CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
1
HEARING:
Wednesday, July 18, 2007, Iraq: Trends and Recent Security Developments ...
APPENDIX:
Wednesday, July 18, 2007
.....................
51
WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 2007
IRAQ: TRENDS AND RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member,
Committee on Armed Services
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee
on Armed Services ........
WITNESSES
Kagan, Dr. Frederick W., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute .....
Mathews, Dr. Jessica T., President, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace .................................................... ..............................................................
Perry, Dr. William J., Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Center for
International Security Cooperation, Stanford University
APPENDIX
75
55
......
66
PREPARED STATEMENTS:
Kagan, Dr. Frederick W. .
Mathews, Dr. Jessica T.
Perry, Dr. William J. .........
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
List of Notional Political Timeline, dating from September 2006 to March
2007 ........
Map of the Locations of the Major Iraqi Army and National Police Divi-
sions submitted by Dr. Frederick W. Kagan
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
Mr. Loebsack .........
95
(III)


Provide both positive and negative incentives for the Iraqi Gov-
ernment to accelerate their reconciliation process and oil revenue-
sharing so the Sunnis have a stake in a stable Iraq.
And finally, mount an intensive diplomatic effort to persuade
friendly regional powers to assist economically, politically, and with
training, and to put pressure on unfriendly regional powers to stop
arming militias and fomenting violence.
I would point out to you that this is not a defeatist strategy, but
one that recognizes the importance of stabilizing Iraq, and proposes
that change in strategy that recognizes the reality that for four
years our strategy has not achieved that stability in spite of the he-
roic efforts of our troops.
If the recommendations to the ISG would be followed, many of
our combat brigades would be out of Iraq by the first quarter of
next year. As our Army combat brigades and Marine units return
to their bases in the United States, the Defense Department will
have a huge budget and management problem in restoring them to
full combat readiness. This problem is of special concern to this
committee because of the constitutional responsibility of the Con-
gress in constituting and equipping our Armed Forces.
The Army, all of whose active brigades with high readiness levels
at the beginning of the war, presently has no active brigades not
already deployed, that readiness level needed to meet future con-
tingencies, and low readiness levels invite such contingencies. In-
deed, our security may already have suffered because of the percep-
n of Iran and North Korea that our forces are tied down in Iraq.
The Congress also needs to consider the role of the National
Guard, since the compact with these citizen-soldiers has been shat-
tered by extended deployments that have caused many of them to
lose their jobs, or even their families.
In sum, I believe that the President's diplomatic strategy is too
timid and his military strategy is too little and too late to effect the
lasting and profound changes needed. His strategy is not likely to
succeed because it is tactical, not strategic; because it does not en-
tail real conditionality for the Iraqi Government; and because it
would only deepen the divide in this country.
The ISG proposal has a better chance because it recognizes that
the key actions needed in Iraq to effect lasting results must be
taken by the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Army and because it
provides the support and the incentives for those actions.
Most importantly, the recommendations of the bipartisan Iraq
Study Group provide an opportunity for Americans to come to-
gether again as one Nation indivisible.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Dr. Perry. Again, we appre-
ciate your effort in being with us this morning.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Perry found in the Appendix on
page 66.]
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Mathews, Jessica Mathews, thank you for
being with us also.


cause people hold political dreams and desires for revenge for far
longer than that. And the Iraqis know that they live there and we
don't, and that someday we will be gone and they will remain. And
many of them would plan that way, even if they believed that we
would maintain our present commitment for many years.
So, based on the experience elsewhere and a three-plus-year test
on the ground, I think it is unlikely that more of the same will
produce a united Iraq, at peace with itself. It is a bitter but, I
think, a sounder and wiser conclusion that the American presence
and strategy in Iraq is, as I said, prolonging and delaying a strug-
gle for power that will ultimately resume when we depart.
Second point is that while we have had many—countless changes
in tactics, we have been pursuing the same political goal in Iraq
since 2004, and that is a united government of Sunnis, Shia, and
Kurds working together. We have made no significant-no real
progress toward that in this time.
And the present description of the needed next steps as mundane
and achievable benchmarks if only the Iraqi Government would
work a little harder and not take a summer vacation is a form of
dangerous self-deception. The reason why we have made so little
progress is because these needed steps are hugely difficult and im-
portant ones, in which every Iraqi faces enormous personal poten-
tial gains and losses. They would be hardly achievable in the best
of conditions, and these are the worst of conditions. Why worst? We
know that four million Iraqis are either refugees out of the country,
internally displaced, or dead. In U.S. per capita terms, that is 50
million people.
Think for a few minutes about what that would be like. Could
we under such conditions come together as a Nation, bury past and
present wrongs, and under foreign occupation and direction make
painful and scary political accommodations, amend our Constitu-
tion and reallocate wealth? The question obviously answers itself,
and yet we continue to pretend that the Iraqis can.
Third, we are debating this problem almost entirely in military
terms, which distorts the options available to us. Secretary Perry
has pointed this out. A change in political strategy in Iraq and a
shift in our political attention and economic and military priorities
across the region redefines the possibilities. The analysis has to
recognize, which generally it does not in Washington today, that a
significant change in U.S. policy would change what others are
willing to do.
I believe that the Iraq Study Group's call for a multinational re-
gional effort and diplomatic offensive is a step in the right direc-
tion, but it still presumes that the government—that the current
Government of Iraq would represent that country and, therefore,
that the current U.S. political strategy would continue.
A better approach, a more difficult one but I think a better one,
would be one that more resembles the bond process that success-
fully laid the basis for political transition in Afghanistan. In that
case, Iraq would be represented by all its major parties. The key
foreign governments would participate and support their various
clients. This would be lengthy and chaotic, I recognize, a much
higher political risk than the U.S. has heretofore been willing to
undertake. But it holds at least the possibility that broad represen-


13
With a few exceptions, each month in 2006 was worse than the
last. And by the end of 2006 it seemed apparent to all, including
me, that we were on the path to defeat. In January 2007, the Presi-
dent announced a new strategy, and it is a strategy, it is not sim-
ply a change in tactics. It lays out a clear strategic objective, a path
going there. It is a clear military strategy. It is perfectly appro-
priate to question it. You can disagree with it, you can disagree
with its premises, but it is a strategy. And the assumption is in-
deed that political progress in Iraq will not be possible or would not
have been possible at the level of violence we saw prevailing in the
country at the end of 2006. And furthermore, that the Iraqi Secu-
rity Forces by themselves were unlikely to be able to bring the
level of violence down to a point at which normal political process
would be adequate without significant assistance.
As a result, President Bush announced a new strategy whose
military component focused heavily on establishing security in the
core areas of Iraq that were most violent. And to that end, he sent
additional forces into the country. I want to make the point people
frequently focus on this number of 20,000 troops and how can
20.000 troops make a difference. And it is just five b
so forth. But it is not just a question of what those 20,000 addi-
tional troops were doing. It is also a question of what the other bri-
gades in the country were doing as well, what the other combat
troops were doing. Because even as the new brigades started arriv-
ing at the rate of one a month in January, the commanders in the
field began to take all of the units that had been on FOBs and
push them into the neighborhoods pursuing a fundamentally dif-
ferent approach.
So it is not just a question of another 20,000 troops. It was a
question of what all of the U.S. combat troops in Iraq were doing,
whereas in the past only a handful at a time in any one given place
would be undertaken to establish security. Now, almost all of the
U.S. security forces in Iraq were seeking to establish security.
Neither is it the case that the new troops were initially ear-
marked to Baghdad and subsequently sent elsewhere as a result of
spreading violence. From the outset, Generals Petraeus and
Odierno were explicit that they thought it was not going to be pos-
sible to secure Baghdad without eliminating terrorist sanctuaries
in what they called the “Baghdad belts,” the areas north and south
to the city, in many of which we have had no combat presence for
many years, and that have become very serious terrorist sanc-
tuaries.
As a result, by design, as the new forces flowed in, of five Army
brigades that went in, two brigade headquarters went into Bagh-
dad, three brigade headquarters went into the belts. Of the Marine
that went in, all of them were directed outside of Baghdad,
and that was by design. Forces did move around some outside of
Baghdad in response to changing security situations. But the plan
to attempt to control both the belts and Baghdad was the plan from
e outset. And it is, in my view, from a military perspective a
sound plan.
I will emphasize very briefly that it is a plan that is very dif-
ferent from anything that we have tried in the past. In the pre-
vious period as we tried to establish security in one part of the


14
country or another at a time, we did indeed allow the enemy to es-
tablish safe havens in parts of the country where we were not. The
current operation is attacking almost all of the safe havens that al
Qaeda has established for itself in Iraq at the same time, from
Fallujah through Lake Tharthar, to the southern belt, through
Yusufiyah, Mahmudiyah and now even into Arab Jabour and
Salman Pak, which had been absolutely no-go terrain for us, held
by terrorists for years.
Around into the north in Diyala, we are finally clearing Baquba,
and we are moving around to the north of the city, clearing areas
around Taji and Tarmyia which have also been insurgent strong-
holds.
If you look at Iraq, Iraq is not a limitless place. And when you
speak about the possibility of al Qaeda displacing away from this
operation, there are a limited number of options that they have.
They can move into Kirkuk and attempt to inflame the situation
there, as they have done, although I would note that the recent at-
tacks that we have seen in Kirkuk are actually a continuation of
what has been a steady drum beat of periodic attacks in Kirkuk
that al Qaeda has been carrying out at least since the beginning
of the year.
They can try to move into Ninawa Province, of which Mosul is
the capital, and inflame sectarian and ethnic tension there. They
have made some efforts to do that. We have been very aggressive
in response with Special Operations, and the Iraqi Security Forces
in that region have been very effective.
Outside of those areas, it is very difficult for al Qaeda to find any
bases. They are not going to be moving into the south, into Shia
land, where there is no support and indeed active hostility to them,
and they are not going to find very good safe havens in Kyrgyzstan
either. So, in fact, the operations that we are currently conducting
severely limit the areas al Qaeda can try to move into and push
them fundamentally, with the exception of Mosul, into areas that
are of far less strategic importance than the area we are currently
engaged in securing.
Now, I do believe it would be necessary to conduct follow-on oper-
ations to clear those areas out, but this is not just a question of
pushing them around from one region to another.
At the same time as the surge strategy was being debated, as Dr.
Perry mentioned, we were presented with an opportunity. And it
was an opportunity that few had foreseen. And the opportunity was
that the Sunni sheiks in Anbar Province were turning against al
Qaeda. That was not something that was of our doing primarily.
It was something that resulted from al Qaeda mistakes. But they
are mistakes that are inherent in the nature of that organization,
which in fact pursues a version of Islam, if you want to be generous
and call it that, that is loathsome to most Iraqis and indeed to
most Muslims, and that has very little popular support in the Mus-
lim world. And the evidence is just about anywhere al Qaeda estab-
lishes itself and immediately attempts to impose its version of Is-
lamic law, the locals begin to resist, and al Qaeda engages in a
cycle of violence with them. It did that in Anbar Province, killed
a popular sheik, committed a number of other atrocities, and the


15
people of Anbar, particularly the leadership, started to turn against
al Qaeda.
That process was facilitated by the skillful operations by U.S.
military forces in the province, the U.S. Army brigade, commanded
by Colonel Sean McFarland in Ramadi. Marine forces throughout
the province working to clear the area were very important in
shaping this process. These were among the handful of units, as I
mentioned, that had been attempting to establish security in their
areas despite the larger strategy of not doing that, that prevailed
in the theater, and they were successful.
I will confess that as I read about this project in 2006, I was
skeptical. I looked at the low force ratios that the Marines had in
Ramadi, and I said they are never going to be able to do this. I was
wrong. They were able to do it. And they were able to do it in large
part because they were able to work synergistically with this move-
ment of the Sunni sheiks against al Qaeda in the province. The
surge has dramatically increased the speed with which this process
has been moving forward. As some people put it, even when you
are operating with Sunni tribes and many tribal systems, there is
the desire among them to be friends with the strongest tribe. And
we have established ourselves for the moment as the strongest
tribe in al-Anbar, which is one of the reasons why the Sunni shei
are comfortable working with us and allowing us to serve as a
bridge between them and the Iraqi Government, and, most of all,
seeking our assistance in fighting al Qaeda, which they now per-
ceive as a deadly foe. This process has expanded beyond al-Anbar
Similar awakening movements have developed in Salahaddin
Province in the north of Baghdad, in Bago Province, which is a
mixed province to the south where we have even had Shia tribal
rs come forward and say, hey, we want to do some of the stuff
that the Sunnis are doing in al-Anbar. And it is happening in
Diyala Province where we have had tribal agreements coming to-
gether, tribal cease-fires and tribes reaching out to us to work with
us working against al Qaeda as well.
So this is a process that has been spreading and accelerating
over the last year, fueled, I believe, by the confidence that these
eaders have that we will stand by them and help to ensure that
they can prevail in the struggle against al Qaeda.
It is a very important development. It is not one that I believe
can continue in the absence of a strong military presence engaged
in the sorts of operations that we are now pursuing.
Let me also step back for a moment and point out that this shift
in attitudes in Anbar and throughout the country is pivotal not
only in Iraq but in the global war on terror. We have actually seen
this process occur in Afghanistan as well. We have seen it occur in
Somalia. The fact is that al Qaeda does not have very much of a
brand that has much mass appeal in the Muslim world, but it is
frequently the case, because they are such fanatical fighters and so
determined, that unless an outside force is present to defeat and
contain them militarily, they can terrorize local populations into
supporting them against their will.
I think that is a very important lesson for us to take away from
this conflict as we think about pursuing the global war on terror
in general and the counterterrorism fight in Iraq in particular.


16
Responsible people in this city understand and say repeatedly
that we cannot simply abandon Iraq and allow it to become an al
Qaeda safe haven, and advocate leaving U.S. forces behind to en-
gage in counterterrorism. I am not sure I would challenge them to
describe exactly what sort of counterterrorism operations they have
in mind if they don't look like what we are doing. The sectarian
violence that we are seeing in Iraq right now resulted from the de-
liberate efforts of al Qaeda to create it for their own benefit, and
they are benefiting every day. If we were to leave, they have made
it clear that they will attempt to recreate the sectarian violence,
which has been coming down steadily, get it up to previous levels
and continue to benefit from it.
I do not understand in this context how we can imagine that we
could fight al Qaeda in Iraq without addressing the sectarian vio-
lence that is their primary tool for establishing themselves in the
country.
I would like to make one last point about the discussion of what
the likely consequences of U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would be. I
respectfully disagree with Dr. Mathews about the absence of histor-
ical evidence for the likelihood of difficulty there. I would refer the
committee to the excellent report done at the Brookings Institute
by Ken Pollack and Dan Byman called “Things Fall Apart” that
brings to bear significant evidence that would lead us to believe
that the consequences will indeed be very dangerous. But I would
like to caution the committee and everyone in this discussion for
making the same mistake that the President is accused of having
made—and I think with some justice before the Iraq war-of as-
suming that the post-conflict scenario would be rosy, would be opti-
ic, would go the way we would want it to be. I think we can
make just as large a mistake if we choose optimistic scenarios
about the post-withdrawal situation that are questionable in the
face of many, many reports, some very solidly based, about the pos-
sibility that the optimistic scenarios will not play out. I thank the
committee for its attention.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan can be found in the Ap-
pendix on page 75.]
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman for his comments. I am
reserving my questions until a later moment. Mr. Hunter just in-
formed me that he will reserve his comments until a later moment
in this hearing.
Mr. Saxton, you are called upon, please.
Mr. SAXTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for permitting me
to be the lead questioner here. Let me just begin with this. As I
sat and listened to the witnesses and, of course, most recently Dr.
Kagan, it occurred to me that what we are really trying to do here
is to figure out over time—you don't have to turn the clock on for
me. That is all right. The lights aren't working.
The CHAIRMAN. The lights aren't working. Why don't we start all
over for him. Start over.
We will start all over for you, and we will watch the clock here.
Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, as I was saying, thank you.
It occurs to me what we are all trying to do regardless of our per-
spective on Iraq, what we are all trying to do is to figure out how
to counter the threat caused by al Qaeda and extremist Islamic


17
groups who wish us harm. And as I look at the history of this,
there are efforts that have been made which I think have all been
made in good faith.
We first noticed perhaps—or at least this is my perspective—that
al Qaeda—that extremist Islam was a factor to be dealt with dur-
ing the 1980's, and we chose a course of action which was in con-
cert with them because we had an enemy that we recognized as
being a more—an enemy that we needed to deal with in a more di-
rect fashion. Of course, that was the Soviet Union. So we supported
the efforts of the Taliban. And I guess we could make a case today
that maybe that wasn't the smartest thing to do.
And then during the 1990's, we entered a new phase of engage-
ment with extreme Islamist groups. During the 1990's, we had the
attack on the Khobar Towers, we had the attack on the African em-
bassies, we had the attack on the Cole and others, and our decision
at that point was not to do anything to directly confront them. And
I believe that today we could make the case that that was an error
in judgment.
And then, of course, we had the events of 2001 and a new period
of engagement with Islamist terrorist groups, Islamist fundamen-
talist groups when we went to Afghanistan. And for a time Afghan-
istan seemed to be a successful engagement until, of course, the
groups fled to the other side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
and set up shop all over again, and we found ourselves in that re-
gion of the world with newly constituted groups which today are
said to be as strong as or perhaps even stronger than they were
before 2001.
And, of course, that brought us to Iraq, and as Dr. Kagan pointed
out, our intentions were good. We thought we had to deal with Sad-
dam Hussein, and we went there. And under the leadership of the
Bush Administration and Don Rumsfeld, we decided that our policy
would be a limited military one where we would seek to bring on
board an Iraqi security force that we would be able to leave in
charge. And once again we lived through an era—we worked
through an era where we made mistakes.
And so the question today is what should our future policy be?
And I think I have heard two diametrically opposed sets of ideas
about where we ought to go.
Let me just ask Dr. Kagan this. Looking at the history of where
we have been in this fight against fundamentalist extremist
groups, what is your best guess as to what we ought to be doing
and doing in the future and based on where we have been, Dr.
Kagan.
Dr. KAGAN. I think we are pursuing the right approach in Iraq
right now, and I think it is very important that we see it through
to the end. I think we are making tremendous progress in defeat-
ing al Qaeda in Iraq in conjunction with the Iraqi people. And I
think the historical examples that you have brought to bear are
very telling.
We made a tremendous mistake in the wake of the Soviet with-
drawal from Afghanistan in deciding that Afghanistan was a far-
off place of which we knew little and something we could afford to
ignore. And as a result, we allowed the Taliban to seize power, and


19
have expressed every confidence that they can achieve their objec-
tives with the forces that they have. I believe General Odierno
said, I don't need more forces, I just need more time.
And I would also note that we have changed the training of
Iraqis force. Iraqi forces that deploy into Baghdad now first run
through a training area in Nasiriyah to the east of Baghdad, which
is designed to give them a much higher quality of training before
we deploy them into the streets. And, of course, since last fall many
more Iraqi forces have been engaged directly in combat and have
received quite a lot of on-the-job training. Reports from the people
that I spoke to when I was in Iraq in May tell me that many Iraqi
units are fighting extremely proficiently and professionally.
Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Mathews, you indicated that we are asking the
wrong questions. One of the series of questions we try to impose,
for lack of any kind of metric, any kind of yardstick by which to
measure progress, were some benchmarks which were put into law
recently, and now we are seeing the answers to those benchmarks.
Were those benchmarks the wrong criteria? Do they go in the right
direction? Some have suggested that we are being a bit too harsh,
holding them to standards that are too tough in the midst of a civil
war of this intensity.
Dr. MATHEWS. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I tried to suggest-excuse
me, Mr. Spratt—the benchmarks—and I think the use of the word
and particularly this list suggest—as I said, these are achievable.
They are rather straightforward. In fact, we are asking, first of all,
to amend the Constitution, which was only agreed to because we
promised the Sunnis that it would be fixed to give them a better
deal. And that was a somewhat unrealistic promise. It has encour-
aged them to fantasize about what they can get and to dig in their
heels against further work with the government until they can.
And there is no prospect that we are going to. Meetings do not
mean progress, as any Member of Congress knows. The same thing
is true on the oil deal.
at we are talking about here are fundamental allocations of
political power. And I believe that the Iraqis are not yet ready to
make those choices themselves because they haven't yet tested
each other's strength and will. And there are too many organized
groups determined to do that. So I believe we are engaged in a
rather elaborate exercise of self-delusion about the benchmarks.
Mr. SPRATT. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McHugh from New York.
Mr. McHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome to you all. I appreciate you being here.
Dr. Kagan, we have heard, and I think understandably, that
there is a deep concern that somehow American forces today are
in the middle of a civil war, that we can extract ourselves from that
civil war. And whether it is the recommendations of the Iraq Study
Group group or the bill that the distinguished chairman had on the
floor just last week focus in on al Qaeda. Do you think that is
achievable? Are we in the middle of a civil war? And can you sepa-
rate the two in this current environment?
Dr. KAGAN. In my view, any insurgency is definitionally a civil
war, and I have always found this discussion to be a little bit prob-
lematic. If you mean are we in the midst of a full-scale civil war


21
Mr. McHugh. That is fair, and I respect that. But the Iraq Study
Group recommended this.
If you made a recommendation, I presume you formulated some
figure of some sort. What would that be?
Dr. PERRY. We did not formulate a figure. We discussed the fig-
ure. We discussed it with some of the military people. It would
clearly lead to a reduction in force over what we now have, but it
would still beI think we said in the report it would still be a size-
able military force remaining in Iraq.
Mr. McHUGH. Okay. Dr. Kagan, do you have any idea what that
force would take, what it would look like? We have about 160,000
now. What would that force look like, forgetting if it would be suc-
cessful or not?
Dr. KAGAN. Well, it depends. If the mission is as usually de-
scribed, to support the Iraqi Security Forces and also to conduct
counterterrorism operations in some form, there have been a num-
ber of proposals out there that suggest anywhere from 60- to
100,000 troops would be required for that. I haven't yet done all
of the math for that. I think the higher estimate of that is probably
more accurate when you consider how heavily obligated we are to
support the Iraqi Security Forces right now logistically.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much for your testimony this morning. I have
asked this question before from our military leaders, and you men-
tioned this, Secretary Perry. When they disbanded the Iraqi Army,
the police and the civil servants, I have asked them who made this
decision. And the reason I asked this question is because we hope
that this is not repeated again. Was this a military decision? Was
this a civilian decision? I think it was a very, very big mistake to
disband the military, the police, and the civil servants. And I have
asked the military leaders and nobody seems to know where that
decision came from.
Do any three of you have any idea how they were able to arrive
at this conclusion that it was for the interest of our troops and
their people to disband the army, the police and the servants?
Dr. PERRY. I was not there at the time and do not know why or
how that decision was made. I know when it was made, and it was
made shortly after the general who was in charge of the divisional
forces there was relieved and replaced by Mr. Bremer. And I be-
lieve it was Mr. Bremer that made the decision. And I do know
that the general strongly opposed that decision and argued to Mr.
Bremer against doing it.
Mr. ORTIZ. Ever make a decision like that without getting all the
mice together, because I think that it was a very costly mistake
that we made.
Dr. PERRY. That is my judgment also.
Mr. ORTIZ. You know, what is the impact on the United States
military of continuing our involvement in Iraq? Are we in danger
of breaking the United States Army through the high rate of de-
ployment and repeated deployments? And one of the reasons I ask


22
this question, I just had a call from my constituent, the family of
a constituent, about five days ago. This individual had been de-
ployed three times. He has been back less than six months, and he
has been called again, and he is going to be activated to go back
to Iraq for a fourth time. I think this is too much.
Not only is this impacting on our reserves, on our National
Guard, the soldiers are tired. And this is why—I was just wonder-
ing, I mean, are we in danger of breaking the United States Army
through this high rate of deployment?
Dr. PERRY. I don't know whether I can answer that question in
the sense you ask it. I would say, though, that I am very much con-
cerned about the Army National Guard. I think they have been
overextended. I think, in effect, we have broken the compact that
we had with the guard. After this war is finally over, it will not
be just a matter of rebuilding the guard. I think we need to recon-
sider from first principles what the mission of the guard would be
and have a new compact with them that would be more appro-
priate for the future. And I think that would be a very important
role for this committee to take on that job.
Mr. ORTIZ. I just wonder if anybody else from the witnesses that
would like to respond to that same question since I have a little
time left.
Dr. KAGAN. Well, I will.
I am also very concerned, of course, about the strain that this
war is placing on our military. I am also concerned about the cor
sequences for our military of inflicting the first ever defeat on the
all-volunteer force. This is not a force that is accustomed to losing
wars, and I am very concerned about what the consequences of
that will be.
But I would like to echo Dr. Perry's comment that there is more
to consider here than simply the strain of the current war. I began
advocating for larger ground forces in 1997, and I have been con-
sistently saying since then that the ground forces need to be larger.
And I know that there has been support in this committee and on
the Hill in general for expanding ground forces even as successive
administrations have opposed doing that. I am happy to see the
Bush Administration has now finally called for an increase in the
ground forces, which I think is urgently required, even if you think
we are going to be out of Iraq in the near future.
If you look at the scale of the potential of future threats, it is
simply unacceptable for us not to be able to undertake an operation
of this scale without imposing such strains on the ground forces.
And I would hope that the committee will continue to work actively
with this Administration and subsequent Administrations to, in
fact, attempt to accelerate and expand the expansion of ground
forces that this Administration has proposed.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jones, North Carolina.
Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And, Dr. Kagan, I want to—I agree with you. We can't go back,
but we can learn from mistakes made by looking at the past. I
want to read one statement to you, and I have a question for each
one. This is an article written by Lieutenant General Greg New-
bold, a man I have great respect for, gave up a star simply because


23
he saw what was happening before we went into Iraq; an article
written April 9, 2006, Time Magazine: From 2000 until 2002, I was
a Marine
rine Corps lieutenant general and Director of Operations for
the Joint Chief of Staffs. After 9/11, I was a witness and therefore
a party to the actions that led us to the invasion of Iraq and unnec-
essary war.
Inside the military family, I made no secret of my view that the
zealots' rationale—the zealots' rationale for war made no sense.
The reason I want to mention that—the zealots, the neocons. Are
you a part of the neocon group that wanted to go into Iraq? Yes
or no.
Dr. KAGAN. I supported the invasion of Iraq. I am not sure what
exactly the neocon group is. Usually that is used as a pejorative
term.
Mr. JONES. Well, I would put Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, you
know, the people—Rumsfeld included—that seemed not to care
about the professionals whose intelligence was warning us what
would happen. But that is history. I won't agree with that. This is
the question: Before the war in Iraq, what was the size of al Qaeda
in Iraq when Saddam was in power?
Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I don't know for sure, but I assume
that it was very small. That is what I understand.
Mr. JONES. Okay. Dr. Perry, would you agree with Dr. Mathews
that there was very little, if any, strength of al Qaeda in Iraq be-
fore the invasion?
Dr. PERRY. Yes.
Dr. MATHEWS. I think we are confusing two different groups, al
Qaeda in its global form with individuals in Iraq and the group al
Qaeda in Iraq, or al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, which didn't exist.
Mr. JONES. Okay. So the presence now, whether it is one group
or the other group, is obviously growing inside of Iraq since now
that we have this sectarian war, civil war. I mean, there is no
question about that.
Dr. MATHEWS. No question.
Mr. JONES. Okay. Dr. Mathews, I think I understood you to say
that there is no way to say what will happen when we and if we
downsize the number of American troops in Iraq, whether there
would be a civil war that will spread and grow throughout the na-
tion, that all the countries will come in and try to add fuel to the
fire of a civil war.
Dr. MATHEWS. I would guess that it is very likely that other
countries will get sucked in more deeply than they already are with
more arms and more money and maybe more proxy fighters. I
think it is very unlikely that the war will spread across the bor-
ders. Iraqis are principally fighting for power in Iraq. That is what
90 percent of the violence is about. Why would they go across the
borders to do that? Also history tells us that this is not what hap-
pens with civil wars in this region. They suck others in rather than
spread.
Mr. JONES. Dr. Perry, as a former Secretary of the Navy—and
I appreciate your concern about the National Guard. We have had
hearings on that. There is no question that the National Guard has
done a magnificent job in supporting the effort in Afghanistan and


24
Iraq, but primarily Iraq. And many of the Governors are very upset
with the fact that there is so much presence of the National Guard.
My time is about to run out. I have got a quick question. Would
you think it would be if a bill was put in by a Member of Con-
gress to say that the guard would be significantly reduced over the
next year and come back to the States so that they can help the
States during hurricane seasons, floods and every other—do you
see this would be a major hurt for the effort in Iraq?
Dr. PERRY. I would like to see two related changes made. First,
agreeing with Dr. Kagan, I would like to see an increase in the size
of the active duty ground forces, particularly the Army. And then
second, if that were done, that would allow, I think, a restructuring
of the mission of the guard to be primarily homeland defense.
Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my time is up.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor is not here.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here.
Dr. Perry, in your end statement at the end you say, quote, in
sum, I believe that the President's diplomatic strategy is too timid,
his military strategy is too little and too late to effect the lasting
and profound changes needed. His strategy is not likely to succeed
because it is tactical, not strategic, because it does not entail real
conditionality for the Iraqi Government, and because it will only
deepen the divide in our country, end of quote.
Last week at our Oversight Investigation Subcommittee, we had
a great panel including General Wes Clark, who stated very strong-
ly he thinks it is too early to give up militarily on what is going
on in Iraq, but says the thing is going to fall apart, and there isn't
any point in continuing unless there is a dramatic change in strat-
egy.
Dr. Mathews, in your statement you state we are—quote, we are
debating this political problem almost entirely in military terms,
which limits and distorts the available options. A change in politi-
cal strategy in Iraq and a shift in political attention on economic
and military priorities across the region redefines the possibilities.
Analysis of options must recognize, and it generally does not today,
that a significant change in U.S. policy will change what others are
willing to do, end of quote.
Last week when we had the vote in the House, I was one of the
ten Democrats that voted against it. And one of the reasons I did
is because it focused only on the military. It was purely a discus-
sion about military options, and it had nothing about the strategy.
I think one of the problems, Dr. Perry—I am going to address my
question just to you if I might. I don't think that many of us have
a clear understanding of what we are saying when we say strategy.
Summarize for me. What do you think should be our strategy to-
ward Iraq and the region?
Dr. PERRY. My best judgment of the appropriate strategy for Iraq
was the strategy we laid out in the Iraq Study Group, but I think
the important point, to follow up on the specific point that you
made, is that the strategy should entail military, political, and dip-
lomatic. It has to involve all three components for it to be a full-
blown strategy.


26
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Perry, thank you for being with us today. And I know you
have been with us a lot of times as a former Secretary of Defense.
You mentioned in your testimony that you think we needed to
have a surge in diplomacy rather than a surge in troops, and that
the surge in diplomacy hasn't been undertaken by the Administra-
tion. Now, when you were Secretary of Defense, we had the of
course in 1993—or Under Secretary—we had a car bomb explode
in the World Trade Center. We had something like 326 sep
tacks over that period of time, that 4 years from 1993 to 1997. We
had, of course, in 1996 the Khobar Towers attack which killed 19
American service people.
What surge in diplomacy did you undertake at that time to blunt
this—what appeared to be then a burgeoning campaign by extrem-
ists against American—the American people and in some cases
American service personnel?
Dr. PERRY. Let me refer specifically to the Khobar Towers bomb-
ing, which is one I am very familiar with in some detail. Two dif-
ferent things we did in response to that. One of them was we
worked extensively with the Saudi Government to prevent the ac-
that bombing was intended to ca
the American troops to leave Saudi Arabia. We announced strongly
that we were not going to let the bombing drive us out of Saudi
Arabia. We worked with the Saudi Government to prepare an en-
tirely new base for American troops located in the center of the
desert which we could provide better force protection for. That was
a major diplomatic thrust with the Saudi Government to get them
to do that move.
Second, I'd like to comment specifically—
Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Perry, I am talking about a diplomatic thrust.
Dr. PERRY. That was a major diplomatic thrust with the Saudi
Government. They were not at all anxious to make the move we
are talking about. In terms of the decision not to confront the peo-
ple, we were prepared to confront them, to confront forcibly and
with military action the perpetrators of that. At the time we
thought that had been engineered by the Iranian Government, and
we had a contingency plan prepared to have a retaliatory strike if
that could be confirmed. As it turned out, neither the FBI nor the
Saudi police were able to finally determine who did that, who actu-
ally perpetrated that bombing, so we were not able to. But I can
assure you that we were quite prepared to do that.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So you were prepared, but you weren't able
to ID the perpetrators. So you didn't-
Dr. PERRY. Exactly. As far as I know, they have not been identi-
fied to this date.
Mr. HUNTER. Now, you said you didn't think there was enough
troops—that was in your preliminary statement-in Iraq. The fig-
ures that I am looking at here—and correct me if I am wrong.
When you became the Under Secretary of Defense and later Sec-
retary, we had 14 Army divisions. You then took that down to 10
Army divisions. Do you think in retrospect that was a mistake?
Dr. PERRY. At the end of the Cold War, first the Bush Adminis-
tration reduced the military by 25 percent.


29
Do you think they are losing some of their shine that they had ini-
tially and losing some of their popularity?
Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I think it is very hard to gauge the
popularity of a movement. I think what we can say with a fair de-
gree of confidence is that there is an attitude in the Muslim world
“not in my backyard” as it comes to al Qaeda. You will still find
Muslims who are supporting the anti-American message of al
Qaeda and supporting various other aspects of that message, but
what we have seen regularly is that as al Qaeda actually estab-
lishes itself in a country and starts to implement its version of rad-
ical Islam, locals start to resist, and a cycle of violence begins. That
to me tells me that whatever else is going on, the message that
they are carrying beyond anti-Americanism is not selling very well.
Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Mathews and Dr. Perry, what do you think
about that? Do you think they are losing some of their initial popu-
larity?
Dr. PERRY. I don't have an informed judgment on that question,
Mr. Hunter.
Dr. MATHEWS. I don't either in a broad sense, but I wanted just
to refer you—and I wish I could remember the reference-recently
reported polling results in Egypt which show that more than 90
percent of the people viewing attacks on civilians is illegitimate
and immoral, but over 93 percent view attacks on U.S. forces in
Iraq as—including those that result in civilian deaths. We have to
recognize the distinguishment that is being made that is related to
what is viewed as a greater evil.
Mr. HUNTER. Well, I understand that. But al Qaeda is—I noticed
in the Arab media is being identified as—when they show these
mass bombings with women and children, body parts laying in the
street from these big bombs, they are being identified in the media,
international media, as being al Qaeda bombings. That certainly
doesn't reflect on attacks on American troops.
So my question is do you think that that is bringing down the
image, giving them a demotion in the propaganda war, if you will,
as a result of those attacks? The commanders who make those deci-
sions to blow up crowds of women and children have to look at the
upsides and the downsides. Do you think there is a downside for
them in terms of their position in the Muslim world?
Dr. MATHEWS. I don't know. I do think that attacks in Iraq are
judged differently.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Regarding the Iraqi Army, General Peter Pace a few days ago
made reference to the fact that the number of active brigades in
the Iraqi Army has dropped—and I don't have the numbers before
me—but has dropped by several numbers. I am sure someone can
get that statement for us. But needless to say that is of great con-
cern.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me say I agree substantially with Dr. Mathews
and Dr. Snyder's comments that, you know, a foreign military occu-
pying force being able to solve the issues of such a power vacuum,
power struggle, civil war in Iraq is hard to imagine, and also the


30
notion that there is a certain amount of political pressure that we
can put on them to get them to resolve their differences. The dif-
ferences are heartfelt and deep, and they are not going to resolve
them, because the bulk of Shi'a and Sunni are both sort of holding
out for the notion that their side can win, and they don't want to
reach political accommodation because their constituents don't
want them to. And we can bang our heads against that wall for a
long time. Those fundamental realities don't seem to me like they
are going to change.
And if there is some assurances that any of you can give me that
I am missing something here, and that there is a greater possibility
of reconciliation any time in the future that we can see, I am happy
to hear it. I doubt it. But even assuming for the moment that that
is wrong, that we could, in fact, somehow, you know, force a politi-
cal solution there, the troop numbers are disturbing to me in terms
of our commitment. Let me say why. And I have heard even the
generals—I think General Petraeus said this, it might have been
somebody else, that the surge at its current level is not sustainable
past next spring no matter what; that basically we don't have the
troops to sustain it at that level.
So if you accept the clear-and-hold strategy—as I see it, there are
two flaws to it. One is the one that I mentioned, clear and hold for
how long? Until they decide to resolve their differences politically?
Well, as I just said, and as many of you have said, it doesn't look
like that is going to happen. But the second is we don't have the
troops to do that.
If we could be sort of everywhere in Iraq for as long as we want,
then possibly that level of military presence could keep things
under control, but as it stands right now, we are squeezing a bal-
loon. We go into one area, get it under control, leave to go to an-
other area, and it just continues. And given that we don't have the
troops to maintain this past next spring under any scenario, how
do we get over that hump? How do we deal with the troops?
I guess two parts to that question. One, is it wrong? Do we have
the troop strength to maintain this level of troops past next spring,
or under what scenario does this work if we don't have those
troops, given the incredible emphasis on the hold part of this? We
don't have the troops to hold it past next spring. How is that pos-
sibly a sufficient amount of time? I start with Dr. Kagan.
The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. As the gentleman can notice, the
light is not working, so we are keeping time here at the desk.
Mr. SMITH. I trust you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed.
Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, first of all, we are not squeezing the
balloon. We are operating. We are not simply hitting them in one
area and then moving to another. We are deliberately clearing a
large swath of central Iraq, including almost all of the major insur-
gent havens, all at once. And it has been frequently reported by
soldiers on the ground and even by media over there that the in-
surgents are having a hard time finding new places to move to in
the area that they care most about and reestablish themselves be-
cause they are tending to find there are also American forces work-
ing with Iraqis there as well.


Mr. SMITH. But the violence is popping up. I mean, it just popped
up in Kirkuk. It popped up in Baquba when we were in Baghdad.
It seems like they may not be happy there, but they are certainly
killing and causing destruction there.
Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, there has been al Qaeda attacks in
Kirkuk at least once a month going back to January before that,
and there has been violence in Baquba well back in 2006. This is
not a new thing. This is not a question of them moving back to
Baquba. They have been there all along. Zarqawi was captured not
very far from Baquba, which is where they established the Islamic
State of Iraq. This is not squeezing the balloon. We have just
cleared Baquba, in fact, for the first time. And we have cleared it,
and we are holding it, and we are holding it simultaneously, as we
are operating in Fallujah and Yusufiya and Mahmudiyah and
Salman Pak and Arab Jabour and Taji and Tarmiya and Lake
Tharthar.
Mr. SMITH. Skipping forward to next spring when we can't hold
it any longer because we don't have the troops to maintain the
surge, what happens then?
Dr. KAGAN. I don't accept that premise, Congressman. I think
people have said various different things about this. We can sus-
tain the surge beyond April if we choose to, if it becomes necessary.
And then the other question is how rapidly do we start drawing
1, because you can start drawing down potentially in the
spring. The assumption that would undergird that would be an op-
timistic scenario, that violence—would get violence sufficiently
under control while we are increasing the size and capability of the
Iraqi Security Forces; that it will actually become possible to hand
over to them and have them maintain it, because that has been the
aim of the strategy all along. This has always been designed to be
a bridging strategy, to bring the level of violence down to a point
of which the Iraqi Army and police can secure it and continue it.
Will that happen by the spring? I am not sure. Could we con-
tinue this surge beyond the spring if we chose to? Yes, we could.
e will have to see what will become necessary. But I think we
should make that decision when the time is upon us and when we
have a better idea of what the situation on the ground actually is.
Mr. SMITH. Well, I guess I am out of time. I was interested in
the comments of the other two panelists.
The CHAIRMAN. Was the question fully answered?
Mr. SMITH. It was fully answered by Dr. Kagan. I was curious
of Dr. Perry or Dr. Mathews.
The CHAIRMAN. Quickly, Dr. Perry.
Dr. PERRY. If we want to extend the surge beyond spring, the
most obvious way to do that and the most undesirable way to do
it would be to extend the
the deployment of the troops that are already
there.
Dr. MATHEWS. I would just add that I think U.S. Generals have
made pretty clear that their judgment is that Iraqis would not be
able to manage the security of Iraq alone for several years. This is
not a question of next spring.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
The information to which I was making reference a few moments
ago from General Peter Pace is that earlier there were ten battal-


32
ions of the Iraqi Army operating independently, and today there
are six Iraqi battalions operating independently.
Mr. Saxton.
Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the oppor-
tunity to ask a question at this time.
Let me just ask this. Well, let me say this first. I think it is im-
portant that we all recognize who our enemies are in the war and
particularly in the front in Iraq. Recently a top al Qaeda leader in
Iraq was arrested by U.S. forces. His name was al Mashhadani,
also known as Abu Shahid. He was actually captured in early July.
And information, according to press releases, indicate that al
Qaeda central, that is the main al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan or
wherever they are, is providing direction to al Qaeda in Iraq. Al
Mashhadani states, quote, the Islamic State of Iraq is a front orga-
nization that masks the foreign influence and leadership within al
Qaeda in Iraq in an attempt to put an Iraqi face on the leadership
of al Qaeda in Iraq.
I guess I am interested to know what your take is on this specific
information. I just open that up to anybody that wants to comment.
Dr. KAGAN. I was very pleased to see the release about the cap-
ture of this individual, who, according to press release, I believe,
is the top Iraqi in al Qaeda in Iraq. The group, as we know, is
headed by Abu al Massari, who is an Egyptian. The number two-
another—al Massari just means an Egyptian, another fellow who
was identified in that way was recently captured.
We have been rolling up this al Qaeda network in a variety of
ways, and I hope that this capture will help lead us to others as
previous captures have done. It supports, in my view, unequivo-
cally the fact that al Qaeda in Iraq is connected to the global al
Qaeda movement, which is apparently important because some
people in this town have been casting doubt on that. It is not
equivalent to it. Al Qaeda is a franchise movement. Individual
groups pop up on their own, as this one apparently did in Iraq, but
they then do attempt to link into the global movement, which is
significant because the global movement then directs resources in
various ways to different regions depending on its prioritization. It
has been prioritizing Iraq very heavily, and it has been sending, ac-
cording to General Petraeus, anywhere from 40 to 80 foreign fight-
ers a month into the country. That sounds like a very small num-
ber, but we also know that about 80 to 90 percent of the suicide
bombers in Iraq are foreign fighters, and the suicide bombings cre-
ate a disproportionate sense of defeat here, a disproportionate
sense of violence in Iraq and were, as you know, critical to helping
establish sectarian violence.
So I think that there is no question this capture along with many
others supports on the one hand the conclusion that this al Qaeda
in Iraq is tied to the global al Qaeda network in a way that is very
worrisome, but it also shows that we are being successful in Iraq
in identifying these individuals based largely on local tips and in-
formation that we get from being there, rounding them up and un-
raveling this network.
Mr. ŠAXTON. I do have a follow-up question, but I would offer the
opportunity for either of the other witnesses.


33
Dr. PERRY. I don't have anything to add to what Dr. Kagan said.
Thank you.
Mr. ŠAXTON. Dr. Kagan, with regard to the al Qaeda network,
when we think of an organization, particularly a military organiza-
tion, we think of a line of command and a formal structure within
which that military organization operates. Based on your experi-
ence, could you describe for us the nature of the al Qaeda organiza-
tion?
Dr. KAGAN. I will do my best. It is not an easy thing to do with-
out access to the classified information since most of our under-
standing of this comes from sensitive intelligence, and I don't have
that, but it appears that al Qaeda in Iraq does have actually a fair-
ly impressive hierarchical organization, and they do tend to estab-
lish regional emirs in different parts of the country that are re-
sponsible for that, that are coordinated with the central leadership
cell.
That having been said, it is a cellular organization based on old
revolutionary principles, that it is designed to maximize security.
So it is difficult when you grab one of these guys to just get every-
one else rolled up. And it is an organization in which local initia-
tive plays a big role balanced with the allocation of resources and
priorities from the top. So it is a very flexible, very adaptive organi-
zation. It is one that is very difficult to go after.
The best way to go after it is to get-is to eliminate its popular
support, and that is what we have been helping to do in Iraq, be-
cause the Iraqis have turned against al Qaeda, and we have been
supporting them. That is by far the most significant, most perma-
nent and most likely to be successful approach that we can follow.
Chasing these guys around with Special Forces is a much harder
thing that is much less likely to lead to success.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Dr. Kagan.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all of you for being here.
I wanted to follow up a little bit on this discussion, because, Dr.
Kagan, you are suggesting, I think, that al Qaeda in Iraq is com-
posed of the Sunni insurgency essentially, that they make up basi-
cally al Qaeda in Iraq. I wanted to explore that a little bit further
because we certainly know that there are many experts out there,
among them Dr. Cordesman and others, who have spoken more to
the fact that these are not necessarily jihadists, they are Sunnis
who are opposed to the occupation, and they certainly are involved
in a power grab, which we can well understand. But there is a dif-
'ence here of how we describe the Sunni insurgency as al Qaeda
versus Sunni insurgency. Could you break that down in your think-
ing, particularly in terms of numbers and ideology?
Dr. KAGAN. Very happily, Congresswoman. I am not sure you
were here for my opening remarks.
My focus was on saying that I do believe from 2003 to January
of 2007, we were primarily dealing with the Sunni Arab insur-
gency. It was about the fact that the Sunni community did not


34
want to accept a lesser role in Iraq, and that a major shift occurred
in February 2006 when the sectarian violence was ignited.
I absolutely do not think that al Qaeda makes up even the ma-
jority of the Sunni resistance movement. It plays a disproportionate
role because of the nature of its attacks and its objectives and its
organization.
One of the interesting things that we have seen is that in part,
in my view, as a result of the surge and the pressure that we have
been putting on the other Sunni insurgents, we started to see the
Sunni Arab insurgents turning against al Qaeda themselves, and
we have been able to broker cease-fire agreements with the 1920's
brigades which are very hard-core Baathist insurgents to cooperate
with them against al Qaeda.
So it is absolutely possible. Al Qaeda is certainly the smallest in
number of the insurgent groups, if you want to regard it as an in-
surgent group. Its objectives are fundamentally different in any
event. It is a terrorist group.
Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If I may, though, I think because of
the way we discuss it in many ways—I don't even think in your
comments one would assume from that that it is the smallest
group, and I don't know whether Dr. Mathews or Dr. Perry wants
to comment on that. But is part of the difficulty that it is perhaps
more emotional? I am not suggesting in any way that their tactics
aren't horrific and that we need to respond to them, but I also won-
der whether it is part of the way in which we are discussing and
being somewhat unclear about the makeup of the insurgency.
Part of that leads me to a question that I would like you all to
address, is how then we counter that, whether through propa-
ganda, through our media, through their media. Have we really
taken ahold of being able to do that, and isn't it partly because we
have done it-seeing them really as al Qaeda as opposed to other
issues that we might address?
If I may, in another question, Dr. Mathews, I think real quickly
with my time here, one of the things that you mentioned is that
we really have not articulated our intentions, our long-term inten-
tions, in the region.
And I wonder if that isn't part of the problem that we have had
as well, that we haven't really put that out there. I mean, we are
talking about the surge, clearly, but I was just in Iraq last week,
and if you ask, what are our long-term strategies in Iraq and in
the region, people start talking about the surge again, which is
not—which is not the strategy that we should be focussing on.
So, number one, is part of the difficulty that we really are not
being very discerning about these insurgent—about al Qaeda and
the insurgency? And also, what do you think our strategy should
be to counteract that in the media perceptions not only in Iraq, but
here at home?
Dr. MATHEWS. Well I think, Congresswoman, that there are two
different ways to send a message about what our intentions are.
One is what we say, and one is what we do. I was trying to make
the point that what we are building there suggests very strongly
to people there and in the region that we intend a permanent pres-
ence, and we intend to use Iraq, as somebody has said, sort of as
an American aircraft carrier to project power in the region.


35
I think that is a big mistake. I think this body ought to take on
that issue and debate it, debate its wisdom. Instead this question
of funding provisions has been sort of an ineffective proxy for that.
On the other question that you were asking, you know, I think
it is a terrible mistake to grant al Qaeda in Iraq more importance
than it deserves and, even in a broader sense, to obsess more about
al Qaeda as a threat to the U.S. more than it deserves. And finally,
I think it is important to note that I think it was either General
Petraeus or General Pace who ranked it fourth among-out of five
among the threats that we face in Iraq.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Jones has a question, I understand, and then we go to Mr.
Murphy.
Mr. ÍONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I just want to read very quickly, and then I do have a ques-
tion primarily for you, Dr. Perry. An article in the North Carolina
paper, The News & Observer, April 23, 2007, the title, “Deployed,
Depleted, Desperate”. Here is a question to those who still support
President Bush's strategy to stretch out the Iraq war until after he
has left office, and for those who think we should be prepared to
continue our bloody occupation of Iraq for five or ten years. This
is the question-not you personally. But this is the question in the
article: Are you ready to support reinstating Selective Service? I
have Camp LeJeune in my district. I have met with many Army
and Marines. They are the best, but they are tired, and they are
worn out. If we are going to increase the numbers, where in the
world are we going to get the people?
And let me read quickly—and I will let you answer. And from
the same article: Did demands of the war on our troops and their
rn-out equipment already have pushed the annual cost
of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses above $1 billion, and of re-
cruitment advertising to $120 million annually?
I hope I am wrong, but I will tell you that I have been here for
14 years, I go to all the meetings I can go to learn because I am
not an expert in anything, but I just don't see where we are going
to get the manpower if we don't discuss the draft, if we are there
with what we have now. If we increase the numbers, where are we
going to get the manpower? Do you think there is going to come
a time that this Congress and the President, whoever he or she
might be, are going to have to discuss the draft?
Dr. PERRY. Yeah. If you consider a draft and ask me to testify,
I would testify against it. I think the all-volunteer force has been
an amazing success in this country, and I strongly support it, and
I would not support going to a draft.
Mr. JONES. Well, I guess I will ask Dr. Mathews. If projections-
and projections sometimes are wrong, I am the first to acknowledge
that—but if projections are accurate, and we have got fewer people
who are going into the voluntary service because of our commit-
ment in Iraq of thousands and thousands of troops, and they know
they are being worn out, and then you have to say, well, where are
we getting the manpower pool? I am not saying do you advocate
a draft or not, but where do you go?


36
Dr. MATHEWS. Congressman, I am really—I am not enough of an
expert. I have views on the draft, but they are views of a layman,
and they really don't deserve, I don't think, to be aired here.
Mr. JONES. Well, I guess the point is are we going to have to
grapple with that, Americans are going to have to grapple with
that. And if it continues to go the way it is going with our troops
going four and five times around, somebody at some point in time
is going to have to think, where do we get the manpower from?
Dr. MATHEWS. I think that is undeniable.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Murphy.
Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Chairman.
And I know Mr. Jones's kind of question about the manpower
here in America. My focus is about the manpower over in Iraq.
When I was there as a soldier in 2003–2004, I had trained over
600—helped train over 600 Iraqi at that time, called Iraqi Civil De-
fense Corps (ICDC), now called Iraqi Army. And we continually
hear from the President that the critical mission in Iraq from—we
hear this from President Bush is that when they stand up, we will
stand down. However, when you look back—when I was there in
2003, when we trained these ICDC, we didn't have uniforms for
them. In fact, we gave them Chicago White Sox hats to identify
them. That is how little support the Administration gave us to exe-
cute this critical mission.
That was four years ago. Now it doesn't seem like we are moving
forward far enough. Five days ago, July 13, I know Chairman Skel-
ton mentioned it in the New York Times article, said, American
commanders in Iraq said, and I quote, “The effort to train Iraqi
Army and police units had slowed in recent months, and would
need to be expanded to enable any large-scale reduction in Amer-
ican force levels,” end quote.
The reason given for this lack of progress was in large part be-
cause preparing Iragi units to operate without American backing
have become a secondary goal under the current war strategy,
which has emphasized protecting Iraqis and the heavy use of
American combat power. In short, the surge strategy emphasizes
peacekeeping and force protection and deemphasizes training Iraqi
troops.
The President's escalation has simply enmeshed American troops
even further being peacemakers in Iraq's religious civil war. Gen-
eral Pace recently said that there are 6,000 American soldiers in-
volved in the training mission, 6,000 out of 158,000. That is less
than 1 in 25, 4 percent. In fact, a number of Iraqi battalions rated
as capable of operating without American assistance fell to six this
month. That is down from ten in March, shortly after the esca-
lation of troops.
With this in mind and all that the escalation has done is to
make the Iraqis even more dependent on our American GIs and
marines, not less. I would like to have your thoughts on my com-
ments. If I could start with Dr. Perry.
Dr. PERRY. I concur with the assessment that you just gave me.
The Iraq Study Group's recommendations were to increase the-in-
crease, not decrease, the emphasis on training, and to do that by


37
putting an emphasis on embedding troops, American troops, within
the Iraqi forces, a way of increasing their professionalism.
various assessments to how many troops we have in-
volved, but we are talking about probably 15,000 to 20,000 troops
involved in the training and embedding missions as opposed to the
6,000 that you are describing now.
Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.
Dr. Mathews, please.
Dr. MATHEWS. I just wanted to add that there has never been a
satisfactory explanation of the desertion rate in the Iraqi Security
Forces. And General Pace's comments—you know, there is a qual-
ity of sand being poured into a bottle and running out the bottom
that should make us, I think, ask ourselves something that you
know well, which is that an Army's most important asset is its mo-
tivation, its will, its knowledge of who it is fighting for and for
what. And that is a good part of why the return on the investment
we have made in training has been so low, in my judgment.
Mr. MURPHY. Dr. Kagan.
Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I would like to thank you for your
service to the Nation both as a soldier and as a Congressman.
ee that we are pouring sand into a bottle would just
keep coming out of the bottom. The desertion rate in the Iraqi
Army actually tends to be relatively low compared to desertion
rates in armies historically. It is not low compared to ours, but ours
is the best in the world by a long margin.
Mr. MURPHY. If I could focus now, Dr. Kagan, six now of the
Iraqi battalions are dropping.
Dr. KAGAN. Yes. We have reduced—the number of Iraqi Army
that is capable of operating independently has apparently de-
creased. The number of Iraqi units that are fighting actively
against the enemy, fighting bravely, taking casualties every day
and continuing in the struggle is increasing. Iraqis continue to vol-
unteer. And when you keep in mind that Iraqis volunteering until
very recently had to run the risk of being attacked with suicide
bombs at the recruiting stations, and that basically because it is a
volunteer force and because of the way the Iraqis do leaves, which
has been criticized widely, but it is the way they do business, they
basically have to re-up every month when they come back from
their leaves, and they do that even in the midst of very hard fight-
ing, even among very heavy casualties. So I really have to take ex-
ception to the notion that the Iraqi Army is not standing up to this
fight in some way, not that you have said that, but others have
been making that case, and I find that very disturbing.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Johnson from Georgia.
Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Kagan, although you have been kind of like a lone wolf at
your last couple of hearings, I think you have done an admirable
job of presenting an alternative view on things in Iraq. And I would
like to just ask you whether or not it is true that there are other
strategic challenges that the U.S. may have to confront around the
world in addition to the Iraq force that permeates violence over
there, al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in general. There are other stra-


38
tegic challenges that we may face throughout the world; is that cor-
rect?
Dr. KAGAN. Yes, of course it is, Congressman. We face the chal-
lenge of being a global power with interests around the world, and
we face a number of potential threats. In fact, we face a number
of active enemies, including states that are actively working to sup-
port those who are killing our soldiers, which includes Iran in this
case. And there are other threats that we can identify. Of course,
North Korea is a major challenge, China is a major challenge, the
instability in Pakistan is a major worry. Clearly there are all sorts
of threats around the world, but I think that it is important to
identify,
Mr. JOHNSON. I want to stop you right there. Are we at risk of
being unable to meet other challenges because our U.S. military is
bogged down in Iraq?
Dr. KAGAN. I am going to hesitate because I know that the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs stated not very long ago that he did
not believe we were at risk of being unable to meet ch
where based on his professional evaluation of the situation, the
likely nature of those threats.
Mr. JOHNSON. What is your opinion about it?
Dr. KAGAN. Not having looked into what would be required in
various scenarios very carefully, I clearly think we clearly do have
challenges, and I have been on record all along as saying that I
was concerned that the military was too small, and I worried about
this even in the 1990's. So I believe we do continue to face chal-
lenges.
Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Thank you, Dr. Kagan.
Dr. Perry, thank you for your service to the Nation and your long
and distinguished career in academia and business as well. It has
well prepared you for the tasks, the recent tasks, that you have un-
dertaken.
Dr. PERRY. Thank you.
Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you for your service.
What are your thoughts on our ability to meet any of the chal-
lenges that may arise around the world, given our—
Dr. PERRY. I think our overextension of our armed forces in Iraq
puts at risk our ability to meet these other challenges. And indeed,
I believe the perception of other nations, even if it is an incorrect
perception, that we are tied down in Iraq has already led them to
take actions which are adverse to American interests.
Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.
And, sir, you mentioned something about we need to create dis-
incentives for Iran and Syria in supporting sectarian violence in
Iraq. What are these disincentives.
Dr. PERRY. Pardon me?
Mr. JOHNSON. You mentioned something about we needed to cre-
ate disincentives for Iran and Syria to continued support for sectar-
ian violence. What are those disincentives?
Dr. PERRY. I would be most optimistic about our ability to work
with Syria, which I think is working against our interests in Iraq
today. I think we have leverage on Syria, and I think we could use
that leverage effectively, but it would take a really concerted and
sustained diplomatic effort to do that.


39
We have done that in the past with Syria. When Mr. Baker was
the Secretary of State, he met a dozen times with Syria in trying
to get them to take actions which we wanted to take relative to
Israel and was ultimately successful in that. But it takes a long
and sustained diplomatic effort. It cannot be done by our ambas-
sadors in the region. It cannot be done on a one-time basis..
Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. .
And, Dr. Mathews, you gave a very cogent analysis of our think-
ing in terms of this so-called troop surge, and you had stated that
the struggle for power is created by the political vacuum that was
left by the leadership void that was taken out in Iraq, and that this
political power struggle is just a natural result of that, and it is
not soon to end.
Do you have any ideas about how long it might take for the sec-
tarian forces to fight their way out of this and come to some kind
of a political solution and end the fighting over there?
Dr. MATHEWS. The record is that once these sorts of struggles
start, they take a very long time to burn themselves out, because,
of course, the longer they go on, the more people are hurt, the more
people have lost family members, friends, houses, businesses, et
cetera, and the greater the motivation is to keep going. So the
record since 1945, if you look at all the civil wars that have taken
place, is that on average they last ten years.
I do think that there is some hope, and it is a very small one,
as I said, that we could attempt to go back and recreate the step
that we tried to skip of allowing a full-fledged debate among Iraqis
as to their political future. We tried, rather, to put our own set of,
in my view, wholly unrealistic deadlines on them and to restrict
the debate to a very tiny circle of largely exiles, and that produced
a truncated political sorting out that has now manifested itself in
the streets, in this armed struggle. If it goes on, I think it will
like this, it will go on for many, many years, and
Mr. JOHNSON. And that is whether we are there or not?
Dr. MATHEWS. I believe so. I mean
Mr. JOHNSON. We can't stop it by our presence?
Dr. MATHEWS. I think the evidence suggests not.
Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia may be interested,
in 1994, on the way to the 50th anniversary of D-Day, I had occa-
sion to go near the Royal Marine headquarters near Exeter, Eng-
land, and I was briefed by two sergeants that had just returned
from lengthy stays in Bosnia, and both of them agreed that this
will end soon because everybody is getting tired of fighting. And
sure enough, not too long thereafter, we had the peace accords.
I think the question might be, Mr. Johnson, as to if and when
they will all get tired of fighting. And if there is any indication or
any precedent, I think it would be that in Bosnia.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Perry, when the Iraq Study Group produced its report, there
was about one page in the whole document dealing with the con-
cept of partition. It was pretty much dismissed out of hand. And
since the report was issued, and we now know from the United Na-
tions that there are four million refugees in Iraq, two million inter-


40
nally, who have kind of fallen back into their own sectarian or eth-
nic enclaves, the central government clearly is not hitting on all
cylinders in terms of trying to reach reconciliation.
You know—and we have talked about Bosnia now at least a half
dozen times during the course of this hearing. It just seems to me
that maybe we should revisit that concept. And again, I am not
talking about hard partition or soft partition, but clearly people are
retreating into their own—what they feel is the only safe place
they can go, which is their families and their religious groups. And
I was just sort of wondering, A, why was the study group that
dismissive? And, B, do you think it is time to maybe revisit that?
Dr. PERRY. Even though we had only one report about partition,
we spent considerable time discussing it and debating, including
g excellent briefings from Mr. Gelb and Senator Biden, both
of whom are strong proponents of it, as you know. And I believe
there was a time when that might have been an appropriate move
for the American Government to take.
I do not believe we have the power to effect that today. When we
were in Iraq, a question we asked each of the members of the
Iraq-we talk to all members of the Iraqi Government, dozens of
them. A question we asked each of them was would they support
a move toward a partition? And to a man—and they were all
men—to a man they all said no, very strongly opposed to it.
Now, to be sure, they all had a vested interest in a partition. But
the point is this is a government which we helped set up the proc-
ess by which it was established, the government which is elected
by the Iraqi people. So for us today to impose partition, the first
thing we would have to do is remove that government, which would
be, you know, an enormous undertaking and set us back in ways
that are really quite unpredictable. My judgment today is we no
longer have the option, the United States no longer has the option
of imposing a partition. In our discussions in the Iraq Study Group,
many of us believed that that is what Iraq would evolve to in time
anyway, but we did not have the power to make it happen.
Mr. COURTNEY. It does seem people are voting with their feet in
that direction.
Dr. Mathews, I don't know if you have any observations on that
issue.
Dr. MATHEWS. I would go one step further, which is—than Sec-
retary Perry, which is I think it is a matter of U.S. policy. I agree
with him that we don't have the U.S. troops to execute this policy
peacefully or even reasonably peacefully, but I think as a choice,
conscious policy, it would be a terrible mistake because it would
convince all those in the region, and there are many, many of
them, that we came there into Iraq to dismantle the strongest Arab
State in the interest of Israel. And I think, you know, as a political
choice of policy to pursue partition, I agree that it may very well
be where things end up, but that is a very different thing than the
U.S. adopting it as its policy. I think it would be very, very unwise
as well as unfeasible.
Mr. COURTNEY. I mean, the other recommendation of the study
group, which was to embed and train Iraqi troops. There was a
comment-Colin Powell was quoted in State of Denial—I guess he
had a conversation with President Bush after he left the Secretary


41
of State's office, where he warned that if you don't have a govern-
ment that troops—that an Iraqi Army is connected to, then all you
are doing is training militia. I was just sort of wondering what you
thought of that observation.
Dr. PERRY. I think it is a very good observation, and it is cer-
tainly one of the dangers of the tactic of training Iraqi troops.
I should say more generally that even if all the recommendations
of the Iraq Study Group had been carried out, we had no assurance
that that would lead to a stable Iraq because of the uncertainties
about whether the Iraqi Government would be able to sustain. Not
only the President's strategy, but the strategy of the Iraq Study
Group really depends on the Iraqi Government being able to sus-
tain itself, and I do believe that that is important, very much in
question.
Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Sestak.
Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Perry, when you came here in February, I asked you
the question, how long would it be before you became a date-cer-
tain person? And you answered, about six months. Do you still be-
lieve that? Are you there at this time as the best strategy?
Dr. PERRY. I am not there yet.
Mr. SESTAK. It is not six months yet.
Dr. PERRY. No. But I agree with the President's assessment that
a departure from Iraq today would lead to disastrous results. I
think there is still an opportunity to try to make the situation sta-
ble before we leave, and I still believe that the recommendations
of the Iraq Study Group are the best way of achieving that.
Mr. SESTAK. With regard to the Iraq Study Group, two branch
questions. Iran, in your testimony what I read and what you have
said, we had Mr. Fingar, the head of the National Intelligence
Council, here about a week—a few days ago. He reminded us that
the National Intelligence Estimate about a year ago said that any
rapid withdrawal, defined at 18 months, would have Iraq spin into
chaos. Earlier he had said, however, that Iraq does not want, as
you said, Ms. Mathews, Dr. Mathews, a failed state, a fractional-
ized government. When he was asked did that 18-month assess-
ment of spiraling chaos include Iran being involved, he said no.
When asked if it would make a difference, he said, you know, it
would. Doesn't know exactly. Is Iran critical? Is it the critical piece
with Syria to having—if there were to be by force of law a date cer-
tain, given enough time, key to leaving behind an unfailed state?
Dr. PERRY. I think both Iran and Syria are playing critical nega-
tive roles today. As I have testified before, I think we have some
opportunity to influence Syria in a more positive—take a more
positive course. I am not at all confident we have—today have the
ability to influence Iran to take actions which we want them to
take.
Mr. SESTAK. Dr. Mathews, you have kind of touched on this al-
ready.
Dr. MATHEWS. I am not sure I have more to add to what Sec-
retary Perry just said. I think those are the two critical players.


42
But again, I think there—what they are willing to do depends enor-
mously heavily on what our posture is.
Mr. SESTAK. Correct. And that is why my question is, does date
certain, we won't be there, not just on an interim basis, give the
incentive for them to participate positively? Now, Dr. Fingar said
yes, Mr. Fingar, the head of National Intelligence Estimate.
Dr. MATHEWS. I think it is—I am hesitating because I think we-
that everybody in this town has been too sure about things that
were—this is a multivariable equation, and we tend to always talk
about it one at a time. I think that that is the most likely outcome,
that they would be more willing, and that Tehran in particular
shares an interest in not having chaos on its borders.
Mr. SESTAK. Dr. Perry, one other thing. December 6 you came
out with the ISG, and you had a goal of end of March for the com-
bat troops to have been redeployed. I have watched Somalia where
it took us 6 months to get 6,300 troops out of there, as you remem-
ber, and we had still another 17,000 over there just to make sure
it was a safe redeployment. And we didn't have over 100,000 U.S.
civilian contractors in that country as we do in Iraq. Many people
now go to that date that you have established as the date to some
degree twofold. That date, if it were to be a goal and become a date
certain, is it really the right date, or did you really mean about a
year and a quarter? And number two is—
Dr. PERRY. Iraq Study Group was a date by which we could have
the combat brigades that were patrolling the streets of Iraq out of
Iraq. But even by that date, we would still have a strong rapid re-
action force in Iraq, we would still have support forces in Iraq,
there would still be contractors in Iraq. We did not describe a strat-
egy for completely withdrawing from Iraq. I believe that would be
a very, very complicated strategy to execute.
Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
I have left on the list Mr. Loebsack, Ms. Shea-Porter and Mr. An-
drews in that order.
Mr. Loebsack.
Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to the three of you for being here and testifying today.
I am sorry, I was in a previous hearing as well, markup. That is
why I am so late. Some of the things that I may cover may have
been covered already, and I apologize if that is the case.
I want to mostly address my comments and my questions to you,
Dr. Kagan. I just want to make a couple of comments at the outset.
When you were asked if we have enough troops for the surge, you
quoted General Odierno. Of course, we know he is not the person
who is in charge in Iraq. It is General Petraeus, and if the record
shows otherwise, I will be happy to be corrected. But to my knowl-
edge, General Petraeus has never stated so unequivocally as Gen-
eral Odierno has that we have enough troops for the surge. In fact,
some of us were in Iraq in February, Congressman Andrews and
some others, and if I remember correctly, we asked General
Petraeus directly if we had enough troops, and essentially he said
that is all the troops that he has. So I just want to make that clear
at the outset.


44
18,000 in Ninawa. Those are the ones I can think of off the top of
my head, a significant portion of the Iraqi Army.
You know, I can go back and try to top up what I think all the
rest of the figures are. Oh, and we have 12,000 in Anbar, who have
signed up this year, whereas previously we were not able to recruit
anything in Anbar.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin-
ning on page 95.]
Mr. LOEBSACK. For the record, I have difficulties with the words
like “many” and “significant.” I would like to know if there is any
way—I would like to know precise numbers. If there is any way
that you or our military can give us those numbers, I think that
would be really important for all of us here who have to make deci-
sions on these matters. So thank you very much, and I yield back
my time unless Dr. Mathews would like to make a comment. You
look like it.
Dr. MATHEWS. No. I was just struck that we have been here al-
most three hours, and nobody has talked about the police, which
are absolutely critical to establishing peace in Iraq, and where we
have a real disaster.
Mr. LOEBSACK. I might just make a comment. I think Congress-
man Andrews and I—now that things may have changed since Feb-
ruary, but that was very disturbing when we were there, was the
difficulty training police. And even prior to the training figure—try-
ing to figure out who the people were who were being trained, and
whether they were really folks we should be training as police. But
again, I don't want to put words in Congressman Andrews's mouth,
but I think he probably would agree with me while we were there.
That is a good point and thank you.
And I yield back. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.
Dr. Kagan, how many times have you been to Iraq? And when
was your most recent visit?
Dr. KAGAN. I have been to Iraq twice in early April and early
May for about eight days each time, and I am about to return next
week.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And where were you at that time?
Dr. KAGAN. Each time I spent a couple of days in the Green
Zone, and then I rode around with American units in battlefield
circulations in various neighborhoods in Baghdad. I have been to
Baquba, I have been to Taji, I have been to-
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. In what capacity?
Dr. KAGAN. What capacity?
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Yes.
Dr. KAGAN. I was there as an observer.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Who invited you?
Dr. KAGAN. I was there at the invitation of General Petraeus.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I was there in March. Do you think it is a
good sign or a bad sign that mortars are now hitting the Green
Zone, and that people are having to walk around with their armor?
Is it a meaningless sign, or is it a bad sign that maybe we are los-
ing control right inside our embassy area?
Dr. KAGAN. Mortars have been hitting the zone all year.


45
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Let us correct that for a moment. Mortars
have not been raining on them all year. There has been quite a sig-
nificant change. Yes or no?
Dr. KAGAN. There has been an increase in mortar attacks, but
there have been more mortar attacks—
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. In the interest of five minutes,
thank you. I appreciate that.
Do you agree with Peter Pace when he said—when he was asked
if he was comfortable with the ability to respond to an emerging
world threat, he said no, he was not comfortable because of the
troops and all of the treasure in Iraq and the weariness of the
troops. Yes or no, do you agree with General Pace on the comment?
Dr. KAGAN. I have been concerned about our ability to respond
globally since 1997, and I am on the record about that.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do you agree with Max Boot, who stated in
a subcommittee hearing last week that we could get the troops that
we needed from people who wanted green cards, and that they
could come from other countries and go fight for us and get green
cards? Would that be a good policy? Please say yes or no.
Dr. KAGAN. I cannot answer that with a yes or no, Congress-
woman. I can tell you that it is a good idea to think about offering
citizenship for a reward for service. The details of that program I
would have to think about in greater detail.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do we need them in order to continue fight-
ing?
Dr. KAGAN. Do we need who?
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do we need people who are not from our coun-
try but could use a green card?
Dr. KAGAN. Do we need them to continue the fight? No. I don't
believe we need them to continue the fighting.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Can you tell me specifically where you would
get the troops? Because the testimony I have gotten from pretty
much everybody is that our troops are exhausted, worn out, and we
don't have troops that could continue. Where would you get the
troops? And if you could just like one sentence.
Dr. KAGAN. There are additional troops. We could either extend
the tours of soldiers that are there—this has always been discussed
by the Joint Staff—or we could redeploy National Guard units,
which, as Dr. Perry suggested, would be very undesirable, but
might become necessary. And I also believe that we need to work
to expand the size of the ground forces as rapidly as possible.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. You and I both know that that would take a
great deal of time, recruitment, training, et cetera. So your sugges-
tion now is to extend the time that the troops are there?
Dr. KAGAN. Congresswoman, I don't work in the Joint Staff, and
I can't tell you exactly how this would be done, but I can tell you
that that is one method, and another method is redeploying Na-
tional Guard forces who have already been there.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, that is good because since you have gone
as an observer, it is important for me to know what you observed.
Now, when I spoke to General Petraeus and General Fill in
March when I was there, General Petraeus and General Fill gave
me widely varying numbers on the number of Iraqi military and
Iraqi soldiers that were going to do the, quote, standing up for ev-


46
erybody. As a matter of fact, General Petraeus doubled the number
in an hour. Do you think we have a better handle on the numbers
of troops and Iraqi police now than we did in March? Do we have
better data?
Dr. KAGAN. I believe that we do have an understanding of how
many Iraqi Army soldiers there are, and how many Iraqi police
there are, understanding that there is fluctuation in a force in war-
time. But, yes, I think we have an understanding of that.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And how do you think we got there? Because
when I asked them and they asked about the difference, they said,
well, it is hard to tell, people come and they get their bonuses, they
ave, they don't come back again, they might die, they might be
sick. How are we basing the data now?
Dr. KAGAN. Congresswoman, when I was there, briefings that I
received suggested they put new programs in place to identify ex-
actly how many Iraqi police there were, who they were, and make
sure that people were not simply coming in to collect their bonuses,
but that they were actually on the rolls.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. So we are doing better
Administrationwise, administratively there.
Dr. KAGAN. That is what I was briefed when I was there, yes.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Last question-or two questions. Are we there
to bring democracy to Iraq? Is that your overriding belief, that we
are there to bring democracy to Iraq?
Dr. KAGAN. Ma'am, I think that we are there in pursuit of Amer-
ican national interests.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Is that to bring democracy to Iraq? Or could
you tell me what it is exactly?
Dr. KAGAN. Well, I believe we have a vital national interest in
not allowing Iraq to become a failed state and a haven for terror-
ists.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Was it a failed state before we went in?
Dr. KAGAN. Obviously not.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Last question, do you think we should do the
same for Iran? Do you think we need to go into Iran?
Dr. KAGAN. Congresswoman, I have never advocated invading
Iran.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Andrews, please.
Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I would like to thank the panel for their en-
durance and their very trenchant observations. Thank you very
much.
Dr. Kagan, if today is a typical day in Iraq based upon the data
of the last couple of months, there will be 145 attacks against
someone. On the average, how many of those attacks are launched
by al Qaeda?
Dr. KAGAN. A small number.
Mr. ANDREWS. How small?
Dr. KAGAN. I don't know.
Mr. ANDREWS. I am sure we don't either. If we could assume for
a moment that by whatever strategy the al Qaeda forces in Iraq
were completely vanquished, not one attack took place at all, there


49
it would be an art, not a skill, which military units of the Iraqis
we could safely embed troops in, not to have an issue where—be-
cause of their motivation and loyalty.
Does that concern you, Dr. Perry, at all in the sense that leaving
behind a rapid-reaction force, knowing that one-third of our troops
there right now are combat, trying to have enough advisors or
trainers embedded in units that could be of questionable loyalty-
does that really mean much of a scale-down in forces, or does that
also put us to the point that I think is true, that come next spring
we are to the real verge of truly, maybe permanently, for some
time breaking our Army?
Dr. PERRY. Yes, that does concern me, Admiral Sestak. And at
the time we made the recommendation, we made it after a very
careful consultation with the commanders in Iraq at the time, Gen-
eral Chiarelli, General Casey and particularly General Dempsey,
who is in charge of the training and a number of troops, small
number of troops, we had embedded at that time. General
Dempsey's view then was that this can be safely done, that there
was no examples at all of the Iraqi troops turning against the
Americans who were embedded in them. But I think that question
has to be continually reexamined. What was true last September
may not be true today.
I must say that my own personal experience of that is in my
grandson, who has had three deployments in Iraq. His last deploy-
ment was embedded in an Iraqi battalion. He felt completely safe
relative to the soldiers with whom he was embedded.
Mr. SESTAK. My take on this, and the reason I raise it, is I am
somewhat worried that the dynamics have changed since the ISG
came out. And now there is much movement to say, let us see if
that is the solution. We want almost a sequel two before they say
March is the goal, before they say embed the trainers, because so
much has happened.
Dr. PERRY. I agree completely with that, Admiral Sestak, and I
would not support specific recommendations of the group without
reexamining them in light of the current-in particular I would
like to carefully reexamine the embedding recommendations.
Ir. SESTAK. That is what I meant earlier about a deadline.
If I could, one last question, Dr. Kagan. You point out Fallujah,
how it sunk into chaos after we kind of pulled back out. You talk
about Tall' Afar and Anbar, and that there is some—and like in
Anbar, there was some political will upon the tribal sheiks, things
stabilized to some degree.
What I ask is two quick questions because my time is just about
up. To some degree, where you point out any success, it was be-
cause the military was not acting in a political vacuum. So as I
step back, and having been out there with Senator Hagel, the best
three days I have had in Congress, and hearing the highest leaders
of this government say, the highest leaders, it is appeasement, the
re-Baathification law-can I just finish one thing? Is there really
any possibility of ending this thing the way you want to without
truly breaking us militarily, our Army?
Dr. KAGAN. Well, Congressman, if I didn't think there was a way
of ending this without breaking us, I wouldn't have advocated the
strategy. I do think that it is possible. I think that it will be very


50
difficult. The sort of political support that we were talking about
in Fallujah and Tall' Afar and so forth was mainly support to con-
duct the security operation and willingness of the Iraqi Govern-
ment to bear the onus for doing that. We have seen tremendous
support from the Iraqi Government to conduct security operations,
and I would add not simply against al Qaeda, but also against even
Jaish al Mahdi militias, which months ago people were very con-
cerned that this government wouldn't let us go after.
I think that this is a long process. I think that it will take time
for these political accords to be made. But I also think we can im-
prove the security situation dramatically without necessarily hav-
ing a hydrocarbons law pass, without necessarily having a de-
Baathification law passed. I don't believe that those legislative
benchmarks are essential to bringing the violence in Iraq down,
and I think that the recent months hear me out on this. Violence
has dropped even though benchmarks have not been met. Will it
continue; will it be stabilized if there is no progress? Obviously not.
But the question of timelines, I think, is more complicated than
some would like to make it in this regard.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman, and I appreciate the gen-
tleman's interest in the aftermath after the American and coalition
forces do leave or limit their presence there.
Maybe one of the witnesses can correct me as to the source of
the quote. I think it was Clausewitz who said that no war ever
ends the way it was anticipated. If you don't know to the contrary,
we will turn it to Mr. Clausewitz, and with that, we will thank the
gentleman for his questions, and the Ranking Member for sticking
it out here with us.
And, Dr. Perry, Dr. Mathews, Dr. Kagan, you have just been ex-
cellent today. We really appreciate you doing this, and it has been
an excellent hearing. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]





The Situation In Iraq
TESTIMONY BY JESSICA T. MATHEWS
PRESIDENT
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
WASHINGTON DC
July 18, 2007
(55)


56
The current conversation in Washington badly distorts what is happening in Iraq and
what our options are. As it has from the very beginning, U.S. strategy has more to do
with political needs in Washington than it has to realities on the ground—to our
continuing confusion and detriment. Five key considerations provide a more clear-eyed
view and may offer a new approach for the way forward.
The premise of our current strategy-that a political solution would follow if the
violence could be reduced-is false. What is underway today in Iraq is a natural
and inevitable struggle for power. The American presence delays what will
eventually happen anyway.
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley said it over and over this past
weekend—the premise of the President's policy is that insecurity blocks
political reconciliation. If we can reduce the violence significantly enough,
reconciliation will follow. On close examination, every part of this
argument is wrong.
First, the word reconciliation is a huge distortion of what must happen. To
reconcile means to restore friendship and harmony. That's not what's
involved here. What's happening on the ground is the natural second
stage of a government overthrow (through revolution or, in this case,
externally-imposed regime change), namely a domestic struggle for power
in a political vacuum. The assumption behind the strategy, that political
reconciliation was marching along when the bombing of the Samara
mosque ignited open sectarian violence, and is now waiting to resume-
like a current that would flow were it not blocked by the dam of
violence-is not supported by the evidence. Nor is it semantics to point
out that it is equally true that the lack of a political solution creates the
violence. Whether you call it a civil war or not, what organized groups in
Iraq are engaged in today is a struggle for political power--within
sectarian groups as well as between them.
A political solution-a power sharing agreement-will eventually emerge
but likely only after the various parties have tested each others' strength
and will, when their desire to fight has burned itself out, and when the key
parties decide that they can do at least as well at the negotiating table as
they can in the streets. This will not happen by September, or by next
spring. Based on recent history, it is unlikely to emerge even in 5 years.
Since 1945, civil wars have lasted ten years on average, with half running
for more than seven years (James Fearon, Foreign Affairs, Vol.86, No.2).
To believe that the present strategy will ultimately succeed, one therefore
has to embrace three heroic beliefs: that together with Iraqi security forces
we have a large enough force to contain over a long term guerrilla
violence that springs from many sources; that a combination of political


58
foreign occupation and direction, make painful and scary political
accommodations, amend the constitution and reallocate wealth? The
question answers itself—yet we continue to pretend that Iraqis can.
Think of immigration policy as an American "benchmark”. Remember
what we just went through in trying to deal with a threat that is miniscule
by comparison to any of the dozens an Iraqi faces. Then remember these
conditions—50 million people displaced or dead-and you will have a
clearer understanding of why these benchmarks aren't being reached and
won't be any time soon.
We are debating this political problem almost entirely in military terms which
limits and distorts the available options. A change in political strategy in Iraq
and a shift in political attention and economic and military priorities across the
region redefines the possibilities. Analysis of options must recognize as it
generally does not today—that a significant change in U.S. policy will change
what others are willing to do.
When they are careful, our leaders remember to say that there is no military
solution to the problem in Iraq; that it is a political problem. But for
obvious reasons Americans see this as a war and therefore as a military issue
and the debate in Washington follows suit. For every time that someone
remembers to say that Amb. Crocker and Gen. Petraeus will report in
September, there are at least twenty times when only General Petraeus is
mentioned.
Similarly, the three broad options that are being debated-keep doing what
we're doing; reduce and redeploy the troops to focus on counterterrorism,
force protection, border security and training; and, bring the troops home-
are all defined almost entirely in military terms. They all assume that our
core political strategy in Iraq doesn't change. There is a different approach.
The Iraq Study Group's call for a multinational, regional effort to help find a
solution in Iraq is an important step in the right direction. However, it
assumes that Iraq is represented at such a conference by its current
government and therefore that the current U.S. political strategy for the
country continues. A better approach would be one that more resembles the
Bonn process that laid the basis for political transition in Afghanistan. Iraq
would be represented by all its major parties. The key foreign governments
would participate and support their various clients. This would be a lengthy
and chaotic process with higher political risk and less control by the U.S.
than we have heretofore been willing to assume. However, it holds at least a
possibility that broad representation and debate among Iraqis, heretofore
short-circuited by U.S. policy, might produce a viable political outcome
with less continuing violence.


financial support, supply of arms and proxy fighters rather than troops.
Iraq's neighbors are well aware of the dangers. Neither of the two key
players, Saudi Arabia and Iran, wants a direct confrontation. They and
other neighbors are deeply aware of the risks of a sharper divide between
Sunni and Shi'a countries, as evidenced in part by the sound rejection that
met recent American efforts to organize a coalition of Sunni states against
Iran.
Another frequent claim is that an American exit would be a tremendous
psychological victory for radical Islamists across the entire Muslim world.
This echoes the fear of the dominoes that didn't fall after Vietnam. In this
case, an American exit from Iraq (not the region) would be a cause for
celebration among some terrorists and perhaps a temporary source of
strength, but it is at least equally true that the American occupation of Iraq
(I use those words advisedly because that is the way it is seen in the region
is jihadists' principal recruiting tool. Who is to say whether an American
departure would be-on balance—a shot in the arm or a significant mid
and long term loss? The danger from already committed terrorists after an
American exit would probably increase outside Iraq as some would be
forced out and others would be less likely to travel there.
The fear that an American departure would leave open a field that would
be claimed by Iran demands close scrutiny. Iran might seek to dominate
southern Iraq, but Iraqi Shi'a are anything but monolithic. Some are close
to Tehran, but without the infidel foreign presence many would fight
Persian domination as they have before. Moreover, it is undeniable that
American troubles in Iraq embolden and strengthen Iran. An American
exit is a loss for Tehran in that respect.
The greatest unknown after a carefully planned and executed departure is
what effect the likely short term rise in violence in Iraq and generalized
fear of the consequences would have on oil prices. This bears serious
analysis it has not, to my knowledge received, and anticipatory planning.
Congress needs urgently to address and end the dangerous charade that has been
underway between it and the administration regarding whether the U.S.
government is currently planning a permanent presence in Iraq.
Congress has repeatedly passed provisions prohibiting the use of appropriated
funds to construct permanent military facilities in Iraq-in one case by a Senate
vote of 100-0. On the first occasion the administration lobbied strenuously and
successfully against the provision. Later, however, it allowed numerous such
provisions to pass, presumably on the grounds that such language is
meaningless because no one can prove that anything is going to be "permanent”.


61
Meanwhile, the U.S. has continued to construct a massive, wholly self-
contained embassy akin to a 19th century foreign compound except heavily
fortified, and equally large and self-contained bases with military facilities,
amenities (stores, Pizza Huts and Burger Kings, swimming pools and exercise
courses), and costs that could only be justified by very long term planned use.
The major bases are designed to support force projection across the region and
North Africa. The largest bases cover 15-20 square miles each and each
accommodates 14,000-20,000 military personnel plus thousands more
contractors.
After years of evasions and denials, one month ago the White House and the
Pentagon finally revealed what has been obvious on the ground all along.
Defense Secretary Gates remarked that the U.S. was seeking a “long and
enduring presence” in Iraq under a yet to be negotiated Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA). He went on to say “The Korea model is one, the security
relationship we have with Japan is another.” U.S. forces have been in both of
these countries for more than half a century. His comments did not receive
nearly the attention they deserve.
What is the administration's thinking regarding a long term U.S. military
presence in Iraq? How big a presence and for what purposes? Is there a settled
policy? A document of any kind? Has it ever been debated at senior levels?
Or, did the planning and building begin—as one general has said-by
engineers who wanted to stay ahead of the policymakers and continued on
autopilot ever since?
This issue has immense political consequence. Repeated polls show Iraqis
strongly oppose the bases. Across the Middle East, the enormous American
footprint supports those who believe that the U.S. invaded Iraq to control the
country and its oil resources and establish itself as a permanent power in the
region. Congress must end its ineffectual Kabuki dance on spending and call
the question on policy: what are the administration's plans and are they wise?
In my view, any serious attention to political and social realities in Iraq and to
opinion across the region and globally, leads quickly to the conclusion that
major U.S. military facilities in the Middle East should be located outside of
Iraq.


62
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION
INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S.
House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses
appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum
vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants
(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous
fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is
intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in
complying with the House rule.
Witness name: DR. JESSICA TUCHMAN MATHEWS
Capacity in which appearing: (check one)
Individual
X Representative
If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other
entity being represented: PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON DC
FISCAL YEAR 2007
federal agency
dollar value
subject(s) of contract or
grant
federal grant(s) /
contracts
DE-FG52-
07NA28169
Dept of Energy
$250,000
SAQMPD6C0129
Dept of State
$15,000
$60,000
Effective US-Russian
Nuclear Energy
Cooperation
Religion, Security and
Society in Central Asia
Military Capabilities of
India, China and Pakistan
China Crisis Management
NA
DOD thru CSBA
DIA
HHM402-05-M-
0283
$134,527.69
FISCAL YEAR 2006
-
federal agency
dollar value..
subject(s) of contract or
federal grant(s)/
contracts
HHM402-05-M-
grant
DIA
$93,078.48
China Crisis Management


63
0283
NA
DOD thru CSBA
$40,000
Military Capabilities of
India, China and Pakistan
JIHAD AND THE
EVOLUTION OF ISLAM
Dept of State
$70,000
FISCAL YEAR 2005
federal agency
dollar value
Federal grant(s) /
contracts
HHM402-04-M-
10266
NA
subject(s) of contract or
grant
China Crisis Management
DIA
$188,982.42
DOD thru Vistar
$100,000
Military Capabilities of
India, China and Pakistan
JIHAD AND THE
EVOLUTION OF ISLAM
Dept of State
$5,000
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please provide the following information:
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List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts
manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering
services, etc.):
Current fiscal year (2007):_Research


64
LA
Fiscal year 2006:_ Research
Fiscal year 2005: _Research
Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:
Current fiscal year (2007): $209,527.69
Fiscal year 2006:_$203,078.48
Fiscal year 2005:_$293,982.42_


65
Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on
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Current fiscal year (2007):_$250,000
Fiscal year 2006: 0
Fiscal year 2005:_0


67
But before i discuss the ISG and its new way forward, I will first look back to consider
how the disastrous situation in Iraq arose. (A partial list of references for my assessment
includes “Squandered Victory", Larry Diamond; “Assassin's Gate", George Packer; “Fiasco",
Tom Ricks; and "State of Denial", Bob Woodward.)
The administration gave three reasons for the invasion of Iraq. The first was the alleged
imminent danger from Iraq's WMD programs. I believe that military action to stop an illegal
nuclear program would have been warranted, but it would have been targeted against nuclear
facilities, and not entail the occupation of Iraq. In any event, there was no imminent or even
gathering danger from Iraqi nuclear weapons or other WMD. It appears that the UN
inspections had, in fact, been working.
The second reason was the alleged imminent danger to the US from Iraq's support of
terrorism. Military action to defeat Al Qaeda could have been justified, as it was in Afghanistan.
But while Al Qaeda had been using Afghanistan as a training area, it had no significant
presence in Iraq prior to the invasion, and had no relationship with Iraq's government.
The third reason was to bring stability to the Mideast by creating a democratic
government in Iraq. Certainly a democratic government in Iraq could be a blessing to its people
and a boon to the region. But the task of imposing a democratic government in Iraq turned out
to be substantially more difficult than the administration imagined. Indeed, it is not clear that
any strategy could have fully succeeded in achieving a democratic, stable government in Iraq.
But we may never know whether it was possible, since the administration's attempts to do so
were burdened with serious strategic errors.
In particular, four errors were the most consequential:
The administration failed to get support from regional powers and from key allies.
As a consequence, US forces comprise almost 90% of the coalition, as opposed
to about 50% in Desert Storm or Bosnia.
The administration did not send in enough troops to maintain security after the
Iraqi army was defeated. Thus, after the Iraqi army was defeated and Iraq broke
out in looting, the US did not have enough troops to maintain control, giving the
insurgency a chance to gain a foothold.
The administration disbanded the Iraqi army, police and civil servants a few
weeks after the Iraqi army was defeated. As a result, 500,000 angry young men
were turned loose on Iraqi towns with weapons and no jobs, and Iraq was left
with no security force except for the undersized coalition military force.
The administration pushed the Iraqi provisional government to establish a
constitution and hold elections, but in a faulty process that did not adequately
protect minority rights, thus setting the stage for a bloody power struggle
between Shias and Sunnis.
2


68
The cumulative affect of all of those strategic errors is a disastrous security situation in
Irag, which continues to deteriorate:
• Since the war began, almost 30,000 US military personnel have been killed,
maimed or wounded.
• Last year more than 30,000 Iraqis were killed in the sectarian violence sweeping
the major cities of Iraq.
Well over a million Iraqis have left the country, including large numbers of Iraqi
professionals.
• And the violence is still trending up.
As grim as this situation is, it could become even worse when US soldiers leave, as the
administration has stated. But, in the absence of political reconciliation, that could be true
whether we leave a year from now or five years from now.
B. THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP
In face of this growing disaster, the US Congress commissioned an independent
bipartisan study charged to reach consensus on a way forward in Iraq. Jim Baker and Lee
Hamilton were named as the co-chairmen and each of them selected four other members from
his own party. Additionally they recruited forty expert advisors. Neither the members nor the
advisers received any compensation. We met two to three days each month from March to
August of last year being briefed by military and political experts. A very important part of our
fact-finding was consulting with the Iraqi government. So we went to Baghdad in September,
and spent four days meeting with all of the top officials of the Iraqi government, as well as our
military commanders in Iraq.
After we returned from Iraq, we spent six intensive days trying to reach a consensus.
This process was very difficult, and it is a tribute to our co-chairmen that we were able to
succeed. All of our members were motivated by the belief that Iraq posed a serious problem
for our country, and that to be of constructive help we had to reach a bipartisan consensus on
how to move forward.
The ISG report was released to the public on 6 December. It called for a change in
mission, a reinvigoration of diplomacy in the region, a strengthening of the Iraqi government,
and the beginning of troop redeployments.
The change in mission proposed was the key to everything else in the report. We
believed that we should try to strengthen the present government's ability to hold off a full-
scale civil war. We believed that we should continue our efforts to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq.
Although Al Qaeda was not a significant factor in Iraq before the war, it has since established a
strong foothold, specializing in mass killings. We believed that we should reduce the
commitment of our ground forces in Iraq and reestablish their readiness for other missions.
The US has important security responsibilities outside of Iraq, which cannot be met if our
ground forces are tied down in Iraq for the indefinite future.


69
We recommended the following actions to carry out these missions:
Shift the mission of US troops from combat patrols to training the Iraqi
army, including imbedding some US soldiers so that they can provide role
models and on-the-job training for Iraqi soldiers.
Begin pulling out US combat brigades, with the goal of having all out by
the first quarter of 2008, except for a strong rapid reaction force needed
for force protection and the fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq.
Continue to support Iraqi forces with intelligence, logistics, and air support.
Provide both positive and negative incentives for the Iraqi government to
accelerate the reconciliation process and oil revenue sharing so that
Sunnis have a stake in a stable Iraq.
Mount an intense diplomatic effort to persuade friendly regional powers to
assist economically, politically, and with training and to put pressure on
unfriendly regional powers to stop arming militias and fomenting violence.
C. IMPACT OF IRAQ ON GROUND FORCES READINESS
If the recommendations of the ISG were to be followed, many of our combat brigades
would be out of Iraq by the first quarter of next year. As our Army combat brigades and Marine
units return to their bases in the US, the Defense Dept. will have a huge budget and
management problem in restoring them to full combat readiness. This problem is of special
concern to this committee because of the constitutional responsibility of the Congress in
constituting and equipping our armed forces. The Army, all of whose active brigades were at
high readiness levels at the beginning of the war, is at dangerously low readiness levels.
Today, none of the non-deployed brigades are at readiness levels needed to meet other
military contingencies. And low readiness levels invite such contingencies; indeed, our security
may have already suffered because of the perception of Iran and North Korea that our forces
were tied down in Iraq. The Congress also needs to reconsider the role of the National Guard,
since the compact with these citizen soldiers has been shattered by extended deployments
that have caused many of them to lose their jobs or even their families.
D. A COMPARISON OF THE PRESIDENT'S NEW STRATEGY WITH ISG
PROPOSALS
In January the president announced what he called a new way forward in Iraq. I fully
agree with the president's assessment that failure in Iraq could have serious consequences for
security in the region and, ultimately, American security. And I agree that we should make a
serious effort to avoid such a failure. But I firmly believe that the bipartisan proposal made by
the ISG gives us a better chance of avoiding that failure than does the president's proposal.


71
achieve. They would require the dedicated efforts of the best American diplomats, both in and
out of government. And even with such an effort, we probably would not succeed in all of our
diplomatic goals. But we will never know how much, in fact, can be accomplished through
diplomacy unless we give it such a dedicated effort. Two noteworthy precedents of successful
American diplomacy in the face of equally daunting odds were the diplomacy by the first Bush
administration that facilitated a peaceful ending of the Cold War, and the diplomacy by the
Clinton administration that ended the Bosnian War. So far this year the administration has
taken diplomatic actions far less comprehensive than envisaged by the ISG. They have had
very limited discussions with Iran, apparently to no effect, and none at all with Syria, which
plays a pivotal role in the region and with whom we could have considerable leverage.
F. CONCLUSIONS
In sum, I believe that the president's diplomatic strategy is too timid, and his military
strategy is too little and too late to effect the lasting and profound changes needed. His
strategy is not likely to succeed because it is tactical not strategic; because it does not entail
real conditionality for the Iraqi government; and because it will only deepen the divide in our
country.
The ISG proposal has a better chance because it recognizes that the key actions
needed in Iraq to effect lasting results must be taken by the Iraqi government and the Iraqi
Army, and because it provides the support and the incentives for those actions. Most
importantly, the recommendations of the bipartisan ISG provide an opportunity for Americans
to come together again as one nation, indivisible.


72
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73
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VOIP


75
STATEMENT BY
FREDERICK W. KAGAN
RESIDENT SCHOLAR
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON
IRAQ: TRENDS AND FUTURE SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
JULY 18, 2007


76
The New Strategy in Iraq
By Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan
The Weekly Standard Publication Date: July 9, 2007
The new strategy for Iraq has entered its second phase. Now that all of the additional
combat forces have arrived in theater, Generals David Petraeus and Ray Odierno have
begun Operation Phantom Thunder, a vast and complex effort to disrupt al Qaeda and
Shiite militia bases all around Baghdad in advance of the major clear-and-hold operations
that will follow. The deployment of forces and preparations for this operation have gone
better than expected, and Phantom Thunder is so far proceeding very well. All aspects of
the current strategy have been built upon the lessons of previous successful and
unsuccessful Coalition efforts to establish security in Iraq, and there is every reason to be
optimistic about its outcome.
The first phase of the new strategy unfolded over five months--between the president's
announcement of the "surge" on January 10 and the arrival of the last of the five
additional Army brigades and Marine elements in early June (though critical enablers for
those combat forces have only just arrived). As the new units entered Iraq, commanders
began pushing forces already in the theater forward from their operating bases into
outposts in key neighborhoods of Baghdad and elsewhere. The purpose of these
movements was to establish positions within those key neighborhoods and to develop
intelligence about the enemy and relationships of trust with the local communities.
Also during this first phase, additional Iraqi security forces were deployed to Baghdad in
accordance with a plan developed jointly by the U.S. and Iraqi military commands. All of
the requested units were provided. The Iraqi military has just completed its second
rotation of units into Baghdad; as before, all of the designated units arrived, and they
were generally closer to being fully manned than in the first rotation.
The new U.S. troops have increased the available combat power in Iraq by about 40
percent, from 15 brigades to the equivalent of 21 brigades. Generals Petraeus and
Odierno allocated only two of the additional Army brigades to the capital. The other three
Army brigades and the equivalent of a Marine regiment they deployed in the surrounding
areas, known as the "Baghdad belt." There, under the guise of Operation Phantom
Thunder, they are now working to disrupt the car-bomb and suicide-bomb networks that
have been supporting al Qaeda's counter-surge since January.
But this second phase is designed primarily to support the clearing and holding
operations in Baghdad itself, which will continue for many months. It is those operations
that are meant to bring lasting security to Iraq's capital and thus create the space for
political progress.
The United States has not undertaken a multiphased operation on such a large scale since
the invasion, so it is unsurprising that many commentators are confused about how to
report and evaluate what is going on. Indeed, the current effort differs profoundly from
anything U.S. forces have tried before in Iraq. As Coalition forces begin the attempt to


77
establish sustainable security in Baghdad and its environs, it is worth reviewing past
major combat operations in Iraq, since their clear lessons have informed planning for the
current, much larger campaign.
Falluja, 2004
The U.S. Marines fought two big battles in Falluja, the easternmost major city in Anbar
province not far from Baghdad, in the spring and fall of 2004. The enemy was a dense
network of al Qaeda fighters and Sunni Arab insurgents who had prepared defensive
positions throughout the city and had considerable support from the local population. The
initial assault was ordered on short notice after the kidnapping and execution of several
American contractors, whose bodies were prominently displayed from a bridge.
The Marines were not given adequate time to prepare for the attack. They could not
establish forward outposts in the city, develop adequate intelligence about the enemy, or
gain the trust of the population. The American command did not fully prepare the Iraqi
government for the intensity of the battle or the controversy it was bound to generate. As
a result, the Marines' initial assaults resulted in heavy casualties and collateral damage.
The Iraqi government was shaken, and the Marines were ordered to abandon the effort
and rely instead on local forces to restore order in the city. Lacking troops, training, and
support, the local allies were quickly either turned or slaughtered, and al Qaeda and the
insurgents strengthened their hold on Falluja and Anbar generally.
The second Marine attack, in the fall, was much more successful. The local units were
reinforced and given time to develop a much clearer intelligence picture, as well as to
obtain local allies, although those were still few and unreliable. The much better-planned
attack cleared the city, although with considerable collateral damage resulting largely
from the sophistication of the defenses the enemy had been able to establish during the
pause between the two attacks.
The Marines were not allowed to follow up on their success in Falluja, however. No
effort was made to clear and hold Ramadi or the Upper Euphrates Valley for more than a
year. In the meantime, the area between Falluja and Baghdad, including the Abu Ghraib
neighborhood on the western outskirts of the capital, was left largely devoid of American
forces and remained a major Sunni Arab insurgent and al Qaeda base. Nevertheless,
Falluja was fairly stable for many months after the Marine attack, only slowly sinking
back into chaos and enemy control.
Najaf and Sadr City, 2004
The summer of 2004 also saw the only major combat between Coalition forces and
Moktada al-Sadr's Mahdi army, or Jaysh al-Mahdi. This took place in the Shia holy cities
of Najaf and Karbala and the Baghdad neighborhood of Sadr City. The Sadrist uprising
followed close on the heels of the first Battle of Falluja, and it seemed briefly that the
Coalition might be defeated simultaneously by Sunni insurgents and Shia militias across
Iraq. But U.S. forces rapidly regained control of the situation in Sadr City, where Major


78
General Chiarelli's 1st Cavalry Division restored order. Fighting in Najaf was greatly
complicated by the fact that the Sadrists took up positions in and near the Imam Ali
Mosque, one of Shia Islam's most sacred sites. Skillful Coalition military operations
dislodged the Sadrists from those positions without significant damage to the shrine, and
killed many Sadrist fighters in the process.
The battles of Sadr City and Najaf continue to influence the situation in Iraq today. Sadr
appears to have learned from these battles that his militia cannot stand up to American
forces in pitched battles. He has avoided situations that might lead to such fights,
preferring hit-and-run attacks, the use of IEDs (and now EFPs, explosively formed
projectiles), and death-squad attacks on Sunni Arabs after the bombing of the Samarra
Mosque in February 2006. The successes in Najaf and Sadr City were fleeting in another
respect, however. U.S. forces left both areas quickly, and the Sadrist militias retook
control of them within months. The Sadrists remain largely in control of Najaf and were
long uncontested in Sadr City, although recent events have greatly complicated their
situation there.
Tal Afar and the Upper Euphrates, 2005
After the uprisings of 2004, the United States focused its efforts on moving the political
process forward in Iraq and on training the Iraqi army and National Police. It was widely
expected in the government and especially in the military leadership that political
progress would translate directly into improved security. It was also believed that the
onus for conducting what military operations were necessary should fall on the nascent
Iraqi military to the maximum extent possible.
Nevertheless, the Coalition command understood that only U.S. forces could provide the
short-term security necessary for elections. The command requested and received
significant reinforcements to this end in late 2005. The most dramatic battle before the
elections came in September 2005, when Colonel H. R. McMaster's 3rd Armored Cavalry
Regiment cleared Tal Afar, a city in Nineveh Province between Mosul and the Syrian
border.
Tal Afar was a stronghold of the Sunni Arab insurgency and al Qaeda on the road from
Syria into the heart of Iraq. As in Falluja, the enemy had prepared sophisticated defensive
positions and terrorized the local population into providing support. McMaster had a
number of advantages over the Marines in Falluja, however. He had a larger number of
trained and reasonably reliable Iraqi soldiers, the first fruits of a new effort to build an
Iraqi army capable of conducting counterinsurgency efforts. He was also able to establish
outposts in and around the city, develop a sophisticated intelligence picture, and shape
the situation to his advantage before beginning the major clearing operation. The result
was a marked success. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment isolated the city with a berm
to control access and then cleared it house-to-house in conjunction with the Iraqi army. .
Some insurgent cells fought back determinedly, but the Coalition forces cleared the city
without destroying it, and gained the support of the population in the process.


80
Nevertheless, the Marines and Army units in Anbar began a series of quiet efforts to
regain control that ultimately led to spectacular and unexpected success. They began to
engage local leaders in talks, particularly after al Qaeda committed a series of
assassinations and other atrocities against tribal leaders and local civilians as part of an
effort to enforce their extreme and distorted vision of Islamic law. U.S. forces under the
command of Colonel Sean MacFarland also began a quiet effort to apply the clearing
principles honed through operations in Falluja, Sadr City, and Tal Afar to Ramadi. There
were never enough forces to undertake such operations rapidly or decisively, and success
never appeared likely, at least to outside observers, who focused excessively on the force
ratios.
But the effort was successful beyond all expectations. The tribal leaders in Anbar came
together to negotiate an accord that ultimately produced the Anbar Awakening, an
association of Anbar tribes dedicated to fighting al Qaeda. Recruiting for the Iraqi
Security Forces in Anbar increased from virtually zero through 2006 to more than 14,000
by mid-2007. As the 2007 surge forces augmented U.S. troops in Anbar and began to
change the political dynamic in Iraq, efforts to clear Ramadi and bring overall violence in
the province under control also peaked. As New York Times reporter John
after a recent visit to Ramadi, Anbar's capital has "gone from being the most dangerous
place in Iraq, with the help of the tribal sheikhs, to being one of the least dangerous
places." And the Anbar Awakening movement has spread to Sunni tribes in neighboring
areas. Parallel organizations have developed in Babil, Salahuddin, and Diyala provinces,
and even in Baghdad. As the new strategy of 2007 took hold, U.S. forces found that they
could even negotiate and work with some of their most determined former foes in the
Sunni Arab insurgency--groups like the Baathist 1920s Brigades that once focused on
killing Americans and now are increasingly working with Americans to kill al Qaeda
fighters. Coalition operations in Anbar, which looked hopeless for years, have
accomplished extraordinary successes that are deepening and spreading.
Baghdad, 2006
The worsening sectarian violence after the al-Askariya Mosque bombing led General
Casey to conduct two operations aimed at restoring stability in Baghdad. Dubbed
Operations Together Forward I and II, they involved surges of fewer than 10,000
additional U.S. troops and a relatively small number of Iraqis into the capital to conduct
clearing operations. Inadequate planning and preparation for the movement of the Iraqi
battalions into Baghdad led to the refusal of many of those units to show up. The plans,
moreover, relied on Iraqi forces to hold cleared neighborhoods on their own, while U.S.
forces moved on to other troubled areas.
These operations failed. Six months of intense sectarian conflict had led many members
of the mostly Shiite Iraqi police into death squads. They were not and could not be
effective bulwarks on their own against sectarian violence of which they were a part. The
fact that most Iraqi army formations did not show up reduced the force ratios necessary to
clear neighborhoods and deprived the Iraqi command, which was poorly organized, of
resources vital to holding areas that U.S. forces cleared. The very small increase in


81
American combat power (two additional brigades in Baghdad, but no overall increase in
the American force levels in the theater) was inadequate to gain control of the situation.
Sectarian killings dropped during the first two weeks of the second, and larger, operation,
but then rapidly rose above pre-operation levels and continued to rise for the rest of the
year. By November, Operation Together Forward II had mostly ground to a halt, having
made no lasting improvement in the situation.
Lessons of the Past
A number of clear lessons drawn from these operations have informed the current
strategy. First, political progress by itself will not reduce the violence. From May 2003
through mid-2006, the Bush administration and the military command focused on
political progress as the key. The transfer of sovereignty in mid-2004, the election of a
Transitional National Assembly in January 2005, the approval of a new constitution by
referendum in October 2005, and the election of a fresh National Assembly in December
2005 were all expected to subdue violence by creating an inclusive and balanced
government. Throughout this period, American armed forces tried to stay in the
background, keeping their "footprint" minimal and pushing the nascent Iraqi Security
Forces into the lead. Violence steadily increased. Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda terrorists
dug into cities that U.S. forces left open, and Shia militias took control of abandoned Shia
lands.
When local American commanders took the initiative to clear insurgent hotbeds, they
were generally successful. These operations produced measurable improvements in
important areas that decayed only slowly, despite the absence of follow-up or adequate
continued presence. U.S. forces honed their skills in such operations, allowing them
finally to clear insurgent-held cities without destroying them or excessively alienating the
local population. Political progress and political solutions are essential to ultimate success
in counterinsurgency, but they must often be complemented by major military operations
sustained over a long time.
Second, all American efforts to establish local security in Iraq have been hindered by the
paucity of U.S. troops there, yet some have succeeded even so. Colonel McMaster could
muster nearly one Coalition soldier (American or Iraqi) for every 45 people in Tal Afar,
which helps explain the speed and success of the clearing in that city. But General
Chiarelli restored order in Sadr City in 2004 with fewer than one soldier per 100
inhabitants, and the Marines and Army units in Anbar cleared Ramadi slowly with
similarly poor ratios. More soldiers and Marines, to say nothing of more trained and
reliable Iraqi troops, would have made every operation proceed more rapidly and
smoothly, but the evidence suggests that critical clearing operations can succeed even at
hese lower ratios. There are now well over 350,000 Coalition forces, including Iraqis, in
he country, whose population is around 25 million--an overall ratio significantly better
han what sufficed to restore order in Sadr City and Ramadi.
Third, rapid reductions in Coalition forces after clearing operations undermined the
success of almost all past operations. In Sadr City and Najaf, the withdrawal led to the


82
complete if quiet restoration of the militias that had been driven out. In Falluja and Tal
Afar, rapid reductions in Coalition forces led to slow deterioration, although not to
previous levels of insurgent and terrorist predominance. Turning control of cleared areas
over to Iraqi forces prematurely--as in Falluja after the first battle and in Baghdad after
Operations Together Forward--generally led to rapid failure. The Coalition must plan to
maintain a significant presence in direct and indirect support of Iraqi forces after clearing
operations are complete in order to sustain success. The model is Ramadi, where
Coalition forces have remained in strength even as the situation has improved, helping to
deepen the positive trends underway there. The capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces
have improved steadily, but it is highly unlikely that Coalition forces can leave areas as
soon as they have been cleared without seeing security deteriorate.
Fourth, every successful operation was preceded by commanders' taking the time to
develop a good intelligence picture of the situation. To do this, they moved forces into
the area and made contact with the local population. Advance forces help shape the
environment by occupying bases from which subsequent operations can proceed and by
establishing relationships with local leaders that will be exploited in subsequent phases.
This also helps commanders and planners refine their estimates of the forces required in
the clearing operation. Especially operations on a large scale, involving the physical
movement of many forces, require significant preparation.
Fifth, Coalition casualties generally increase at the start of major clearing operations,
when Coalition troops move into areas previously held by the enemy, especially where
the enemy has prepared sophisticated defensive positions. As the enemy realizes that a
major attack is underway, he often launches counterattacks, in an attempt to blunt the
offensive and/or weaken the will of leaders in Baghdad and Washington. Depending on
the scale of operations and the resilience of the enemy defenses, this period of increased
violence can last for days or weeks. As clearing proceeds to its conclusion, however,
violence generally drops and Coalition casualties begin to fall. This pattern has occurred
in almost every successful clearing operation, including Sadr City, Najaf, the second
Battle of Falluja, Tal Afar, and Ramadi. Higher force ratios combined with solid
preparation can reduce the intensity and duration of this spike in violence and casualties,
but cannot eliminate it.
Operation Phantom Thunder in Context
The new strategy for securing Baghdad was designed with all these lessons in mind, as
well as lessons from other successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operations
elsewhere. So far, the campaign has the hallmarks of past successful operations, and it
has a number of promising new elements. One of these new elements is Operation
Phantom Thunder itself.
Many advocates of the new strategy--and many critics--bemoaned the staggered arrival
over five months of the additional combat forces, which delayed the start of major
clearing operations and seemed to threaten a ragged and uneven launch. But Generals
Petraeus and Odierno put the time to good use. They immediately began to push U.S.


84
forces can become increasingly responsible for maintaining the security that they have
helped to establish. The current strategy is on track to produce that outcome--which is
why it deserves to be given every chance to succeed.
Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar in defense and security policy studies at the
American Enterprise Institute. He is the author of Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success
in Iraq, a report by the Iraq Planning Group at AEI. His most recent book Finding the
Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy (Encounter Books) was
published in September 2006. Previously an associate professor of military history at the
U.S. Military Academy at West Point, he is the author of The End of the Old Order:
Napoleon and Europe, 1801-1805 (Da Capo, 2006) and coauthor of While America
Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today (St. Martin's
Press, 2000). A contributing editor at The Weekly Standard, he has also written numerous
articles on defense and foreign policy issues for Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal,
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Policy Review, Commentary magazine,
Parameters, and other periodicals.


86
FISCAL YEAR 2005
federal agency
dollar value
Federal grant(s)/
contracts
TPD-03-C-0001
OSD
$18,675
subject(s) of contract or
grant
Scharnhorst and military
transformation (one
contract over three fiscal
years)
Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee
on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government,
please provide the following information:
Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:
Current fiscal year (2007):_ 1 (over three fiscal years);
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1 (over three fiscal years)
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1 (over three fiscal years).
Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:
Current fiscal year (2007):
Fiscal year 2006:
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OSD
OSD
LOSD
List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts
manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering
services, etc.);
Current fiscal year (2007): _Military transformation
Fiscal year 2006: _ _Military transformation
Fiscal year 2005: __ _Military transformation_


87
Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:
Current fiscal year (2007):_
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$18,675 (over three fiscals)__;
$18,675 (over three fiscals)
$18,675 (over three fiscals)


88
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
JULY 18, 2007


UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION
.
Notional Political Timeline
September 2006
• Form Constitutional Review Committee
• Approve law on procedures to form regions
• Agree on political timetable
• Approve the law for Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)
• Approve the Investment Law
October 2006
• Approve provincial elections law and set date for provincial elections
• Approve a hydrocarbon law
November 2006
• Approve de-Ba'athification law
• Approve provincial council authorities law
• Approve a flag, emblem and national anthem law
December 2006
Approve Coalition Provisional Authority Order 91 concerning armed forces
and militias
Council of Representatives to address amnesty, militias and other armed
formations
• Approve amnesty, militias and other armed formations law
January 2007
• Constitutional Review Committee completes its work
February 2007
• Form independent commissions in accordance with the Constitution
March 2007
• Constitutional amendments referendum (if required)
(91)



Iraqi Security Forces
Tall Afar
Al Qa'im
Tikrit
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Ar Ramadi
Bagubah
17
Baghdad
Ar Rutbah
BAGHDAD
Karbala
An Na
Al Amaar
Diwaniyah
As Samawah
mawah
An Nasriyak1
AJ Basrah
Net