negotiations focused on more foreign investment and involvement and by making full use of the newly developed Quick Reaction Fund (QRF). d. Security. Recommendation 45 suggests leaving excess equipment behind as coalition forces depart and encouraging acceleration of Iraqi use of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Although only limited deliveries have occurred thus far, Iraq has invested significantly in FMS. Also, as forces depart, MNF- I will continue to study the feasibility of leaving equipment behind. We are working closely with the Department of the Army and Office of the Secretary of Defense to transfer 8,500 M1114 Up-armored HMMWVs to the Iraqi security forces under a FMS-like case with greatly reduced costs per vehicle. These 8,500 HMMWVs become excess when the MRAP vehicles flow into country and are put into the fight with American units. e. Rule of Law. Recommendations 52–55 and 57-61 cover expanding Iraqi po- lice capability to control crime, transforming the Ministry of Interior, controlling the Facilities Protection Service, and training the National and Border Police. Through the efforts of the U.S. Embassy Rule of Law section, the Law and Order Task Force, and the Coalition Police Assistance Transition Team, the coa- lition is effectively implementing these recommendations. Recommendations 57, 60, and 61 all assume the Department of Justice will take the lead for Iraqi Police training, as recommended in Recommendation 56 (which is beyond MNF- I/USM-I purview). While these recommendations are being implemented by a mix of civilian and military trainers, they are not being done so under a Depart- ment of Justice lead. - Four recommendations of the ISG Report are not being implemented at this time. More detailed information is as follows: 272 ly n.o Recommendatioa ISF developmifferent priorities ignificant co? a. Recommendations 50 and 51 deal with the transfer of the National Police and Border Police from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defense. This concept continues to be evaluated as part of the long-term evolution of the inte- rior forces, and the ultimate decision will eventually be made by the Govern- ment of Iraq. b. Recommendation 42 requires the United States to complete Iraqi security force training and equipping by the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. As the Gov- ernment of Iraq continues to define its requirements, ISF development will like- ly not be complete by the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. c. Recommendation 43 discusses changing the coalition priorities to focus on counterterrorism and ISF development. While both activities are important, the current coalition strategy assigns different priorities. Counterterrorism is a coa- lition priority, but its effective execution requires significant conventional com- bat forces for intelligence collection and complementary conventional operations, not just options normally associated with counterterrorist elements. In fact, the success of the current counterterrorism program would be impossible without . broad conventional support. Also, although population protection has a higher priority within the current MNF-I strategy, we are also working with the Iraqis to improve the capability of the Iraqi security forces, through training and equipping programs and robust partnering and advisory efforts. Notably, the partnering effort would not have been as effective with the reduced coalition presence recommended by the ISG. The remaining 39 ISG recommendations are directed toward the U.S. Government and, as such, are beyond the scope of either MNF-I or USM-I. Of the recommenda- tions that are out of the purview of MNF-I or USM-I, recommendations 13–18 focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict; recommendation 37 focuses on ensuring U.S. executive and legislative branch actions do not undercut Iraqi amnesty proposals; rec- ommendations 40–41, 44 focus on national policy statements and DOD personnel as- signments; recommendations 46–49 focus on resetting the force; recommendation 56 assigns Department of Justice lead for Iraqi police training; recommendations 64, 66–67, 69–71 deal with U.S. national economic policy decisions; and recommenda- tions 72–79 focus on U.S. national budgetary, personnel, and intelligence policy. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Pryor. Senator Martinez. Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much. I appreciate your hosting me in Baghdad a few days ago. I got an advance, I think, of what we have seen in your report, and I want to tell you that between what I've heard from you, and also what I was able to perceive by vis- iting several places, and seeing and talking to our troops, that I have a very positive view of your report. I am astonished that some may be so invested in failure that they cannot see the very positive signs that you're bringing to us. I had the privilege of visiting Patrol Base Murray, south of Bagh- dad, and I saw there, myself, this is the last brigade of the surge. They've been there since late-May or early-June. They've been in the fight in a very tough neighborhood south of Baghdad, and they have been rooting out al Qaeda. I talked to Iraqis there, who are so thankful that our troops were there, that are working with them in partnership, and the enthusiasm that I saw from our men and women in uniform, there performing admirably, sustaining some difficult losses of their own troops, is what leads me to think that this strategy is succeeding in the neighborhoods where it matters, and turning the situation around. So while I understand the dif- ficulties ahead, and the difficulties that we've had in the past, I must say that I am encouraged by what I saw there, and by what you report to us here, as well. I know we've been talking about this for a long, long time, but I wonder if you would, General, define for me who it is that our enemy is in Iraq? Who are we fighting? 273 General PETRAEUS. At the outset, actually if I could just point out first, you'll be heartened to hear that the al Qaeda in the area of Arab Jabour was killed in the last several days as well, and that's in the Arab Jaboor area there, and that was in an area that was a sanctuary for al Qaeda, southeast of Baghdad, in an area in which operations are planned, set up and then run into Baghdad. So, it is a significant accomplishment by those at Patrol Base Mur- ray. Senator MARTINEZ. It's like the conduit to Baghdad, isn't it? General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Sir, I use the term that the enemy, the wolf closest to the sled, is al Qaeda-Iraq because it is the enemy that has, in the past, ignited the enormous escalation in ethno-sectarian violence by some of its actions. The bombing in February 2006 of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra are fore- most among those, the enemy that causes the most horrific casual- ties, the most sensational attacks, and again has an effect at times, or tries to have an effect of pouring gas on burning embers, wher- ever they can find them. They're the ones responsible for the bombings of the four Yazidi villages several weeks back, of some Turkomen villages prior to that, south of Kurkuk, in trying all the time, again, to conduct more of those types of attacks. Beyond that, certainly the militia extremists supported by Iran are very much a growing concern. I mentioned earlier, we've learned a great deal about them after capturing the head of the special groups and the Lebanese Hezbollah operative who was sup- porting them, with Iran and a number of others over time, quite a few brigade commanders, in that particular structure. Again, the impact that they have is very significant because it can eat at neighborhoods. In many respects, it is the militia extremists at this point in Baghdad that are the cause of the ethno-sectarian vio- lence, more so than are al Qaeda or any other Sunni extremist af- filiates. Senator MARTINEZ. Slide number 10, in my view, gives a great graphic portrayal of the success that you've had against al Qaeda- Iraq and we can add to this chart, now, the Amir that you just mentioned from my old friends at Patrol Base Murray, God bless them. General PETRAEUS. Sir, and again, that is significant success against al Qaeda. They're off balance, we're in the pursuit mode against them, certainly in many, many more places than we were before and had to take some tough casualties to go into areas that they had controlled before, Baqubah, and a variety of Baghdad neighborhood, Arab Jaboor, and other locations. Beyond that, I think the other enemies are less kinetic, but more just the challenges of institutions, again, that just aren't fully func- tioning. Certainly, residual sectarian influences, and even the de- gree of corruption that is still in certain elements in Iraq, those present big challenges, as do a variety of these different issues that we have to deal with in trying to stand up the security forces, in getting their logistical systems working, getting the institutional structures established, getting the sectarian activities out, and so forth. 275 Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, sir. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez. Senator Webb. Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman, welcome to mile 25. I've been with you all the way, but you've been running a lot harder than I have. I would like to make just two comments about some of the testi- mony that preceded me and then try to get quickly to two ques- tions. The first, to echo something that Senator Clinton said, as a re- sult of a question that was posed by Senator McCain. I think it's important to point out for the historical record, that the situation in al Anbar did turn around before the surge began. I mentioned this in the Committee on Foreign Relations, but I think it's impor- tant to mention it here. Also, it's a matter of, on the one hand, I think, personal loyalty. My son is an infantry Marine, he was in the 1st Battalion 6th Marines, and through that period at the last 4 months of last year, in particular, they were knocking back Ramadi block by block and street by street. I think, number or they deserve credit, and number two, you don't want your staff to have to throw hands with the 1st Battalion 6th Marines, if some- body were trying to take credit for what they did. The second is, when we talk about consequences of failure, Am- bassador, I sadly point out, that so many of these consequences were what people, such as myself, General Zinni, and General Scowcroft were trying to point out as the predictable consequences of an invasion. We have basically scrambled the egg here and we're all struggling to try to find a way to bring the United States out of this in a way that will bring further stability to the region, but I think it's fair to point that out. I want to renew, briefly, General Petraeus, my comments that I began at the end of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hear- ing about this dwell-time situation. You can see how divided we still are here in trying to come to grips with the policy. As we con- tinue this debate, I just very strongly believe that we need to some sort of a safety net under our troops. The one inarguable re- sult of this policy has been the disruption of the rotational cycles of deployment, when we accelerated the deployment cycles. Its pol- icy has resulted in extended tours, 15-month deployments, and also an acceleration of other situations like stop-loss and, on the Marine Corps side, the going into the pool of the Individual Ready Reserve in a way that they had not done in previous years. On a personal note, my number two daughter's long-time boy- friend of 7 years, when I was an embedded journalist in Afghani- stan in 2004, I was able to get up to where his unit was, one of the nine stops that I made. He did 4 years in the Marine Corps, infantry corps, pulled two tours in Afghanistan, out a year and a half, finally got a good job, and then last Friday he gets the news he's been recalled, he's going back to Iraq. This is the kind of situation that people up here really aren't see- ing because of the bifurcation that began back in Vietnam between the people who are making policy and the people who are carrying it out, quite frankly. I'm really glad to see so many members of this committee have been able to go on congressional delegations and 276 come over and, even if it's just a brief period of time, see what the United States military looks like, even see what a combat environ- ment looks like. But we need some advocates up here for a situa- tion that is really having a dramatic impact on the men and women who are having to go through these repeated cycles. I was out of the room when Senator Nelson of Florida asked about this. I am told, General, your response to him was that this is more a matter for a Chief of Staff of the Army, in terms of dwell- time. Is that correct? General PETRAEUS. Senator, I, again, am very concerned about the strain on, and sacrifice of, our soldiers. Obviously, what a com- mander in the field wants, is soldiers who have had maximum time between deployments. They'll obviously perform better, they'll have had more time to prepare, presumably, and be rejuvenated in a way that they would not if it has been a shorter dwell-time. So again, I very much want that and I stated that, I believe at that time, I certainly did earlier today. What I meant by that is, again, I'm just not any, have been away from the Army sufficiently, that I just don't have a feel for what that kind of policy would mean to the Army. It has a responsibility, as a force provider, and I again, don't know what that would do in that sense to the Army. That's why I say that it's just one I think I have to defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army. Having said that, I'd love to, again, have some experience in this myself, in the past 6 years, I think it's coming up on 4 of those 6. So, I am all for max- imum dwell-time. Senator WEBB. Right. I think, I related to you a conversation that I'd had with the Chief of Staff of the Army, when the tours went to 15 months, where his comment to me was that he is feed- ing the strategy. So, somewhere in here, we need to find a balance, and that's the reason that I introduced the amendment that I did. There are times, perhaps, when Congress needs to weigh in and kind of be a referee. The other question I wanted to be able to ask you, Ambassador, it's something that I've thought a lot about and I would like to get your perceptions on I was a journalist in Beirut in the 1980s, you spent a long time there, I spent some time there, not in any way the sort that you did, but I see a lot of similarities in the situation, from Lebanon in the 1980s and Iraq today. Although, Iraq is sort of macrocosmic, but with the notion of a weak central government that can't get its feet on the ground and very strong armed militias around them that are not going to obey the edicts that come out of them. We had a very bad situation there. We did leave. What do you draw from this, in terms of how we're trying to fix the situa- tion in Iraq? Ambassador CROCKER. It's a great question, Senator, and cer- tainly something that's preoccupied my mind. Í spent a total of 6 years in Lebanon, two different tours, and neither of them at really great times, given levels of violence. You don't want to overstate the similarities, or at least I cer- tainly don't. Iraq is a vastly bigger country, substantially greater strategic importance, I would argue. There are some other impor- tant differences too, just in terms of internal conditions, that Leb- anon was, without question, an all out civil war in the late 1970s, 278 Iraqis to do the right thing, if you will, at those border points of entry. It is hugely important on the Syrian border, again, to try to cut down on the flow of foreign fighters. Sometimes some of them un- doubtedly just drive in and that's something that we have to try to interdict, obviously, at those ports of entry. Then, on the Iranian side, what we want to do is similar, and also to have some addi- tional backstop to that on some of the key routes that lead to Bagh- dad, so that again, we can interdict more of the arms and ammuni- tion that come in from Iran. Senator CORKER. That's something that's urgently being pur- sued? General PETRAEUS. It is, indeed. Yes, sir. In fact, if it's important to the military, there's a set of slides and they have stoplights and we have that for the ports of entry, in particular. Senator CORKER. I want to thank you for the exemplary model you all set up. I think you all have a common wall between your offices and work together on a daily basis, both diplomatically and militarily to achieve our goals here. I know it seems to be an evolv- ing thing we focus on. We focused on diplomacy a great deal 3 or 4 months ago, it was upgrading of troops and obviously, and for good reason, it's been the lack of the central government's progress politically, certainly at this point in time. Ambassador Crocker, talk to us about the nature of the conversa- tions that you have privately, if you will, with the Prime Minister, the President, and the Deputy President, just about the fact that those things are not happening that need to happen, certainly, to create the top-down reconciliation that Senator Warner was refer- ring to. Ambassador CROCKER. In the course of the last couple of months, we've had an extensive and intensive series of discussions with all of the Iraqi leadership as part of the effort they were making to come together and to work on both specific substantive issues and to work on processes. That's what led to the communiqué at the end of August, in which they announced agreements on several areas, among the five principle leaders of Iraq. What may be more important in the long run are the substantive achievements on de-Baathification reform, provincial powers, de- tainee issues, and how to handle armed groups that no longer want to fight against the coalition or the central government. What may be even more important than that was the announcements that the five made, that they would continue to work together, both at their level, through a mechanism involving the President, the two Vice Presidents, and the Prime Minister, but also at a preparatory level, where their deputies would continue to meet as they did for a num- ber of weeks during the summer, to wrestle with the hard issues econciliation and try to hammer out issues to the point where the leadership could effectively deal with them. Again, that in- volved multiple meetings on the part of me and my staff with, again, all of Iraq's leaders, as they moved toward this. One other outcome, incidentally, of that meeting, was a state- ment, declaration, by the five that they wanted to reach an agree- ment with the United States on a long-term strategic partnership. I find that noteworthy, again, particularly in light of the reports 281 ree with'ti thought wal questio renewed and expanded the mandate for the U.N. Assistance Mission Iraq (UNAMI) in resolution 1770 (August 10), and the mandate now encourages U.N. engagement with Iraq on political reconciliation, economic and electoral reform, humanitarian assistance, and regional dialogue. We are pleased that U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed clear interest in increasing U.N. involvement in Iraq by cohosting with Prime Minister Maliki a September 22 U.N. High Level Meeting on Iraq. This international gathering was a notable success. The Secretary General endorsed efforts to provide additional staff to implement the expanded UNAMI mandate and including the establishment of a support mechanism for the neighbors process. Furthermore, the Secretary General appointed a new Special Representative of the Secretary General for Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, who will launch his efforts by attending the November Expanded Neigh- bors Ministerial in Istanbul. In an effort to encourage regional support for Iraq, de Mistura will then embark on a consultative tour of neighboring countries thereafter. The road to stabilizing Iraq will likely continue to be a difficult and sometimes uncertain one. However, we believe that we are on the right course as we work with the international community, under the auspices of the U.N., to help build a more secure, stable, and prosperous Iraq. Senator WARNER. The next question I have is, the Jones Com- mission report, I thought was a very satisfactory contribution. Do you agree with that? General PETRAEUS. I do, sir. Senator WARNER. Mr. Ambassador? Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, I do. Senator WARNER. One provision in there, page 129, “Cir- cumstances of the moment may continue to present the opportunity for considering a shift in the disposition in deployment of our forces. This could be characterized as a transition to a 'strategic over-watch' posture. Such a strategy would include placing increas- ing responsibilities for internal security on the Iraqi forces, espe- cially in urban areas. Coalition forces could be retasked to better ensure the territorial defense”-that's the border—"of Iraq, and in- creasingly concentrating on the Eastern and Western borders and the active defense of the critical infrastructures essential to Iraq,” namely their water, their power, their electricity, and so forth. Now I judged in your comments and testimony you took a ref- erence to that, but I judged from what you said, that there could be a point in time when that type of transition might well be em- ployed by the forces under your command. Is that correct, General? General PETRAEUS. Sir, it certainly is possible. We want to get to an overwatch situation. Now where the forces deploy to or, whether they go home or take on those other mission, I think, is something that we need to look at very hard. Senator WARNER. Lastly, General, there's been a good deal of comment in the press—I can't ascribe the accuracy—that various segments of the chain of command, the President, Security Council, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Fallon, yourself, as to dif- ferent viewpoints. I was privileged to have many years of experi- ence in the Pentagon and here on this committee, I think that's healthy that the different views were assessed and will eventually be presented to the President. But I assume that you f think you've said this for the record, that you did work within the chain of the command, that you did listen to your colleagues and the Chairman of the JCS, member of the JCS, and others, as well as Admiral Fallon, and all of it was brought to bear on the testi- mony that you've given us today. 282 General PETRAEUS. Sir, that's correct. Actually Secretary Gates really, I think, sheparded quite a process that took place with a number of different briefings to the Chairman, to the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs, and eventually to the President. I have been told that there is support for what I have recommended. Certainly Ad- miral Fallon has assured me of that, as well as the Chairman and the Secretary. Senator WARNER. Right, and that will be brought to the Presi- dent as he prepares to state the General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir. In fact, the JCS had a session separately with him the day after I briefed him, I believe was the chronology. Senator WARNER. You had a session when he visited your home? General PETRAEUS. Sir, we also had that session. I gave my rec- ommendations, actually, several days prior to that and then there was the additional session in Anbar province as well. Senator WARNER. Did this trip back provide any opportunity for further work in that area? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I have not talked to the President at all since I have been back. My conversation with the Secretary merely was, “Good luck.” I have talked to Admiral Fallon on several occa- sions and basically, and he just assured me that he supports the recommendations that I have put forward. Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, General. Chairman LEVIN (presiding]. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator McCaskill. Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator McCASKILL. Thank you. It's a much quieter and smaller room than when we began. I'd like to point out what is obvious about me being the last questioner. That is how I got here. inst an incumbent in the United States Senate, who was 100 percent supportive of the President's policies in Iraq, had never really asked a tough question during his time on this com- mittee of any of the men and women who sat at that table, justi- fying why we were going and what was happening when we were there. So, as our democracy works, the people of my State made a deci- sion whether or not they wanted to send him back to Washington to continue to support the policy, or whether they wanted someone different. I'm blessed, they decided they wanted someone different and I'm here. So, I too want to echo everyone's comments about our respect for you and the work you do. But I also feel a mandate from my election to disagree, to challenge, and to ask the kind of questions that I think most Americans want asked right now. The benchmarks came to this discussion by virtue of the com- mander in chief. It was the commander in chief that gave the speech in January, that said “We will judge the success of this strategy by the benchmarks.” We've had a lot of discussion today about the benchmarks and bottom-up, top-down, and I don't want to repeat anything that's been done. But I went back and read the testimony, General Petraeus, when you were confirmed. You had an exchange of questions and answers with Senator Levin about those benchmarks and about the leverage we could use. There was 283 discussion about what could we use as leverage and there was dis- cussion about, from you, that we could withhold things, we could withhold our support, we could prov I guess my first question to you, and if you could answer it very briefly, I would appreciate it, what leverage do we have? Because clearly, it does not appear to be working. Why is it not obvious to the American people that we're exercising any of the l we have? This just appears that we have to take on faith, that this last date is not 2030, or 2025, or 2040. That's where I think my frustration lies, is I see no effective use of leverage to force the is to come back from vacation. Either of you? Leverage that we can use? Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, we clearly do have leverage and we use it. At the same time, national reconciliation, I think by defi- nition, is not something that can be forced from outside. It, just by, again, definition, means people in conflict agreeing to work through differences and to come together. So, we can facilitate, we can pressure to some degree, but ulti- mately, national reconciliation has to be an Iraqi process. I have expressed my view that, to state to the Iraqis that if they don't do A, B, and C, for example, on reconciliation, that we are then going to withdraw forces, has a very high risk of being counterproductive, that it will cause them to be less likely to compromise, rather than more. So I think we have to be very careful about that. I wish there were simple answers. I wish there were clear-cut things that we could do to get them to do the things that result in national reconciliation. But there aren't. In my experience and I've been there about 6 months now, it is a long, slow, hard grind that may now become easier because of the effects of the surge in reducing violence. It's because, I am convinced that it is only when violence comes down and shows every indication of staying down, that you create the climate in which hard compromises, if not be- coming easy, at least become possible. General PETRAEUS. Senator, I mentioned earlier, I don't know if you were here, but at one time, in an earlier assignment, I did ac- tually withhold support for an element in the Major Crimes Unit in the Ministry of Interior after they were found to have been mis- treating detainees. We have looked at some of that type of action. We have actually discussed this. At one point we actually even pre- pared a letter with respect to something like that. At this point, we just haven't reached the point, literally, where we think that that would be more productive than less productive. On the other hand, there are some carrots, as well, that can be used. For example, right now, the Major General who oversees our Detainee Operations is working closely with the Sunni-Arab Vice President to try to facilitate the release of those Sunni-Arabs who have been in the system, have been prepared for release, guarantor pledges by individuals who we view as responsible and a judge is participating in this, and to try to accelerate that process. That is one of their big concerns in the Sunni-Arab community. That has actually generated some positive responses, in terms of engagement with the national process. So, there are areas like that where we cannot just use stick but occasionally use carrot as well. That's just one example of that, al- 284 though obviously, we have to find some more examples to get them to come to grips with the really big issues. Senator MCCASKILL. I don't want to belabor the difference of the opinion of the Armed Forces. I think they're doing a magnificent job, but I noticed Senator Martinez talked about talking to the troops. When I was there in June, I had an opportunity to talk to a number of Missourians and I got all different opinions. Some of them stuck in my mind, but one I'll never forget, and that was a young man who was telling me about the biggest problem they face. That was 1 hour a day of electricity and what a terrible, dif- ficult situation that was, to get the confidence and the participation of the Iraqi people, because of 1 hour a day of electricity. I said to him, “But what if we pulled out, if we began to pull out in a meaningful way, wouldn't it be chaos?” He looked me right in the eye, and he said, “Ma'am, this is chaos.” So, that stuck with me and it probably always will. I would like to close today on a subject matter we haven't talked about today, but it's one that's near and dear to my heart, and that's the money. I spent most of my time in Iraq in June looking at contracting. My background is an auditor. I have yet to sense a feeling of urgency among the Active military, among the folks at DOD, about the way money has been spent in this conflict, particu- larly as we have dealt with privatization at a level we've never had privatization before, in a contingent operation. We have privatized much more than we ever have, in terms of not just reconstruction, but obviously in troop support and logistics. I would certainly appreciate, briefly, if the Chairman will indulge me at this point, your sense about that. I think that all of this is about choices and none of them are easy, but I do think people need to understand that the price tag for 1 month pays for health insurance for 800,000 American children. That is a startling reality of what we're doing. The President's going to ask us for another $50 billion of debt, and now we have borrowed most of the money for this conflict. The strength of our military not only relies on the incredible leadership that we develop within our military and t brave and courageous acts of our military men and women, but it depends on the economic status of our Nation and the strength and security of our economy. I would like, briefly, from both of you, your reflection on the heartbreaking news that we had, that even someone in the Active military was involved in fraud, and stealing money from the American people, the kind of contractor abuse, the kind of overspending we've seen, the kind of money that's been spent that we can't account for. What, if anything, is being done on a day-to-day basis to address the incredible amount of money that's being spent and a sense of urgency about making sure that every dime of it is spent wisely? General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, a very important step is the support for the continuation of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), which I think is very important and has proven very, very useful. The formation of the Joint Con- tracting Command Iraq, I think over time, has improved very much the process that is conducted over there. The Iraqi First Program Initiative is also one that not only gets us, in many cases, lower costs and lower salaries, but gets the local people invested in our 288 Based on the security improvements we have made and additional improvements we expect to make, we have already recommended a drawdown of the five surge bri- gades, two Marine battalions, and Marine Expeditionary Unit. We believe that we will be able to execute this reduction in forces without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve. Further reductions and potential changes to our mission will take place, but in my professional military judgment, it is premature to make those recommendations at this time. By mid-March of next year, we believe we will have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further troop reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008. By then, we will know more about the enemy situation, the capabilities of the Iraqi forces and the concerned local citizens, and further improvements to the security situation, and will then be prepared to make recommendations for additional drawdown and poten- tial change in mission. As we move forward, we must remain mindful of the fact that the accomplishment of our mission in Iraq will not be quick or easy. Doing so will take continued time, commitment, and resources on the part of our country. Our plans call for sustain- able security to be established nationwide by the summer of 2009, but that does not end the commitment of American forces, which I would expect to continue well into the next administration, though at a reduced level over time. I expect long-term force levels will be determined by a long-term strategic relationship that will be ne- gotiated between the Government of Iraq and our own government. concer more about the readjustments beyon appreciation for the by mid-March of ney 4. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, what are our specific military goals, and pre- cisely what is required from the U.S. military to achieve them? General PETRAEUS. In the near-term, by summer 2005, our goal is to protect the population and create a baseline of local security. Specifically, this includes the neu- tralization of irreconcilable armed groups, the containment of militias, the reduction of large-scale sectarian violence, the protection of infrastructure, and the further de- velopment of the Iraqi security forces. In various areas throughout the country, coa- lition forces will be leading and partnering with or in overwatch of their Iraqi coun- terparts. The baseline of localized security they create will ensure the population is protected, thus enabling political and economic progress and fostering reconcili- ation. In the intermediate-term, by summer of 2009, our goal is to create sustainable security. Specifically, this includes a greatly diminished level of violence that the Iraqi security forces will be able to sustain largely on their own and for the long- term. This includes not only the capabilities of the Iraqi units themselves, but also the abilities of the Ministries of Interior and Defense to effectively perform their in- stitutional functions on their own. Coalition forces will largely be in an overwatch position by this point, responsible for monitoring developments and providing quick- reaction force support, intelligence, and other key enablers. Transition teams will also continue to support the development of Iraqi forces. While in overwatch, should a situation develop that is beyond the capacity of Iraqi forces to handle on their own, coalition forces will be readily available to back up our Iraqi counterparts. Overall, this diminished level of violence will create the conditions for further polit- ical and economic progress. In the long-term, our goal is Iraqi security forces that are capable of protecting the population and controlling their borders and that are able to sustain themselves. Ministries of Interior and Defense that are capable of performing their institutional functions, and a coalition forces presence, one large enough to continue to provide a contribution in accordance with an agreed-upon long-term security relationship that is mutually beneficial to our Nation and to Iraq. Achieving local security, then sustainable security, and then ultimately a long- term security relationship will require a continued commitment of time, resources, and personnel, not just from the U.S. military but from other members of the inter- agency. However, in the future, we project that the number of personnel and re- sources required will be far smaller than at present time. As I stated above, we have already begun to transition responsibilities and draw down the surge forces, and we plan to make further recommendations on troop decreases and potential mission shifts in mid-March. Incal security, then sustainable orum CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ 5. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, please tell me the total number of private con- tractors in Iraq serving in combat, combat support, and security roles who are fund- ed by the U.S. Government. Please break down the numbers of each and describe the range of duties that private contractors are involved in. 290 order to provide the Government of Iraq with a proportional response option and bridging capability between the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Army. Achieving this goal will take considerable time and continued effort, and some units may, in- deed, need to be disbanded, but the right strategy is in place to get there. m lack the imilitars. How ceneral Per and goals eigh on y Armed Foritary is ind provid ARMY RETENTION RATES 7. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, in 2003, only 18 percent of West Point grad- uates quit the force. This low attrition rate has been attributed to the memories of September 11, the successful war in Afghanistan, and the fact that war in Iraq was just under way. Duty called, and it seemed a good time to be an Army officer. How- ever, last year, when the 905 officers from the class of 2001 had to make their choice to stay or leave, 44 percent quit the Army. It was the Service's highest loss rate in 3 decades. Some have suggested that there is a “trust gap" between junior and senior officers. Others have suggested that we are on a quixotic quest in Iraq to reach an unreachable goal, leading to disillusionment among our young officer corps. Some of the combat-tempered junior and mid-level officers have charged the general corps, many of whom lack combat experience because they attained their rank in peacetime, with demanding the impossible and providing too few resources to achieve success. The result is that the military is losing, at record rates, the very individuals that can best lead our Armed Forces. How does this exodus of the future leaders of the military weigh on your decision-making in attempting to achieve mili- tary objectives and goals in Iraq? General PETRAEUS. As Commander of MNF-I, my responsibility is to develop and execute a strategy focused on achieving our goal of sustainable security in Iraq. As such, the recommendations I presented before your committee were based on my view of how we are faring as we build sustainable security and what means are re- quired to meet our stated goal. However, as a senior leader of our Nation's Armed Forces, I am also acutely aware of the strain being put on our ground forces as a result of our ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This understanding in- formed, but did not drive, my recommendations. Undoubtedly, to be successful—not just in the short-term, but more importantly in the medium and long-term—our military needs top-quality leaders. Today's junior officers, who will be tomorrow's senior leaders, are probably the most combat experi- enced generations of officers in the history of our Nation. Most Army and Marine Corps lieutenants and captains have deployed multiple times and learned first-hand what it takes to succeed in an exceedingly challenging environment. Now, many of these same leaders are choosing to leave military service because of, among other reasons, the high operational tempo. I am in my fourth year or longer deployment since September 11 and my family and I intimately understand the strain placed on our troopers and their families through repeated and lengthy deployments. Ideal- ly, through both the expansion of the force as well as a gradual decrease in the number of our forces deployed, our military will be able to return to a more manage- able deployment cycle, with at least double the time at home compared to the time deployed. In the meantime, the Army has recently released other initiatives de- signed to retain our junior officers, including expanded offers of graduate school and a retention bonus. Additionally, as I go out and visit with subordinate commanders across Iraq, I encourage them to mentor their junior officers and communicate to them their worth to this fight and to the long-term health of our organization. I do the same, taking the time to personally talk to company commanders (captains) on nearly every trip I take to see troops, listen to their concerns, and remind them that they matter a great deal—to all of us. ame, takointh to this them tas I godling expanded releas U.S. ARMED FORCES 8. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, what is the long-range impact of the war in Iraq on the U.S. Armed Forces? General PETRAEUS. At this stage of an ongoing conflict, it is difficult to predict what the long-range impact will be on the Armed Forces, but we do have some indi- cators already. On the positive front, we now have one of the most experienced com- bat forces in our Nation's history, complete with a core of battle tested leaders, many of whom have multiple tours and often have served in both Iraq and Afghani- stan. Our military has also demonstrated an ability to change doctrine and adapt training to the current fight, to become proficient at new tasks, and to field needed new equipment. While these adaptations did not necessarily happen fast enough during the early years of our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, they are now oc- curring much more quickly. We can see the difference: more than ever before, I am 292 the benchmarks you were charged to report on-benchmarks originally proposed by the Iraqis themselves-achieved? Ambassador CROCKER. Like U.S. servicemen and women, Iraqi officials—including politicians, judges, and security forces—are stepping up and putting their lives at risk on a daily basis to sustain a democratic, Federal Iraq and continue progress on political reconciliation. Beyond benchmarks, the Government of Iraq is pursuing political reconciliation by 'latching up the national and provincial governments. For example, on Sep- tember 30, Iraq's Finance Minister, Bayan Jabr, announced that the portion of the capital budget that goes directly to the 18 provinces would increase to nearly $4 bil- lion next year. Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Barham Salih, also announced that Babil Province would be rewarded for its effective budget execution with $70 million for a major loan program for small businesses and individuals. Previously, Vice Presidents al-Mahdi and al-Hashimi and Deputy Prime Minister Salih announced a 70 percent increase in the 2007 provincial capital budget as well as $50 million in compensation for losses suffered in Anbar in the fight against al Qaeda. While not yet meeting the legislative benchmark of passing a Hydrocarbon Law, sharing of hydrocarbon revenues is taking place equitably while deliberations over a revenue-sharing law continue. Further, U.S. leaders have stressed the importance of passing national hydrocarbon legislation during meetings with both Prime Min- ister al-Maliki and President Talabani. 12. Senator BYRD. Ambassador Crocker, the U.S. taxpayer has been called upon to provide hundreds of billions of dollars to support the war in Iraq. What specific assurances can you give, contrary to many of the other official reports we are receiv- ing, including some from your own Department, that this war is making us safer here in the United States? Ambassador CROCKER. Our efforts in Iraq make the United States safer at home by helping to stabilize the region and by confronting al Qaeda. Should the United States abandon or drastically curtail its efforts, Iraq could fall into chaos or civil war and become a safe haven for terrorists who could strike America at home and abroad. Civil war in Iraq would also likely trigger the intervention of regional states, all of which have a vital national interest in Iraq's future. The Iranian Presi- dent has already announced that Iran will fill any vacuum in Iraq. In partnership with courageous and dedicated Iraqis, we have weakened al Qaeda in Iraq and reduced its ability to carry out acts of terrorism. A growing number of communities in Iraq have joined the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq. Should the United States quit Iraq prematurely, the gains made against al Qaeda in Iraq and other extremist groups could easily be reversed. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAQ 13. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, the President's Chief of Staff, Josh Bolten, was quoted in an interview with USA Today last week as saying President Bush wants to make it “possible for his successor—from whichever party that successor is from—to have a sustained presence in the Middle East, and have America con- tinue to be a respected and influential power in the Middle East.” Was maintaining a long-term military presence in Iraq an objective provided to you by the Com- mander in Chief, or any member of his administration, when you took command of the Multinational Force in Iraq? General PETRAEUS. It was not a specific objective. Developing a long-term rela- tionship with Iraq, though not specified to a particular military relationship of any set size, has been a strategic goal. The 10 January 2007 NSC Iraq Strategy Review defined the administration's strategic goals and objectives (page 5 of attached un- classified briefing). The strategic goal was established before I took command and has not since been changed: A unified, democratic, Federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the war on terror. The NSC noted that, “While our strategic goal requires a long-term relationship with Iraq, we are at a new phase in the effort and must sharpen the objectives we believe are achievable in the next 12-15 months." The following objectives are where we have focused the energies of MNF-I in co- ordination with our Embassy and Iraqi partners: 1. Defeat al Qaeda and its supporters and ensure that no terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq. The astend itself, and anged: Ă unified as est 295 The Regional Picture • Our allies in the region are concerned about negative Iranian influence in Iraq, - Support for the Iraqi Government, however, can help stabilize the region. • Iran has been cultivating influence in Iraq through all means at its disposal. – Iran's threat involves both lethal action and the burrowing of Iranian actors into Iraqi institutions. • Syrian actions, while posing less of a strategic threat to Iraq than Iranian actions, exacerbate the tactical challenge faced by the Iraqi government. Present Situation • We have achieved many of our initial objectives in Iraq. : - Saddam Hussein's regime is no longer an organized threat to Iraq, its neighbors, or the United States. :::-: Iraq is governed by a freely elected government under a permanent constitution. Democratic institutions have been established and are enabling Iraqis to shape their own state. - Per capita incomes have increased ($743 to $1593 according to the World Bank, although inflation also has risen) and Iraq has performed under its IMF agreement . But the situation in Iraq has grown increasingly complex over the past 12 months. . : - Al-Qaida terrorism and a vicious insurgency are now combined with sectarian violence, : - The national government is eager to take lead responsibility, but it is hampered by a lack of . governmental capability and widening sectarian divisions : - Power centers are devolving, with events outside the international zone becoming more relevant to .national trends.. ... • The political process has shown signs of maturation, but meaningful reconciliation has yet to be achieved. Iraqi leaders have not yet achieved a single vision for a unified Iraq. .. a meulage .. • Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have grown in effectiveness, but the levels of violence with which they must cope continue to increase. :: ... - Professionalism and effectiveness are improving but are not yet consistent across the force, CH, -- Some members of the ISF, notably the police, are contributing to sectarian violence. . -: Despite more than 300,000 trained and equipped members of the ISF, substantially fewer numbers are present for duty on a given day. .. 5 ..." : Combat losses, desertion, attrition, and leave account for the majority of those absent. 296 Present Situation * The situation in Baghdad has not improved despite tactical adjustments. - The situation in Baghdad determines nationwide trends; its stabilization has been seen as key to a unified Iraq. - The Government of Iraq has not yet delivered promised essential services. - Limitations on operations have hindered the execution of security plans. anom Force levels overall in Baghdad have been inadequate to stabilize a city of its size. • Iraqi support for the Coalition has declined substantially, in part due to failure of security over the past year. . - In the absence of security, communities are turning to "self-help." • in his public and private statements, Prime Minister Maliki articulates a positive vision where all Iraqis are protected by the rule of law. .:.- Execution and delivery on pledges remain vital. Key Assumptions ** marine HOME DECORDS UKSEL Previous Now Primary challenge is a Sunni-based insurgency, Political progress will help defuse the insurgency and dampen levels of violence. WWW. COM Wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww Primary challenge is violent extremists from multiple communities; the center is eroding and sectarianism is spiking...... While political progress, economic gains, and security are intertwined, political and economic progress are unlikely absent a basic level of security. • Effective national reconciliation may or may not take the form of a comprehensive package or deal; it could come about as the product of piecemeal efforts National Compact is within the grasp of Iraqi leaders and will have meaningful impact on security. Majority of Iraqis will support the Coalition and Iraqi efforts to build a democratic state. • Iraqis increasingly disillusioned with Coalition efforts. Region has a strategic interest in the stabilization of Iraq, Many Arab states remain wary of throwing their full support behind the Iraqi Government. Majority of Iragis and Iraqi leaders see their interests as best advanced by a unified Iraq. While still committed to a unified Iraq, many Iraqis are also advancing sectarian agendas -- as hedging strategies, pursuit of narrow interests, and due to history, • Dialogue with insurgents has not improved security and may not produce strategic gains in current context. · Dialogue with insurgent groups will help reduce violence. w • Many elements of ISF are in the lead but not yet ready to tragi Security Forces are gaining in strength and ability to handle Iraq's security challenges. handle Iraqi security challenges independently. 297 Strategic Goals and Objectives Our strategic goal in Iraq remains the same: A unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror, • While our strategic goal requires a long-term relationship with Iraq, we are at a new phase in the effort and must sharpen the objectives we believe are achievable in the next 12-18 months. The objectives in this new phase are: 1. Defeat al-Qaida and its supporters and ensure that no terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq. 2. Support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad and regain control over the capital. . 3. Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and counter/limit destructive Iranian and Syrian activity in fraq. AVANI 1 4. Help safeguard democracy in Trag by encouraging strong democratic institutions impartially serving all Iraqis and preventing the return of the forces of tyranny. 5. Foster the conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation but with the Iraqi Government clearly in the lead. 6. Continue to strengthen traqi Security Forces and accelerate the transition of security : ..responsibility to the Iraqi Government. 7. Encourage an expanding Iraqi economy including by helping Iraq maintain and expand its export of oil to support Iraqi development. . 8. Promote support for Iraq from its neighbors, the region, and the international community. www. Major Strategic Shifts Iragis Are in the Lead in Ensuring Success - U.S. in Support Role Place the responsibility for success on the Iraqis Recognize and expect that sectarian violence must be addressed by Iraqis Encourage Iraqis to reach national reconciliation • Urge Iraqi Government to serve Iraqis in an impartial way The Primary Mission Is Helping Iraqis Provide Security to the population · Help Iraqis provide greater levels of security in Baghdad in order to enable political and economic progress Help fraqis create the security environment in which political deals needed to sustain security gains can be made Bolster Iraqi capabilities and transfer responsibility to able units as part of this effort Moderates Will Be Vigorously Supported in their Battle with Violent Extremists Counter extremist portrayal of Iraq's conflict as Sunni vs. Shi'a, rather than moderates vs. extremists . Recognize and act upon the reality that the United States has a national interest in seeing moderates succeed Build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi'a, Sunnis, and Kurds We Will Diversify our Political and Economic Effort in fraq to Achieve Our Goals Increase attention to developments outside of the International Zone -- emphasize flexibility". . • Help Iraqi provincial governments deliver to their constituents and interact with Baghdad Extend the political and economic influence through the expansion of our civilian effort We Will Further Integrate Our Civil and Military Efforts • Harness all elements of national power; further augment joint civilian-military efforts throughout theater . Resource at levels that assume a resilient enemy and realistic assessment of Iraqi capacity over the next 12 months Embedding Our Iraq Strategy in a Regional Approach is Vital to Success.. • Iraq is a regional and international challenge • Intensify Gol and USG efforts to expand regional and international help, counter Iran and Syria meddling • Invigorate diplomatic efforts to improve the regional context... We Must Maintain and Expand Our Capabilities for the long War .. Acknowledge that succeeding in Iraq is the immediate challenge, but it is not the last challenge • Ensure we have adequate national capabilities to fight the long war, on the military and civilian side 300 There is no doubt that the enemy we face constantly adapts to our efforts. At the same time, because of our experience in Iraq, I believe we are farther along in learn- ing how their networks are organized, how they fund their activities, how they com- municate, how they train, and how they recruit new members than we would have been without the past 4 years of learning on the battlefield. We continue to get bet- ter and adapt as well, by fine-tuning the synchronization of conventional and special operations, by improving our tactics and enhancing our technology, by fusing intel- ligence and by the accumulation of experience. The July 2007 NIE noted al Qaeda central as the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as it was before September 11, but also stated, “We assess that greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past 5 years have con- strained the ability of al Qaeda to attack the U.S. Homeland again and have led terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike than on Sep- tember 11.” I believe our efforts in Iraq are a part of that equation and an impor- tant reason we must continue to work with our Iraqi partners to defeat terrorist networks here in Iraq. f billionge our andren to 18. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, every year our troops are in Iraq, the costs to our country are huge: thousands killed in action, thousands more permanently disabled or maimed, and hundreds of billions of dollars. With the money we have spent we could have contributed to rebuilding our aging transportation infrastruc- ture, retooling our educational system to train our children to compete in the global market place, and strengthening the security of our borders. So we have a responsi- bility to this country to assess whether or not the mission is worth the cost: a cost measured in American lives, in foregone programs in America, in the health and welfare of our military, and in the risk if other areas of the world demand our mili- tary resources. Even if the mission is worth the cost, we must assess whether or not we can continue to afford to pay it. In your opinion, is the cost worth it and what does America gain for the expense? General PETRAEUS. Ultimately, this is a question for the national leadership of the United States. In my professional opinion, we have substantial national inter- ests in Iraq. Failure in Iraq would mean that important American and global inter- ₂tiņtiņņēņģtiņēņ₂ņēmēģ₂/₂§\§₂§? ?§Â₂Ò₂Â₂Òâū₂/₂ū₂/₂ /₂/₂/₂ ģētiņ₂ņģēģtiņ₂Ỉ ?₂?Â?Â?Â₂Òti₂mēģ₂ņēmēģ₂Ò₂ÂòÂ?₂? we got a glimpse of that during the height of ethno-sectarian violence in 2006), many of our vital and important national interests would be negatively affected. A withdrawal before achieving sustainable stability would result in the further re- lease of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and would likely produce a number of dangerous results, including a high risk of the disintegration of the Iraqi security forces, a rapid deterioration of local security, a marked increase in violence, further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows, alliances of convenience among Iraqi groups and other internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals. The recent DIA report confirms my assessment of the consequences of with- drawal. A failed state in Iraq would also allow al Qaeda-Iraq to regroup and regain the sanctuaries they had established and that Iraqi and coalition forces have se- cured in the past months. Al Qaeda writ large would also benefit from the psycho- logical and recruiting boost to their cause that would be derived from the perceived failure of American policy. Beyond al Qaeda, Iranian hegemonic ambitions could be encouraged. Additionally, the developing nexus between Iraq, Tehran, Damascus, and Lebanese Hezbollah would solidify and exacerbate the underlying Sunni-Shiite conflict already in the Middle East. There is a significant risk that Iraq would be the catalyst for broader regional turmoil as Turkey, Iran, Syria, and other neighbors acted to defend their interests. These consequences would have an adverse impact on the global economy, as potential interruptions in the export of oil from Gulf Re- gion would impact global economic markets. Such results would, in my view, con- stitute failure in Iraq; our shared vision of a stable and secure Iraq would not be achieved and American and global interests in Iraq and the region would not be pro- tected. To be sure, the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult, and frustrating, but I believe that it is possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time through our continued efforts, though doing so will not be quick, inexpensive, or easy. The costs of staying in Iraq are high, but the costs of withdrawal before achieving sustainable security may well be much higher. I believe that the best way to secure our national interests and avoid an unfavor- able outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our operations on securing the Iraqi peo- ple while targeting terrorist groups and militia extremists and, as quickly as condi- tions are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements. 302 provide basic services, though much work remains to be done in this category. In addition, we continue to work with over 52.000 Iraqi security forces that operate in the Baghdad Security Districts, a number that is increasing, as this will lay the long-term foundation for sustainable Iraqi security. IRAQI TRIBES 23. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, I understand that there are over 150 tribal groups in Iraq. During your hearings on September 10 and 11, 2007, you specifically denied media reports that you were arming Sunni tribes in al Anbar to assist them in fighting al Qaeda. However, I am still concerned about other forms of assistance that might be provided. You did not, for instance, discuss if you are providing any other kind of support to the tribes, such as funding and/or training. My concern is that we may provide them with support that could be utilized against the Shiites or, even our own troops once they are through battling al Qaeda. After all, some of these tribes were previously killing Americans. In addition, the appearance that we are favoring some tribal groups over others could exacerbate sectarian and eth- nic conflict. I understand that assisting the Sunni tribes helps put al Qaeda on the defensive; however, I must caution that we must do so with great care in order to avoid unintended consequences. Please describe what resources and/or training you are providing to the Sunni tribes in any province to support their efforts against al Qaeda, and how you are ensuring that anything you provide is not used against our troops, the Shiites, or the Kurds. General PETRAEUS. Í appreciate your well-founded note of caution, and this is in- deed an area where we have had to accept some risk, though not without what we consider sufficient mitigation. In separating the armed tribes who are willing to work with us from extremist individuals and irreconcilable groups, we can gain two tangible benefits: we reduce the number of opponents on the battlefield, and we gain contributing partners who have staked their families' well-being on working to- gether with coalition and Iraqi security forces. As I testified, coalition forces are not arming tribes. Tribal members are already armed for the most part due to the Iraqi policy that allows every household to main- tain one AK-47 assault rifle. The support of coalition force for Sunni tribes is fo- cused on supporting community watch groups trying to rid al Qaeda elements from their midst and on providing basic skills to tribal members who agree to monitor key infrastructure or transportation routes in order to prevent its destruction or the emplacement of improvised explosive devices. Before any training takes place, a plan is developed that clearly defines the responsibilities for all parties, outlines the limitations of authorities, and explains the consequences if any person violates the agreement. The tribal sheikh or neighborhood leader selects and vets candidates who also sign an agreement and swear an oath to the Iraqi Government. Once the agreements are signed, the coalition forces' Iraqi security forces in process and screen the candidates including the collection of biometric data, cross-matching with the biometrics database against criminal databases, and recording the serial num- bers of candidates' personal weapons. We then work with the Iraqi Government to get formal hiring orders for their integration into Iraqi security forces. The training provided to these groups covers defensively oriented skills such as checkpoint operations, detainee handling procedures, human rights, Law of Land warfare, safe weapons handling, and proper reporting procedures. The equipment provided to the Iraqis in these situations generally involves a uniform (usually a t- shirt and arm band), cell phones, a phone card, and materials such as reflective belts, chemical lights, and, in some cases, GPS systems that help provide identifying information and locations to improve coordination and reduce fratricide. 24. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, if you are providing funding to the Sunnis tribes, please describe the purpose of the funding, and how you are ensuring that the funds are used as intended. General PETRAEUS. The funding we are providing to Shiite as well as Sunni tribal volunteers covers the initial costs of the broader Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) movement, in which there are now some 65,000 individuals participating. The ma- jority of these CLCs are Sunni at the present time, though we are seeing rapid growth in the number of Shiite citizens who are also forming groups to reject ex- tremist Jaish al Mahdi and Iranian influence in a similar manner that Sunni tribes rejected al Qaeda. We estimate that approximately $35 million will be spent on these citizen groups through the end of the year, which is a wise investment both in getting a large number of military age males into employment and in the dra- matic reductions in violence we see in the areas in which active CLCs are present. 303 In fact, just the reduction in vehicle losses due to battle damage more than offsets the cost of the CLCs. The next step, which is crucial, is developing with the Govern- ment of Iraq the mechanism by which the CLCs go onto Iraqi payrolls. This effort is in its nascent stages now, and I expect to report more on it in the future. AMERICAN-IRAQI RELATIONS 25. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, Dennis Ross, who is a leading Middle East expert, who served in several Republican and Democratic administrations, has stat- ed that, “It is an illusion to believe that the new Iraq is going to act as our partner in the war on terrorism.” How sure are we that a new independent Iraq-even one at peace with itself—is going to be pro-American, especially given the pervasive in- fluence of Iran on the dominant Shiite leaders, and what is the basis for your con- clusion? General PETRAEUS. I cannot guarantee success in Iraq or even if we arc success- ful, that the new independent Iraq will remain pro-American. However, a free and independent Iraq is most likely to be a stabilizing force in the Middle East, and given that it is Shiite-led, and largely Arab, it is at least likely to oppose al Qaeda in Iraq in many areas, as well as Iran, based on historic suspicions and fighting. What I can say is that the building of a strong strategic partnership with the Iraqi Government is in our best interest and that Ambassador Crocker and I are both committed to making this happen. Recently, Iraqi officials indicated that they want- ed the United Nations Security Council to extend the mandate of the MNF-I through the end of 2008. Once that mandate extension expires, we believe that sen- ior Iraqi leaders intend on seeking a long-term bilateral security agreement with the United States, an agreement similar to those that exist with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Egypt. IRAQI REFUGEES 26. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, it seems to me that the number of inter- nally displaced people (IDP) is an indicator of sectarian violence. I understand that about 1.8 million Iraqis are now refugees in other countries and that the number of IDPs has increased from 499,000 in February to over 1.1 million in July. Do you agree that the increasing number of IDPs is an indicator of increasing sectarian vio- lence and rising ethnic tensions? General PETRAEUS. As Ambassador Crocker and I testified, the fundamental source of conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition will take place, and its resolution is nec- essary to produce long-term stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether the competition takes place more or less violently. Tragically, one of the by-products of this power struggle is the number of Iraqis and families that are displaced from their homes as a result of sectarian threats and violence. The surge of operations has led to increased security for Iraqis throughout the country and, while the num- ber of displaced people remains far too high, we have seen positive signs: citizens beginning to return to neighborhoods and an Iraqi government that is working to guarantee the property rights of those who were displaced in order to help re- integrate them into civil society. All indicators are that overall sectarian violence in Iraq is significantly lower now than it was in the winter of 2006 and 2007. 27. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, the pace of IDPs does not seem to have been slowed by the surge. How do you respond to the criticism that this is further evidence that the surge has failed? General PETRAEUS. The military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met. Though the improvements in security have been uneven across Iraq, the number of incidents, such as attacks and ethno-sectarian violence, has decreased since June. This decrease in sectarian violence and terrorist attacks, and the associ- ated enhanced security that the surge enabled, have given government and commu- nity leaders valuable time to try and resolve pressing political, economic, and sec- tarian issues. As incidents continue to decline and confidence in the security situa- tion stabilizes, many displaced Iraqis will eventually return to their homes and com- munities. In fact, as I mentioned above, we are beginning to see a small but signifi- cant number of families moving back into neighborhoods that have been secured by coalition and Iraqi security forces. 304 BENCHMARKS 28. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, in its report on the Iraqi government's progress in meeting its benchmarks, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) asserted that it could not confirm that there has been a reduction in sectarian vio- lence since the surge, as a measure of sectarian violence is difficult since the per- petrator's intent is not always clearly known. The report further stated that the av- erage number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the last 6 months, and that the decrease in total average daily attacks in July is largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than civilians. How is the MNF-I determining which killings or attacks are sectarian violence, and which are not? While some may be obvious, I am sure that many are not. General PETRAEUS. Ethno-sectarian violence is defined as an event and any asso- ciated civilian deaths caused by or during murders/executions, kidnappings, direct fire, indirect fire, and all types of explosive devices, identified as being conducted by one ethnic/religious person/group directed at a different ethnic/religious person/ group, where the primary motivation for the event is based on ethnicity or religious sect. Analysts review each event to determine the ethnicity and/or religious sect of the victim(s), the entity being attacked, the demographics of the area where the at- tack occurred, and the method of attack to determine whether a particular event should be included as ethno-sectarian violence. As you correctly point out, many of these events are obviously ethno-sectarian in nature, while others are less obvious until the full range of circumstances are closely examined. MNF-I employs a methodology that is consistent, rigorous, and thorough. We have shared our methodology with the CIA and DIA, and they concur with our sys- tem of measurements. In large part, the GAO's criticism is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of our methodologies. We have always welcomed outside audits and will continue to do so and we continue to stand by our metrics. 29. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, you stated in the hearing that the current methodology has been used for over a year. From this, I conclude that the current methodology was changed approximately 3 years into the war. How long exactly has this methodology been in use, and why was it changed? General PETRAEUS. I have attached to this response the document “MNF-I Ethno- Sectarian Violence Methodology” which outlines the definitions and methodology we use to determine if violent acts should be classified as ethno-sectarian. This method- ology has not changed since July 2005. MNF-I defines ethno-sectarian violence as "an event and any associated civilian deaths caused by or during murder/executions, kidnappings, direct fire, indirect fire, and all types of explosive devices identified as being conducted by one ethnic/religious person/group directed at a different ethnic/ religious person/group, where the primary motivation for the event is based on eth- nicity or religious sect.” The only significant change to the reported level of ethno-sectarian violence is one that resulted from our receipt of backlogged data from the Iraqi National Command Center in March 2007. After verifying the data, we updated previous accounts of the levels of sectarian violence with these reports to ensure we had the most accurate depiction of the sectarian violence we are measuring. This additional data did not arrive in time for inclusion in the March 9010 Report to Congress, but was reflected in the June 9010 Report. Since then, MNF-I has worked hard to improve our coordi- nation with our Iraqi counterparts to ensure we receive Iraqi reports in a timely and consistent manner. We believe that using verified Iraqi data adds to the accu- racy of our statistics. 308 population using the market was Shi'a. Some Sunnis may have also been killed or injured in the event; however, extremist ideology permits the killing of any Muslim who is frequenting an area used by a different sect, since they are considered apostates. This suicide vest attack is considered an ethno-sectarian incident. Direct Fire: Direct fire often targets religious gatherings, such as individuals entering and .. exiting mosques; individuals entering and exiting educational facilities, and individuals entering and exiting medical centers, market areas, and gatherings for work Coalition reports (SIGACTS) are used for this category of attacks. skllah . . Example: Individual day laborers of the same sect or ethnicity gather while waiting for work and are killed by direct fire that is shot by individuals of a different sect or ethnicity : Indirect Fire (IDF): Indirect fire often targets medical centers, market places, mosques or religious symbols, educational facilities, religious gatherings, stores/restaurants, and houses in neighborhoods. It also often targets Coalition Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and Government of Iraq facilities and personnel, Due to the inaccuracy of IDF, it must be assessed as being directed against civilians of a specific sect/ethnicity, and there must not be any Coalition Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, or Government of Iraq facilities or personnel in the area; if they are, it cannot be construed that they were not the intended target. Coalition reports (SIGACTS) are used for this category. Executions: Executions include civilians that show signs of torture. This includes evidence of individuals being bound, blindfolded, or shot anywhere in the head or decapitated, strangled, hung, suffocated, or mutilated as well as instances where three or more bodies are found together (except in cases of indirect fire). Executions against Iraqi Security Forces or any other government personnel are excluded. Also excluded are executions conducted due to ..., intra-sect violence. For this category of attack, Coalition reports (SIGACTS) are supplemented by Host Nation reports, since those reports have the best information available from morgues and police stations. Murder: Murders can be categorized as ethno-sectarian violence if it is determined that the perpetrator is of one ethnicity/religious group and the victim is of a different ethnicity/religious group. Coalition reporting and Host Nation reporting are both used for this category of attack, Kidnapping: Kidnapping events are considered ethno-sectarian incidents if they involve individuals who are kidnapped solely because of their ethnicity or religion. Coalition reporting and Host Nation reporting are used for this category. 30. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, how can you use this methodology to evalu- ate trends in sectarian violence against previous years when the methodology was changed? General PETRAEUS. The methodology for measuring ethno-sectarian violence has not changed since it was implemented in the summer 2005. Additionally, the rig- orous methodology deals with interpreting data, rather than collecting it. Thus, when comparing data from different years, MNF-I analysis apply the same method- ology to the entire data set to make the most accurate trends assessments possible. Prior to 2005, we weren't as focused on ethno-sectarian violence as we are today. In fact, prior to the bombing of the Mosque of the Golden Dome in early 2006, ethno-sectarian violence was limited. The bombing of the mosque literally tore the fabric of Iraqi society, pining sects against one another and plunging neighborhoods into violence. 312 the government is because it is seen as an extension of the American occupation force. Has anybody seriously researched the underlying cause for opposition to our presence? General PETRAEUS. There is undoubtedly an element of resistance to perceived oc- cupation that adds “fuel to the fire,” particularly given Iraqi xenophobia, but overall I believe we are more of a stabilizing force than an irritant, as seen by the decrease in sectarian violence as additional coalition forces were brought into the country. I believe the resistance to the government stems more from internal Iraqi politics in that groups representing the diversity of the Iraqi populace are for the first time fairly competing for political power. Iraq is the one of the most complex and challenging situations we have ever faced as a nation, and perhaps one of the most thoroughly examined. In 2007, there were two in-depth NIEs, not to mention other government agency reports, academic and think tank studies, and, of course, our partnership with the Iraqis, all providing val- uable insights into the motivations of groups opposing the Government of Iraq. Ambassador CROCKER. For some insurgent groups U.S. presence is an underlying reason for resistance to the Government of Iraq. Some view Iraqi security forces as extensions of the coalition forces that are helping to train and equip them. Others, like al Qaeda, are against any governmental system not based strictly on what they assert is the only true understanding of Islamic law. These extremists are violently opposed to the governments of most Muslim nations, regardless of outside influ- ences. Still others simply wish to take control of power and resources for their own profit, seeking to subvert any force that would block their access. Among the studies devoted to this topic, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, led by James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, made some relevant observations. Accord- ing to their research, “Sectarian violence causes the largest number of Iraqi civilian casualties.” They note that, far from calling for quick withdrawal of forces, many Iraqis see the coalition presence as a crucial buffer against opposing sects—for Sunni leaders, a buffer against Shiite militias and, for Shiite leaders, a buffer against al Qaeda and former regime elements. For that reason, the study warned that any premature withdrawal of coalition forces would likely lead to much higher levels of violence. memes ammonts of most Muslim nations, regar menn calling for buffer agaiShiite leaderudy warn or not the romers from the warring fast and Ambassador Crocker 41. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, has anyone spo- ken with leaders from the warring factions/insurgent groups to determine whether or not the removal of most of our troops might actually cool things down and facili- tate acceptance of the government? General PETRAEUS. MNF-I has engaged in dialogue with warring factions and in- surgent groups. On issues of potential security accommodations, we insist that no expedient agreement can be made that undermines the sovereign Government of Iraq. Over time, as sufficient Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped, they will increasingly allow us to thin our forces, which could potentially be used in bar- gaining with some warring factions/insurgent groups. It is our understanding, how- ever, that many of these groups would fully support the removal of most of our troops in order to increase their relative power, which would not necessarily trans- late into support of the government. On a broader scale, we recognize that in many cases Iraqi public opinion favors the removal of coalition forces when the question is broadly asked. More nuanced polling elicits responses that indicate a hesitance to have coalition force leave before reaching a sustainable level of security and stability. Additionally, the coalition is seen as a fair arbiter in facilitating the reconciliation process, regardless of Iraqi opinion of coalition presence. Ambassador CROCKER. Coalition forces are serving in Iraq under a U.N. mandate and at the invitation of the democratically elected Government of Iraq. Accordingly, while the United States puts a priority on understanding the motivations and oper- ations of the warring factions/insurgent groups, the United States consults first and foremost with the Iraqi government about policy regarding the withdrawal of forces or overall troop levels in Iraq. We have, however, engaged select insurgent groups, most notably in Anbar province, with positive results. Ultimately, it would be a mis- take to assume there is a direct relationship between the level of coalition forces and the level of violence. For example, in some areas where there is a declining coa- lition presence, we have seen an increase in the level of violence among various mi- litia groups as well as criminal gangs. Violence in Iraq and the motivations behind it are varied and dynamic. en uv we invitation of the democratically blends ng i sag una 42. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, the goal of this research would be to identify what is the underlying objection to our presence, which would provide us with the information we need to develop a successful strat-