POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF THE U.N. MANDATE
FOR IRAQ: OPTIONS
WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 2008
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William D. Delahunt
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. DELAHUNT. The subcommittee will come to order. Today's
hearing is the seventh in a series held by this subcommittee re-
garding the so-called Declaration of Principles and any possible
agreements based on that document, which was signed by Presi-
dent Bush and Prime Minister Maliki in November of last year.
The Declaration of Principles initially embraced a pledge to es-
tablish an indefinite, open-ended presence of United States combat
forces in Iraq in order to, among other commitments, and I am
quoting from that document, “Support the Republic of Iraq in de-
fending its democratic system against internal and external
threats, and to provide security assurances and commitments to
the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression.”
These were extraordinary promises by President Bush. Many of
us were taken aback not only by the breadth and depth of these
commitments but by the position of the Bush administration that
it was unnecessary to submit such an agreement to the United
States Congress. This unprecedented claim to executive branch au-
thority prompted Senator Clinton to file a bill in the Senate and
our colleague, Rosa DeLauro of Connecticut, who will join us later,
to file a similar one in the House, the effect of which would be to
require the submission of such an agreement to Congress for its ap-
proval.
In our first hearing on December 19, 2007, we reviewed the role
that the Iraqi Parliament expected to play in the approval of the
extension of the U.N. mandate to December 31, 2008, as expressed
in a letter from a majority of members to Prime Minister Maliki
and to the United Nations Security Council, calling for the inclu-
sion of a timetable for the withdrawal of United States troops; oth-
erwise, they registered their objection to the extension of the man-
date.
I would note for the record that all of the witnesses at this hear-
ing agreed that Article 61 of the Iraqi Constitution, under that par-
ticular Article, any United States-Iraq agreement which would sup-
(1)


11
القائمة العراقية الوطنية
حكومة قوية
شعب آمن
وطن زاهر
To the Honorable Presidency Board of the Council of Representatives
Subject:
Monitoring of Provincial Elections in Iraq
In view of the upcoming provincial elections in Iraq and with respect to the
significance of such elections on the lives, hopes, and aspirations of the Iraqi
people, we the undersigned request the assistance of the United Nations, European
Union, Arab League, and other relevant election observers to monitor, observe,
and supervise the provincial election throughout Iraq's provinces to ensure
fairness of the results and transparency of the political process.
In order to have effective, fair, and democratic election as well as guarantee
the success, non-interference, and impartiality in the election process, we the
undersigned are committed to exerting all our efforts. It is our sincere hope that
the organizations mentioned above will assist in this process.
With our considerate regards,
MP Alia Nsaif Hassem
General Secretariat
Iraq National List
June 8, 2008


20
the most appropriate environment for American troops and contrac-
tors to continue their work.
The United Nations Security Council resolutions that provide
Chapter VII authorization for the coalition presence in Iraq have
allowed weak Iraqi governments to cede authorities to the United
Nations. In light of the earlier immaturity of the Iraqi political sys-
tem, that was appealing for a number of years.
However, it is no surprise that the multiethnic, multisectarian,
democratically elected Iraqi leadership is now chafing to take con-
trol of its own security arrangements. This is exactly what the ne-
gotiations between the United States and Iraq will permit.
Some have suggested that Iraqi parliamentarians who have ex-
pressed concern about the shape of any bilateral agreement with
the U.S. should carry the day. Their views, however, are theirs
alone. These parliamentarians are responsible to their constituents.
Their opinions regarding immunity for American service people,
contractors, the nature of American bases in Iraq, and all else, are
questions to bring to their side of the table. We have our own side.
Still others, including you, Mr. Chairman, in a most interesting
Washington Post opinion editorial, have insisted that it behooves
the President to shelve these negotiations and request a renewed
United Nations mandate, whether under Chapter VII or Chapter
VI. Many find this position a little bit confusing. Should the next
President and Commander in Chief wish to walk away from Iraq
or from the many countries where we have Status of Forces Agree-
ment, he can do so. If the Congress wishes to use the powers en-
dowed it by the Constitution to limit the obligation of funds for
particular activities, whether in Iraq or elsewhere, presumably it,
too, can do so.
However, if we are to be swayed by the argument that a Presi-
dent with 5 months of tenure remaining in his term should cede
decision-making to the United Nations, I wonder exactly where this
guiding principle will lead. Perhaps the President should not nego-
tiate with Iran or North Korea. Perhaps we should step away from
trade negotiations. And if so, why for 5 months? Why not for a
year? After all, the next President will inherit the fruits of all of
these decisions, benign or otherwise.
Mr. Chairman, conduct of the war and the protection of our na-
tional security is not a popularity contest. Mob rule does not decide
how a President deploys troops in his role as commander in chief
nor how the Congress allocates money with its power of the purse.
There are vital questions to be answered in the months and years
ahead about Iraqi burden-sharing, protection of long-term Amer-
ican interests in Iraq and in the wider region, and about how best
to sustain the victory that the surge has brought.
I commend your committee for asking many of these questions,
and I commend especially our commanders who have earned, I be-
lieve, the right to help inform the answers. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Pletka follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF Ms. DANIELLE PLETKA, VICE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN AND
DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify
this afternoon on the question of the extension of the United Nations mandate for
Iraq.


21
people, its neighbors or the United Chat
As I am not a lawyer, nor an expert on public opinion—both of which are rep-
resented already on this panel today—I propose to frame the issue in what I believe
is the proper context. The question of the extension of the United Nations mandate
that governs the allied presence in Iraq has received undue attention, and dis-
tracted from the very real question of American interests. Presumably, one's posi-
tion on the wisdom of the initial decision to topple Saddam Hussein notwith-
standing, few responsible American leaders are interested in leaving Iraq if in so
doing they create an environment that poses a threat to American security or that
of our allies.
For that reason, many have suggested that it will be the judgment of the com-
manders in Iraq, briefed to informed policymakers that should help dictate the way
forward. This is not politically attractive to advocates of ending the war without re-
gard to the circumstances on the ground, but it is the responsible course.
Americans, Iraqis and others have fought and died to secure an Iraq that can
never again threaten its own people, its neighbors or the United States and its al-
lies. Again, while there are those who opposed the war and continue to oppose the
efforts currently taking place, there are few responsible leaders who are interested
in frittering away the gains built by our men and women in uniform.
The status of forces and strategic framework agreements currently under discus-
sion are intended to underpin sustained success rather than institutionalize a for-
eign presence in Iraq. And while some within Iraq have suggested that the contrary
is true-namely Muqtada al Sadr, the Iranian proxy who leads his own rogue mili-
tia-in fact, providing a long term framework is the best way for the United States
to ensure that it is our elected leadership that determines the most appropriate en-
vironment for American troops and contractors to continue their work.
The United Nations Security Council resolutions that provide Chapter VII author-
ization for the coalition presence in Iraq have allowed weak Iraqi governments to
cede authorities to the United Nations. In light of the earlier immaturity of the
Iraqi political system, that was appealing for a number of years. However, it is no
surprise that the multi-ethnic, democratically elected Iraqi leadership is now chafing
to take control of its own security arrangements. This is exactly what the negotia-
tions between the United States and Iraq will permit.
Some have suggested that Iraqi parliamentarians who have expressed concern
about the shape of any bilateral agreement with the United States should carry the
day. Their views, however, are theirs alone. These parliamentarians are responsible
to their constituents. Their opinions regarding immunity for American service peo-
ple, contractors, the nature of American bases in Iraq and all else are questions to
bring to their side of the table. We have our own side.
Still others, including you, Mr. Chairman, in a Washington Post opinion editorial,
have insisted that it behooves the President to shelve these negotiations and request
a renewed United Nations mandate. Many find this position confusing. Should the
next President and Commander in Chief wish to walk away from Iraq-or from the
many countries where we have a status of forces agreement—he can do so. If the
Congress wishes to use the powers endowed it by the Constitution to limit the obli-
gation of funds for particular activities, presumably it too can do so.
However, if we are to be swayed by the argument that a President with five
months of tenure remaining in his term should cede decision-making to the United
Nations, I wonder where exactly this new guiding principle will lead. Perhaps the
President should not negotiate with Iran? Or North Korea? Perhaps we should step
away from trade negotiations? And if so, why for five months? Why not for a year?
After all, the next President will inherit the fruits of all of these decisions, benign
or otherwise.
Mr. Chairman, conduct of war and the protection of our national security is not
a popularity contest. Mob rule does not decide how a President deploys troops in
his role as commander in chief, nor how the Congress allocates money with its
power of the purse. There are vital questions to be answered in the months and
years ahead about Iraqi burden sharing, protection of long term American interests
in Iraq and in the wider region, and about how best to sustain the victory that the
surge has brought. I commend your committee for asking these questions. And I
commend our commanders who have earned the right to help inform the answers.
Thank you.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Ms. Pletka.
And Dr. Kull, would you please proceed?


22
STATEMENT OF STEVEN KULL, PH.D., DIRECTOR, PROGRAM
ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES (PIPA)
Mr. KULL. Thank you for inviting me to speak. Today I will be
addressing the question of how the Iraqi people view the presence
of United States troops in Iraq and, more importantly, what they
want to see happen in the future. As I will demonstrate, the Iraqi
people are showing signs of impatience with the presence of United
States troops.
Now, one may ask why this matters. Obviously, the Iraqi people
will not be negotiating agreements about United States forces in
Iraq. As long as the government wants United States troops there,
one may believe that it does not really matter what the Iraqi public
thinks. However, it does appear that the Iraqi Government is pay-
ing attention to the Iraqi public.
As you probably know, 144 of the 275 members of Parliament
signed a letter calling for a timetable for the withdrawal of United
States troops, citing as a key reason the attitudes of the Iraqi peo-
ple. This call for a timetable was then reiterated in the June 3rd
letter presented to the United States Congress from representa-
tives of the Iraqi Parliament that you mentioned. And just in the
last few days, Prime Minister Maliki has been increasingly aligning
himself with this public pressure. This may well be influenced by
the prospect of upcoming elections.
So, if the United States Government wants to play a constructive
role in the future of Iraq, I think it behooves us to understand bet-
ter the dynamics of public opinion and thus the forces of the polit-
ical universe within which Iraqi leaders are operating.
So turning now to the polling data. Is the story simply that
Iraqis want United States forces to leave Iraq? I will be presenting
substantial data that say that Iragis do want United States troo
to leave within a near-term time frame. But I will then also show
some data suggesting that their attitudes are not quite that simple;
that there is some interest in a continuing relationship with U.S.
forces but only in the context in which the relationship between the
United States and the Iraqi Government is fundamentally changed
from what it is now.
I will start with the most recent polling. In March of this year,
ORB conducted for the British Channel 4 a poll asking Iraqis what
they would like to see happen with the multinational forces: 70
percent said they wanted them to leave; with 78 percent of them
wanting them to leave within 6 months or less, and 84 percent
within a year. And thus, for the sample as a whole, 6 in 10 said
that they want the troops out within a year or less.
In a poll conducted in February of this year for a consortium of
news outlets led by ABC News, 73 percent said they oppose the
presence of coalition forces in Iraq; 61 percent said that the pres-
ence of United States forces in Iraq is making the security situa-
tion in Iraq worse.
Now Iraqis have been asking for a timetable for withdrawal for
some time now. At the beginning of 2006, WorldPublicOpinion.org
found that 7 in 10 wanted U.S.-led forces out according to a time-
table of 2 years or less. About a year later, we asked a in, and
7 in 10 favored a timetable of 1 year or less. And in late 2006, the
U.S. State Department conducted polls in numerous Iraqi cities


25
However, as Iraqis gradually regain this sense that their country
belongs to them, they will likely move toward wanting some ongo-
ing relationship with the U.S., both economic and military, to help
them find their way out of this troubled period in their long his-
tory.
Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kull follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN KULL, PH.D., DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ON
INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES (PIPA)
Thank you for inviting me to speak. Today I will be addressing the question of
how the Iraqi people view the presence of US troops in Iraq and, more importantly,
what they want to see happen in the future. As I will demonstrate, the Iraqi people
are showing signs of impatience with the pace of US withdrawal.
Now one may ask why this matters. Obviously the Iraqi people will not be negoti-
ating the agreements about US forces in Iraq. As long as the government wants US
troops there, one may believe that it does not matter what the Iraqi public thinks.
However, it does appear that the Iraqi government is paying attention to the Iraqi
public. As you probably know, 144 of the 275 members of Parliament signed a letter
calling for a timetable for the withdrawal of US troops, citing as a key reason the
attitudes of the Iraqi people. This call for a timetable was then reiterated in the
June 3rd letter presented to the US Congress from representatives of the Iraqi Par-
liament. Just in the last few days Prime Minister Maliki has been increasingly
aligning himself with this public pressure. This may well be influenced by the pros-
pect of upcoming elections.
Thus, if the US government wishes to play a constructive role in the future of
Iraq it behooves us to understand better the dynamics of public opinion and thus
the forces of the political universe within which Iraqi leaders are operating.
Furthermore, Iraqis' attitudes about US forces are likely to affect their readiness
to cooperate with coalition efforts to fight the insurgency, or even their readiness
to support the insurgency. There is evidence that many Iraqis do support attacks
on US troops and that this attitude is related to perceptions of US long-term inten-
tions in Iraq. Thus dealing with these perceptions is critical to the success of the
mission.
So turning now to the polling data: is the story simply that Iraqis want US forces
to leave Iraq? I will indeed be presenting some data that say that Iraqis want US
troops to leave within a near-term time frame.
But I will then show some data suggesting that their attitudes are not quite that
simple: That there is some interest in a continuing relationship with US forces, but
only in a context in which the relationship between the US and the Iraqi govern-
ment is fundamentally changed from what it is now.
I will start with the most recent polling. In March of this year ORB conducted
a poll for the British Channel 4, asking Iraqis what they would like to see happen
with the Multinational Forces. Seventy percent said they want the Multi National
Forces to leave, with 78 percent of this group wanting them to leave within six
months or less and 84 percent within a year. Thus about six in ten of the whole
sample said they want the troops out within a year or less.
In a poll conducted in February of this year for a consortium of news outlets led
by ABC News, 73 percent said they oppose the presence of coalition forces in Iraq.
Sixty-one percent said that the presence of US forces in Iraq is making the security
situation in Iraq worse.
Iraqis have been asking for a timetable for withdrawal for some time now. At the
beginning of 2006 WorldPublicOpinion.org found that 7 in 10 wanted US-led forces
out according to timetable of two years or less. About a year later 7 in 10 favored
a timetable of one year or less.
In late 2006 the US State Department conducted polls in numerous major Iraqi
cities and consistently found about two-thirds calling for the US to leave.
While some might think that the Iraqi people should be impressed with the re-
sults of the surge on stability in Iraq, most insist that they are not. In the Channel
4 poll only 26 percent said that the surge had succeeded while 53 percent said that
it had not. The ABC News poll found only about a third saying that the surge had
a positive effect on security and slightly over half said that it had made security
worse.
Iraqis seem to shrug off concerns about the security implications of a US with-
drawal. Asked by ABC News what impact it would have on the overall security situ-


28
time
have the effect of continuing the current status and privileges and
immunities of those forces through a modality of CPA 17, which
would continue in force. And I think this would also confirm the
continuing applicability of the 2002 congressional authorization,
part of which, as you recall, authorizes the use of U.S. forces to en-
force Security Council resolutions.
Now, there is no reason in principle why this could not be done
under Chapter VII. This need not amount to a derogation from
Iraqi sovereignty or rest upon a finding that the Iraqi Government
was a threat to the peace. It could rest upon a determination that
the situation in Iraq was a continuing threat to the peace because
acts or the threats by other elements. Chapter VII has been
applied in many different situations with respect to many countries
without derogating from their sovereignty. In fact, all U.N. mem-
bers, including the United States, are currently subject to obliga-
tions under two important Chapter VII resolutions at the present
time.
Even if the MNF mandate were not extended under Chapter VII,
Iraq would remain under Chapter VII regime in other respects, for
example, with respect to the deduction of sums from their oil ex-
port revenues to pay compensation to victims of the Gulf War and
also with respect to Iraqi obligations with respect to WMD.
There is one respect in which Iraq might even find benefit from
a further Chapter VII resolution in that Iraqi oil proceeds are cur-
rently immunized from attachment under a Chapter VII resolution
which expires at the end of this year, and to continue that would
require another Chapter VII resolution.
Mr. DELAHUNT. If I can interrupt for just a moment. Could that
same protection be afforded the Iraqis under a Chapter VI exten-
sion?
Mr. MATHESON. Technically, no, because you would have to have
mandatory effect on other states. So technically, I think you would
need a Chapter VII extension. Now, Chapter VÌ. If for some reason,
which may be political or perceptions of sovereignty, it becomes un-
desirable to have a Chapter VIÌ extension, I think the same effects
could be had by action by the Council under Chapter VI. And this
would be based expressly on the request or the consent of the Iraqi
Government. In the past, a number of military operations have
been authorized by the Council under Chapter VI based upon the
consent of the states in question and some of these have had rather
robust military missions.
A Chapter VI resolution would not require a finding of a threat
to the peace. And since it would rest expressly on the consent of
the Iraqi Government, presumably there would be no question of
a derogation from Iraqi sovereignty. This could all be made abun-
dantly clear in the text of the resolution and in communications by
the United States and Iraqi Governments to the Council and in
separate exchanges by the United States and the Iraqi Government
or agreements to that same effect, and perhaps all of these things
should be done.
I think in Chapter VI extension would have the same essential
operational consequences as a Chapter VII resolution in this case.
The existing mandate and authority of the forces of the MNF would
continue, this time based on the consent of Iraq. The status and


36
the long-term goal of those who have been negative about the pol-
icy and that is it will prevent us to leave with honor and it is also
permitting us, I think, to be able to leave Iraq with succeeding to
the point that we will leave an Iraq that is not going to be then
immediately dominated by an anti-Western radical regime that
threatens the stability of the world, and perhaps threatens the se-
curity of the United States; not to mention, of course, the well-
being of the Iraqi people themselves.
So with that said. I think that we now are facing this issue as
to how do wewhere do we go from here and what is that strategy
going to be, and again not paying attention to the polls, how do we
get where we want to go and it seems to me that we have to make
a decision by the end of the year as to what the Status of Forces
Agreement will be or what we will do about the fact that there is
no more U.N. mandate to rely on. And we have several different
approaches. It has been suggested—I appreciate all of your testi-
mony in that. I personally believe that it would be better for us to
maneuver ourselves within a framework of reaching an agreement
with the Iraqi people through their Parliament and make it a bilat-
eral understanding that will perhaps give us a temporary respite
from having to immediately come to this agreement and I think
that would—now, didn't you say, sir, that this could be achieved
with an exchange of letters or of some kind?
Mr. MATHESON. Yes, you could do it that way. The only question
that would be left over would be your question of congressional au-
thorization, whether that continues to apply or whether further ac-
tion-
Mr. ROHRABACHER. We would, of course, want congressional au-
thorization for this. It seems to me that doing this in a bilateral
way, which includes in my definition anyway, a ramification by the
United States Congress and their Parliament that seems to me a
much better way than to try to do this through the structure of the
United Nations. Let me remind everyone that—who would like to
rely on the United Nations, that the U.N.-every problem that I
ve seen that the U.N. gets involved in elongates it more dramati-
cally than if we would try to do a bilateral issue on our own. I
mean, a sizeable number of the countries of the United Nations are
run by gangsters and lunatics and these are countries that are
you know, would in no way—their governments are corrupt and
they are not elected by anybody but who has the toughest—who is
the toughest kid on the block, and it seems to me the fact that the
United Nations has to deal with that reality makes it less effective.
It is like looking at the Human Rights Commission and definitely-
there you have some of the world's worst human rights abusers on
the human rights commission.
So perhaps your testimony today has been-Mr. Chairman, I
think has been valuable, because I think that it seems to me that
that is the way we should proceed but also making sure that we
proceed with the idea that that understanding has to be ratified by
the Congress. Would you have anything that you would like to add
to that, your-I think you mentioned earlier that you were looking
at Chapter VI or—wouldn't it be better just to do this in a bilateral
way?