Y 4.AR 5/2 A:2007-2008/60
Y 4.AR J12 Ao aco' [H.A.S.C. No. 110–60]
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRAQI
SECURITY FORCES
HEARING
BEFORE THE
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
HEARING HELD
JUNE 12, 2007
1.5.1:00
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, June 12, 2007.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:11 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Martin Meehan (chair-
man of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTY MEEHAN, A REP.
RESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS, CHAIRMAN, OVER-
SIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. MEEHAN. Welcome, General, Mr. Kimmitt. Welcome to the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.
Today we will continue our examination of the most pressing
issue facing the country: the war in Iraq.
In past weeks the subcommittee has looked into a number of as-
pects of the complex mission to man, train and equip the Iraqi Se-
curity Forces. We have also looked at whatever plans we have been
able to obtain to turn over security to them.
We know how hard and difficult this work is, that our armed
services have put a lot of effort into this difficult and dangerous
project.
Today's hearing will begin with a brief opening statement from
Mr. Mark Kimmitt of the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs. He is the deputy secretary for
the Middle East and South Asian affairs.
He will be followed by testimony from General Martin Dempsey,
who until recently was the commander of MNSTC-I.
I understand that you have been nominated to be the
commander of U.S. Central Command.
In previous hearings, we had hoped to hear from witnesses on
the command relationships and the responsibility of the Multi-Na-
tional Corps-Iraq, called MNC-I, and the Iraq Assistance Group,
called the IAG. We would have benefited from their operational
perspectives.
In today's hearing, we will hear about the Multi-National Secu-
rity Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and its Civilian Police
Advisory Training Team (CPATT). These organizations are charged
with training and equipping the Iraqi police service and military,
as well as managing transition advisory teams for the Ministries
of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI).
CPATT also supervises the contractors who are international po-
lice liaison officers and international police trainers working with
the Iraqi local police.


testineral Denally transl!inues tore that
Foremost, how does ISF's mission fit into the Iraqi strategy?
Over the past few years, we have spent $19 billion training and
equipping more than 348,000 ISF personnel, all for the purpose of
transitioning security responsibility over to the Iraqis.
My sense is that this remains our strategy. The only variable
that has changed is how and when we transition security respon-
sibilities to the Iraqis.
One thing this investigation has demonstrated is that
transitioning security responsibilities simply for the sake of
transitioning will not stabilize Iraq. In fact, it may slow progress
down.
I do, however, want to make sure that, contrary to recent press
reports, our strategy continues to view ISF as the lynchpin to our
plan to eventually transition U.S. forces out of Iraq.
General Dempsey, I hope you can comment on this during your
testimony.
Another issue I would like our witness to clarify is how we are
progressing in developing a truly national Iraqi security force.
Again, there are an increasing number of press reports that ele-
ments of the ISF, particularly the Iraqi police service, suffer from
sectarian infiltration. Additionally, it seems problems of sectarian
influence continue to affect the ministries, particularly the Min-
istry of the Interior.
I would like to hear your assessment of the situation and under-
stand what steps we are taking to resolve that problem.
I would also like to know how sectarianism is affecting the com-
bat effectiveness of ISF. A rogue Iraqi unit that carries out sectar-
ian reprisals is only one kind of sectarian problem. Sectarianism
can manifest in other ways.
This leads me to the general concern about our knowledge of ISF.
While this subcommittee has learned a lot about how we train,
transition teams and equip ISF, we have learned little about the
operational competency of ISF. I am concerned that the transi-
tional readiness assessments (TRAs) do not tell us enough about
Iraqi units. Given the $19 billion the American people have spent
on ISF, we have a responsibility to monitor and track how the
forces we have trained and equipped are operating.
· I look forward to hearing our witnesses' statement and their
views on these matters.
Thank you for being here, again, General Dempsey, and welcome
back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin
can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Akin. And thank you
very much for that advice, as well.
We are honored to have the distinguished chair of the Armed
Services Committee, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Ike Skelton,
here. And I would like to ask the chairman if he would like to
make some opening comments.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. First, let me
compliment you on having this hearing. It is very, very important,
and overdue.
We, first, though, wish to acknowledge your tremendous work in
the Congress and on this committee. And being the first chairman


e
to support the fielded forces. And finally, professionalizing that
force and its leaders.
We achieved our initial target for Iraqi Security Forces genera-
tion of 134,700, what we call the objective counterinsurgency force,
or military forces, and 188,300 objective civil security forces, which
are police, in December of 2006. However, based on changes in the
security environment in the latter half of 2006, the two security
ministers, in consultation with MNSTC-I, adjusted our 2007 end-
strength goals for both the army and the police.
I will discuss this in detail later in the statement and, of course,
during questioning.
We are now working to develop an Iraqi military of just over
190,000 and an Iraqi police forces of approximately 195,000. We
rack to achieve these force levels by the end of this cal-
endar year.
Currently we have trained and equipped 154,000 military forces
and 194,000 police forces. It is important to note that we are simul-
taneously building both new units and training individual replace
ments. Annual attribution is approximately 15 to 18 percent in the
army and 20 to 22 percent in the police.
MNSTC-I has a comprehensive four-phased plan to build, en-
hang
p and transition the Iraqi Security Forces to the gov-
ernment of Iraq's. control as soon as possible. As you know now,
such phases are a useful concept in developing plans, but they are
rarely cleanly separated and never entirely sequential in execution.
Planning phases such as these almost always overlap one an-
other as progress is made and as efficiencies are exploited in any
given phase. Stated another way, we work in multiple phases si-
multaneously.
Let me summarize the goals of each of these phases.
Phase one, the build phase, ensures that initial Iraqi Security
Forces are organized, trained, equipped and based.
Phase two, or enhance, makes the generated forces better, with
s on adding capabilities, including armor protection and in-
creased weaponry, as well as advanced training to prepare them for
full operational control.
Phase three, or the development phase, ties the tactical forma-
tions to a developed, institutional architecture, thereby setting the
conditions for their transition to self-reliance.
And phase four, or transition, based on a common understanding
by both sides—that is, the government of Iraq and the government
of the United States-of our long-term security relationship, then
transitions internal security responsibility to them, while we also
assist Iraq begin to prepare to defend itself against external threat.
Now, we have learned many important lessons, and we have
made many adaptations along the way.
We have learned that the development of security forces is analo-
gous to a three-legged stool. The first leg is a standard curriculum
of training so that every soldier and every unit gets the same
skills. The second leg is embedding transition teams. And the third
leg is partnering units with coalition forces.
And the distinction between the two—that is to say, the transi-
tion teams and the partner units—is very important. A partner
unit will provide instruction and education and expertise by men-


toring and role-modeling, but that is only one facet of that partner
unit's broader mission. An embedded transition team, on the other
hand, in contrast, is dedicated completely to the development of
that Iraqi unit.
We have learned that transition is essentially a balancing act.
On one side, you have assimilation and one the other side is de-
pendency. Transition too soon and the system falters. Transition
too late and the system becomes dependent on the coalition.
Through 2005, the United States government was paying the
bills for all Iraqi life support and for all Iraqi Security Forces. Now,
because we had helped them build their 2006 budget and knew
ad the necessary funding, we made it a goal in 2006 to
transition responsibility for Iraqi soldiers and policemen over to
Iraqi control.
It was painstaking and difficult work for reasons that could, if
you like, come out in questioning. But by the middle of 2006, the
MOD and the MOI had assumed control of all life support across
the entire Iraqi army and police.
We learned the importance of developing both the tactical and
the institutional sectors of the military and police forces simulta-
neously. In Iraq today, soldiers and police are being paid by the
central government. Their life support is being provided by the cen-
tral government.
The Ministries of Defense and Interior are functioning institu-
tions who feel themselves accountable for the security of the Nation
and for their security forces.
Challenges remain, but we should not underestimate the impor-
tance of having a coherent, accountable and responsible Iraqi chain
of command from individual soldier and policeman to the ministers
of defense and interior.
We have learned that the business practices of the Iraqi govern-
ment are horribly inefficient and ineffective, and that there is no
pool of skilled civil servants to overcome them in the near term.
Among our goals in 2007 is to transfer equipment, sustainment
and infrastructure costs or expenditures to the Iraqi responsibility.
To do that in an environment of unskilled bureaucrats and bad
business practices, we convinced the government of Iraq to reach
out to us as their acquisition and procurement agents, and to enter
into foreign military sales program with the United States.
Thus far, the Iraqis have invested about $1.7 billion into foreign
military sales. We anticipate they will invest another $1.6 billion
this year.
Let me put that into perspective. 2007 is the first year that the
government of Iraq will spend more on its security forces than the
United States government. And they will outspend us at a rate of
two to one. They are now spending more money on themselves than
we are spending on them in the security sector.
If the government feels itself accountable to the soldier and un-
derstands its responsibility to provide him resources, then the sol-
dier in turn is going to feel his loyalty toward the central govern-
ment. We consider this an important measure of progress.
Both tactical and institutional performance are improving. They
must now be tied together.


10
ning levels of these combat battalions up to 120 percent strength,
or an additional 20,000 soldiers.
The ongoing 2007 growth plan addresses many, but not all, of
these structural gaps in the Iraqi Security Forces.
MNSTC-I's current assessment is that the Iraqi Security Forces
will require growth in scope and scale similar to what we accom-
plished in 2007 in order to ensure sufficient force to protect the
population throughout Iraq, overmatch the enemy, provide depth
necessary to deploy forces around the country, and implement an
annual training and reconstitution program.
The threats faced by the government of Iraq have proven both
resilient and adaptive. We have identified key capability gaps in
the Iraqi Security Forces. MNSTC-I is working to improve the
quantity and the professionalism of the ISF's leaders, address the
issues of logistics and sustainability, ensure combat overmatch, and
provide Iraq's security leaders the ability to project power with suf-
ficient rotational capability to meet the challenge facing them.
Coalition forces currently cover these capability gaps. Failure to
address these Iraqi security capability gaps will lock U.S. forces
into tactical battle space and greatly increase the risk to the Iraqi
Security Forces should the coalition presence decline in the near
future.
In reflecting on my time in Iraq, I think I can identify four key
decisions that we have made in the effort to build effective security
institutions.
The first was the formation of MNSTC-I to professionalize and
standardize the growth of Iraqi Security Forces.
The second was the decision to embed advisory teams by simply
partnering with them.
The third occurred on the 1st of October, 2005, when MNSTC-
I assumed responsibility for developing the Ministry of Defense and
the Ministry of Interior's capacity and capabilities.
And the fourth and most recent was the recognition in late 2006
of the inabili
ability by the Iraqi government to execute their budget
and, therefore, successfully enrolling them into the United States
foreign military sales program in order to assist them in growing
the force and executing their budget.
I would like to close with some thoughts about the Iraqi leader-
ship and about the Iraqi people.
The leaders of Iraq and their people are working in an incredibly
challenging environment and a dangerous environment. They risk
their lives every day as they carry out their nation's business. And
they live with the constant fear of having their families attacked.
The people of Iraq have demonstrated both resolve and resiliency
in withstanding the assaults of extremists, and seem to be commit-
ted to make a better life for themselves, their families and their
nation.
The leaders and the people of Iraq have not given up on them-
selves. We should not give up on them.
I again thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
And I am now prepared to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dempsey can be found in the
Appendix on page 56.]


12
minority, or if it is being done to disadvantage the other groups,
the Kurds and the Sunnis. And we are very careful to both under-
stand the rationale and to watch the conduct after the fact.
It is a fact that there are leadership changes going on all the
time. When we confront them, they will say to me-in fact, most
recently, they said to me, “Well, look, General, you have been here
for two years and you are going home, so we want to
lar policy: Two years and you move on.”
It is hard to say sometimes, sir.
Mr. MEEHAN. How are negative appraisals of Iraqi units and
commanders communicated from the MTT to the Iraqi assistant
group chain over the MNSTC-I chain and its links with the MOD
and the MOI?
How are these, sort of, negative appraisals of these units—what
is the chain like?
General DEMPSEY. The transition teams do the transition readi-
ness assessments, we call them, on a monthly basis, against a se-
ries of metrics that I think you are familiar with.
I know you didn't get them as quickly, certainly, as you wanted
to see them. But I am told that we have moved beyond that and
you do have access now to the TRAs and the background data that
forms them.
But in any case, the TRA itself is done by the transition team
and then discussed with the Iraqi counterpart leader, passed over
to Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Lieutenant General Ray Odierno,
who has a cell in his headquarters that collates the data.
And then, on a monthly basis, there is a briefing that General
Odierno gives to General Petraeus. I sit in on it. And at that brief-
ing, we discuss the movement, either forward or backward, of units
to battalion level.
Now, near simultaneously, I have a staff—we have approxi-
mately 100 transition team members in the MOI and in the MOD,
the joint headquarters. We do exactly the same thing for the two
security institutions.
And then, once a month, we brief General Petraeus on institu-
tional progress, or the lack of progress, thereby giving him the abil-
ity to see both ends of this security enterprise, the degree of tac-
tical progress or the degree of institutional progress.
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Akin.
Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My impression, just from having sat in these hearings for some
considerable period of time, the first thing is that it seemed like
the police sector was a lot harder than just the regular security
forces. Somehow the Iraqis understood a soldier, but they didn't
seem to understand the concept of police as much. So that seems
to have been difficult all the way along the line.
Is that, like other things in Iraq, a little spotty, depending on
your geography? For instance, the way the Marines in Anbar han-
dled it, is that a little different than the way it is by the Army in
Baghdad in the way that the police are used? Is it true that the
police, particularly in a place like Ramadi, now, where the sheiks
are heavily involved in that, that that is better?
And so, that is just the first question, just comment on police
versus the other.


13
The second question I have is, if you stand way back from what
we have done, what has happened over a period of years is we have
put a lot of Americans in contact with a lot of Iraqi people at all
different levels of government and different kinds of professional
positions. To a certain degree, are some of our philosophies of a lit-
tle bit more peaceful, democratic kind of society, are they rubbing
off over there in the long-term sense?
If we were to withdraw over some period of time, have we left
something behind where they are going to be thinking a little bit
differently?
I suppose I am asking you to speculate a little bit, but you are
in a better position to do that than some of us are.
Thank you, sir.
General DEMPSEY. To the first one, sir, on the police and does it
vary around the country, it certainly does. We say there is no tem-
plate in the development of almost anything in Iraq.
I mean, as you know, the police are actually performing remark-
ably well in Mosul, for example, working side by side with Iraqis.
There is only one U.S. combat battalion in Mosul, which is the sec-
ond or third largest city, depending on what you believe about
Basra.
And so, in the second or third largest city, you have police forces.
in Iraq in charge of local security, who call upon the army, the
Iraqi army, if they have a problem, who, in turn, calls upon that
one coalition battalion if they have a problem.
And that is, of course, where we would like to be throughout the
country.
But, as you say, with police, what we have learned is there is no
history in Iraq, and I might even say in the region because I have
traveled extensively in the region of police that are what you and
I would describe as a force that lives to protect and serve the popu-
lation.
Police forces in the region are notably corrupt. And they get that
way because, as we say, they live at the point of corruption.
The difference between building an army and building a police
force is that an army is built with the intent that it will move
around the country and it has a national fabric and it has national
loyalties.
Police forces live locally. Their families live locally. They don't
really have a sense of nation. They have a sense of local commu-
nity, and all of the influences that are brought to bear.
So it has been very challenging.
But I would also say, Congressman, that all local influences are
not negative. And as we see now playing out in Al Anbar, the local
influences are starting to become something we can leverage posi-
tively.
The second part, sir, about are some of our values rubbing off on
our Iraqi counterparts, I would say absolutely.
But in a situation where there is such levels of violence-levels
of violence that, frankly, sometimes it is mind-numbing to me that
they accept them. They do have a tolerance for violence that ex-
ceeds our ability to understand it.
In that environment, I think they crave security to the point
where they will often sometimes wax nostalgic about the Saddam


15
I think to both our credit and to our Iraqi brothers and sisters'
credit, though, that no one has given up on it. I mean, we have still
got our shoulders to that boulder, you know, rolling it up the hill.
If I sound, you know, cautiously optimistic here today, it may be
that I have been there too long. I don't know. But in the process
of being there this long I have come to gain a certain faith in Iraq
that I, frankly, didn't have traveling in the rest of the region.
You may have heard me say, Congressman, that if it is in United
States' national interest—and I will promise not to step on Mr.
Kimmitt's equities here in terms of policy—but if it is in United
States' interest to have a strategic partner in that part of the
world, which is a very dangerous part of the world, situated with
Iran, Syria, the volatile Mideast conflict, and this, let's face it, ex-
istence of radical Islam that believes itself to be completely—that
their way of life is completely anathema to ours—if it is important
to have a strategic partner in that part of the world, Iraq should
be that partner.
It has oil, of course. But more important, it has water, it has ag-
riculture, it has human capital, it has a very fine education system,
and it has a history that is as rich as any in the world, and who
understand that history.
And so I think that the metaphor applies. There will be times
when this boulder rolls back. It is probably rolling back a bit right
now in Baghdad. But I don't think it is going to roll over us, and
I think we are going to be okay.
Dr. SNYDER. The question in my mind several years ago when we
met in Baghdad, I had this picture of the boulder being fairly close
to the top of the hill. And now I think there are great expanses of
the American people think that the top of that hill is a long, long
ways to go.
And I appreciate your comment about cautious optimism. I think
in terms of what the American people are looking for and the work
that you have been doing on this training is what is going to get
us finally there, that we can declare this done.
We are going to go around several rounds. I wanted to ask one
final question this round.
How do you see the quality and numbers and experience of our
U.S. trainers, our troops that are doing the training? Any com-
ments you have about that now. And we may want to expand on
that as time goes by.
General DEMPSEY. Okay.
By the way, the answer to your first question there, sir, about
is it closer or further away from the top of the hill, the real key
for us, I think is to convince the American people that there is a
point in time where we can stop doing the tactical job for them, we
can stop running patrols, we can stop manning checkpoints. I think
that that part of it is closer, far closer, than when you and I spoke
a couple of years ago.
The institutional side, in other words, a mature institution that
has a functioning pay, promotion, logistics, contracting sector, they
are going to need some help in that for a long time.
It is probably worth noting that when I was in Saudi Arabia
doing this program, I was there in year 28 and 29 of that program.
But it is a program that works at the national level to help the


20
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, you were talking a second ago about the MOI
and the payroll. What I heard you say was that there are tens of
thousands more serving than have been trained.
Did you say being paid than have been trained? Or is it that the
payroll is inflated by folks who aren't really there?
General DEMPSEY. Well, there are certainly, we call them ghost
policemen. There is a percentage that we believe and I could give
you an approximation of that.
Let me give you the background, sir. It might help you under-
stand it.
When Minister Jabr was the MOI, we noted that the police
forces, particularly in the province, had a tendency to overhire,
more or less as a jobs program.
Mr. CONAWAY. Okay.
General DEMPSEY. And so we got him to essentially fix the end
state of the Iraqi police forces in the provinces based on inter-
national law enforcement standards in counterinsurgency environ-
ments. And, I mean, I could drill further down in this, if you like.
But the bottom line is, that is how we came up with the number
135,000, spread across 18 provinces, based on the population in the
provinces and the threat in the provinces. Higher threat area, more
police: Al Anbar province, 11,330, for example; Baghdad, 25,000.
What happened, though, is because there is still in Iraq, as a rel-
atively young government, there is still some disagreement be-
tween the powers of the center and the powers of the province.
Some of the provincial governors, in particular in places of religious
significance like Karbala and Najaf, grossly overhired policemen.
And it only became apparent to the minister and to us when the
payroll rolled in and they put a demand on the system that we
hadn't recognized before.
And, again, we are getting better at databases, automation. So
we have been getting better and better visibility on what is really
out there, to the point where now there is something between
60,000 and 75,000 policemen on the payroll over the authorization
and untrained by us.
And so the question, now, for the Iraqi government is, what do
they do about it?
Of that 60,000 to 74,000, certainly 10 to 20 percent of it will be
ghosts that are just there for payroll purposes.
Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Well, that is a better answer than 100 per-
of them being ghosts. I am hoping that those 50.000 that are
there, that are trained, are actually, maybe, doing something. But
thank you. I appreciate that.
General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. CONAWAY. Given as I got here late, I really don't want to re-
plow previous ground. Is there anything that either one of you
wished you had said during your testimony this morning, that I
will now give you a chance to take whatever time you want to say
anything else that we didn't question you about or-
General DEMPSEY. Yes, and, sir, thank you for that.
XIIUNUD.
AI


24
But I would suggest to you that what MNSTC-I does as a living
is try to help shape the answer to that question so that they can
get what they need, but not more.
In fact, part of my mission statement is to build security forces
that will be sustainable by the government of Iraq over time. So
there is a degree of fiscal reality. We know what their budget is.
It was $32 billion last year. We know what the International Mone-
tary Fund will allow them to spend in the security sector. And we
bumped them right up against it so that they can sustain, over
time, what we are building with and for them.
Mr. BARTLETT. If we were to ask you how many of these forces
they needed so that we could leave, what would you tell us?
General DEMPSEY. What I would tell you, sir, is that we had a
target for the end of 2006, which I have mentioned previously. We
made an adjustment because one of the assumptions we made
early on, in my first tour, was we would build security forces for
a short war, partnered with us, against an environment of decreas-
ing levels of violence, because we believed we could help them drive
the levels of violence down, and therefore we needed this many se-
curity forces to take over responsibility.
And the end of 2006 or the middle of 2006, we took a look, and
levels of violence were not coming down. In fact, they w
ing. We also saw some of the problems with units deploying around
the country, and we made adjustments. And with our Iraqi coun-
terparts and with their funding, largely, we have got them on a
path to grow an additional 45,000 military forces this year.
We just recently completed another assessment looking to 2008.
The reason we did it now is both because General Petraeus is
adapting his strategy, and we also did it now because the govern-
ment of Iraq's budget cycle runs June through August, and we
want to make sure that we inform their budget and what we think
they need in 2008.
I am not yet prepared to give you a number, but I would say,
as I said in my statement, that it is pretty clear to us that for them
to take over responsibility in the face of declining coalition pres-
ence, at some point, they need to be slightly bigger.
Mr. BARTLETT. General, our constituents are very uneasy with
terms like “stick it out” and “stay the course.” They have no idea
what that means. If that means we are going to be there 50 years
from now, like we are in South Korea, they have got no stomach
for that, sir.
Americans would like to have on their refrigerator a checklist
that says how many of these forces we need and what laws need
to be passed, and they want to check those off month by month so
that they know when this thing will be over.
I would hope that the administration would focus on developing
those numbers so that our citizens can have that assurance that
there will be an end to this.
I would like to yield the remainder of my time to the ranking
member. Thank you.
Mr. AKIN. Thank you.
I would just maybe “me too” what Congressman Bartlett just
said a little bit. My sense from a marketing point of view as just
a plain old American-and, of course, I have had a chance to get


25
over to Iraq a couple of times—but our sense is the media keeps
saying, “Well, somebody got killed, another couple of people got
killed today.” We hear that over and over again. And one of the
things that we are not provided news-wise with is, “These are the
to-dos, and we are checking things off the to-do list.”
When we go to Iraq, we have a sense that there is progress. It
is slower than we would like it to be, but relatively speaking, con-
sidering the conditions in the country, it is pretty significant
progress. But we don't really know what those items are and how
to check them off, so just wanted to reiterate that.
The second thought was, it has also been my sense that our dif-
ficulties over there have been less military than they were more in
the nation-building kinds of things.
Like, you have some police; you are trying to get them kicked
into shape, but there are no courts, there are no jails. You have
problems with you can't wire transfer money, which isn't really a
military thing to build the wire transfer system in banking. You
have to run oil pumping facilities and oil storage and transfer and
all that. You have electric and sewer and all those things, which
are really, in a way, nonmilitary.
My sense has been that if there have been problems, it has been
more in the nonmilitary sector almost than it was in the military.
Would you want to respond to that?
General DEMPSEY. I will ask Mr. Kimmitt to assist me on this.
I will say, as it affects my job, though, I can say that one of the
things we have been dealing with since we got there in April of
2003 is that the Iraqi people believed that, because we are who we
are, that we would make their lives immediately better in those
very sectors you are speaking: electricity and fuel and economic de-
velopment.
And certainly, I think we will have to reflect on the fact that, be-
cause those sectors have languished, it has affected the security
sector. In other words, I think there are certainly some parts of the
population that have lashed out because they haven't realized those
dreams.
You want to add anything?
Mr. KIMMITT. Well, Congressman, I think your point is exactly
right, that to the extent that the military is bearing a significance
on the operations, it is oftentimes important to pull back and recog-
nize that the solution and the long-term progress inside of Iraq is
really going to be less about the military consequences and more
about, “Is this society prepared to move on?” to dismiss not only
the past of Saddam but any longstanding differences between the
major constituent groups, the Shia, the Sunni, the Kurds.
We are not pleased, at this point-and this is a subject that we
will probably talk about later on, either in the closed session or
later on in the 9010 discussions.
We are certainly not pleased, at this point, that the space and
time that the military has bought for the Iraqis themselves to take
on the hard questions of reconciliation, that they haven't yet used
this opportunity, and not recognizing that there is a difference, as
General Petraeus has said many times, between the Baghdad clock
and the Washington clock, the American clock.


59
protection and increased weaponry and advanced training to prepare them for full
operational control. Phase III (DEVELOP), ties the tactical formations to a developed
institutional architecture and sets the conditions for their transition to self-reliance. Phase
IV (TRANSITION), based on a common understanding by both sides-Government of
Iraq and Government of the United States of our long-term security relationship,
transition of internal security responsibility occurs while we also assist Iraq begin to
prepare to defend itself against external threats.
We've learned many important lessons and made the necessary adaptations along the
way.
We've learned that the development of security forces is analogous to a three-legged
stool, if you will. The first leg is a standard curriculum of training, so that every soldier
and every unit gets the same skill sets. The second leg is embedded transition teams. The
third leg is partnered units. And the distinction between the two is very important. A
partnered unit will provide instruction and education and expertise by mentoring and
role-modeling, but that is only one facet of the partnered unit's broader mission. An
embedded transition team, in contrast, is dedicated completely to the development of that
Iraqi unit.
We've learned that transition is essentially a balancing act. On one side you have
assimilation, and on the other side is dependency. Pass responsibility too soon and the
system falters. Pass responsibility too late and the system becomes dependent on
coalition support. Through 2005, the U.S. government was paying the bills for all Iraqi