mation was presented, so please be mindful of anything you might
say based on what you heard in the closed briefing.
Again, we welcome our witnesses. Thank you for being here. And
we are looking forward to your remarks. And we will take your
whole text for the record, but I would ask you to keep your pre-
pared remarks fairly brief so that we can get to our questions.
And now I would like to turn to my colleague, Mr. Akin, our
ranking member, for any opening remarks that he might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Meehan can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 69.]
STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND IN-
VESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses for taking time to join us.
And I think today's hearing is starting to come toward ti
of our hearing overall study of how things are going in training the
Iraqi Security Forces, and particularly the focus today is on con-
tractors and how the contractors help to fill this critical mission,
particularly building the Iraqi Security Forces.
Specifically, I am interested in how we use contractors for train-
ing the Iraq police services. And it seems to be that the police area
is one that we need to pay some particular attention to and under-
stand what is going on there, for no other reason, the police, as sort
of a new idea, I suppose, to the Iraqis.
The U.S. government's reliance on contracts raises a second, re-
lated issue that has come up indirectly a number of times over the
course of our investigation. I am referring to the challenge of effec-
tive interagency participation in Iraq. Today's hearing should shed
light on how agencies other than Department of Defense have and
inue to contribute to the development of the ISF, in particular,
and improving the overall situation in Iraq in general.
Winning this war requires the application of all elements of na-
tional power; we must be able to tap into a wide-ranging expertise
resident across the U.S. Government.
It seems to me that both the State and Justice Departments rely
on contractors to carry out missions that reside within their area
of expertise, at least with respect to training local police. I would
like our witnesses to comment on the rationale for this practice and
the benefits and drawbacks of using contractors in Iraq.
Finally, I want to comment on one specific contract matter. Use
of contractors in theater is a complicated situation. When contrac-
tors are embedding in the U.S. police transition teams, as in the
case of the international police liaison officers, an already com-
plicated matter turns into a matter of concern. I am curious about
the guidance we give these contractors with respect to co
and control, personal security, and logistical support.
I look forward to the witnesses elaborating on some of these
points. And, once again, thank you all for joining us.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appen-
dix on page 71.]
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Akin.


ment Agency (DEA), Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms Bureau (ATF),
and the U.S. Marshals.
I might also note that even the most effective police will not be
successful if the rest of the criminal justice system is broken. We
are therefore providing substantial support to the criminal justice
sector in concert with our interagency partners and contractors.
Today, it also my pleasure to review the steps INL has taken to
improve contract management and oversight. ČPATT and the mili-
tary continue to set the overall requirements for the mission and
exercise operational control over the police advisers and trainers
that INL supplies. However, we are responsible for managing and
overseeing our contracts with service providers and for monitoring
our agreements with interagency partners.
We have cooperated closely with the various inspectors general
and have undertaken our own assessments, asset verifications, and
audits to identify problems in management contract oversight. Nu-
merous remedial measures to have already been taken, and we are
constantly exploring ways to be more effective.
In the past, the mission in Iraq has often outstripped our staffing
and oversight capabilities, both domestically and in the field. Rec-
ognizing this, we added 64 permanent positions, recently obtained
approval from Embassy Baghdad to increase INL's permanent
staffing from 4 to 20 people—4 are from a contract officer rep-
resentatives—and created an entire contract support division for
programs in Iraq, Jordan and Afghanistan, which consist of 15 em-
ployees. We are also expanding our Washington-based Iraq pro-
gram staff.
We continue to strengthen internal controls, as well, in areas
such as inventory oversight and performance reporting on property
management. Statements of work are now more detailed provide
contractors with specific requirements and performance standards.
INL is improving our invoice files and significantly is actively
reconciling all past payments made since the inception of our con-
tracts in Iraq and Jordan, as well as Afghanistan. This is an inten-
sive process, which includes the review of an estimated 2 million
pages of supporting documentation, covering roughly $2.5 billion in
contracts, that will require approximately 10 full-time staff mem-
bers an estimated three years to complete, but I assure you we will
recover any payments inconsistent with contract terms and condi-
tions.
The Department of State and INL are committed to promoting
competition and have recently competed or are in the process of
competing several of our Iraq contracts and task orders. We re-
cently began the process of competing the task order for most of
the personnel and related support INL provides in Iraq.
Contractors are critical to implementing programs in Iraq and
other crisis zones, but we recognize it is our duty to ensure that
contracts are carefully monitored, as American lives and tax dollars
are at stake. We have made significant progress in recent months,
but this effort will require constant vigilance.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Patterson can be found
in the Appendix on page 74.]
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you very much.
Lonciling all past prdan, as well a view of an esthlu$2.5 billion


Turning now to the mission in Iraq, the United States Depart-
ment of Justice has been involved, in terms of police training, po-
lice development, from the very start in Iraq.
Shortly after the fall of Baghdad, in May 2003, the Department
of Justice criminal division deployed, with funding from INL, a se-
lect team of 25 senior Federal law enforcement officials to assess
the state of the justice system in Iraq. And the result of that as-
sessment team was a comprehensive set of three reports regarding
the police services, the corrections services, and the justice element
of the country of Iraq.
The ICITAP portion, the police training portion of that mission,
stayed on and was critical in helping to stand up, from the start,
the Irag police services, the border agency, and the corrections
services. And from that day until the current time, ICITAP has
been in the country of Iraq for the Department of Justice, working
in three critical areas: police strategy, in terms of development and
training; corrections, where, too, we have helped establish the
strategy for the corrections services and implement it; and, finally,
anti-corruption, where the Department of Justice, through ICITAP,
has been extremely active in the Commission for Public Integrity.
Our current staffing is four authorized slots for senior, full-time
employees, Federal senior law enforcement agencies, and a number
of contractor positions for each of these missions. And in each of
these areas, corrections, police, anti-corruption, we have helped cre-
ate and develop strategies; we have helped formulate training g cur-
riculum, and provide that training curriculum; helped established
and lead academies; and have participated under the direction of
CPATT, in particular, in the training of tens of thousands of Iraqi
police and correctional officers.
I would be remiss, however, if I did not, in my third topic, point
out that ICITAP's efforts, dramatic as they have been and, we be-
lieve, as dedicated as they have been, are only part of the efforts
undertaken by the Department of Justice, with regard to Iraq and
the rule of law in Iraq.
There are a number of Federal law enforcement agencies from
the Department of Justice that have been involved, again, from the
start in police training and police-related activities in Iraq. Among
those are OPDAT, as mentioned, our overseas prosecutorial devel-
opment office, which has deployed a number of assistant United
States attorneys or other Federal prosecutors to serve both in the
embassy in Baghdad, as rule of law advisers, and on the provincial
reconstruction teams.
Those advisers have helped mentor and train investigative
judges and trial judges, have provided advice on both the structure
and the implementation of the prosecutorial service, and have been
instrumental throughout in building up the counterpart to the po-
lice and correctional aspects of our work there.
In addition, the United States Marshals service, again, often-
times with funding from State and INL, has provided invaluable
training, with regard to judicial security, witness security, and re-
lated court personnel security matters, and is now engaged in help-
ing to establish a similar marshals service in Iraq itself.
The ATF, our alcohol, tobacco, firearms and explosives agency,
has been involved in training, with regard to explosives and


10
STATEMENT OF COL. ANITA M. RAINES, CHIEF, LOGISTICS
SERVICES DIVISION, J4 DIRECTORATE, JOINT STAFF, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Colonel RAINES. Good morning, sir.
Chairman Meehan, Congressman Akin, and members of the com-
mittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss contracting issues related to the Iraqi and Afghan secu-
rity forces. To put my testimony into context, I am speaking to you
today as the chief of the logistics services division within the J4 lo-
gistics directorate of the Joint Staff.
As a career multifunctional logistician, I have served as the divi-
sion chief for six months and have supervisory responsibility for
's primary functions, which include mortuary affairs,
base camp services, and contracting. We serve as the combatant
command's advocate and integrator for these joint functions within
the Joint Staff.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for
your continued support, and I am happy to address your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Colonel Raines and Mr. Motsek
can be found in the Appendix on page 94.]
Mr. AKIN (presiding). The chairman stepped out for just a
minute, so I get to enjoy for a moment a chance to ask a question
or two.
And I guess I had quite a few, but, Mr. Swartz, maybe I would
start where you are. And I would like to just make something that
is an intuitive kind of thing that I have been seeing, as we have
been having hearings, and also my trip to Iraq several times. And
tell me if you think that at least I am on to something, and how
does that relate to your area of expertise.
It is my sense is that our warfighters have been reasonably well-
organized, done a pretty good job, but when it comes to the non-
military pieces that we have to do to build a civilization, particu-
larly things like wire transfers of money and banking, creating an
entire judicial system, it is not just a matter of police, which they
don't really understand the technology of police anyway, but aside
from that, a judicial system, some kind of system of law and a
place to put the bad guys and lock them up, that entire system, my
sense is that we can tell a general to go somewhere and go fight
a way, but we don't tell the Department of Justice to take a battal-
ion over and set up a judicial system. We don't say to Commerce,
you know, “Go set up a banking system,” or whatever it is.
So I guess my question is, is that true, that we are not as well-
equipped to do the non-military functions? And you said that you
made what sounded like a great statement, all the stuff that Jus-
tice has done and everything, but there is one thing you said. You
said we had four full-time employees—that seemed like maybe you
needed a little more than that to set up a justice system in Iraq,
if that is what I heard you saying.
So if you would comment on that. And I can cheat with this
question a little bit and say that relates, also, to the development
of the police services, but that is my overall concern. Are we really
equipped and organizationally set up to do things other than just
military? And I hate to use the word nation-building, but anybody
has a free shot at that. I have a couple of minutes.


12
of 40 to 50. I will do the math while my colleagues address this,
but we do have-
Mr. AKIN. It is still a relatively small number, though. So you are
counting a lot on contractors to help do what has to be done over
there?
Mr. SWARTZ. In terms of the implementing the day-to-day train-
ing, that is correct. That is an essential element of what we do.
Mr. AKIN. Anybody else want to take a quick shot at that before
my nickel runs out here?
Ambassador PATTERSON. Mr. Akin, let me just say that this issue
has provoked a lot of soul-searching on the part of the Administra-
tion, and there is a special office that has been set up in the State
Department led by Ambassador John Herbst. And he has the full
support of Secretary Rice. And you might want to ask him for a
briefing directly, but he has about 30 people working for him.
And he designing, basically, a civilian reserve corps.
ivilian reserve corps. And he has
reached out to a number of other agencies and his colleagues with-
in the State Department to plan. And the idea of this would be that
it could deploy quickly in emergency situations, that security on
the ground get basic economic services restored. And, again, I think
it might be interesting to hear from him directly. But this, as you
say, is a real issue.
Mr. AKIN. So you are agreeing with me that it is an issue, but
you are also saying that we are trying to address that,
Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. AKIN. And, I guess, my question is, I assume we have run
into this in other nations where we have been, but we don't always
learn by our mistakes, either. So my question is, do we have some-
thing ready to go so that we end up getting into some conflict and
we have to do some rebuilding, do we have teams that can go in?
So you are saying he is the guy to talk to?
Ambassador PATTERSON. Sir, I have been in the foreign service
for almost 34 years, and I have never seen anything on this scale.
For instance, in Haiti, in 1994, it was a much easier situation. We
confronted many of the same problems you are seeing in Iraq
today, but the scale was simply a lot less, so it was easier to take
them out of the civilian agencies and deploy them more rapidly.
And, frankly, the sums involved were a lot less, as well.
Mr. SWARTZ. And, Mr. Akin, if I may return to that topic, as I
think we demonstrated in Iraq with the support of our other agen-
cies, particularly State Department, the criminal division of the
Department of Justice and the other law enforcement entities in
the Department of Justice can deploy almost immediately a rapid
force to assess the situation and to put in place the structure that
needs to be put in place for whatever—work is done.
And if I may supplement my answer, just doing the math
Mr. AKIN. But for all of your assurances, there really isn't a court
system in Iraq now, is there?
Mr. SWARTZ. Well, I cannot say that we have successfully com-
pleted that process, but I think we have certainly—we have made
strides, in terms of the judges we have worked with. And I think
umber of investigative judges who have shown a great
deal of courage throughout this process and worked very closely
with our Federal prosecutors over there.


13
And if I may just supplement my answer, it looks—just my quick
calculation—we have approximately 75 to 100 personnel, with re-
gard to training and operations, and that is not counting the ap-
proximately 120 we have the regime crimes liaison office.
Mr. AKIN. Not a word from Fort Belvoir here or anything? I am
a survivor of Fort Belvoir.
Mr. MOTSEK. I survived Fort Belvoir. In fact, they moved my old
headquarters.
So you bring up—the question you asked from the Department
of Defense is in the larger context, which is, we made a conscious
decision in the early 1990's to size the force at a particular size,
and then we decided to focus our forces on the pointy end of the
spear, if you will. And so we took the risk in the back end.
So we knew consciously that we were going to have to rely on
a package that was not organic to us, that was going to be con-
tracted. That was a conscious decision. What Ambassador Patter-
son said, though, was absolutely correct. The order of magnitude of
this effort dwarfs anything we have done in the past.
Just for a quick buzz, we constantly talk about the LOGCAP con-
tract, the multibillion-dollar contract that we use for general sup-
port inside the area of responsibility (AOR). That is multibillion
dollars today. If you added up all the previous LOGCAP contracts,
summed them for all the previous contingencies that we had, you
be somewhere in a little bit of excess of $600 million. So that
gives you a sizing issue that we have been faced with.
And so the discussion might be appropriate as to, did we do the
right thing? Do we need to re-look consciously where the chop lines
need to be on the variety of functions? And I am sure that the
other agencies in government have a similar function. It is exacer-
bated at DOD simply because of our size.
Mr. AKIN. The scale of what you are dealing with.
Mr. MOTSEK. Yes, sir.
Mr. AKIN. Mr. Chairman, I have strayed a little bit, I confess,
from the strictly police and all, but it does connect to the contract-
ing. Thanks so much.
Mr. MEEHAN (presiding). Thank you very much, Mr. Akin.
My question is primarily for Ambassador Patterson, but I would
like the other panelists to comment. What is the current status of
the contracts overseen by the INL, the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and ICITAP, the Inter-
national Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, with
respect to the international police trainers and international police
liaison offices that are providing training to the Iraqi police? What
is the status of those contracts?
Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, the status of INL's portion with
DynCorp, the contract—we went out to our three main contractors
with a statement of objectives last week. We are in the process of
re-bidding this contract, and we hope we will be finished by the
19th of July.
Mr. MEEHAN. We have heard varying reports regarding the qual-
ity of police trainers being provided for police liaison officers. How
do you respond to our reference that they tend to lack the manage-
ment and training experience that would truly make them useful
for the mission that they were tasked with?


15
of the decision the President made, but he made the decision. We
need to do what we can to make it work.
But we can't be satisfied with where we are at, and I know you
are not satisfied, either. So then the—not the frustration—chal-
lenge for Mr. Akin, and Mr. Meehan, this committee, and the Con-
gress, American people, is how we can we be of help? I mean, how
can we help sort this stuff out, not in a combative relationship?
That is what was so discouraging about this memo a few days
ago, is this committee is not trying to be in a combat with the Sec-
retary of Defense's office. But we are trying to figure out ways that
we can help, because no one is satisfied with how it is going.
So part of, it seems to me, what we try to do is to look at, well,
do we have the right people? Do we have the right congressional
oversight? Do you have the tools—or the financing? Do you have
the right tools that you need to help you deal with wayward con-
tractors, when someone goes awry, I mean, all those kind of things?
Because, obviously, we don't know how to do your work. We don't
know how to do it. And it is a frustrating thing.
I wanted to ask a series of questions in that vein. Secretary Pat-
terson, what languages, foreign languages, do you speak?
Ambassador PATTERSON. I speak decent Spanish and have had a
year of Arabic, which I don't remember very well.
Dr. SNYDER. And Arkansan?
Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes. [Laughter.]
Dr. SNYDER. What has been your experience with regard to try-
ing to fill these positions with contractors or State Department per-
sonnel with regard to language skills?
Ambassador PATTERSON. I can speak to my INL office there. I be-
lieve we have one person there who speaks some Arabic. We have
a 10-person office of 10 professionals that is going increasingly up
to 20. It has been an enormous challenge, and I can't speak for the
department as a whole. I know the Secretary has addressed this
in her hearings, but language capability has been a huge challenge
in all the deployments.
Dr. SNYDER. Now, as somebody who has been in the business
since—I think 1973 is when your career started, and you ha
very illustrious career, we are proud of you—when September 11th
occurred, the whole country was stymied by this whole issue of,
how do we get language-skilled peoples that meet the security clas-
sification and everything?
But we are now five years later from that. Why are we still sty-
mied with regard to language skills in State Department person-
nel? Why has there not been a successful effort so that there would
have been the kind of focus on, I assume that we think language
skills are important to do these jobs—why are we still behind, this
many years later from when the war started and when the war in
Afghanistan started?
Ambassador PATTERSON. Sir, I will take that question back to
our management and get an answer for you, because I have heard
the Secretary answer this in other oversight hearings. And, frank-
ly, I don't want to v
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin-
ning on page 139.]
Dr. SNYDER. We like winging it.


16
Ambassador PATTERSON. I must say that a lot of the Arabic
speakers have done service in Iraq. And then it is not as if they
are sitting in Paris. They have been to places like Yemen or Saudi
Arabia, too, where we served, my husband and I served.
So I think the system is just stressed, but I will take
tion back and get an answer for you from the director general.
Dr. SNYDER. And then one final question, if I might, Mr. Chair-
man.
Mr. Swartz, if Ms. Patterson has a U.S. contractor—and I have
had some in my district that have served both DOD and State De-
partment—and it turns out that an individual turns out to be a
drug dealer, who, in the course of the drug dealing, has shot and
killed a couple of Iraqi civilians, what is your ability—how is that
person dealt with in the legal system? Who has the authority to
prosecute that person? And how many people have we had those
kinds of issues? Do we have people out there with those kinds of
challenges that are not being dealt with by anyone's legal system?
Mr. SWARTZ. Sir, I think that that is a question that I will also
take back, but I can tell you that, thanks to the work of Congress,
with regard to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act,
MEJA, we have certainly had expansive and expanded powers to
deal with that type of issue, that is, to deal with criminal actions
taken in certain circumstances for those accompanying military
forces abroad.
In terms of people out there, as Ambassador Patterson has sug-
gested, we have, I think, all three entities here have moved quickly
to deal with any questions of misconduct, in terms of leaving people
in place. And I could give you further information, I believe, with
regard to, in general terms, any ongoing criminal investigations,
with the main focus on contractors.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin-
ning on page 139.]
Dr. SNYDER. Well, I want to be sure what part you are taking
for the record and what part you are not. Who is going to prosecute
the person I described?
Mr. SWARTZ. Sir, it would depend. I would have to look at the
facts of the particular case to see whether we can fit into one of
our particular jurisdictional statutes within the Federal criminal
justice system. The Department of Defense can address the capac-
ity of the Iraqi government to deal with contractors or not, in terms
of what is permitted.
But in terms of our actions, of course, the criminal division,
whenever possible, seeks to prosecute any criminal activity that is
engaged in by contractors. And it would depend, again, on whether
the jurisdictional prerequisites for our statutes were met in a par-
ticular instance.
I would believe, again, in the hypothetical you have provided,
that we would be able to find a basis of prosecution of such an indi-
vidual, probably on several different jurisdictional bases.
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.
Mr. Gingrey.
Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


20
is in our interest to start consolidating these down to a more man-
ageable level.
And so we are in the process of doing that, as we speak, as well.
Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Andrews.
Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you.
I would like to thank the witnesses for their testimony this
morning and each of you for your service to the country, as well.
We greatly appreciate it.
And particularly you, Mr. Motsek, please give your son our best
wishes and our thanks for his service.
Mr. Motsek used the phrase "effective stewardship” a few min-
utes ago. And, Ms. Patterson, I want to ask you about some con-
cerns we have about effective stewardship at the Joint Police
Training Academy in Jordan (JIPTC).
Two months ago, the chairman led members of this subcommit-
tee and others to a visit to Iraq, and Jordan, and Kuwait, Brussels.
And one of the stops was at the police training academy in Jordan,
which I will call the JIPTC for purposes of our discussion.
In your testimony, you note that more than 54,000 Iraqi police
recruits have been trained in the basic training at the JIPTC.
When we visited the JIPTC, we were told—now, let me preface this
by saying, I was very impressed by the quality of the work by the
people running by the JIPTC. They were sincere, and they are very
competent. They are very committed to their mission. And I have
no doubt that they do a very good job training police recruits.
My concern is the quality of the recruits coming in and what
happens when they leave. We were essentially told that referrals
to the JIPTC were done by the Iraqi government without a signifi-
cant background check. Whomever they sent got trained. There is
a biometric identification process when recruits arrive, but that
process is not then matched against any database, we were told, so
that we can determine who, in fact, is coming in the front door of
the academy.
Is that so? Do we know who was coming in the front door of the
JIPTC?
Ambassador PATTERSON. Let me first say, Congressman, that ba-
sically the role of the trainers and the officers at JIPTC is not to
handle recruitment, nor is it to handle deployment after they re-
turn.
But on the recruitment side, it is CPATT that handles recruit-
ment, and I know they are working vigorously to improve the re-
cruitment process and the vetting process. But the biometric thing
that you saw there—and I have seen it myself—is a feedback mech-
anism to develop databases—
Mr. ANDREWS. If I may, who is responsible for the recruitment
of people coming into the JIPTC?
Ambassador PATTERSON. CPATT, the civilian police mission han-
dles recruitment. Certainly in the early stages—I am not trying to
duck your question.
Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.
Ambassador PATTERSON. Certainly in the early stages there was
a problem with recruiting and with vetting. They have been run-
ning these names against existing Iraqi criminal databases, and


21
one figure that sticks in my mind—and this is a better question for
DOD than for ourselves—they have gotten rid of over 3,000 people,
because they have found criminal records on these individuals.
So this is an ongoing challenge. You bet, it is an ongoing chal-
lenge. But there has been some improvement
Mr. ANDREWS. Here is the specific question I am asking. When
a recruit walked through the front door of the JIPTC a year ago,
did we know, in fact, who that person was, or did we have to rely
upon who they said they were?
Ambassador PATTERSON. I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. ANDREWS. Could you get the answer for us?
Ambassador PATTERSON. We will ask CPATT to give you the an-
swer.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin-
ning on page 140.]
Mr. ANDREWS. Okay.
Second is, when this biometric database was up and running,
against what was it checked? So if we collect someone's biometric
information, did we check it against a database that would have
identified a Shiite militia fighter or an al Qaeda member? Did we
or did we not?
Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, we will have to take most of that for the
record, but when you talk about those specific sub-elements, part
of the databases that are referenced—and, again, you are only as
good as your databases, as you are alluding to—are the field inter-
views and the field records that are prepared by the military side
of the house. So that is included in the
Mr. ANDREWS. Let me ask you this specific question. If, in March
of 2004, a suspected al Qaeda fighter is arrested and detained in
Iraq, and he or she is then biometrically identified when they are
held in Baghdad, and then they are released for whatever reason,
and then they use a different name and enroll in the JIPTC, would
we know that the person who enrolled in JIPTC was that suspected
al Qaeda fighter?
Ambassador PATTERSON. I think so.
Mr. ANDREWS. You think so. How would we know that?
Ambassador PATTERSON. We can't–because we have fingerprint
checks. And we will get you more definition here, but there is a fin-
gerprint check, and it does get checked against Iraqi databases. So
I think that would be the case. We need to get-
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin-
ning on page 140.]
Mr. ANDREWS. That is not what we were told by the people run-
ning the JIPTC.
Ambassador PATTERSON. Okay, well, we need to get you more
precision-
Mr. ANDREWS. What they told us 60 days ago was that a large
majority of the people who came through the front door were not
checked against any existing database. Could you clarify that dif-
ference for me?
Ambassador PATTERSON. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Mr. ANDREWS. All right, the second question I have is about cost.
Our research indicates that, by the time the chairman led the
CODEL to the JIPTC, that the American taxpayers had spent


24
I would be astonished if it were not true that some percentage
of these graduates are out there attacking our forces today, after
we have spent $500 million on this.
The final question I have for you is—
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Andrews, just on that point, what was inter-
esting about it was, it seemed, in the screening process, the only
Iraqis who they screened out were Iraqis who had already been
trained prior to—in other words, they had the fingerprints of some-
body who had already gone through the training, who would come
back to the facility to be trained again under a different name,
however—for a refresher course under a different name. However,
because of the system with the fingerprinting, we were able, it
seems, to weed those people out, but I don't think there
NDREWS. Well, if the chairman will recall, the other thing
that we found very disconcerting is that we asked, who was ex-
pelled and on what basis? Because we were told by the leaders of
the academy they do expel people. And the basis for expulsion for
really misbehavior during the training course. So this means that,
if an al Qaeda member was polite for eight weeks, they stayed, and
they learned all of it.
I mean, here is the final question I have for you. How many peo-
ple are being trained at the JIPTC this morning?
Ambassador PATTERSON. This morning?
Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.
Ambassador PATTERSON. I think we started our corrections pro-
gram at 830.
Mr. ANDREWS. Eight hundred and thirty people.
Ambassador PATTERSON. Or in the process of arriving. This is a
new course, Congressman, for corrections officials.
Mr. ANDREWS. How many Iraqi police are being trained at the
facility this morning?
Ambassador PATTERSON. None.
Mr. ANDREWS. None? So all the Iraqi police are now being
trained somewhere else in Iraq?
Ambassador PATTERSON. In Iraq.
Mr. ANDREWS. This is after we spent $150 million on the facility,
we are not training Iraqi police anymore? Why is that?
Ambassador PATTERSON. Because they are being trained in Iraq.
And the idea is that we don't want to continue paying the overhead
on what you aptly described is a very expensive facility, if we have
no reason to use it.
Mr. ANDREWS. But how does it make sense, from a cost manage-
ment perspective, to incur an entirely different set of overhead for
new places in Iraq that I assume we are paying for, as well?
Ambassador PATTERSON. We are not paying for them. That func-
tion has been largely turned over to the Iraqis.
Mr. ANDREWS. The Iraqi government is paying for these training
facilities?
Ambassador PATTERSON. The Iraqi-yes, again, this is a question
more appropriately addressed to CPATT, but the training function
has been largely turned over the Iraqis.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Motsek, are we paying any of the overhead
in those new facilities or are the Iraqis paying for all of it?


29
to start at it. Your role is obviously to come in here and put the
absolute best foot forward, your organizations, and I understand
that.
But, together, our role is to try to get it right. And parts of my
frustration is, this system, this deal doesn't allow you to share
is not working. We heard about
that you have done, and it is positive, and all those kinds of things,
but I don't think anybody remotely thinks that the Iraqi justice
system, the Iraqi police system, any of those Iraqi functions are
working the way that we would want to.
And to the extent that we still have a role in that, I understand
the chairman's frustration, in that sovereign government's going to
make decisions that we disagree with, but it is their government.
If they decide to move all the training to Baghdad, and it is on
their nickel, you know, that is one of the joys of working with a
partner that gets to control their deal. They make decisions that
we don't necessarily agree with.
On a second comment, I was in a hearing yesterday in which the
Department of Agriculture was complaining about not being able to
contract for stenographers, hearing reporters, and how difficult
that was for them. And they were using that as an excuse as to
why it took so long to make certain changes in the milk program.
Last time I checked, I don't think we have had an IED or a gun-
fight at any of those hearings, so figuring out how you find contrac-
tors, and how you manage those contractors, and how you get rid
of the bad ones and keep the good ones, can you talk to us—I am
a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) by background, and so I have
a sheet in here that is labeled “Exhibit E” from some place, that
says somebody did some sort of an audit—they use that phrase
$3.2 billion has been looked at.
How do you coordinate-obviously, you have three different orga-
nizations at the table. You all have your own funding streams. You
all have your own ideas about how-how do you coordinate be-
tween each other just the review of contractors? Or do your con-
tractors just work for you and you are solely responsible for that
work?
In other words, how do you manage that contractor group? Do
you ever actually fire somebody? And not these individual folks
who are actually providing the work, but I am talking about the
DynCorps and the umbrella folks, who actually you looked at first.
How do you set up a system to evaluate those guys or do you, I
guess is a better question?
Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, we are principally responsible for contract exe-
cution.
Mr. CONAWAY. Even on the State Department side?
Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, it is not an easy question to answer, because,
as I said, this is a rather unique lash-up. And what will happen
is, we have two sets of overriding direction on what we are doing.
We have the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), the acquisition
regulations, but then we also have the FMR, the financial manage-
ment regulations. So those are the two big, broad contexts, big
muscle moves, CPA-oriented-type documents we have to operate
under.


33
would like to be able to come tell you where we stand at any given
date so you can see the progress made.
But I honestly got to tell you, you have to give us a chance to
implement it, because a lot of people are demanding a lot of infor-
mation, and a lot of sub-element pieces that we are trying to pull
together to give you a coherent package. So, from a personal stand-
point, if we can have the chance to actually implement that, which
we are aggressively doing, and I fully support it, it is a logical
thing for us to have to do. And it was a very good piece of legisla-
tion, which we are following as best that we can.
The second piece is just
Mr. MEEHAN. Excuse me. On the first piece, does that mean you
think that, in the defense authorization bill, there should be an ad-
justment in the lang
Mr. MOTSEK. No, sir, just give me a chance to implement what
you got, because we are pushing the envelope. But I am more than
willing to come up and let you know where we stand on any given
day as to how we are doing and implementing, and then the warts
will become obvious where I have a problem.
And the second piece of that will be that and this is just for
your information now-it would be premature for me to ask for
your direct help, but just to be aware of it, is that the contractor
personnel issue is bigger than the Department of Defense. You
of Congress keep on talking about the AOR in general.
And we are backing into the control of that.
The field, the commander in the field has published fraggos that
talk about the responsibility of non-DOD contractors to report into
our automated system so we can get a feel for them. It is very im-
portant, as I said early on, the man in the field, I am principally
interested for the numbers, for the sake of a security and force pro-
tection. And so, at some point in time, we may need assistance in
making that a forcing function, if we can't get it through fraggos
in the field and compliance at DFAR. So we may come back to you
for some help there.
Mr. SWARTZ. And, Mr. Conaway and Mr. Chairman, if I may add,
as a general matter, I think that hearings that let us explore the
importance of technical assistance and developmental work with
regard to security forces and police forces around the world are
very useful to highlight, I think, the important work that is being
done by the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and
DOD. And it is seldom recognized, but it is critical, we believe, to
our national security interests.
Mr. MEEHAN. Mrs. Davis.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
Thank you to all of
It is clear this is very complicated. I think, Ms. Patterson, you
probably put it best when you said that the requirement here has
outstripped our efforts, and a lot of catching up to do. About how
long has it been, then, since you feel that you actually are moving
in a direction that is going to accomplish results? How long has it
been, if at all? Where do you think that has been, the last year-
Ambassador PATTERSON. For my own operation, I have been here
about a year and a half, but I would put it well before that, about
all of you for being here


49
highlighted in this hearing. The role of the private sector is too lit-
tle understood and too often treated with suspicion.
About ourselves, the International Peace Operations Association
(IPOA) is a non-profit, non-partisan, nongovernmental association
of service companies providing critical services to peace and stabil-
ity operations worldwide. We have more than 30 member compa-
nies providing services, including training, logistics, security, avia-
tion, mine action, and medical support. We represent a demand-
driven industry, providing cost-effective services in some of the
most dangerous environments imaginable.
This testimony will provide some background information and
explain why our government utilizes these companies to enhance
policies and ways the government could be a smart client.
First, I want to be clear. The leadership, initiative and oversight
of the training effort must come from the governments of the
United States and Iraq. While some of the actual training can be
done by U.S. military and government employees, a significant por-
tion of the expertise, resources, and hundreds of the experienced
long-term personnel doing the hands-on training and mentoring are
necessarily going to come from the private sector.
This is a concept where an effective public-private partnership is
simply indispensable. Indeed, it is inconceivable that success could
be achieved any other way. Attempting reconstruction and redevel-
opment in the face of an ongoing conflict is necessarily difficult,
and nothing quite like the operation in Iraq has been attempted in
the past.
The closest parallel might be the Civilian Operations and Revolu-
tionary Development Support, the CORDS program, in Vietnam,
which did show a surprising degree of success in the face of con-
stant attacks by the Vietcong, but only with an astonishing level
of national commitment, which we do not have today.
While there are a number of actions that can be taken to im-
ove the training process, the ultimate success of Iraq depends on
dramatic political improvements in that country, as well. Simply
put, a professional security sector is not a replacement for a func-
tioning government, and it is inconceivable that a functioning gov-
ernment could survive long without a reliable security sector.
sector has been active in the training process. And
if called upon, they will increase its role even more. In the years
since 2003, much has been done to increase and improve the secu-
rity sector training capacity. At the same time, much has been
done to address the contractual and oversight problems that are in-
evitable in any operation on this scale.
We need to get it right. The private sector is playing a critical
role and will be an essential player during and beyond any with-
drawal.
Why do we use the private sector? Well, first of all, I think con-
tractors are cost-effective. Contractors are veterans and ex-cops
that live side-by-side with the military personnel in the same dan-
gerous, rough conditions. They provide an astonishing degree of ex-
perience and expertise. They usually stay in the country longer
than the troops, and Dr. Avant addressed that point.


57
Dr. AVANT. If I could just add to that, I think, in terms of not
just a timeline, but having some mechanism to punish failure to
develop is important. And in Croatia, it was very important to be
able to freeze the training funds. And so the threat of a freeze even
would often create movement, even in Tudjman's government, in
ways that would be very useful.
Ănd so I think, even if you are not talking about a timeline, talk-
ing about some sort of institutional milestones and some amount
of money that is tied to that, or resources that are tied to that, is
very important.
Dr. SNYDER. Secretary Gates has been candid, both with Mem-
bers of Congress, but also publicly about, while he doesn't agree
with the House Democratic bill, that the debate has helped nudged
the ball down the field a little bit, and we have a good cop-bad cop
thing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here. I am sorry I missed some of the early
testimony, but I will try and follow up and take your comments
from your written testimony.
I would like to go to the question—and I know you were here
when we discussing with the first panel—you just mentioned a gen-
eration to train the Iraqi police. Do you believe that, in what you
thought of our trainers, five years experience that was requested,
and what kind of training do you think they got to be trainers? And
are we developing, basically, the capacity to do that kind of train-
ing?
Mr. BURKE. First, we need to divide the training concept up into
two. We have classroom trainers who are, you know, platform in-
structors. And they come under the MPRI contract, I believe, right
now. It had been SAIC. And they work under ICITAP, Department
of Justice. And that is the cost-plus contract, where they are able
to set standards for the people they want to employ, and then the
contractor gets the cost of the employee, plus a profit margin,
whatever that is.
The other contract, which I think is still held by DynCorp, is a
competitive, low-bid contract, where it is in DynCorp's interest to
perhaps lower the price paid to the employees that they are hiring.
And these are the advisers who are going out on the streets, who
are running the streets of Baghdad and Iraq. It is where the 17 of
them have been killed, so I want to be careful how I say this, but
I think we could do better, perhaps, raising the standards of the
people who are going into that advisory role, going out in the police
stations.
If you are at 5 years as a police officer and you are walking into
a police station and trying to advise a 25-, 30-year veteran, police
colonel, he is going to look at you as a 5-year—you know, he knows
you are obviously young, if you have only 5 years on the job. And
you are not going to have quite the same impact if you come in
with the years of experience that the classroom instructors have.
So I think we could perhaps-


58
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. What about cultural training, as well?
I mean, were we really providing them with what they needed? I
am assuming that very few of them spoke out, I expect. Were we
providing them on the other end what is needed to be able to un-
derstand the culture that they are working?
Mr. BURKE. We are providing some training, but very minimal
training. I know, at the beginning, we didn't get any training. A
week at Fort Bliss, mostly some medical checkups and x-rays and
stuff like that, and then we deployed. So it was sort of, for the
original team, learning on the fly.
But, yes, we could do better. And I think if we look at this plan
that the State Department is considering, we could build into that
cultural training, cultural awareness for, you know, whatever size
this reserve corps is going to be, and have some of them train for
different parts of the world, much like the SF, the Special Forces
community in the military does, where they have teams designed
for specific theaters.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is the State Department going to you
for consulting on that at all?
Mr. BROOKS. To me?
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes, please, go ahead.
Mr. BROOKS. Well, I was just going to say, on the cultural train-
ing, I think that is becoming a larger component. I think it is im-
portant.
And it is interesting. For example, Blackwater actually trains as
a training course, where they do intensive Iraqi Arabic and Iraqi
customs and things for contractors, because they see it as a valu-
able, I guess, mechanism for their own people. So it is actually got
some value, and I think that is an aspect that I think contractors
are going to get into much more.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes, well, we certainly know. I mean,
we have been to Fort Riley, in terms of the embedding with the
military, and what that role will be, but I wasn't certain whether
we were developing that kind of capacity, if you will, at our train-
ing level, when it comes to the
Mr. BROOKS. It can be put into contracts that a certain amount
of training goes into anybody who deploys. I think that would be
appropriate. I mean, to a certain extent, you don't know where the
next deployment is going to be. We already have contractors, I
think, in Somalia now, supporting the African Union. We have con-
tractors in Darfur. We have contractors in Congo. So you can't
train everybody for everything, but you can either find people that
have background or you can have, you know, require within the
contract a certain amount of training in certain areas.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Did you want to say something, Dr.
Avant?
Dr. AVANT. I was just going to point out the difference between-
I mean, the training that DynCorp employees get, that are the po-
lice advisers, is not the kind of training that Doug was talking
about, in terms of cultural awareness.
I know that there were complaints about the training capacities
of many people, even in the Balkans. And I think, in Iraq, it is a
very different kind of environment, where you have the degree of
tribal and religious law that is operating alongside the system of


59
law that we are trying to create, in terms of sort of the law enforce-
ment.
And so the training, I would imagine, for the kinds of police ad-
visers that you would need would be quite a bit greater in the Iraqi
context. So, you know, that would be another thing that would go
into some sort of long-term, strategic thinking about having a po-
lice force that was able to train, would be not just, you know, an
eight-day course or something in how to deal with people that
aren't from the United States, but also have certain kinds of issues
that people would have to face in different parts of the world.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If we are going to accept the idea that
we are always going to need both contractors, as well as a military
force and a police force, perhaps, assisting in some way, then we
need to do this differently.
Dr. AVANT. Right. And we don't have I mean, with many of the
contractors in the military, you can decide. Do you want to send
people from the Army or do you want to send contractors? But the
United States doesn't have a deployable international civilian po-
lice force, and so that—you are really are deciding contractors.
What would be good, if you were going to do that, is at least have
some sort of agency in the government that is in charge of thinking
about strategically, rather than using the contractor for the strate-
gic thinking, as well as the deployment.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is that part of the civilian corps? You
heard them mention the State Department is looking to kind of de-
velopment of civilian corps. Is that kind of-
Dr. AVANT. Well, this was in Bush's State of the Union address.
And I don't think anyone knows exactly what is going on in that
office, or no one that I have talked to, so I don't know, you know.
I hope you all have him up and at least the testimony.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Any other response to the testimony
that you heard, that you would like us to know about, that was a
concern to you, or you would like to emphasize?
Mr. BROOKS. I think I would emphasize, actually, the aspect of,
when you use contractors, they will use as many l
as they are allowed to use, which is actually quite good, in terms
of redevelopment. Now, with the police, it is a little bit different,
with the police training.
But, you know, when you are doing reconstruction work, when
you are doing security, you want to use as many locals as you can,
which is good for the economy, which is training, which is all sorts
of long-term benefits.
When I was doing my academic research before IPOA, I was in
Sierra Leone, and PAE was one of the contractors there. They had
eight Americans, and I think it was 400 Sierra Leoneans doing all
the logistics and support. And everything in that U.N. operation
that was fixed, or moved, or done was being done by these PAE em-
ployees, these Sierra Leoneans.
And it made a lot of sense. And it is a real benefit, I think, you
get from contracting.
Mr. BURKE. It is a situation that only just hadn't happened in
Iraq. Most of the contractors-country nationals were coming in
from other countries to work in Iraq. Now we are starting to hire
some locals.


60
I think, for a while, it was a security issue, but now we are look-
ing at the benefit of hiring locals and putting money into the local
economy as outweighed by the risk, if you manage the risk well.
Dr. AVANT. Yes, I would just add to that, that, you know, as you
might worry about people who are being trained without back-
ground checks that are sort of going off to fight in the militias,
when the United States leaves Iraq, it will leave whatever capac-
ities its imparted to local people, under the control of whatever ci-
vilian leadership there is.
And so I think that it is—you know, I completely agree that it
is wise to use locals, but it is also wise to pay attention to the kind
of structure, the political structure that they are operating under.
And that just goes back to the whole issue of training, you know,
not only people working in the national government in Iraq, but
also local government officials.
If you are going to have a police force that can do, certain kinds
of things, and yet it is responsive to a local government that isn't
acting the way local governments act or we would expect them to
act, then you are going to have a lot of problems.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.
Mr. Gingrey.
Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for
this meeting, this hearing. I know we have had two panels. I have
not been able to be here for much of it, and I missed a lot of your
testimony, but thank you for being with us and shedding some
light, a lot of light on this issue.
I know Ms. Davis and I went to Fort Riley, as she was pointing
out. And we have heard testimony from the MiTT teams, military
transition teams. I think that what she was alluding to, and I
would certainly agree with this, we need something similar to that
in regard to the police force. I guess we could call it a POT team
and get away with that, but something similar to the MiTT teams.
And Representative Davis and I were at Fort Riley, Kansas, and
very impressed with what the military is doing there.
I know that, Mr. Burke, you had said in your testimony that you
have considered the police training mission a complete failure, and
that bothers me, of course. I just would like to know a couple of
things that you might suggest—maybe you have already done this
and I missed it—but in regard to what we can do.
And, you know, you talked about the five-year experience level
and the lack of credibility if they don't have a little gray around
the temples with the Iraqis, who have, in many instances, a lot
more experience. And I understand that, but I would think it might
be a little difficult to recruit an older, more seasoned, near retire-
ment, if you will, police person with lots of experience for this very
dangerous mission. You point out 17 of them have been killed, and
I can understand that.
But, you know, just how do we go about this? And I do want to
ask this question. I really should know the answer to it. What was
the police situation in the country before 2003, March? And, of
course, Baghdad is, I think, a metropolitan area of 4 million people,
is it not?
Mr. BURKE. A little larger.
,


62
with over there. Some of them have been forcibly retired, because
the new government doesn't want their people with their back-
ground, if you will. Maybe it is religious issues; I don't know. Some
of them
Dr. GINGREY. Well, let me interrupt you. In that part of our re-
Baathification benchmark that, you know, we want them to give
these people an opportunity to come back, do we not?
Mr. BURKE. We do, but I don't think they will. I know one major
general who used to head up what we would conside
sponse police, the patrol police. He has left the country. He is living
in Egypt.
The former police chief of Baghdad, he is now living down in
Dubai, working down in Dubai. Another major general, who is still
e in a very important position, e-mails me constantly, asking
me to help him get out of the country and come to the United
States as a refugee. So there are many of them that, you know,
don't want to stay there and who want to get out.
Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, let me just real quickly-Dr. Avant,
am I pronouncing it correctly?
Dr. AVANT. Avant.
Dr. GINGREY. Avant. I am not familiar with a lot of your publica-
tions, but I was reading your bio, and I know that it says that you
have been doing some work on how the United States government's
use of private security affects democratic processes in the United
States. Can you comment on that just a little bit? I mean, you
know, a few minutes.
Dr. AVANT. Yes, I am basically gathering a lot of information
about the way in which the press covers private security forces in
Iraq versus military forces, looking to the issue of transparency.
How much do people know about these kinds of forces?
Because, you know, as we heard earlier, you know, private con-
tractors have essentially doubled the size of the U.S. force in Iraq.
And, you know, the degree to which people get information about
that would be important for transparency.
I have also looked at something that we call in political science
veto points, which is essentially the role of Congress in deciding on
contracts and sort of looking at the deployment of forces versus
contracting and the degree to which it gives power to the executive
ss. And there, as I think I mentioned at the end of
my prepared remarks, it tends to advantage the executive branch
relative to. Congress, at this point.
The third thing that I have done is some experiments that look
at how people react to the deaths of private security versus mili-
tary personnel in Iraq. So it is trying to look at issues of public con-
sent, transparency, and checks and balances, in order to sort of un-
derstand how our government's use of these contractors has af-
fected the processes of democracy in the U.S.
Dr. GINGREY. Yes, but, I mean, in regard to the use of the private
security contractors, you don't consider that somewhat a violation
of our democratic process, do you?
Dr. AVANT. Well, I think that if you sort of look at the foundation
of democracy in the Western world, it came alongside the idea of
citizen armies. And so there is a very long tradition of connecting
E


63
democracy with some duty and responsibility of citizens to both
serve, but also be a check.
And the whole issue of whether contracting separates that is ac-
tually—I am just writing a paper right now-looking at exactly
that kind of issue historically.
Dr. GINGREY. That is very, very interesting, and I thank you for
that.
Mr. Chairman, I didn't have anything else. That is great.
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.
And I want to thank the members of our second panel for your
testimony. Appreciate it very much. We would love the opportunity
to follow up with any of you, should other members have questions.
But thank you very much for appearing.
And the hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]





APPENDIX
APRIL 25, 2007





PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
APRIL 25, 2007





Opening Statement of
Chairman Martin Meehan
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Hearing on the Use of Contractors in Training, Equipping, and Sustaining
the Iraqi Security Forces
April 25, 2007
Good morning, and welcome to our witnesses and guests. This is the sixth session
and second open hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on
the topic of the development of Iraqi Security Forces.
In his address to the nation on January 10th, the President announced his intention
to accelerate the transition of security operations to the Iraqis. Reports from the field
regarding the readiness and performance of the Iraqi Army have, however, been
mixed, and news regarding the Iraqi Police Services has often been highly
discouraging. It is my intent to lead this Subcommittee past the anecdotal evidence,
and to get to the bottom of what kind of progress we are really making.
To that end, we have been pursuing this effort through a series of briefings, hearings,
and requests for information over the past several months to examine specific
aspects of the Iraqi Security Forces. We have looked at training, equipment, logistics,
and costs. We have talked to the leaders engaged in the effort, and have particularly
tried to talk to the more junior personnel who work directly with Iraqi Security Forces
on a daily basis.
Last week, you may know, our efforts to do that were blocked at the last minute by
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. Since we have DOD
witnesses with us today, I would like our record to reflect how unhappy we were
about what happened last week, and furthermore, that no one from the senior levels
of DOD or the Joint Staff has even called me to discuss the situation. I would also
like to have it on our record today that this is not a settled question, and I would not
expect OSD Legislative Affairs to stand in the way of this Subcommittee's
constitutional responsibility to perform oversight, pursuant to our congressional
prerogatives and policies, rather than those they would like to dictate to us.
With that said, our work goes on. Today, we turn our attention to the role that private
contractors have played in the mission to train, equip, and sustain Iraqi Security
Forces. There were almost 127,000 contractors for the Department of Defense
alone in Iraq as of DOD's most recent count, in addition to 145,000 troops. We must
leave aside for another day the broader issue of whether this is an appropriate way
for the United States to fight its modern wars. Today, we will focus on the role these
contractors have played with respect to the Iraqi Security Forces mission.
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70
We will first receive testimony from a panel of Department of Defense, Department of
State and Department of Justice witnesses. The reason for the breadth of this panel
is that the Iraqi Security Forces mission does not involve only Iraqi military training.
The Departments of State and Justice have played a major role in training Iraqi
police, advising the Ministry of Interior, and other rule of law oriented missions. We
will look forward to hearing about how the roles and responsibilities for each agency
in Iraq have evolved, as well as the procedures for accountability, management, and
oversight of contractors that have been put in place.
In addition, we expect that our Department of Defense witnesses will provide us with
greater insight into the nuts and bolts of how contracting for a mission as broad and
complex as developing the Iraqi military and Iraqi police is done.
Our first panel of witnesses includes Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Ambassador Anne Patterson; Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swarz; Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense Gary Motsek; and Colonel Anita Raines, who is Chief of the Logistics
Services Division of the Joint Staff.
We will also welcome a second panel of witnesses today, who we expect to provide
both outside perspectives on the use of contractors for this type of mission, and a
real-life account of the contractor-led police development effort on the ground in Iraq.
Our second panel includes Dr. Deborah Avant, who is the Director for Global and
International Studies at the George Washington University Elliott School of
International Affairs, Mr. Doug Brooks, the President of the International Peace
Operations Association, and Mr. Gerald Burke, who is a retired Major in the
Massachusetts State Police and former Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior
and Iraqi Police Services.
To encourage discussion at today's hearing, I would like to follow the same less-
formal procedures as we have in our previous briefings and hearings I have talked
with our distinguished Ranking Member, and he has agreed to dispense with the 5-
minute rule during today's hearing. Pursuant to Rule 11(b)(2) of the Rules of our
Committee, the Subcommittee will dispense with the five minute rule and allow
questioning to proceed as subcommittee members express interest rather than
strictly by seniority.
I would like to remind everyone that while this is an open hearing, we have received
closed briefings in which classified information was presented, so please be mindful
of anything you might say based on what you heard in the closed briefings.
Welcome again to our witnesses. We're looking forward to your remarks. We will take
your whole text for the record, but I ask that you keep your prepared remarks fairly
brief so we can get to our questions.
Now, I would like to turn to my colleague, Mr. Akin, our ranking member, for any
opening remarks he might have.


71
Statement of Ranking Member Todd Akin
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee Hearing on the Use of Contractors for Training,
Equipping and Sustaining Iraqi Security Forces
April 25, 2007
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you calling this very important
hearing. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today-I look forward to
hearing your statements.
Today's hearing is this subcommittee's second open meeting, and
culminates two months of oversight activities aimed at investigating the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). I'm pleased that today's hearing will look at the
important issue of how the U.S. government is using contractors to fulfill the
critical mission of building the Iraqi Security Forces.
Specifically, I'm interested in how we use contractors for training the
Iraq Police Services. Over the course of this investigation it has become
rse
iva
increasingly clear to me that more attention needs to be devoted to the Iraqi
Police Services, and matters of rule of law in Iraq more generally. It is my


73
Finally, I want to comment on one specific contract matter. Use of
contractors in theatre is a complicated matter. When contractors embed in
U.S. Police Transition Teams (PTTs), as in the case of the International
Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs), an already complicated matter turns into a
matter of concern. I'm curious about the guidance we give these contractors
with respect to command and control, personal security and logistical
support. I look forward to our witnesses elaborating on this.
Again, thank you to all the witnesses for being here today.
[Yield Back to Chairman Meehan]


74
Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces
Testimony by
Ambassador Anne W. Patterson
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
U.S. Department of State
before the
House Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation
April 25, 2007, 9:00 a.m.
2212 Rayburn House Office Building


75
Chairman Meehan, Representative Akin, and other distinguished
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
Department of State's efforts to assist the Coalition and the Government of
Iraq in developing capable civilian security forces that serve the people of
Iraq, respect human rights, and operate in accordance with the rule of law. It
is also my pleasure to review the steps my Bureau has taken to improve
contract management and oversight of these efforts.
Creating an effective police force in Iraq is a difficult task under any
circumstance given the size of the country and scope of the mission. The
broader security challenges, including the involvement of international
terrorist networks like al Qaida, the rise of ethnic militias and insurgent
groups, and inter- and intra-ethnic conflict have made this difficult task even
harder. The tragic deaths of 17 American police advisors and many other
security personnel are testament to the challenges and risks we face.
In spite of this, U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) Civilian
Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) has – with assistance from the
Department of State, Justice, Homeland Security, other agencies and
international partners – trained more than 135,000 Iraqi Police Service
personnel, more than 24,000 National Police Service personnel, and more
than 28,000 border guards responsible for 17 border crossings and ports of
entry. CPATT has also trained smaller numbers of Iraqi criminal
investigators, intelligence professionals, and dignitary protection personnel.
CPATT has met and exceeded all of its basic training goals, but more must
be done. Specifically, the Coalition and the Government of Iraq must
continue to develop the skills, integrity, and credibility of these forces. This
will be a long process, as peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and
elsewhere have demonstrated that building a competent and responsible
police organization is a complex process that can take a decade or more.
Organization and Responsibilities
The Department of State drew upon its previous experience with
peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo to support the
Coalition Provisional Authority's and the Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq's (MNSTC-I) efforts to reconstruct Iraqi's police and
civilian security institutions. To respond to the dynamic situation on the
ground in Iraq, we used contractors to provide expertise and logistical
support to establish and conduct large and complex programs in difficult,


76
hazardous environments. We also employed the help of other U.S. agencies,
especially the law enforcement, advisory, and training entities of the
Department of Justice. Two offices within the Department of Justice's
Criminal Division, the International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the Overseas Prosecutorial Development
and Training (OPDAT), play key roles in implementing U.S. foreign policy
in Iraq.
Due to the security situation, the sheer scale of the task, and in order
to ensure unity of effort, the President issued National Security Presidential
Directive 36 (NSPD 36) on May 11, 2004. This Directive assigned the
mission of organizing, training, mentoring, and equipping Iraq's security
forces, including police, to CENTCOM. CENTCOM established MNSTC-I
to manage this effort and created CPATT to train and equip Iraqi police and
other civilian security forces.
Since CPATT assumed responsibility, the Department of Defense has
transferred $1.5 billion to the Department of State's Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to provide a range of support,
including:
690 International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs), for which we
have contracted with DynCorp International. IPLOs perform
primarily assessment, training, and mentoring functions in the field
along side Coalition military counterparts.
192 International Police Trainers (IPTs), for which the Department
of Justice's ICITAP, funded through an interagency agreement
with INL, has contracted with Military Professional Resources Inc.
(MPRI). These trainers are primarily providing assistance to Iraq's
police training academies.
143 Border Enforcement Advisors, 20 of which are provided by
ICITAP through its MPRI contract and funded through an
interagency agreement with INL, and 123 of which are provided
through an INL task order with DynCorp.
• Support for the above personnel inside Iraq, including equipment
and body armor, housing, construction of forward operating bases


77
and camps, meals, transportation, security, and IT and medical
support all provided through a contract with DynCorp.
Operation and maintenance of the Jordan International Police
Training Center (JIPTC), a facility created with help from our
international partners and designed for basic training to large
numbers of Iraqi police recruits. INL has utilized a bilateral
agreement with the Government of Jordan; personal service
providers and other contracts for management personnel; contracts
with DynCorp International, Civilian Police International (CPI),
Selrico, and al-Wasita to operate JIPTC; and an interagency
agreement with the Department of Justice's ICITAP to provide
trainers. Since opening in November 2003, JIPTC has graduated
more than 54,000 Iraqi police, over 50,000 of which were new
recruits who completed an 8-week basic training course. At the
Government of Iraq and CPATT's request, the basic training
program at JIPTC ended in February 2007 and has shifted entirely
to police academies within Iraq.
INL has also utilized several interagency agreements with the
Departments of Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security and their law
enforcement branches - including with the Federal Bureau of Investigations,
the U.S Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco
and Firearms, U.S. Marshals, and other agencies which provide specialized
training to Iraqi forces.
Contract Management and Oversight
CPATT and MNSTC-I continue to set the overall requirements for the
civilian security development mission in Iraq and the Multi-National Forces-
Iraq exercises operational control over the IPLOs and IPTs that INL supplies
to the mission. However, the Department of State is responsible for
managing and overseeing our contracts with service providers and for
monitoring our agreements with interagency partners.
We have cooperated closely with the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction, the State Department Inspector General's Office, and
the Government Accountability Office (GAO), as well as undertaken our
own assessments, asset verifications, and audits to identify problems and
weaknesses in funding and contract oversight, performance evaluation and


78
management. Numerous measures to improve our management and
oversight capacities have already been undertaken and we are constantly
exploring ways to be more effective.
The urgency and scale of requirements in Iraq has often outstripped
our staffing and oversight capabilities both domestically and in the field,
particularly in the early stages. Security challenges have also impeded the
ability of our staff to travel throughout Iraq. Recognizing that our staffing
had not kept pace with the three-fold increase in assistance being
implemented by INL - from $956 million in FY2002 to nearly $3 billion in
FY2007 – we have added 64 permanent positions to perform program,
financial, and contract management functions. To support our Iraq program
specifically, we recently obtained approval to increase permanent INL
staffing at Embassy Baghdad from four to twenty people – nineteen of
whom will be directly involved in either contract or program management
and oversight (four are Contract Officer Representatives). Due to security
risks and the need to minimize staffing at Embassy Baghdad, we established
the bulk of our contract management support division domestically for INL
programs in Iraq and Jordan - as well as for Afghanistan - which consists of
15 personnel. We are also expanding our Washington-based Iraq program
staff.
11 PIVO
We have strengthened internal controls as well, such as inventory
oversight and regular performance reporting on property management.
Statements of work have been improved to make them more detailed and to
provide specific contractor requirements and performance standards; and we
have made several improvements to internal controls for validating and
approving payments with contractors generally. We are in the process of
establishing complete invoice files and are actively reconciling all past
payments made since the inception of our contracts in Iraq and Jordan, as
well as Afghanistan. This is an intensive process which includes the review
of an estimated 2 million pages of supporting documentation covering
roughly $2.5 billion in contracts and will require approximately 10 full-time
staff members an estimated three years to complete. INL is making every
effort to recover any overpayments or payments inconsistent with contract
terms and conditions.
The Department of State is committed to promoting competition
among contractors to ensure that the American taxpayer gets the best value
possible for their money. Last year, we competed our support contract for


79
JIPTC and we just finished competition of a task order for 123 border
advisors for Iraq. The process of competing our task order for most of the
personnel and related support provided through INL in Iraq is expected to be
finished this summer. Our existing competitively awarded contracts with
DynCorp International, Civilian Police International (CPI), and Pacific
Architects and Engineers (PA&E) each have ceilings of approximately $20
billion over their five year terms. They will expire in early 2009 and the
Department of State has begun work to initiate a new competition.
The Way Forward
The Department of State and INL are proud contributors to the U.S.
Government's efforts with the Government of Iraq and international partners
to build civilian security institutions in Iraq. We are grateful for the
dedicated service of thousands of police from all over the United States, who
work daily in harsh and dangerous conditions to help make Iraq a safer,
more stable country. The sacrifices they and their families make are
honorable and praiseworthy - particularly those who have paid the ultimate
price for their service.
INL relies on contractors to implement critical assistance efforts in
Iraq and other crisis zones, but we recognize that it is our duty to ensure that
these sizeable contracts are closely monitored, as American lives and tax
dollars are at stake. We have made significant progress in recent months,
but this effort will require constant improvement and vigilance.
5


80.
*
Department of Justice
CUTII
STATEMENT OF
BRUCE C. SWARTZ
DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
CONCERNING
MAJOR AREAS IN WHICH CONTRACTS HAVE BEEN UTILIZED TO SUPPORT THE
TRAINING, EQUIPPING, AND SUSTAINMENT OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, AND
CHALLENGES THAT HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN INTERAGENCY COORDINATION,
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT, AND OVERSIGHT
PRESENTED
APRIL 25, 2006


81
STATEMENT OF
BRUCE C. SWARTZ
DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
CONCERNING
MAJOR AREAS IN WHICH CONTRACTS HAVE BEEN UTILIZED TO SUPPORT THE
TRAINING, EQUIPPING, AND SUSTAINMENT OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, AND
CHALLENGES THAT HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN INTERAGENCY COORDINATION,
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT, AND OVERSIGHT
APRIL 25, 2007
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to
discuss the role of the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program in the training, equipping, and sustainment of the Iraq Security Forces.
I. OVERVIEW OF ICITAP
Created in 1986, DOJ's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
(ICITAP) has become a leader in law enforcement development worldwide, with active
programs in 48 countries around the globe. ICITAP's mission is to help achieve U.S. criminal
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82
justice and foreign policy goals by assisting in developing sustainable foreign law enforcement
institutions that promote democratic principles, instill respect for human rights and human
dignity, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism.
ICITAP's activities encompass three principal types of assistance projects: (1) enhancing
capabilities of existing law enforcement institutions in emerging democracies (e.g., Balkans,
Eurasia, Sub-Sahara Africa); (2) assisting nations on the frontlines of the war on terrorism (e.g..
Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines); and (3) developing law enforcement institutions in the context
of post-conflict reconstruction or international peacekeeping operations (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo,
Iraq).
In all of its assistance projects, ICITAP seeks to avoid piecemeal training efforts, and to
instead focus on the comprehensive, long-term development of police forces and corrections
institutions. Further, and whenever possible, ICITAP and its sister agency-DOJ's Office of
Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training- seek to integrate their
assistance programs, and to work with other Federal law enforcement agencies, in order to
simultaneously develop all three pillars of the criminal justice system: police, courts, and
corrections.
Currently, ICITAP has programs in 48 different countries. We have deployed 18 Federal
ICITAP senior law enforcement advisors (SLEAs) overseas, who are usually attached to the U.S.
embassy or mission, and who oversee the management and delivery of the police development
programs in-country. Programs that are too small to support an in-country SLEA are managed by
Federal ICITAP headquarters (HQ) staff in Washington. ICITAP currently utilizes a contract
with MPRI for the procurement of personnel, goods and services for ICITAP programs
worldwide, to include Iraq. The current ICITAP contract with MPRI is an indefinite


83
delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract covering a base-year with five option periods, and
having a ceiling of $400 million over the entire term of the contract. Under the terms of this
contract MPRI provides advisors, logistics, and administrative support for ICITAP law
enforcement programs around the world. But while ICITAP uses its contract with MPRI to
obtain these personnel and services, ICITAP at all times, develops, manages, and evaluates all of
its programs.
The contract design, bid, and award process, as well as the day-to-day administration, are
managed by the department's Justice Management Division's (JMD's) procurement services
staff. JMD has assigned and imbedded a senior contracting officer whose sole responsibility is
to provide oversight and guidance on all ICITAP contract-related matters.
Finally, it should be noted that ICITAP's budget comes almost exclusively from project-
specific funding provided by outside agencies – primarily the Department of State (DOS), the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and, recently, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation. This means, then, that ICITAP looks to other U.S. Government agencies with
regard to both the selection and funding of overseas law enforcement development projects.
II. ICITAP IRAO PROGRAMS
In May 2003, after the U.S. military secured Baghdad, the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice, with funding provided by the DOS’s Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), deployed a select team of 25 career senior justice
practitioners into Iraq to assess the state of law enforcement and justice sector institutions. This
team produced three comprehensive assessments, which were provided to the Coalition
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Provisional Authority (CPA) leadership, on the state of the police service, the judiciary, and the
correctional system.
The ICITAP component of the assessment team remained on the ground in Iraq to help to
stand up the key components of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice: the Iraqi
Police Service (IPS), the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), and the Iraq Correctional
Service (ICS). Today, almost four years later, ICITAP continues to provide support in three vital
program areas: the Iraq Police and Border Services, the Iraq Correctional Service, and the
Commission on Public Integrity.
In each of these programs – police, corrections, and public integrity -- ICITAP has helped
develop and implement institutional development strategies. ICITAP also has developed training
curriculum, delivered basic and advanced instruction programs, and operationalized and
managed training academies. Those academies have educated tens of thousands of Iraqi civilian
law enforcement professionals throughout Iraq.
At present, ICITAP's in-country staffing levels supporting these three programs consist
of four authorized Federal senior management personnel positions and approximately 307
contractor personnel. Funding to support these three program efforts has totaled approximately
$285.7 million to date and has been provided by DOS/INL via inter-agency agreements. This
funding is used almost exclusively to manage program efforts and fund the salaries of instructors
and advisors. All life support elements (e.g., logistics, security, equipment) for all ICITAP
personnel working in Iraq are provided by INL’s contractor.
As I noted earlier in my testimony, ICITAP currently utilizes a prime contract with
MPRI, managed by the Department of Justice's Justice Management Division, to procure the
services of the 307 senior police and corrections instructors and advisors to support its mission in
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Iraq. While retaining all program control and development responsibilities, ICITAP works
closely with MPRI to ensure recruitment, selection, and deployment of the highest caliber
personnel possible. Let me turn to each of the programs in greater detail.
POLICE PROGRAM
Within six months of deploying into Baghdad in May 2003, a small ICITAP team of.
experts, working with coalition partners, assisted in the development of a comprehensive police
assessment, helped to reconstitute the Ministry of Interior and stand up the Iraqi Police Service in
Baghdad, designed the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement, developed the basic skills
police curriculum, and helped to establish the Jordan International Police Training Center.
ICITAP's efforts in these first critical months helped to launch what is arguably the largest
international police development and training program ever undertaken.
In early 2004, ICITAP contributed to the establishment of what is now known as the
Multinational Security Transition Command's Civilian Police Assistance Training Team
(CPATT). From 2004 to 2006, ICITAP's Federal senior law enforcement advisor in Iraq served
as the deputy of CPATT and as the senior civilian advisor to each of the three preceding CPATT
commanding generals.
Funding for ICITAP's Iraqi policing initiatives totals more than $213.5 million to date.
ICITAP currently has authorization for two Federal civilian managers on the ground in Iraq to
work with CPATT in the police training mission, along with 191 subcontracted senior police
trainers and advisors, known as international police trainers (IPTs). IPTs are primarily engaged
in training Iraqi Police Service personnel and Iraqi Police Service trainers at police academies.
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86
Under the CPATT mission, to date, more than 155,000 Iraqi police have graduated from
courses developed and/or delivered by ICITAP and/or ICITAP-trained Iraqi police instructors.
ICITAP helped to establish, and currently advises Iraqi Police Service personnel at the Baghdad
Police College, the Irbil Police College, and seven regional basic training facilities throughout
Iraq (i.e., Basrah, Hillah, Kut, Mosul, Najaf, Sulaymaniyah, and Hammam Al Alil).
ICITAP also has successfully developed curricula for 25 distinct specialized and
advanced courses. To date, more than 18,000 Iraqi police have completed these advanced
courses, to include Basic and Advanced Criminal Investigations, Interviews and Interrogations,
Critical Incident Management, and Violent Crime Investigations. With its coalition partners,
ICITAP developed and delivered the Transition and Integration Program, which is aimed at
introducing human rights doctrine and application, use of force concepts, and other modern
policing practices, to the Iraqi Police Service officers who served under the former regime. More
than 46,000 Iraqi police have completed the Transition and Integration Program to date.
Additionally, ICITAP has provided assistance to CPATT to help establish a functional
and sustainable border security department in Iraq that is capable of preventing violence,
narcotics, and human trafficking, and of preserving the human rights and dignity of all who cross
the Iraqi borders. ICITAP has been asked to provide up to 20 subcontractor border security
instructors and advisors to provide basic skills and advanced training at the regional DBE
training academies throughout Iraq. To date, ICITAP has assisted with the training of 11,976
Iraqis in basic border security; advanced and specialized training started this month.
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87
CORRECTIONS PROGRAM
Since May 2003, ICITAP has led the USG's efforts to reconstitute an Iraqi corrections
system based on the United Nations Standards for Ethical Treatment of Prisoners. A
multinational team, consisting of three ICITAP subcontractor senior corrections advisors, as well
as three experts from Great Britain and Canada, produced a final report on the state of the Iraqi
corrections system that was issued on June 15, 2003. The assessment report made 15 specific
recommendations for the re-establishment of a professional, secure, and humane correctional
system to support the Iraqi criminal justice system. These recommendations became the basis for
the development of a strategic plan to establish a new Iraq Corrections Service (ICS). Within the
first three months, ICITAP trainers reinstituted operations of prison facilities in the Baghdad
region and stood up an initial guard force to begin intake of criminal detainees.
Today ICITAP remains the primary USG entity charged with implementing prison
reform initiatives. The program is headed by two ICITAP Federal civilian managers in Iraq who
oversee approximately 80 contractor personnel serving as international corrections trainers
(ICTs) to support the development of the ICS. Unlike the ICITAP police trainers - who are
under the control of CPATT -- the ICT mission remains under the control of the Embassy's rule
of law program. To date, ICITAP has received a total of $62.6 million from INL for this effort.
ICITAP's 80 ICTs are stationed in Baghdad and northern regions. ICITAP provides basic
training, field training, and mentoring in an effort to strengthen the ICS and Kurdish region
institutional capacities. On-the-ground efforts are closely coordinated with British corrections
advisors, who support reform efforts in Iraq's southern region, particularly in and around the city
.7.


88
of Basrah. ICITAP also coordinates with the U.S. military and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior,
both of which oversee substantial numbers of detainees currently outside the Iraqi corrections
system.
In practice, the correctional system in Iraq consists of the ICS national system and an
independently operated system in the country's northern Kurdish region. ICITAP has
successfully built an indigenous training capacity within the ICS, providing instructor
SUCO
development courses to Iraqi instructors, who in turn provide advanced courses in weapons,
emergency response team training, transportation, personal security details, and biometrics.
ICITAP also established the National Corrections Training Academy and regional training
academies, which have graduated more than 7,500 new staff from pre-service training.
In addition, ICITAP has facilitated the transfer of authority at the Baladiyat Prison from
the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) to the Ministry of Justice. Baladiyat is a 750-bed, newly
constructed MOL-operated detention facility. Following the completion of renovations funded by
the U.S. military, the facility now houses ICS inmates. On September 1, 2006, ICTs assisted in
the final transfer of Abu Ghraib Prison to the ICS. The ICS and the Iraqi Amy have united
forces to guard the 6,000-bed prison until its future use is determined. Abu Ghraib was closed on
February 28, 2006, when approximately 2,000 inmates were transferred out of the facility.
Currently, ICITAP is assisting the ICS in the development of director general's orders,
utilizing the United Nations Standards for the Ethical Treatment of Prisoners as a general
guideline for policy formation. The first order, which explained the director general order
procedure, was distributed at the director general's executive staff meeting on April 9, 2006. To
date, 30 director general's orders, covering a variety of topics, have been completed.
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THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC INTEGRITY PROGRAM
The Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) was created in early 2004 by the CPA,
pursuant to CPA Rule 55. The CPI was established as an independent governmental body with
the mission to prevent and investigate corruption, and to promote transparency and the rule of
law throughout Iraq.
The Iraqi Governing Council, which was responsible for the establishment of the CPI,
vetted civilians with legal backgrounds to carry out the commission's investigative functions.
The Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), along with the Special Investigative Unit (SIU), fulfills critical
investigative functions within the CPI structure. Their respective assignments are to investigate
alleged acts of corruption and to provide protection for public officials who are threatened due to
their cooperation with ongoing corruption investigations.
Since September 29, 2004, State/INL has provided more than $9.6 million in funding to
ICITAP to provide institutional support, training, mentoring, and investigative surveillance
equipment needed to establish and train an effective CPI investigative corps. ICITAP has
deployed 16 subcontractor advisors in-country to oversee this effort and support the investigators
assigned to the CPI.
FY06 funds facilitated an expansion of program assistance in the areas of witness
protection, intelligence, forensic capability, and internal controls. The additional resources have
also enabled ICITAP to support the CPI's placement of six regional branch offices and smaller
CPI satellite offices in Iraq's 18 provinces. The program continues in FY07.
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ICITAP has successfully trained 120 ACU and 161 SIU anti-corruption investigators,
who have been assigned 1,851 public corruption cases to date. During FY06, advisors assisted
CPI investigators with the referral of 1,388 cases to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq for
prosecutorial opinion.
III. OTHER DOJ TRAINING IN IRAQ
I would be remiss if I did not note that ICITAP is only one part of the extensive efforts
undertaken by the Department of Justice to help establish the rule of law in Iraq. With the
committee's permission, I would like to describe briefly our other work in this area. While a few
con
of these also depend upon limited contract support, by far the majority of them are executed by
Department of Justice personnel assigned to the Embassy in Baghdad:
OPDAT: The Criminal Division's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development,
Assistance and Training (OPDAT) – the sister organization of ICITAP – has deployed Federal
prosecutors to serve as Resident Legal Advisors (RLAs) in Baghdad and as part of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in five other cities. The RLAs currently train trial and investigative
judges under the authority of the Higher Juridical Council; advise on changes in law and policy
within the Higher Juridical Council; and provide counsel, support, and assistance on a variety of
court administration, management, security, and case-specific matters. The RLA programs are
conducted pursuant to agreements with DOS, and funding for the effort since 2003 has totaled :
approximately $25.4M in total funding from Foreign Operations or Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) appropriations.
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United States Marshals Service: Twelve Deputy U.S. Marshals from the USMS
Special Operations Group (SOG) serve in Iraq on four-month rotational assignments. They
SU
Prve
provide technical assistance and training support to the Iraqi judicial sector on security for
witnesses, judges, prosecutors and other court personnel, as well as security for courthouses. In
addition, they are beginning to provide support for the creation of a counterpart Iraqi Marshals
Service. To date, USMS programs has received $38M from the State Department's Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) for these efforts.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives: The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has participated since October 2003 in the planning
LUN
and implementation of counterterrorism/explosives training for the Iraqi Police in support of the
Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT). ATF has completed numerous two-week
post-blast investigation courses at Camp Dublin and one-week basic explosives courses at Adnan
Palace for over 300 Iraqi Police Service officers. (ATF also has conducted 15 highly-specialized
pre-deployment Military Post-Blast Investigation Training schools for U.S. military personnel
before they arrive in the Iraqi theater, as well as pre-deployment explosives training for U.S.
State Department Diplomatic Security Service personnel headed to Iraq.)
In addition, ATF has
deployed eight personnel in Iraq in support of the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell
(CEXC), including Certified Explosives Specialists and Explosives Enforcement Officers
assigned to incident response teams and providing technical explosives and post-blast
investigative expertise. Since March 2004, ATF also has deployed a Certified Explosives
ves
Specialist, Special Agent Canine Handlers, and a canine unit to Iraq to perform missions related
-11-


92
to sensitive critical infrastructure protection, including searching vehicles, individuals, and
facilities to reduce and counter the threat of improvised explosive devices.
Drug Enforcement Administration: The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has
delivered courses in intelligence and intelligence analysis to the Iraqi police agencies in support
of CPATT.
Federal Bureau of Investigation: Since 2003, the FBI has deployed rotating teams of
personnel to provide specialized counterterrorism and complex criminal case training to the Iraqi
police in support of CPATT. In addition, the FBI has ten personnel at the Legal Attaché Office
in Iraq to perform investigations and other operational activities. The Department also has 55
agents and support staff at the Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) and throughout Iraq; the
majority of these agents serve on rotating details.
Major Crimes Task Force: In 2005, the Department of Justice established the Major
Crimes Task Force (MCTF), which assists the Iraqi police agencies with the investigation of
major crimes (murder, kidnapping, etc). Using a train-the-trainer approach, ten Federal law
enforcement personnel from the FBI, DEA, USMS, and ATF enhance the Iraqi police officers'
abilities to conduct major investigations with the intent of restoring law and order. Resources
and funding ($11.0M) for the MCTF originated with a directed reallocation of IRRF funding that
was transferred to DOJ through DOS.
The Regime Crimes Liaison's Office: The Regime Crimes Liaison's Office (RCLO)
was established in May 2004, to assist the Government of Iraq in investigating and prosecuting.
crimes by Saddam Hussein and key members of his regime, and in establishing the Iraqi High
Tribunal (IHT) to try former regime members for their crimes. The RCLO numbers
approximately 120 full-time personnel, including 13 Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA),
- 12 -


94
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
JOINT TESTIMONY OF
MR. GARY MOTSEK
ASSISTANT DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PROGRAM SUPPORT
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)
AND
COLONEL ANITA RAINES
J-4
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
April 25, 2007
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS


95
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Akin, and Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
contracting issues relating to the Iraqi Security Forces. At the Department of
Defense, we perform thousands of contract actions to support the State
Department and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-
I). All of our support contracts follow normal contracting processes and
procedures, and we are fully committed to working with our agency partners on
these contracts. We are pleased to join our colleagues from the State Department
and the Department of Justice to share with you an overview of our contingency
contracting efforts.
We are currently incorporating the requirements set forth by Section 854 of
the Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act into our new
contingency contracting policies. We are implementing measures that
institutionalize and enhance the oversight of contractor personnel and contractor
operation. Since October 2006, we have established the Office of the Assistant
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support, established the Materiel
Readiness Committee, are developing a Contingency Acquisition Support Office,
and expanded Contingency Contracting training modules through the Defense
Acquisition University as required by Section 854. We have also begun to
improve controls with contracting through the use of automated systems tied to
our common access cards. With these systems we have been able to establish a


100
change introduced by contracting for training generally exacerbates the above difficulties.
Below, I first outline the general benefits and risks of using contractors and then discuss
at how they impact the general difficulties of training foreign forces.
Benefits:
PSCs can draw on a deeper pool of personnel and personnel with specific
experience. In the ACRI program, for instance, MPRI was able to provide
French-speaking instructors for francophone African states that would not be
available from the ranks of the Special Forces. In Iraq, the US has relied on
PSCs that have recruited internationally, providing a much larger labor pool.
Contractors can provide greater stability in training programs. While military
personnel rotate in a fixed manner in US forces, PSCs can provide teams in which
the same personnel stay in a country for several years."
Contractors can move personnel to the field more quickly in some circumstances,
providing what some have called "surge” capability.“ As the US went about the
monumental task of training the Iraqi Army, police, and other security forces,
PSCs offered a vehicle for a rapid increase in trainers that bolstered the capacity
of thinly stretched coalition forces.
Risks:
Contractors are "rigid tools for fluid environments". The contract specifies tasks
to be done and payment to be received for a specific period of time. Even if US
priorities change, the contract enshrines the original agreement and makes change
costly.
Contracted services often pose difficulties with coordination and integration.
Integration between different elements of US government, the host government,
and other governments is complicated by dividing up training efforts among
different contractors.
Contracted training services are subject to political opportunism. When
contractor and host government share interests, they can collude to further private
interests rather than public goals.
Contracted training is difficult to monitor and control.
Contracted training can be more costly. Particularly in risky or uncertain
environments.
? Interview with Ed Soyster, MPRI - 12 April 99; Interviews with Jean-Michel A Beraud and Clifford L...
Fields, MPRI (ACRI program) 31 January 00; Interview with Scott Fisher, State Department, ACRI
program, 31 August 99.
Comments of Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, at the International
Peace Operations Association Dinner, Washington, DC, 19 November 2003.
* Interviews with Ed Soyster, MPRI, 1999, 2000, 2002; Stacey Rabin, PAE, comments at SAIS/IPOA
Conference, “Enhancing Public-Private Peace Operations: Evaluations and Opportunities," Washington,
DC, SAIS 20 November 2003.


103
Increased activity on the part of the Iraqi government is vital to the creation of an
effective set of security forces in the long run. If these interventions are partisan or
corrupt, however, they impede coordination and work against US and coalition goals.
Because contractors are directly interfacing with the Iraqi government and have
information about the degree to which members of the Iraqi government are reinforcing
or undermining professional training, it is crucial that effective communication networks
between US and coalition forces, US and coalition policy makers, and contractors be
constructed.
In one important way, contracting for training can provide some advantages in
coordination by generating greater stability of personnel doing the training. While
military personnel rotate in a fixed manner in US forces, PSCs can provide teams in
which the same personnel stay in a country for several years.
3. Political direction from civilians that are poor or opportunistic can undermine stability
no matter how good the training.
Military capacity need not translate into stability. Capable security instruments can
overthrow governments or allow individual leaders or groups to pursue private or partisan
ends. While the efforts of US troops are not impervious to this dynamic, PSCs are more
likely to feed into opportunism. By their very nature, the flexibility of private forces can
more easily be taken advantage of for private gain.
This was immediately apparent in the creation of the Facilities Protection Services in
Iraq. Reports were that whole militia groups joined in force leading salaries and training
to further strengthened the militias. Erinys did not violate the terms of its contract by
training these people: the contract did not anticipate this opportunistic action. Initially
each Iraqi ministry had armed units from this force to protect their infrastructure and
other units protected private property but the Facilities Protection Services is now being
moved under the control of the Ministry of the Interior.
As indicated above, though, similar infiltration has been reported to have occurred in the
police forces. The Ministry of the Interior, under whom the Iraqi Police Service, the
National Police and the Directorate of Border Enforcement serve, is also reported to have
strong ties with Shiite militia groups. In response to concerns about the infiltration of the
Iraqi police, DynCorp spokesman Greg Laguna said, “We don't control the political
situation, the political loyalties of the people.”
There are two kinds of opportunism at work in Iraq. One is a very dangerous potential
for a diffusion of control that could result in the development of parallel forces that do
not work together under central government command. Lessons from a wide variety of
transitional states suggest that parallel forces loyal to different leadership can undermine
prospects for peace. A crucial element for the development of civilian control is a
civilian hierarchy that centralizes command over all forces.
s Comments of Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, at the International
Peace Operations Association Dinner, Washington, DC, 19 November 2003.


104
The second is lower level corruption where officers pay kick backs to their superiors in
order to get supplies and ghost soldiers and police help line political pockets. This
second problem is exacerbated by the degree to which governance by local tribal and
religious leaders take precedence over or are not well coordinated with the Iraqi
constitution and Iraqi law.
Both work to undermine training efforts and often they work together. Setting up a
system where contracted trainers think it is their job to contribute to managing this kind
of opportunism is quite difficult - but it is also vital if we are to avoid US dollars being
used to undermine stability in Iraq. Coordination among the different forces in Iraq and
the tensions between the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the
national leadership is something that needs to be monitored carefully.
4. Professional values are often hard to put in practice - particularly against irregular
opposing forces
The difficulty of maintaining professional behavior against irregular forces is something
that troops struggle with constantly even in the US and the UK where training and
socialization in professional values is very strong - witness Abu Ghraib and Haditha.
Training forces without an historical appreciation of military professionalism to abide by
these international law and professional values in the midst of an insurgency is a
monumental task.
To the degree that PSCs draw from retired military personnel who are well socialized in
international values and conduct their work accordingly, the values represented in
military training can be as strong as if troops were training. The work that MPRI did for
the ACRI program drew personnel with good area and language skills and generally
operated well within the bounds of integration with social values. PSCs pulled directly
from US professional military education in designing their curriculum. This curriculum
is carefully designed to represent international values (not simply supporting civilian
control of the military and respect for human rights, but claiming that these are integrally
related to success on the battlefield) that model a particular type of military
professionalism - and one that is consistent with what active-duty US troops would
present.
Because contractors are not subject to the chain of command, however, the reliability of
their behavior (even given recent attempts to make them liable to the US Code of
Military Justice) is not as well reinforced as troops. According to Colonel Gerald
Schumacher, a retired Special Forces officer, chaotic conditions in Iraq have led to an
almost cavalier attitude among private security personnel toward international law, “I
don't know how anyone can function in an insurgent environment and have any regard
for the laws of warfare and the Geneva Conventions."l6
16 Quoted in Tob Robberson, “DynCorp has big role, little oversight in war efforts,” Dallas Morning News,
Sunday 24 December 2006.


105
Furthermore, the US contracting pattern in Iraq has relied on more companies and some
that have recruited much more internationally. This recruitment pattern has yielded a
more heterogeneous set of employees and companies that may represent different values
(or less attention to professional values) in training. The US contract with Erinys to train
a private facilities protection force brought in expatriates from South Africa, Nepal, and
the UK, among others." The degree to which these employees represented
professionalism in their work has been questioned - even by those in the industry.
Even if professional values are modeled in training, they also have to be reinforced with
promotions and other rewards in the service. If personnel are rewarded for professional
behavior, the organization will yield more professionalism. If, as in the case of the police
chief in Basra who was fired for telling the truth about militia infiltration, they are
punished for professional behavior, however, the reverse will be true.
5. The US often has many sub-goals in a conflict and the pursuit of one may undermine
others (e.g., US forces working with warlords in Afghanistan to gain access to al Qaeda
hideouts -one US goal- worked against President Karzai's efforts to consolidate control
over the country by training a national Afghan Army -another US goal).
Contractors have frequently used the complexity of US goals to suit their interests in the
continuation of a contract. When it looks as if their contract might be frozen because a
host country is violating human rights concerns or misbehaving in some other way, a
company may claim that its contract should not be frozen because "engaging” human
rights abusers may lead to improvements in civil-military relations and democratization
that may enhance attention to human rights in the long term. In a number of instances,
these kinds of arguments have allowed a contract to continue even when a legal embargo
is in effect. 18 When confronted with evidence that the same company's contract may be
in violation of local laws or be used politically by host country politicians in violation of
human rights norms, though, the company can turn around and claim that it is serving US
interests by enhancing the capacity of the host government's forces or rewarding
cooperative behavior internationally. More than once, contractors told me that, “it is not
our job to insure that our boss (the host country) abides by its own laws."9 Similar
issues have cropped up in the training of Iraqi security forces.
Institutional structures that can ameliorate foreign training stresses
I have argued elsewhere that democratically dense networks of international
organizations (IOS) - can offer a coordinating umbrella for norms and standards and
"DynCorp advertisements for police officers specify a requirement for US citizenship. See
http://www.policemission.com/iraq.asp.
" See Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: the Consequences of Privatizing Security, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter four.
" Interviews with MPRI officials, 2002.


108
perceives a lower level of US commitment and generally values this training less highly-
there is a certain cachet attached to being trained by US troops.23 And there are questions
about the relative costs of these missions.24
The private option also enables US government officials to forgo investment in (or
reorganization of) military forces for new problems – using PSCs one time make it more
ey will be used in the future.25 While the private option provides flexibility
in the short run, then, it is harder to control and frequently more costly than its public
alternative and reduces incentives to reorganize the force. This is dramatically
illustrated by the US use of DynCorp for fielding international civilian police. Initially
DynCorp allowed the US to field a force of international civilian police in Haiti that it
had no other way of fielding. Over the long term, however, the DynCorp option has
allowed the US government to avoid the creation of an international civilian police
capacity - despite the fact that such forces have been routinely sent abroad over the last
10 years and much evidence that these forces lack the requisite strategic vision for
effective action.27
Contracting for foreign training has thus far changed the balance of control between the
executive and legislative branches of government. The executive branch hires
contractors, not Congress. Though Congress approves the military budget, it does not
approve individual decisions to contract out training. It is harder for Congress to oversee
PSC behavior in contract with the US government. The annual consolidated report on
military assistance and sales, for instance, does not include information on who is
conducting particular training missions.-- Examples of executive use of PSCs to evade
congressional restrictions abound. For instance, when Congress institutes stipulations on
the numbers of US troops - the executive has used contractors to go above this number:
Sometimes Congress has innovated and stipulated an upper limit on the number of
contractors, but this has simply led PSCs to hire more local personnel. Thus, the
executive branch, in its decisions to hire contractors and in its day-to-day implementation
2 Comments of Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, at the International
Peace Operations Association Dinner, Washington, DC, 19 November 2003.
24 Decisions to outsource these missions are generally to reduce stress on personnel not to save money -
but many point to assumed) cost saving to justify the privatization. A variety of Pentagon staff, however,
have expressed confusion about the relative cost and suspicion that the cost is higher. There are no good
empirical studies of the relative cost of public v private foreign training.
25 Thomas McNaugher, “The Army and Operations Other than War,” in The Future of the Army
Profession edited by Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002).
20 See Goldman, et. al., Staffing Army ROTC, P. 12; Susan Gates and Al Robbert, “Personnel Savings in
Competitively Sourced DOD Activities," (Washington, DC: RAND (MR-1117-OSD); “Contingency
Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in the Balkans," GAO/NSIAD-00-225
(September 2000).
27 Interview with Robert Perito, June 04. See Perito, The American Experience with Police; Robert Perito,
Where is the Lone Ranger When You Need Him? America's Search for a post-conflict Stability Force
(Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2004); David Bayley, Democratizing the Police
Abroad: What to do and How to do it, (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2001).
"Lumpe, “US Foreign Military Training;" Baum, “Nation Builders for Hire," p. 36


109
of policy is advantaged vis-a-vis Congress. Indeed, this change is often touted by
members of the executive branch as one of the benefits of contracting out."
This is not to suggest that congressional oversight of foreign training is easy or that the
executive does not have an advantage in this arena in the first place. The institutional
safeguards that give Congress indirect means of control over military forces, however,
are not present with PSCs. For instance, Congress has long-standing ties to military
organizations, which affect incentives for individual service members and provide
mechanisms for congressional control. These mechanisms are not so readily available for
PSCs. There are, of course, other ways to avoid congressional scrutiny - through the use
of covert operations, for instance. PSCs simply add another tool to this list.
This is also not to suggest that Congress will not develop better tools for oversight of
PSCs in the future. Given the stresses on US forces and the likelihood that contractors
will be used for a wide variety of military tasks in the future, I hope that Congress along
with the agencies of the executive branch will develop more effective strategies for
managing these contracts.
30 For instance, Theresa Whelan claimed that one of the advantages of contractors is that they "ease” FMF
rules for training foreign militaries. Comments of Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Africa, at the International Peace Operations Association Dinner, Washington, DC, 19 November 2003
12


110
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION
INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S.
House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses
appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum
vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants
(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous
fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is
intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in
complying with the House rule.
Witness name: Deborah Avant
Capacity in which appearing: (check one)
_x_Individual
_Representative
If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other
entity being represented:
FISCAL YEAR 2007
federal agency
dollar value
federal grant(s)/
contracts
N/A
subject(s) of contract or
grant
FISCAL YEAR 2006
federal agency
federal grant(s) /
dollar value
contracts
INA
subject(s) of contract or
grant


111
FISCAL YEAR 2005
VO
federal agency
dollar value
Federal grant(s) /
contracts
Title VI
subject(s) of contract or
grant
International Education
Department of
Education
$325,556
Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee
on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government,
please provide the following information:
Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:
Current fiscal year (2007):_0_
Fiscal year 2006:_0
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Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:
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List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts
manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering
services, etc.);
Current fiscal year (2007):
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Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:
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112
Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on
Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please
provide the following information:
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MANAN
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DoE
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software design, etc.):
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Education
Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:
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Fiscal year 2005: _$325,556


115
INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION
Security Sector Reform in Iraq: Enhancing the Role of the Private Sector
Testimony of the International Peace Operations Association
25 April 2007
Doug Brooks, President
1.
Introduction
Thank you for the opportunity to provide an industry perspective on the critical issues highlighted in this
hearing. The role of the private sector is too little understood and too often treated with suspicion.
The International Peace Operations Association is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, nongovernmental
association of services companies providing critical services to stability and peace operations worldwide.
With more than thirty member companies providing services including training, logistics, security,
aviation, mine action, and medical support we represent a demand-driven industry providing cost
effective services in some of the most dangerous environments imaginable. This testimony will provide
some background information and explain why governments utilize these companies and how they can
best be smart clients.
The leadership, initiative, and oversight of the training effort must come from the governments of the
United States and Iraq. While some of the actual training can be done by U.S. military and government
employees, we should be clear that a significant portion of the expertise, resources and hundreds of
experienced long-term personnel doing the hands-on training and mentoring are necessarily going to
come from the private sector. Contractors are providing extraordinary expertise, resources and capacity
to the training and support of the Iraqi police and military. This is a concept where an effective public-
private partnership is simply indispensible. Indeed, it is inconceivable that success could be achieved
any other way.
Not surprisingly there have been innumerable political and operational problems and conflict related
setbacks to the training programs, as well as frequent attacks targeting the Iraqi trainees. Attempting
reconstruction and redevelopment in the face of an ongoing conflict is necessarily difficult and nothing
quite like the operation in Iraq has been attempted in the past. The closest parallel might be the Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam, which did show a
surprising degree of success in the face of constant attacks by the Vietcong - but only with an astonishing


117
Contractors are able to stay in the field indefinitely. Turnover is lower than similar military operations
where units are rotated out on six to twelve month tours and individuals must constantly be reassigned to
new positions in order for their careers to progress. The private sector's ability to maintain core
personnel from year to year to ensure a single doctrine applied by a single training entity enhances
standardization and quality.
Contractors are not given enough credit for their resilience to risk. While some critics of the private
sector have predicted that contractors would withdraw due to the high risk inherent in Iraqi operations,
in fact the industry has found the risk levels to be manageable and remarkably few companies have left as
a result of the threat levels. Risk fluctuates, but to date contractors have shown amazing robustness in
their performance.
Companies are much more controllable and accountable than portrayed in the press. Contracts can be
and are sometimes modified, penalized or cancelled based on performance and changing conditions.
Companies must answer to government Contract Officers providing guidance and oversight and
contractors must obtain government licenses to do military or police training. All government
contractors must abide by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and if they are working for the
Department of Defense, they must also follow the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement
(DFARS). This is a process than can always be improved and enhanced, but it is important to keep in
mind that additional rules and regulations can also add costs and more importantly, risk.
Individual contractors themselves can be held accountable as well. The Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) allows the U.S. government to try individuals of all nationalities (except host
country nationals) in Federal courts for felonies. This law has been on the books for several years but the
Department of Justice is only now beginning to exercise it appropriately. There have been changes made
that may put contractors under the military's Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). However the
use of the UCMJ for civilians has been extremely controversial and is opposed by several human rights
organizations. Similar rules have been struck down in the past by the Supreme Court as well.
Nevertheless, effective accountability is good for the industry and IPOA has been consistent in support of
enhancement
The private sector is fully expandable to address changing needs and requirements. Companies are able
to tap into huge pools of expertise and most companies have databases of thousands of individuals with a
full array or skills, expertise, experiences, languages and capabilities which can be brought to bear in


118
INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERAȚIONS ASSOCIATION
support of policies. Contractors take a burden off the military and allow soldiers to focus on their core
missions. As the situation in Iraq evolves we can be confident the role of the private sector will evolve as
well.
III.
Improving Contracts
Outsourcing has been hugely successful, and we do have the best-supported, best-supplied military in
history. However, there have been some obvious and very public flaws that have arisen in the course of
the conflict and there is a number of things that could be done to address the problems.
In light of the number and value of contracts that have been utilized, the most obvious way to maximize
value would be for both the Department of State and Department of Defense to improve oversight
capacities and capabilities in general. The quality of Contract Offices has varied significantly, a problem
frequently cited by IPOA's membership, although our member companies also emphasize that there has
been a steady improvement. Improvement in oversight is something our industry strongly supports as
good oversight benefits better companies as well as clients.
Next, contracts for complex contingency operations need to have flexibility built in to take into account
the inherently chaotic nature of conflicts. Too often contracts are modified significantly while already in
force, creating problems, additional costs and delays for companies and clients.
A frequent complaint from our member companies is about the lack of continuity in oversight. Handoffs
between Contract Officers and their successors can be irregular, problematic and disruptive. This can be
compounded when contracts are passed between government departments. Intragovernmental
coordination could be vastly improved. Companies are concerned that DoD Contract Officers and Dos
Contract Officers neither communicate enough nor do they operate with the same rules, creating costs
and complications impacting on performance.
Finally, there needs to be a recognition that quality matters, especially for contracts where so much is at
stake. Too much emphasis is placed on competitive pricing when better quality companies are ultimately
more effective at achieving policy objectives. Contracts awarded with too much emphasis on price can
reward marginal companies and undermine more experienced and professional firms. Repairing
problems or addressing delays made by cheaper contactors can also cost more resources in the long run.
Companies that are members of IPOA would like to be recognized for adhering to a recognized industry
code of conduct, something that is especially significant given the realities of conflict and post conflict


119
INTERN À TI O NÁD PEACE OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION
environments. Ultimately, too much emphasis on price often simply offers a mirage of good value
although the larger mission is not served well as a result.
IV.
Conclusions
The U.S. effort in Iraq has been the best-supported, best-supplied military operation in history largely
due to the innovative and creative utilization of private sector resources. There have been a number of
well publicized problems and there will no doubt be more in the future. U.S. government leadership
could be immensely useful in addressing the problems and ensuring that the invaluable capabilities the
private sector brings to enhance national policies continue to be utilized to their fullest.
Particularly with the Iraqi police, the use of contractors has enabled the training of tens of thousands of
police without creating undue strain on military operations. The capacity that the private sector has
brought to the challenge could not have been achieved in any other way without significant additional
costs and strains on the larger U.S. effort in Iraq. Contractors reduce the burden on the military and
could do more if these programs were expanded, especially regarding military training as has been done
in the past.
There are ways that the process could be improved and there is much that could be done to ensure better
procurement, management, oversight and law enforcement. Good laws and good oversight are good for
good companies. As a responsible trade association IPOA is happy to work with all branches of the U.S.
government to proactively address the problems.
Perfection in peace and stability operations remains a lofty goal, and laws and practices need constant
refinements and improvements. We must remember that the private sector has been supporting U.S.
military operations for literally centuries, and there is no doubt that we are going to utilize its capabilities
in the future. It is critical that we use these companies in the best, most cost effective and efficient way.
while at the same time guaranteeing effective oversight and accountability.
I look forward to answering your questions.


120
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION
INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S.
House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses
appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum
vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants
(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous
fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is
intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in
complying with the House rule.
Witness name: Doug Brooks
Capacity in which appearing: (check one)
Individual
X
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entity being represented: International Peace Operations Association (IPOA)
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121
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please provide the following information:
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123
House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Gerald F. Burke
Major, Massachusetts State Police (Retired)
Former Senior Advisor, Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police Service
April 25, 2007
Good morning and thank you for the opportunity to speak today.
My name is Gerald Burke.
In May 2003, I was a member of a six-person team of police executives sent to Baghdad, :
Iraq, by the United States Departments of Justice (ICITAP) and State (INL). The police
team was part of a larger criminal justice team including corrections and legal executives.
That assignment in Iraq would last until June 2004. Initially, our team conducted a
Needs Assessment of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) for DoJ and DoS.
In March 2005, I returned to Baghdad with the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
as a National Security Advisor to the Iraq Ministry of Interior. That assignment lasted
until February 2006.
Based upon my professional training, education and experience, and particularly, my two
years in Iraq, I have made several observations and conclusions.
SUMMARY: It is my opinion, that, despite the best efforts of thousands of American
Police Officers over the last four years, and the ultimate sacrifice of twelve American
Police Officers, the police-training program in Iraq has been a complete failure. If we
are lucky, and if the Iraqi people are lucky, we may have an opportunity at the request of.
a new Iraq government to do it all over - and to do it right the next time. If we do not get
an opportunity to do it over again in Iraq, then we should be better prepared for the next
country we are involved with - and there will be, eventually, another country.
During my time in Baghdad I worked closely with the United States and British military,
particularly the Military Police, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the Iraq Reconstruction Management
Office. More importantly, I worked very closely, virtually everyday, with the Iraqi
Police Service (IPS).
First, and foremost, I have nothing but praise for the military. Their war-making
capabilities are simply awesome. In particular, I want to compliment the 18th Military
25 APR07 GFB


125
Our original team developed a recommendation for 6,000 international civilian police
trainers and advisors. While this recommendation was quickly reduced to 1,500 by
powers-that-be above our pay grade, it took six months before the first 24 civilian trainers
and advisors arrived from the US. Twenty-four trainers and advisors for a nation of 25
million! A year after our report was submitted there still were less than 100 civilian
police trainers and advisors in Iraq.
The legislative process in Congress may have caused part of this delay. Part of this delay
may have been caused by the bifurcated nature of our international police missions. The
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) of the Department
of State and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
(ICITAP) of the Department of Justice both share responsibility for international police
missions.
INL is responsible for the advisors who are on the streets and visiting police stations
y in Iraq. These advisors are hired on the basis of a low bid contract currently
awarded to Dyncorp, I believe. ICITAP is responsible for the classroom trainers working
in academies across Iraq. These trainers are hired on the basis of a cost plus contract
previously awarded to SAIC but now held by MPRI. This division of responsibility also
leads to a number of operational problems as well.
My recommendation is that all trainers and advisors should be hired on the basis of a cost
plus contract to ensure the highest possible quality of personnel.
In Iraq, the funding for civilian police trainers and advisors was not available until after
October 2003: eight months after the start of the war. In fact, funding was even scarce
for our advance team: I worked under five or six contracts during my first tour as funds
were transferred to keep us in country.
As the insurgent activity increased in the fall of 2003 with attacks on embassies, the
United Nations, the Red Cross, Iraqi police stations, and even our hotel, there was
widespread recognition that the recruiting, training and deploying Iraqi Police was
failing. The failure to deploy civilian police trainers and advisors in a timely manner
delayed the recruitment, training, equipping and deployment of a civilian Iraqi law
enforcement agency.
The US Military was directed to help with the process. By sheer number of personnel,
the US Military began to dominate the process and to accomplish the task. In December
2003 the first class of IPS recruits was sent to the Jordan International Police Training
Center. The first IPS recruit class entered the Baghdad Academy in January 2004.
By March 2004, the US Government recognized that only the US Military had the
personnel, logistical and transportation assets to accelerate the process. The Civilian
Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), under the command of a two star Major
General, was created to recruit, train, equip and sustain the IPS. (See the United States
Institute for Peace, Special Report 137).
25 APR07 GFB


126
At this point the distinction between an Iraqi military force and an Iraqi civilian rule-of-
law police service became almost interchangeable with the use of the term of the Iraqi
Security Force. It was at this time that input or control of the police training by civilian
police experts was significantly reduced.
Across Iraq, American soldiers and Marines were pressed into service to be police
trainers and advisors. These soldiers and Marines occasionally came from Military
Police units but more often than not they were artillerymen, transportation corps,
quartermasters or any other available units.
One unfortunate side effect of the militarization of the police training mission was that
the soldiers and Marines trained best at what they knew best: military skills and tactics.
Issues such as the rule-of-law, human rights and treatment of suspects and prisoners, the
concept of probable cause under Iraqi Law and policing in a democracy received less
emphasis.
In early 2004, partly due to the inability of the Iraqi Police Service to respond to
insurgent activity, the Iraq Ministry of Interior and the US Military organized “third
force" paramilitary Public Order Battalions such as the Special Police Commandos.
These Battalions have now grown to Division level strength and have been recruited en
masse from former Republican Guard units and the Islamic fundamentalist Badr Brigade.
These Special Police, recently renamed the National Police, receive training only from
the US Military and not civilian police trainers and advisors. There have been numerous
allegations from Iraqis and non-government organizations that these Special (National)
Police are functioning as death squads committing human rights abuses such as murder,
torture and kidnapping. Some American military and police advisors sarcastically refer
to these Special Police as our “Salvadorian Option". Some refer to them simply as death
squads.
I want to be careful that my comments - my criticism - of the militarization of the police
training mission is not construed as a blanket criticism of the US Military. The US as
Military was simply doing its best - while undermanned and under equipped for its
primary mission - to fill a void left by other US Government agencies.
I also want to make the distinction between the career Iraq Police and the ad hoc Special
Police. The IPS pre-dated Saddam and was created in 1920 by the British. Saddam did
not particularly trust the IPS and, over the years, created a number of secret police and
muhabarat organizations that usurped much of the authority of the IPS.
Candidates for the IPS Officer Corps were generally well educated and not necessarily
well connected to the regime. Many families sought to get their sons into the police to
avoid them getting drafted into the army. This was particularly true during the Iran Iraq
War in the 1980's and the Gulf War. Individual officers prided themselves on their
higher education. Many of the commanders had attended college outside of Iraq,
particularly before the sanctions.
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129
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION
INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S.
House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses
appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum
vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants
(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous
fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is
intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in
complying with the House rule.
Witness name:
Gerald F. Burke
Capacity in which appearing: (check one)
X Individual
_Representative
If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other
entity being represented: _N/A
FISCAL YEAR 2007
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contracts
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130
FISCAL YEAR 2005
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Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee
on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government,
please provide the following information:
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Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:
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manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering
services, etc.):
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131
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Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please
provide the following information:
Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government: -
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software design, etc.):
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AN
3








QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEHAN
Mr. MEEHAN. What is the plan to address the poor literacy rate among ISF per-
sonnel?
Colonel RAINES. All Iraqi police forces complete a literacy examination during the
recruiting process and individuals must meet the minimum literacy standards. For
those individuals that need to improve their literacy skills, literacy training is of-
fered at certain police training centers; however, there is no comprehensive nation-
wide program within the Ministry of Interior.
Literacy is also a basic requirement to join the Iraqi Joint Forces. The Iraqi Joint
Headquarters is considering potential programs to improve literacy. For example, in
Al Anbar province, Coalition forces and Iraqi leaders have recently worked with
local universities to provide focused tutoring for perspective recruits. Currently, in-
formal discussions are ongoing between military leaders and university staffs to ex-
tend a literacy program to soldiers in the Army, but no formal agreements have
been reached.
Mr. MEEHAN. What is the plan to address the poor literacy rate among ISF per-
sonnel?
Mr. MOTSEK. All Iraqi police forces complete a literacy examination during the re-
cruiting process and individuals must meet the minimum literacy standards. For
those individuals that need to improve their literacy skills, literacy training is of-
fered at certain police training centers; however, there is no comprehensive nation-
wide program within the Ministry of Interior.
Literacy is also a basic requirement to join the Iraqi Joint Forces. The Iraqi Joint
Headquarters is considering potential programs to improve literacy. For example, in
Al Anbar province, Coalition forces and Iraqi leaders have recently worked with
local universities to provide focused tutoring for perspective recruits. Currently, in-
formal discussions are ongoing between military leaders and university staffs to ex-
tend a literacy program to soldiers in the Army, but no formal agreements have
been reached.
Mr. MEEHAN. What is the plan to address the poor literacy among ISF personnel?
Ambassador PATTERSON. National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD-36)
assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq's security forces to CENTCOM. We
referred this question to CENTCOM's Civilian Police Assistance Training Team,
which provided the following response:
All Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) candidates for positions within the civil secu-
rity forces must be literate at time of entry. The MOI recruiting policy states that,
"the candidates must have graduated from Intermediate School as a minimum re-
quirement.” The MOI recognizes that illiterate individuals were hired during a pe-
riod of expedient hiring in the provinces and has ordered the provinces to develop
literacy programs to address this problem where it may exist. CPATT has supported
and implemented a pilot program for literacy at the Baghdad Police College. This
program was quite successful and it was turned over to the Iraqi Police Service for
wider implementation. Provinces such as Ninawa (Mosul) have developed and imple-
mented programs to address the problem of illiteracy within the ranks.
Mr. MEEHAN. What is the plan to address the continuing lack of Arabic and Kurd-
ish linguists to serve with U.S. trainers, transition teams and partner units four
years into the war?
Colonel RAINES. Multi-National Force—Iraq (MNF-I) is not aware of any substan-
tiated analysis, data, or recent inquiries that indicate a formidable lack of linguists.
The latest information from the 27 May 2007 Linguist Weekly Roll-up indicates that
Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq (MNSŤCI) currently has the
following linguists per the stated requirements:
Arabic Cat 1 Local Nationals: 507 assigned/547 required (93 percent)
Kurdish Cat 1 Local Nationals: 25 assigned/26 required (96 percent)
Persian Farsi Local Nationals: 1 assigned/1 required (100 percent)
Turkish Local Nationals: 1 assigned/1 required (100 percent)
The Army addresses the requirement for Arabic and Kurdish linguists through
Soldiers, where available, and through contracting activities.
entatto add the post
(135)


136
ers and U.S. trainers suboment of 1935. The Thea fill in these eleme
train part, Arabidiers.
fillimbined
was raise any otheirementsment of 1936 MINS from Lucernent to the M
units. Inhas mainte Theaterne partnernal.conta
The OIF Theater Linguist Manager manages the linguist assets on the ground to
provide the greatest linguist support possible to each element present. The majority
of the linguist requirements in Iraq are for Arabic speakers and a small percentage
is for Kurdish speakers. When Kurdish linguists are requested, the requirement is
normally for dual-language Arabic-Kurdish speakers.
The following initiatives below represent Army efforts to fill OIF theater linguist
requirements:
a. All available Soldiers with Arabic and Kurdish language skills currently sup-
port OIF operations in accordance with their occupational specialties and unit rota-
tions.
b. In February 2003, the Army initiated the 09L Translator Aide Pilot Program
to bring additional Arabic language skills and cultural expertise into the Individual
Ready Reserve. The recruiting effort later expanded to include Kurdish and other
languages. In February 2006, the Pilot Program transitioned into the Military Occu-
pational Specialty 09L, Interpreter/Translator. Currently, some OIF theater linguist
requirements, to include the Military Transition Teams (MiTT) in Iraq, are sup-
ported by available 09L Soldiers.
c. The bulk of the Arabic and Kurdish linguist support to the MITTs, U.S. train-
ers and Coalition partner units in Iraq comes from Local National contract linguists.
MiTTs, U.S. trainers subordinate to the MNSTCI and partner units have a current
combined linguist requirement of 1935. The Theater Linguist Manager is focused on
filling these requirements and has maintained fill in these elements beyond the
level of many other OIF units. In February 2007, the total OIF linguist requirement
was raised to support an increase of forces. The contractor is increasing local re-
cruiting efforts; newspaper advertisements, flyers, and monetary incentives are
being considered to meet the higher requirements. The Army continues to provide
screening support to the local hiring effort and is addressing local recruitment with
the contractor to improve the overall linguist fill. The Army continues to press the
current contractor to recruit and retain linguists to achieve 100 percent of the con-
tract linguist requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
d. The Defense Language Institute (DLI) has expanded its efforts to increase
linguist throughput and quality, and to increase the Arabic and Kurdish language
familiarization available to the Army. The Emerging Languages Task Force pro-
vides instruction in low density languages, including Kurdish. New DLI language
training detachments and distribution of Arabic Survival kits also increased the
available Arabic language training opportunities.
While mission requirements are not static and mission changes make it unlikely
that we will achieve 100 percent support for the forces in OIF, the Army is doing
all possible to provide maximum linguist support:
Mr. MEEHAN. What is the plan to address the continuing lack of Arabic and Kurd-
ish linguists to serve with U.S. trainers, transition teams and partner units four.
years into the war?
Mr. MOTSEK. Multi-National Forces—Iraq (MNFI) is not aware of any substan-
tiated analysis, data, or recent inquiries that indicate a formidable lack of linguists.
The latest information from the 27 May 07 Linguist Weekly Roll-up indicates that
Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTCI) currently has the
following linguists per the stated requirements:
Arabic Cat 1 Local Nationals: 507 assigned/547 required (93%)
Kurdish Cat 1 Local Nationals: 25 assigned/26 required (96%)
Persian Farsi Local Nationals: 1 assigned/1 required (100%)
Turkish Local Nationals: 1 assigned/1 required (100%)
The Army addresses the requirement for Arabic and Kurdish linguists through
Soldiers, where available, and through contracting activities.
The OIF Theater Linguist Manager manages the linguist assets on the ground to
provide the greatest linguist support possible to each element present. The majority
of the linguist requirements in Iraq are for Arabic speakers and a small percentage
is for Kurdish speakers. When Kurdish linguists are requested, the requirement is
normally for dual-language Arabic-Kurdish speakers.
The following initiatives below represent Army efforts to fill OIF theater linguist
requirements:
a. All available Soldiers with Arabic and Kurdish language skills currently sup-
port OIF operations in accordance with their occupational specialties and unit rota-
tions.
b. In Feb. 2003, the Army initiated the 09L Translator Aide Pilot Program to
bring additional Arabic language skills and cultural expertise into the Individual
Ready Reserve. The recruiting effort later expanded to include Kurdish and other
languages. In Feb. 2006, the Pilot Program transitioned into the Military Occupa-


140
Absent a “training float,” the Department simply does not have enough personnel
to fill all of its critical overseas and domestic positions and simultaneously allow for
large numbers of long-term language students. We have prioritized staffing, rede-
fined assignments rules, and drawn on Civil Service employees to help fill critical
overseas positions, but more resources are needed both to sustain the Department's
efforts to develop and maintain a highly-proficient cadre of Arabic speakers and to
tend to the general business of diplomacy worldwide.
The FY 2008 State Department budget request includes an increase of
$20,821,000 to enhance the Department's ability to provide foreign language and
other developmental training, including 48 new Foreign Service positions to improve
the language proficiency of current and incoming Foreign Service employees. The re-
quested increase of $20.821M would also be used to fund special programs such as
Arab media workshops and internships in the field and additional overseas immer-
sion training opportunities.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA
Ms. DAVIS. Just a few other questions, in terms of contracts. For example,
DynCorp, you mentioned that people need five years of experience in police work
in order to train Iraqi personnel. Do we think that that is enough? And are they
bringing the skill sets that are really necessary to do that job?
Ambassador PATTERSON. Most have significantly more experience. The roughly
690 International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) currently serving in Iraq have an
average of 21.6 years of law enforcement experience. The current low is nine years
and the high is 38 years.
We have made significant enhancements to our pre-deployment orientation and
screening processes to ensure the personnel we deploy are prepared to meet mission
objectives. The screening program includes: psychological tests, physical agility
tests, and joint interviews with DynCorp and Department of State employees. IPLO
candidates that pass this screening must undergo two weeks of INL-sponsored
training before being deployed. Training includes: weapons qualification, mission
briefs, familiarization with the history and culture of the region, first aid, convoy
operations, team building, GPS and map reading, and hostage and survival training.
This effectively screens for unqualified or unmotivated individuals, and roughly 23
percent of candidate IPLOs fail orientation training.
We are confident that the IPLOs supplied by the Department of State's contract
with DynCorp International have sufficient and relevant law enforcement experi-
ence in order to train and mentor Iraqi civilian security forces. We are in constant
communication with CPATT to ensure that the personnel provided by our contractor
meet the mission needs and are performing effectively as part of the MNF-I mission
in the field.
candidate is for un cand and children wemo weekete com
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS
Mr. ANDREWS. When a recruit walked through the front door of the JIPTC a year
ago, did we know, in fact, who that person was, or did we have to rely upon who
they said they were?
Mr. MOTSEK. All of the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS)
and U.S. Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) files have been routinely sent to the
Department of Defense's Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) to be checked against pre-
viously entered BAT records (civil and detainee records), pre-war Iraqi criminal
records, 1991 Gulf War prisoner fingerprint records, and latent fingerprints har-
vested from various forensic efforts in Iraq. There is also an arrangement with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to compare these records with FBI records and
other associated biometric records collected by the U.S. Government.
If this crosscheck identifies derogatory or negative information on any student
who is attending, or has graduated from, the Jordan International Police Training
Center (JIPTC) or other Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT)-certified
police academy inside Iraq, those files are turned over to the National Ground Intel-
ligence Center (NGIC) and Iraq's Ministry of Interior Internal Affairs section. The
comparison of all biometric records (not exclusively police cadets or graduates) up
to June 2007 had resulted in more than 8,500 matches to criminal records generated
from approximately 666,500 biometric enrollments (includes persons other than po-
lice). As of June 2007, there were 29,691 JIPTC graduates enrolled in the system.
Mr. ANDREWS. Is the Department of Defense tracking through CPATT these train-
ees?


142
which limited CPA's ability to verify graduates' whereabouts; and the absence of
electronic database systems (and often even the power to operate electronic systems)
at both the federal and provincial/district levels. Other factors also complicated the
effort. Police station commanders, in many cases, were not given notice from MOI
that new officers would be assigned to their stations and commanders often did not
have the resources to pay new officers. There was also resistance on the part of
some Iraqi police commanders to accept JIPTC graduates, as they either did not ac-
cept the training or preferred to appoint their own officers. Finally, some Iraqi offi-
cers decided not to serve as police officers and others left due to insurgent intimida-
tion, threats, and attacks against new police officers.
Mr. ANDREWS. What kind of biometric tracking is now in place for recruits and
graduates at the JIPTC?
Colonel RAINES. Iraqi Police Service (IPS) recruits are entered into biometric data-
bases. Each recruit provides detailed personal information, ten fingerprints, a front
and side view photograph, a retinal scan, and a voice print. The electronic files are
sent to the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) compound at
Adnon Palace where all the files are checked not only through the Iraqi AFIS sys- -..
tem (internal to Iraq), but also through the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) in West
Virginia. There, these files are cross-checked with two U.S. force protection systems
used by the Coalition in Iraq: the Biometric Identification System for Access (BISA)
and the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT). Any recruit record identified with a
"hit" on the AFIS system (e.g., criminal record or double dipping in two agencies),
is sent to Ministry of Interior Internal Review for investigation.
The Iraqi AFIS does not track where IPS officers are stationed or what training
they have received. Currently, this is a manual paper/ledger process. However, a
human resources system, the Iraqi Police Data Management System (IPDMS), is
currently being developed by the Ministry of Interior. Iraqi AFIS information will
populate IPDMS, but IPDMS will not contain biometric data.
Mr. ANDREWS. What kind of biometric tracking is now in place for recruits and
graduates at the JIPTC?
Mr. MOTSEK. Iraqi Police Service (IPS) recruits are entered into biometric data-
bases. Each recruit provides detailed personal information, ten fingerprints, a front
and side view photograph, a retinal scan, and a voice print. The electronic files are
sent to the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) compound at
Adnon Palace where all the files are checked not only through the Iraqi AFIS sys-
tem (internal to Iraq), but also through the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) in West
Virginia. There, these files are cross-checked with two U.S. force protection systems
used by the Coalition in Iraq: the Biometric Identification System for Access (BISA)
and the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT). Any recruit record identified with a
"hit" on the AFIS system (e.g., criminal record or double dipping in two agencies),
is sent to Ministry of Interior Internal Review for investigation. .
The Iraqi AFIŠ does not track where IPS officers are stationed or what training
they have received. Currently, this is a manual paper/ledger process. However, a
human resources system, the Iraqi Police Data Management System (IPDMS), is
currently being developed by the Ministry of Interior. Iraqi AFIS information will
populate IPDMS, but IPDMS will not contain biometric data.
Mr. ANDREWS. What kind of tracking for graduates is now in place for recruits
and graduates at the JIPTC?
Ambassador PATTERSON. National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD-36)
assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq's security forces to CENTCOM. We
referred this question to CENTCOM's Civilian Police Assistance Training Team
(CPATT), which provided the following response:
All students at JIPTC and other CPATT-certified police training academies inside
Iraq are enrolled into the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS).
All AFIS files are sent back to the Department of Defense's Biometric Fusion Center
(BFC) to be checked against previously entered Iraqi civil and detainee records, pre-
war Iraqi criminal records, 1991 Gulf War fingerprint records, and latent finger-
prints harvested form various forensic efforts in Iraq. There is also a relationship
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other associated biometric records col-
lected by the U.S. Government.
The AFIS data collection program is maintained to help provide a positive identi-
fication for all Iraqi Security Force personnel, though it is not a human resources
system that tracks personnel throughout their career in the Iraqi police, army or
the prison system.
The assignment and tracking of police personnel after academy graduation is con-
ducted by Iraq's Ministry of Interior (MOI). However, the current paper-based
records system used by the MOI, coupled with the decentralized nature of the Iraqi
Police Service and the ongoing insurgency, makes tracking personnel exceedingly


143
difficult. In the near future, an automated system currently being installed in the
MOI and its subordinate units, with U.S. Government assistance, will make the
MOI's personnel and pay systems more transparent.
Graduates of U.S.-sponsored academy training are assigned to the Provincial Po-
lice Directorate. The Provincial headquarters will then make the district and station
assignments. CPATT tracks the number of graduates and the assignments to the
provinces but does not have a presence in all stations to directly verify that the
graduates report for duty. At this time, we can not guarantee that an individual
reports to duty at a specific police station; however, it is the contention of the MOI
that the vast majority of academy graduates report to their assigned duty station.
Mr. ANDREWS. How long has this tracking system been in place?
Colonel RAINES. Biometric screening for Iraqi Police Service recruits began in
March 2005.
Mr. ANDREWS. How long has this tracking system been in place?
Mr. MOTSEK. Biometric screening for Iraqi Police Service recruits began in March
2005.
Mr. ANDREWS. How long has this tracking system been in place?
Ambassador PATTERSON. National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD-36)
assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq's security forces to CENTCOM. We
referred this question to CENTCOM's Civilian Police Assistance Training Team
(CPATT), which provided the following response:
There is no U.S. Government system in place to track graduates of the Jordan
International Police Training Center or graduates of other CPATT supported police
training academies in Iraq. However, CPATT is assisting Iraq's Ministry of Interior
in creating an automated record system that will make the MÕI's personnel and pay
systems more transparent. The Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System,
which collects biometric data on individuals receiving training, has been in theater
since November 2005.
Mr. ANDREWS. Are people in U.S. military prisons and stockades in Iraq that are
suspected of or have been charged with killing or attempting to kill Americans iden-
tified using biometrics?
Colonel RAINES. Yes, if the detainee is a Coalition detainee, then most likely the
detainee was entered into Biometric Automated Toolset and the detainee's status
was checked through the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) in West Virginia.
If the individual was detained by Iraqi forces, some have been entered into the
Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and checked with Iraqi
AFIS and the BFC. Iraqi law states that Iraqis are only entered into Iraqi AFIS
upon sentencing by an Iraqi judge.
Mr. ANDREWS. Are people in U.S. military prisons and stockades in Iraq that are
suspected of or have been charged with killing or attempting to kill Americans iden-
tified using biometrics?
Mr. MOTSEK. Yes, if the detainee is a Coalition detainee, then most likely the de-
tainee was entered into Biometric Automated Toolset and the detainee's status was
checked through the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) in West Virginia.
If the individual was detained by Iraqi forces, some have been entered into the
Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and checked with Iraqi
AFIS and the BFC. Iraqi law states that Iraqis are only entered into Iraqi AFIS
upon sentencing by an Iraqi judge.
Mr. ANDREWS. Are people in U.S. military prisons and stockade in Iraq that are
suspected of or have been charged with killing or attempting to kill American identi-
fied using biometrics?
Ambassador PATTERSON. National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD-36)
assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq's security forces to CENTCOM. We
referred this question to CENTCOM's Civilian Police Assistance Training Team,
which provided the following response:
All U.S. Military prisons in Iraq use the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT), an
identity management system used to record data and classified attachments linked
to biometrics of detainees and non-U.S. persons of interest. The BAT system was
originally designed as a dossier system for U.S. Military Intelligence personnel. It
is composed of biometric records used to positively identify individuals (unclassified
information), and an application for entering relevant intelligence information con-
cerning the individual (classified information). These two portions can be separated
and routed to the appropriate organizations for processing. BAT is interconnected
with other CENTCOM databases and databases in the continental United States.
BAT data travels back to the Biometric Fusion Center (West Virginia) to be checked
against previously entered BAT records (civil and detainee records), pre-war Iraqi
criminal records, 1991 Gulf War fingerprint records, and latent fingerprints har-
vested form various forensic efforts in Iraq. There is also a relationship with the
Criminal records.y entered BATO metric Fusion cente the continental interc