4.F 76/1:110-195
REPORT ON IRAQ TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
APRIL 9, 2008
Serial No. 110–195
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OV - 4. 2008
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa
DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
DIANE E. WATSON, California
RON PAUL, Texas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GENE GREEN, Texas
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
CONNIE MACK, Florida
RUBEN HINOJOSA, Texas
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon
TED POE, Texas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
JIM COSTA, California
VACANT
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
BARBARA LEE, California
ROBERT R. KING, Staff Director
YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director
(II)


CONTENTS
WITNESSES
The Honorable Ryan C. Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, U.S.
Department of State ...........
General David H. Petraeus, Commanding General, Multi-National Force-
Iraq, U.S. Department of Defense .......
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Ryan C. Crocker: Prepared statement .
General David H. Petraeus: Prepared statement .
The Honorable Lynn C. Woolsey, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California: Letter to the President .........
The Hon Davide Lynn Letter to the
.....................................
.................
APPENDIX
Written responses from General David H. Petraeus to questions submitted
for the record by the Honorable Bill Delahunt, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ........
Written responses from General David H. Petraeus to questions submitted
for the record by the Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California .......
Written response from General David H. Petraeus to question submitted
for the record by the Honorable John Tanner, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Tennessee ...........
Written responses from the Honorable Ryan C. Crocker to questions sub-
mitted for the record by the Honorable Bill Delahunt ........
Written responses from the Honorable Ryan C. Crocker to questions sub-
mitted for the record by the Honorable Diane E. Watson ...............................
Written response from the Honorable Ryan C. Crocker to question submitted
for the record by the Honorable John Tanner
The Honorable Ron Paul, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas: Prepared statement .....
The Honorable Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Texas: Prepared statement .......
The Honorable Mike Pence, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Indiana: Prepared statement
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas: Prepared statement
........
ed by the norable Ryanner
Congre
(III)





REPORT ON IRAQ TO THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2008
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order. Before we
begin, let me outline today's proceedings, and welcome to our refur-
bished committee room.
After my opening statement and that of our distinguished col-
league, Rank
Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, we will hear the
witnesses' opening statements. I will recognize committee members
for 5 minutes each based on seniority for those who are here at the
opening of the hearing—that was 30 seconds ago—and an order of
arrival for those joining us later.
Secondly, I would like to make it clear that our committee's pol-
icy, what it is on handling protests. We have no objection to audi-
ence members wearing tee shirts and hats expressing their views.
But to maintain order in the hearing room, we request that audi-
ence members do not hold up or wave signs, make gestures to at-
tract attention, stand up and protest, shout or yell your views, or
otherwise disrupt the hearing. We will ask the capitol police to re-
move anyone from the room who violates this policy, and I should
let people know that it is the policy of the capitol police to arrest
anyone ejected from the hearing room.
Our witnesses are in the home stretch of a congressional testi-
mony marathon. To some, this hearing may even seem like the
fourth time around and endless loop. That is why we are asking
both Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus to
more or less summarize the main points of their testimony at their
discretion, a report to Congress that has been heard once in the
House and twice in the Senate already. This way we will move
along more quickly to the questions posed by members of the com-
mittee.
To make sure that as many members of the committee as pos-
sible are yielded time, I intend to use the gavel at the 5-minute
mark exactly. In other words, a member can use his or her time
to give a speech or to question the witnesses, but no backloading,
no 442-minute speech, with then the questions coming. The wit-
nesses will not be answering those kinds of questions.
(1)


Now that these housekeeping points have been made, I recognize
myself for some opening remarks to our distinguished witnesses.
The committee has great respect, Mr. Ambassador, General
Petraeus, for your accomplishments and deeply appreciate your
service. We are also keenly aware of the sacrifices being made by
the United States military and our dedicated diplomatic corps in
Iraq, along with their families. But our respect and appreciation for
you and
nd the people you lead does not mean that we should yield
in our oversight responsibilities.
Quite the opposite. We have to make a tough-minded assessment
that is fact-based and not ideologically driven. It is right and ap-
iestion the reports of progress that the Executive
Branch offers to Congress.
Congress and the people who sent us to Washington want to see
the years of effort in Iraq end with a positive meaningful and last-
ing result, a stable, cohesive Iraqi Government, democratic in na-
ture, an Iraq that does not threatened its neighbors, and is able to
resist domination by them, a country living under the rule of law
with protection for individual and minority rights.
This would be good for Iraq, of course, but more importantly, it
would be good for American interests. But are we there yet? Hard-
ly. Can we get there at a cost appropriate to that be
convinced. In fact, in some areas we seem to be slipping backwards.
General Petraeus, when you last came before this committee, you
argued that the surge would allow United States troops to help
their Iragi counterparts seize and hold areas that were then under
the control of anti-American forces. How effective could this effort
have been when mortars and rockets can rain on the Green Zone
launched from Sadr City District of Baghdad, directly across the
Tigris. Our diplomats and other civilian personnel are literally
under fire. For more than 2 weeks, our Embassy is bombarded. In
all the past 2-plus weeks, we have seen the worst violence in the
Green Zone since the war began 5 years ago.
I have a clear memory that the seize and hold component of the
surge strategy, as conceived in late 2006 and implemented in 2007,
would eventually be directed at the most violent and unstable
areas of Sadr City. Yet we do not even seem to be close to seizing
and holding Sadr City.
Why not? Are we focusing our efforts on securing this district for
the long term or must we rely on the whims of Muqtada al-Sadr
to maintain the peace? What can you tell us about how this situa-
tion came about? What is the source of this mortar and rocket fire?
What is the reason for it? What, if anything, can be done to stop
it?
Some reports say the rockets were made in China. Is that the
case? And if so, how have they made their way to Baghdad?
On another subject, the surge was intended to quell the violence
primarily in order to create political space for Iraqis to move on to-
ward national reconciliation. Two years ago a key Iraqi leader with
whom I met defined national reconciliation this way:
“Moderate Shiites, Sunni and Kurdish leaders coming together
across sectarian lines as Iraqis to join hands so that they could
get things done for the benefit of the whole country. The mid-
dle would rise in Iraq and lead the way in this process.”


Today, on the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Baghdad and
the Iraqi people by the United States and our coalition partners,
I want to reiterate how grateful we are for the sacrifices made.
We must continue to base our Iraq policy not upon short-term do-
mestic political considerations, but upon our enduring national se-
curity interests in Iraq, and indeed throughout the Middle East.
We must consider the consequences of our policy decisions, and
recognize that immediate disengagement would only embolden the
forces of radical Islam and leave an enormous power vacuum in
Iraq-one to be filled by the regime in Iran, with its proxies in Iraq
and throughout the region.
Our enemies have made clear their intentions, both in words and
deeds.
In his most recent interview, released on April 2, senior al-Qaeda
jihadist Ayman al-Zawahiri stated, and I quote:
“The battalions of the Mujahedin after expelling the occupier
from Iraq, shall make their way toward Jerusalem.'
He further elaborated:
“There is no doubt that the American collapse has begun ...
and the raids on New York and Washington were identifying
marks of this collapse.”
Al-Qaeda has been, if nothing else, consistent in its message in
this regard.
In October 2006, al-Qaeda member Abu Hamza stated:
“We will not rest from our Jihad until we are under the olive
trees . . . and we have blown up the filthiest house—which is
called the White House.”
I am willing to take them at their word—that they desire noth-
ing more than the destruction of the United States and that they
are willing to stop at nothing to achieve it.
There are those in the United States who argue that the threat
would disappear if the United States were not in Iraq. That is not
only naive, but dangerous.
There are those who look at Iraq and Afghanistan as two inde-
pendent battles, calling for retreat from one as the recipe for suc-
cess in the other.
But they cannot be separated. We must look at them in an inte-
grated manner, in the same way the radicals look at them as inter-
twined and as part of their broader effort to drive "all unbelieving
forces” out “from the land of the Muslims” and to destroy the
United States, the “Great Satan.”
Some in the U.S. are becoming impatient. They say we have done
enough for Iraq.
However, they fail to fully comprehend the critical strategic in-
terests that are at stake for us over there and the great sacrifices
which Iraqis are making for their own freedom. While throughout
Iraq the jihadists are losing-losing militarily and losing the sup-
port of the local Sunni population—they are by no means defeated.
As you, General Petraeus, testified in the Senate yesterday:


5
"Al-Qaeda's senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central
front in their global strategy send funding, direction, and for-
eign fighters to Iraq.”
We must also recognize that Iran is engaged in a proxy war
against us in Iraq; that Iranian agents and military forces are ac-
tively providing training, expertise and weapons to attack United
States forces and the Government of Iraq.
Last week, U.S. Major General Kevin Bergner said:
“We have seen the continued use of Iranian-manufactured and
-supplied rockets, mortars and explosively-formed penetrators
... and in fact, we have captured individuals who tell us that
they have recently been to Iran and have been trained by the
Quds Force operatives.”
In the last year, we have witnessed important political progress,
but we understand that we still face significant challenges on both
of these fronts.
However, the recent passage of the pensions law, the de-
Ba'athification law, the provincial powers legislation, the Fiscal
Year 2008 budget, and consideration of the consumer protection
law have clearly illustrated that they are up to the task.
itical that we lay the groundwork not only for normalized
bilateral relations between the United States and Iraq, but for Iraq
to take its place among responsible nations.
To start, we must begin by recognizing Iraq as a sovereign nation
and our ally.
We must stop talking down to Iraq and start talking with Iraq
as a partner.
Iraqis have volunteered in large numbers to fight for their free-
dom in their armed forces.
Many have died in the struggle against radicalism and for free-
dom. Iraqi casualties in this struggle far exceed our lamentable
American casualties.
But we are not fighting their war for them. We are assisting
them in their fight—which is both their fight and our fight-and
the fight of every freedom-loving people everywhere.
Your work, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, has
given our Iraqi ally a hope for freedom, a strategy for success.
We must not fail where they have succeeded. As former Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan stated in his first inaugural address:
“The American people are ready for peace. We will negotiate
for it, sacrifice for it. But we will not surrender for it.”
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your time.
Chairman BERMAN. Our witnesses today are well known to all of
us. Ambassador Ryan Crocker is one of the most distinguished
members of our Diplomatic Corps. He has been Ambassador to Iraq
since March of last year. His assignment to Iraq is his fifth ambas-
sadorship. He has previously been our chief diplomat in Lebanon,
Kuwait, Syria and Pakistan. He has received the Presidential Dis-
tinguished Service Award, and the Department of Defense Medal
for Distinguished Civilian Service. In 2004, the President elevated
him to the rank of career ambassador, the highest rank in the For-
eign Service.


General David Petraeus is likewise one of our most distinguished
military officers. He has been in his current post as commanding
general of the Multi-National Forces in Iraq since February of last
year. This is his third command in Iraq. He commanded the 101st
Airborne Division during the initial phase of the war. He was in
charge of training Iraqi security forces in 2004 and 2005, and as
I indicated, he returned to Iraq as our top commander last year.
Gentlemen, you have testified before this committee 7 months
ago. We do look forward to hearing your testimony again today,
and Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RYAN C. CROCKER, UNITED
STATES AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have cir-
culated my full statement and ask that that be submitted for the
record.
Chairman BERMAN. It will be.
Ambassador CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Ros-
Lehtinen, members of the committee, I must start by noting with
genuine sadness the absence in the room today, the absence of
Chairman Tom Lantos. I first met Chairman Lantos in Lebanon in
1982, and he is someone I have had the honor of working with off
and on for the quarter of a century that followed. He was truly a
great American. We all mourn his loss and I know we are all deep-
ly grateful for the contributions he made to this great country.
Chairman BERMAN. Thank you.
[Applause.]
Ambassador CROCKER. It is an honor to appear before you today
to provide my assessment of political, economic and diplomatic de-
velopments in Iraq.
Last September, I said that the cumulative trajectory of these de-
velopments was upwards, although the slope without line was not
steep. The developments over the last 7 months have strengthened
my sense of a positive trend. Immense challenges remain and
progress is uneven and often frustratingly slow, but there is
progress. Sustaining this progress will require continuing U.S. re-
solve and commitment.
Five years ago today, the statute of Saddam Hussein was toppled
in Baghdad. The euphoria of that moment evaporated long ago, but
as Iraq emerges from the shattering violence of 2006 and the early
part of 2007, there is reason to sustain that commitment and the
enormous investments we have made both in the lives of our young
brave men and women and our resources. Let me describe briefly
some developments upon which I base such a judgment.
The first is at the national level in the form of legislation and
the development of Iraq's Parliament. In the last several months,
Iraq's Parliament has formulated, debated vigorously, and in many
cases passed legislation dealing with vital issues of reconciliation
and nation building. A pension law extended benefits to individuals
who had previously been denied them because of their service
under the former regime. The Accountability and Justice Law, de-
Ba'athification reform, reflects a strengthened spirit o
ation as does a far-reaching amnesty law.


April 5 by virtually all of Iraq's main political leaders—Sunni,
Sħiia and Kurd—made clear.
One conclusion I draw from these signs of progress is that the
strategy that began with the surge is working. This does not mean,
however, that U.S. support should be open-ended or that the level
and nature of our engagement should not diminish over time.
It is in this context that we have begun negotiating a bilateral
relationship between Iraq and the United States. In August, Iraq's
five principal leaders requested a long-term relationship to include
economic, political, diplomatic, and security cooperation. The heart
of this relationship will be a legal framework for the presence of
American troops, similar to that which exists in nearly 80 countries
around the world.
This agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and
we anticipate that it will expressly forswear them. The agreement
will not specify troop levels and it will not tie the hands of the next
administration. Our aim is to ensure that the next President ar-
rives in office with a stable foundation upon which to base policy
decisions, and that is what this agreement will do. Congress will
remain fully informed as these negotiations proceed in the coming
weeks and months.
In terms of economics, since September we have seen the revival
of market-places across Iraq and the reopening of long-shuttered
businesses. According to a Center for International Private Enter-
prise poll last month, 78 percent of Iraq business owners expect the
Iraqi economy to continue to grow in the next 2 years.
With the improving security and rising government expenditures,
projects that Iraq's GDP will grow 7 percent in real terms
this year, and inflation has been tamed. Iraq's 2008 budget has al-
located $13 billion for capital investment and reconstruction, and
a $5 billion supplemental budget this summer will further inve
export revenues in building infrastructure and providing services.
This spending also benefits the United States. Iraq recently an-
nounced its decision to purchase 40 commercial aircraft from the
United States at an estimated cost of $5 billion.
The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over. Our
assistance focus has shifted to capacity development and an em-
phasis on local development through our network of ministerial ad-
visors and 25 provincial reconstruction teams, PRTs. We are seek-
ing to ensure that our assistance in partnership with the Iraqis
leverages Iraq's own resources.
Iraq is increasingly using these resources to support projects and
programs that we have helped develop. It has committed nearly
$200 million in support of a program to provide vocational training
for concerned local citizens who stood up with us against al-Qaeda
in the awakening. We developed technical specifications from which
Iraq's state-owned oil company will build new oil export platforms
and pipelines with over $1 billion.
In Baghdad, the municipality has stepped up to take over labor
contracts with $100 million that we had been covering under the
Community Stabilization Program.
Iraq will need to continue to improve governmental capacity,
pass national-level hydrocarbon legislation, improve electrical pro-
duction and distribution, improve the climate for foreign and do-


mestic investment, and take a number of other steps. We, along
with other international partners, including the United Nations
and the World Bank, will be assisting the Iraqis as they move for-
ward with this challenging agenda.
In the region and
the region and the international community under dynamic
new leadership, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq has
increased the scope of its activities and the size of its staff. It is
playing a key role in preparation for provincial elections and in
providing technical assistance to resolve disputed internal bound-
aries. UNHCR has returned international staff to Iraq to assist
with the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.
Regionally, support from Arab capitals for Iraq must improve for
the sake of Iraq and the sake of the region. Bahrain's recent an-
nouncement that it will return an ambassador to Baghdad is wel-
come, and other Arab states should follow suit. Iraq is a multi-eth-
nic state, but it is also a founding member of the Arab League and
an integral part of the Arab World. We encourage more active Arab
engagement with Iraq and we expect that Prime Minister Maliki's
effort against Shija extremist militias in Basra will receive Arab
support.
Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi Government
to establish a stable, secure state through the arming and training
of militia elements engaged in violence against Iraqi security
forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians. The extent of Iran's ma-
lign influence was dramatically demonstrated when these elements
clashed with Iraqi Government forces in Basra and Baghdad. We
know more than ever about Iranian-supported lethal networks in-
side Iraq and their Quds Force sponsors, and we will continue to
aggressively uproot and destroy them.
At the same time we support constructive relations between Iran
and Iraq, and are participating in a tripartite process to discuss the
security situation in Iraq. Iran has a choice to make.
Mr. Chairman, almost everything about Iraq is hard. It will con-
tinue to be hard as Iraqis struggle with the damage and trauma
inflicted by 35 years of totalitarian Ba'athist rule. But hard does
not mean hopeless, and the political and economic progress of the
past few months is significant. I must underscore, however, that
these gains are fragile, and they are reversible.
Americans have invested a great deal in Iraq, in blood as well
as treasure, and they have the right to ask whether this is worth
it, whether it is now time to walk away and let the Iraqis fend for
themselves. Iraq has the potential to develop into a stable, secure,
multi-sectarian democracy under the rule of law. Whether it real-
izes that potential is ultimately up to the Iraqi people. Our sup-
port, however, will continue to be critical.
I said in September that I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. That
is still the case, although I think now we are closer. I remain con-
vinced that a major departure from our current engagement would
bring failure, and we have to be clear with ourselves about what
failure could mean.
Al-Qaeda is in retreat in Iraq, but it is not yet defeated. Al-
Qaeda's leaders are looking for every opportunity they can to hang
on. Osama bin Laden has called Iraq “the perfect base," and along
with the comments from Ayman al-Zawahiri, it reminds us that a


10
fundamental aim of al-Qaeda is to establish itself in the Arab
world. It almost succeeded in Iraq. We cannot allow it a second
chance.
It is not only al-Qaeda that would benefit. Iran has said publicly
it will fill any vacuum in Iraq and extremist Shiia militias would
reassert themselves. We saw them try in Basra and Baghdad. And
in all of this, the Iraqi people would suffer on a scale far beyond
what we have already seen. Spiraling conflict could draw in neigh-
bors with devastating consequences for the region and the world.
Mr. Chairman, as monumental as the events of the last 5 years
have been in Iraq, Iraqis, Americans—and the world, ultimately-
will judge us far more on the basis of what will happen than what
has happened. In the end, how we leave and what we leave behind
will be more important than how we came. Our current course is
hard, but it is working. Progress is real although fragile. We need
to stay with it.
In the months ahead, we will continue to assist Iraq as it pur-
sues further steps toward reconciliation and economic development.
Over time, this will become increasingly an Iraqi process, as it
should be. Our efforts will focus on increasing Iraq's integration re-
gionally and internationally; assisting Iraqi institutions to
strengthen the political process and promote economic activity; and
supporting U.N. efforts as Iraq carries out local elections this year.
These efforts will require an enhanced civilian commitment and
continued support from the Congress and the American people.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize and thank all
those who serve our country in Iraq, both military and civilian.
Their courage and commitment, at great sacrifice, has earned the
admiration of all Americans. They certainly have mine, and it is an
honor for me to serve there with them.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:]
T
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RYAN C. CROCKER, UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, and Members of the Committee:
It is an honor to appear before you today to provide my assessment of political,
economic and diplomatic developments in Iraq. When General Petraeus and I re-
ported to you in September, I gave my considered judgment as to whether our goals
in Iraq were attainable—can Iraq develop into a united, stable country with a demo-
cratically-elected government operating under the rule of law?
Last September, I said that the cumulative trajectory of political, economic and
diplomatic developments in Iraq was upwards, although the slope of that line was
not steep. Developments over the last seven months have strengthened my sense
of a positive trend. Immense challenges remain and progress is uneven and often
frustratingly slow; but there is progress. Sustaining that progress will require con-
tinuing U.S. resolve and commitment. What has been achieved is substantial, but
it is also reversible. Five years ago, the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled in
Baghdad. The euphoria of that moment evaporated long ago. But as Iraq emerges
from the shattering violence of 2006 and the early part of 2007, there is reason to
sustain that commitment and the enormous investments we have made both in the
lives of our young brave men and women and our resources. Let me describe the
developments upon which I base such a judgment.
RECONCILIATION: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL POLITICS
The first is at the national level in the form of legislation and the development
of Iraq's parliament. In September, we were disappointed that Iraq had not yet en-
acted some key pieces of legislation. In the last several months, however, Iraq's par-
liament has formulated, debated vigorously, and in many cases passed legislation
atteringoria of thars ago, the What has ng that press


11
dealing with vital issues of reconciliation and nation building. A pension law ex-
tended benefits to individuals who had previously been denied them because of their
service under the former regime. The Accountability and Justice Law (de-
Ba’athification reform), passed after lengthy and often contentious debate, reflects
a strengthened spirit of reconciliation, as does a far-reaching Amnesty Law.
The Provincial Powers Law is a major step forward in defining the relationship
between the federal and provincial governments. Passage of this legislation required
debate about the fundamental nature of the state, similar in its complexity to our
own lengthy and difficult debate over states' rights. The Provincial Powers Law also
called for provincial elections by October 1, 2008, and an Electoral Law is now
under discussion that will set the parameters for elections. All major parties have
announced their support for these elections, which will be a major step forward in
Iraq's political development and will set the stage for national elections in late 2009.
In January, a vote by the Council of Representatives to change the design of the
Iraqi flag means the flag now flies in all parts of the country for the first time in
years. The passage of the 2008 budget, with record amounts for capital expendi-
tures, ensures that the federal and provincial governments will have the resources
for public spending. All of this has been done since September. These laws are not
perfect and much depends on their implementation, but they are important steps.
Also important has been the development of Iraq's Council of Representatives
(CoR) as a national institution. Last summer, the CoR suffered from persistent and
often paralyzing disputes over leadership and procedure. Now, it is successfully
grappling with complex issues and producing viable tradeoffs and compromise pack-
ages. As debates in Iraq's parliament became more about how to resolve tough prob-
lems in a practical way, Iraqi politics have become more fluid. While politics still
have a sectarian bent and basis, cross-sectarian coalitions have formed around
issues, and sectarian political groupings which often were barriers to progress have
become more flexible.
Let me also talk about the intangibles: attitudes among the Iraqi people. In 2006
and 2007, many people understandably questioned whether hatred between Iraqis
of different sectarian backgrounds was so deep that a civil war was inevitable. The
Sunni Awakening movement in al-Anbar, which so courageously confronted al-
Qa'ida, continues to keep the peace in the area and keep al-Qa'ida out. Fallujah,
once a symbol for violence and terror, is now one of Iraq's safest cities. The Shi'a
holy cities of Najaf and Karbala are enjoying security and growing prosperity in the
wake of popular rejection of extremist militia activity. The Shi'a clerical leader-
ship—the Marja'iyyah-based in Najaf–has played a quiet but important role in
support of moderation and reconciliation. In Baghdad, we can see that Iraqis are
not pitted against each other purely on the basis of sectarian affiliation. The secu-
rity improvements of the past months have diminished the atmosphere of suspicion
and allowed for acts of humanity that transcend sectarian identities.
When I arrived in Baghdad a year ago, my first visit to a city district was to the
predominantly Sunni area of Dora. Surge forces were just moving into neighbor-
hoods still gripped by al-Qa'ida. Residents also were being terrorized by extremist
Shi’a militias. Less than a year later, at the end of February 2008, tens of thou-
sands of Shi’a pilgrims walked through those streets on their way to Karbala to
commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. Sunni residents offered food and
water as they passed through, and some joined the pilgrimage.
News from Iraq in recent weeks has been dominated by the situation in Basrah.
Taken as a snapshot, with scenes of increasing violence and masked gunmen in the
streets, it is hard to see how this situation supports a narrative of progress in Iraq.
And there is still very much to be done to bring full government control to the
streets of Basrah and eliminate entrenched extremist, criminal, and militia groups.
When viewed with a broader lens, the Iraqi decision to combat these groups in
Basrah has major significance. First, a Shi’a majority government, led by Prime
Minister Maliki, has demonstrated its commitment to taking on criminals and ex-
tremists regardless of sectarian identity. Second, Iraqi Security Forces led these op-
erations, in Basrah, and in towns and cities throughout the south. British and U.S.
elements played important roles, but these were supporting roles, as they should be.
The operation in Basrah has also shaken up Iraqi politics. The Prime Minister
returned to Baghdad from Basrah shortly before General Petraeus and I left for
Washington—and he is confident in his decision and determined to press the fight
against illegal groups, but also determined to take a hard look at lessons learned.
The efforts of the government against extremist militia elements have broad polit-
ical support as a statement April 5th by virtually all of Iraq's main political lead-
ers—Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurd-made clear.
A wildcard remains the Sadrist Trend—and whether the Iraqis can continue to
drive a wedge between other elements of the Trend and Iranian-supported Special


12
Groups. A dangerous development in the immediate wake of the Basrah operation
was what appeared to be a reunification between Special Groups and the mainline
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). We also saw a potential collapse of the JAM “freeze” in mili-
tary operations. As the situation unfolded, however, Muqtada al-Sadr issued a state-
ment that disavowed anyone possessing “heavy weapons”—which would include the
signature weapons of the Special Groups. This statement can further sharpen the
distinction between members of the Sadrist Trend, who should not pose a threat to
the Iraqi state, and members of the Special Groups, who very much do.
One conclusion I draw from these signs of progress is that the strategy that began
with the Surge is working. This does not mean, however, that U.S. support should
be open-ended or that the level and nature of our engagement should not diminish
over time. It is in this context that we have begun negotiating a bilateral relation-
ship between Iraq and the United States. In August, Iraq's five principal leaders
requested a long-term relationship with the United States, to include economic, po-
litical, diplomatic, and security cooperation. The heart of this relationship will be
a legal framework for the presence of American troops similar to that which exists
in nearly 80 countries around the world.
The Iraqis view the negotiation of this framework as a strong affirmation of Iraqi
sovereignty—placing Iraq on par with other U.S. allies and removing the stigma of
Chapter VII status under the U.N. Charter, pursuant to which Coalition forces pres-
ently operate. Such an agreement is in Iraq's interest—and ours. U.S. forces will
remain in Iraq beyond December 31st, 2008, when the U.N. resolution presently
governing their presence expires. Our troops will need basic authorizations and pro-
tections to continue operations—and this agreement will provide those authoriza-
tions and protections.
The agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and we anticipate that
it will expressly foreswear them. The agreement will not specify troop levels, and
it will not tie the hands of the next Administration. Our aim is to ensure that the
next President arrives in office with a stable foundation upon which to base policy
decisions, and that is precisely what this agreement will do. Congress will remain
fully informed as these negotiations proceed in the coming weeks and months.
Mr. Chairman, significant challenges remain in Iraq. A reinvigorated cabinet is
necessary both for political balance and to improve the delivery of services to Iraq's
people. Challenges to the rule of law, especially corruption, are enormous. Disputed
internal boundaries—the Article 140 process—must be resolved. The return of refu-
gees and the internally displaced must be managed. The rights of women and mi-
norities must be better protected. Iraqis are aware of the challenges they face, and
are working on them.
Iraq's political progress will not be linear. Developments which are on the whole
positive can still have unanticipated or destabilizing consequences. The decision to
hold provincial elections—vital for Iraq's democratic development and long-term sta-
bility—will also produce new strains. Some of the violence we have seen recently
in southern Iraq reflects changing dynamics within the Shi'a community as the po-
litical and security context changes. Such inflection points underscore the fragility
of the situation in Iraq, but it would be wrong to conclude that any eruption of vio-
lence marks the beginning of an inevitable backslide.
w them. The agreement will nou open,
it will expressly forends of the next Adstable foundat
fullyin Chairman, significanbalance and to cially corruption, a
ECONOMICS AND CAPACITY BUILDING
In September, I reported to you that there had been some gains in Iraq's economy
and in the country's efforts to build capacity to translate these gains into more effec-
tive governance and services. Iraqis have built on these gains over the past months,
as is most evident in the revival of marketplaces across Iraq and the reopening of
long-shuttered businesses. According to a Center for International Private Enter-
prise poll last month, 78 percent of Iraqi business owners surveyed expect the Iraqi
economy to grow in the next two years.
With the improving security and rising government expenditures, the IMF
projects that Iraq's GDP will grow 7 percent in real terms this year, and inflation
has been tamed. The Dinar remains strong and the Central Bank has begun to
bring down interest rates.
Iraq's 2008 budget has allocated $13 billion for reconstruction, and a $5 billion
supplemental budget this summer will further invest export revenues in building
the infrastructure and providing the services that Iraq so badly needs. This spend-
ing also benefits the United States—Iraq recently announced its decision to pur-
chase 40 commercial aircraft from the U.S. at an estimated cost of $5 billion.
As Iraq is now earning the financial resources it needs for bricks and mortar con-
struction through oil production and export, our assistance focus has shifted to ca-
pacity development and an emphasis on local and post-kinetic development through


15
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS, COMMANDING
GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE
General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ros-
Lehtinen, and I, too, want to begin by saluting your former chair-
man, Congressman Lantos.
Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you 7 months
ago, there has been significant but uneven security progress in
Iraq. Levels of violence and civilian deaths have been reduced sub-
stantially. Al-Qaeda-Iraq and a number of other extremist elements
have been dealt serious blows. The capabilities of Iraqi forces have
grown, and there has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis
in local security.
Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas are still unsatisfac-
tory and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as events in
the past 2 weeks have reminded us, the progress made since last
spring is fragile and reversible. Still, security in Iraq is better than
it was when we reported to you last September, and it is signifi-
cantly better than it was 15 months ago when Iraq was on the
brink of civil war.
A number of factors have contributed to the progress. First, has
been the impact of increased numbers of coalition and Iraqi forces.
You are well aware of the U.S. surge. Less recognized is that Iraq
has also conducted a surge, adding well over 100,000 additional sol-
diers and police to its security forces in 2007.
A second factor has been the employment of coalition and Iraq
forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, deployed to-
gether to safeguard the Iraq people, to pursue al-Qaeda-Iraq to
combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local reconcili-
ation and to enable political and economic progress.
Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift among
certain elements of the Iraqi population. Since the first Sunni
“Awakening” in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq increasingly
have rejected al-Qaeda-Iraq's indiscriminate violence and extremist
ideology. Over time, Awakenings have prompted tens of thousands
of Iraqis contribute to local security as so-called “Sons of Iraq.”
With their assistance, the threat posed by al-Qaeda-Iraq-while
still lethal and substantial—has been reduced significantly.
The recent flare-up in Basra, southern Iraq, and Baghdad under-
scored the importance of the cease fire declared by Muqtada al-
Sadr last fall as another factor in the overall reduction in violence.
Recently, of course, some militia elements became active again.
Though a Sadr stand-down order resolved the situation to a degree,
the flare-up also highlighted the destructive role Iran has played
in funding, training, arming, and directing the so-called Special
Groups and generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds of
many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the Special Groups pose the great-
est long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq.
In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict
in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities
for power and resources. This competition continues, influenced
heavily by outside actors, and its resolution remains the key to pro-
ducing long-term stability in Iraq.


16
ino dinant
Various elements push Iraq's ethnosectarian competition toward
violence. Terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminal
gangs pose significant threats. Al-Qaeda's senior leaders, who still
view Iraq has the central front in their global strategy, send fund-
on, and foreign fighters to Iraq. Action by neighboring
states compound the challenges. Syria has taken some steps to re-
duce the flow of foreign fighters, but not enough to shut down the
key network that supports al-Qaeda-Iraq. And Iran has fueled the
violence in a particularly damaging way, as I mentioned, through
its lethal support to the Special Groups.
These challenges and recent weeks' violence notwithstanding,
Iraq's ethnosectarian competition in many areas is now taking
place more through political dialogue and less through violence. In
fact, the recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq
was dealt with temporarily, at least, by most parties acknowl-
edging that the rational way ahead is talking rather than street
fighting.
.
one
Though Iraq obviously remains a violent country, we do see
progress in the security arena. As this chart illustrates, for nearly
6 months security incidents have been at a level not seen since
early-to-mid-2005, though the level did spike in recent weeks as a
result of the violence in Basra and Baghdad, but has now begun
to turn down again, though the period ahead will be a sensitive
one.
As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we
closely monitor the number of Iraqi civilians killed due to violence.
As this chart reflects, civilian deaths have decreased over the past ..
year to a level not seen since the February 2006 Samarra Mosque
bombing that set off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore the
very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early 2007.
hnosectarian violence is of particular concern in Iraq, as it is
a cancer that continues to spread if left unchecked. As the box on
the bottom left of this chart shows, the number of deaths due to
ethnosectarian violence has fallen since we testified last Sep-
ber. A big factor has been the reduction in Baghdad. Some of
this is, to be sure, due to sectarian hardening of certain Baghdad
neighborhoods. However, that is only a partial explanation as nu-
merous mixed neighborhoods still exist. În fact, coalition and Iraqi
forces have focused along the fault lines to reduce the violence and
enable Sunni and Shiia leaders to begin the long process of healing
in their communities.
As this next chart shows, even though the number of high profile
attacks increased in March as al-Qaeda lashed out, the current
level of such attacks remains far below its height a year ago. More-
over, as we have helped improve security and focused on enemy
networks, we have seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such at-
tacks.
The emergency of Iraqi volunteers helping to secure their local
communities has been an important development. As this chart de-
picts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of Iraq-Shiia as well as
Sunni—under contract to help coalition and Iraq forces protect
their neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads. These
volunteers have contributed significant in various areas, and the
savings in vehicles not lost because of reduced viole


17
mention the priceless lives saved—have far outweighed the cost of
their monthly contracts.
Sons of Iraq have also contributed to the discovery of improvised
explosive devices and weapons and explosive caches. As this next
chart shows, in fact, we have already found more caches in 2008
than we found in all of 2006. Given the importance of the Sons of
Iraq, we are working closely with the Iraq Government to transi-
tion them into the Iraqi security forces or other forms of employ-
ment, and over 21,000 have already been accepted into the police,
army or other government jobs.
Al-Qaeda also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and
al-Qaeda elements have targeted them repeatedly. However, these
attacks—in addition to al-Qaeda's use of women, children, and the
handicapped as suicide bombers—have further alienated al-Qaeda
from the Iraqi people. And the tenacious pursuit of al-Qaeda-Iraq,
together with al-Qaeda's loss of local support in many areas, has
substantially reduced its capability numbers and freedom of move-
ment. This chart displays the cumulative effect of the effort against
al-Qaeda and its insurgent allies in Iraq. As you can see, we have
reduced considerably the areas in which al-Qaeda-Iraq enjoys sup-
ports and sanctuary, though there clearly is more to be done.
Having noted that progress, al-Qaeda is still capable of lethal at-
tacks in Iraq, and we must maintain relentless pressure on the or-
ganization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it, and on
the resource flows that sustain it. This chart lays out the com-
prehensive strategy that we, the Iraqis, and our interagency and
international partners are employment to reduce what al-Qaeda
needs in Iraq.
As you can see, defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq requires not just ac-
tions by our elite counter-terrorist forces, but also major operations
by coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated intel-
ligence effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs,
information operations initiatives, diplomatic activity, the employ-
ment of counterinsurgency principles in detainee operations, and
many other actions.
As we combat al-Qaeda in Iraq, we must remember that doing
so not only reduces a major source of instability in Iraq; it also
weakens an organization that al-Qaeda's senior leaders view as a
tool to spread its influence and foment regional instability. Osama
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have consistently advocated ex-
ploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen AQI involved
in destabilizing activities in the wider mid-east region.
Together with the Iraq security forces, we have also focused on
the so-called Special Groups. These elements are funded, trai
armed, and directed by Iran's Quds Force with help from Lebanese
Hezbollah. It is these groups that have launched Iranian rockets
and mortar rounds at Iraq's seat of government in the inter-
Iraqi and coalition leaders have repeatedly noted
their desire that Iran live up to promises made by President
Ahmadinejad and other senior Iranian leaders to stop their support
for the Special Groups. However, nefarious activities by the Quds
Force have continued and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the
threat they pose to Iraq. We should all watch Iranian actions close-
ly in the weeks and months ahead as they will show the kind of


18
relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the char-
acter of future Iranian involvement in Iraq.
We have transferred responsibilities to Îraq forces as their capa-
bilities and conditions on the ground have permitted. Currently, as
this chart shows, half of Iraq's 18 provinces are under provincial
Iraqi control. Many of these provinces—not just the successful ones
in the Kurdish Regional Government area, but also a number of
southern provinces—have done well. Challenges have emerged in
some other others, including, of course, Basra. Nonetheless, this
process will continue, and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah Prov-
inces to transition in the months ahead.
Iraqi forces have grown significantly since September, and over
540,000 individuals now serve in the Iraq security forces. The num-
ber of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations,
albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well over 100.
These units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evi-
denced by the fact that Iraqi security force losses have recently
been three times our own.
We will, of course, conduct careful after-action reviews with our
Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were units
and leaders found wanting in some cases, and some of our assess-
ments may be downgraded as a result. Nonetheless, the perform-
ance of many units was solid, especially once they got their footing
and gained a degree of confidence, and certain Iraqi elements
proved very capable.
Iraq security ministries are steadily improving their ability to
execute their budgets. As this chart shows, in 2007, as in 2006,
Iraq security ministries spent more on their forces than the United
States provided through the Iraq Security Forces Fund. We antici-
pate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and
$11 billion next year, and this projection recently enabled us to re-
duce significantly our Iraqi Security Forces Fund request for Fiscal
Year 2009, from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion.
While improved, Iraq security forces are not yet ready to defend
Iraq or maintain security throughout the entire country on their
own. Recent operations in Basra highlight improvements in the
ability of the Iraq security forces to deploy substantial numbers of
units, supplies, and replacements on short notice, they certainly
could not have deployed a division's worth of army and police units
on such short notice a year ago. On the other hand, the recent op-
erations also underscored the considerable work still to be done in
the area of expeditionary logistics, force enablers, staff develop-
ment, and command and control.
We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign Military
Sales program. As of March 2008, the Iraqi Government had pur-
chased over $2 billion worth of equipment and services of American
origin through FMS. Since September, and with your encourage-
ment of the organizations in the process, FMS deliveries have im-
proved.
While security has improved in many areas, and the Iraqi secu-
rity forces are shouldering more of the load, the situation in Iraq
remains exceedingly complex and challenging. Iraq could face a re-
surgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq or additional Shiia groups could vio-
late Sadr's cease-fire order. External actors, like Iran, could stoke


19
violence within Iraq, and actions by other neighbors could under-
mine the security situation as well.
The Commander's Emergency Response Program, the State De-
partment's Quick Response Fund, and USAID programs enable our
commanders and troopers to help deal with its challenges. To that
end, I respectfully ask that you provide us by June the additional
CERP funds requested in the supplemental. Encour
ouragingly, the
Iraqi Government recently allocated $300 million for us to mange
as Iraq CERP they perform projects for their people, while building
their own capacity to do so. The Iraq Government has also com-
mitted $163 million to gradually assume Sons of Iraq contracts,
$510 million for small business loans, and $196 million for a Joint
Training, Education, and Reintegration Program. The Iraqi Gov-
ernment pledges to provide more as they execute the budget passed
2 months ago.
Last month I provided my chain of command recommendations
for the way ahead in Iraq. During that process, I noted the objec-
tive of retaining and building on our hard-fought security gains
while we draw down to the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat
teams, also redeploying two marine battalions in the Marine
Expediary Unit. I emphasized the need to continue work with our
Iraqi partners to secure the population and to transition respon-
sibilities to the Iraqis as quickly as conditions permit, but without
jeopardizing the security gains that have been made.
As in September, my recommendations are informed by oper-
ational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations
include recognition that the military surge has achieved progress,
but that the progress is reversible. Iraq security forces have
strengthened their capabilities but still must grow further. The
provincial elections in the fall, refugee returns, detainee releases,
and efforts to resolve provincial boundary disputes will be very
challenging. The transition of Sons of Iraq will require time and
careful monitoring. Withdrawing too many forces too quickly could
jeopardize the progress of the past year; and performing the nec-
essary tasks in Iraq will require sizeable conventional forces as
well as special operations forces and advisor teams.
The strategic considerations include recognition that the strain
on the U.S. military, especially on its ground forces, has been con-
siderable. A number of the security challenges inside Iraq are also
related to significant regional and global threats, and a failed state
in Iraq would pose serious consequences for the greater fight
against al-Qaeda, for regional stability, for the already existing hu-
manitarian crisis in Iraq, and for the effort to counter malign Ira-
nian influence.
After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of com-
mand that e continue the drawdown of the surge combat forces
and that, upon withdrawal of the last surge brigade combat team
in July, we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and evalua-
tion. At the end of that period, we will assess the conditions on the
ground, much as we have done as we have looked at where we
could redeploy the surge forces, and determine where and when we
can make recommendations for further reductions. This process
will be continuous, with recommendations for further reductions
made as conditions permit.


20
This approach does not, to be sure, allow establishment of a set
withdrawal timeline. However, it does provide the flexibility those
of us on the ground need to preserve the still fragile security gains
our troopers have fought so hard and sacrificed so much to achieve.
With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early
2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment of sus-
tainable security in Iraq. This is not only important to the 27 mil-
lion citizen in Iraq, it is also vitally important to those in the Gulf
region, to the citizens of the United States, and to the global com-
munity. It is clearly in our national interest to help Iraq pre
revent
the resurgence of al-Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help
Iraq resist Iranian encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid re-
newed ethnosectarian violence that could spill over Iraq's borders
and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq
to expand its role in the regional and global economies.
In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our Nation
in Iraq as well. We have asked a great deal of them and of their
families, and they have made enormous sacrifices. My keep per-
sonal awareness of the strain on them and on the force as a whole
has been an important factor in my recommendations..
The Congress, the Executive Branch, and our fellow citizens have
done an enormous amount to support our troopers and their loved
ones, and all of us are very grateful for that. Nothing means more
to those in harm's way than the knowledge that their country ap-
preciates their sacrifices and those of their families.
Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the civilian and
military men and women serving our Nation in Iraq. It remains the
greatest of honor to soldier with them.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:]


21
Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq
General David H. Petraeus
Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq
8-9 April 2008
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
provide an update on the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently
provided to my chain of command.
Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you seven months ago, there has been
significant but uneven security progress in Iraq. Since September, levels of violence and civilian
deaths have been reduced substantially, Al Qaeda-Iraq and a number of other extremist elements
have been dealt serious blows, the capabilities of Iraqi Security Force elements have grown, and
there has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis in local security. Nonetheless, the
situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as
events in the past two weeks have reminded us and as I have repeatedly cautioned, the progress
made since last spring is fragile and reversible. Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when
Ambassador Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is significantly better than it
was 15 months ago when Iraq was on the brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy
additional US forces to Iraq.
A number of factors have contributed to the progress that has been made. First, of course, has
been the impact of increased numbers of Coalition and Iraqi Forces. You are well aware of the
U.S. surge. Less recognized is that Iraq has also conducted a surge, adding well over 100,000
additional soldiers and police to the ranks of its security forces in 2007 and slowly increasing its
capability to deploy and employ these forces.
A second factor has been the employment of Coalition and Iraqi Forces in the conduct of
counterinsurgency operations across the country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people,
to pursue Al Qaeda-Iraq, to combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local
reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress.
Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift among certain elements of the Iraqi
population. Since the first Sunni “Awakening” in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq
increasingly have rejected AQI's indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. These
communities also recognized that they could not share in Iraq's bounty if they didn't participate
in the political arena. Over time, Awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of Iraqis—some,
former insurgents—to contribute to local security as so-called “Sons of Iraq.” With their
assistance and with relentless pursuit of Al Qaeda-Iraq, the threat posed by AQI—while still
lethal and substantial—has been reduced significantly.
The recent flare-up in Basrah, southern Iraq, and Baghdad underscored the importance of the
ceasefire declared by Moqtada al-Sadr last fall as another factor in the overall reduction in
violence. Recently, of course, some militia elements became active again. Though a Sadr stand-
down order resolved the situation to a degree, the flare-up also highlighted the destructive role
Iran has played in funding, training, arming, and directing the so-called Special Groups and
generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the
Special Groups pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq.


22
As we look to the future, our task together with our Iraqi partners will be to build on the progress
achieved and to deal with the many challenges that remain. I do believe that we can do this
while continuing the ongoing drawdown of the surge forces.
The Nature of the Conflict
In September, 1 described the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among
ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition continues,
influenced heavily by outside actors, and its resolution remains the key to producing long-term
stability in Iraq
Various elements push Iraq's ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Terrorists,
insurgents, militia extremists, and criminal gangs pose significant threats. Al Qaeda's senior
leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, send funding, direction,
and foreign fighters to Iraq. Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq's challenges. Syria
has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters through its territory, but not enough to
shut down the key network that supports AQI. And Iran has fueled the violence in a particularly
damaging way, through its lethal support to the Special Groups. Finally, insufficient Iraqi
governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and corruption add to Iraq's problems.
These challenges and recent weeks' violence notwithstanding, Iraq's ethno-sectarian.competition
in many areas is now taking place more through debate and less through violence. In fact, the
recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq was dealt with temporarily, at least,
by most parties acknowledging that the rational way ahead is political dialogue rather than street
fighting
Current Situation and Trends
As I stated at the outset, though Iraq obviously remains a violent country, we do see progress in
the security arena.
As this chart [Slide 1] illustrates, for nearly six months, security incidents have been at a level
not seen since early-to-mid-2005, though the level did spike in recent weeks as a result of the
violence in Basrah and Baghdad. The level of incidents has, however, begun to turn down again,
though the period ahead will be a sensitive one.
As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we closely monitor the number of Iraqi
civilians killed due to violence. As this chart (Slide 2] reflects, civilian deaths have decreased
over the past year to a level not seen since the February 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing that set
off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore the very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early
2007. This chart also reflects our increasing use of Iraqi-provided reports, with the top line
reflecting Coalition and Iraqi data and the bottom line reflecting Coalition-confirmed data only.
No matter which data is used, civilian deaths due to violence have been reduced significantly,
though more work clearly needs to be done.
Ethno-sectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq, as it is a cancer that continues to spread
if left unchecked. As the box on the bottom left of this chart [Slide 3] shows, the number of
deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence has fallen since we testified last September. A big factor
has been the reduction of ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad, density plots for which are shown


24
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in the upcoming Supplemental, as ISR is vital to the
success of our operations in Iraq and elsewhere.
As we combat AQI, we must remember that doing so not only reduces a major source of
instability in Iraq; it also weakens an organization that Al Qaeda's senior leaders view as a tool
to spread its influence and foment regional instability. Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri
have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen AQI involved
in destabilizing activities in the wider Mid-east region.
Together with the Iraqi Security Forces, we have also focused on the Special Groups. These
elements are funded, trained, armed, and directed by Iran's Qods Force, with help from Lebanese
Hezbollah. It was these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq's seat of
government two weeks ago, causing loss of innocent life and fear in the capital, and requiring
Iraqi and Coalition actions in response. Iraqi and Coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their
desire that Iran live up to promises made by President Ahmedinajad and other senior Iranian
leaders to stop their support for the Special Groups. However, nefarious activities by the Qods
Force have continued, and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the threat they pose to Iraq. We
should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months ahead, as they will show the
kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian
involvement in Iraq.
Iraqi Security Forces
The Iraqi Security Forces have continued to develop since September, and we have transferred
responsibilities to Iraqi Forces as their capabilities and the conditions on the ground have
permitted. Currently, as this chart [Slide 9] shows, half of Iraq's 18 provinces are under
provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces—not just the successful provinces in the
Kurdish Regional Government area, but also a number of southern provinces—have done well.
Challenges have emerged in some others, including, of course, Basrah. Nonetheless, this process
will continue, and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah Provinces to transition in the months ahead.
Iraqi Forces have grown significantly since September, and over 540,000 individuals now serve
in the Iraqi Security Forces. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in
operations, albeit with some Coalition support, has grown to well over 100 [Slide 10]. These
units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evidenced by the fact that Iraqi Security
Force losses have recently been three times our own. We will, of course, conduct careful after
action reviews with our Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were units and
leaders found wanting in some cases, and some of our assessments may be downgraded as a
result. Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid, especially once they got their
footing and gained a degree of confidence, and certain Iraqi elements proved quite capable.
Underpinning the advances of the past year have been improvements in Iraq's security
institutions. An increasingly robust Iraqi-run training base enabled the Iraqi Security Forces to
grow by over 133,000 soldiers and police over the past 16 months. And the still-expanding
training base is expected to generate an additional 50,000 Iraqi soldiers and 16 Army and Special
Operations battalions throughout the rest of 2008, along with over 23,000 police and 8 National
Police battalions.


25
Additionally, Iraq's security ministries are steadily improving their ability to execute their
budgets. As this chart [Slide 11] shows, in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq's security ministries spent more
on their forces than the United States provided through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF).
We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year,
and this projection enabled us recently to reduce significantly our Iraqi Security Forces Fund
request for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion.
While improved, Iraqi Security Forces are not yet ready to defend Iraq or maintain security
throughout the country on their own. Recent operations in Basrah highlight improvements in the
ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to deploy substantial numbers of units, supplies, and
replacements on very short notice; they certainly could not have deployed a division's worth of
Army and Police units on such short notice a year ago. On the other hand, the recent operations
also underscored the considerable work still to be done in the areas of logistics, force enablers,
staff development, and command and control.
We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. As of March
2008, the Iraqi government has purchased over $2 billion worth of equipment and services of
American origin through FMS. Since September, and with your encouragement of the
organizations in the FMS process, delivery has improved as the FMS system has strived to
support urgent wartime requirements. On a related note, I would ask that Congress consider
restoring funding for the International Military Education and Training Program, which supports
education for mid- and senior-level Iraqi military and civilian leaders and is an important
component of the development of the leaders Iraq will need in the future.
Upcoming Challenges
While security has improved in many areas and the Iraqi Security Forces are shouldering more of
the load, the situation in Iraq remains exceedingly complex and challenging. Iraq could face a
resurgence of AQI or additional Shia groups could violate Moqtada al-Sadr's cease-fire order
and return to violence. External actors, like Iran, could stoke violence within Iraq, and actions
by other neighbors could undermine the security situation as well.
Other challenges result, paradoxically, from improved security, which has provided opportunities
for political and economic progress and improved services at the local, provincial, and national
levels. But the improvements have also created expectations that progress will continue. In the
coming months, Iraq's leaders must strengthen governmental capacity, execute budgets, pass
additional legislation, conduct provincial elections, carry out a census, determine the status of
disputed territories, and resettle internally displaced persons and refugees. These tasks would
challenge any government, much less a still developing government tested by war.
The Commander's Emergency Response Program, the State Department's Quick Response
Fund, and USAID programs enable us to help Iraq deal with its challenges. To that end, I
respectfully ask that you provide us by June the additional CERP funds requested in the
Supplemental. These funds have an enormous impact. As I noted earlier, the salaries paid to the
Sons of Iraq alone cost far less than the cost savings in vehicles not lost due to the enhanced
security in local communities. Encouragingly, the Iraqi government recently allocated $300
million for us to manage as “Iraqi CERP” to perform projects for their people, while building
their own capacity to do so. The Iraqi government has also committed $163 million to gradually
assume Sons of Iraq contracts, $510 million for small business loans, and $196 million for a


27
encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethno-sectarian violence that could spill over
Iraq's borders and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq to expand its
role in the regional and global economies.
Closing Comments
In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our Nation in Iraq. We have asked a great
deal of them and of their families, and they have made enormous sacrifices. My keen personal
awareness of the strain on them and on the force as a whole has been an important factor in my
recommendations.
The Congress, the Executive Branch, and our fellow citizens have done an enormous amount to
support our troopers and their loved ones, and all of us are grateful for that. Nothing means more
to those in harm's way than the knowledge that their country appreciates their sacrifices and
those of their families.
Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the men and women serving our Nation in Iraq
and in the courage, determination, resilience, and initiative they demonstrate each and every day.
It remains the greatest of honors to soldier with them.
Thank you very much.


1000099
SA
***
os
Multi-National Force-Iraq
Charts to accompany the testimony of
GEN David H. Petraeus
8-9 April 2008


Weekly Security Incidents
STARTSEITE OORLEANSININ ARESTATIE
AR
ENALINSKALAINEN UNTERNEHMEN ALINAN KALIMAN
TAN BARANG
KEMA
BOGOTAROBRNO

2000
Attacks Against traqi Infrastructure and Government Facilities
Bombs (IEDs and Mines), Both Found and Exploded
Sniper, Ambush, Grenade and Other Small Arms Attacks
Mortar, Rocket and Surface-to-Air Attacks
Ramadan
16OCT-14NOV04
050CT-04NOVOS
24SEP-230CT06
13SEP-130CTO7
1800
Fardh al-Qanoon,
15 February 2007
1600
B
S
1400
Parliamentary
elections,
15 December 2005
Samarra mosque
bombing,
22 February 2006
1200
TAN
S
Iraqi elections,
30 January 2005
Constitutional
referendum,
15 October 2005
T INA
1000
PA
THERE
tart
L
WEB
SESSA
ETRAS
008
RUARI
B
BB
FLASIN
WER
RAHA
BALSALATL AR
ER
600
BUDE
www
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WERERE
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26-Nov-04
24-Dec-04
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8-Jul-05
5-Aug-05
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25-Nov-05
90-90-ez
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900*
$O-JeWLL
12-May-06
godas-1
27-Oct-06
24-Nov-06
22-Dec-06
16-Feb-07
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13-Apr-07
keptit
3-Aug-07
Lo-das-ez
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NATION ORDENERASIESTUNUTRIGA


500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
.
SRO
ONS
Jan-06
Feb-06
Mar-06
Apr-06
May-06
Jun-06
Jul-06
Aug-06
Sep-06
Oct-06
Nov-06
Dec-06
Jan-07
Feb-07
Mar-07
Apr-07
May-07
Jun-07
Jul-07
Aug-07
Sep-07
Oct-07
Nov-07
Dec-07
Jan-08
Feb-08
Mar-08
Civilian Deaths
NH
Coalition Data
Iraqi and Coalition Data


LG


Ethno-Sectarian Violence
DEC 06
APR 07
SEP 07
AR
Baghdad
Baghdad
Baghdad
Density plots depict incidents of ethno-sectarian deaths.
MAR 08
2500
Jur
Ethno-Sectarian Deaths
All of trag
Baghdad Security Districts
2000
.
1500
1000
Baghdad
500
Density
Least DDODOCO Most
Neighborhood Sect Legend
75% Sunni
75% Shl'a
May-06
90-uns
90-inr
Aug-06
Sep-06
Oct-06
Nov-06
Dec-06
20-uer
Feb-07
Mar-07
Apr-07
May-07
Jun-07
Jul-07
Aug-07
Sep-07
Oct-07
Nov-07
Dec-07
80-uer
Feb-08
Mar-08
51% Shi'a / 25% Sunni
51% Sunni / 25% Shi'a
Unknown
Mixed - No majority


WORD
May-06
Jun-06
Jul-06
Aug-06
Sep-06
Oct-06
Nov-06
Dec-06
Jan-07
Feb-07
Mar-07
Apr-07
May-07
Jun-07
Jul-07
Aug-07
Sep-07
Oct-07
Nov-07
Dec-07
Jan-08
Feb-08
Mar-08
High Profile Attacks (Explosions)
BASA
Total
Suicide Vests
Suicide Car Bombs
Car Bombs



Sons of Iraq
Concerned Local Citizens
LORE
Dahuk
Total Contracted: 91,641
Volunteers: 4,605
Sunni: 78%
Shia: 19%
Other: 3%
Mosul
Tall'Afar
Kirkuk
Sulaymaniyah
Transitioned: 21,128
Anbar: 8,206
Iraqi Security Forces: 8,241
Non-Security Employment: 4,681
Al Qa im
Al Haditha
Samalta
Balad
oBa'qubah
Ramadi
Costs:
Average Monthly CERP: $16M
Fatulah
O Al Kut
Karbala
Al Hillah
Al Amarah
An Najaf
Ad Diwaniyah
Qurnah
As
Samawah (An Nasiriyah
Al Basrah
Az Zubayr
Umm Qasr
Density
DO
O
Most


34
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to-uer-6
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250


35

Al Qaeda in Iraq and Sunni Insurgents
OlallAfar
Mosul
Mosul
Irbit
Kirkuk
Tikito
Tikrit
Samarra
Samarra
Al Qa'im
Al Qa'im
sBaqubah
Baqubah
Ar Ramad
Ar Ramadio
BAGHDAD
BAGHDAD
O Ar Rutbah
O Ar Rutbah
Baghdad
Baghdad
Karbala
Al Kutil
Karbala
O Al Kut
An Najaf
oDiwaniyata
An Najaf
o Diwaniyah.
As Samswah
o As Samawah
December 2006
March 2008


36
Anaconda Strategy vs. AQI
ALL
Work with Syria
Strategic
Source Countries Engagement
Interagency
Communications
Border Ports of Entry
Improvements
Information
Operations
Kinetics 3
AQI NEEDS
Internet
Counter-Terrorist
AQ Senior Leader
Force Ops
Weapons Guidance
Conventional
Money
Religious
Force Ops
/ Ansar / NOT
Engagement
(al Sunna
Iraqi Conventional
Foreign
Command
Education
& Special Force Ops
Fighters
Other and Control
Jobs Programs
Sons of Iraq
Groups
Services
Ideology
Safe
Havens
Non-kinetics
Popular
Counter Ethno-Sectarian
Support
Pressures
Counterinsurgency
in Detention Facilities
Tribal
Awakenings
Detainee
< Politics
Intel Fusion Intel, Surveillance Releases Detainee
Political
and Recce Platforms
Reconciliation
Armed Unmanned
& Intelligence
(Laws/policies) Aerial Vehicles
8

Ops


38
Iraqi Combat Battalion Generation
Infantry, Armor, Special Operations, and National Police Battalions
JAN 2007
MAR 2008
DEC 2008
171
(Projected) 187
200
Battalions
180
Battalions
160
140
115
Battalions
112
Battalions in
the lead
120
100
93
Battalions in
the lead
80
44 Battalions
36 Battalions
27 Battalions
20
National Police
Iraqi Army
National Police
Iraqi Army
National Police
Iraqi Army
ORA 2
ORA 3
ORAA FORMING
LORA1
Operational Readiness Assessment = ORA
10


43
Well, good luck on that one. I do not know when you accomplish
it. That is the big problem.
I know when we ask you certain questions, you are not there to
determine policy, but you have to have that “can do” attitude and
accept the policy and push straight ahead and answer that ques-
tion, and say, yes, we can do it, and the brave men and women
that you work with have been achieving quite a lot.
Our job is just the opposite. Our job is to question. Our job is to
raise those points. Our job is to look at what the alternatives are,
and if we cannot do it this way, how we do it another way, and
you really were not expected to answer the question, you know,
how do we pull out when your mission is to stay in.
But it reminds me of that old song after World War I that you
probably know very well, the words are, “We are here because we
are here.” When we are asked why the troops are there, well, we
sent the troops over there and now we have to support them be-
cause they are there. Well, why are the troops there? Because we
sent them.
And what do we have to do? We have to support them because
they are there. So we are there because we are there because we
are there because we are there and it never ends. How do you get
out of this mess is the real question? How do you fix it?
I would liken your job to that of Sisyphus pushing that great
huge stone up an endless hill. And when we ask you, “When can
you stop pushing it?”, the answer is you do not know but you have
to keep pushing it, and certainly your answer is, “We have made
progress today. We have had some setbacks but we have made
some progress recently.”
Well, are the setbacks irreversible? And the answer is not nec-
essarily, but maybe so. Maybe we are going to have setbacks again.
The surge seems to be working at this moment, but it seems we
have not killed enough terrorists or dissuaded enough people from
becoming such that they are not going to be replaced.
When does this end? You know, when do you stop pushing that
big stone up the hill? And the answer is you really cannot see be-
yond that stone. You do not know what a just settlement looks like
because you cannot see around it, and you will know it when you
see it, but maybe the hill is a little bit too steep.
With the surge, you have gotten a re-do. You know, we have not
had one of those since we played in the playground, but you get
a re-do. Four thousand Americans who died do not get å re-do.
Twenty thousand, thirty thousand whose lives have been dis-
membered do not get a re-do. Tens of thousands, scores of thou-
sands of families who have been destroyed do not get a re-do. The
only thing we know for us is there will be a lot more people who
do not get re-dos.
How do you know we have won because at the end of this thing,
unless we decide it is the end, nobody is going to hand you re-
volver, nobody is going to hand you the sword and say we quit, we
have stopped, how do we know the Iraqis can stand up for them-
selves? Nobody seems to be able to answer that question
Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, it is a question that we both ask our-
selves constantly, and it is through asking that question and an-
swering it on a localized basis that it is possible, in our judgment,


44
to execute the redeployments that are currently underway, and I
think that that will continue to be the answer. It is going to be not
one grand sweeping moment in which we can say it is all fixed, but
it is going to be area by area, circumstance by circumstance. It is
complicated. It will continue to be complicated, but I think it is do-
able.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Gen-
eral Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, thank you for your extraor-
dinary leadership. You have really provided a leadership that the
world has come to envy, and I personally want to thank you be-
cause under the most difficult hardships you have carried, both of
you have carried yourselves with tremendous class. This is your
fourth hearing, and I want to thank you for your incisive re-
sponses. I do not want to ask the most obvious questions because
they have already been answered at least twice by both of you.
But I do have a question about the empowerment of concerned
local citizens to take responsibility for security, the Sons of Iraq.
It appears sound and workable, and the implementation of this ini-
tiative has clearly mitigated violence and helped transfer owner-
ship of security issues to the Iraqis themselves, and, of course, this
is on top of the additional build-up. General Petraeus, you have
suggested that by December 8 of this year, 187 Iraqi army combat
battalions comprised of about 750 personnel each, and 44 national
police battalions will be up and running to combat the threat.
General Petraeus, you pointed out that the number of Sons of
Iraq has grown from 21,000 to over 91,000, with an average month-
ly cost of $16 million. I would like to give you an opportunity to
respond to Wolf Blitzer's statement yesterday, and I quote him:
“A lot of people fear that as quickly as these guys switched
from being enemies, insurgents, terrorists, killing Americans,
killing Iraqi troops and now being on the payroll in effect of
the U.S. Government, they could flip right back very quickly
if they weren't on the payroll of the U.S. Government.”
It's my sense that payroll issues notwithstanding, the surge in
the Sons of Iraq has much more to do with enlightened self-inter-
est, a growing understanding and recognition and awakening that
al-Qaeda and other militants are the peoples' enemy, a sense that
an individual can play a constructive and coordinated role in pro-
tecting their families, and that surge in the Sons of Iraq is a direct
result of diplomatic outreach by U.S. and coalition forces at the
local level.
How do you respond to Wolf Blitzer's comments?
General PETRAEUS. First of all, Congressman, it is the result of
enlightened self-interest, and that is what we are trying to play on,
and we have reminded these newly enlightened Sunni Arabs of
what they receive from al-Qaeda, which was indiscriminate vi
lence, an extremist ideology that on reflection they realize they
wondered why they had ever let these folks into their communities.
They did it because they felt disrespected, dispossessed and a vari-
ety of other feelings in the wake of liberation, having run the coun-
try before.


45
But then they also came to recognize that it ruined business in
the Euphrates River Valley. You know, we jokingly say sometimes
that every tribe is a little bit like the guys that we see on the So-
pranos. They all have, you know, a trucking company, an import/
export business, and a construction business. It is about enlight-
ened self-interest, and they realize now, and we have helped them
to that realization, as has the Iraqi Government, that you cannot
participate in the bounty that Iraq has if you do not play. They did
not vote in the elections in January 2005. They know that was a
catastrophic error. As a result, that is why the Sunni Arabs, in par-
ticular, and others, want to see provincial elections in the fall, and
it is one of the reasons that that law was a benchmark as the Am-
bassador mentioned.
Again, all we have tried to do is to play on that, to help them
to that realization. Then they certainly help themselves, and then
saw it when others stood up and raised their hand to fight against
these people that had brought these problems to their doorstep in-
stead of solutions.
Now, to move forward, they do have to be incorporated into le-
gitimate institutions of the Iraqi Government or the legitimate
economy, local businesses and so forth, and in fact, as I mentioned,
as the chart showed, over 21,000 have already been incorporated
into the security forces or other governmental positions, and a lot
of that started in Anbar, and interestingly the Prime Minister,
Shiia Prime Minister who went to Anbar for the first time in some
20 years last year, and then has been back again a couple more
times, he has provided more resources to that almost exclusively
Sunni Arab province than the Iraqi Government has provided to
any other; again, trying to show them how important the govern-
ment viewed the stand that they were taking against al-Qaeda-
Iraq, then allowed the reopening of the border crossing at Alkeim
with Syria, the life blood of the Euphrates River Valley starts to
run back through it again, and the sheiks who again are all busi-
nessmen in addition to heads of tribes can start to see business re-
vive in cities like Ramadi and Fallujah that is as late as the spring
of last year you could not drive through in an armored vehicle
without getting it. The other day we walked through without any
body armor or Kevlar.
Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired, and
I recognize the chairman of the Africa and Global Health Sub-
committee of our committee, Mr. Donald Payne of New Jersey.
Mr. PAYNE. I am kind of technically challenged with this new
equipment here. But so good to see you, General and our Ambas-
sador, and let me just say how proud I am of you, General
Petraeus, for the outstanding work that you do and the way that
you carry your office.
Let me though say that in October 2002, I was one of the mem-
bers who led the opposition on the floor of the House. As a matter
of fact, I managed the bill on the resolution authorizing President
Bush to attack Iraq. As an early and staunch opponent of this war
I have watched every single prediction made by this administration
proven wrong from the duration of the war, the reception we would
receive, the cost, the number of casualties, the existence of weapons


46
of mass destruction to the countless number of Americans and
Iraqis who have lost their lives. Every single one wrong.
During my years in Congress, I have had the privilege twice to
be appointed as the congressional delegate to the United Nations.
I strongly believe in the power of democracy and diplomacy. If we
had allowed the United Nations' inspectors to complete their work
before this war started instead of suddenly ordering them once
Saddam Hussein said they could go anywhere, we would not be in
this predicament today. There would have been no weapons of
mass destruction. There would have been no biological weapons
and we would have 4,000 Americans still alive.
Ironically, it was almost 5 years ago, on May 1, 2003, that Presi-
dent Bush deemed the operation in Iraq as “Mission accomplished,”
affirming an end to the major compact in Iraq. By that time ap-
proximately 175 brave Americans had lost their lives in combat.
Yet today over 4,000 more confirmed deaths as this war continues;
67 fatalities from my home state of New Jersey.
The human cost of this war remains tragic. Tens of thousands of
injured soldiers, countless number of Iraqi lives have been de-
stroyed by this war. There is a great sense of sadness among those
of us who foresaw over 5 years ago the tragedy that is now unfold-
ing in Iraq without an answer of how it can end. The war that we
were told would be swift and certain now continues to drain our
tax dollars as a cost of living rises, gas prices, and all the rest,
80,000 jobs lost in March, unemployment over 5 percent for the
first time in years.
It is just draining, but the thing that was very scary was that
it was Osama bin Laden who said that we will win this war by
bankrupting America, and I might ask you, Ambassador Crocker,
how are we going to continue to fund this war, which we must do
because we are in it, some of the questions that was asked by Mr.
Ackerman?
You know, we are spending $10.3 billion a month; $339 million
a day; 8,000 students could get PELL grants; 2.6 Americans with-
out adequate health care, and on and on. But how do we continue
to pay for this war?
Of course, it is off budget, but 1 day off budget has to be brought
on the table, and is there a projection in your mind about how long
this will go on?
It was once said that Saddam Hussein was responsible for 9/11.
That was a part of this hoax also. We knew Saddam Hussein, but
it was cleverly woven in. How many years and what cost, and in
your opinion can we continue to sustain the financial cost in addi-
tion to the tremendous human cost?
Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, my mission is in Iraq. I cannot make
those broader judgments. What I can say is that I believe that we
and the Iraqis are making progress, that the trajectory is moving
up in the areas I described in my statement, and that I believe that
the consequences, the costs if you will of major failure in Iraq are
so great that the two together require us to keep going, but I can-
not answer that broad question.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton.


47
ant
Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of
you for your service with a great debt of gratitude, as well as all
of our troops over there, and hope you will convey that, General,
when you get back there.
Let me just say, Ambassador, you said that Osama bin Laden
said that Iraq would be the perfect base of operation for the expan-
sion of terrorism around the world, not just in the Middle East, as
we have seen in New York on 9/11. So I hate to put you on the
spot, but we need some direct answers from you folks. This is very
important and I know politics is a tough thing for you to deal with,
but we are going to have a new President in a little over 8 months,
and one of the biggest issues in the Presidential campaign is a pre-
cipitous withdrawal versus hanging in there and defeating al-
Qaeda and the terrorists.
Now, what I would like to know, and I am going to give you the
time that you need to answer this, but I would like for it to be as
concise as possible, what would happen if we had a very precipitous
pullout, number one, or if we hung in there to win this battle?
I want to know and the American people really want to know
what would happen if we with a new President said, we are going
to jerk everybody out of there in 6 months, and the American peo-
ple want to know this because right now the war is very unpopular,
and the American people want to know the facts before we pick the
next President.
Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, as you know, I am a career foreign
service officer, and I have probably served both Democratic and Re-
publican administrations, and I hope to do that loyally and to the
best of my ability as long as I am in the service.
I tried to in my statement deal with the issue of a dramatic
change in what we are doing in Iraq, but I am not linking that to
Presidential campaigns or what happens in January or anything
else.
I did say in my statement that if we decide that we just-
Mr. BURTON. We cannot hear you. Is your microphone on?
Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. Do you hear me now?
I did say that if we were to decide that we just do not want to
be engaged in this anymore, if we make a precipitous change in our
conditions-based approach, that we could risk failure in Iraq, and
I talked about what some of those consequences could be, including
a base in the Arab world for al-Qaeda.
Mr. BURTON. I do not want to put words in your mouth, but I
want to make sure we understand. If there was a precipitous pull-
out within a period of time, let us say 4, 5, 6 months, a vacuum
would be created, and al-Qaeda would be the beneficiary if they
were aggressive, along with Iran's help, to make that a base of op-
eration for expanded terrorism around the world?
Ambassador CROCKER. My judgment is that where conditions are
at this time, that you would see a spiral down, and that would lead
to expanded sectarian conflict at levels we probably have not seen
before. It would bring the neighbors, especially Iran, into the fight,
and it would create space for al-Qaeda to root itself on Arab soil.
Mr. BURTON. I hope that everybody in America gets the gist of
your comments because I think it is extremely important that they
know between now and next November.


49
President face a circumstance, if, and I realize we may get an in-
coming President that supports your policies even more fervently
than the current President, but if we get an incoming President
who wants a new policy, will that President find on January 21 a
dilemma where if they ordered immediate withdrawal, it will be an
unplanned withdrawal? And if they do not order immediate with-
drawal, then we continue to suffer casualties.
Will you start planning on November 5 to be the best possible
servant for the new boss you are going to get January 21?
General PETRAEUS. Congressman, I can only serve one boss at a
time, and I can only execute one policy at a time. I am sworn to
the concept of civilian control of the military. I fully support it. And
we can you know, we execute the mission that we have at that
time.
Now, as a transition approaches, obviously there is going to be
back and forth to facilitate and to try to get inside the head, I
would assume, and not me, this will be the secretary of defense,
the chairman of the joint chiefs thinking their way through various
contingencies, and again at some point there will be contingency
planning directed, and obviously we would carry out the direction
of the contingency planning.
Mr. SHERMAN. So you would expect to get contingency plans in
a variety of different natures, some of them consistent with the in-
coming President as well?
General PETRAEUS. Very, very hypothetical on this. I am actually
very uncomfortable, candidly, with where the conversation is going.
As a military man, again, who subscribes to civilian control-
Mr. SHERMAN. I would hope that you would put yourself in a po-
sition to follow a new President but I have-
General PETRAEUS. That is exactly right.
Chairman BERMAN [continuing]. One more question for Ambas-
sador Crocker and limited time.
General PETRAEUS. Okay. Yes, sir.
Mr. SHERMAN. We have a huge national budget deficit. The
Iraqis are selling their oil for over $100 a barrel, and they have a
$30 billion surplus. We are providing for their security with our
troops and lives, and we are paying for their security forces. In
fact, you have asked us to appropriate another $2.5 billion for the
Iraqi Security Forces Fund, and billions for Iraqi reconstruction.
Iraq has that $20–30 billion surplus. They have got tens of bil-
lions of dollars of currency reserve, and they could be bori
hundreds of billions of dollars if the Saudis carried out their prom-
ise to renounce the debt that Saddam incurred to them.
Why are we paying everything that we are paying? Why are you
not demanding that the Saudis follow through with their promise
and that the Iraqis spend their reserves?
airman BERMAN. I am sorry, but the time of the gentleman
has expired. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Push the button here. Yes, I will follow up
with that specific question.
Mr. SHERMAN. Great.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Why are they not paying more? And let me
invite my colleagues to join me when tomorrow I drop a piece of
legislation that would re ire that any status of forces agreement


50
with Iraq include a provision that the Iraqi Government will be
paying for the cost of that security that we are providing them, and
what is your reaction to that.
As you can hear today, if there is anything that is emerging it
is the United States Government and the people of the United
States have paid an awful price. It is time for the Iraqis to pay that
price for their own protection.
Ambassador CROCKER. Congressman, I have certainly in the
course of the last 2 days had that message emphasized loud and
clear. I was aware of the
Mr. ROHRABACHER. And would you make that part of the status
of forces agreement so that if there is an agreement with Iraqi Gov-
ernment, they know that they are going to be obligated to pay the
expenses rather than have the hard-pressed American taxpayers to
pay for this?
Ambassador CROCKER. That is something we would have to con-
sult on within the interagency, consider-
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me make the suggestion that the next
time we ask the question the answer is yes after you have checked
on this. And if not, there is going to be trouble on the Republican
side as well as the Democratic side of getting support for an ongo-
ing conflict. So I would invite my colleagues to join me in that leg-
islation which I will drop tomorrow.
General, is it fair to say that there have been thousands of rad-
ical Islamic extremist terrorists who have been killed in Iraq since
our troops went in there, non-Iraqis?
General PETRAEUS. It probably is thousands certainly of foreign
fighters. I think we estimate at this time there is somewhere be-
tween 50 and 70 or so that come in a month, typically through
Syria. At one time it was probably as high as 100, perhaps to 120.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So over these years that we have been
fighting there, perhaps as many as 1,000 foreign fighters, terrorists
have come in—this is what al-Qaeda is supposed to be all about.
Let me note that I would like to thank you and the troops for
killing as many of them as you were able to kill because they now
are not alive to come here and kill my family, and kill the families
of those of us who are sitting here and the American people. That
is a mission accomplished that we are grateful for.
In terms of getting the whole mission accomplished and getting
us out of there, it seems to me what we are talking about is we
need to—the Iraqis need to step up both financially and militarily,
also perhaps we could use some help from other countries.
I understand Kosovo and Albania, in gratitude to our help in
achieving peace and stability there, they are willing to send more
troops. I would hope that we are searching out all the alternatives
for having more people come in to help carry the burden, and I will
ask the diplomat that. Is there any chance of that happening?
Ambassador CROCKER. There is an ongoing effort to seek out ad-
ditional coalition partners to look for additional sources of troops,
and indeed General Petraeus is more qualified to speak on this.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. America does not mind leading the way, but
we do mind it if we are carrying the entire load whether it is the
commitment of treasury, commitment of blood. The American peo-
ple deserve to be taken into consideration and cannot be taken for


51
le in
granted by everybody else in the world, and that is why I think we
sent the wrong message that we will carry that burden no matter
what in the future. It is time for the Iraqi people to step up not
only in terms of financially, but in terms of their own personnel
and taking care of their needs, and it is time for other peopl
the world to quit relying on Uncle Sam to carry the whole load, and
I think, General Petraeus, we are all behind you. We are grateful
to you and our diplomats who have been trying to do—you have
been doing this for us, for the American people, but the American
people cannot carry this load forever. So we are looking forward to
a time when someone else can pick up some of it.
General PETRAEUS. Congressman, it is important to note, as I
mentioned I think in my statement, that Iraqi security force mem-
bers' losses are typically about three times our losses, and interest-
ingly, the Sons of Iraq losses, again out of their 91,000 or so, are
also 2.5 to three times our losses in addition.
So Iragis are very much stepping up to the plate in that regard,
and they are certainly giving their lives for their country as well.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler, for 5 minutes.
Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.
General Petraeus, last week in anticipation of this hearing I sent
an urgent e-mail asking my constituents and other Americans if
they were serving on this committee, what is the one question they
would pose to you. There was an extraordinary response with more
than 5,000 questions submitted.
These e-mails and phone calls expressed deeply held frustrations
about the war in Iraq, and reflect the concerns of millions across
the nation who feel their opinions and concerns are cast aside by
the Bush administration. I want to thank everyone who responded
and submitted a question for today's hearing.
While many of the respondents rightfully highlighted the bravery
of our troops, the majority of the e-mails expressed a strong desire
to see withdrawal of American soldiers from Iraq, and an end to
this 5-year war that has cost our Nation so dearly. Most of the
questions boiled down to this: General, we often hear President
Bush and Senator McCain say we must win in Iraq. What is the
definition of winning? What would a military victory look like that
was sufficient enough to allow us to begin leaving?
Then in a horrific turn of events, two of my constituents, Ester
and Len Wolfer of Boca Raton, Florida, learned that this past Sun-
day their son had been killed for this war. Major Stuart Wolfer was
a 36-year-old reservist on his second tour. Ée was married with
three young children ages 5, 3 and 20 months. His family was re-
lieved that he was in the Green Zone for they hoped he would be
safe there. He was not.
I spoke to Mr. Wolfer yesterday, last night, who asked me to ask
you simply, For what? For what had he lost his son?
So allow me to combine, if you will, the questions from the people
that responded to me and Mr. Wolfer. What has all this been for?
And please, respectfully, do not tell us, as you told Senator Warner
yesterday, to remove a brutal dictator. That is not good enough.
There are many dictators in the world. For what did Stuart Wolfer


53
standing in his community, and I wanted to ask you about that.
Thank you, General.
General PETRAEUS. First of all, Congressman, in fact, the Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has actually just made a statement, I think
it was yesterday or the day before, that weapons should only be in
the hands of legitimate Iraqi security forces. So he has very much
retained his influence, but he exercises it in the tradition that is
called the quietest tradition rather than say the tradition in which
xercise political power in Iran where there is a much more
direct involvement in the government and its functions.
There are a variety of rumors about what Muqtada al-Sadr is
doing in Iran. He certain apparently is undertaking religious stud-
ies to try to get to the next step, which is not by any means aya-
tollah, and how long that will take, again there is some debate over
this, whether there is a special fast track or not.
Regardless of that, he has a name that is greatly respected in
Iraqi society, the “Martyr Sadr,” his father and uncle. He is the
face of a movement that is very important to the Iraqi people. Tra-
ditionally was a nationalist movement, stayed in Iraq actually dur-
ing the time of Saddam when others went outside the country, and
a movement that is dedicated to serving the poor and down-
trodden
Mr. ROYCE. Right.
General PETRAEUS [continuing). Of the Iraqi people. And so it is
ovement that in a sense has to be reckoned with. It has to be.
It cannot be discounted, and it is a movement that has to be incor-
porated into the political process and so forth-
Mr. ROYCE. Well, I thank you for your explanation, especially on
his recent comment, I had not heard that, and I am encouraged by
that.
Let me ask Ambassador Crocker, because you testified yesterday
that Iran is pursuing a Lebanonization strategy by backing militias
and other proxy groups in Iraq. That is a pretty striking statement
given what Lebanon has done in terms of the divisions it has cre-
ated, that it is phased as a result of Hezbollah as an arm of Iran.
It is also significant given that you saw Lebanon and Iraqian
machinations up close when you were stationed there back in the
eighties, and can you compare the Iranian actions you are seeing
in Iraq today with what you saw back in Lebanon when you were
stationed there?
Ambassador CROCKER. There are similarities and there are dif-
ferences. The similarities are, again, Iranian support for extremist
militia elements that they to a large extent control. There are also
differences. One of them has been a substantial Ir
these militia influences. That is what prompted the Sadr declara-
tion of a freeze on military actions in August, and the recent fight-
ing in Basra and Baghdad has also triggered again a broad popular
rejection.
There is a history between Iraq and Iran. They fought an 8-year
bitter civil war, and it puts limits, I think, on Iran's influence in
Iraq that they perhaps do not have in Lebanon.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from American Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega.


54
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, for the record I want to asso-
ciate myself with your opening statement and your sentiments and
concerns concerning the issue that we are now debating.
General Petraeus, I received a call yesterday that one of my Sa-
moan soldiers while leading his platoon patrolling a certain area in
Baghdad was hit by an IED and was critically wounded ar
immediately transferred from Iraq to Germany, and now after
three serious operations he is now at Walter Reed Hospital. And
this morning as I speak Sergeant First Class Sene Polu, a proud
Samoan warrior from American Samoa is going through two addi-
tional serious operations.
Last night I visited Sergeant Polu and his family at Walter Reed
Hospital, and accompanying me was a relative of mine whom I be-
lieve served with you in Iraq. He is Command Sergeant Major luni
Savusa of U.S. Army Europe, and he sends his personal regards to
you and to your family.
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, we have all been
sworn to defend the constitution, to support and defend the con-
stitution. Our duties and responsibilities in serving the American
people come under the authority of the sacred document. Under our
constitution, the power to declare war is vested in the Congress,
not the President of the United States even though he is the com-
mander in chief of all of our armed forces.
Moreover, under the constitution, the authority to establish an
army and a navy is vested in the Congress, not the President.
We also believe and accept the unique concept that our military
leaders and soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen come under civil-
ian authority. The decisions and policies that have unleashed the
tremendous powers of our military forces to wage war against Sad-
dam Hussein came from Congress and the White House, and not
by our military commanders. And yet when our military officers
are given the opportunity to express their professional judgments
as soldiers, they are condemned, criticized, vilified, and scape-
goated by civilian authority.
A classic example of this, General Petraeus, is General Eric
Shinseki, whose professional opinion on force structur
ments is a classic example of how badly we have conducted this
war. Doing it on the cheap, and now after 5 years of mismanage-
ment and bad decisions again from civilian authority, at the cost
now of about $500 billion, who puts a check on our civilian author-
ity?
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, we have accom-
plished our military mission by defeating Saddam Hussein who
supposedly had nuclear weapons, supposedly an imminent danger
and posed a serious risk to the defense of our Nation, and of
course, we all know he did not have nuclear weapons.
We have just now built a $900-million Embassy in Baghdad to
establish our diplomatic presence with a country that has a popu-
lation of 25 million people, and going less because of all the—some
2–3 million refugees coming out of Iraq alone. Is not this matter
of a political solution that should now be left to the Sunnis, the
Kurds and the Shiites, who by the way make up 60 percent of the
country's population?


55
I would respectfully request your response to that, Ambassador
Crocker, and by the way I also want to pay my deepest respect for
the tremendous service that you have given to our country.
Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, sir.
It is certainly the case, in my view, that ultimately solutions in
Iraq have to be political solutions. This cannot be a question of a
military victory. There have to be political agreements, but it is
also very much the case, in my view, that our current engagement
is necessary to create and sustain the conditions in which Iraqis
can work their way through to sustainable stability. And as I said
in my statement, this is what they are doing at both local levels
and at national levels.
It will be a difficult process and it will take time, but it is my
judgment that the Iraqis are moving this process in the right direc-
tion.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Tancredo.
Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no speeches to
make here, just a few questions, and I will make them brief, and
would hope for the same in terms of the responses
First of all, also thank you and congratulations, General, on the
apparent success of the strategy that we referred to as the surge,
and thank you, Ambassador, for your efforts.
A couple of things. First of all, in January of last year, President
Bush told us all in an address to the nation that “The Iraqi Gov-
ernment would take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's prov-
inces by November 2007.” Of course, that has not happened. I am
just wondering whether, General Petraeus, you have any idea of
why he made that statement and especially such a definitive state-
ment, all Iraqi provinces will be under control of the Iraqi Govern-
ment is what he said. Why would he say a thing like that, and that
is one of the reasons why we get the kind of confusion around here
that you see? That is number one.
Number two, there have been widespread reports about the de-
velopment of gangs inside the military in Iraq, inside our military,
you know, MS-13 graffiti appearing in Baghdad as weird as this
sounds, but it was reported on national news. To what extent is
this truly a problem? If it is a problem of a significant nature, to
what do you attribute this?
Apparently some of these people are coming back into the United
States after having been trained by our own military, of course,
and using military tactics in order to advance their own lawless ac-
tivities here.
And for Ambassador Crocker, there is a very specific law, U.S.
Code 1253, that says that you may not—you may not give visas to
any country that refuses to accept their nationals back who have
committed some crime in the United States. Iraq is one of the
countries that refuses to accept their nationals back who have com-
mitted crimes here. When we try to deport them, they are not citi-
zens of the United States, we try to deport them. Iraq refuses to
accept them. There is a law that says you must-it does not say
you may-it says you must in fact stop giving visas to that country,
any country that does this.


56
Can you tell me why you are not following the law, when you
will begin to follow the law if you have any anticipation of doing
it?
Those three things, and I would appreciate the answers as briefly
as possible.
General PETRAEUS. Congressman, first of all, I am not aware of
a problem with gangs, and that is one that I will have to check on.
[The information referred to follows:]
WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS TO QUESTION
ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE THOMAS G. TANCREDO
A review of Provost Marshall records (which record all incidents) throughout Iraq
revealed no reports of gang-related incidents or activity, including activities by MS-
13. However, leader emphasis on this potential issue and watchfulness for any signs
of its emergence are important. Leaders throughout the chain of command are
aware that gang activity is prohibited by military regulations and of the need to re-
port such activity should it occur.
General PETRAEUS. Second, I do not know why the statement
was made that you quote. Presumably it was because of a projec-
tion that was provided to him. I believe that was before the time
that I was the multinational force of Iraq commander.
If I could just take the opportunity to thank Congressman for
conveying the message from Command Sergeant Major Savusa who
is a great noncommissioned officer. I personally awarded him the
Bronze Star for valor for an action when we were ambushed in the
fight to Baghdad outside the Battle of Hila.
Ambassador CROCKER. Congressman, I am just not aware of this
particular instance or instances. Obviously, I would be very grate-
ful if I could get the details from you or our staff, and obviously
we will look into it.
Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Ambassador, we have written, and I have
asked the Secretary of State about this question at least three
times. We have written. We will continue to do so. I will provide
you with more information and would appreciate a definitive an-
swer to the question.
Mr. Manual Maranda, who is an employee of the Office of Legis-
lative State Craft in the U.S. Embassy, came out with a list of
charges. I am sure you are aware of them, charges that despite the
excellent progress of the military, he believes that the State De-
partment's efforts have been poorly managed, characterize them as
willfully negligent, if not criminal. What are your responses to Mr.
Maranda's allegations?
Ambassador CROCKER. These are Mr. Maranda's personal views
to which he is entitled. I absolutely do not agree with them. I think
that the civilians out in Iraq, both the State Department and other
agencies, are doing extremely good work under very difficult cir-
cumstances, both in Baghdad and out in our now 25 Provincial Re-
construction Teams working at the local levels.
Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel, for 5 minutes.
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. As you know, I spent
Christmas in Iraq, and had the opportunity to speak with both of


57
you, and I want to thank both of you for the service you provide
to our country. What you are getting, obviously, is a sense of a lot
of frustration from all of us, from many of us, from me certainly,
and others as well.
When you testified, both of you, before our committee last Sep-
tember, you both talked about political benchmarks of the Iraqi
Government, and almost served as a framework for what you were
saying to us. The Iraqi Government has obviously been unable to
achieve all of that.
We talk about Iran and we can all agree, I do not think we dis-
agree, Iran is the biggest threat to the region right now. To me,
the worst part of the war in Iraq, besides the lives lost and the
money it cost, is the fact that because of our invasion we have actu-
ally given Iran the upper hand in the region.
Maliki, as much as we try to make him to be a democratic figure,
is propped up in Parliament by the pro-Iranian factions. When we
about trying to broker things like with the Sadr group,
it seems that Iran again has the upper hand.
General, you said, and I agree with you, that Iran is funding,
training, arming, and protecting the insurgents. They are obviously
doing that.
Ambassador Crocker, you said that you want to look at condi-
tions rather than timelines. You also said that U.S. support should
not be open-ended. The frustration with us is it seems like the sup-
port is open-ended, and every time we say that we want the Iraqis
to do this, and that is why we have the surge, and we want to
allow them to be able to do things, 6 months later, 8 months later
when they have not achieved that, we sort of change the rules. We
say, well, you know, we are here for another reason.
So please address the frustration that you hear. Nobody ques-
tions the job that you are both doing, certainly not me. You have
a very difficult situation, but we as Members of Congress are just
frustrated. We do not want an open-ended war. We want the war
to end. We do not see the goals that we say we are setting achiev-
able, and how can we know that 6 months from now, a year from
now, 5 years from now we are not going to be here saying the same
thing, and moving the goalpost a little bit and find that the Iraqi
Government has not achieve any of the things that we need?
Ambassador CROCKER. Congressman, first, I have been very care-
ful during my tenure in Iraq, I have not said in X months Y will
be achieved. I have been very careful about that. That said, there
are achievements with respect to the benchmark legislation, the
laws that I cited in my statement that were passed in the first few
weeks of this year or the first 2 months of this year constitute
achievement of benchmarks both de-Ba'athification reform, am-
nesty, provincial powers, the Provincial Powers Law which set a
date for elections, these are all benchmarks.
I have said previously that I think there is a risk of focusing too
much attention on the benchmarks as an absolute measure of suc-
cess or failure. I think you could get all the benchmarks and still
not have sustainable security in Iraq.
Mr. ENGEL. But you can understand, and I would like the Gen-
eral to answer, the frustration that we have. Both of you used the
term that what is happening in Iraq is fragile and reversible. In


58
fact, I would characterize both of your testimony last September as
much more upbeat than your testimony now. Your testimony now
is sober. It is not as upbeat as it was.
So, General, again, we are all frustrated. We want the war to
end. We want it to end responsibly, and yet it seems to be never
ending.
General PETRAEUS. Congressman, with respect, I believe the tes-
timony in September was sober and forthright as well, and what
we have tried to do today is to be forthright. That is why we have
stated the facts as we see them and the way—
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. And
the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul.
Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like unani-
mous consent to submit a written statement for the record.
Mr. Chairman, I want to submit several questions to the panel,
and there will not be enough time to answer these, but I want
these questions to be on the record.
First, I would like to ask, why should the American people con-
tinue to support a war that was justified by false information since
Saddam Hussein never aggressed [sic] against the United States,
Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11, and Iraq had no weapons of mass
destruction?
It is said that one must continue the war because we have al-
ready sacrificed so much, but what is moral about demanding even
more needless sacrifice of American lives merely to save face with
the mistake of invading and occupying Iraq?
Doesn't it seem awfully strange that the Iraqi Government we
support is an ally of the Iranians, who are our declared enemies?
Are we not now supporting the Iranians by propping up their al-
lies in Iraq? If Maliki is our ally, and he has diplomatic relations
with Ahmadinejad, why can't we? Why must we continue to pro-
voke Iran, just looking for an excuse to bomb that country? Does
our policy in Iraq not guarantee chaos in this region for years to
come?
It is estimated that up to 2,000 Iraqi soldiers refused to fight
against al-Sadr's militia. Why should we not expect many of the
80,000 Sunnis we have recently armed to someday turn their weap-
ons against us since they, as well as the Mahdi Army, detest any
and all foreign occupation?
Is it not true that our ally, Maliki, broke the cease fire declared
by al-Sadr by initiating the recent violence? Is it not true that the
current cease fire was brokered by the Iranians, who also con-
demned the attacks on the Green Zone? How can we blame all of
the violence on the Iranians?
Is it not true that with the recent surge in violence in Iraq that
the March attacks are now back at the same level as they were in
2005? Does Iran not have a greater justification to be involved in
neighboring Iraq than we do since it is 6,000 miles from our
shores? If China or Russia were occupying Mexico, how would we
react?
Since no one can define “winning the war,” just who do we expect
to surrender? Does this not mean that this war will be endless
since our political leaders will not end it; that is, until we go broke,
and maybe that is not far off?


60
clear violation of the Iraq Constitution, would further erode our
credibility not just in Iraq but elsewhere.
So if you could give me an answer to that after I pose this ques-
tion to you. It is a request, really. I would like you to convey to
the Iraqi Parliament, or Council of Representatives, in the Iraqi
Executive Branch, the so-called “Council of Ministers,” that should
the United Nations' mandate be allowed to expire at the end of this
year, it is the view of many of us in Congress, with support from
constitutional scholars, that the continued use of force in Iraq by
U.N. armed forces will require authorization by the United States
Congress.
Now, the administration position is different, but many of us in
Congress feel vigorously and profoundly that, as one of my col-
leagues earlier read, “The power and the authority has to come
from the U.S. Congress.”
The administration claims that the use of force against Iraq has
two prongs: One to address the threat posed by the government of
Saddam Hussein and one to enforce relevant United Nations reso-
lutions.
The first prong is gone, but the administration continues to claim
that it is in effect because of an endless threat in Iraq. With this
proposal, the second prong would disappear with the U.N. man-
date.
So I am just simply making a request. I think, to be fair to the
Iraqi Government, both the legislative branch, as well as the Coun-
cil of Ministers, please inform them that there are strong feelings
here in the United States that once, in this Congress, in this insti-
tution, that once that mandate expires, then it is this Government,
the next administration has to come back to get authorization.
Could you please convey that to both Prime Minister Maliki and
to the speaker of the Council of Representatives?
Ambassador CROCKER. I can certainly do that, sir, but I would
imagine that they have already heard you.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I hope they have. Can you answer my first ques-
tion, then, which is—
Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. Very quickly, the Iraqi Govern-
ment will determine its own procedures, and I am sure they will
do so with full respect for their Constitution.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired, and
the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake, is recognized for 5 min-
utes.
Mr. FLAKE. Thank you, Chairman, and I thank the witnesses,
General and Ambassador. Thank you for your distinguished serv-
ice.
I, myself, was more than somewhat skeptical when the surge
plan was presented that we would see the type of gains that we
have seen, and I think a lot of it is certainly due to your diligence
and the diligence, certainly, of our troops.
I do have concerns for the long term, and I want to associate my-
self with the comments made by Mr. Ackerman. I still am, after
hearing testimony and hearing testimony before other bodies and
hear
earing the questions here, I still have a hard time seeing the big
picture and what constitutes success. That is not just one side of


61
the aisle with those kinds of concerns. Many on this side of the
aisle have that as well.
I do not expect that you can say any more than you have said,
but just to let you know that is a concern, the long term, in terms
of what constitutes success. I think that there is a sincere effort,
I know, in this body, to exercise our Article I authority, that we do
have the power of the purse, and we desperately want to see suc-
cess, but a lot of us are concerned that we do not see the frame-
work that can be actually measured. I am still waiting for that,
and if you have any thoughts on that, I would appreciate hearing
them. If not, I will pass it on to the next questioner.
Ambassador CROCKER. It is a very valid question, Congressman.
There is not going to be, in my view, a single moment when you
have success border to border in Iraq. It is going to be a process,
and the fact that we are now in the process of redeploying surge
forces back home because conditions permit it, I would term as a
success.
As I said earlier, I think that is how this will proceed, that it will
be area by area and issue by issue that gradually moves us from
an active role in combat in different places, eventually into
overwatch and eventually into more conventional roles, such as as-
sisting with training of Iraqi forces. But it is going to be an incre-
mental process over time, not a single, dazzling moment.
Mr. FLAKE. I yield back.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired, and
the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Carnahan, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
the gentlemen here before us today for their service.
I want to really just acknowledge what I am sure you have heard
over the last 2 days, and that is a mounting backlash to the Iraqis
not standing up sufficiently-militarily, politically, and especially
financially—the cost of this war, in human terms, to our reputation
and standing in the world, to our readiness, as Chairman Skelton
has outlined eloquently; to our resources being diverted from our
struggling economy and needs at home; and from the greater al-
Qaeda threat to the United States in Afghanistan.
As Ambassador Crocker acknowledged to Senator Biden yester-
day, this war was sold on assurances that oil revenues would be
used to help fund reconstruction of what is one of the most oil-rich
nations in the world. During our last hearing, there were many sto-
ries about waste and mismanagement and corruption in terms of
use of U.S. funds.
Now we see the growing surplus in the Iraqi Government that,
frankly, we are paying for twice. We are paying in our tax funds,
and we are paying at the pump.
There was a bipartisan letter from Senators Levin and Warner
asking the GAO why United States taxpayer money is being over-
whelmingly used to fund Iraqi reconstruction. What specific ac-
tions, gentlemen, are being taken to use the oil-rich Iraq Govern-
ment's surplus to pay for the war and reconstruction costs?
Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, as I said earlier, we are getting out
of the bricks-and-mortar construction business. We have been clear,


62
and the Iraqis themselves have been clear, that construction/recon-
struction going forward is an Iraqi responsibility.
That is best shown, I think, through decisions that the govern-
ment has taken just in the last few days to provide $350 million,
for example—this was a decision yesterday—for reconstruction in
Basra in Mosul, and in parts of Baghdad that have been affected
by the recent violence.
They are also talking about a separate $5 billion reconstruction
fund to concentrate on key areas, such as health and education.
This will all be their money.
Mr. CARNAHAN. Let me interrupt, Ambassador. Is this an issue
of the Iraqis just being overly dependent on us, using our budget
as a crutch, or are there other difficulties with them really dipping
into their own vast resources to fund what is going on there?
Ambassador CROCKER. One of the challenges they have faced is
simple capacity, just the ability to execute. We saw this, for exam-
ple, in our 2006 budget. They only managed to actually execute
something like 22 percent of their capital budget. They just, you
know, could not spend the money in a productive way. That per-
centage almost tripled in 2007 to about 63 percent, still, obviously,
short of ideal. But they are developing a capacity not only to plan
how they want to spend their money but then to actually imple-
ment that, but it has been an incremental process.
Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, both. I yield back.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pence, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Chairman. I want to add my greetings
and gratitude to both of these great public servants on behalf of the
people of eastern Indiana. Your leadership, as a soldier and dip-
lomat, has been exceptional, and you represent the very finest of
this country, and I am grateful for your service.
Thank you for your hospitality in my two most recent trips to
Iraq, and I am pleased to extend that hospitality to Capitol Hill for
you all.
The first question: Ambassador Crocker, Iran is in the news
today. They recently announced the installation of some 6,000 new
centrifuges for their allegedly peaceful nuclear program. I was pro-
voked by a question of a colleague in the Senate yesterday. Senator
Barack Obama of Illinois told you we needed “a diplomatic surge
that includes Iran.” Senator Obama also said, “We should be talk-
ing to them as well.”
Ambassador Crocker, I am under the impression we have been
talking to Iran, particularly in 2007. I am aware of several meet-
ings that you, as the American Ambassador to Iraq, have had with
your counterpart from Iran. Am I right in understanding, are you
talking to Iran? Are we engaged in a dialogue with Iran?
Ambassador CROCKER. You are correct, Congressman, that we
have had discussions on security in Iraq with the Iranians on three
occasions. These are trilateral discussions. The Iraqis are in the
room as well, but it is our one authorized-
Mr. PENCE. I am remembering—forgive me for interrupting—I
am remembering a 4-hour meeting perhaps at the home of Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Very serious issues were discussed with
your counterpart from Iran.


63
Ambassador CROCKER. That is correct, and we have also had
talks at an experts' level. The Iraqis, a few days ago, announced
that they would like to see to arrange another round of these talks.
We have said that if that is what Iraq is requesting, we are pre-
pared to sit down.
Mr. PENCE. The Secretary of State and the administration have
said, We are talking to Iran. We are willing to continue to talk to
Iran.
Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir, on the issue of security in Iraq.
Mr. PENCE. Security in Iraq, precisely. Very quickly, have those
talks produced any results relative to Iran's direct involvement in
violence against United States troops within Iraq or enmity toward
Israel or their nuclear weapons program? Any concessions whatso-
ever from Iran?
Ambassador CROCKER. To be perfectly frank, Congressman, thus
far, I have seen no concrete results as a result of these discussions.
Mr. PENCE. Very good. General Petraeus, I want you to know, in
my visits to Iraq over the last year, and from the evidence you
have presented here today, it is clear to me and to many of us in
this Congress and across the country, the surge is working. The
strategy that you brought to this theater of combat has achieved
significant military progress, and I commend you for it.
You have made repeated references to the fragile nature of our
success. I recognize that. I accept that it is not irreversible, but it
has been substantial and dramatic progress.
In the minute-and-a-half left remaining, let me ask you, Other
than the American soldier and their extraordinary professionalism,
what accounts for the extraordinary progress in the last 15 months
in Iraq, in the expansion of security and stability following the ad-
vent of the surge?
General PETRAEUS. Well, as I mentioned, Congressman, it was
also the Iraqi surge, the increase of their armed forces and police
forces of over 100,000; the increase in the “Sons of Iraq” additional
security forces, if you will, at the local level; and I think something
that really has to be highlighted again and again, and that is the
rejection by more and more and more Sunni-Arab communities of
al-Qaeda Iraq.
That is a very significant action. It is important that it took
place, of course, in the heart of the Arab world. I would like to
think that that is something that others could take a lesson from
as well. Indeed, frankly, there are other countries in the region
that have also become mightily concerned about the threat of that
form of extremism and have taken a number of different actions to
moderate various elements in their societies that produce the kind
of feeling that can support al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
Mr. PENCE. Thank you, both. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentlewoman from California, Ms. Woolsey.
Ms. WOOLSEY. Gentlemen, it is not easy to get two Members to
agree on anything up here, as I am sure you see. It is even rarer
when 92 Members come together and agree on something, and that
is exactly what has happened. Ninety-two Members of this House,
including Foreign Affairs Committee members, Congresswoman
Lee, Chairman Payne, Chairman Delahunt, Representative Meeks,


64
Vice Chair Watson, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Represent-
ative Hinojosa, Representative Linda Sánchez, myself, Representa-
tive Scott, and my colleague across the aisle, Representative Paul;
we have all gone on record opposed to this open-ended occupation.
We signed our names to a letter to the President stating that we
will only support appropriating additional funds for United States
military operations in Iraq during Fiscal Year 2008 and beyond for
the protection and safe redeployment of our troops out of Iraq be-
fore President Bush leaves office.
I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, unanimous consent that the
letter be included in the record. Unanimous consent.
Chairman BERMAN. Without objection.
Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515
July 20, 2007
The Honorable George W. Bush
President
United States of America
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing to inform you that we will only support appropriating
additional funds for U.S. military operations in Iraq during Fiscal Year 2008
and beyond for the protection and safe redeployment of our troops out of
Iraq before you leave office.
More than 3,600 of our brave soldiers have died in Iraq. More than
26,000 have been seriously wounded. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have
been killed or injured in the hostilities and more than 4 million have been
displaced from their homes. Furthermore, this conflict has degenerated into a
sectarian civil war and U.S. taxpayers have paid more than $500 billion,
despite assurances that you and your key advisors gave our nation at the time
you ordered the invasion in March, 2003 that this military intervention
would cost far less and be paid from Iraqi oil revenues.
We agree with a clear and growing majority of the American people
who are opposed to continued, open-ended U.S. military operations in Iraq,
and believe it is unwise and unacceptable for you to continue to unilaterally
impose these staggering costs and the soaring debt on American taxpayers
currently and for generations to come.
Sincerely,
Barbarallel a
Ortal
Lillepee Male
Barbara Leel
Wynn Woolsey
Maxine Waters


66
Ms. WOOLSEY. Gentlemen, polls show that up to 80 percent of
the American public supports redeployment of our troops out of
Iraq. When that statistic was presented with those staggering
numbers, the Vice President's response was, “So?”
Well, I want to tell you, that "so" came from the same adminis-
tration that got us into Iraq with misleading information in the
first place, and I do not feel that that is where you are coming
from. I want to believe that you have more respect for the Amer-
ican people than our Vice President.
So what we need to know, and I am absolutely certain that you
have eventualities, you have contingencies, that you are truly wait-
ing for conditions on the ground to tell us when we are going to
come and go because you have to be planning. So how do you plan?
How do you base the rate that troops can safely be redeployed? By
the month? By the quarter? What funding stream would be nec-
essary to accomplish this?
We have no idea. We cannot get that information here in the
Congress. What will it cost to bring our troops home because we
g to have to pay for that as well? How long would it take
for a complete troops redeployment?
General PETRAEUS. Congressman, as I explained earlier, the
process of determining how rapidly we can bring forces home is
really the process that we exercised when we determined the pace
and also the location, really, of where we could reduce forces to
bring down the surge forces: The five-brigade combat teams, two
Marine battalions, and the Marine Expeditionary Unit.
What we have done in those cases is we look at the security and
the local governance conditions in an area to determine where we
can thin out our forces and thereby redeploy additional elements.
Obviously, we look at the enemy situation in the area. We look at
the ability of Iraqi forces to deal with the threats that are present.
That is what we have been doing. That is how we rework the bat-
tlefield geometry to draw down the surge forces.
Ms. WOOLSEY. General, you have told us this, so I have heard it,
and we have all heard this. You must be basing it on some num-
bers of what it would take to be safe in bringing our troops home,
what it is going to cost to bring our troops home, what it will cost
to be involved in reconciliation and capacity building within Iraq.
Where do we get those numbers? Is it available to the public?
General PETRAEUS. It is not arithmetic, Congresswoman. As I
mentioned yesterday, this is more akin to calculus than it is to
arithmetic. It is more akin to the political-military calculus that
the Ambassador described earlier, I think, in this hearing today,
and it is the battlefield geometry. What we are trying to do is de-
termine how quickly we can bring our forces—again, we very much
share the frustration.
Those of us who have been at this for a long time obviously want
the war to end as much as anybody else, perhaps maybe more. It
is sometimes said that the biggest piece activists are those who, of
course, are actually downrange, risking it all.
What we want to do is come home the right way without jeopard-
izing the gains we have fought to achieve and achieving the impor-
tant national interests that we have.
it o11


68
Mr. WILSON. Additionally, Ambassador Crocker, I am going to
give you an example question because I asked it of you earlier, be-
cause I want the American people to know this, that al-Zawahiri,
the al-Qaeda spokesman for Bin Laden, on July 9, 2005, made the
goals of al-Qaeda very clear.
First, expel the Americans from Iraq. The second stage is, estab-
lish authority in Iraq. The third stage is, extend the Jihad wave
to the secular countries around Iraq. The fourth state is the clash
with Israel, which is the extermination of the people who live in
Israel.
Now, if they achieve their four stages, would they be satisfied
with what they have, or will they continue attacks on the United
States?
Ambassador CROCKER. Congressman, as you know, I have been
focused on al-Qaeda for quite some time. I opened our Embassy in
Afghanistan after 9/11. I served 272 years as our Ambassador to
Pakistan, and, of course, now I am in Iraq.
It is my judgment that al-Qaeda has been and remains a stra-
tegic enemy of the United States and that if they can find the
means, they will attack us again. I am familiar with the 2005 al-
Zawahiri statements that you cite. The question I would have is
whether this would, indeed, be sequential or whether, if they can
get that secure base, they will begin planning more or less imme-
diately for that kind of attack.
Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is
important to note our respect, mutually, for both of you gentlemen,
and thank you for the courtesies shown to our delegation during
the 5th year—week, if you will—of the invasion of the United
States into
One of the Senators in yesterday's hearing, I think, captured a
lot of our sentiment without reflecting on the very fine and out-
standing work of the United States military and our civilian sup-
port system through the State Department. He asked a simple
question: How do we get out of this mess?
I hope that this does not characterize all of my questions, but I,
frankly, believe that you all are outstanding public servants, and
you are implementing the policies of this administration.
So you are in a difficult box, but I hope to pose some questions
that really attract what I believe will help us reach a solution.
First of all, I would like to take note of some of the visual pic-
tures of our trip. It is noteworthy that the Americans are armed,
with helmets and flak jackets. The civilian population—this little
girl in a pink dress was trying to play on the streets. We were
walking through, and I have great gratitude to be able to so.
General, none of these are classified shots, so I want you to note
that.
This is one of the streets that we were walking on, certainly our
weaponry and otherwise there. Here is another one. Here is a little
boy, civilian, compared to Americans walking through the streets.


69
As I walked through these streets, I also saw a lot of quality-of-
life needs—trash and lack of clean water—in terms of conversa-
tions. The Sunni men that were there were criticizing or com-
plaining that they wished that they could have a government that
would rid itself of sectarianism. That is what they view their lead-
er, Mr. Maliki, as a sectarian who continues to promote divisions
between the groups. The good news, Ambassador Crocker, is that
they will be participating in the election.
We have spoken about the Iraqi security forces. I, frankly, be-
lieve we do not give them enough credit, and that is why we are
in the plight that we are in today. An outstanding general, who,
frankly, believes that his forces are getting ready and getting ready
better; one of the generals that we met, an Iraqi general. We de-
cided to make sure that we let everyone know that t
well dressed, but they are also, I believe, on the road of great com-
petency.
What we are continuously presented with, however, is quite the
contrary. Let me raise the points of the resolution of 2002, and I
will read from it, just to note that we were to deal with the United
Nations resolutions and to rid ourselves from the al-Qaeda.
Let me ask General Petraeus. Saddam Hussein is gone, is he
not? I, obviously, need to get a quick answer because my time is
running out.
General PETRAEUS. Absolutely.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. There has been a democratic election.
General PETRAEUS. Correct.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Al-Qaeda, to your knowledge, is an amoeba.
It is free flowing. It may be in Iraq. It may be in Afghanistan. Is
that not true?
General PETRAEUS. It is certainly in Iraq. It is less in Iraq than
it was a year ago.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. It finds itself in other places.
General PETRAEUS. Not easily. Again, it has to find a place where
it can put down-
Ms. JACKSON LEE. You would suggest that it is not in Afghani-
stan and
General PETRAEUS. I did not say that.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, that is my question. Does it find itself
in other places, al-Qaeda?
General PETRAEUS. Certainly. Al-Qaeda, in fact, is thr
chou
the region of the Middle East.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. With that in mind, let me say, General, that
I, frankly, believe that we are operating without authority. The
2002 resolution has been complete. The military has completed its
tasks. I would declare it a military success, and I would ask tha
you convey to the President that we should now bring our troops
home.
To Ambassador Crocker, even though there may be light being
made of diplomacy, is it not important that we continue to work
on a diplomatic end in giving technical assistance to Iraq to use its
own money to help build up its country?
Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, ma’am, it is, and we are very much
involved in that. In fact, we are going to be bringing out a number


70
of additional advisers from the Department of Treasury who will
focus precisely on budget execution.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. With that in mind, then, we can use the diplo-
macy and technical assistance and complete our tasks and end the
war so that we do not continue to have the loss of lives, as I did,
with two soldiers being buried in my district.
I believe there is no more authority for this war. I believe it is
terminated, and I believe that our soldiers should come home cer-
tainly to a welcoming and grateful nation. I yield back my time.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The
gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gresham Barrett, is recog-
nized for 5 minutes.
Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General and Ambas-
sador, God bless you. Thank you for being here today. Please tell
our heroes that we love them, and we pray for them every day.
One quick statement. A lot of our colleagues, over the last couple
of days, have talked about the cost of the war. The only thing I
would ask them is to think about the cost of actually losing this
war.
General, in regards to the Basra operations, I know there were
some good things and some bad things, but the leader of their
country, a sovereign nation, took two brigades in 24 hours, with
Special Operations guys, took them to the field, and had mixed re-
sults, but isn't that a success? They could not have done that a
year ago, could they, General?
General PETRAEUS. They could not have, Congressman, and I did
highlight that, and then they moved another brigade subsequent to
that, and they had their C-130's turning several times a day with
supplies, reinforcements, casualty back-haul, and so forth.
I think the more important point, if I could, is that Basra is, by
no means, over. Basra is going to be ongoing for a number of
onths and will require a sustainable solution over time, and it is
still very much the early days, actually, in Basra.
Mr. BARRETT. But in that sense of the action, the leader of the
nation taking charge, a big success, wouldn't you agree?
General PETRAEUS. Well, we have talked repeatedly about want-
ing Iraq to be a sovereign country, wanting their leader of the sov-
ereign country to make decisions, and he made one, and, candidly,
it was a bit of a surprise. It was much more sudden than the very
ate process that, in fact, we were actually, literally, working
on at the time that he made the decision, based on his assessment
of security issues there, and then gave orders to do that. He did
ask for our support, and we said that we would provide support.
It would not be ground forces; it is advisers and close air support
and ISR support and that type of thing.
Mr. BARRETT. Yes, sir. Ambassador?
Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. Looking at the Basra operation
from the political standpoint, advice to military, the Prime Min-
ister's decisiveness in this, including going down personally to
Basra for the opening phases of this operation, has garnered him
widespread political support from almost all of Iraq's leaders-
Sunni, Kurd, as well as Shiia–because he is being perceived, as
the Shiia Prime Minister of Iraq, as willing and able to take on


72
Ambassador, you answered an earlier question where you said
that you deal with conditions and not with timelines. Well, let us
put some metrics on the conditions that you are talking about, and,
General, you, in answer to an earlier question, gave some fairly
general answers to what constitutes, if you will, success. I would
like to hear some metrics from both of you gentlemen about when
we can begin to start paying attention, adequate attention, to the
rest of the world.
Ambassador CROCKER. Well, again, we approached this, obvi-
ously, from the focus on Iraq. As you know, Congressman, re-
deployments are underway. The surge forces are coming home, and
General Petraeus and I have both described the process by which
we are able to make recommendations in that regard.
r. WU. With all due respect, Ambassador, I am asking you
about metrics. What are identifiable criteria that we can measure
against so that we can conside
General PETRAEUS. Congressman, if I could, the metrics are
among those that I showed you today. That is a subset of the over-
all metrics that we use to track basically how we are doing. What
we showed you was all of them totaled up, but we also look at them
by region. Let me give you an example.
Mr. Wu. Excuse me, General. Based on the metrics that you put
up, at what point on those graphs do we reach the point where we
can redeploy our military and our diplomatic resources?
General PETRAEUS. At the point where those metrics for an area,
such as Anbar Province, and I wish we had included that, we have
a provincial slide, and it shows it going just like that, in terms of
violence, and then we lay down the troop to task. We have to look
at what it is that we are trying to accomplish, look at the local
Iraqi security forces and the local governance, and that is what has
enabled us to reduce. We are in the process of reducing from 14
battalions in Anbar Province down to about six. That is a very sub-
stantial reduction to take place in the course of about, I guess, 8
or 9 months or so. It is based on those kinds of
Mr. WU. Thank you, General. Perhaps offline
offline here, we can get
both of you gentlemen to respond, at what point on those charts,
we can define success. I would be happy to take that as a written
response outside of this hearing.
General PETRAEUS. Congressman, let me be, again, forthright
with you, which is the spirit that we have been in. There is not an
arithmetical solution that says that for Anbar Province, when you
hit this number and this metric; it is much more about a number
of different metrics that we look at.
At the end of the day, this is about feel. This is what we pay our
commanders to do, is to make judgments and to assess a situation
and to say, “I think that we can take this battalion out of here, this
battalion out of here. We can leave these smaller elements.” This
is how we cobble together the response. By the way, we have got
to make sure we have a Medivac within the “golden hour,” and all
the rest of this, again, a very complex endeavor, and that is how
you are able to determine how much you can come down over time.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. WU. Thank you, sir.


73
Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mack, is
recognized for 5 minutes. There is a legal dispute resolved in the
favor of Mr. Fortenberry with the agreement of Mr. Mack. Mr.
Fortenberry is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. MACK. Mr. Chairman, I yield my time to Mr. Fortenberry.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador
Crocker and General Petraeus, welcome. Thank you for joining us
today. On behalf of the people of the First District of Nebraska, let
me thank you for your service and sacrifice on behalf of our !
General Petraeus, under current operational and policy assump-
tions, and recognizing the complexity and fluidity of the situation,
what will Iraq look like in 6 months, your best judgment?
General PETRAEUS. Well, in part, as we projected with the pro-
vincial Iraqi control, there will be a number of additional provinces
that will be under Iraqi control. Again, I think we had the projec-
tions on there. Sometimes those actually come forward, as in the
case of, say, Anbar Province. Sometimes they move back, as has
been the case with, say, Ninawa Province.
In those provinces, there will be more robust Iraqi governance.
Iraqi forces will be shouldering more of the burden. We certainly
intend to keep the heat on al-Qaeda Iraq and to try to reduce fur-
ther the areas in which they have influence, to some degree. I
would not call it a safe haven at this point, but operating space,
and to continue to press that.
There clearly has to be both a military and a political solution
with respect to the militia forces. Again, there is a huge political
component to that, given their connection, and that is something
that clearly has to be worked out, and it is something, frankly, that
the Iraqi political leaders are very much seized with right now.
There will have been provincial elections, and that will have en-
abled more representative governance in the various Iraqi prov-
inces. We hope that that can satisfy the aspirations of those who
made a bad decision in the last elections back in January 2005,
when large numbers of Sunni Arabs, for example, boycotted the
vote.
I certainly hope that basic services have been improved in terms
of electricity, water, sewage. There are projects ongoing in a variety
of those different areas. They, obviously, depend, to a considerable
degree, on the security situation, but, again, there have been im-
provements in those areas, and that certainly the oil exporting con-
tinues as it is, if not perhaps even tuned up a bit more, although
the North, I think, recently broke either its all-time record, or cer-
tainly its post-liberation record.
We hope, as we get into a variety of different ministry activities,
more of the health clinics that we have helped Iraq build will be
open by that point in time. I think it is between a third and a half
right now that are open, and, again, we hope to see several dozen
more of those opened over time.
Again, I would just go on like that down the various lines of op-
eration that are in our joint campaign plan. As you know, there is
not a military campaign plan in Iraq or a separate Embassy cam-
paign plan. It is a joint campaign plan signed by the two of us, and
we do link arms as we try to take this forward and try to make
progress across the board. Thank you.


callin
Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, General. Briefly, switching to the
Ambassador, Mr. Ambassador, I noted in your testimony you refer
to a "diplomatic surge.” I was pleased to see that, in that Čongress-
man McCaul, my colleague, and I introduced a resolution last year
ng for a diplomatic surge to make it the stated objective of
Congress to augment our security efforts by engaging international
stakeholders and robust diplomacy to help ensure their support for
political, economic, and humanitarian assistance toward the rapid
stabilization of Iraq.
Thus far, you have talked about enhanced U.N. engagement in
Iraq, the International Compact, and the Neighbors Conferences.
What specific outcomes do you seek to accomplish in this regard by
the end of the year?
Ambassador CROCKER. Well, with respect to the neighbors, the
Arab neighbors, what we would very much like to see is the Arabs
reengaging with Iraq. There are no Arab ambassadors currently in
Baghdad, and that is not good for Iraq, and it is not good for the
Arab states.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. Debt relief and economic assistance as well?
Ambassador CROCKER. Certainly, on debt relief, some have
granted it; others have not. That needs to move forward.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. I think that these are very important consid-
erations. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from New York, Mr. Crowley, is recognized for 5 min-
utes.
Mr. CROWLEY. I thank the chairman and thank both Ambassador
Crocker and General Petraeus for being here this morning, this
afternoon, for these past couple of days and your testimony that
you have given before both the Senate and the House.
I also want to thank both of you for my recent trip to Iraq, where
I was treated very warmly and protected very well and felt very se-
cure and safe on that particular CODEL led by my good friend and
colleague from California, Mr. Costa.
I want to thank the men and women who are serving in our
armed services over there who are exemplary and, I think, are just
fantastic and terrific people who are doing the best job that they
can under what I think are extremely difficult, if not somewhat im-
possible, circumstances.
I never once doubted for a moment that our troops would be suc-
cessful in the surge. I think that we can basically do whatever we
want to do militarily. The real question really lies as to whether
or not the Iraqis have the ability to do what they need to do politi-
cally to move forward.
That really comes to, I think, the question for me, and that is,
we have seen a steady decline in the coalition of the willing in Iraq,
and I would ask both Ambassador Crocker and you, General
Petraeus, whether or not that is disconcerting to you, whether you
have concern about the lack of involvement by the greater free
world in what is happening in Iraq today, that lack of involvement.
Ambassador CROCKER. Čongressman, that international involve-
ment is very important, but it can take different forms. We have
got good, strong, coalition partners. Their roles may transform over
time. The Australians, for example, as they decrease their military


75
role are increasing their role in economic engagement with Iraq,
and we welcome this.
It is also why the kinds of efforts that the congressman was just
asking about, I think, are so important, to have the Arabs more en-
gaged with Iraq, again, not as military coalition partners but at a
political level.
Mr. CROWLEY. I am very interested in the investments that are
being made in an economic way to help in Iraq by our allies, but
what I am really concerned about is the fact that the United States
is paying 95 percent of the cost of the military action in the occupa-
tion within Iraq today, and our allies, in reverse of the first Gulf
War where that was not the case, where most of the burden was
placed on the rest of the world, we are paying certainly our fair
share in that. That is not the case in this circumstance.
comes down to, for me, whether or not this is worth any addi-
tional American lives in keeping this effort going when there seems
to be an intractable problem in getting the Iraqis to get their act
together. We know how complicated the situation is. One just has
to look at the Senate and, certainly, Senator McCain and his, time
to time, inability to understand or get the clear picture about what
a Shiia is and what a Sunni is, or who is involved in al-Qaeda, who
is not involved in al-Qaeda. But, certainly, the American people
look at this as well and say this is a very, very difficult situation,
and they are questioning whether or not it is worth additional
American lives to be put on the line for something that is intrac-
table for a long period.
General PETRAEUS. It is my view, Congressman, that there is po-
litical progress, and I tried to outline that in my testimony. We see
it at local levels, among both Sunnis and Shiia who are sick and
tired of militia and terrorist activity and making that clear. We see
it at the national level where improving security has created an en-
vironment where the kinds of compromises on legislation that just
could not be had, say, 6 or 9 months ago are now achievable.
Mr. CROWLEY. Is it fair to describe the Iraqi legislature as dys-
functional?
General PETRAEUS. No, sir. I do not believe it is. The Iraqi Coun-
cil of Representatives, the Parliament, showed us, in the first cou-
ple of months of this year, that they are able to come together and
make the trade-offs across sectarian lines to get through some com-
plex pieces of legislation like, again, an amnesty law, enormously
important to the Sunnis. It required an atmosphere in which the
Shiia would not see that as threatening, and that is the atmos-
phere we are increasingly getting now.
Mr. CROWLEY. Ambassador, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I know
my time is about to expire. I just want to congratulate our ally,
Jordan, for the work that they are doing in terms of helping to
train Iraqi police, as well as extending themselves, in terms of
opening up their borders for refugees. I think it is important to
note for our other allies in the Arab world to recognize it and my
colleagues as well. Thank you.
General PETRAEUS. Counterterrorism, too.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. We
are now on the 10-minute bells for a series of eight votes. I am not
going to ask General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to hang


78
readiness levels are shot. We have had our soldiers on three and
four tours of duty.
You know, if you really want to get a taste of this war, I always
advise my colleagues to make sure you go to Landstuhl Air Base.
have been over there three times every time I go over into the
war zone. I have been over there three times at Landstuhl. If you
want to know the cost of this, you look in the eyes of these soldiers,
and you know what that cost is.
I am here to tell you, General, I am very concerned about the
complete brutalization of our military in this process, and this is
the elephant in the room that we continue to try to gloss over. I
get tons of calls in my office, at every one of my town hall meet-
ings, where soldiers who have served their duty come back with
great complaints. The way we treat our wounded warriors and our
veterans is despicable, and as we talk about this surge, even the
generals have said that the 30,000 surge that we have had in place
has caused unsustainable stress on our military.
Secondly, with your offer and your extension, again, in all due
respect, because I respect you for the job that you are doing, but
our military advisers are saying to us, those who are in the Pen-
tagon, those that are here now, not just the retirees, this pause
that you are asking for in the slowdown, in order to sustain it at
the 140,000-troop level, will cause immeasurable harm. I am not
just talking about the physical harm. I am talking about the men-
tal stress.
Nearly 200,000 of the 516,000 soldiers that have served in Iraq
have been over there on their second tour, 63,000 on their third
tour, and about 28,000 now moving on to their fourth tours of duty.
I am not telling you anything that you do not know, but one fact
is glaring out. Thirty percent of every one of these troops that have
served in Iraq are suffering from mental health problems. I am not
even counting the divorce rates that are there.
So when we evaluate, going forward, what we are going to do in
100 years there, or how long we are going to stay, we must take
into consideration the tremendous damage that we are doing to our
men and women in uniform, and it is for that reason that we need
to plan a redeployment out.
The other reason is this: In 6Y2 months, you may not say we are
going to end this war. I might not say it. I am saying and hoping
we end it. But the American people are going to end this war, and
they are going to come to the polls in November, and they are
going to speak loudly: We need to have a plan in order so that we
can move out.
I think one piece that is missing is this great reluctance to un-
derstand the impact of Iran. Iran is a major player in this. I recall,
you are a student of history, and you know full well what happened
in World War II. A lot of us did not want to move with Russia.
Russia was a problem. But we had to deal with other countries who
we did not agree with in order to come to a conclusion: This war
must end for the sake of our military.
Our military is weaker today than it was 5 years ago. Iran is
stronger today than it was 5 years ago. It is no wonder that, in the
recent action in Basra, where there was a settlement for peace,
who negotiated it? Iran. Where was it negotiated? In Iran.
Ty.


79
We have got civil war upon civil war here. These folks have been
fighting for centuries. What are we going to do in the next 6
months to settle this? How are you, as commander, going to deal
and look soldiers in the face to send them to their deaths, knowing
that this matter is coming to an end? The American people are
going to say it is coming to an end. There is going to be a change
in the presidency, and we cannot continue it with the brutalization
and the back breaking that we are doing to our military.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much.
Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina, with
my apologies for making him be here 10 minutes longer than he
needed to be, Mr. I
Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General and Ambassador,
you know, our military is really the incredible race horse that will
run its heart out for the American people, and, really, in sort of
three phases, you have been completely successful.
We asked you to go depose a madman who we thought was dan-
gerous to us. You did that; a complete success.
The second phase: Disrupt terrorist networks, no further attacks
on the United States; score that one as a success, too.
The third phase; I was not completely sold, but the idea of a
surge seems to have worked in terms of the military consequences
of creating this security zone space for them to decide questions.
Now, of course, you need to make those decisions.
So, in each phase, our military has accomplished exactly what we
asked you to do. Ambassador Crocker said something very helpful
in your testimony, sir. You said that, essentially, we are supporters
of their democracy, of Iraq's democracy, but we are not guarantors
of their democracy. Maybe that is my way of phrasing it, not yours.
I wonder, General and Ambassador, what would be the warning
signs that we are going from supporter status to guarantor status?
Ambassador CROCKER. Congressman, I do not see us moving in
that direction. We are trying to, as you rightly said, create the con-
ditions where they can take the political decisions necessary to fur-
ther reconciliation and get themselves on the track to a stable fu-
ture, but these have to be their decisions. We cannot pass their
laws for them. It would be impossible, and it would not have any
effect, even if it were possible. So I do not think I see the cir-
cumstances under which this would arise.
Mr. INGLIS. Your answer worries me because there would be no
warning signals for you that we have gone from supporter to guar-
antor. I think there is a point at which you clearly go from sup-
porter to guarantor. In other words, you say that we will stay in-
definitely. That would be the warning sign that we cannot stay in-
definitely. At some point, you have to say, “We support
e to say, “We supported you, but
we are not going to guarantee you.”
Ambassador CROCKER. I have got you now. Well, I think one way
to frame that would be the effort we are beginning now for a stra-
tegic framework agreement and a status of forces agreement. As I
noted in my testimony, to give our military the authorities and pro-
tections it will need when the Security Council resolution expires
at the end of the year, we will need that kind of agreement.


81
moving. There is a Civilian Conservation Corps kind of concept.
There is the Job Training and Reintegration program. There is
basic education. There is skills—
Mr. COSTA. So you believe you have the resources to successfully
mainstream all of these within the next 12 months.
General PETRAEUS. We do, and we are now helped because of the
Iraqi—that I mentioned and the funding, again-
Mr. COSTA. With the Maliki government's support.
General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. I think, in the statement, if you just
want to look at it-I think it is about three pages from the end-
it details all of-
Mr. COSTA. I will refer back to it. I do not have a lot of time,
and I have waited a long time, and we have got votes to go.
General PETRAEUS. By the way, I think it is nearly $1 billion, to-
tally, if you add it all up.
Mr. COSTA. All right. I think we are going to learn more from the
Basra situation. I think it is a good case study, and many of the
questions I had about winners and losers and how well they have
performed and whether or not Maliki's credibility has increased as
a result of this, I think you have answered.
I would like to go, Mr. Ambassador, to an issue that was raised,
and it has been discussed over the last year, as to whether or not
the right form of government exists to really bring these factions
together. I guess the national security adviser to Maliki, Rubeyeya,
wrote a column back in January—I am sure you are familiar with
it-stating that “[t]he current political framework is based on a
pluralistic, democratic vision that, while admirable, is entirely un-
suited to resolving the three-way divide. It ignores the underlying
issues and expects that a consensus will emerge simply by enacting
a liberal, constitutional legal order.”
He goes on to say that “[p]luralistic democracy will not take root
unless the National Political Compact recognizes and accommo-
dates the fears and the aspirations of the Iraq community,” and
then he talks about some other factors in there.
I would like you to comment on the expectation level. It has got
to be terribly frustrating, doing what you guys do every day, but
do we have the right mix here to have an expectation level that we
can reach in the next year?
Ambassador CROCKER. Well, I think we do, Congressman. What
Dr. Rubaie was talking about, what the thrust of that op-ed was,
was the creation of regions within Iraq. There is already a Kurdish
region.
Mr. COSTA. We were there. It seems to be doing well.
assador CROCKER. Exactly. There is a regions law that was
passed 18 months ago. There was a moratorium on its effective
date that will become effective, actually, this month, and that will
permit a province, or a grouping of provinces, to begin a process of
regionalization, if they so choose.
Mr. COSTA. Included in that are the five contracts that the Kurds
had signed on the oil leases. Will they be observed by the govern-
ment in Baghdad?
Ambassador CROCKER. Well, this is some of the unfinished busi-
ness in determining who has authority to do what, and the validity
of those oil contracts on a national resource signed by a regional


82
government is contested now between the Federal Government and
the regional government. It is one of the things they are going to
have to work out.
Mr. COSTA. I have more questions. I do not have any more time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and keep up the good work, gentlemen.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. My
metric is arithmetical, and it is down to one, and I recognize the
gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee.
Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for allowing the
hearing to conclude with my final questions. Good afternoon, Gen-
eral Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Let me again thank you
both for your service. Both of you, as well as our very brave troops,
have made countless sacrifices.
I am one, however, who believes, like many, that there is no mili-
tary solution in Iraq. We are occupying a country that has de-
scended, really, into a civil war, which our troops are basically
called to referee, and this was very clear last week in Basra when
American commanders felt obligated to risk American troops to res-
cue, for the most part, Iraqi forces from an unwise, ill-conceived,
and unilateral decision by the Prime Minister of Iraq, and it is re-
ported that at least 1,000 Iraqi security forces refused to fight or
abandon their posts.
It appears also, and we have heard this over and over today, that
Iran has gained a very strong foothold in Iraq and that al-Qaeda
is still ever present.
So, first, General Petraeus, can you explain al-Qaeda's presence
and Iran's role in Iraq prior to “shock and awe” 5 years ago, and
is America safer now?
Secondly, General Petraeus, let me just say, and some have men-
tioned, that many see the signs that parallel the march to war
against Iraq now setting the stage for a preemptive military strike
against Iran. You mentioned earlier that that is not within your
authorization, but, with regard to a flat-out yes or no, are you au-
thorized to conduct military operations against Iran? And I would
just like, again, maybe a flat-out yes or no. Okay.
General PETRAEUS. Could I just give you that answer in private
later? It will reassure you. I think that is probably a classified an-
swer. I would be happy to answer to you right after this, if that
is okay.
Ms. LEE. Okay. Certainly. Ambassador Crocker, let me ask you
the question, and we will go back to General Petraeus. On six occa-
sions—I just want to remind you-President Bush did sign the leg-
islation containing provisions relating to no permanent military
bases in Iraq, but, in December, he issued a signing statement, in
essence, not especially approving of that policy.
So now, with the SOFA Agreement pending, let me ask you, and
you said that we do not intend to seek permanent military bases
in Iraq, the President somehow is not clear on that, so maybe you
are defining “military bases” differently than what he is defining
"military bases.”
I agree that the administration can obligate the expenditure of
public funds to guarantee the security of a sovereign country with-
out congressional approval, especially now that the American peo-


83
ple have spent over $500 billion on Iraq, which has contributed sig.
nificantly to this recession that is hurting millions of Americans.
So could you, Ambassador Crocker, clarify this permanent-mili-
tary-base issue and the confusion of either the President or the
President's staff and appointees?
Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, ma'am. The position is as I stated it
in my testimony. We are not seeking permanent military bases in
Iraq. That is our position. That is something that the Iraqis are not
seeking either, and, as I said, it is our expectation that the Status
of Forces Agreement, when negotiated, will explicitly foreswear
permanent military bases. So I think we are quite clear on that.
Ms. LEE. Okay. Well, Ambassador Crocker, I would urge you to
let the President know that because that signing statement is real-
ly undermining exactly what you are saying
General Petraeus, could you answer my question—I do not have
much time left—with regard to the presence of al-Qaeda in Iran in
Iraq prior to “shock and awe”?
General PETRAEUS. I am not aware of a presence of al-Qaeda in
Iraq prior. There is some discussion of links with some extremist
organizations, but, again, I am not sure how much stock I would
put in that either.
Prior, of course, Iran and Iraq were not exactly kissing cousins
in those days. In fact, they had, of course, a lengthy, 8-year war
that dominated most of their relations between 1980 and 1988 or
so.
Ms. LEE. So how could America be more secure now, 5 years
later, if Iran and al-Qaeda were not present 5 years ago? Is my
time up? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General, and
thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I will look forward to your responses
privately.
Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
Mr. Ambassador, General, we do thank you very much for being
here. We do congratulate you for your and our forces' successes in
the considerable areas where there has been success. Our hearts
are with you. Our minds have some reservations. But thank you
for your patience here, and good luck. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:57 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]





APPENDIX
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
WRITTEN RESPONSES FROM GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS, COMMANDING GENERAL,
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE–IRAQ, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE BILL DELAHUNT, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Question:
What are the sources of your monthly totals, which appear under two categories,
"Coalition Data” and “Iraqi and Coalition Data”?
Response:
“Coalition Data” consists of combat and incident reports rendered or verified by
the units of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). These unit reports are entered
into a database known as the Combined Information Data Network Exchange
(CIDNE) which allows data to be analyzed and sorted.
The category of “Iraqi and Coalition Data” includes all MNF-I reports in CIDNE
as well as reports from the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces. Ele-
ments of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior submit combat and
incident reports through their own channels. These reports are translated by Coali-
tion personnel and, after being screened to prevent duplication with existing Coali-
tion reports, are entered into CIDNE at the Iraqi National Operations Center and
the Iraqi Ground Forces Command Headquarters.
Question:
Why are the deaths reported under “Iraqi and Coalition Data” so much higher
than the deaths reported under "Coalition Data?” For example, for 2006, the totals
are roughly 25,000 versus 12,000.
Response:
"Coalition Data” represents the reports submitted by Coalition forces, and “Iraqi
and Coalition Data” represents all reports verified and submitted by the Coalition
as well as all reports submitted by official Iraqi sources (after removal of duplicate
reports). The difference between the two values represents those incidents reported
solely by Iraqi sources. The differences are attributable to the fact that Iraqi Secu-
rity Forces have been located in areas where Coalition forces were not present and,
although it is improving, in the past, Iraqi reports were occasionally inflated for a
variety of reasons (including sectarian and political influences) and sometimes lack
rigorous analysis and confirmation.
Question:
Do you consider these sources necessarily incomplete, or do you think that there
two categories are capturing the vast majority of civilian deaths?
Response:
It is likely that some civilian deaths occur at a time or place where Coalition and
Iraqi units are not present and therefore no report is submitted. We do not know
the precise magnitude of this missing information. However, trends in Coalition and
Iraqi data are consistent with each other, and this consistency leads us to believe
that, though the exact figure may be inexact, the trends are indicative of the secu-
rity situation in Iraq. In addition, as the Iraqi Security Force presence continues
to get more robust across Iraq, we expect the number of deaths not captured in ei-
ther Coalition or Iraqi reporting to continue to decrease over time.
(85)


88
these capabilities takes time and dedicated efforts. We see indicators of substantial
improvement in the Iraqi Security Forces. Iraqi forces have grown significantly since
September, and over 540,000 now serve in the Iraqi Security Forces. The number
of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coali-
tion support, has grown to well over 100. Eight of sixteen Iraqi provinces are now
under Provincial Iraqi Control, with two more provinces due to transition over the
next two months. Ongoing Iraqi Security Force operations in Basra, Mosul, and
Sadr City demonstrate increased planning capability, mobility, and tactical com-
petence, as well as an ability to conduct simultaneous major operations throughout
the country.
The enablers that Coalition forces provide are in line with expectations and gen-
erally involve capabilities that take more time to build (i.e. close air support capa-
bility). The performance of many units has been solid, and some formations and spe-
cialist organizations are proving to be extremely capable. As progress continues in
increasing the size and the capability of Iraqi Security Forces, these forces will con-
tinue to assume an ever larger share of the responsibility for security in Iraq.
Question:
It is estimated that Iraq exports over 1.9 million barrels of oil per day, with reve-
nues estimated at $41 billion in 2007. Iraqi oil proceeds in 2008 could yield an esti-
mated $56 billion.
Why are we spending U.S. taxpayer dollars at the current rate when Iraq has ac-
crued close to $100 billion in oil revenues in 2007 and 2008? Can you tell me how
much of Iraq's oil revenues have been used for reconstruction? How much of Iraq's
oil revenues have been used for the Iraqi security forces?
Response:
The Iraqi Government has an increasing ability to meet its responsibility to fund
reconstruction and security operations in Iraq, and it is making progress in picking
up a greater share of the load. As Ambassador Crocker recently stated before Con-
gress, “The era of US-funded major infrastructure projects is over.” Instead, we are
focusing our efforts on helping to build Iraqi governmental capacity so that Iraqis
can better leverage their own resources. For example, Iraq's 2008 budget contains
$13 billion for reconstruction, with an additional multi-billion dollar reconstruction
spending package in the works. In terms of security spending, we anticipate Iraq
will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year, and a 2008
supplemental of $4.3 billion for security spending has been proposed.
As Iraqi spending on reconstruction and Iraqi Security Forces continues to in-
crease, U.S. spending will continue to decrease. As an example, increased Iraqi
spending on the Iraqi Security Forces has enabled us to decrease our budget request
for the Iraqi Security Forces Fund for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.0 bil-
lion. This trend will continue over time.
As Iraq continues to spend more and the United States spends less, a period of
transition is needed because Iraqi capacity is still limited. However, Iraqi capacity
is gradually improving as well, as evidenced by a solid increase in budget execution
last year. In the meantime, we are looking for additional ways to help Iraq to lever-
age our capacity to spend its own funds. A good example of this is the Iraqi Com-
mander's Emergency Response Program, which we call “I–CERP.” The Iraqis have
already allocated $300 million for this fund, of which $270 million has been depos-
ited in an account on which Coalition forces can draw. Coalition forces have already
made substantial progress in using this money to deliver schools, health clinics,
community centers, and other projects on behalf of the Iraqi Government to the
Iraqi people.
Question:
I am very concerned about the humanitarian crisis in Iraq from the decades of con-
flict and deteriorating basic services in the country. The International Organization
for Migration (IOM) reports that there are over 2.7 million internally displaced peo-
ple in Iraq. Although the IOM reports that the rate of displacement has fallen, the
condition of those displaced is worsening. The U.N. estimates that conflict and vio-
lence since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 have led to 151,000 civilian deaths, created
tens of thousands of widows and orphans, and cut off 60% of the population from
at least one essential service.
What are you doing to urge the Iraqi government to address this very serious hu-
manitarian problem?
What do you see as the prospects for the return of those people who have been dis-
placed?
ng on rector security spenali and $11 billion, we antic


90
are serving in both countries as well as Kosovo. Currently, more than 10% of active
duty forces have deployed to Iraq three times or more. With countless more troops
facing three or more deployments to Iraq, is there a point at which this operational
tempo undermines our ability to execute our counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq?
Response:
Despite a demanding operational tempo, the forces I see in Iraq are better pre-
pared to conduct counterinsurgency operations now than they have been at any time
that I have been in Iraq. Our soldiers understand counterinsurgency operations and
are more adept at them than any soldiers in our history. Our service members,
many of whom have substantial experience, are now better trained and equipped
to meet the demands of this complex environment. Focused on protecting and serv-
ing the population, they remain capable of meeting the demands of intense combat
when necessary. In fact, our armed forces are showing increased sophistication in
areas which include: the use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, time-
sensitive targeting, and the ability of conventional and special operations forces to
operate effectively with one another. Thanks to Congress and the Department of De-
fense, our forces are now also better equipped than they were in 2003. The Mine-
Resistant, Ambush Protected vehicle is a noteworthy example of an equipment im-
provement that has saved countless lives. In short, despite the strain of repeated
deployments, our forces are executing the counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq better
than ever before in our time in Iraq.
That being said, there is clearly strain on the Active and Reserve Components.
I am aware keenly of the strain and the stress on the force, on the individuals, on
equipment, and on readiness. Many Soldiers have completed or are in the midst of
second or third deployments. This is obviously difficult for them and their families.
My own family is well acquainted with the challenge of separation, as I have now
been deployed for more than four and a half years since 2001. Having noted that,
our troopers have incredible resilience. The 3rd Infantry Division, which is com-
pleting its third tour in Iraq now, met its reenlistment goal for the entire fiscal year
halfway through the year. Though it is beyond my brief to determine the overall
health of the services, this is, nonetheless, something about which I am concerned
and about which I engage in dialogue with the Service Chiefs and DoD leadership.
WRITTEN RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE RYAN C. CROCKER, UNITED STATES AM-
BASSADOR TO IRAQ, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR
THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE BILL DELAHUNT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CON-
GRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Question:
I am writing to follow up on my questions during yesterday's Foreign Affairs hear-
ing on Iraq.
First, I wish to thank you for committing to convey to the Iraqi Council of Min-
isters and the Iraqi Council of Representatives that there is a serious dispute between
Members of the U.S. Congress and the Bush Administration regarding the proposed
long-term bilateral agreement(s)
Specifically, it is the view of many of us in Congress, and of the vast majority of
constitutional scholars who have appeared before the Subcommittee that I chair, that
should the United Nations Mandate be allowed to expire at the end of this year, the
continued use of force in Iraq by U.S. armed forces will require authorization by the
U.S. Congress.
The Administration's position-expressed in a letter signed by Assistant Secretary
of State Jeffrey Bergner after one of our hearings—is that if the UN Mandate is not
renewed, there will still be authority for the U.S. to use force in Iraq.
Many of us in Congress, supported, as I noted, by the weight of constitutional
scholarship, dispute that claim vigorously. The 2002 resolution authorizing the use
of force against Iraq had two prongs, one to address the threat posed by the Govern-
ment of Saddam Hussein, and one to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions.
The first prong is gone, and the administration's claim that it continues to be in ef-
fect because of an endless threat in Iraq is absurd. The second prong would dis-
appear with the UN Mandate.
This is what I want conveyed to the Government of Iraq: that if the Man-
date is allowed to expire, and is not renewed as it has been four times be-
fore, then the potential exists for a significant constitutional confrontation
within the U.S. Government.


92
ed from our asfactor in then particular the surge
2006 were of difficult iseiliation. The caders with thes
nespress on a varied national na provide lead to progres the Iraqi govern
General Petraeus/Ambassador Crocker, how will what I see as current short-term
security maneuvers in Iraq, as represented by the so-called surge strategy, bring long-
term military and political stability to Iraq?
You have basically told the Committee here today that the American people should
plan for more of the same in Iraq over the rest of the year. It is nothing more than
a holding pattern. What is your strategic vision for Iraq that will stabilize the coun-
try and lead to a draw down and redeployment of U.S. forces over the next year?
It is clear that Iraqi security forces were not up to the task of standing on their
own during recent military maneuvers in Basra. General Petraues, what must be
done in order for the Iraqi military to be able to stand on its own without U.S. sup-
port and why hasn't that been accomplished yet?
Response:
The surge resulted from our assessment that the intense levels of violence we wit-
nessed in 2006 were a major factor in the inability of Iraq's leaders to make
progress on a variety of difficult issues, and, in particular, issues related to political
accommodation and national reconciliation. The purpose of the surge was to improve
security in the short term and provide Iraq's leaders with the “breathing space" to
engage in a political process that would lead to progress on these issues.
One of the contributions of the surge was to give the Iraqi government time to
improve its own ability to maintain security. In 2007, Iraq added well over 100,000
additional soldiers and police to the ranks of its security forces. It is slowly increas-
ing its capability to deploy and employ these forces.
The surge was also accompanied by the adoption of a counterinsurgency strategy
intended to promote long-term security and stability. Coalition and Iraqi Forces
were deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people, to pursue Al Qaeda-Iraq, to
combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local reconciliation, and to enable
political and economic progress.
The additional security provided by surge forces also amplified a growing grass-
roots Sunni Arab rejection of terrorist activities in western Iraq. This, in turn, led
directly to heavy blows inflicted on Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which found itself facing
an increasingly hostile population. This popular rejection of AQI terrorism has in
large part spread throughout Iraq and encouraged citizens to increase cooperation
with Iraqi Security Forces as well as Coalition forces. The resulting relationships
have laid a much-needed foundation for security cooperation and confidence that has
already significantly decreased levels of violence. In the wake of recent operations
in Basra, we are seeing indications of a similar rejection of extremism, violence, and
lawlessness within segments of Iraq's Shi'a community.
While political progress was not as rapid and extensive as we would have liked,
there has been significant improvement. The Council of Representatives passed key
laws on amnesty, de-Baathification reform, provincial powers, and the national
budget. We regard each of these as essential steps toward long-term stability. The
extensive negotiations and willingness to compromise in the passing of the legisla-
tion are also good indicators of a maturing political dialogue that will also con-
tribute to a more stable Iraq. Planning for provincial elections is now underway-
another critical requirement for future stability.
We view the surge as a successful initiative in that it has reduced violence and
permitted political progress, but it is important to remember that the current situa-
tion is fragile and the gains we have seen are reversible. We will need to base our
strategy going forward on the conditions we see on the ground. Nevertheless, we are
convinced that many essential components of a stable Iraq are beginning to take
root, and we expect continued progress in the near future.
Question:
It is estimated that Iraq exports over 1.9 million barrels of oil per day, with reve-
nues estimated at $41 billion in 2007. Iraqi oil proceeds in 2008 could yield an esti-
mated $56 billion.
Why are we spending U.S. taxpayer dollars at the current rate when Iraq has ac-
crued close to $100 billion in oil revenues in 2007 and 2008? Can you tell me how
much of Iraq's oil revenues have been used for reconstruction? How much of Iraq's
oil revenues have been used for the Iraqi security forces?
Response:
Largely as a result of security gains from the President's military and civilian
"surge” in early 2007, Iraq's oil production and exports have increased steadily over
the last six months, particularly in the north. At the same time, the price at which
Iraqi crude is sold on the global market has risen significantly to prices well above
the $57 per barrel projected in Iraq's 2008 budget. It is important to remember that,
while production and export gains are encouraging, they can also be reversed. Thus,


93
while there are currently projections for a significant windfall in 2008, any number
of events, such as pipeline failures, pipeline interdictions, or inclement weather,
could cause average production and export levels to drop by the end of the year,
decreasing the currently-projected windfall.
It is also important to note that the Government of Iraq (GOI) budgeted a com-
bined $91 billion for overall expenditures in 2007 and 2008. In addition to increas-
ing allocations for reconstruction and security spending, detailed below, the majority
of the GOI's budget can be categorized as operating expenditures (e.g., salaries, pen-
sions, goods and services, social benefits, debt service).
We agree that Iraq must do more to finance its own reconstruction and security
given its increasing revenues. Since 2006, the U.S. Government has been re-focusing
its foreign assistance from bricks and mortar reconstruction projects to programs
that boost Iraqi capacity at the national and provincial levels. At the same time,
the GOI has increasingly borne the financial responsibility for Iraq's reconstruction
needs. Our assistance has shifted to concentrate on people and capacity building
rather than large-scale infrastructure projects, increasing the GOI's ability to pro-
vide essential services to its citizens. We are also providing humanitarian assistance
to refugees and funding small, high-impact projects to support security gains by
Iraqi and US military forces.
Our policy goal is to leverage remaining U.S. foreign assistance to enable the
Iraqis to invest their own resources more responsibly and productively. Programs
such as those carried out through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the
Local Governance Program, and ministerial capacity building efforts are designed
to support ever-increasing GOI reconstruction efforts.
The GOI has allocated greater amounts in its annual budget for reconstruction
and investment each year since 2005, from $5.0 billion in 2005 to $13.1 billion in
2008, an increase of over 150 percent. The GOI also plans to issue a supplemental
of at least $5 billion in the coming months, some of which will be allocated for recon-
struction spending. The GOI is making good on its pledges to spend this money.
Capital budget execution has improved significantly at all levels of government
since 2005, when the GOI spent $1.2 billion of its $5 billion capital budget, to an
estimated $6.3 billion out of a $10 billion capital budget in 2007. We expect this
trend to continue in 2008 given security improvements and improvements in tech-
nical capacity at all levels of government.
The GOI has also increased allocations for security ministries over the last three
years, from $2.1 billion in 2005 to $9 billion in 2008. Security spending, like capital
reconstruction spending, has improved since 2005. The Ministries of Defense and In-
terior spent $2.08 billion out of a combined $2.14 billion total allocation in 2005,
and more than doubled that by 2007, during which they spent $4.6 billion out of
a combined $7.3 billion overall allocation. Ultimately, we expect the GOI to bear the
full burden of the cost of its security forces.
Question:
I am very concerned about the humanitarian crisis in Iraq from the decades of con-
flict and deteriorating basic services in the country. The International Organization
for Migration (IOM) reports that there are over 2.7 million internally displaced peo-
ple in Iraq. Although the IOM reports that the rate of displacement has fallen, the
condition of those displaced is worsening. The U.N. estimates that conflict and vio-
lence since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 have led to 151,000 civilian deaths, created
tens of thousands of widows and orphans, and cut off 60% of the population from
at least one essential service.
What are you doing to urge the Iraqi government to address this very serious hu-
manitarian problem?
What do you see as the prospects for the return of those people who have been dis-
placed?
Are you thinking about property compensation or restitution for those displaced,
particularly since many of those returning will find their properties occupied by oth-
ers?
How do you propose to have any kind of real political reconciliation in Iraq until
these horrendous conditions are dealt with? Do you support Senators Kennedy's and
Biden's calls for the White House to establish a coordinator for Iraqi refugee policy
and increase funding for refugee assistance?
Response:
The United States Government (USG) and the Government of Iraq (GOI) recog-
nize that several aspects of the humanitarian situation in Iraq need to be addressed.
Three of the most pressing humanitarian issues that the GOI, USG and inter-
national community have focused attention on are: ensuring widows and children


94
the increase $8 milliugees strive saut famili upplies
are given assistance; providing essential resources to internally displaced persons
(IDP); and, assisting countries that have accepted Iraqi refugees.
Given the fact that Iraq has historically been a very patriarchal society, the rising
death toll among Iraqi men has created a unique predicament for women and or-
phanages. The GOI, USG, and international community have worked together to
provide compensation to surviving family members to help ensure that they can
purchase the necessary goods to help sustain their families. Similarly, Coalition
Forces and the international community have urged the GOI to ensure that orphan-
ages are well maintained with medical supplies, food, and water to help all Iraqi
children who have been left without families.
While GOI pledged to give $25 million to its neighboring countries that have
taken in Iraqi refugees ($15 million has been dispersed to Syria, $2 million to Leb-
anon, and $8 million pledged to Jordan), the USG continues to encourage the GOI
to increase its assistance for displaced Iraqis. President Bush recently stated that
the GOI needs to utilize its increasing resources in a manner that aids all Iraqis;
which undoubtedly includes IDPs as well as refugees.
The U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster As-
sistance (USAID/OFDA) is the lead agency on issues related to IDPs in Iraq.
State Department and USAID humanitarian assistance targeting IDPs and refu-
gees climbed from $43 million in fiscal year 2006 to $171 million contributed in fis-
cal year 2007. Included in this program expansion is USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA)'s efforts to assist approximately 920,000 Iraqi bene-
ficiaries, which included IDPs and host community citizens and families. OFDA
funding went from $8 million in fiscal year 2006 to $37 million in fiscal year 2007.
OFDA funds activities through five non-governmental organizations (NGO) and
international organization (IO) partners to implement programs that span all of
Iraq's eighteen governorates in the following sectors: health, water and sanitation,
non-food relief distribution, temporary shelter improvements, income generation,
host community support, protection, and IDP data collection and analysis. The State
Department provided nearly $123 million in fiscal year 2007 through IO and NGO
partners to provide health, education, shelter, water and sanitation, and protection
to hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees and conflict victims. Thus far in fiscal
year 2008, the State Department and USAID have together made available a total
of $208 million in humanitarian assistance targeting IDPs and refugees. Since 2003,
the USG has been the single largest contributor of humanitarian assistance for refu-
gees and Iraqi IDPs, providing more than $500 million to date.
The GOI, USG, and the international humanitarian assistance community have
started working together to address these and other issues as they plan for the po-
tential of large-scale returns. The GOI, the office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), and other international organizations are developing a joint
survey to assist in better understanding the needs of IDPs, refugees, and host com-
munities in reference to potential large-scale returns. UNHCR, in cooperation with
other International Organizations and the GOI, has started to develop the different
elements of the survey. It expects to issue an interim report in the fall of 2008. The
U.S. Department of State has convened an interagency working group to begin to
address some of the many return-related issues.
Regarding the issue of property compensation or restitution, the GOI and the
USG both recognize the psychological and physical importance of ensuring that re-
turning IDPs can either reclaim their property or collect compensation. Property
restitution/compensation ultimately is an internal Iraqi issue. However, the USG
has been and will continue to engage the GOI on this and all returns-related issues
The Administration recognizes the urgency of the Iraqi displacement situation
and understands that this will affect national reconciliation in the long-term. In
September 2007, the Departments of State and Homeland Security appointed senior
level officials to work on Iraqi refugee issues: Secretary Rice appointed Ambassador
James Foley as the Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees and Secretary Chertoff ap-
pointed Lori Scialabba as his Senior Advisor on Iraqi Refugees. Ambassador Foley
and Ms. Scialabba have been working closely together to facilitate and streamline
the processing of Iraqi refugee cases for resettlement in the United States. The Ad-
ministration is working towards resettling 12,000 Iraqi refugees in fiscal year 2008.
A senior refugee coordinator has been assigned to the Embassy in Baghdad, and we
have begun processing Special Immigration Visas for eligible Iraqi staff members as
well as refugee cases. We also have helped to organize and have participated in
international and regional meetings to focus attention on the Iraqi refugee issue. We
continue to publicly and privately press for additional support for international hu-
manitarian organizations engaged in providing support for displaced Iraqis and for
governments hosting refugees.
gees angor, USG, and on to address the the office of the ions are developing
lraoin the açilitat
onal melso hanigratisigned


95
n your opinion, see and even more are intve reported to me that my congressional
Question:
Ambassador Crocker, I have a number of Assyrian Christians in my congressional
district. I have met with them and they have reported to me that 1 in 3 Assyrian
Christians is a refugee and even more are internally displaced.
In your opinion, is ethno-religious cleansing taking place with respect to the Assyr-
ian community? What is the U.S. Government doing to protect this persecuted minor-
ity group as well as other minority groups?
Response:
The Government of Iraq is focused on improving security for all Iraqis, including
Iraq's Assyrian Christian citizens and other minority groups. When the fight against
al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) shifted to the northern province of Ninewa, home to a large
number of religious minorities, including Christians, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-
Maliki made it a priority to send Iraqi Security Forces to the area. Iraqi Security
Forces, with support from Coalition Forces, continue their campaign to bolster secu-
rity in the area. In fact, this support often deters criminal organizations from tar-
geting and intimidating minority groups.
Our Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mosul and Coalition Forces have been
working closely with the Iraqi Security Forces to ensure that Christians from the
Nineveh area are recruited fairly into the Iraqi Police force. The Iraqi Police in
Ninewa are in the process of filling 700 positions with Christians to serve in their
own communities. By maintaining a diverse police force, Iraq will be in a better po-
sition to attend to the needs of its diverse minority communities.
WRITTEN RESPONSE FROM THE HONORABLE RYAN C. CROCKER, UNITED STATES AM-
BASSADOR TO IRAQ, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JOHN TANNER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF TENNESSEE
Question:
Ambassador Crocker, at what point does a strong, centralized government in Bagh-
dad fade from the realm of reasonable probability? What is the consequence of a de-
centralized government in Iraq?
Response:
When the Iraqi people ratified their new Constitution, they showed their pref-
erence for a federal state. This decision arose in part from a national desire to cre-
ate a state that could not be absolutely dominated by the center, as was the case
during Saddam Hussein's rule. The Iraqi Constitution provides for a federal system
and the Iraqi Council of Representatives passed a law to establish mechanisms by
which provinces can form regions with additional authorities. (The area of the
Kurdistan Regional Government is the only region thus far.) The recent Provincial
Powers Law, which grants certain powers to Iraq's provinces, constitutes another
legislative mechanism for devolving authority from the center. The exact nature of
Iraq's federal system and the relative strength of the central government and re-
gional/provincial bodies remain subjects of discussion and negotiation among Iraqis,
but it is clear that some degree of decentralization is desired by the Iraqi people.
The U.S. actively promotes the strengthening of governmental and non-govern-
mental institutions throughout Iraq, in addition to assisting the central government
in meeting its national responsibilities. Our Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
play a vital role in improving local governance, supporting the rule of law, pro-
moting economic development, and building respect for human rights. PRTs build
ties between the central and provincial governments that facilitate the disburse-
ment of Iraq's national funds, another step forward in developing an effective fed-
eral system. It is our view that the marked progress occurring at the provincial level
is laying the groundwork for real national reconciliation in Iraq.
Legisla federaleial bodione degrethe strenaddition
Trianal/provjear that soromotes the
sm and the relabjects of discussion is desired bx and non-enment
The U.S.eart that some deam, subjects of disth of the central com
playing economice central and another step progress ocruin Iraq.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RON PAUL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Mr Chairman, I would like to thank you for calling this hearing on the current
state of affairs in Iraq with General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker.
Reviewing the presentations by our panel, I have noted with some concern that they
seem more focused on justifying a future attack on Iran than reporting on progress
in Iraq. Much of the assertions about Iran in Iraq seem illogical, others seem in-
tended to inflame the situation with little justification.


96
-
suspect these in reality designed for a permanen militias to under hw the United
an set und the alleis tying, partipolitical parn Zone
Particularly, I am concerned about claims that a new enemy in Iraq has emerged
with ties to Iran. First we were told that the enemy was Saddam Hussein and his
Baathist Party. Then we were told the enemy was the “dead-enders” from Saddam's.
former government. Then the prime enemy became “al-Qaeda in Iraq,” a prime focus
of the presentation by Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus last September.
Now we are told that the new enemies are mysterious “Special Groups” that are
said to have spun off from al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.
If this phenomenon of constantly emerging enemies bent on destabilizing Iraq is
accurate and our presence in Iraq keeps generating new enemies, perhaps the prob-
lem is the occupation itself. If this is the case, doesn't it make sense that our depar-
ture from Iraq may actually have a stabilizing effect?
I suspect these allegations that Iranian-supported “Special Groups” are now the
prime enemy are in reality designed to provide an excuse for a planned US attack
on Iran or are meant as justification for a permanent US military presence in Iraq.
It makes little sense to assert that Iran is funding militias to undermine the Iraqi
government. The current Iraqi government may have been approved by the United
States, but essentially it was made in Iran. The leading political parties of Iraq, the
DAWA and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council have close ties to Iran. Leaders of
these parties were in exile in Iran until the US invasion of Iraq. Iranian president
Ahmadinejad is warmly welcomed in Baghdad by Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki. Why
would Iran set up militias in the south to destabilize a government with such strong
Iranian ties? I find the allegation that Iran just cannot tolerate an elected govern-
ment next door to be unsatisfying, particularly considering that Iran itself regularly
holds elections where a wide variety of political parties compete for power.
It is alleged that the rockets fired into the Green Zone during the recent clashes
in Baghdad and Basra were made in 2007 in Iran. Is it not true, however, that if
the Iranian government were to actually arm the Iraqi militias, these groups would
have more modern weapons to counter U.S. helicopter gunships and heavy tanks?
Is there any hard proof that the Iranian government is arming groups in Iraq?
There are reports that thousands of US weapons have gone missing in Iraq. If some
of these turn up in the hands of insurgents, would it make sense to suggest that
the US government is intentionally arming them?
In fact, there is plenty of evidence that Iran is trying to prevent the further desta-
bilization of Iraq, which makes sense considering that Iran is next door and would
keenly feel the effects of an Iraq fallen into civil war. The Associated Press reported
yesterday that the Iranian government has condemned attacks on the “Green Zone”
in Iraq. According to other press reports, the government of Iran brokered a
ceasefire after recent Iraqi government moves against elements of al-Sadr’s Mahdi
Army in Basra.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by again stating my concern that the real
purpose of today's testimony is to further set the stage for an attack on Iran. Con-
gress should make it very clear that there is no authority under current law for an
attack on Iran. It is in our best interest to talk with Iran and to work with Iran
to help stabilize the situation in Iraq. It is also in our immediate interest to remove
US forces from Iraq as quickly as it is safe to do so.
to be unswide variered int007 in
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GENE GREEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. I would like to wel-
come General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker here today and more importantly
thank you for your service to our country.
Despite your continuing efforts and the efforts of our brave men and women in
the armed services, the situation in Iraq is still dismal.
General Petraeus, on March 13, 2008, you told a group of journalists that U.S.
officials believe that the Iraqi government's progress on national reconciliation and
its conditions of public services have been insufficient to date. In addition, the Iraqi
government continues to fail to meet the eighteen benchmarks that were tied to
funding authorized by the 2007 supplemental appropriations act. On September 4,
2007 the Government Accountability Office released a critical assessment of Iraq's
progress towards these eighteen political and military benchmarks. While the Iraqi
government has made some headway since September, political conflict between
provincial leaders and the Maliki government as well as Sunni/Shia tensions con-
tinue to thwart most progress. The fact that Muqtada al-Sadr was better able to
affect events in Basra than the Iraqi government shows how little influence the
Iraqi government has outside of Baghdad. The Administration's strategy toward the
Iraqi government is not working.


97
I am also concerned about the state of the military and the impact of Iraq on our
war-fighting ability. CIA Director Michael Hayden recently said that a terrorist at-
tack against the United States would most certainly originate from the Afghan-
Pakistan border region. Yet, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mi-
chael Mullen, has indicated that we do not have enough troops in Afghanistan, and
that we do not have the ability to send more because of the demands of the Iraq
War. Because of this, our efforts against Al Quaeda in Afghanistan are threatened.
As I have said before, this indefinite, open-ended commitment of our resources and
troops cannot continue.
Yet, General Petraeus, in your Senate testimony yesterday you recommend that
we implement an open-ended suspension of U.S. troop withdrawals this summer due
to the recent upsurge in violence. However, there are many accounts that areas that
are currently stable, are apt to revert into violent, unstable areas at any time. The
Iraqi government must be held accountable and forced to make progress, or we
should start redeploying our troops. We cannot continue to police a civil war that
is depleting our military resources and hampering our ability to recruit and main-
tain experienced military personnel. Yet the Administration continues to send us
funding requests that do just that.
I look forward to the testimony from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker
today, and I again thank the chairman for holding this hearing.
we uelu accountable and forced to meas at any time the
Tragility. Budoperatio not irree on the bo
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MIKE PENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA
I welcome back our distinguished witnesses and I thank you both for your ex-
traordinary service to this country. During each of my last two visits to Iraq I was
hosted by our esteemed witnesses. I am glad to return the favor in welcoming them
today.
Tragic events ebb and flow in Iraq. There is the constant threat of bloodshed and
instability. But the direction is also unmistakable. Because of the surge and because
of newfound cooperation by Sunni Arabs, we are making significant progress in Iraq
but that progress is not irreversible. It is still possible to squander those hard
fought gains by overconfidence on the battlefield or by initiating a reckless and pre-
cipitous withdrawal.
What I saw first hand in my last two trips to Iraq is born out in the testimony
of our witnesses today. Despite the unwillingness of many in Washington to accept
it, the surge is working. Significant military and political progress has been
achieved during the past 15 months, but the fight is far from over.
General Petraeus has made repeated references to the “fragile” nature of our suc-
cesses. I welcome his candor and modesty, but fragile progress is not insignificant
progress. And fragile progress is not unmeasurable progress. Violence in Iraq in the
form of sectarian attacks, civilian and military casualities have been dramatically
reduced since the advent of the surge and the American people deserve to know
that. However fragile, our gains in Iraq have been substantial and I commend our
witnesses for their parts in bringing about this transformational change in Iraq.
I recall the debate we had on the House floor last year about the President's deci-
sion to surge forces in Iraq with new commanders and new tactics. Many current
leaders in Congress opposed the surge. Many said the surge would not work, that
the war was “lost.”
Because they believed the surge would not work, many said the only way forward
in Iraq was backward to retreat and withdrawal. But as our witnesses attest today,
the surge is working and the progress, while fragile, has been significant and has
paved the way for measurable political progress in Iraq.
Not all the trends in Iraq are to my liking, to be sure. I share everyone's concerns
about the pace of reform by the Iraqi government and the problem of corruption.
I yield to no one in my concern for the expenditure of scarce taxpayer resources.
I authored an amendment in 2003 to the Iraq supplemental funding bill, calling for
all reconstruction to take the form of a loan. I still support this. But focusing on
dollar amounts without a view of the overall security situation is short-sighted.
Practically everyone in Congress has correctly praised our troops' sacrifice and
heroism. Almost all of us have lamented the heavy burden, the operational tempo,
required to sustain repeated deployments in support of the War on Terror. Mobiliza-
tion of the National Guard and Reserve components affect virtually every congres-
sional district, inducing mine in Indiana. There have been heartbreaking sacrifices
in the lives of thousands of American families. But we must not permit those sac-
rifices to have been in vain.
wed the surge wowithdrawal.agile, has bee
Imant in 2003 to the Iraq supplementai


98
To those who clamor for retreat, to those who call for withdrawal before this work
is completed, I ask “At what cost?” At what cost are we willing to accept a politically
motivated retreat? What losses are we ready to accept? Loss of security? Loss of
prestige? The loss of more lives? Loss of blood-bought freedoms for the Iraqi people?
Let there be no mistake about the consequences of failure in Iraq. The void cre-
ated by an untimely American departure, will not be left void. It will be filled. We
know it will not be filled by friends of freedom and democracy. And whatever errors
or flaws we have witnessed in our strategy to-date, they will pale in comparison to
the tragedy and destruction awaiting us and the Iraqi people if we fail to bring this
matter to a successful conclusion.
To turn our backs on a widening American success at this critical time would en-
sure a widening conflict, expanding tyranny and growing human misery.
America has always had to make the hard decisions in defense of liberty. Ours
is a noble tradition of running into the burning building while others are running
out. Our forefathers and our men and women in the field today know why they sac-
rifice even when some forget. Again, we are faced with difficult decisions. Experts
will debate which strategies worked and which ones did not, but history will judge
either our resolve in the battle against freedom's foes, or it will record our retreat
and the human tragedy which followed.
Mr. Chairman, at this critical hour, we must show the patience of a diplomat and
the perseverance of a soldier. On behalf of our national interest and in defense of
the cause of liberty, we must advance, not retreat. We must advance with respon-
sible diplomatic efforts and advance with reasonable security measures. Strategies
may change, but our resolve must not. This is our duty.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome our two distinguished wit-
nesses: General David H. Petraeus, the Commanding General of the Multinational
Force in Iraq, and the Honorable Ryan C. Crocker, United States Ambassador to
Iraq. I would like to begin by thanking you for your exemplary service to our nation.
I had the opportunity to meet with you both in Iraq last month, and I thank you
for traveling to Washington to appear before us today, on the fifth anniversary of
the capture of Baghdad by U.S. forces. As we work to resolve the ongoing conflict
in Iraq, it is essential that we obtain as much accurate information as possible
about the situation on the ground. I look forward to your informative testimony.
We have achieved the military goals laid out by the 2002 Resolution.
In 2002, when I voted against the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United
States Armed Forces Against Iraq, I did so because I believed that this would be
a war without end. I believed this resolution would trap us in a conflict that, like
the Vietnam war, would consume American resources and lives without tangible
yield. Unfortunately for the people of both this country and Iraq, I was right. The
2002 Resolution that provided the authorization for the use of military force in Iraq,
and authorized the President to:
“(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing
threat posed by Iraq; and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding
Iraq.”
Specifically, the resolution called for the disarming of any weapons of mass de-
struction in Iraq, removal of the rogue Iraqi regime, the capture of any al-Qaeda
operatives in Iraq, as well as the promotion of democracy in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, our troops have achieved extraordinary military success in Iraq,
toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein in only 21 days, assuring the world that
Iraq does not possess weapons of mass destruction, assisting the Iraqis in holding
free elections, and setting the nation on a path toward democracy. However, while
our troops have achieved the objectives for which they were sent to Iraq, they are
now caught in the midst of a sectarian conflict. Unfortunately, there is no military
solution to Iraq's ongoing political and sectarian conflicts. This is a war without end.
Though President Bush continues to rely on a strategy that seeks to stabilize and
reconcile Iraq by force, only the Iraqi government can secure a lasting peace. Thus
far, the Iraqi government has demonstrated an inability or an unwillingness to de-
liver on the political benchmarks that they themselves agreed were essential to
achieving national reconciliation, which was the rationale and stated objective of the
surge.
ssess weapine nation on a pathich they were se there is no militant


102
that our veter our veterans are taken the war. We need to helper
Americans currently without adequate health insurance with access to medical and
dental care at community health centers.
While the U.S economy is facing a recession, our ability to implement a full-scale
economic stimulus package has been hampered by the enormous government ex-
penditures on the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Members of the House
of Representatives, it is our duty to ensure the security of the American people, both
fiscally and physically. American economists agree that the outrageous funds Amer-
ica has spent on the ill-advised war efforts has hit Americans hard, within their
homes and at the gas pumps. Joseph Stiglitz, Columbia University Professor and
winner of the Nobel Prize for Economic, reiterated last month, “There is no such
thing as a free lunch, and there is no such thing as a free war. The Iraq adventure
has seriously weakened the U.S. economy, whose woes go far beyond loose mortgage
lending. You can't spend $3 trillion—yes, $3 trillion-on a failed war abroad and
not feel the pain at home.”
As a Member of the New Direction Congress, I refuse to rubber-stamp this admin-
istration's irresponsible spending on the war. We need to be focusing our funds on
ensuring that our veterans are taken care of when they get home, we must ensure
that our veterans have a home to return to, and we must stand up and hold this
administration and its representatives accountable for their spending.
Humanitarian Situation
Mr. Chairman, the war in Iraq has created an immense humanitarian emergency.
43% of Iraqis suffer from “absolute poverty,” 70% have no access to clean water, and
80% lack access to effective sanitation. As many as 4.5 million Iraqis, or nearly one
in five of the nation's residents, have been displaced due to violence. This includes
2.3 million Iraqi refugees and 2.2 million Iraqis displaced within Iraq itself, and
these Iraqis are particularly vulnerable, facing dire conditions and a desperate
struggle to survive. I feel very strongly that the United States must seek out ways
that it can do more to alleviate this growing crisis.
The displaced Iraqi population is quite unique. It is a predominantly urban popu-
lation, with 36% of IDPs reportedly living in Baghdad. Those displaced to neigh-
boring countries are also primarily living in urban centers, rather than camps. This
seriously compromises the ability of humanitarian aid organizations to deliver much
needed services.
Iraqis have primarily fled to Syria, which currently hosts over 1 million Iraqi ref-
ugees, and Jordan, which has absorbed 500,000. The vast majority of countries in
the region are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the Iraqis who
have fled to these countries are not afforded the rights and protections of refugees.
Meanwhile, the ever-increasing sectarian violence is causing immense daily chal-
lenges for Iraqis. In addition to the millions already displaced, an Iraqi Red Cres-
cent Organization predicts that an additional 80,000 to 100,000 persons are dis-
placed each month. Iraq has become a humanitarian disaster, and one that con-
tinues to get worse every day.
Women and children are particularly vulnerable. Some 80% of the displaced are
women and children, and, as a result of four years of high Iraqi casualties (the ma-
jority of whom have been male), many households are now headed by women. Be-
cause many of the women who have fled to Syria are barred from seeking legal em-
ployment, thousands have been forced into prostitution to support themselves and
their children.
As Chair of the Congressional Children's Caucus, I am particularly disturbed
that, according to UNHCR, a total of 2 million Iraqi children are displaced. Further-
more, 28% of Iraqi children are malnourished. Displaced Iraqi children are particu-
larly vulnerable. Iraqi children are not allowed to enroll in school in Syria, and over
90% of school age children in Jordan cannot afford to attend school. In all, over
800,000 may now be out of school, and many children instead go to work as child
laborers to help support their families.
I am particularly appalled that, in the midst of this enormous refugee crisis, the
President's FY 2009 budget request includes deep cuts for refugee programs. The
Administration's request of $764 million for refugee assistance would represent a
cut of $260 million, or 25.4%, in comparison with last year's totals, and would likely
require expanded funding to be appropriated through a supplemental request. With
the increasing number of refugees globally, and ongoing conflicts not only in Iraq
but also in Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and elsewhere producing ever-growing
numbers of people fleeing violence and instability, it is extremely irresponsible and
morally reprehensible that the Bush Administration plans to decrease funding for
refugees.
Mr. Chairman, the enormous number of displaced Iraqis is both a serious problem
in itself and a symptom of ongoing violence and instability in Iraq. I believe that
the women which many households are now headas
he Bush a instabilit elsewhng confidental rewould like a


103
savu istening to the Lieutenant Gonna
phasianistan if we feOnited Statesnistan, the firant General,
it is important that we address both of these serious issues, that we work to meet
the needs of those already displaced, and to prevent further displacement by work-
ing to create a more secure environment within Iraq. So long as sectarian violence
continues unabated, the pattern of population displacement too will continue to ac-
celerate. Experts recognize that the ability of the international community to effec-
tively address the displaced persons issue. Reconciliation will also augment the abil-
ity of the Iraqi government to build their capacity to provide security, as well as
basic services, for those returning to their homes.
Weakening our National Security
As a Senior Member and subcommittee Chairwoman on the Committee on Home-
land Security, I am also particularly concerned that evidence suggests that not only
is increased U.S. military presence in Iraq not making that nation more secure, it
may also be threatening our national security by damaging our ability to respond
to real threats to our homeland. Nearly seven years have passed since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, and President Bush has not caught the perpetrator,
Osama bin Laden. Instead, he has diverted us from the real war on terror to the
war of his choice in Iraq.
Last week, the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, of which I am
a Member, heard testimony on “Strategic Chaos and Taliban Resurgence in Afghani-
stan” from a distinguished panel that included U.S. retired Lieutenant General
David W. Barno. After listening to the Lieutenant General describe the acute need
for more U.S. resources in Afghanistan, the first front in the war on terrorism, I
asked whether the United States would ever be able to meet its commitments in
Afghanistan if we keep pouring lives and resources into Iraq. Lt. General Barno em-
phasized that Iraq continues to be an enormous drain on our military, and that our
involvement in Iraq is significantly hindering our ability to effectively fight ter-
rorism in Afghanistan.
Lt. General Barno is not the only one to have expressed this grim reality. Admiral
Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated, “so, should we
be in a position where more troops are removed from Iraq, the possibility of sending
additional troops [to Afghanistan]—where we need them, clearly—certainly is a pos-
sibility. But it's really going to be based on the availability of troops. We don't have
troops—particularly the Brigade Combat Team size—sitting on the shelf, ready to
Mr. Chairman, according to a National Intelligence Estimate released in July
2007, Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and the area along the Pakistan border has regained
its strength over the past several years. The NIE, entitled “The Terrorist Threat to
the U.S. Homeland,” projected Al-Qaeda's strength in the region to be comparable
to its pre-9/11 abilities. According to testimony by Director of National Intelligence
Mike McConnell, delivered in February, Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai's
government controls only one-third of the country. The rest, ominously, is controlled
by either the Taliban or local tribal leaders. Similarly, the United Nations reports
a sharp increase in insurgent and terrorist violence in Afghanistan during 2007, re-
sulting in an estimated 8,000 conflict-related deaths and an average of 566 incidents
per month. As stated by General James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps,
we “cannot have one foot in Afghanistan and one foot in Iraq.”
Whether or not we believe the war in Iraq is crucial to the war against terrorism,
it certainly is not the only front to this global effort, and we must ensure that we
are able to devote sufficient attention to serious threats, both actual and potential,
to our national security. It is becoming painfully clear that the war in Iraq, and in
particular the President's troop surge, has vastly diminished our military readiness.
According to Retired Major General Arnold Punaro, of the Commission on the Na-
tional Guard and Reserves, “We think there is an appalling gap in readiness for
homeland defense, because it will be the Guard and reserve that have to respond
to these things.”
Mr. Chairman, General Richard Cody, Army Vice Chief of Staff, stated earlier this
month that “When the five-brigade surge went in ... that took all the stroke out
of the shock absorbers for the United States Army ... I've never seen our lack of
strategic depth be where it is today.” He is far from alone in his views. 88% of cur-
rent and former military officers surveyed by Foreign Policy magazine and the Cen-
ter for New American Security believe that the Iraqi war has “stretched the U.S.
military dangerously thin,” while 60% say that the U.S. military is weaker than it
was five years ago.
Mr. Chairman, according to the Department of Defense, over 468,500 members of
the National Guard and reserves have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan,
26,386 of whom hail from my home state of Texas. Nearly one quarter of these
brave Americans have been deployed more than once. One year ago, the Commission
go.”
Acconi Gua defense
of the shocko ih be where it ficers survey that the Iraqi w. military i