Y 4.AR 5/2 A:
2007-2008/85
[H.A.S.C. No. 110–85]
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S ASSESSMENT
OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S RECORD
OF PERFORMANCE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 5, 2007
Pennsylvania State University
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
HOWARD P. “BUCK” McKEON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JEFF MILLER, Florida
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
TOM COLE, Oklahoma
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
ROB BISHOP, Utah
MARK UDALL, Colorado
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director
MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member
STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member
MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant
(II)


CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
HEARING:
Wednesday, September 5, 2007, Comptroller General's Assessment of the
Iraqi Government's Record of Performance ..
........
APPENDIX:
Wednesday, September 5, 2007 ......
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2007
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S ASSESSMENT OF THE IRAQI
GOVERNMENT'S RECORD OF PERFORMANCE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Committee on Armed
Services
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee
on Armed Services ..
WITNESSES
Walker, Hon. David M., Comptroller General, U.S. Government Accountabil-
ity Office ........
APPENDIX
PREPARED STATEMENTS:
Walker, Hon. David M. ....
..............................
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
Mr. Ellsworth ....
Mr. Murphy .......
(III)


ourselves why should we expect this record to be different in the
nd whether further American efforts will be of any effect.
It is not clear to me why we should continue to move ahead with
this strategy at the cost of American lives and dollars if the Iraqis
are not stepping forward themselves.
Over the next week this committee will hold four hearings, in
which this is the first. To look at Iraq policy and hopefully help
members come to some agreement as to how we should proceed,
this hearing is appropriate to go first to create a baseline for our
future discussions. And I thank Mr. Walker greatly for his testi-
mony, not just today, but Mr. Walker, you've been very, very kind
with your time and your advice on previous occasions. We appre-
ciate it.
Before I turn to the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton, my
friend, for remarks he would like to make, let me make one admin-
istrative comment. If it becomes clear during the course of the
hearing that some of this discussion should occur in a closed ses-
sion, I am prepared to adjourn the hearing early at 12:30 so we can
meet for a classified briefing with the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) at that time in Room 2212. I hope we can keep the
discussion open if we can. But if we must adjourn, if members feel
that we must, we will just have to do it.
So again, David Walker, thank you so much for being with us.
Mr. Saxton.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
NEW JERSEY, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the
Honorable David Walker for being with us here today. He has done
a great professional job that we always expect and that he always
does. I want to start by saying that while it is important that we
continue to assess the progress being made in Iraq, I have some
concerns about the hearing this morning. First, the benchmarks
were put in place to enable us to assess the progress being made
in Iraq. However, the mandate given to the GAO was to report on
whether the benchmarks had been met. Those are two different
things. By solely examining whether each benchmark was
achieved, without considering the actual progress being made
under each area, it appears that this hearing has been set up with
a goal of providing a negative picture by failing to accurately reflect
the current activities on the ground in Iraq.
Second, there are no Administration officials here to provide the
complete story on the GAO report card.
And third, almost daily there has been more and more positive
news being reported on the progress being made in Iraq. And yet
today we will be turning a blind eye, or at least it appears to me
that way, to this progress, which is very concerning to me.
On the intent of the benchmarks, the first point that I raised
earlier this year—Mr. Chairman, as you correctly pointed out, Con-
gress mandated a series of progress reports to gauge the Iraqi gov-
ernment's performance on a variety of benchmarks. Some bench-
marks, as you also pointed out, Mr. Chairman, such as enacting
legislation on de-Baathification, on amnesty, on the military disar-
mament program, came from the Iraqi's own national reconciliation


Tha
plan. Still other benchmarks, such as forming a constitutional re-
view committee, completing a constitutional review itself, passing
legislation for equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources, and
providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support the
Baghdad security plan originated with the Iraq Prime Minister
Nouri al Maliki. These were all Iraqi goals, and they are today.
oplemental appropriations act. Public Law 110-28. later
outlined a total of 18 benchmarks, but set no deadlines for the
Iraqi government. Instead Congress mandated that the Adminis-
tration assess Iraqi progress on the benchmarks so that we will be
informed as we possibly
e possibly could be about the political, economic, and
military efforts underway and the trends associated with them.
The President's interim assessment in mid-July stated that the
Iraqis had made progress on eight benchmarks and unsatisfactory
progress on another eight. It further stated that as of mid-July it
was too soon to measure the progress on two measures, saying that
the prerequisites for legislation on both amnesty and a strong mili-
tia disarmament program were not yet present.
But now today, interestingly enough, Congress has required the
Comptroller General to determine whether or not the Iraq govern-
ment has achieved 18 benchmarks. That was never the intent. I
say interestingly enough because the legislation set no deadlines.
And of course the task force before Mr. Walker was different than
that of the Administration. Whereas the President was to provide
an interim report in July and a final report in September, an as-
sessment of progress toward meeting the benchmarks, the Comp-
troller General was to assess by September 1st whether the Iraq
government had achieved these benchmarks; a yes or no, pass or
fail grade.
It is interesting that the Administration's task was to report
progress, while the GAO's task was to report a report card, and
that the GAO report card was due two weeks before the second
progress report. Moreover, I wonder about the fact that Mr. Walker
appears before us today in this public setting and for the record to
discuss his report on how it differs from the President's assess-
ment. And yet as I pointed out before, no Administration witnesses -
are here to provide their views or comment on the GAO report
card. It seems to me that such a one-sided hearing merely provides
a forum for political rancor and rhetoric and not for an open public
debate on how one can define progress in Iraq. And that brings me
to the question of what these benchmarks actually mean and
whether they will accurately reflect activities on the ground. Put-
ting aside the discussion of whether Congress was seeking positive
Iraqi government trends toward political, economic, and military
goals or the achievement of those objectives, I can't help but feel
that trying to boil down the establishment of the new nation to 18
individual measures, many of which are subjective and not at all
interrelated, misses the point. To be accurate, the military surge
which reached full strength in mid-June is working. General
Petraeus and others have told us that there have been positive de-
velopments, such as decreased ethno-sectarian violence in Bagh-
dad, increased civilian cooperation with tip lines and more caches
of weapons discovered and destroyed. And attacks in Anbar Prov-
ince are at a two-year low thanks in large part to the growing mo-


mentum of the bottom-up cooperation among the local tribal lead-
ers, which has knocked al Qaeda and other outside influences back
on their heels.
We hear daily reports. Just this morning CBS reported, let me
quote, CBS, Baghdad, Iraq, one week before General David
Petraeus is expected to give his report on U.S. progress in Iraq,
CBS Evening News anchor, Katie Couric says that she has already
seen dramatic improvements in the country. We hear so much
about things going bad, but real progress has been made there in
terms of security and stability, Couric said on Tuesday. I mean, ob-
viously, infrastructure problems abound, she says, but Sunnis and
U.S. forces are working together. They banded together because
they had a common enemy: al Qaeda. Couric traveled to the City
of Fallujah and Anbar Province, which I might add some of my col-
leagues have done with similar reports, which U.S. forces entered
in April 2003 and again in November 2004. That is the same city,
she says, in house-to-house fighting American forces uncovered
nearly two dozen torture chambers. They are no longer there. We
found numerous houses also where people were just chained to the
wall for extended periods of time, U.S. military intelligence officer
Major Jim West said back on November 22, 2004. The face of Satan
was there in Fallujah. I am absolutely convinced it was true, said
Marine Lieutenant Colonel Gareth Brandl. Couric went on, It is
also the city where four American military contractors were set on
fire, mutilated, and hanged from a bridge by insurgents. Now today
Fallujah is considered a real role model for something working
right in Iraq, Couric said. Reportedly we have even seen this co-
operation spread to the Diyala Province and outskirts of Baghdad.
I find it interesting how 18 benchmarks have fallen far short of
providing the accurate measure of important Iraqi progress over
the last few months. Progress that many of us have remarked upon
as stability spreads due in large part to the so-called bottom-up ef-
forts of our soldiers, Iraqi citizens, and our leaders the Sheikhs. If
our existing congressionally mandated yardsticks cannot reflect the
ins, we must really start to question the value of these
benchmarks.
It took our own Nation nearly a decade to evolve from the Arti-
cles of Confederation to the U.S. Constitution, and through the
amendment progress we are still perfecting it. It took Germany,
Japan, and South Korea even longer to recover from wars and firm-
ly establish their stable institutions of government. And none of
these nations face the challenges that the Iraq government is tack-
ling. None of them had a major terrorist group fermenting violence
and unrest in their borders. None of them had regional actors pro-
viding arms, manpower, and ideological support for active
insurgencies. To my knowledge, none of them had such an imbal-
ance of vulnerable natural resources.
At the end of the day our Nation must decide whether to pursue
victory in Iraq and, if so, at what cost. Today's hearing will not an-
swer these questions. But in acknowledging that we cannot deter-
mine the U.S. direction forward based solely on individual subjec-
tive objectives imposed by another sovereign nation, I do hope to
better gain an understanding of the things to help me consider
more fully our available options from a strategic perspective, what


To complete this work we reviewed U.S. agency and Iraqi docu-
ments, and we interviewed officials from the Department of De-
fense, State, and Treasury; the Multi-National Force Iraq and its
subordinate commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the
United Nations. These officials included, among others, Ambas-
sador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus. We made mul-
tiple visits to Iraq in 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22,
2007 to August 1, 2007. We obtained information from the Penta-
gon up until August 30, 2007. We asked for data through the end
of August. We had data through August 15th, but we did not re-
ceive data through the end of August. Our analysis was enhanced
by approximately 100 GAO Iraq-related reports and testimonies
that we have completed since May of 2003. As the chairman men-
tioned, all of these boards are in your testimony, and I would com-
mend you to take a look at the testimony if you have difficulty
reading this.
First, I think it is important to understand the origin of the
benchmarks. The origin of the benchmarks are not the United
States Congress, and they are not the United States Government.
The origin of the benchmarks are overwhelmingly from the Iraqi
government. Going back to June of 2006 and reaffirmed in subse-
quent statements by Prime Minister Maliki of Iraq in September
2006 and January 2007, the commitments on these benchmarks
were most recently stated in a May 2007 international compact for
Iraq.
The second board, if we can, as of August 30, 2007, based upon
our independent and professional assessment, we believe that the
Iraqi government had met three, partially met four-
The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me. That would be on page six of the tes-
timony before us, because it is impossible to read the chart.
Mr. WALKER. Sorry about that, Mr. Chairman. Some of those in
the front row can read it. But I agree, when you are back there up
on the top of the dais it is tough, so that is why we put it in the
testimony as well. But I think the key is that the bottom line is
based upon our independent and professional judgment the Iraqi
government, as of August 30, 2007, had met 3, partially met 4, and
did not meet 11 of the 18 benchmarks. If you want to break that
down by the three categories, you will find that they had met one,
partially met one, and not met six in the legislative area. On the
security area they had met two, partially met two, and not met five
in the security area. And in the economic area they had partially
met one of one in that area. So that is how it breaks down from
that perspective. This chart shows our summary judgment and pro-
vides commentary.
The next board, and also contained in your testimony, notes in-
formation with regard to legislative goals. As I mentioned-
The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, Mr. Walker. That would be page
eight of our handouts.
Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are eight legisla-
tive goals. And as you can see of the eight, the government
met one of the eight as of August 30th; namely, the rights of mi-
nority political parties and Iraq's legislature protecting those
rights. The government also partially met one benchmark to enact


the Administration's July assessment. Several key points here.
Number one, ours is of August 30th; the Administration's was as
of July. As you all know, the Administration is set to report again
within the next week with regard to where things stand now.
Second, as Mr. Saxton properly pointed out, ours is based up
whether or not the standards have been met, partially met or not
met, whereas the Administration's is based upon progress, whether
or not they believe satisfactory progress has been made. I think
you need to consider both. At the same point in time I think you
should note that while there are differences between our assess-
ment and the Administration's, only on one of these 18 is there a
significant difference. By that I mean we said “not met” and they
said "met". Only one. And that is the first one dealing with the
Constitutional Review Committee and completing the constitu-
tional review. I don't know what their new assessment is going to
say. I would hope and expect that you will probably see better rat-
ings in some of these areas from the Administration in September
than July, but I don't know that for a fact.
I will say this: The GAO represents the only independent and
sment that the Congress will receive on these 18
benchmarks. Let me restate that. The GAO represents the only
independent and professional assessment that the Congress will re-
ceive based upon these full 18 benchmarks.
So in conclusion, as of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government
met 3, partially met 4 and had not met 11 of the 18 legislative se-
curity and economic benchmarks. Importantly, in late August Iraq
senior Shi'a, Sunni Arab, and Kurdish political leaders signed a
unity accord signaling efforts to foster greater national reconcili-
ation. The accord covered draft legislation on de-Baathification re-
form and provincial powers laws, as well as setting up a mecha-
nism to release some Sunni detainees being held without charges.
However, the polarization of Iraq's major sects and ethnic groups
and fighting among Shi'a factions continues to diminish the stabil-
ity of Iraq's governing coalition and its potential to enact legislation
needed for sectarian reconciliation. Hopefully these agreements will
ultimately result in laws, but only time will tell.
As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, in our view
it should balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with
military progress and homeland security foreign policy and other
goals of the United States. Future Administration reports on the
benchmarks will be more useful to the Congress if they clearly de-
picted the status of each legislative benchmark, provided additional
quantitative and qualitative information on violence from all rel-
evant U.S. agencies, and specified the performance and loyalties of
Iraqi Security Forces supporting coalition operations. It is not
enough just to look at their readiness. You also have to look at
their reliability. Both are important in order to ascertain their abil-
ity to effectively support the coalition. -
Last, let me say that clearly some progress has been made in al
Anbar province and parts of Baghdad, clearly, as a result of the
surge. The question is why, is it transferrable, is it sustainable?
And the real question for this Congress is not what has happened
in the past, but where do we stand now and what is the proper way
forward, including what goals should we be trying to achieve and
SPO ORIES


what role should our military and other key players within the gov-
ernment play to try to help achieve those goals.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer questions
of the members.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 47.]
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Walker, thank you. Thanks to your staff for
the excellent work that you have presented us today. I will just ask
one question, then turn to the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. Walker, there has been some dispute about the level of vio-
lence in Iraq. And we have heard certain press claims sectarian vi-
olence against civilians is down, and your report seems to disagree
with that. The latest unclassified ĎIA data that we have also
seems to disagree with that.
What is the source of the confusion regarding the violence
against civilians? What is really going on? What standards should
we look at? Where do we go from here?
Mr. WALKER. Well, first there are several sources with regard to
overall violence. And we have unclassified information that is in-
cluded in our report, and we showed that on the board. Whereas
you can see that violence, overall violence increased up until June,
it decreased in July, and we will see the August numbers here in
the near future. That is aggregate violence statistics. And I think
they speak for themselves. And we are comfortable with those
numbers.
Here is where the disagreement is, Mr. Chairman. To my knowl-
edge only MNFI, the Multi-National Force of Iraq maintains data
on sectarian violence. That is a subset of overall violence. And as
one can understand at the outset, it is difficult with any degree of
certainty and reliability to know which of the overall violence re-
tes to sectarian factors and which don't. And the MNFI believes
that their data shows that sectarian violence has gone down. And
in fact we were made available of some of that data through Au-
gust 15th. We asked for data beyond that. We weren't provided
them. We have not been able to get comfortable with the methodol-
ogy that MNFI uses to determine sectarian violence. We are com-
fortable with the methodology that is used to determine overall vio- :-
lence. We think it is important that you consider both.
But let me just reinforce this, that with regard to sectarian vio-
lence, benchmark number 13 says, “reducing the level of sectarian
violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security.”
There is agreement that militia control of local security has not
been eliminated. There is a difference of opinion, a strong dif-
ference of opinion, as to whether or not sectarian violence has de-
creased. So the only area that I am aware of today where there is
a strong disagreement between what we are reporting and what
the military is saying is the sectarian violence portion of goal 13.
That is it. It is not that there aren't other disagreements that exist,
but that is the only one that I am aware of where there is a signifi-
cant difference of opinion, and hopefully I have explained to you
why we reached the judgment we did.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Walker, thank you very much. Mr. Saxton.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me try to be
pleasantly disagreeable on one point that you made, and I again


10
-2..
. T
appreciate the great job that you have done in preparing to come
here this morning. But in your assertion that you are the only
independent and professional reporting service that we will hear
from, I would beg to differ. I understand that the military is not
independent, but they certainly are professional. And I think the
same could be said about our intelligence service, so with that little
amendment.
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Saxton, I agree they are professional, but they
are not independent. And just as in corporate America, the reason
you have auditors is do you want to just rely upon the people who
are responsible for executing? They are totally professional, no
question about that, and you definitely ought to consider their
opinion, but they are not independent.
Mr. SAXTON. We agree.
Mr. WALKER. Thank you.
Mr. SAXTON. Let me just follow up on the chairman's question.
In recent weeks it seems to me that almost every expert, whether
we consider people like General Petraeus or people in think tanks
around town like Michael O'Hanlon, have remarked upon the de-
cline in sectarian violence. Your report notes the level of violence
in Iraq is unchanged. I am going to read here a list of statistics
put forth, as you correctly pointed out, by the Multi-National Force
of Iraq that demonstrate, at least to a large extent, that sectarian
violence, in my opinion, has gone significantly down. And I wonder
if you can explain, given the following information, the GAO report
continues to state that the benchmark for reducing sectarian vio-
lence has not been met.
First, throughout all of Iraq, since the height of the ethno-sectar-
ian violence in December of 2006 until the end of August 2007 the
overall number of civilian casualties killed and wounded has
dropped according to these numbers by 71 percent.
Second, ethno-sectarian violence in all of Iraq are down to less
than one-half of the levels at the height of the violence last Decem-
ber.
Third, attacks of any type in the Anbar province have gone from
a high in October of 2006 of more than 1,350 per month to fewer
than 250 per month today. Overall, incidents of violence against
any target in Iraq are down from a high of 1,700 per week in mid-
June 2007 to fewer than 950 a week today. High profile attacks,
such as car bombs and suicide vest attacks, are down in March
2007 by more than 170 per month to 88 a month in August.
So it seems clear to me that if one looks at these numbers, which
you say are the only ones that exist, one would have to come to a
different conclusion than you did.
Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Saxton. Let me be clear. The data
using is unclassified data that is in the report. And it
is based upon a methodology that we are comfortable with. And it
therefore provides a basis to get a sense for overall trends, you
know from month to month and over time.
Let me also be clear that the information with regard to sectar-
ian violence is classified. We have some information in our classi-
fied report talking about certain issues there. Let me acknowledge
been a decline in what is being reported there with-
out getting into specifics. But let me also reinforce that we are not
a
.
.
.
Loe


15
ancy on data. So let us talk a bit about overall, overall incidences
of violence. Those two are down as well, according to the data.
Do you disagree with the data, or are you uncomfortable with the
data with respect to attacks across the board, from a high of 1,700,
according to the data that we were provided in mid-June, to fewer
than 960 a week now? That is not classified, that is not ethno-sec-
tarian. But is there an agreement at least between you and the
compilers of these data as to the overall violence incidents?
Mr. WALKER. On figure 4, which talks about average number of
daily enemy initiated attacks again the Coalition, Iraqi Security
Forces, and civilians, May 2003 to July 2007, we are comfortable
with that overall methodology. There is other information that we
have, which may be in the classified report, that kind of breaks it
down.
Mr. McHUGH. But overall you would agree, as the data that we
have been provided, that there is a significant reduction in overall
violence in Iraq since mid-June? I understand that is a short pe-
riod, but that is the period of the surge.
Mr. WALKER. If you just look at the publicly available data,
which is in my testimony, that goes through the end of July. There
was a significant reduction between June and July. But it is about
the same level as February. My view is when you are looking at
performance, you need to look at three things: How do you stand
as of a point in time, how are you trending and how does it com-
pare from a contextual sophistication as to the relevant importance
and what is a reasonable amount of progress to achieve within a
certain amount of time.
Mr. McHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. May I interrupt before I call on Mr.
Ortiz? I am having a difficult time in determining how one deter-
mines what sectarian violence is. Assume, Mr. Walker, a building
is blown up, downtown Baghdad, there is no sign or claim of who
blew it up. How do you say this is sectarian, how do you say this
is insurgent done, how do you say this is al Qaeda done or maybe
by some criminals.
Mr. WALKER. That is one of the primary concerns we have, Mr.
Skelton. If you look at the graphic I just talked about, it does break
down between who the attacks are on-Coalition, Iraqi Security
Forces, or civilians.
The CHAIRMAN. There is no calling card.
Mr. WALKER. Right, correct. And that is one of the reasons that
we can't get comfortable with the methodology for determining
what subset of the data that we are comfortable with relates to sec-
tarian versus non-sectarian violence.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ortiz. :
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you so
much for your report. Progress in Iraq is being measured by bench-
marks, and according to your report, the Iraqi government only
met three of those 18 benchmarks. The vendors market is not in-
cluded in what is the benchmarks. The marketplaces where they
pay them up to $2,500 to open the markets, where they fix the
stalls because there is a delegation of Americans, generals, and
politicians coming to see the marketplace. They are surrounded by
30,000 troops, helicopters, and airplanes. When we go to Iraq, we


(19
progress, established progress, which is, I think, what you have
been talking about in terms of is it real, is it sustainable, is it
transferable.
Having said that, one of the benchmarks deals with increasing
the number of Iraqi Security Forces that are capable of operating
independently. That is without U.S. forces being there to sustain
them and support them.
Since 2003, we have spent over $20 billion to train and equip
Iraqi soldiers and police officers so that ultimately they can have
that stand-alone capability.
Your report states that this goal has not been met and that the
number of Iraqi units capable of independent action has actually
decreased. I would ask you to comment on and explain why that
has been after the amount of money was spent.
Mr. WALKER. Let me just note that you are correct in noting that
we said that it has not been met and that the number of units that
can operate independently has declined since March. Let me also
say that the details of that are in our classified report, and it might
be better to talk about that during the classified session. i
Mr. REYES. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, are we having a classified session?
The CHAIRMAN. The question is, are we having a classified por-
tion? We can thereafter, you bet.
Mr. REYES. Thank you.
When one of the major problems we face in building up the Iraqi
Security Forces, as has been mentioned here, not just the sectarian
violence but also sectarian militia infiltration of the armed services,
would you be comfortable in discussing the infiltration as an issue
and as a problem, or would that be-
Mr. WALKER. The only thing I would say is that is a concern. It
has been. It remains a concern, and I think the details would be
something that would be more appropriate to talk about in a classi-
fied briefing.
Mr. REYES. Very good. I will reserve until the classified.
The CHAIRMAN. As I mentioned earlier, if there is a necessity for
classified discussion, we will do that at 12:30, Mr. Walker, and I
hope that meets with everyone's approval, and I realize that will
not get through everyone, but that is the best we can do.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Walker, I appreciate your skill in dealing
with the situation where you knew whatever you all ca
said was going to be used as political fodder in a very intense polit-
ical debate. You knew you were going to be pushed and stretched
into all sorts of policy areas beyond the face of the document, and
I appreciate your ability to try to stick with the objective facts you
were asked to measure.
I have been a strong advocate of using objective metrics to help
as a tool in measuring progress, particularly in areas of national
security.
One of the things I realized in trying to do that on the Intel-
ligence Committee is it is incredibly hard work to try to pick your
metric so that it is useful through the passage of time so that it
is something that can be measured and helps point you in a certain
direction.


20
As I went through these 18 metrics that you were handed, I real-
ized the origin of them, but you would not argue that all are of
equal weight, for example, in trying to determine future policy of
the United States or the government of Iraq?
Mr. WALKER. I would agree they are not of all equal weight, and
we didn't try to weight them.
Mr. THORNBERRY. It occurs to me this discussion, which has been
the subject of great controversy about whether sectarian violence is
going down, is in large measure a function of a difficulty in meas-
uring it. Not whether it is or is not going down, but how do you
know.
Mr. WALKER. That is correct.
Mr. THORNBERRY. So, your position is that you can't know for
sure in a way that is measurable. Doesn't mean it is not happen-
ing, doesn't mean it is happening, but you can't measure it, and
therefore you have to give the results that you give.
Mr. WALKER. Right, and I am not sure that those that are keep-
ing the statistics can reliably measure it either.
Mr. THORNBERRY. I think that is an important point for us all
to discuss. How do you measure whatever it is you are talking
about, and how do you assign importance to the different things
that you are talking about?
I am struck by that, too, when you look at the legislative area.
That hits a little close to home for us. You have been a tremendous
advocate, for example, of this Congress taking action to put Social
Security on a more stable financial footing. If you were to give us
a grade about how well we have done on that, it would be ‘not met,
Mr. WALKER. It would be failure.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Yeah. And using, just as a way of example,
even if a bill had passed out of the House and a bill had passed
out of the Senate while you are waiting on a conference committee,
the Administration report would show progress but your report
would show 'not met'..
Mr. WALKER. I don't know. We might give you “partially met” on
that.
Mr. THORNBERRY. I hope that happens. I am not holding my
breath but the point is, as I understand, let's see, 8 of the 18
benchmarks are waiting on the Iraqi legislature to pass a bill. And
one of those has been met so far, and you described already one
of—another that you describe as partially met because they passed
the bill, but it hasn't taken effect yet, is that true?
Mr. WALKER. That is correct. There are eight benchmarks they
have met. One they have partially met. Six have not been met in
the legislative area.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I appreciate the work you all have done.
I would hate for somebody to judge by this standard in a number
of areas because I am not sure that this Congress would come out
as well as a lot of us would hope.
But I also look forward to continuing to work with your organiza-
tion in looking for objective measures to see whether the things are
getting better that stand the test of time. It is a huge job. I am
just beginning to appreciate that difficulty, but I think your folks
can help us do that, and I appreciate it.
right?


22
these specific strategic goals, or we don't have articulation of the
goals for that area.
And I will use one specific example with regard to Iran. The
President in his speech in Australia talked about Iraq being an ally
against international terrorism. And we have heard people talk
about it being an ally against Iran. Well, a democratic Iraq may
have a different view of what its relationship with what Iran will
be.
So my question is, should we be having a hearing here—we have
had this one today on measuring the objectives. Shouldn't we be
having a bigger discussion on what are the foreign policy goals of
this Nation with regard to some of those areas that I outlined? And
then have a discussion about what are the objectives that we are
going to look at with regard to achieving those specific foreign pol-
icy goals that you mentioned in your statement.
Mr. WALKER. Well, first, Mr. Snyder, let me say that what we
did in issuing this report is what the Congress asked us to do on
the time frame you asked us to do it. And in my professional
opinion
Dr. SNYDER. I am not talking about this should be your burden,
I am talking about it in terms of the goals.
Mr. WALKER. But I think we can help you. In my opinion, I think
we need to fundamentally reassess what our goals ought to be:
Micro in Iraq and macro within the region, and with regard to the
Islamic community, et cetera.
Second, we need to define objectives in order to try to help
achieve those macro and micro goals. We need metrics and mile-
stones that will help to assess where we are, how we are progress-
ing, which ones are more important than others, and what is a re-
alistic path, you know, an expectation to have on making that
progress, and we need to have periodic reporting on that based
upon relevant and reliable data that is reviewed by independent
parties. We would be happy to work with the Congress to try to
achieve that should you so desire.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.
The DIA has furnished us a declassified monthly attack trend by
category. I have laid it in front of each of the members. You might
find it of interest. Going back to May of 2003 through July of 2007.
And the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Jones, is recog-
nized.
Mr. JONES. Thank you very much.
And, Mr. Walker, thank you, and I realize that any time that you
give a report, especially during wartime, that it is going to be very
controversial, because it depends on those who are listening and
what side of the political aisle they happen to be on, and I think
that is sad for this reason: The American people are frustrated.
They want to know that the Congress is meeting its constitutional
ity and therefore, however the Congress sees its con-
stitutional responsibility, to help with the White House to have a
direction for victory and a definition and understanding of victory.
It is critical.
You are one that I have great respect for. You have said for years
this country is going financially broke disregarding the war. I


25
So my frustration is I don't think our troops are moving this for-
ward in most places in a positive direction. It is the sectarian stuff
is sorting itself out.
And getting past the numbers for the moment. six to seven
months from now, how does any of what I just described change
in a way that we have a reasonable group to turn security over to,
either a central government—which I think is pure fantasy, but if
we want to talk about that, we can—or to some local militias who
are not a friend of ours. I don't see any of those two scenarios. And
if so, isn't it really time to figure out how to de-escalate?
Mr. WALKER. I don't think all of these 18 benchmarks are equal.
We didn't try to weight them. Congress didn't ask us to weight
them, but I think one of the things that you ought to think about
on a going forward basis is are these the right benchmarks, should
some be added and should you try to weight them in some way?
That brings me back to the point that I said before. It is time
to reassess what are our goals, what are our objectives, who should
be doing what, including what the proper role of our forces should
be.
Mr. SMITH. I just took a stab at that reassessment, actually.
What do you think of that reassessment? As with everybody here,
I have got a lot to learn on this. It changes rapidly. If it is true
the way I just described it, it puts a totally different picture than
we are just sticking it out until we get the security over and turn
this over to somebody we can trust.
So I am curious in the moments left here—
Mr. WALKER. Well, you know, I think it is one thing to help the
Iraqis help themselves, but ultimately there are certain roles and
functions that the Iraqis have to be able to perform on their own.
And there are certain things that only the Iraqis can do: I mean,
pass the legislation, and try to do that, okay?
But I think there are certain things that we are doing right now
that ideally Iraqi forces ought to be doing versus U.S. forces. I
mean, we are a foreign force to the Iraqi people. And most coun-
tries, including our own, don't like for foreign forces on the ground
for too long.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Let me follow through on that, if I may. For instance, what
should the Iraqi forces be doing that we are doing for them?
Mr. WALKER. Well, for example, I think that the most notable
area is that we are trying to achieve and maintain security of the
streets in portions of Baghdad and other parts of the country rath-
er than necessarily just focusing on training the Iraqis and provid-
ing certain logistical air support and going after al Qaeda wherever
al Qaeda might be. That is probably the biggest single issue, Mr.
Chairman, that I would point to.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes.
Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Walker, for your good work, and thank you, Mr. Walker, for being
here and for your good work, and whenever we are doing an analy-
sis of success or analysis of success for any programs, as I under-
stand it, we need a couple of criteria. First of all, you need com-
petent analysts that are doing that, and we certainly recognize you


27
Mr. FORBES. How do you differ in your metrics from their
metrics?
Mr. WALKER. First I question whether it is a relevant metric. Vi-
Olence is violence. Second, I question the reliability of being able
to determine with any degree of certainty that something is sectar-
ian-related versus non-sectarian-related.
Mr. FORBES. Of the metrics that you were given, did you agree
with these metrics and would there have been any changes that
you would have used in this metrics?
Mr. WALKER. First, we can talk more in the classified briefing
about the one issue I talked about before. Second, these are not the
benchmarks that I would pick with a clean sheet of paper up.
Mr. FORBES. Just in conclusion, you think you are more inde-
pendent than Petraeus or Ambassador Crocker. They could have
more information or less information. We don't know that. And the
metrics you used would not have been the metrics you would have
used if you could have picked on a clean sheet of paper but
Petraeus and Crocker would not be so limited because they had a
clean sheet of paper because we didn't dictate to them what metrics
to use.
Mr. WALKER. No. I think you did say that they are supposed to
show whether or not satisfactory progress is being made in these
areas but they do—may do things other than these that you didn't
ask them to do and I expect they will.
Mr. FORBES. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Let me compliment the committee. You are staying well within
the five-minute rule. We get more folks the opportunity to ask
questions.
Mrs. Tauscher, the gentlelady from California.
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much for being here.
I applaud you and your staff for what I consider to be a very
comprehensive report, considering you didn't pick the metrics, con-
sidering that I do believe you are independent, when we stipulate
to some of these things up front, and what has been a Gordian
Knot for both the Congress and the American people for the last
five years.
I just got back from my fourth trip to Iraq last week, and I did
not find the kind of progress that I had been led to believe that
we would achieve. Let me also stipulate that when you have the
finest fighting force in the world and you add more of them, there
will be more security where they can be.
We are now at 160,000-plus troops. There isn't anybody on this
planet that doesn't know that we cannot sustain that number
through March. So we are going to have a withdrawal of troops.
When we have that withdrawal of troops, one of the questions I
tried to ask or did ask and did not get a satisfactory answer out
of either General Odierno or Petraeus last week was what we have
in March, some drawdown, whatever that number is; presumably,
it will be in the 25 to 30,000 range if we go down to where we were
previously. Considering that there have been modest gains, consid-
ering that the Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar have, at least, at best,
a transactional movement toward us to get rid of al Qaeda. Wheth-
er it is sustainable or not, I don't know. In the absence of a central


29
and is this situation sustainable? And I think the answer is it is
not.
Thank you.
Mr. SPRATT (presiding). Mr. Turner.
Mr. TURNER. Thank you.
Mr. Walker, I too want to echo what others have said about GAO
and its reputation and all of the work that you do. S
in all of our committees it is important to get an assessment that
tells us what an agency is doing, what a policy is doing or what
the consequences are of action or inaction. So I want to commend
you and the work that certainly everyone in your agency does.
You have emphasized several times the issue of independent and
professional and maybe a little too much, in my opinion, your em-
phasis on independence, because you know everyone comes with
their own bias, their own funding resources that they have to re-
spond to and the like.
But nonetheless, your statement of independent and profes-
sional—and I want to ask you this question because of what we are
going to be doing next.
In looking at your assessment, I don't think overall there is a
whole lot of disagreement on this committee about the conclusions
that you reached.
But you are preceding General Petraeus and the ambassador
when they come in and tell us what their views are. And with your
emphasis of independent and professional, I know that you don't
mean to diminish what they have to say for us. I mean, General
Petraeus has said that they would be honest and straightforward.
He will tell us if our policies are not working, if we need to be
doing something different or if we are making progress.
I know the people in this committee have a great deal of respect
for General Petraeus.
So perhaps you could give us some guidance as to how you see
us proceeding. We have your independent professional report,
which I don't think you have heard too many people pick specific
items that they had significant difference of opinions as to what
you have said factually.
How would you recommend that we review and critically under-
take an analysis of what General Petraeus and the Ambassador
will say for us?
Mr. WALKER. First, I have tremendous respect for General
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. I have no doubt in my mind
that they are extremely capable professionals that you ought to se-
riously consider whatever they have to say. I think they will give
you their views.
My view is when you are dealing with independence, there are
two issues on independence. There is individual independence and
institutional independence. From an individual standpoint, they
may be giving you their independent view, but they are not institu-
tionally independent from the executive branch. That is a fact.
Second, they clearly are in a better position to assess certain
things than we may be because they are on the ground.
On the other hand, you know, I think it is important for you to
be able to consider what they have to say, what Ġeneral Jones and
his group have to say, what we have to say, and you need to tri-


34
And how should we formulate or what questions should we formu-
late about the al Anbar experience and how it might be transfer-
able to a much larger city, Baghdad, with a much more complex
set of sectarian issues?
Do you have opinions on that?
Mr. WALKER. Based upon non-classified information, first, I think
it is important to note that there was a disproportionate amount
of foreign fighter activity in al Anbar province—al Qaeda, as well-
al Qaeda in Iraq, as well as foreign fighter activity. What changed
dramatically was the tribal leaders and others decided that al
Qaeda had gone too far, allegedly, and therefore they are trying to
fight al Qaeda.
Now, one has to understand that, and one would argue—and I
have heard broad-based agreement here—that we ought to be doing
whatever we can to eliminate al Qaeda. So that is relevant, and we
have to determine how we can transfer that.
Second, al Anbar is about 15 percent, I understand, of the total
Iraqi population. It is not part of Baghdad. It is predominantly a
Sunni community. So when you talk about sectarian violence like
Sunni versus Shi’a or whatever, that is not really that relevant
there, okay? Now not to say that there aren't differences within the
Sunni community, the Shi'a community, there are. But that is an-
other example of where the al Qaeda experience might be able to
be transferable but the sectarian experience might be different
than what we are experiencing elsewhere, including in Baghdad,
because of the demographic makeup of that province.
Those would be a couple of examples.
Mr. LARSEN. So those would be some questions to explore?
Mr. WALKER. And I agree with your characterization. I think you
ought to seriously consider what Admiral Crocker and General
Petraeus say. You ought to consider ours along with theirs and
along with General Jones and triangulate.
Mr. SPRATT. Mrs. Drake of Virginia.
Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Walker, for being
here. I think what is frustrating is that we really tied your hands
and that there is things out there that we can all see that aren't
really able to be reflected on this page.
And I also went to Iraq over August. And when we met with the
Deputy Prime Minister, the question that I had for him was that
it was my understanding that he had the votes to pass the legisla-
tion that we are so interested in. His answer back, kind of sur-
prised, was, well, yes, he had 75 percent of the vote and could very
easily pass the legislation, but if he did that he would be cutting
ntire Sunni politicians out, and they would feel that they had
no impact on the government, no political clout.
So what happens on your report is that all of the legislation is
not met, but number 16, where you talk about rights of minority
political parties, is met. Where had they passed that legislation, it
would have been-I guess you would have had to say those weren't
met, because you would have cut an entire segment out of the polit-
ical process and made them feel—so I don't know how you are able
to weigh when you look at this what it really means. Because when
he explained it, I thought I would much rather they wait, get the


35
cracy a
consensus that they are trying to build in order to pass this legisla-
tion, than to cut an entire segment out of the population.
If you want to comment on that, I have a couple more before I
run out of time.
Mr. WALKER. Of course, Ms. Drake. First, if I understand the sit-
uation directly, and I don't know what was said, that wouldn't
change our assessment on number 16. The infrastructure is there
to protect minorities. But on the other hand, in any
super majority is going to prevail. That is a political judgment
which they are making to say that I don't think it is right to be
able to pass it right now because it could have a significant adverse
effect on the ability to achieve national reconciliation. That is their
judgment.
Mrs. DRAKE. Right. So they lose points instead of gaining points
for trying to do something that will give greater stability?
Mr. WALKER. No, they wouldn't lose any points. We wouldn't
change number 16. That would stay the same. Actually the
be gaining points if they actually passed some legislation. Then the
question is whether or not there could be an adverse effect some-
place else because they did that.
Mrs. DRAKE. The other comment that he made that was so inter-
esting, because he clearly was also disappointed with the national
government, but he wanted us to understand that their focus and
their goal right now was to create the institutions of government
so that one party could not take over; no one could grab power and
be in absolute control. And that is very similar to what Admiral
Fallon talked about recently, and explaining that our objective is
to create those conditions that are necessary for a government to
function, like rule of law and protecting the rights of citizens. I
guess part of my frustration is that you are not able to reflect that,
and maybe like you have said, we need to come back and give you
a wider range to do it.
I also on that same vein am concerned that the economic status
isn't really reflected in the benchmarks either. And I just read this
week about Mosul ready to wear, and that we are going to be im-
porting clothing made in Iraq to be sold in America, as well as-
you never read about the 60 countries that are helping us on the
reconstruction effort. So I just think, to the average person looking
at this and saying things haven't gotten better when there are a
lot of things that can't be reflected in this report—so, that must be
a frustration to you as well.
Mr. WALKER. It is. If I were drafting benchmarks, some of these
would be there. Some of them would be different. There would be
other ones that would be there. And I think that is something Con-
gress ought to seriously consider, and I think you ought to think
about changing
Mrs. DRAKE. And my last comment, and you have addressed it,
and I have heard you say it deals with the level of violence, and
your interpretation and then what we hear when we go. Our trip
we actually met with four sheikhs, two Sunni, two Shi'a, which
surprised me, because I thought they could never even speak to
each other, much less work to take their region back, and to be sit-
ting in the room in front of us, Sunni, Shi'a, Sunni, Shi’a. So I was





55
Figure 3: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative Benchmarks

Drafting
Enacting
) Implementing
laws
SAUS
Laws drahed and reviewed
Draft referred to co
Representatie
Draft amanded by Committee, placed
Speakers Ollice
Fist reading completed
Non calendar by Speaker's Office
Ratification procedures
Law published in Gazette
Orders written by cabiner
Generatother
Ongoing a podoben
Drah placed on calendar by
3389XSSEROSSA
Guidance issulet by Prime Minister is
Ministadother
De-Ba'athifications
Second reading completed
Oral amended by Committee, placed
on calendar by Speakers Office
Third reading completed, wole taken

Hydrocarbon laws
Framework
Revenue sharing
Ministry of Oil Restructuring
Iraq National Oil Company
Formation of regions

Elections
Electoral commission
Provincial authoritiesc
Provincial election law
Provincial election dated
Amnesty
Disarmament and demobilization
No legislation draited
Source: GAC analysis of Department of State Department o! Defense, UN and Iraq Sovesaniyenk dala.
Notes:
'The Iraqi legislature is considering several competing drafts.
"The Iraqi Constitution exempts the law on formation of regions from following the Presidency
Council's ratification process that is set out in Article 138 of the Constitution.
"The draft deals with broader lederal versus provincial powers, according to the United Nations.
*According to State, the Iraqi goverment may not need a law to set the election date, though to date
this is uncieas.
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GAO-07-12211