HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
HOWARD P. "BUCK” MCKEON, California
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina
KEN CALVERT, California
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JEFF MILLER, Florida
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
RICK LARSEN, Washington
FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TOM COLE, Oklahoma
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
ROB BISHOP, Utah
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
MARK UDALL, Colorado
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
PATRICK MURPHY, Pennsylvania
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director
MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member
STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member
MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant
O


REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE
SECURITY FORCES OF IRAQ
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, September 6, 2007.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:35 p.m., in room 2118,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the
committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The CHAIRMAN. Before we start our hearing, which is a very,
very important one, and we appreciate the witnesses, I will not tol-
erate anyone now, during this hearing, or before this hearing being
here and using any of our facilities for propaganda purposes. The
one who did so was just escorted from the chambers.
The committee will come to order. Today, we receive the testi-
mony of the Independent Commission on the Iraqi Security Forces.
Attending this afternoon are our old friend, General Jim Jones,
the chairman of the Commission, as well as the other commis-
sioners who are joining him at the witness table.
General Joulwan, good to see you again.
General JOULWAN. Good to see you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Former Secretary of Defense, John Hamre, good
to see you.
Chief Ramsey, thank you so much for being with us.
The Independent Commission was mandated by the supple-
mental appropriations bill we passed earlier this year. The Com-
mission was charged with conducting an independent assessment
of the Iraqi Security Forces.
A similar assessment was carried out by our Oversight Investiga-
tions Subcommittee earlier this year under the leadership of Marty
Meehan and Todd Akin. As you know, Marty Meehan has left Con-
gress and gone into the field of education. I hope the Independent
Commission found their report to be helpful.
The Independent Commission's report raised a number of ques-
tions about the ability—more importantly, the motivation of the
Iraqi Security Forces to take over responsibility for security from
the American forces.
I think most of us agree that the Iraqi Army is in better shape
than some of the other forces and has shown some improvement
over time. But, as the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
mentioned in yesterday's hearing, Mr. Walker testifying, there are
(1)


still concerns about sectarian activities by some of the army units.
I hope the Commission will address that question.
The Iraqi Security Forces are one of the vital pieces in the cur-
rent strategy in Iraq. They are the forces that are supposed to sup-
port ours in the surge. They are the forces that are going to have
to hold areas that American forces have cleared when the Amer-
ican forces pull back from providing the primary security in Bagh-
dad, Anbar, and a few other areas. They are ultimately the forces
that will have to take over the fight against the insurgency. The
faster they can take over the fight the better.
This committee and the Congress will face significant questions
about the future mission of U.S. forces and about how best to con-
tinue the mission of training and equipping Iraqi Security Forces.
We need your critical assessment, gentlemen, on how to move for-
ward.
General Jones, John Hamre, General Joulwan, Chief Ramsey,
thank you again for appearing to be with us; and we are very, very
appreciative.
I now call on my friend, my colleague from California, Ranking
Member Duncan Hunter.
otive
STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for hav-
ing this hearing.
Mr. Chairman, I know a lot of our members participated in the
fairly extensive hearing this morning starting at nine o'clock with
respect to Iraq, and so what I would like to do is offer my written
statement for the record.
I know you have got lots of folks who want to ask questions and
lots of good testimony to give, so let me just welcome all of the
members and note that, from my perspective, the stand-up and the
reliability of the Iraqi Army is I think the key force for stability
and success in Iraq. So, obviously, a very critical issue—for this
member, the most critical issue of all—the dimensions that we are
presently examining with respect to the prospects for Iraq.
So thanks for being with us; and, Mr. Chairman, that completes
my statement. I look forward to the witnesses.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's prepared statement will be put
in the record without objection, and we thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 49.]
The CHAIRMAN. General Jones, let's go ahead and proceed, sir.
And thank you again for taking this undertaking.


please turn to page 23 and 24 in the report, as my next remarks
will address those slides.
We made more than 70 site visits in Iraq. And as you can see
from the charts in front of you and on your desk, this included vis-
its to the Iraqi military, ministerial headquarters, and the various
command centers, training facilities, and operating bases. We also
visited Iraqi police stations, joint security stations, and law enforce-
ment academies; and commissioners traveled to border, port, and
internal security installations, as well as to Coalition facilities de-
signed to assist with Iraqi security training and transition. These
visits were invaluable to us, as they allowed us a firsthand look at
the real work being accomplished daily by members of the Iraqi Se-
curity Forces and their dedicated Coalition partners.
The Commission met with more than 100 Iraqi officials, more
than 100 U.S. and current former government officials, and more
than a dozen leading non-governmental experts on the subject of
Iraqi Security Forces.
Finally, the Commission examined previous studies and reports,
ke , and documents with information relevant to the perform-
ance and status of the Iraqi Security Forces, the rate of progress,
and their prospects for fulfilling the responsibilities of a profes-
sional and effective security force.
Before addressing our key findings, I would like to emphasize
that the findings and recommendations by this Commission were
endorsed unanimously by all members of this Commission..
I would also like to note that the Commission could not have per-
formed its work without the generous assistance and support of
many, many individuals. In particular, we are grateful for the sup-
port provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Štaff, the Multinational Force Iraq, the entire military chain of
command, as well as the Department of State and Embassy Bagh-
dad. We also appreciate the openness we were shown by many offi-
cials of the government of Iraq.
Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, the Iraqi Security Forces
are made up of two major components, the Iraqi military and the
Traqi police. The Commission examined both components and their
governing ministries in order to fulfill our mandate.
The Iraqi military includes the Army, Special Forces, the Air
Force, and the Navy. They operate under the Ministry of Defense,
and today they number approximately 152,000 personnel in uni-
form.
Iraqi police forces include the Iraqi Police Service, the National
Police, the Border Forces, and the Facilities Protection Services.
They operate under the Ministry of the Interior, and their total
number is approximately 324,000.
In terms of overall results, the consensus opinion of the Commis-
1 is that the most positive event that can occur in the near term
to influence progress in Iraq is a government-led political reconcili-
ation which leads to an end to sectarian violence. Everything seems
to flow from this point, to include the likelihood of a successful con-
clusion to our own mission. Absent that event, it will certainly be
harder and it will take longer in order to be successful.
Our overall evaluation of the Iraqi Security Forces is that real
progress has been achieved, though it is relatively uneven across


the span of the security forces. With regard to the Ministry of De-
fense, we note good progress. We note the existence of a strategic
vision for the future and eagerness to take on more responsibility.
We note the presence of thousands of young Iraqis eager to join the
armed forces.
We note the development of a bureaucracy that is not very re-
sponsive to the needs of the field because of the bureaucratic
layering and the cumbersome bureaucracy that seems to be devel-
oping which inhibits the delivery of equipment and supplies from
getting to Iraqi front lines.
As you know, the 10 divisions making up the Iraqi Army are
composed or led by—four of them are led by Shi'a, four by Kurds
and three Sunni divisions today in the Iraqi Army.
With regard to the Army, we have noted an impressive progress
in ability and willingness to defend against the internal threats to
the nation, working with police units where possible to bolster the
police units' capability shortfalls. We have seen evidence of consid-
erable tactical success on the ground. One thing that impressed all
of us was their willingness to take on more combat missions as
soon as possible. I might note that the Iraqi Army intends to grow
from 10 divisions to 13 divisions in 2008.
I ask you to turn to page 57 of your report for the next slide.
Sectarian n problems in the Ministry of Defense and in the Iraqi
Army are minor as compared to other institutions in the Iraqi gov-
ernment. The basic elements necessary to grow an Army are in
place and functioning; and, as I said earlier, they seem to have an
unlimited amount of volunteers ready to enlist in the ran
There is an alarming development in terms of the existence of
duplicate and parallel chains of command and intelligence-gather-
ing institutions; and we noted a much-needed requirement to im-
prove in cooperation with other organizations, other agencies such
as the Ministry of the Interior and more coordination required with
police forces.
The Iraqi Army cannot yet operate independently due to a chron-
ic lack of logistics, supply, mobility, and national command and
control capabilities. It cannot defend against external threats ema-
nating from Syria and Iran, especially along the borders in the de-
fense of its critical infrastructures.
The most capable and professionally effective military units in
Iraq are its Special Forces unit. In our judgment, they are as good
as any in the Gulf region, although they lack in mobility and cur-
rently do not have enough enablers. But their willingness to fight
and their professional capability and their morale is extremely im-
pressive.
The Navy and the Air Force remain in an early developmental
stage. They are making satisfactory progress.
The Commission has recommended that the Iraqi government
consider integrating the Coast Guard and the Navy into a single
maritime force. Iraq is a nation with a 36-mile coastline, and cur-
rently the Navy and the Coast Guard function independently and
under two different ministries.
Turning briefly to the Ministry of the Interior, this is judged by
the Commission to be a weak ministry, despite recent attempts to
change out senior personnel for sectarian reasons. Little progress


19
torial integrity of the nation, but away from the cities, as the Iraqis
handle their own problems themselves. And that to us is encourag-
ing. What that means specifically in numbers is beyond our capac-
ity to assess.
Mr. McHUGH. I see my time expired. Thank you again.
Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair recognizes Dr. Snyder.
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jones, did you have any Arkansans on that commission?
I always like to recognize Retired Sergent Major McMichael. We
are very proud of him and his Arkansas heritage.
I want to pick up a little bit where Mr. McHugh was. As I read
your report about the Iraqi National Army side of things, I thought
it was reasonably positive, things are moving the right way,
logistical problems, close air support challenges in the future. But
that was different than sort of the press headlines that says, Iraqi
Army Unable to Take Over Within a Year. I read your report. I
think you used the word “independently.” Is that kind of the key
distinction? You don't have any expectation that tomorrow or the
next day that they are somehow going to be able to have their sup-
ply lines and logistics and close air support, but that they can do
a lot of fighting and are already? Is that how you would distinguish
between the press headlines we have been seeing?
General JONES. I think that is correct. The way we characterize
it is they can do more internally to face the troubles that they are
facing. But to try to build an army—first of all, having defeated the
Army and then having dismembered it and then trying to reassem-
ble it and have it to be able to be ready to take on the internal
threats of the insurgencies and the external threats posed by the
neighboring countries, that is a little bit of a stretch in the period
of time that they have had. There is no question in my mind that
they are on the right glide slope to get there, and because of the
increased capacity, it is going to give us more capability to do more
on the external side while they take care more the internal prob-
lems.
Dr. SNYDER. How I want to spend the remaining time I have is
I want to read these comments from what you call your concluding
hts on page 129 and 130. We have a big debate going on in
this country and a big debate going on in this Congress, and you
all are very much aware of that, and your report is being reviewed
in that context. But I want to read what you all say, which you all
signed off on unanimously, and just ask our three former military
people here to comment on it.
And this is what your report said: Concluding thoughts. While
much remains to be done before success can be confidently de-
clared, the strategic consequences of failure or even perceived fail-
ure for the United States and the coalition are enormous. We ap-
proach a truly strategic moment in this still young century. Iraq's
regional geostrategic position, the balance of power in the Middle
East, the economic stability made possible by the flow of energy in
many parts of the world, and the ability to defeat and contain ter-
rorism where it is most manifest are issues that do not lend them-
selves to easier, quick solutions. How we respond to them, however,
could well define our Nation in the eyes of the world for years to
come. And that is the end of your-all's unanimous opinion.


38
forces, but the truth of it is that everything you looked at talks
about political reconciliation in tandem with, so it is pretty difficult
to look at one aspect and not merge them. And clearly my desire
today is to merge them to say no matter what else happens, those
horrendous figures that you put in the book, and I thank you for
that, coupled with what I mentioned, and that ethnic cleansing,
does not look good for the future of Iraq.
So I guess my final question to you is, based on what you saw
and what has happened to the Iraqi people, what has happened to
the United States people, when will you say this is enough and
would you say this is enough if I asked you when to end?
Dr. HAMRE. Again, our charter was fairly narrowly drafted. And
we felt it was important, because this is such a hot and hotly
charged issue, for us to stay fairly firmly inside the boundary of
our specific charter. Every individual here might have personal
views. But we presented a consensus report to you. And I think we
should stay at that. I think that is how we can be helpful to you,
the Congress, rather than to try to offer individual comments or
speculation on how to answer.
Forgive me for dodging it.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. No, I thank you for that. I understand. And
I clearly am deeply concerned about the possibility of success. And
so I felt that, you know, I needed to ask you that. And I thank you
again, everybody, for going there and doing what you did for this
country. Thank you.
Dr. HAMRE. Thank you.
Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman. The Chair now
recognizes Admiral Sestak.
Mr. SESTAK. Thank you for your time, sirs. I just have a couple
quick questions, and because of limited time hopefully quick re-
sponses. General Joulwan, will their Army in 18 months poten-
tially, or 24 months, be the exact equivalent of ours as we do our
efforts out there in Iraq?
General JOULWAN. The exact equivalent, quickly, no. But they
can make substantial progress.
Mr. SESTAK. Thank you. General Jones, my question to you is
will the security situation improve, in your assessment, having
been there, over the next 18 or 24 months if absolutely no political
accommodation is taken? If so, would that be because if not, okay.
If so, would that be because of our U.S. military presence pri-
marily?
General JONES. I think the internal security of the country will
improve simply because of the increase in the capability of the
Iraqi Army. Hopefully, that will be accompanied by some police re-
forms. But the thing that will make the most difference is achiev-
ing political reconciliation.
Mr. SESTAK. So Secretary Hamre, my question comes back to
you. Since I was struck by your reference in asking Chief
McCausland to speak about Ireland, if the security situation will
improve somewhat, primarily because they get better, but then we
absent ourselves, we go to the borders, my question really comes
and the Iraqi Army is not going to be as capable as we are, and
if there is no political accommodation, are we really, while this re-
port is very good, are we actually measuring the wrong benchmark


39
for progress? Because in Ireland, unless Ian Paisley and Gerry
Adams had come to an agreement politically, we never would have
gotten down to a police car with two people sitting in it. It began
with political accommodation. And then the police could become
less with no Army.
So in fact, Mr. Hamre, from your more broader political aspect
here, because you did say in your first chapter that you wanted to
comment on the general trends associated, really while this bench-
mark is interesting, it is relatively not irrelevant, but we are actu-
ally measuring and looking at the wrong thing. It must be political
accommodation first if that Ireland is your example—Northern Ire-
land, I apologize.
Dr. HAMRE. Admiral, I think this report, when—these are secu-
rity professionals. These are 500 years of military experience, 150
years of police experience. These are security guys. Their first rec-
ommendation is that this really has to begin with political rec-
onciliation.
Mr. SESTAK. It must begin with political-
Dr. HAMRE. It is going to be dramatically harder without it.
Mr. SESTAK. So any assessment that comes with this, if you don't
mind, Mr. Secretary, that tells us about improvement in the Army
is interesting, but unless someone is coming on Monday, as Mr.
Larsen was getting to, and telling us about measuring progress in
litical areas, this report is interesting, but relatively not that rel-
evant to what really should be measured.
Dr. HAMRE. But I-sir, I think it would be much harder to get
political reconciliation if there aren't structures that politicians can
rely on to help produce what citizens want. And the goal of produc-
ing an Army that is able to bring security to the country is going
to be a positive value for that reconciliation. So even though we feel
the political reconciliation clearly has to be the primary lead-
Mr. SESTAK. And first you said.
Dr. HAMRE. It will make it much harder. I don't know how it gets
solved.
Mr. SESTAK. If I could comment, just so you understand, I have
been struck how somehow we have permitted the Petrae
a general, to set the tone of the national debate in September on
a military security issue. Nowhere are we having the tone set by
what is in the U.Š. security interests or the U.S. military interests.
As I was struck in Iraq when I asked the General what about the
impact of Iraq on our Armed Forces at home? That is not my role,
he said. And so while this report and the GAO report that we were
given are interesting, shouldn't we really be measuring not the
progress of Iraq in benchmarks, but the benchmarks of U.S. secu-
rity in the region by looking at the political accommodations and
the nations attendant to that?
Dr. HAMRE. Sir, I think that is the integrated challenge that only
the Congress can resolve. You are getting different inputs from dif-
ferent experts, different commissions, and you are going to have to
be the ones that pull this together to decide what is the right
course. We weren't asked to do that.
Mr. SESTAK. I understand.
Dr. HAMRE. And we are trying to offer a valid input to you as
you are going to have to.


40
Mr. SESTAK. I only comment because I was also struck in your
report that although Iran and Syria are involved destructively, the
comment in your report of how to deal with that is protect the bor-
ders militarily. Nothing about trying to deal with those two dip-
lomatically. Not your role. But that is my concern, is the debate
that begins on Monday is on a military approach, not
not-we are defi-
nitely not on the correct level for this debate on Monday with the
general. Hopefully, Ambassador Crocker will bring that to what
should be the President's, as it is called, report within that political
context.
Thank you, sir. I am sorry, General.
General JONES. No, I was just simply going to add that, personal
observation, that what is lacking, what has been lacking is a stra-
tegic debate. It is a lot easier to talk about tactical issues, about
whether units are doing well and everything else, and that seems
to be what we gravitate towards. But the strategic consequences
and the strategic issues of this particular problem really should be
engaged at a much—at a higher level. And we certainly applaud
that as a commission.
Our job was to answer a limited, fairly narrow set of questions.
And we actually went beyond that by writing the last chapter in
an effort to be helpful, to try to interpret what this might
mean based on what we found out. But you are—I think we agree
with you that there are many strategic issues beyond that that
have to be debated.
Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, General. I only took liberty because you
opened that door.
Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks both the Admiral and the Gen-
eral. Mr. Meek.
Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to commend
the commission, comment on the work that you have been able to
do in such a short period of time, and the personal time that you
have all spent in trying to serve the country even more than you
have already served, whether it be in the front line of a police de-
partment or in our military. I guess there are two or three ques-
tions that a lot of members have been asking and you have been
kind of answering them the same way or differently. But I guess
I want to really kind of focus on the police end.
I recently had an opportunity over the break to go over and go
into Fallujah and had an opportunity to walk about three to four
blocks to a police station. Now it wasn't like a Starbucks kind of
walk that I was going to stop in and get a cup of coffee with a pla-
toon of Marines, but I can tell you that I can't help—and I am so
glad to see my good friend Chief Gainer and Chief Ramsey working
together again. And Chief Timoney I know that could not be here
today. But when you look at the whole policing issue and the
money that is on the street, I live here in Washington. When I am
home I live in District 2, but I live in Police District 1 here in D.C.
And we will go down to the recreation center and have our little
meeting, and we will talk about crime. We talk about bicycles miss-
ing. We talk about gunshots. And obviously the chief in her wisdom
or the police commander would say, fine, we will get right on it,
and then we start seeing bike patrol, mounted patrol, foot patrol.
And then crime starts to go down and we feel good. But what is


51
building the Iraqi Security Forces from scratch. Less than three and
half years later, the Coalition has trained and equipped over
350,000 Iraqi Security Forces.
More impressive than the sheer number of trained and
equipped forces is the dramatic improvement in the quality of these
forces since April 2004 when Iraqi forces failed to show up at the
battle of Fallujah. Today Iraqi units are leading the fight in surge
operations in Baghdad and elsewhere. Iraqi forces, particularly the
Army, are fighting the enemy and dying for their country.
To be sure, more work needs to be done. My own view is
that the ISF will make the most progress if all of the Iraqi Army's
131 battalions is rotated through a three month operational combat
tour in a contentious zone, such as Baghdad. The key to fielding an
effective Iraqi Army is to ensure that this force has seen combat
and has become battle-hardened. This battlefield experience will
strengthen the chain of command and build unit cohesion and