General JONES. Their information goes up to the C3 of Multi-Na-
tional Corps, which is where that information is collated into the
overall TRA assessment information. So their operational chain of
command runs from the more senior teams, which are located in
brigade or the division level, that goes up to Multi-National Corps
and is collated there by the C3, which is the operations section of
Multi-National Corps.
In addition to that, each of these Iraqi units has a partner unit,
and that is a coalition unit that partners with them, so that you
have a parallel organization that provides mentoring and coaching
in support to that unit. So in terms of their operation they are also
informally being looked at just by virtue of operating together, and
that also is a topic of discussion.
There is a lot of communication that goes on, obviously, between
the transition teams and the commanders of the partnered units.
And so that exchange of information is also helpful in terms of the
analysis of the effectiveness.
Besides that raw data, what I would add is that there is oper-
ational information, and that is as you either work with a unit or
you observe them in the fight, you do some analysis to determine
what is their level of effectiveness based on their assigned mis-
sions, and you can see them out operating. Because these embed-
ded teams are out operating with the unit, watching an operation,
that is partially recorded in the TRA information. But also the
Corps commander and his subordinate division commanders that
are working with these Iraqi units also see the effects of their oper-
ations, and that can be anything from how they perform in a fight,
to the number of intelligence-based operations they are conducting
successfully and other kinds of indicators that tell you that that
unit is either being more or less effective.
Mr. MEEHAN. What specific adjustments have been made over a
period of years as we have gotten data or information? What types
of changes have we implemented as a result of-obviously training
the Iraqi Security Forces hasn't gone as well as anyone anticipated
that it would in the beginning.
I find it very difficult to, number one—other than going to Iraq
and talking to people who are there, we have had a difficult time
getting people before this committee, Oversight and Investigations,
to talk to us about how this process really works and what adjust-
ments are made as a result.
I appreciate, General, your testimony or your answer to the ques-
tion. Those answers are in most of the books that we get here, most
of the briefings. But I am wondering what adjustments are actually
made in terms of real life?
General JONES. I can start quite a while back. When I arrived
in March of 2004 one of the first big adjustments that we made
was the concept of embedded teams. We started off with the Iraqi
Army Forces having what I would call part-time advisors, and that
is people who would go through as mobile training teams, which is
a very effective way to train U.S. forces.
However, what we discovered, beginning with the April 2004 op-
erations that went on where we saw the Iraqi forces weren't pro-
gressing like we thought they would, what we saw was that was
not a very effective method of training Iraqis.


to do about the force, you generally look to the higher head-
quarters, the services, if you will, or the Joint Staff to make the
recommendations on that.
Mr. MEEHAN. As Members of Congress, one of the reasons why
we go to Iraq on a regular basis is to actually talk to the men and
women who are on the front lines, because often times we get a
better perspective. Sometimes we hear that they are not getting
equipment that they need; or we are hearing that there are prob-
lems with communication that result in not having up-armored
Kevlar vests, for example; not getting water, those types of things.
That is why the committee likes to try to get, in addition to able,
articulate people like yourselves, to get some people who are really
more operational.
Mr. Akin.
Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you were to change hats
with us and be Congressmen—I know that might seem like a
nightmare to some degree—but when we go to Iraq, depending who
you talk to, you get valuable information depending on what level
you are. Sometimes if you are talking to a sergeant you get some
very specific information on a point topic.
I think my favorite people to talk to were lieutenant colonels,
just because it seemed like they had responsibility for something
and they would say, look, I don't know anything else a
is going on but this area; this is my deal and I can tell you about
it.
We got some very valuable help. We calibrate what we are ask-
ing questions about and sometimes we get the top commanders
talking to us. Everything was generalities but nothing to flesh the
picture out. And I think that is what the Chairman was making
reference to.
General Jones, you started to develop a little bit of the transition
of how we are working with the training. You said initially we run
a team of people through the way we treat the U.S. troops, and it
seems to work okay for the U.S. troops but it wasn't working in
Iraq. So, instead, the concept was to take the team and just lit-
erally leave them with the unit for a period of time.
Is that partly because they didn't have the same assumptions
that our troops do, and so you have to—it takes longer to build
that? And what were the transitions, if you would just kind of
speed up your answer, from when you were there in April of 2004,
what were those changes and how did we learn and develop how
we were doing the training?
General JONES. If I can answer the second part first. We
transitioned to this embedding concept. Another adjustment that
we made was, in fact, beginning to collect readiness information be-
cause the Iraqis had no system for doing that. The next major shift
was the establishment of partnering units. That was an item that
was done a little bit more than a year ago.
So it has been a series of adjustments made, based on what we
thought was best as the situation developed. In terms-
Mr. AKIN. Were some of those things, with 20–20 hindsight,
things you would have done five years ago, or were some of those
things also because the Iraq situation was moving as well?


16
what has been called the kind of open source decentralization of
the insurgency, of the warlords, militias, that we should be talking
more about what we are learning from what they are doing, and
how we are responding, and how we are in fact training the Iraqis,
along with ourselves, to adapt better. Is that something that we
ought to be focusing on more than on numbers? Because if we don't
get what is going on out there, if we don't know our enemy, then
how in the heck are we going to be able to be successful at what
we are doing? And so I am just, you know, is that appropriate from
your points of view? Is it only numbers? What are we missing?
General JONES. Ma'am, I would say in fact it is a whole lot more
than numbers. You know, it is nice to have quantifiable things to
analyze. And quantifiable things are very important, but there are
some things that aren't as easily quantifiable that are also very im-
portant as well. In terms of adaptation for the security forces in
Iraq, I think that is probably not a well understood, but very im-
portant, aspect of all of this. And the more you understand about
the adaptations we are trying to have, I think the more you recog-
nize the level of difficulty of the task.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Can you identify what is the greatest
frustration in trying to do that and trying to ascertain that then?
And again, what is it? Do we need more resources? What would
make a difference?
General JONES. Part of it is time. You know, we have institutions
in Iraq that have at least 35 years, but probably more than that,
of institutional culture that we are trying to change. Under the
Saddam era, the security forces were focused pretty much on a sin-
gle thing, and that is keeping an individual in power. The idea of
having an institution whose job it was to serve the Nation or the
people of the Nation is a marked change in the institutional culture
that, you know, that we are working with. And we have made con-
siderable progress in doing that, but it is an extremely difficult
task. We are trying to create security forces that can deal with an
insurgent environment. The traditional Iraqi Army forces were
trained to deal with conventional threats, other armies. They had
no doctrine, no concept of how to do intelligence-based operations
to deal with an insurgency. So we have started to work that basi-
cally from the ground up to include the training of all Iraqi leaders
who, none of them had really any experience or any background
that would make it easy for them to make that transition as well.
So, I mean, there are a lot of things like that that are not quantifi-
able things but that are part of this whole rubric.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. How are we going to use that then to
try and move forward, understanding it is not all quantifiable, but
I guess what I am looking for is something that I am not just read-
ing in the papers, that we could be doing that is specific. And
maybe, you know, getting moving away from this little bit, if you
could talk about, we are obviously involved in a surge. Has that
taken folks away from the embedding and the training to your
knowledge?
General JONES. The answer is no. This plus-up of forces is in ad-
dition to the forces that were there and the transition teams that
are embedded. So in fact it hasn't taken away from the transition
teams. What has happened is the number of forces that are





34
today. Because some of our other efforts have been delayed or blocked, we finally
requested access to commanders whose plans, policies and assessment of progress
are crucial to our understanding of the effort to transition security responsibilities to
the Iraqi Security Forces. They were not made available, so we asked for their
deputies or any knowledgeable staff officer. None were made available and no
alternatives were suggested. Then we asked for knowledgeable staff officers from
Central Command Headquarters in Tampa. We were told none was capable of
providing testimony. We were offered instead a possible CODEL for eight Members
late in June, which we will appreciate but is really much delayed in contributing to
important debates in this House. And I would remind the committee that a staff
delegation arranged for mid April was cancelled. We were also offered access to
Lieutenant General Dempsey when he returns in mid-June, which we will also
appreciate but which also doesn't fulfill our requirements.
So gentleman, I hope for all our sakes' that you are able to answer our questions
today. Among them will be specific questions about the contents of a critical
document that this subcommittee has not been able to obtain, the Joint Campaign
Plan signed by the Commander of the Multinational Forces Iraq and the Embassy as
it pertains to developing the Iraqi Security Forces. MNSTC-I also has an unclassified
Campaign Plan for developing the ISF and that has not been provided to us either.
Today's hearing will begin with testimony from Mr. Peter Velz who is from the office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the Middle
East. He will be followed by Brigadier General Michael Jones from the Joint Staff. He
is the Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs for the Middle East.
To encourage discussion, I would like to follow the same less-formal procedures
today as we have in our previous sessions. Thave talked with our distinguished
Ranking Member, and he has agreed to dispense with the 5-minute rule during
today's hearing, but I would ask my colleagues not to monopolize the witnesses. I
will try to alternate in recognizing members between the majority and Minority,
I would like to remind everyone that this is an open hearing so no classified
information will be discussed. However, if necessary, when we are finished here we
can retire to a separate room for a classified discussion for just members and
cleared staff.
Welcome again to our witnesses. We're looking forward to your remarks. We will take
your whole text for the record, but I ask that you keep your prepared remarks fairly
brief so we can get to our questions.
Now, I would like to turn to my colleague, Mr. Akin, our ranking member, for any
opening remarks he might have.