met most legislative, security and economic benchmarks. So, that
assessment-needless to say—is at odds with some other trial bal-
loon assessments that have been floated in recent days, and hope-
fully we can establish here, some kind of benchmark ourselves, as
to what it is we ought to be measuring.
Let me emphasize, I think I do this in a bipartisan way on behalf
of all of our committee members. We're not looking for a Democrat,
we're not looking for a Republican, we're not looking for a liberal
or a conservative outlook here. We're looking for the truth, we're
looki the facts, and we're looking for the best policy for the
United States of America, and that means the best policy for our
troops, and for our interests in the region. And we obviously all
want those interests to dovetail with the interests of the people
who live in that region. That's when you have the best foreign
policy.
That's why Congress asked for this report, on these 18 bench-
marks. And we're seeking, here, to get an accurate picture of where
we are in Iraq, and of where we go from here.
But as I said, it is inescapable, unavoidable to ignore the bottom
line conclusion of your report, which says that the Iraqi Govern-
ment has met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18
benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed. Violence
remains high. It remains unclear whether the Iraqi Government
will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. In other words, only
3 of these 18 benchmarks have actually been met, as we meet here.
And I want to emphasize one other point. We keep hearing some
folks talking publicly about whether some particular tactical de-
ployment of a number of troops in Anbar, or some other particular
province, has been successful. I think everyone has acknowledged
that it is possible, with an increase of troops in a particular small
area to gain some kind of tactical advantage. That is not what is
at issue here.
The fundamental purpose of the escalation was to give the Iraqi
Government the breathing room to make the decisions necessary to
be able to achieve the benchmarks. And when we see that, even
after its full implementation, those benchmarks are as far from
being reached as they are, it is hard to draw any assessment, ex-
cept there is a failing grade for a policy that is still not working.
This conclusion appears to contrast with, at least some, aspects
of what we're heard as interim assessments of the benchmarks.
Those delivered to Congress in July, which found, and I quote,
“That satisfactory progress had been made in meeting 8 of the 18
benchmarks.” In particular, there seems to be some disagreement
over whether the security situation has actually improved, whether
the Iraqis have provided the three brigades required for the Bagh-
dad securit plan, and whether the Iraqis are meeting their com-
mitments with respect to spending reconstruction funds.
I would also emphasize that we recognize the difference between
making progress, and actually meeting benchmarks. And these dis-
crepancies, nevertheless, raise questions about the information that
we're receiving from other sources about the war in Iraq.
We also need to be certain that the GAO received the full co-
operation and support of the Department of Defense and the White
House in preparing this report. One thing we all agree on is that


the escalation did have this one single, simple goal: To create
breathing room for Iraqis themselves to make the political com-
promises that will hold their country together and end their civil
war.
Even the White House acknowledges that there is no American
military solution to an Iraqi civil war. Yet still, despite the obvious
lack of movement on political reconciliation, we keep hearing that
we're making progress in Iraq.
The reality, as explained by your report, and supported by the
consensus view of our 16 intelligence agencies, compiled jointly in
the most recent national intelligence estimate, is that there's been
no meaningful progress on meeting the key political benchmarks.
In fact, your report concludes that the Iraqis met only one of the
eight benchmarks for political progress, and that was protecting
the rights of minorities in Iraq's legislature, and partially met one
other.
The Iraqis have not yet agreed on the key issue of amending the
Constitution, and crucial legislation on de-Baathification, oil rev-
enue-sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarma-
ment, which has still not been enacted.
The GAO is not alone in these conclusions. Your findings echo
last month's National Intelligence Estimate, an independent as-
sessment which concluded that the overall level of violence remains
high, the level of political progress has been negligible, and that
"the Iraqi Government will become more precarious over the next
6 to 12 months.”
We can see the unsettling news in Iraqi politics with our own
eyes—15 of the 37 members of the Iraqi Cabinet have now with-
drawn their support, making it exceedingly difficult to imagine how
the national reconciliation efforts of the Shiite-dominated govern-
ment will be improving in the near future, though we obviously
hold out hope that it wil
All summer, supporters of the escalation have urged us to wait
until this moment. Wait until September, give the escalation a
chance. Wait until September to hear from General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker. Well now, September is here, the President
has just visited, and we anticipate those reports in the next days.
But the result already on the table is, I hate to say it, probably
as predictable as it was 3, or even 6 months ago, before hundreds
of additional Americans gave their lives.
The administration has somehow varnished over its own goals.
It seems to be unwilling, chronically, to be able to meet, even, its
own goals. And each time, we hear a sort of shift in analysis, with
the rationale, “This is what we were trying to do all along. This
is what really mattered,” as we shift from what had been pre-
viously stated as what really mattered.
The fact is that mistake after mistake has been met, not with a
changed policy, but with a changing rationale.
The White House, we know, badly wants our fellow Americans
to lose sight, perhaps, of some of the original purposes of the origi-
nal decisions that we've made. But we, here in the Congress, need
to remember it, as we listen to what is now going to be promised,
or now assessed. And it has to be measured against those past
assessments and past rationales


We made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most re-
cently from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analysis has been en-
hanced by about 100 different reports and testimonies we've issued
on Iraq since May 2003, and we obtained data as recently as Au-
gust 30, 2007.
I will start on the left. I've got several boards that, hopefully, will
be helpful to the Senators, and all of these, I might note, are in-
cluded in my testimony as figures, and I'll be going in order.
Figure 1, or Board No. 1, shows that the benchmarks that are
contained in the act were derived from commitments articulated by
the Iraqi Government, beginning in June 2006, and affirmed in
subsequent statements made by Prime Minister Maliki in Sep-
tember 2006 and January 2007. Iraq's commitments to these
arks were most recently stated in a May 2007 international
compact for Iraq.
Next, on my right—your left—is the second board. As of August
30, 2007, the Iraqi Government had met 3, partially met 4, and did
not meet 11 of the 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation h
been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the
Iraqi Government will spend the $10 billion in reconstruction funds
it has allocated. And we'll leave this one up on the right, because
it's the bottom-line assessment.
Then back to my left, for the third board, with regard to legisla-
tion, the Iraqi Government met one of eight legislative bench-
marks, the rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature
to make sure they are protected. The Government also partially
met one benchmark, to enact and implement legislation on the for-
mation of regions. This law was enacted in October 2006, but will
not be implemented until April 2008.
Further, the government has not enacted legislation on de-
Baathification, oil revenue-sharing, provincial elections, amnesty,
and military disarmament.
Then back here to my left, for the next board, with regard to se-
curity, two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifi-
cally, Iraq's Government has established various committees in
support of the Baghdad security plan, and it's established almost
all of the planned joint security stations in Baghdad.
The government has partially met the benchmarks of providing
three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations, and the
benchmark of eliminating safe havens for outlaw groups.
Five other benchmarks have not been met in the security area.
The government has not eliminated militia control of local security,
eliminated political intervention in military operations, ensured
even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable
of independent operations, or ensured that political authorities
made no false accusations against the security forces.
It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased.
This is a key security benchmark. Since it is difficult to measure
intentions, and there are various other measures of population se-
curity, from different sources, all of which do not show consistent
data. Some show increases, some show decreases, and some show
inconsistent patterns. And so, therefore, we're not in a position to
say that that condition had been met.


If we look and see, the security situation, you'll see the overall
security situation was roughly the same in July, on average num-
ber of attacks per day, as it was in February 2007, and that's the
next one here on the left.
Public Law 110–28 requires GAO to report to the Congress by
September 1 on whether or not they've achieved these, we've done
that, and—but I want to show you how our assessment compares
with the administration's assessment of July 2007. And, I realize,
Senator Kerry and other Senators, that the administration will
make a new assessment within the next 2 weeks. I know we all
look forward to that.
But, I think if you look at this, you'll see that as I mentioned be-
fore—we are assessing whether or not the benchmark was met,
partially met, or not met. The administration is assessing whether
or not satisfactory progress is being made. They are fundamentally
different.
And yet, if you look at our analysis, our independent, profes-
sional analysis on the left, versus what the administration said in
July, there is only one benchmark in which there is a significant
difference of opinion, by that I mean, of the three potential ratings,
we had the lowest rating, and they had the highest rating, and
that was benchmark No, 1, “Forming a Constitutional Review Com-
mittee, and then completing the constitutional review.” They have
formed the committee, but there's a tremendous amount of work
that needs to be done to complete that constitutional review, and
that's—we didn't feel enough had been done to give that a “par-
tially met” assessment. Merely forming the committee is not
enough, there's lots more that has to be done.
On the other hand, we do feel that our approach has provided
a professional, objective, fair and balanced assessment, as of Au-
gust 30, 2007.
In summary, as of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi Government had
met 3, partially met 4, and had not met 11 of the 18 legislative,
security, and economic benchmarks.
In late August, there was a significant subsequent event. Iraq
senior Shia, Sunni-Arab, and Kurdish political leaders signed a
Unity Accord, signifying efforts to foster greater national reconcili-
ation. The accord covered draft legislation on de-Baathification re-
form, and provincial powers law, as well as setting up a mechanism
to release some Sunni detainees being held without charges. How-
ever, the polarization of Iraq's major sects and ethic groups, and
fighting amount Shia factions, further diminishes the stability of
Iraq's governing coalition, and its potential to be able to enact
needed legislation for sectarian reconciliation.
As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, in our view,
it should balance the achievement of the act, of the 18 Iraqi bench-
s with military progress, and homeland security, foreign pol-
icy, and other goals of the United States.
Further, administration reports on the benchmarks would be
more useful to the Congress, if they clearly depicted the status of
each legislative benchmark, provided additional quantitative and
qualitative information on violence from all of the relevant U.S.
agencies, and specified the performance and loyalties of Iraqi secu-
rity forces supporting coalition operations. You not only need to be
iks


25
fact that significant progress has not been made in improving the
living conditions of the Iraqis on a day-to-day basis, with regard to
things that all citizens care about-safe streets, clean water, reli-
able electricity, a variety of other basic things—I think you would
have to say, it is dysfunctional, the government is dysfunctional.
Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Let me also ask-have you seen a
recent “Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Report,”
done by Mr. Bowen?
Mr. WALKER. It depends upon which one you mention, Senator.
I do speak with Stu Bowen several times a year, and we try to co-
ordinate efforts and minimize duplication of effort.
Senator HAGEL. It's his most recent report that he has come back
with, and he is now briefing the administration, I understand, on
this. I don't know if you've had a chance to look at it.
Mr. WALKER. I've not seen it, personally, but I imagine my staff
has probably been briefed on it.
Senator HAGEL. Well, it's another important analysis, a different
set of dynamics and factors and areas of inspection than yours. But
it fits into your larger strategic context question you put before this
committee, as you, I think, very succinctly, put it in your last point,
in your list of conclusions. I know my time is up, I want to thank
you, Mr. Walker, and your organization for your continued good
work and support for all of us. We count on it, the American people
expect that kind of quality also, and rely on that kind of quality.
Thank you.
Mr. WALKER. Thank you, sir.
KERRY. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Menendez.
Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Walker, according to the report—and tell me if I'm wrong-
the Iraq Government did not meet the benchmarks to complete
work in revising Iraq's Constitution, did not meet the benchmark
to enact legislation on de-Baathification, did not meet the bench-
mark to enact legislation on oil revenue-sharing, did not meet the
benchmark to enact legislation on provincial elections, did not meet
the benchmark to enact legislation on amnesty, and did not meet
the benchmark to enact legislation on disarming militias. Is that
correct?
Mr. WALKER. That is correct.
Senator MENENDEZ. Now, given that, according to your own re-
port, the Iraqi Government has met only one of the eight legislative
benchmarks. Would you agree that it is a fair assessment to say
that the Iraq Government should get a failing grade on the legisla-
tive benchmarks?
Mr. WALKER. To date, it is unsatisfactory.
Senator MENENDEZ. You're kinder than I am. If the American
public were looking at this, and we had benchmarks, I'm sure that
they would say it's a failing grade.
And isn't it true that the point of the President's escalation plan
was to give the Iraqis a chance to carry out political reconciliation?
Mr. WALKER. The primary point of the surge was to improve se-
curity, in particular, in Baghdad, in order to provide political
breathing room, to make the necessary tradeoffs to achieve political
progress, hopefully resulting in national unification.


29
each August over the last year, and now you have to measure it
against the prior August, not just the prior months.
Senator COLEMAN. Actually, the charts do show—that I've seen-
show the data in terms of seasonal, but then make it very clear
that, it is factored in that it's seasonal, but the violence level is
down. General Petraeus is going to be before us. I just want to
make sure that what I'm hearing from you, if you didn't see that
data.
Mr. WALKER. That's correct, Senator.
Senator COLEMAN. As I say—let me say this. The question you
ask: What's our role? It's one thing to say we're fighting al-Qaeda,
it's another thing to say we're refereeing a blood-feud between, not
just Sunni or Shia, but in many cases what we saw in Karbala re-
cently between Shia and Shia. I sat down with the head of the
Badr Brigade last week. They're in pitch battle with Jaysh al-
Mahdi in Karbala recently, so I think there's a difference.
If you asked the question, I'd just still have to say that one of
my colleagues talks about whether this is helping us in our fight
against, global war against al-Qaeda, one Senator's perspective. I
have no doubt that the fight against al-Qaeda right now is being
centered in Anbar. I think General Petraeus will tell you that. I
think General Gaskin would tell you that. I think you would tell
you that, it's not just its anecdote, but they'll tell you that folks
come across the border and here's how we deal with them. And, I
also think they would tell you that in Anbar they push them back,
that they don't have this, al-Qaeda doesn't have the support of the
population centers.
And in part, and I think the main point here is, that not just
what we're doing militarily, but the local population has turned
against al-Qaeda. And so, you have Sunnis turned against al-
Qaeda, and I think that has tremendous implications in the Global
War on Terror. And the question that you raise, I think has to be
addressed, is how applicable is this to other areas.
Clearly, what General Petraeus supports is a changed strategy
and says we counter this insurgence, we counter this militarily, but
we also turn the population centers against al-Qaeda and working
with us. And, that becomes the real challenge.
Mr. WALKER. Senator Coleman, as you properly pointed out,
progress has been made in Anbar province. As you properly pointed
out, al-Qaeda was a significant presence with regard to that prov-
ince, but that province is not necessarily reflective of conditions
elsewhere. And, I think you need to find out, Why did things
change?
You are correct that the tribal chiefs decided to rebel against al-
Qaeda. Now, whether they rebelled because of al-Qaeda's tactics
and what they did, and it just got so ridiculous that they wanted
to rebel from al-Qaeda or because of what we did. I don't know. But
the key is what happened, why, and to what extent is it relevant
and transferable to other parts of Iraq.
Senator COLEMAN. I think we have to understand that. As I say
though, let me also express the same point you have, that I think
there's consensus on terms of the performance of the Iraqis and the
performance of Maliki. The question, though, that has to be an-
swered, is with that, if we were simply to go. What would be the


35
here. We have benchmarks, but we don't have milestones. And, to
the extent that milestones have existed in the past, they haven't
been met. And, they keep on slipping. And, there needs to be more
transparency and more specificity with regard to milestones, in
order to provide contextual sophistication for the Congress in mak-
ing decisions in this regard, I believe.
Senator CORKER. It seems that the question that you're posing
back to us, and I think it is one that we're going to answer, and
that is—and I think we will, by the way, answer that over the next
few weeks—but the role that we should be playing there, really is
a security issue. I mean, they have to deal with their own legisla-
tive issues. We can't, certainly, deal with that in a democracy.
What are one or two or three of the main components, in your
mind, that keep the Army side of what they're doing from being
able to accomplish the things they need to accomplish? Lay those
out one, two, three. Because the fact of the matter is, the reason
that we're taking a lead in some areas that we'd really not, like not
to be taking the lead on is their incapability, if you will, of doing
that themselves. So, what do you think is leading to, following on
to Senator Casey's comments and others, why is it that they have
just seemed, after 4 or 5 years, not to have the ability, if you will,
to secure themselves?
Mr. WALKER. Well first, I think that the political and the secu-
rity are integrally linked. I don't think that you can separate them
and say that they are separate things. The simple fact of the mat-
ter is, is that they need to make more progress on the political
front, and if they do make more progress on the political front, that
will end up having some implication, I think, with regard to the se-
curity forces. At the same point in time, you've got to have a rea-
sonable degree of security on the ground, in order to provide the
conditions for people to reach political compromises.
Let me clarify what I mean by that. You have Iraqi Security
Forces. It's not just a matter of making sure you have enough with
the appropriate degree of readiness and with either be able to op-
erate independently or have support, but that they be loyal. That
they be committed to a unified Iraq and that they are committed
to fight on that basis. And frankly, you know, until you reach some
type of political reconciliation, I'm not sure if you're going to be
able to achieve that objective when there is a power vacuum that
exists in that country.
And given as several Senators have said, you have many hun-
dreds of years of history that exist in that region long before we
ever existed. So, I think, one has to just focus, not on how many
you have and whether or not they can operate independently,
have adequate support, but also, whether or not they
are loyal to a united Iraq. And, that is directly related, I think, to
the political reconciliation that has to take place.
But I do come back, Senator Corker. There is an issue of what
is the proper role for U.S. troops. There's a difference between
training and providing support to the Iraqis, logistical support, etc.,
and going after al-Qaeda, wherever they might be.
Senator CORKER. Both of which we're doing.
Mr. WALKER. Right.
Senator CORKER. But we're doing—we're doing better.


44
and others do is absolutely outstanding. So, the quality of what you
do is greatly appreciated.
Second, I think your conclusion that the Iraqi Government has
not fulfilled commitments it first made in June 2006, to advance
legislative security and economic measures that would promote na-
tional reconciliation among Iraq's warring factions is unassailable.
And, I think that's the concern. There's just no question about that.
I also think your recommendations should be adopted by the ad-
ministration. You've laid out three recommendations. Secretary of
State should act upon those in terms of providing information,
specifying status of some of these things. Secretary of Defense
needs to provide information regarding some of the broader quan-
titative and qualitative measures of population security. The Sec-
efense needs to provide additional information on the
operational readiness of Iraqi forces. So, we get to the conclusions
are unassailable.
My concern, and also I think you raised the issue that I think
is the issue, what is our role? If the Iraqis can't move forward in
terms of reconciliation, we're not going to be in the role of being
referees with the lives of our soldiers, lives on the line for either
the sectarian violence. This is what we see in Baghdad. And, with
this surge, I think Petraeus will say, we've quieted that down. I
think that AIDA will, when all comes out, show that. But in addi-
tion to that not being referees, in terms of the Shia/Shia battles,
at least in Karbala, between Moqtada al-Sadr's folks and the Badr
Brigade, that has to be resolved.
And, if we can't resolve that stuff, we will find ourselves in other
areas in Iraq, making sure Iran doesn't extends its influence, mak-
ing sure al-Qaeda doesn't regain the ground that it has lost, and
probably making sure the Turks don't come and destabilize, one
area of Iraq that is pretty stable.
Just a statement, and my concern is, what we need to do is move
the politics out of this on both sides and try to do what you've tried
to do with this assessment, where I may disagree and not disagree.
You're talking about have they met, have they met the benchmark?
It's my understanding that, in fact, $100 million in cash has been
distributed to Anbar and that on September 6 distributed. And, in
fact, when I was sitting in, when I was in Ramadi, I watched a
meeting with a Marine Captain and Iraqi folks going over con-
tracts. And, I walked in and saw the contracts that had been let
and the money that has been spent. And, it's my further under-
standing, there will be an additional $70 million that Maliki him-
self will deliver. To me, that says folks are moving forward in an
area that they have to move forward to assure the Sunnis are
going to get something out of this. My sense is that the Sunni, the
Shias don't know that they—they won't accept the fact that they
won. And so, they are holding on and not moving forward. And,
there's a price for not moving forward.
The other concern and, you know, we look, some look at the glass
half empty or half full. If we can be objective about it, the fact is
ite of benchmarks not being met, in spite of what I con-
sider Maliki's inability to produce consistently—and that's a good
point that you make he was in Karbala and in the midst of this
battle between the two, the story was told anecdotally as he walked