Y L(.1= 7e;/I: P /17 U.N. ROLE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. RESOLUTIONS HEARING SUBCOMMITTEES ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST AND ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS FIRST SESSION APRIL 23; JULY 18; AND OCTOBER 21, 1991 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs OC LLF 76/1: 14:1/17 F: 7&0/1: P 1,13/17 $39 Fo I byth US (.10 nme tPr1nt| gOf_fice JUL L3. :.§’..i‘\.~""\I'(I Superintendent of Documents Congress on I S I Offce, Washington. DC 20402 :c-av-i-r °!l~22I‘?~ P 1sBN 0 16 037648 3 MAY 1 5 i_‘.S;,EE€>OS!T(?s‘-‘:"»./' Page COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, Chairman LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California TOM LANTOS, California ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California MEL LEVINE, California EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio TED WEISS, New York GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona JAIME B. FUSTER, Puerto Rico WAYNE OWENS, Utah HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania JIM LEACH, Iowa TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey DAN BURTON, Indiana JAN MEYERS, Kansas JOHN MILLER, Washington BEN BLAZ, Guam ELTON GALLEGLY, California AMO HOUGHTON, New York PORTER J. GOSS, Florida ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida r*~@ GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts F l ‘,5, AUSTIN J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania ‘W ",'_.,---;_~_-5 PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania #1? - .-: __,-,_.,___ M THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA, Pennsylvania f-, I '"" FRANK MCCLOSKEY, Indiana '" .- ‘-1 I , THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey BILL ORTON, Utah . A I JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., Chiefof ' KRISTINE WILLIE, Statéf Assistant SUZANNE HARTLEY, S . -______( SUBc0Mlvlrl'rEE ON EUROPE AND TI-IE MIDDLE EAST LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman TOM LANTOS, California MEL LEVINE, California EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York WAYNE OWENS, Utah HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida ELIOT ENGEL, New York BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania JAN MEYERS, Kansas ELTON GALLEGLY, California JIM LEACH, Iowa MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Subcommittee Staff Director RUssE1.l. J. WllsoN, Minority Staff Consultant CHRISTOPHER KOJM, Subcommittee Staff Consultant KATHERINE A. WILKENS, Subcommittee Staff Consultant DAv1D WEINER, Subcommittee Staff Consultant SUnc0MMl'l'rEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania, Chairman WAYNE OWENS, Utah TED WEISS, New York ELIOT ENGEL, New York GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts FRANK MCCLOSKEY, Indiana DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MARK J. TAvLAluDm, Subcommittee Staff Director MICHAEL ENN1s, Minority Staff Consultant KERRY BOLOGNESE, Subcommittee Staff Consultant . - , - = LlsA HEYEs, Subcommittee Staff Consultant - v I (II) CONTENTS ~ WITNESSES Tuesday, April 23, 1991: Hon. Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Department of State .......................................................................................... .. Hon. John R. Bolton, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Orga- nization Affairs, Department of State ............................................................ .. Thursday, July 18, 1991: Hon. John R. Bolton, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Orga- nization Affairs, Department of State ............................................................ .. Hon. Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Department of State .......................................................................................... .. Monday, October 21, 1991: Hon. Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Department of State .......................................................................................... .. John Wolf, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organi- zation Affairs, Department of State ................................................................ .. MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD State Department’s position on the U.S. authority to employ force to ensure compliance with UNSC resolutions ........................................................................ .. Iraqi children at risk ..................................................................................................... .. Refugee status of Kurds who provided assistance to the allied relief effort in northern Iraq .............................................................................................................. .. Use of frozen Iraqi funds .............................................................................................. .. Total Iraqi frozen assets in the United States ......................................................... .. Iraqi assets unfrozen by Switzerland ......................................................................... .. Chemical and biological sites in Iraq ......................................................................... .. U.N. inspection team taking samples from Iraqi chemical facility ..................... .. Iraqi enriched uranium production program ........................................................... .. Sanctions violations ....................................................................................................... .. Disposition of nuclear materials ................................................................................. .. Humanitarian relief programs .................................................................................... .. APPENDIXES 1. Supplemental questions submitted by the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations to the Department of State and re- sponses thereto ........................................................................................................ .. 2. Supplemental questions submitted by Representative Nancy Pelosi (D—CA) to the Department of State and responses thereto .......................................... .. 3. Letter to President George Bush from 60 Members of Congress, regarding the environmental situation in the Gulf region, dated April 19, 1991 ........ .. 4. Statement of Representative Nancy Pelosi (D—CA) ............................................ .. 5. Letter to Mostafa K. Tolba of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) from 17 Members of Congress, regarding the potential environ- mental consequences of the ongoing war in the Middle East, dated Janu- ary 25, 1991 .............................................................................................................. .. (III) Page 1 24 61 80 159 178 111 119 122 132 135 140 147 151 151 201 208 212 235 255 259 263 270 IV 6. Text of H.R. 2901, to authorize the transfer by lease of four naval vessels to the Government of Greece .................................................................................... .. 7. New York Times article entitled: Iraq Atom Effort Ruined, Inspectors Say, dated July 18, 1991 ................................................................................................. .. 8. Correspondence submitted by James Matlack, director, American Friends Service Committee ................................................................................................. .. 9. Supplemental questions submitted by the Subcommittee on Human Rights 10 11 12 13 14 15. 16 17 18. and International Organizations to the Department of State and re- sponses thereto ........................................................................................................ .. Report on the Third IAEA On-Site Inspection in Iraq under Security Council Resolution 687 (submitted by Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering)... Letter to Representative Doug Bereuter (R-NE) from John R. Bolton, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, De- gaartment of State ................................................................................................... .. upplemental questions submitted by the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East to the Degartment of State and responses thereto ............ .. Supplemental questions su mitted by the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations to the Department of State and re- sponses thereto ........................................................................................................ .. Supplemental questions submitted by Representative Doug Bereuter (R- N E) to the Department of State and responses thereto .................................. .. Supplemental questions submitted by Representative Timothy Penny (D- MN) to the Department of State and responses thereto ................................. .. United Nations Security Council Resolution 706 (submitted by Ambassa- dor Thomas R. Pickering) ..................................................................................... .. Report by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 706 (submitted by Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering)... Statement of Nancy Spannaus, U.S. coordinator, Committee to Save the Children in Iraq .................................................................................. ..' .................. .. Page 272 275 276 286 304 319 320 338 349 350 352 356 393 POSTWAR ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1991 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF- FAIRS, SUBCOMMITPEES ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL OR- GANIZATIONS, Washington, DC. The subcommittees met at 9:07 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gus Yatron presiding. Mr. YATRON. Good morning. The Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and on Europe and the Middle East meet today to receive testimony from the U.S. Ambas- sador to the United Nations, the Honorable Thomas Pickering, and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, the Honorable John Bolton, concerning the post-war role of the United Nations in the Persian Gulf. There are a number of complex issues which must be addressed in the aftermath of the Gulf war. U.N. Security Council Resolu- tions 687 and 688, as well as previous resolutions concerning the Gulf crisis, involve the U.N. and its affiliated agencies in a number of areas, including monitoring the implementation of the cease-fire agreement, peacekeeping, reparations, repatriation, reconstruction, environmental clean-up and the plight of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and refugees. The Congress will no doubt receive additional aid requests from the administration for many of these U.N. operations, and it is es- sential that we have a clear understanding of the U.S. role in working with the U.N. system. The full committee will be meeting in this hearing room at 11:00 o'clock, so we would appreciate it if our witnesses could summarize their statements so members will have enough time for questions. And, of course, your entire text will be included in the hearing record. Ambassador Pickering, as always, it is a pleasure to have you and Secretary Bolton before the committee. You may proceed with your statement, and then we will hear from Mr. Bolton. STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. PICKERING, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you very much, Chairman Yatron, and Chairman Hamilton. It is a pleasure to be back with you today to provide an overview of our current efforts at the (1) 2 United Nations to restore peace and security to the Northern Per- sian Gulf region. Before beginning, let me preface my remarks by saying that the situation is dynamic and evolving, both with respect to the imple- mentation of the cease-fire agreement as well as to the internation- al response to the humanitarian crisis. As the members of the Joint Committee, Security Council Reso- lution 687, setting the terms of the formal cease-fire with Iraq, is without precedent in the United Nations history. While the inter- national community has resorted to arms in the past to fulfill the charter, never before has it defined so forcefully and so specifically the conditions for restoring the peace. In fact, the comprehensive and even programmatic character of Resolution 687 is evidence of the extraordinary and historic spirit of cooperation which has ener- gized the world community since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait last August. _ Also, without precedent is the central role which the resolution confers upon the Secretary-General and the United Nations for its implementation. The Secretary-General and his staff are directly engaged in a number of facets of the activity, including the design of demarcation arrangements for the border, provisions for the de- ployment of U.N. observers, the creation of arrangements to over- see the destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, the design of a compensation regime, the facilitation of the return of Kuwaiti property stolen by Iraq and suggestions for guidelines for the control of arms sales to Iraq. This is a new job description for the Secretary-General and for the United N ations—extending the peacekeeping and peacemaking role in the manner highly beneficial to the interests of this country and the whole of the international community. I want to, in my summary, describe the status of some of these efforts in terms of their main elements. On the boundary dispute, since disagreement on the border was one of the proximate causes for Iraq’s attack upon Kuwait, the Se- curity Council took several unusual steps to remove the border question as a source of friction. First, it demanded that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the boundary to which both agreed in 1963. Second, it requested the Secretary-General to lend his assistance for the demarcation of that boundary. And finally, it decided to guarantee the inviolability of the frontier. The demilitarized zone and the United Nations observer mission, two critical elements of the resolution, are the establishment of the demilitarized zone and a request that the Secretary-General assem- ble an observer unit to patrol it. The DMZ is located astride the Iraq/ Kuwait border and extends ten kilometers into Iraq, and five kilometers into Kuwait, and it includes as well the entirety of the seaward extension of the boundary. The mission is commanded by Austrian Major General Gunter Greindl, who serves as chief military observer, and when fully de- ployed, it will comprise both armed and unarmed military person- nel in the number of approximately 1440. 3 The Secretary General’s preliminary estimate for UNIKOM, as the observer mission is called, is $83 million for the first six months and $40 million for the following six. However, due to donations received or promised by member states, we hope to see these figures decline somewhat by the time the bludget is formally adopted by the General Assembly later this mont . Unlike previous United Nations peace and security missions, UNIKOM has been established under Chapter 7 of the Charter, which means that only a decision of the Security Council may ter- minate it. Iraq is required to provide the mission with all necessary cooperation, but has no power to demand its withdrawal. And I am pleased to say that the Iraqis appear to be abiding by that mandate from the Council. Finally, full deployment of UNIKOM will establish conditions for the completion of the withdrawal of coalition forces. Both processes are now underway. More than one hundred members of UNIKOM have now been deployed. I am told the first observation post will be established tomorrow, and most of the remaining mission should be in place by this coming Sunday. The weapons of mass destruction in the possession of Iraq, their past use and the threatened use of such weapons during the con- flict made the Council take a very strong view that the region would not be secure in the future so long as these weapons remain in Iraq’s possession. Consequently, the most detailed part of the cease-fire resolution is the section creating a program for the secure elimination of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons, its ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometers, its nuclear weapons making capability, as well as associated research, manufacturing and support facili- ties, major parts, components and subsystems. This is a new venture for the United Nations, and a new aspect of the resolution, and we expect a committee or a commission con- sisting of a chairman and a deputy chairman who were named yes- terday, the deputy chairman is an American, and five directors with appropriate qualifications in the areas of chemical and biolog- ical weapons, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons capabilities, oper- ations and compliance monitoring, to run the commission. Each di- rector would be assisted by three to five experts. The total size would not exceed 20 to 25 persons. However, the commission is ex- pected to draw upon additional resources from member state for all of the special tasks which it is to undertake. It will undertake a thorough on-site inspection of weapons and other banned items in the month of May. Until that initial inspec- tion, which is in the form of a survey is complete, it is difficult to estimate the time needed to finish the Commission's tasks, other than its ongoing job of monitoring. However, it would seem that most of the job could indeed be completed by the July 1 target set for it in Resolution 687, while certain tasks, such as the safe destruction of the chemical weapons and chemical agents stored in bulk, may take considerably longer. While the scale of resources which are needed will be reflected through the survey findings, we intend to economize wherever it is safe and prudent to do so. For example, we expect that the commis- 4 sion members, experts and various staff people—inspectors, dispos- al teams, field support units, and security—will be seconded from participating governments and international agencies. Similarly, we hope to see as much as possible of their physical support-transport, communications, housing—provided by or worked out in combination with UN IKOM. Total costs will be a function of the survey findings, as I have indicated, so I cannot venture right now an estimate except to say that the form of funding, whether it is assessed or voluntary, should demonstrably provide for the commission's long-term con- tinuance and sustainability. The commission will work with the International Atomic Energy Agency staff, and discussions with that staff indicate that following a preliminary aerial investigation of known or suspected nuclear sites in Iraq, they are prepared to field their assessment team on or about the first of May. We can estimate the timing of the removal and elimination phase once this on-site assessment is complete. As you know, the Secretary-General and the IAEA Director Gen- eral received letters from Iraq last week containing certain pledges and notifications required under the weapons of mass destruction section of Resolution 687. While the letters appear to meet in a bare bones way some of the requirements of 687, in others, those letters seem to be markedly and notably deficient. In the nuclear disclosure area, for example, Iraq denies the pos- session of any nuclear weapons-usable material despite the wide- spread knowledge that they hold a quantity of highly enriched ura- nium. This is unacceptable, and the IAEA has made this clear al- ready in a letter to Baghdad. If necessary, we will take steps in New York to continue to press Baghdad to provide an accurate dis- closure, and I think it is safe to say that unless Iraq acts in good faith in this, as in all areas covered by Resolution 687, the mem- bers of the Security Council will take a dim view of any request for exception on the export embargo. The cease-fire resolution also establishes a settlement process by which all who have suffered direct injury from Iraqi aggression can seek compensation. This involves the creation of a compensation fund financed by a levy on a certain percentage of Iraqi oil export revenues and a commission to administer that fund. The commis- sion to be designed and developed by the Secretary-General. While he has not concluded his consultations on the organization of the fund, it is evident to us that it will have the following char- acteristics: A size and a composition similar to the Security Coun- cil; a tripartite structure consisting of a governing council of gov- ernmental representatives to address policy questions; a panel of experts for technical issues; and an administrator to manage its op- eration and to supervise the actual attachment of the Iraqi reve- nues. Administrative costs, I am happy to say, will be financed by reve- nues which are to be withheld from Iraqi oil exports. The cease-fire resolution also reconfirms Iraq’s responsibility, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to repatriate and account for all Kuwaitis and Third Country nation- als. Iraq has now released all Kuwaitis whom the ICRC had been able to view or see and register—approximately 6,000 in number. 5 However, more than 5,000 Kuwaitis remain missing and unac- counted for. Kuwait has provided Iraq, through the ICRC, with a list of these persons, but to date Iraq has taken no action regarding them and the Security Council is in the process of following this up. Finally, Resolution 687 requests the Secretary-General to facili- tate the continued return of Kuwaiti-stolen property and to main- tain a record of property not returned or not in tact upon return. Despite early promises of Iraqi cooperation, there is relatively little progress to report and the Iraqis appear to be dragging their feet. We will want to watch this closely since combined with per- formance on other requirements of 687 this again will affect our view regarding any specific Iraqi requests in the export or other re- lated areas. Finally, at each step of the process created by 687, the Security Council will actively oversee implementation, taking whatever steps may be required to ensure Iraq's good faith compliance. Iraq’s performance and the continued presence of Saddam Hussein will have a bearing on both the application of nonmilitary sanctions and their duration. The resolution provides for two levers in this respect: First, Iraq will not be permitted to export at will until it satisfies all provisions for weapons of mass destruction and for the compen- sation regime. Second, while permitting immediate resumption of imports into Iraq of food stuffs and essential civilian goods, the resolution re- quires the council to review the situation regarding all other im- ports every 60 days in light of Iraqi behavior in compliance. In addition, Resolution 687 also allows the Sanctions Committee to permit specific humanitarian exceptions to the export prohibi- tion when such is needed in the view of the members of the Securi- ty Council, to generate resources to support the civilian population. Arms sales and transfers are treated separately. Supply of chem- ical, biological, ballistic missile and nuclear weapons and associated weapons technology are permanently banned under the resolution, and the Secretary-General is now developing guidelines for assur- ing implementation of that ban. Conventional weapons are includ- ed under the same ban. However, the council has decided that it shall review the conventional weapons ban in four months and at regular intervals thereafter in light of the Iraqi compliance with 687 and general progress towards arms control in the region. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my summary of the prepared re- marks. And, of course, I will be pleased to take your questions. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Pickering followsz] 6 STATEMENT BY THOMAS R. PICKERING ‘ U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS before the JOINT CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS April 23, 1991 Chairmen and members of the Committees: I am pleased to join youto today in order to provide the Committee an overview of our current efforts at the United Nations to restore peace and security to the northern Persian Gulf. Before beginning let me preface my remarks by saying that the situation is a dynamic and evolving one both with respect to implementation of the ceasefire agreement, as well as the international response to the humanitarian needs of Iraqi citizens. In some cases that will limit the amount of detail I am able to provide in open session. Nonetheless, I will try to be as forthcoming as possible. I. Ceasefire Implementation Distinguished chairmen, as the members of the joint committees are aware, Security Council Resolution 687, setting the terms of a formal ceasefire with Iraq, is without precedent. While the international community has resorted to arms in the past to fulfill the UN Charter, never before has it defined so forcefully and specifically 7 _ 2 _ the conditions for restoring the peace. In fact, the comprehensive, even programmatic character of Resolution 687 is evidence of the extraordinary and historic spirit'of cooperation which has energized the world community since Iraq invaded Kuwait last August. Also without precedent is the central role UNSCR 687 confers upon the Secretary General and the United Nations for its implementation. The Secretary General and his staff are directly engaged in: the design of demaracation arrangements for the Iraq-Kuwait border; provisions for the deployment of observers; the creation of arrangements to oversee destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; the design of a compensation regime; the facilitating of return of Kuwaiti property; and suggestions for guidelines for the control of arms sales to Iraq. This is a new job description for the UN, extending its role in peacekeeping and peacemaking in a manner highly beneficial to the interests of the United States and the whole of the international community. Let me take several minutes to describe the status of efforts on each of the resolution's main elements. 8 _ 3 _ A. Boundary Demarcation Since disagreement about the border was one of the proximate causes of Iraq's attack upon Kuwait the Security Council took several unusual steps to remove the border question as a source of friction. First, it demanded that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the boundary to which both agreed in 1963. Second, it requested the Secretary General to lend his assistance for its demarcation. And finally it decided to guarantee the inviolability of the frontier. After consultations, the Secretary General has developed a sound plan of procedure and presented it to the governments of Iraq and Kuwait. It calls for establishment of a boundary commission composed of one representative of Iraq and Kuwait, and three independent experts one of whom will serve as chairman. The commission will demarcate the international boundary by means of both geographical coordinates and physical boundary pillars. Its decisions will be taken by majority vote and will be final. The Commission's costs will be borne by the parties equally. We believe this approach is satisfactory and will press for rapid completion of the Commission's work. 9 l l O — 4 - B. Demilitarized Zone and UNIKOM Two critical elements of the resolution are the establishment of a demilitarized zone and a request that the Secretary General assemble an observer unit to patrol it. The DMZ is located astride the Iraq-Kuwait border and extends 10 kilometers (6 miles) into Iraq and 5 kilometers (3 miles) into Kuwait and includes the entirety of the Khor Abdullah waterway separating the two countries in the east. UNIKOM's mission: to monitor the DMZ and the waterway; to deter violations of the boundary by its presence in and surveillance of the DMZ; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one state to the other; and to report to the Security Council in the event of any serious violations of the zone or potential threats to the peace; 10 -5- UNIKOM is commanded by Austrian Major General Gunther Gfiendl who serves as Chief Military Observer. when fully deployed it will comprise both armed and unarmed military personnel not to exceed approximately 1440 in number: 300 military observers, including 20 from the US and each of the other Permanent Members; 680 infantry, temporarily assigned from existing UN peacekeeping operations in the region, in order to provide security for the observer units until stability returns to the area; a field engineer unit for mine and ordnance clearing, an air unit with both fixed wing aircraft and light helicopters; and logistics and headquarters units. Budget The Secretary General's preliminary estimate for UNIKOM is $83 million for the first 6 months and $40 million for the following six. Howeverdue to donations received or promised by member states, we hope to see these figures decline somewhat by the time the UNIKOM budget is formally adopted by the General Assembly late this month. 11 l P I I -5- Chapter VII Status Unlike previous UN peace and security missions, UNIKOM has been established under Chapter VII of the Charter which means that only a decision of the Security Council may terminate it. Iraq is required to provide the mission with all necessary cooperation but has no power to demand its withdrawal. Coalition Forces Withdrawal Finally, full deployment of UNIKOM will establish conditions for completion of coalition forces withdrawal. Both processes are now well underway. More than 100 members of UNIKOM have deployed, and most of the remaining mission should be in place by this sunday. C. Iraqi weapons of Mass Destruction In view of Iraq's past use and threatened use of weapons of mass destruction, it was the Council's strong view that the region will not be secure so long as these weapons remain in Iraq's possession. Consequently, the most detailed part of the ceasefire resolution is the section creating a program for the secure elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, its ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 150 kilometers, its nuclear weapons-making capability, as well as its associated research, manufacturing and support facilities, major parts and subsystems. 12 I I _ 7 _ This section of the resolution mandates the following IIIGESUIGSZ ' " an Iraqi declaration that it unconditionally accepts the supervised destruction of these capabilities - Iraq's acceptance of 687 constituted such a declaration; Iraqi notifications (to the SYG and the Director General of the IAEA) of the location, types and amounts of the prohibited items. an Iraqi commitment not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or weapons usable material, to place any such material under the control of the IABA for custody, removal and destruction, and to accept urgent onsite inspection for that purpose; IAEA inspections and subsequent removal or elimination of nuclear material as well as future monitoring of Iraqi compliance with the nuclear weapons prohibition; formation of a Special Commission to inspect Iraq's prohibited non-nuclear material and sites as well as any sites which may come to the Commission's attention through its own investigation; Iraqi relinquishing to the Special Commission for destruction or removal, of all chemical or biological weapons and related items such as missiles with a range greater that 150 kilometers (about 90 miles); 13 _ 8 _ _ development by the Secretary General - in consultation with the Special Commission, and for approval by the Security Council - of a program for future monitoring of Iraqi compliance with the weapons prohibitions. The UN and the IAEA are working intensively to prepare machinery for carrying out these provisions. Let me make a few comments about these preparations. Special Commission * Organization We expect the Commission to consist of a chairman and deputy chairman to be named imminently, and five directors with appropriate qualifications in the areas of: chemical and biological weapons; ballistic missiles; nuclear weapons capabilities; operations; and compliance monitoring. Each director would be assisted by 3-5 experts. The total size of the Special Commission would therefore be 20 to 25 persons. The Commission can also draw on the additional resources of member states for special tasks. * Assessment Survey The Commission will undertake a thorough on site inspection of the weapons and other banned items in May. 14 _ 9 _ * Duration Until that survey is complete, it is difficult to estimate the time needed to finish the Commission's tasks, other than its ongoing job of monitoring. However it would appear that much of the job could indeed be completed by the July lst target set by 687, while certain tasks, such as the safe destruction of chemical weapons and chemical agents may take considerably longer. * Resources While the scale of resource needs will reflect the survey findings, we will economize whenever it is safe to do so. For example, we expect that Commission members, experts, and various staff — inspectors, disposal teams, field support units, security — will be seconded from participating governments and international agencies. Similarly we hope to see as much as possible of their physical support - transport, communications, housing - provided by or in combination with UNIKOM. * Budget fetal costs will also be a function of the survey findings, so I will not venture an estimate at this time except to say that the form of funding, whether assessed or voluntary should demonstrably provide for the Commission's longterm sustainability. . 15 -10- The Commission will Work with The IAEA: Discussions with IAEA staff indicate that, following a preliminary aerial investigation of known or suspected nuclear sites, they are prepared to field their assessment team on or around the first week in May. We can estimate timing of the removal and elimination phase once the on site assessment is complete. Iraqi Weapons Notifications Required Under Resolution 687: As you know, the Secretary General and the IAEA Director General received letters from Iraq last week containing pledges and notifications required under the weapons of mass destruction section of UNSCR 687. While the letters appear to meet the requirements of 687 in some areas, in others they seem deficient. In the nuclear disclosure for example Iraq denies possession of any nuclear-weapons—usable material despite the widespread knowledge that they hold a quantity of highly enriched uranium. This is unacceptable and the IAEA is making this clear to Baghdad. If necessary we will take steps in New York to induce Baghdad to provide an accurate disclosure. I think it is safe to say that unless Iraq acts in good faith in this as in all areas covered by 687, the Security Council will take a dim view of any request for exceptions to the export embargo. 16 _ 11 _ Q. Compensation Fund The ceasefire resolution also establishes a settlement process by which all who have suffered direct injury from Iraqi aggression can seek compensation. This involves creation of a compensation fund financed by a levy on Iraqi oil export revenues, and a Commission to administer the fund. While the Secretary General has not concluded his consultations regarding the organization of the fund it is evident that it will have the following characteristics: * a size and composition similar to the Security Council; * a tripartite structure consisting of a Governing Council of governmental representatives to address policy questions; a panel of experts for technical issues; and an administrator to manage its operation and supervise the actual attachment of Iraqi revenues; * administrative costs will be financed by revenues withheld from Iraqi exports; 17 -12- E. Repatriation The ceasefire resolution also reconfirms Iraq's responsibility, in cooperation with the International Commiittee for the Red Cross, to repatriate and account for all Kuwaitis and third country nationals. Iraq has now released all Kuwaitis whom the ICRC had been able to see and register, approximately 6000 in number. However, more than 5000 remain missing and unaccounted for. While Kuwait has provided Iraq with a list of these persons, to date Iraq has taken no action regarding them. F. Return of Property Finally, resolution 687 requests the Secretary General to facilitate the continued return of Kuwaiti property and to maintain a record of property not returned or not intact upon return. Despite early promises of Iraqi cooperation there is relatively little progress to report and the Iraqis appear to be dragging their feet. We will want to watch this closely since, combined with performance on the other requirements of 687, it will affect our view regarding any specific Iraqi requests in export or other areas. 18 ’ -13.. G. The Continuing Role of Sanctions At each step of the process created by 687 the Security Council will actively oversee implementation, taking whatever steps may be necessary to ensure Iraq's good faith compliance. Iraq's performance and the continued presence of Saddam Hussein will have a bearing on both the application of non—military sanctions and their duration. The resolution provides for two levers in this respect. First, Iraq will not be permitted to export at will until it satisfies all provisions for weapons of mass destruction and for the compensation regime. Second, while permitting immediate resumption of imports of foodstuffs and essential civilian goods, it requires the Council to review the situation regarding all other imports every 60 days in light of Iraqi behavior and compliance. In addition, 687 also allows the Sanctions Committee to permit specific humanitarian exceptions to the export prohibition when needed to generate resources to support the civilian population. 19 _ 14 _ H. Weapons Emargo Arms sales and transfers are treated separately. Supply of chemical, biological, ballistic missile and nuclear weapons and weapons technology are permanently banned and the Secretary General is developing guidelines for assuring implementation of the ban. Conventional weapons are covered under the same ban. However, the Council has decided to review the conventional weapons ban in 4 months and at regular intervals thereafter, in the light of Iraqi compliance with 687 and general progress towards arms control in the region. II. The Iraqi Humanitarian situation Before concluding my prepared remarks I would like to spend a few moments discussing the evolving humanitarian _ situation in Iraq, the efforts of the United Nations, and the relationship of those efforts to the major undertaking recently authorized by President Bush in concert with President Mitterand of France, Prime Minister Major of the United Kingdom and President Ozal of Turkey. 20 _ 15 _ For purposes of discussion Iraq's humanitarian difficulties can be addressed in three categories: - the problems affecting the country as a whole, described in the report of UN Under Secretary General Ahtisaari and resulting from the war or from the civil strife immediately following it; - the protection and assistance needs of those Iraqis who sought refuge in areas in southern Iraq controlled by coalition troops, many of whom are now congregating on the Iraqi side of the DMZ; - and the protection and assistance needs of those, primarily Kurdish, Iraqis who have fled their homes into the mountains of northen Iraq and into neighboring parts of Turkey and Iran to escape the brutality of the Iraqi military. Over the last several weeks the UN, together with the ICRC and other public and private humanitarian organizations, has begun to deliver food, medical and other emergency assistance to endangered Iraqis in each of these areas. However, in view of the magnitude of the problem and the urgent need to ensure a coordinated response, the Secretary General recently named Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan his executive delegate for the UN Humanitarian Program for Iraq, Kuwait, and the Iraq-Iran and Iraq-Turkey Border Areas. 21 _ 15 _ Prince Sadruddin has essentially three tasks: to ensure a coordinated UN role in the provision of immediate relief to Iraqis in the border areas; to seek to establish conditions for those persons‘ safe return to their homes within Iraq; and to provide assistance to afflicted Iraqi citizens wherever they may be located within the country. His first step has been to reach an umbrella agreement with the Iraqi government including the following terms: Iraqi cooperation with UN humanitarian measures to avert new refugee flows and to promote the voluntary return of existing refugees; Iraqi cooperation in the establishment of a humanitarian presence, in the form of Humanitarian Centers offering food, shelter and medical care, wherever such Centers are needed; the Iraqi government shall cooperate in the urgent establishment of routes of return and relay stations to provide food, shelter, and medicine for returning citizens; UN personnel shall accompany such groups as required; 22 _ 17 _ the UN shall establish such centers and deploy staff on an urgent basis, beginning in areas closest to the borders; the government of Iraq will permit UN use of airlift or overland transport for these purposes and will grant UN staff access to relief; those parts of the country requiring the UN will assign a senior representative to Baghdad to coordinate the operation and will utilize its own radio communication system for that purpose; humanitarian centers will serve both internally and externally displaced persons as well as local populations in need of humanitarian aid; to help meet in government will local currency. We strongly welcome accepted by Baghdad it. Furthermore it — the establishment humanitarian relief country operational costs, the Iraqi make available cash contributions in the UN plan devised“by Sadruddin and and we expect to do our part to support is clearly compatible with the approach of secure areas for protection and - on which we and our allies have 23 - 18 - ‘ already embarked in the far north of the country. The US plans to gradually turn over control of the camps to the United Nations as the Kurds‘ legitimate security concerns are satisfied through the actions and verifiable commitments of the Iraqi government. With regard to the fate of Iraqi displaced persons congregating in the DMZ to the south, we are actively pursuing arrangements to provide for them, particularly for those most at risk of Iraqi government action against them. The remaining population in that area will be placed under the care of the UN High Commission for Refugees within the terms of the agreement just described. The current role of UNIKOM does not provide for the protection of displaced persons and refugees in the DMZ. As is true in any fluid humanitarian crisis, a great many uncertainties remain and I do not wish to underestimate their importance. However as I hope I have demonstrated, the United states is committed to bearing its full share of responsibility for alleviating the suffering. This concludes my prepared remarks. I will be pleased to take your questions. 24 Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Ambassador Pickering, for a very comprehensive statement. Before we get to the questions, we will call on Secretary Bolton to make his presentation. Secretary Bolton, you may proceed, sir. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, DE- PARTMENT OF STATE Mr. BOLTON. Thank you, Chairman Yatron and Chairman Hamil- ton. As always, it is a pleasure to appear before your subcommit- tees. We are now in the process of thinking through in policy terms the potential role for the United Nations in the Middle East. The post-cold war, post-Gulf crisis period is an important testing time for the United Nations. Each day that goes by brings new questions on the appropriate role for the United Nations in this era, and new qulestions on whether the United Nations can perform these new ro es. A clear example is U.N. Security Council Resolution 688, which for the first time the Security Council declares the mass flight and privation of refugees to be a threat to international peace and secu- rity. This is important new territory for the United Nations, be- cause Resolution 688 affirms that the aim of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security, is not just the ab- sence of war, but also the reaffirmation of human rights. Security Council Resolution 687, which mandates an unprece- dented U.N. involvement in political and military questions affect- ing the Gulf, also has broad policy implications, not only for that region of the world, but for the future of the United Nations itself. The basic requirement for the United Nations under 687’s terms is to put in place the structures which will deter future aggressors and also help rebuild regional security and stability. Specifically, the U.N. will oversee the demarcation of an interna- tional border between Iraq and Kuwait and guarantee that border. It will also receive information from Iraq and through U.N.-super- vised inspections on weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemi- cal and biological, and ensure that such weapons, as well as ballis- tic missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometers, are de- stroyed. The U.N. will also establish a fund to be financed through Iraq’s oil exports that will be used to repay Kuwait and Third Countries for damages caused by Iraq’s aggression. Again, an unprecedented role for the United Nations. The fact that a sweeping majority of the Security Council's mem- bers could agree to such a complex and far-reaching resolution bodes very well for the U.N.’s future role in peacekeeping and peace assurance. It represents a triumph of multilateral diplomacy for the United States, our partners on the Security Council and for the international coalition. On April 18, the Iraqi submitted a letter to the Secretary-Gener- al on chemical and biological weapons, and they also submitted a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna on 25 their nuclear capability. The responses appear to fall far short of reality and what is required by the terms of Resolution 687. The special commission established by that resolution and assist- ed by the IAEA, with respect to nuclear materials, is entitled to inspect any location in Iraq to enable them to carry out their man- date. It is important that Iraq not be allowed to evade the obliga- tion set out for them in Resolution 687, and we are currently work- ing on our response to the Iraqi letters in that connection. Iraq’s aggression has also had a massive impact on the Gulf’ s en- vironment. Mammoth oil spills and the burning of hundreds of oil wells in Kuwait have had a dire effect on people and wildlife in the Gulf region and beyond. The World Meteorological Organization and the U.N. environmental program have developed plans to both monitor and deal with the effects of Iraq’s attack upon nature. To meet the challenges of the Twenty-first Century, the U.N. needs not only external political support, but also internal budget- ary and systemic reform. We continue to push for the creation of a unitary U.N. to prune back the duplication of effort and responsi- bility within the U.N. system. In this regard, Resolution 687, by mandating specific agencies such as the IAEA to carry out the tasks they are particularly suited for provides a model for future direction given by the Securi- ty Council for the entire U.N. system. However, countries have to be willing not only to join in high- profile operations, but also to contribute in their capacity as gov- erning members of the U.N. system to ensure the coordination of U.N. efforts that we all see as so desirable. Mr. Chairman, the full committee will meet at eleven to consider the situation of the displaced persons and the refugees. Obviously, we would be happy to answer any of your questions on that subject as well. I have recently returned from Cukurca in Turkey where I accompanied Secretary Baker on his visit to the border region, and also accompanied him in Geneva, with his meetings with his high- ness Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, and the heads of the various hu- manitarian agencies headquartered there. We are asking the United Nations to accept an unprecedented role in restoring peace and stability to the Persian Gulf region. We believe that the United Nations is up to this challenge if provided with the necessary tools, people and financing by the members of the United Nations. The Security Council set out in detail what must be done and when it must be accomplished. So far the United Nations is moving on schedule to meet those obligations. But much hard work lies ahead and neither we, the other mem- bers of the coalition, nor the U.N. can rest on our laurels to date. The tasks ahead in the Persian Gulf will require continued inter- national cooperation. A cooperative united effort between the U.N. organization and its member states will help alleviate the human suffering now occurring in Iraq, help ensure that the Persian Gulf region is not again racked by war of aggression. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would also be more than happy to answer your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton follows:] 26 -1- JOHN R. BOLTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE Thank you Chairman Yatron and Chairman Hamilton. As always, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you and the members of your Subcommittees. The subject of my testimony today is to discuss the role the UN system will play in the aftermath of the War in the Persian Gulf. The post—cold war, post-gulf crisis period is an important testing period for the United Nations. As the UN moves forward to face new challenges, it will be sailing through uncharted waters and making unprecedented use of the UN Charter. A strong example is UN Security Council resolution 688, when for the first time the UN declared the mass flight and privation of refugees to be a threat to "international peace and security.” Resolution 688 expands the scope of the UN and affirms that the aim of the UN, in maintaining international peace and security, is not just the absence of war, but also the reaffirmation of human rights and dignity. We look for the UN to build on the experience acquired in the Gulf crisis, with a greater focus on concrete, achievable actions and less rhetoric. The end of the cold war provides the foundation on which we can build this new and more responsible UN, a UN capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century. 27 _2_ UN Security Council Resolution 687 which mandates an unprecedented UN involvement in political-military questions affecting the Gulf has broad implications, not only for that region of the world, but for the future of the UN itself. The basic requirement for the UN under 687's terms is to put in place the structures which will deter future aggressors and help rebuild regional security and stability. Specifically, the UN will oversee the demarcation of an international border between Iraq and Kuwait, and guarantee that border. It will also receive information from Iraq and through UN—supervised inspections on weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and ensure that such weapons, as well as ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometers, are destroyed. The UN will also establish a fund to be financed through Iraq's oil exports that will be used to repay Kuwait and third countries for damages caused by Iraq's aggression. The fact that a sweeping majority of the Security Council's members could agree to such a complex and far—reaching resolution bodes very well for the UN's future role in peacekeeping and peace assurance. It represents a triumph of multi-lateral diplomacy for the U.S., our partners on the Security Council, and in the international coalition. 28 _3_ The 1989 revolution in Central and Eastern Europe freed the countries of the formerly monolithic Eastern bloc to move away from stale rhetoric and rigid positions based on a failed ideology, and increasingly cooperate with the Western democracies in the UN. Since 1989, we have begun to see a Soviet Union that wishes to cooperate in the Security Council and, to a lesser but still noticeable degree, in the General Assembly. As the bipolar nature of the cold war fades, the countries of the Non—A1igned Movement (NAM) have themselves sought new direction since it is no longer useful to play the West off against the East, and have given up much of their strident rhetoric. In the Security Council, during the Gulf crisis, the NAM states stood, not as an ideological bloc, but as individual states making decisions based on their individual national interests, looking at issues on their merits and responding to Iraqi aggression and compelling humanitarian problems which it caused. Although tensions between the super powers have lessened, thereby reducing greatly the potential for conflict in the former theaters of the cold war, the threat for conflicts among developing countries has not been removed or reduced to any great degree. The Security Council's adoption of Resolution 687 sends a strong signal to future would-be aggressors of what kind of reaction they may expect from the international community. 29 _4_ On April 15, General Greindl, commanding officer of UNIKOM, met with officials of the Iraqi government. He found the Iraqi officials, who have had prior experience with UNIIMOG, to be forthcoming and cooperative. Greindl plans to have additional sessions with Iraqi officials, when he will negotiate guidelines for Iraqi policeman in the demilitarized zone. On April 18, the Iraqis submitted a letter to the UN Secretary General on chemical and biological weapons (CBW), nuclear weapons, and missiles. They also submitted a letter to IAEA in Vienna on nuclear weapons. The responses were on time, met requirements to pledge not to acquire or develop CBW or nuclear weapons, and claimed they had no nuclear or biiological weapons. Iraq did list significant amounts of chemical weapons and some ballistic missiles. However, the responses appear to fall short of what is required, especially in the declarations of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, and their development, manufacturing and support facilities. The Special Commission, assisted by the IAEA with respect to nuclear materials, is entitled to inspect any location in Iraq to enable them to carry out their mandate and we will assist them in drawing up a list of sites for on-site inspection. It is important that Iraq not be allowed to evade the obligations set out for them by the United Nations. 50-323 0 - 92 — 2 30 -5- i Iraq's aggression has also had a massive impact on the Gulf's environment. Mammoth oil spills, and the burning of practically every oil well in Kuwait have had a dire effect on man and wildlife in the Gulf region and beyond. The UN's specialized agencies, the World Meterological Organization and the UN Environmental Program have developed plans to both monitor and deal with the effects of Iraq's attack upon nature. In February, UNEP held an emergency interagency meeting in Geneva to discuss and consolidate available information and how various agencies would be involved in the clean-up effort. Following this meeting, UNEP dispatched a team of scientific experts to Saudi Arabia to obtain objective information on the damage in the Gulf region. The UNEP team observed that the environmental problem is regional in nature, and would require a strong regionally-coordinated effort for its solution. The Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME) is regarded by UNEP as the best available mechanism for such an effort. Meeting in Bahrain at the end of February, ROPME in conjunction with UNEP and IMO developed a long-term plan to cope with the environmental damage created by Iraq during its occupation of Kuwait. The plan was implemented following the cessation of hostilities. The government of Japan has contributed $1.11 million to a special fund established by UNEP to deal with environmental ‘ damage resulting from the War. The State Department has ~ 31 ' -5- informed UNEP that we are interested in sharing information and helping with in-kind contributions to the UNEP Special General Fund. We are currently working with the Department of Defense to see if ten four-wheel drive vehicles could be loaned to UNEP to be used by its damage assessment teams. Additionally we favor communications arrangements that would help facilitate rapid response to future environmental catastrophes, by allowing countries to get in touch with the right sources of assistance. To meet the challenges of the 21st century, the UN needs not only external political support, but also internal budgetary and systemic reform. Too often, the UN system appears incapable of initiating on its own accord a rapid and coordinated response to address humanitarian, environmental and other assistance needs when the requirement is urgent. The multiplicity of UN agencies. a major cause of the lack of coordination within the UN, is also responsible for much of the waste in resources within the UN system. We continue to push for the creation of a "Unitary UN," to prune back the duplication of effort and responsibility common within the UN system. In this regard, Resolution 687, by mandating specific agencies such as the IAEA to carry out the tasks they are particularly suited for, provides a model for future direction given by the Security Council to the entire UN system. ’ 32, v- . -7- Increasingly, the UN's resources come not only from assessed contributions, but from the voluntary contributions of countries. We see this as a positive trend that we wish to encourage. We believe that thereshould be greater sharing of responsibility; we have urged more countries to contribute aid, both in—kind and financial. Moreover, countries should also become more willing to contribute the personnel necessary to carry out UN actions mandated by the Security Council. More than two dozen countries participated in the multi-national ‘naval force enforcing the Iraqiembargo; a similar number joined the military coalition against Iraqi aggression. However, countries have to be willing not only to join in high-profile operations, but also to contribute to the UN's programs in fields like the environment, humanitarian aid and development. I am prepared to discuss the UN's role in providing humanitarian assistance, but in an hour I will appear before the whole Committee to testify on that subject in detail. The UN's role is to support, and not supplant, countries and regional organizations in their efforts to support peace. democracy, human rights and economic development. Interestingly, the UN is also looked to for a potentially leading role when regional organizations are inadequate, as in Cambodia, or where the UN has traditionally played a role in the transition to self-determination, as in Namibia. 33 Mr. YA'rRoN. Thank you very much, Secretary Bolton, for your informative statement. U.S. ASSESSMENT OF U.N. IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVER MISSION FINANCING Ambassador Pickering, as you indicated in your testimony, the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait observer mission will cost approximately $83 mil- lion for the first six months and $40 million for the next six months. What will be the U.S. assessment for this operation? Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The U.S. assessment will be approximately 30 percent of the as- sessed cost. As you know, we hope to reduce the assessed cost by voluntary contribution and contributions in kind, so that at the upper end for our first year, including both the first six months and second six months, it would be in the neighborhood of $36 mil- lion; $24 million for the first period and $12 million following that. Mr. YATRON. Thank you. ‘ DETERRENT EFFECTIVENESS OF UNIKOM MISSION IN PROTECTING DEMILITARIZED ZONE The UNIKOM mission is prohibited from taking physical action to prohibit military personnel from entering the demilitarized zone and its personnel can only be used for self defense. Do you consider the UNIKOM mission to be a credible deterrent to an Iraqi military incursion into the demilitarized zone or area? Ambassador PICKERING. You are correct in saying, in fact, that it is prohibited, although the mission is formed in positive terms. The mission is not obviously to be a totally credible deterrent, but the beginning of a series of what we expect to be credible deterrents with the U.N. force as a kind of trip wire, an observation post out on the front line of any future Iraqi action that might-God forbid—violate that border again. And as you know, we in the states and the region have been working on the additional muscle that might be required to provide deterrence, including cooperation among the Damascus state part- ners and support by the United States, which the President and the Secretary of State have talked about in terms of naval presence and so on. So, the U.N. role is to have a series of unarmed observers to assure that the demilitarized zone remains demilitarized, or that immediate reports come through the Secretary-General to the Se- curity Council for any action by the members of the council to follow that up should there be any violations or indications of po- tential violations. As result, it is part of a system of deterrence, but in itself it cannot be a deterrent. It is true that some of the members will be armed for their own self defense. Indeed, six infantry companies, constituting about 600 men, will be there to provide security for the observers and for the self-defense function. The feeling is that if the demilitarized zone is truly demilitarized, that would be suffi- cient at the present time, but that will be studied as the time goes on, as to whether an upward requirement or a downward require- 34 ment will be required, in order to keep the force and the budgets in tune as the process goes ahead. Mr. YATRON. But it is really only a symbolic deterrent really. Ambassador PICKERING. It is really, sir, just an observation force, and we have never pretended it to be more than that. It provides, I think, the lookout on the front line, if you want to call it that, rather than the muscle required to deter. The muscle required to deter is being undertaken by the states in the region with coopera- tion from friends. Principally the coalition partners that were there before. COMMITMENT OF U.S. IN DEFENSE OF UNIKOM FORCES Mr. YATRON. Well, if, in the event that UNIKOM personnel are attacked by the Iraqi military, has the United States committed itself to coming to their defense? Ambassador PICKERING. The United States has no commitment in that regard that I know of. On the other hand, the United States is committed to immediate consideration of any reports by UN IKOM, both in the Security Council and elsewhere, should that condition arise. It is true that the U.N., as always, is authorized to use their arms only in self defense, only in conditions where they believe they are being attacked. Mr}, YATRON. Well, if they are attacked, will we go to their de- fense. Ambassador PICKERING. We have no commitment in that regard, and that is the kind of decision that the President, the National Security Council and so on would have to take under advisement should that issue arise. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE PEACEKEEPING FORCES Mr. YATRON. Will the peacekeepers only carry light arms? Ambassador PICKERING. Peacekeepers are authorized to carry, in effect, light arms, side arms. They will come as infantry companies with the usual light weaponry of infantry companies. Mr. YATRON. And will they be openly permitted to draw their arms in self defense? Ambassador PICKERING. The U.S. rules of engagement normally permit, in the condition in which they feel they are in a life-threat- ening situation, to defend themselves, and I believe that those par- ticular rules of engagement would permit them to use their arms under those circumstances. Mr. YATRON. So then we have to rely on Saddam’s judgment as to whether something will develop. Ambassador PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, we have to rely on a couple of things. Obviously, one, that he would not repeat his clas- sic mistake before. Secondly, that if he were in any way at all led to that, both the world community and those states that participat- ed in the coalition would be there to deter and defend against such action. And in addition, as you know, the sanctions regime is now on. The indications we have from Iraqi response at the present time is that they are aware of the fact that they have lost this conflict and 35 that they are in deep trouble. The sanctions regime is adding to that, so that that provides an additional lever to reinforce the will of the world community through the Security Council in this par- ticular process. And we obviously see some signs that that is effec- tive, not totally yet, but it is having some effect. Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Chairman Hamilton. Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly com- mend you for having the hearing today. U.S. POLICY TOWARD SADDAM HUSSEIN AND WAR CRIMES I wanted to ask a question that is really not covered in the testi- mony. What is the policy of the United States Government towards war crimes and Saddam Hussein specifically? Mr. BOLTON. The Secretary addressed that question last week when he was in Luxembourg in response to the EC proposal to try Saddam Hussein for war crimes. His response to a reporter's ques- tion was that the United States supported the liability of Saddam Hussein for violations of the 3rd and 4th Geneva Conventions mor- ally, legally and politically; but he pointed out that we have no present plans to find Saddam Hussein and bring him physically to justice. He pointed out that there are very grave risks that would be posed by a trial in absentia of Saddam Hussein, that the goal ought to be to have Saddam Hussein find another job sooner rather than later. Therefore, a trial in absentia might not further that ob- jective. Mr.) HAMILTON. So we do not support war crime trials at this point. ‘- Mr. BOLTON. We support the idea that those who have violated international law be held responsible for their actions. There is a very practical question of how Saddam Hussein is to be brought to justice. Mr. HAMILTON. You would agree that he violated international standards of justice Mr. BOLTON. Unquestionably. Mr. HAMILTON. Then why do we not support trying to bring him to trial on war crimes? Mr. BOLTON. Well, is there a suggestion as to how we are going to get him in custody? Mr. HAMILTON. I am not making a suggestion. You are speaking for the policy of the administration, Mr. Bolton, and I am trying to understand what it is. My understanding is that you, from what you say, and I may not interpret you correctly, is that you do not now favor seeking war crime trials with respect to Saddam Hussein. Mr. BOLTON. Unless Saddam Hussein is physically in custody, the risks of a trial in absentia are such that it might preserve him in power which is not our objective. Mr. HAMILTON. Okay, all right. So you do not now favor war trials, crime trials against Saddam Hussein. Is that correct? Mr. BOLTON. We do not favor war crime trials in absentia against Saddam Hussein and I do not know Mr. HAMILTON. And that is the case now. 36 Mr. BOLTON. He is not in custody. That is correct. Mr. HAMILTON. So you do not now favor war crime trials against Saddam Hussein. Is that correct? Mr. BOLTON. Because he is not in the custody of an international force that could bring him to justice and? Mr. HAMILTON. You do noti Mr. BOLTON. We are looking at the future here. Mr. HAMILTON. Do you seek his custody? Mr. BOLTON. Pardon me? Mr. HAMILTON. Do you seek his custody? Mr. BOLTON. The President, I think, has made it very clear that he does not want to use United States forces for further military action inside Iraq and I have not heard of any proposals to deploy the U.S. Marshals to pick up Saddam Hussein. Mr. HAMILTON. All right. So the situation then is that you do not favor war crime trials against Saddam Hussein now because he would not be present at the trials and you have no plans to get him to a position where you could have the trials. Is that correct? Mr. BOLTON. We would certainly welcome efforts by the Iraqis, themselves, to deliver Saddam Hussein to international custody; but at this point as the President said, we do not plan further arlmed military intervention in Iraq to get Saddam Hussein and ot ers. Mr. HAMILTON. I am just curious as to why you’re not giving me a more direct answer. I am trying to sum up what I understand your position to be. I am not trying to put words in your mouth, but you have got a lot of people out here in the country, this coun- try, and a lot of people in the world demanding war trials for Saddam Hussein. In the recent past, at least, I have not been able to answer what the position of the United States Government is. Now my understanding is that you do not now favor war trial crimes against Saddam Hussein. Is that correct? Mr. BOLTON. As the Secretary said last week—- Mr. HAMILTON. Is that correct, Mr. Bolton? Mr. BOLTON. I do not have anything to add to that. Because he is not in custody and because of the risk—- Mr. HAMILTON. Okay. I understand there may be reasons for it, but you do not now favor them. Is that correct? Mr. BOLTON. I just want to be sure the answer is complete. It is not simply that there is a no on the record, it is that there is a no with reasons behind it. Mr. HAMILTON. That is fine. So the answer is no and you do have reasons for it. Is that correct? That is perfectly okay. Mr. BOLTON. We think they are very compelling reasons. Mr. HAMILTON. You do not now favor war crime trials against Saddam Hussein and the reason, as I understand it, is because he is in absentia. He is not present. Is that correct? Mr. BOLTON. And because of the risk that he would remain longer in power which none of us desires. Mr. HAMILTON. All right. And because of that risk and because you have no plans to bring him into custody. Mr. BOLTON. We have no plans to use U.S. forces to do that. That is correct. 37 Mr. HAMILTON. All right. That is good. It took a little work, but I think we understand it now. Mr. BOLTON. I just wanted to be sure that the answer was com- plete, Mr. Chairman, so that the record was clear. Mr. HAMILTON. I am not trying to have you give us an incom- plete answer, Mr. Bolton, I just wanted to understand it. Ambassador PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, could I just add one point to this? It was very clear that we sponsored and put through the Security Council, the resolution to establish the basis for your ques- tion. That resolution in fact said Iraqis, including Saddam Hussein, should be held responsible for any actions that they commit con- trary to international law and the various Geneva protocols that Mr. Bolton mentioned to you. So I do not think there is any sense of a lack of willingness to deal with the problem if you take into 3000115115 the specific caveats that Mr. Bolton very clearly men- tione . Mr. HAMILTON. Well, look, if you have a criminal at loose, you go after him. Right? Ambassador PICKERING. In the international sphere, that is sometimes complicated. Mr. HAMILTON. I understand that, but you are not making any effort to do it as I understand the policy of our government. Ambassador PICKERING. We are not making a U.S. effort to do so for the very explicit and clear reasons that were laid on the table. POLICY OF OTHER COUNTRIES OR INSTITUTIONS TOWARD WAR CRIMES Mr. HAMILTON. Okay. Now, how about the feeling in the United Nations, Soviet Union, China and any other countries that have identified themselves with respect to war crimes? Are they all in favor? Are some against? What kind of opinion do you encounter? Ambassador PICKERING. All of the countries that you mentioned voted for the resolution which establishes this basis, but I do not see any of the countries that you mentioned, in any way at all using their unilateral resources to try to obtain jurisdiction and move the gentleman to trial. Mr. HAMILTON. So it is your impression now that war crime trials are unlikely? Ambassador PICKERING. In the absence of the man in custody, I think they are highly unlikely. Mr. HAMILTON. Would there be any other fora for these trials other than through United Nations’ actions? Mr. BOLTON. There are a number of possibilities that we have discussed, but again in the absence of Saddam Hussein, it would not be practical to set something else up at this point. If he did come into international custody, then there are a variety of alter- natives which we have been considering for several months. Mr. HAMILTON. If we were to push ahead in the United Nations with a commission of some kind to go ahead with war crime trials, would somebody veto that? Mr. BOLTON. We are not in a position at this point to push ahead because as the Secretary said last Wednesday in Luxembourg, in the absence of having Saddam Hussein, there is not any point in proceeding to set up a mechanism which might never be used. . 38 Ambassador PICKERING. The political answer to your question is, obviously, it depends on the time, conditions and circumstances. It is true that the resolution I spoke about to you was mandatory. It was taken under the mandatory portions of the charter, but it did not say in fact anything beyond them being held responsible. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS INCLUDING RESOLUTION 687 Mr. HAMILTON. I was impressed in your testimony with the ex- traordinary responsibilities given to the United Nations and I think that unprecedented is the word that both of you used several times as they seek to carry out this 687. I just want to get a sense from you. You have confidence that the United Nations has the ca- pacity, the expertise and the funding to play the role that they are going to have to play, not alone with respect to 687, but with re- spect to the refugee question, the environmental issues, and all the other things encompassed in that region as well as the specific re- sponsibilities which you enumerate under 687 which are plaguing us at the moment. Ambassador PICKERING. Perhaps let me take a first whack at that and John may have some comments to add, himself. I would say that with respect to the commitment and the expertise, as you look at 687, I believe there is that possibility. But not only that, we have already seen a willingness on the part of the Secretary-Gener- al to call upon all of the other member states who have the exper- tise in each area to provide advice and assistance. So it is a cooper- ative venture. And in a sense, there is a very strong sense of com- mitment in the international community to aid and assist that. With respect to budgets, we always have problems. In the 687 effort, our approach is to do all that we can to keep the budgets down, consistent with carrying out the important aspects of the resolution. Therefore, we are seeking voluntary contributions in kind, to try to reduce the outflow on resources. Any of us who come up here and testify before you on the issue of resources know and understand your intense interest in that particular question. So the question of resources now depends upon member state willingness to be prepared to provide the kind of contributions, voluntary and otherwise that may come about. I think that as we look at the humanitarian issue, the resource question now looms among the largest. We have been in close touch with the coordinator, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. He and others have made it very clear to us, that there have been appeals. There in fact have been appeals, Chairman Hamilton, for over $700 million already in connection with relief requirements coming out of the current conflict in all of its various ramifications and as- pects. Some come from the International Committee of the Red Cross, some from the High Commissioner for Refugees, and some from Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan as the coordinator. These are very important requirements. We can contribute in whatever way we choose to respond. I believe this is being consid- ered in the administration and I think Mr. Bolton would be the ap- propriate one to respond to how and in what way our own consider- ations are going forward internally. 39 Mr. HAMILTON. Let me just say apart from the question of re- sources, that they have to demarcate a border. They have onsite inspection of these ABC weapons. They take possession of these weapons. They destroy these weapons. They eliminate the Iraqi nu- clear materials, and try to get the property back to Kuwait. I mean those are enormous tasks administratively. You have confidence the U.N. can carry all of that out? Ambassador PICKERING. Yes. I have confidence the U.N. can do that because I know that in the shape and design, particularly of the Special Commission on the Destruction of Weapons of Mass De- struction, that the U.N. will be relying on contributions from those states in the U.N. community that have the special skills. The U.N. will use to the extent that is possible, the International Atomic Energy Agency, supplementing that with experts from the United States and the Soviet Union, and from other permanent members who have the nuclear knowledge and skills. From the countries who are expert in the area of chemical weapons destruction, in- cluding our own so that we will be as others who have this special expertise, the source of the knowledge, the skill and perhaps even some of the special equipment will come that will be required to take this on. In that sense, it is an international cooperative effort led by the Secretary-General, but designed around the knowledge and notion that other people will be involved in a major way. I see the desire as being very strong among the countries with the knowledge to participate. I see the willingness on the part of the Secretary-Gen- eral to include them as being open-ended and wholehearted. I see this as being taken very seriously by the international community. On the border demarcation, it is a technical question. I believe the technical skills are available to do it. There are people in the international community who have already done this successfully, who conform the international portion of the border demarcation COIIlII'llSSl01’1. U.S. PAYMENT OF U.N. ARREARAGES Mr. HAMILTON. I just want to acknowledge—I know my time has expired-that I was looking through this list of the status of contri- butions to the United Nations’ regular budget here. And, of course, what really stands out as you very well know, is that the United States is way behind and I want to commend the administration for their budget position with respect to trying to catch up on those U.N. arrearages. I know the Congress has not supported you in that fully. I think particularly now as we place such enormous im- portance and reliance on the United Nations to help bring about stability in the post-war period, surely the United States ought to be not in arrearage in our dues. So your proposals to try to get us out of that I think are most noteworthy and I commend you for it. I hope the Congress supports you in it. Mr. BOLTON. Chairman Hamilton, I might say in that regard that the President’s decision to request last year for funding of 100 per- cent of the arrearages to be paid out at the rate of 20 percent over a five-year period and his renewed proposal this year to authorize and appropriate the remaining 80 percent to be paid out over a 40 four-year period was a personal decision the President, himself, made. It was not just sort of through the normal budgetary chan- nels, but reflects his intense interest in affirming the U.S. commit- ment to pay its obligations. So we would look forward to working with you, Chairman Yatron, and the others as you work on your authorization bill. Whatever assistance we can be, obviously, we are more than happy to do it. Mr. HAMILTON. I am pleased to hear that, and I commend the President for that as well as you and your colleagues at the State Department because I think you are right on target and I want to be helpful in supporting it. I hope the Congress improves its record. Ambassador PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to extend the colloquy too much further, but I want to thank you for your words of support. I want to join John in the statements he has made and tell you that operating in the environment in New York, in the Security Council, and elsewhere, is made distinctly harder and more difficult. The confidence in the United States is shaken by our inability to move on this particular problem. So to the greatest extent possible, the support of the Congress is obviously critical in meeting these kinds of needs as we go ahead. And you, yourself, have just pointed out the fact that we will be clearly needing to come back to you for additional resources as time goes on. I think what you had to say applies to the additional resources as well as the critically important point of authorizing the repayment of the arrearages. Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Chairman Hamilton. The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bereuter. Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to begin by commending you for holding the hearings today and thank our wit- nesses for their fine testimony here today. I think we have seen the United Nations begin to grow to realize its potential, something we have all hoped for for a long period of time. Certainly, we have had the reduction in the East-West hostili- ty which has made possible a lot of things in the last year. I think that the election monitoring, the cease-fire enforcement monitor- ing, and the U.N.’s response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait have really heartened many people in looking to the United Nations. I think it has been important that we have had the leadership of a President who understands and who is committed to the United Nations. Particularly, I want to commend you, Ambassador Pickering, for your outstanding performance in representing the United States at the United Nations since you have been there. IAEA MONITORING OF IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES I have time for only a couple of questions, but I did want to pursue first of all the nuclear issue. Ambassador Pickering, you have said in your statement that in response to letters, that the Di- rector General of the IAEA had received letters from Iraq last week containing pledges and notifications required under their weapons of mass destruction section of the Resolution 687. But Iraq continues to deny the possession of nuclear weapons usable materi- 42 ly coming out of states that have that special knowledge and prac- tice as I defined it when I spoke in response to Chairman Hamil- ton’s question. Mr. BEREUTER. I thought your response to Chairman Hamilton regarding how the U.N. will attempt to use the resources and ca- pacities of the countries that have that capacity under the U.N. umbrella was informative and the right way to go. THE CONDITIONS AND FUTURE ROLE OF THE IAEA MONITORING OF IRAQ What will end, if anything is clear in this respect, the special scrutiny that the IAEA will give Iraq? Ambassador PICKERING. Well, first of all, as you know, that scru- tiny has been there and will continue with respect to safeguards on any peaceful program should Iraq be found eligible under the N PT for conducting such peaceful programs. Secondly, the Secretary-General will design as an additional phase of the present operation, which should end on the lst of July, sequestering, taking custody, and making initial inspections, an ongoing monitoring program with the Director General of the IAEA. So, together, after the lst of July more or less, they should be able to tell us what their ongoing program should consist of; but, obviously, that will be checked by the Security Council for its adequacy, for its completeness and what we believe should be a permanent continuation. This is really groundbreaking because, in fact, it is saying that in a country like Iraq which has a demonstrated effort to develop, in our view, clandestine programs leading toward nuclear weapons, the international community is taking special steps in that regard, including special continuing monitoring and inspection to be de- signed by the experts to assure that that never occurs again. Mr. BEREUTER. That is reassuring. The IAEA has not been able to successfully monitor programs in Iraq or in several other coun- tries. So some special attention is clearly needed. Some supplemen- tary assistance and monitoring. I assume that the United Nations resolution is the force that will cause that additional scrutiny. Ambassador PICKERING. Well, I would just say one thing, and John may have a comment. The IAEA has been able to do success- fully what it is supposed to do up until now, which is to safeguard the highly enriched fuel which is in Iraq in connection with their program, whatever that may be. That fuel was viewed by the IAEA in the course of regular inspections in November and is due to be looked at again almost immediately. We at the moment believe the IAEA should push ahead and do that as rapidly as possible. Our concern has been that maybe with respect to countries de- veloping programs clandestinely, the pure safeguard system may not be adequate. That is why we have introduced in the resolution the points I told you about. Mr. BEREUTER. Yes. That is exactly right. There is no assurance that those resources will not be diverted. ROLE OF THE UNDRO IN POSTWAR PERSIAN GULF AREA One more area of question. There is an element in the United Nations called the United Nations Office of Disaster Relief Coordi- 43 nator. What role do we anticipate that UNDRO would play in post- war activities in the Persian Gulf region? Ambassador PICKERING. They are part of the consortium under the leadership of the Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. I am not sure precisely because we have not got his full plans yet concerning how he will design and look at their role. It is our impression, however, that a very important lead role will probably be given to the High Commissioner for Refugees be- cause that is a primary focus of the current effort. Again, maybe Mr. Bolton has some further information on that. That is a volun- tarily funded program. It has not been, in my view, the most robust of all U.N. programs. It was initially asked to take on the refugee flow beginning in August. Mr. BEREUTER. Are you talking about UNDRO? Ambassador PICKERING. UN DRO. Mr. BEREUTER. Yes. Ambassador PICKERING. And was supplemented later by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan taking on special responsibility to coordinate all of that. Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Gilman. Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome Ambassador Pickering who is here today with us and who has done an outstanding job in the U.N. as well as Mr. Bolton for his excellent work on all of these issues. U.S. ROLE IN AND PROCEDURE OF THE ELECTION OF THE NEW U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL Mr. Ambassador, can you tell us now that the election of a new secretary-general is imminent? Have we taken any position? Who should fill that role? Will we have input into that process? Ambassador PICKERING. Well, the procedure will be that the Se- curity Council will have to recommend to the General Assembly its choice of the Secretary-General. Mr. GILMAN. When will that take place? Ambassador PICKERING. That traditionally has taken place near the end of the Secretary-General’s term, but I am happy to report to you the Security Council has been conducting informal consulta- tions and has decided that that should take place as early as possi- ble in the next general meeting of the General Assembly, which would be probably the end of September or early October. This means in fact that the Security Council will be telling the world that they ought to get their candidates out and the process open and running in that particular regard. Mr. GILMAN. Are there any new leaders emerging? Ambassador PICKERING. I, at the moment, unfortunately, have seen many of the same candidates that have appeared before with some others. It will be a very important choice and it will be the kind of choice that we will want to make because we clearly want to see the new Secretary-General have not only all the traditional attributes, but we want to see a manager and an administrator of 44 the U.N. at this time when things are changing, when reforms are vitally necessary, and when in fact the prioritization, coherence, and reorganization of the U.N. that is clearly epitomized in our use of the term “unitary” U.N. is taken into account. And we, of course, are going to be a primary player in that. We have made no choices. We want to have a very open contest. We see no regional preferences playing a role in the choice of the new Secretary-General. Mr. GILMAN. Is there any possibility of a United States candidate emerging, such as Ambassador Pickering? Ambassador PICKERING. Up until now, as you know, Mr. Gilman, the five permanent members have not proposed in an important, serious way candidates from each other. I think this grew out of the cold war. The cold war is, I hope growing colder as the days go on. At the moment, however, I have not heard any talk or seen any proposals except in a few newspaper articles that permanent member candidates should be put forward. Mr. GILMAN. We hope that the United States will have an impor- tant role. We would like to see your name being considered for that position. ADMINISTRATION OF WAR REPARATIONS I would like to ask both of you as we get into the reparation stages and the implementation, is there going to be a separate ad- ministrative agency created within the U.N. to oversee reparations and what is the status of that? Ambassador PICKERING. There is. There is a proposal for a very innovative idea, the establishment of a compensation fund for the direct loss, damage or injury having been caused by Iraq during the conflict. That is now being designed by the Secretary-General. Some of the features of that fund that we expect to emerge in his design were covered in my discussion. The primary and most sa- lient point, obviously, is that the fund has to have a source of reve- nue. The source of revenue that has been fixed on by the Security Council is a percentage of Iraqi oil exports once the Iraqis accept the idea of the fund and carry out what they are supposed to do with respect to the destruction of mass destruction weapons. PROVISIONS OF REPARATION FUND Mr. GILMAN. Are we considering as part of the reparation demand that all of the nations which suffered damages or casual- ties as a result of the Persian Gulf initiative receiving appropriate reparations? Ambassador PICKERING. We believe the fund must be designed with the idea in mind of providing for all direct injury, loss or damage wherever that has occurred. We would look at the nations concerned as being the primary litigants or contenders for a share of the fund on behalf of themselves, their citizens and corporations. The fund has not been designed with respect to any limitation in regard to the countries that might come forward for compensation in respect of direct damages. Obviously, the fund will have to work out all of those difficult processes, including deciding the priorities and percentage of the compensation to be paid and on what sort of 45 a basis. So the Secretary-General has an enormously complex and important job in designing this. But it was thought better, in our view, not to try to design this and negotiate it in the Security Council. We would still be there talking about the question today. But in fact to trust the U.N. Turn it over to the Secretary-General and say, “Here you are, sir. Here is an idea. Here are the param- eters. Here are the general outlines.” That is what the resolution does. And then ask him to come forward as we believe he can and now is doing with a proposal about how to carry out all of this. That is now beginning to emerge from the studies and activities he is undertaking and we expect to hear very shortly precisely how that will be done. CLEANING THE ENVIRONMENT AS A REPARATION REQUIREMENT Mr. GILMAN. As part of the criterion standards, do we encompass the cleanup of the environment? The oil spills? The oil fires? Ambassador PICKERING. We do specifically, sir. The resolution talks about environmental damage and depletion of natural re- sources as being specifically included in the direct loss, injury, or damage to be taken into account in the compensation process. COST COMPENSATION FOR KURDISH REFUGEES AND PEACEKEEPING FORCES Mr. GILMAN. What about the costs of assuring the safety, good health and housing of the Kurdish refugees? Ambassador PICKERING. That is not included in the funds, since the cut-off for the fund is the date of passage of that resolution. Al- though I am not precisely sure of whether in fact that might be included in the fund at some future time. At the moment, I think the general impression is that it is the questions arising directly from the conflict at the time that Resolution 687 was passed. Per- haps, again, Mr. Bolton someone who is more of an expert on this issue or a lawyer may have some further words concerning this. Mr. GILMAN. I would hope, Mr. Bolton, that there would be in- cluded, the cost of taking care of the refugees who emigrate as a result of the conflict. In addition to that, any further cleanup that may be necessary. I also believe it would be appropriate that the fund should also apply to peacekeeping costs so that there should not be any additional burden on the nations who were directly in- volved in the Gulf war. Mr. BOLTON. I think we are certainly sympathetic to that point of view. The fund, itself, is something completely new in international re- lations. We looked for precedent as we were considering that reso- lution to see if there was any experience or knowledge that we could bring to bear. It just is without precedence. So we are consid- ering new ways to handle those kinds of concerns on a daily basis. The State Department Legal Advisor’s Office is in consultation with the Secretariat in New York on various ways in which the fund might be set up, how different claims might be handled, how more immediate claims might be handled expeditiously and that sort of thing. We expect a report from the Secretary-General around May the 2nd under the terms of 687 and we would expect 46 after that as the Iraqis come into compliance with the various pro- visions of 687 to begin to actually implement the reimbursement for the costs of the Iraqi aggression. Mr. GILMAN. Well, I hope you do not get bogged down in the legal problems and just keep an eye on the overall objective that Iraq should be made to pay reparations for all of the damages, in- cluding not only those which were involved in the actual hostil- ities, but also any subsequent costs arising out of those hostilities, and certainly the refugee problem is part of that consideration. The necessity for funding a peacekeeping force is also part of that. So too is the cleanup of the environment part of that. I urge you to closely examine all aspects of the reparations funding and not allow these considerations to be left on the table as they start doling out the reparations. I think that there are important aspects of all of this and I am certain that my colleagues would be very much concerned about these considerations. REIMBURSEMENT OF NYPD IN THEIR PEACEKEEPING DUTY AROUND U.N. HEADQUARTERS Just one parochial problem, Mr. Ambassador. Our New York City Police Department has made a request for reparations from the U.N. for their peacekeeping efforts and there is a request by the mayor of the City of New York on behalf of the New York City Police Department to reimburse them for their extra duty as a result of the U.N. activities. Could you comment on that? Ambassador PICKERING. I can comment on that. We have a tradi- tional source of funding for some of that. I am not sure precisely what the current request is involving, but I will be glad to take a careful look at that. We have worked very closely with the New York City Police Department. They have been extremely support- ive, particularly throughout this crisis in terms of dealing with the issues of security, the presence and keeping things open in and around New York. I am very grateful. I expect to be seeing the mayor this afternoon and so I will men- tion to him once again our interest in seeing any request and thank you very much for raising it. Mr. GILMAN. Please mention to the mayor that I made a special request of you. Ambassador PICKERING. I will not forget that, sir. Thank you. Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Gilman. The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Pelosi. The gentleman yields to Ms. Pelosi. Ms. PELos1. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As a guest of the committee, I was pleased to be able to yield to the gentleman from Utah-thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for inviting me as a member of the Appropriations Committee. In my Subcommittee, Commerce, State, Justice, and the Judiciary, we heard some testimony about the environmental clean-up and the responsibility, but you are really the first chairman to call a meeting where we can address the issue of the environmental damage to the Persian Gulf and the response to it. So, I greatly appreciate your including that in the 47 charge for this hearing and allowing me the opportunity to address some questions to our distinguished witnesses. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS IN THE POST-WAR PERSIAN GULF AREA I, of course, share the concerns of our colleagues about the politi- cal, humanitarian and nuclear questions that have been already brought forth. I am pleased that Mr. Gilman, my colleague from New York, is here because he and I circulated a letter to our col- leagues and 57 of them joined us in writing to the President about the clean-up, I submit that letter for the record along with my opening statement) Mr. Chairman, which goes into some detail about the environmental damage in the Persian Gulf. In our letter, we asked the President to proceed with what the dire supplemental appropriations bill called for in terms of what is going on in the Persian Gulf regarding the environment. I will ask about that in a moment. First, I would just like to also submit for the record a letter that was sent on January 25, before the first oil spill into the Persian Gulf, to UNEP, to Mr. Tolba, and Mr. Ambassador.” We sent this letter, to a number of Members of Congress, a bipartisan group, to the UNEP, and we have not really heard back yet. But this was before the very first oil spill, just after the bombing. We believed at the time that the eco-terrorism was predictable. We talked about it in our debate before the resolution to go to war, and if you could help us get a response. Our letter really talked about readiness to deal with what was going on there. We have not heard back since, and that was in January, as I mentioned. So, I have some concerns about the readiness that we had or do have now to deal with it. Mr. Secretary, in your testimony you described some of what is going on in the Persian Gulf, so I do not need to go into so much of t at. I do, Mr. Chairman, have a few pictures, some of which are fa- miliar to us, but some which may be new. Of course, we have all seen the plumbs, and this is noon in Kuwait City, and this is land. This is the desert and that is oil on it, and this is oil through the waterways; all oil. And more of the same, this is the same. Now, what is important about these is that our troops in the Per- sian Gulf are breathing this air. You know that it is a fragile world that we live in, and that damage to any part of the environment is eventually going to be devastating. You know about the soot and the black snow in the Himalayas. I do not have to go into that. INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO DISCUSS ENVIRONMENTAL FINDINGS WITH PRESS One thing I am concerned about, Mr. Bolton, is that we have had inquiry from the scientific community concerning some thought that representatives from the Department of Energy and NOAA are under orders by the White House not to discuss any of their findings about the environmental damage in the Persian Gulf with the press. 1 See appendixes 3 and 4. 2 See appendix 5. 48 Do you know of any such instructions? Mr. BOLTON. I am unaware of any such instructions. We did send a team led by Environmental Protection Agency people to the Gulf soon after the cessation of hostilities as soon as it was feasible to get them in. They have been working with the Kuwaiti and Saudi officials. The principal responsibility at this point, of course, rests with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but we have been happy to provide assistance as requested, and the international community has pro- vided assistance as well. I will take your question and see what I can find out. But as I say, I am unaware of any such instructions. Ms. PELos1. Well, I would appreciate that, specifically that repre- sentatives from the Department of Energy and NOAA are under orders by the White House not to discuss their findings of the envi- ronmental situation in the Persian Gulf. I would appreciate your getting back to the committee on that. ROLE OF STATE DEPARTMENT TO ASSESS AND CONTROL ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE OF WAR What role does the State Department play in coordinating the ef- forts to assess and control the environmental damage that has oc- curred as a result of the war? Mr. BOLTON. Well, as I mention, the principal role, of course, rests with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but we have worked with other agencies of substantive responsibility-—NOAA, the Depart- ment of Energy, EPA and others—in order to provide the assist- ance that we can. Obviously, one of the main things that needs to be done is put- ting out the oil well fires. The government of Kuwait has contract- ed with a number of principally American firms to undertake that operation. Obviously, other efforts will go on simultaneously, but the continuing emission of smoke into the atmosphere, and the con- tinuing leakage of the oil, compounds the already existing problem. So we are working with the government of Kuwait to expedite the capping of the wells and the putting out of the fires. We are work- ing with the Kuwaits and the Saudis on the pollution that has al- ready been washed ashore in the Gulf. We also have a concern for the protection of the marine life and birds in the Gulf. 7 UNEP S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO AN ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY Ms. PELosI. What is your opinion of UNEP’s capability to re- spond to an environmental emergency? Mr. BoL'roN. Well, UNEP is not really designed, and was not in- tended nor equipped to be an environmental emergency reliever, but they have provided the technical expertise that they have, to- gether with the World Meteorological Organization, to assist the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in their clean-up efforts. I CONCERN FOR AMERICAN SOLDIERS HEALTH IN PERSIAN GULF ENVIRONMENT Ms. PELOSI. I have gotten a number of calls from my constituents about their children in the Persian Gulf and they are concerned be- cause it looks like some of them will be there until September. 49 They are concerned about that, plus the fact that they are breath- ing this air there, not that we are any less concerned about Kuwai- tis, Iraqis, Iranians or others who are breathing this air. The way it has been presented in the press is through quotations of our own service people there. One enlisted man said, “They are telling us there is nothing wrong with the air. Come on, man, you can taste the oil in your mouth.” The list goes on and I will submit these for the record. They are saying it is just like New York City. I have been to New York City, and the pollution there does not look anything like this. “We are not stupid” said one sergeant. If it is anything like New York City, we had better do something about New York City in addition to doing something about Kuwait. Many more of our colleagues are hearing from families of sol- diers over there. As I say, it is just indicative of what the people who live there will be left with when our troops hopefully come home. I am very concerned about the impact on the health of our soldiers there. Not to be an alarmist in that regard, but I hope that some consideration is taken about how long these troops have to stay in the Persian Gulf. CONSIDERATION OF MAKING ECOTERRORISM A WAR CRIME Ambassador Pickering, do you think it would be appropriate to make eco-terrorism a war crime? Ambassador PICKERING. I have considered that particular ques- tion. I think that given the magnitude of what has been done both to the Persian Gulf sea and land areas by the oil spills, that that ought to be looked into. I think the use of devastation to cause, through the multiplication by the environmental factor of addition- al devastation in war, goes well beyond what any of us ever consid- ered. And I think that that should be looked at. As you know, some years ago there was an environmental modi- fication convention designed specifically to look at the use of envi- ronmental modification as an instrument of war on a grand scale, and that has had wide support. So already we have had some inter- national attention posed to the problem and we should certainly look further and see whether in fact what Saddam Hussein has done in this region constitutes such. We have already taken part of that into account, as I explained in response to an earlier question, in the compensation regime, where we indicated that the environmental damage and the deple- tion of natural resources, both constituted a claim source for damage in the view of the Security Council. Ms. PELOSI. It is a step forward in terms of reparations and com- pensation. But the damage to the environment, it’s very unforgiv- ing. You can pay for the clean-up, but we cannot retrieve the healthy state that may have existed before. So, I would hope we could do something in terms of sending a very clear signal to pre- vent that which many of us thought was a predictable action on the part of Saddam Hussein to have it made clear to anyone in the futkurg. War is always hard on the environment. This is particular- y a . And, frankly, I am very concerned that we really do not hear enough out of the administration about what is going on there. 50 There are at least 500 oil wells burning, and we have not been able to turn off more than 10 percent of them today. As you may have seen in the paper yesterday, oil is burning there every day, more gil than all the gasoline used in the United States by every person r1v1ng. I would just like to see this issue get much more attention be- cause it is having an impact on the environment which, as I men- tioned, is very unforgiving. I do, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, have one political question. Mr. YATRON. Without objection. OBSTACLES TO A FREE DEMOCRATIC IRAQ AND THE WANTS OF KURDS Ms. PELOSI. In my district; and it is a magnificent district, we have representatives of every population, religion, and school of thought in the world. We do have a number of Kurds in San Fran- cisco as well. People in our community say what the Kurds would like is, obviously, not to be in a camp, although that is an improve- ment, but to be in an autonomous state within a free democratic Iraq. Not an independent country, but an autonomous state within a democratic Iraq. But the main obstacle to that is perhaps the monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait who do not want to see democracy in the region. Could both of you comment on that? Mr. BOLTON. I do not think it is the regimes in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia that are the problems for the Kurds. I think it is Saddam Hussein who is the principal objection. Our position has been for some time that we favor maintaining the territorial integrity of all the states in the region, although ob- viously we would welcome a democratic Iraq. If there were a way to persuade Saddam Hussein to that end, we would be more than happy to try it. But the principal reason for the existing refugee problem, has been Saddam Hussein’s intentional effort to drive the Kurds out of Iraq, into Iran and Turkey in an effort to destabilize those countries. Ms. PELOSI. Forgive me if I was not clear, Mr. Bolton. I know that Saddam Hussein is the cause for the Kurds being in a refugee situation. But what I am saying is, looking down the road to the future, a democratic Iraq is not something that the Saudi government or the Kuwaiti government is interested in and are pursuing as a matter of policy. Mr. BOLTON. Well, I would stay tuned. The Secretary was just in Kuwait having discussions on that score, and we are awaiting fur- ther developments there. But I think the most important thing to take into account would not be the views of the governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia at this point, but what we do inside Iraq specifically, or what the Iraqis do inside Iraq. That is the necessary first step. If they took action to move towards a democratic form of govern- ment, I don’t think there would be objection from other govern- ments in the region. 51 Ambassador PICKERING. Could I just add a point here? Ms. PELosI. Please. Ambassador PICKERING. I think Mr. Bolton has made it very clear the disappearance of Saddam Hussein is certainly very much to be hoped for or desired. But, obviously, we would like to see that replaced by a democratic system which takes into account the role and place of all the minorities. It is interesting that Saddam Hussein now claims, and some of the Kurdish sources have indicated confirmation of this, that he is again negotiating with them for the sort of autonomous region that you have talked about. Of course, we do not know the outcome of that. We do not know precisely what will happen. We know in the past, unfortunately, when he has agreed to such arrangements, he has been the first to break them. So the Kurds have been through a long and bitter experience. But we support very much the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Iraq, not its dismemberment, and the role and freedom of the various groups in Iraq within that kind of construct. It is easy, of course, to tell you what we favor. It is hard to say precisely how that will come about, and that has been what some of the discussion here today has been about. PELosI. I appreciate that, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you very muc . Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Ms. Pelosi, and I want to say thank you for making those photographs of the Persian Gulf available for the committee. The questions that you received from your constituents will be included in the record.‘ We are going to do everything we can concerning the letter that you spoke of, and the letter that you wrote me some time ago requesting that something be done on the environment in the Persian Gulf. We want to commend you for your leadership on this particular issue. Ms. PELosI. Well, I want to commend you too, Mr. Chairman, be- cause you really are the first chairman to have the subject of the environmental degradation of the Persian Gulf as a subject before your committee, and hopefully this will be a beginning where we will have more focus by the Congress, the world community, and particularly by the administration about what is going on there. That is not in any way to say that our concern should not be first for the Kurdish refugees and the humanitarian concerns which you are a champion and a leader, but I appreciate your giving me this opportunity to bring the environmental issue before the Congress. Mr. YATRON. It absolutely will, and we will certainly invite you to the future hearings. ’ Ms. PELOSI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. YATRON. Thank you. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Owens. Mr. OWENS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, all the world was sickened, of course, at the pictures of the Kurdish and Shiite refugees and particularly of ' See appendix 2. 52 their little children. The picture yesterday showed two dying chil- dren and a milk carton. These pictorial communications have really sickened everyone in the world, and I want to deal briefly with what we are doing about alleviating that suffering. I apologize for missing your earlier remarks, but I understand you have not dealt in any depth on this issue. On the 16th of this month, we announced that we were setting up temporary camps in connection with the French and the British for Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. U.N. SUPPORT OF U.S. ESTABLISHMENT OF KURDISH CAMPS IN IRAQ Were we operating under any U.N. authority in going into Iraq? Ambassador PICKERING. We are clearly, in our view, operating under the general authority of a U.N. resolution passed some weeks ago named 688, which provides for humanitarian relief in the region, and I believe that we have made that clear in our public statements. Mr. OWENS. Was the Secretary-General approving of this action? Ambassador PICKERING. The Secretary-General has been closely consulted and been quite supportive. Obviously, we have made clear throughout this process that what we are doing is meeting the emergent and immediate needs which you, I think, have just described to us, while the United Nations, which requires time to get itself fully organized, is then moving to take over our responsi- bilities. And, of course, we have made it clear what we expect and the United Nations has indicated that it wishes to dovetail its ac- tivities with ours so that it can take over our activities just as soon as it is in a position to do so. Mr. OWENS. What do you see as a time frame for that? Ambassador PICKERING. I think it is difficult to predict. Obvious- ly, we would like to talk in terms of weeks rather than months in this regard. STATUS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SHIITE REFUGEES Mr. OWENS. What is happening in southern Iraq with the Shiite refugees, and the rebels who responded to our presence? Is there encouragement to throw Saddam out? Ambassador PICKERING. As you know, we have provided and will Continue as long as we are there to provide assistance and help to those individuals. We are now in communication, however, with the United Nations. The United Nations has an agreement with the government of Iraq to carry out activities all over Iraq, includ- ing establishing camps, relay points, way stations, presence and communication, and facilitation. We remain concerned, as I think all do, about the protection of these individuals, and would like to see that assured in whatever way possible. The Secretary-General of the United Nations and Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan have also shared with us their con- cerns in that regard. We are working closely now, with respect to the High Commission for Refugees, which normally deals with ref- ugees outside the country, about taking over not only in the north, but in the south, the displaced persons who are technically there, with the idea in mind of providing them not only with shelter, 53 food, and medical assistance, but also protection through presence of the United Nations, as long as that is required. Our long-term goal is, obviously to see these people go back to their villages and live there in a situation where they feel comfort- able. That is a large order and a big task. Clearly, we believe the United Nations can play a major role in facilitating this and per- haps make sure through long-term presence that this continues to be the case. The value of international presence should not be underestimat- ed even though it is not armed. Over the long term this has been valuable under many circumstances. I am happy to say that the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross seem to have struck some responsive cords in the government of Iraq in terms of the activities they want to undertake. Now, we obviously have to see if that can be made to happen and this process to be moved ahead. The south, in our view, is as important as the north, even though in fact there are fewer people currently seeking refuge and help there. DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN KURDS AND SADDAM HUSSEIN CONCERNING AUTONOMOUS STATE Mr. OWENS. Do you give any credibility to the discussions you referenced earlier between Kurdish leaders and Saddam Hussein’s government as to the possibility of establishing an autonomous region? Ambassador PICKERING. It is difficult for me to evaluate that without going into private and confidential conversations with the Iraqis. It does seem to me that the Iraqis have shown more inter- est, if I can put it that way, since February 28 in these kinds of efforts and activities than they ever evinced before. I think it is time now to take advantage of and test that to the fullest extent possible in order to see whether it can work out. The presence of Kurdish leaders, which is now reported, and indeed confirmed, in Baghdad, carrying out these talks is interest- ing. The recent reports this morning, which I cannot confirm, are that there is a kind of exchange taking place in order to assure good conduct and there are senior Iraqi leaders in Sulimenia, Northern Iraq, and Kurdish hands, is also interesting. I think we just have to wait and see how that turns out. In the past, these agreements have been worked out. But, unfor- tunately, they have not been kept, which is another part of the question that we have to be concerned about. Mr. OWENS. You express concern that you can not say every- thing that you know about it. But you do give them credibility and you? are optimistic that there is an opportunity to work something out. Ambassador PICKERING. Well, let me say this, sir. I see evidence of interest on the part of the Iraqi government, that I have never seen before, as a result of what by a massive understatement would be called the recent activities. 54 Mr. Owens. Could you give us a more precise answer on exactly what we are doing to try to help the Shiite rebels in the south. Are we establishing camps? Are we providing military protection? Ambassador PICKERING. We have already done all of those things, and obviously now, as we withdraw, we have to provide for a successor. The successor, in our view, has to be in the U.N. system and we want to provide that in the surest and most effec- tive way that we can, taking into account all the points I men- tioned to you. Mr. Owens. Are you satisfied that we are doing everything we can to alleviate suffering and prevent additional hardship on those people? Ambassador PICKERING. I am satisfied that we are. Of course, I am not there on the ground. But from the reports I have, I think our interest is extremely high and our concern has been important- ly expressed. I believe that this is a serious issue and consideration. I believe the actions the President has taken indicate that. Mr. OWENS. You see no particular service or additional authority which could be given by the Congress? Ambassador PICKERING. At the moment I do not, but I think it is here in Washington with the policymakers and the policyplanners that that question should be best addressed. Mr. OWENS. Thank you very much. Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Owens. I am going to call on the gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel. We have to be out of here before 11:00 for the full committee, and I have one final question that I would like to offer, unless anyone else has a question. Ms. Pelosi, did you have one? Ms. PELos1. That is fine. , Mr. YATRON. Okay, we will go to Mr. Engel first and then we will go to Ms. Pelosi. Mr. Engel, the gentleman from New York. Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very, very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first, before I ask a question, just state that I am very happy that we have finally moved in terms of helping the refugees. It is unfortunate that we had to wait until there was so much suf- fering and death, but better late than never, I guess. I just think that once again the world witnesses catastrophe with all kinds of (siugfering and we just seem not to move until we are really prod- e . FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE RELIEF EFFORT Can I ask you, in terms of cost, the relief that is being given now to the Kurds, is the United States bearing the brunt of the cost? I was wondering if any of the other nations recently have been forth- coming in terms of paying a share. We had difficulty during the war to get our so-called allies to pay their fair share, and I am wondering if the track record is any better now with the relief efforts. Ambassador PICKERING. Might I answer this, Mr. Engel. As I had mentioned earlier, there had been appeals for up to and over $700 million. The United States has already put forward, at least in my 55 figures in New York, some $24 million in assistance, even though much more obviously is planned and will have to be dealt with. The second point to make is the European Community alone has committed in the neighborhood of $150 million, and just last night I saw in fact that they had actually turned over some $50 million of that to the U.N. and other relief agencies. So they are moving well. I am sorry I do not have the figures on Japan. I know the Japa- nese have also made contributions, but maybe the State Depart- ment, my colleagues here, can help provide that for the record. I believe the point is that the world community is reacting and being helpful, and that we ourselves are bearing a major share of this effort, and I think we will continue to do that for some time to come. Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. I would just like to ask one question on the cease-fire agreement. IRAQ COMPLIANCE TO WEAPON DESTRUCTION AND U.N. ENFORCEMENT There has obviously been lots of concern, and the President has stated it, with regard to Iraqi compliance on the destruction of their ballistic missiles, chemical, and biological weapons. Will the U.N., in your opinion, be able to enforce Iraqi compli- ance on this destruction? And how will we really be able to tell whether or not we are being told the truth by the Iraqis? Frankly, I do not trust them to tell the truth, nor to tell us the degree of the destruction of their weapons. Ambassador PICKERING. I join you in that feeling and therefore we built into the resolution and provided for the fact that states outside of the U.N. structure could provide inputs to the special commission being formed in order to orient it toward and ask it to carry out inspections of facilities not declared by the Iraqis. The resolution fully permits that. The Iraqis are fully committed to fa- cilitate that. We will now have to test it. What happens if they do not? Then I think the answer is one that I foreshadowed to you earlier. The first resort would be to con- tinue to keep the sanctions regime on, a regime which at least at this point Saddam Hussein would like to see lifted as rapidly as possible. As you know, he has already submitted a request for the lifting of the regime with respect to a billion dollars, more or less, of oil exports to provide for food and other imports into Iraq. So that is our first line of leverage, our first line of moving ahead. I think it is important now that we do everything possible to move speedily, to organize this process and to test Iraq at every turn to make sure in fact that it is really willing to comply with this process. We have already challenged their initial letter on the nuclear question. The IAEA has, the U.N. organization. So, we are going to continue with this. We are going to see it through. And as I said earlier, we intend to do everything we can to ensure that this is enforced. 56 CAPABILITY OF DETERMINING IRAQ’s COMPLIANCE Mr. ENGEL. Are you convinced, Mr. Ambassador, that we have the capability to really get to the truth, of really finding out whether or not these have been destroyed? I mean, obviously they are going to try to tell us that they are even if they are not, and do we really have the capability to know whether or not they are telling us the truth? Ambassador PICKERING. I believe, of course, it is always impossi- ble to answer the question about what it is you do not know. But I do believe we know a great deal, and therefore we have to bring all of that to bear, and we have possibilities of further discovery. So, I think we have the chance to do it, but my view is even if we did not have perfect knowledge, it would still be extremely valuable for us to pursue this as far as we possibly can. EXTENT OF ALLIED BOMBING DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ WEAPONS DURING WAR Mr. ENGEL. Can you give an estimate as to what percentage of the Iraqi nuclear potentiality and biological and chemical weapons were destroyed by allied bombings during the war? Ambassador PICKERING. I am not a military expert and cannot give you a percentage. I think the President spoke in high confi- dence that a very large percentage had been destroyed. The Iraqi declarations and other information seems to indicate that. But it is still true that the Iraqi declaration indicated that the percentage that we are talking about had to do with production capacity, R&D, and facilities. They have made it clear, in their declaration, which of course has to be checked, that they may have a thousand tons or more of chemical agents stocks in addition to filled munitions and bombs. So that there is still a big problem out there with respect to the destruction of chemical agents in Iraq's hands. We also have an indication that they have declared some 50 scud missiles and associated equipment. We have some distrust that that is precise or accurate, but it is a place to begin, and we will want to see what can be done further. So there is a task there. The structure and some of the stocks were not totally destroyed in the conflict, although there is an indication that a very large amount of the production facilities were. Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. I know you have commented on the whole war crimes issues, and I just want to say that I have spon- sored a resolution, the first one introduced in the House, saying that Saddam Hussein ought to be brought up for war crimes. I just wanted to say it is interesting that apparently 75 percent of the American people agree. I know you have commented on it before and I thank you for your comments here today. Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Engel. Ms. Pelosi. Ms. PELOSI. I will be brief, Mr. Chairman. This may only require a yes or no from our distinguished witnesses. 7 HUSSEIN S STRENGTH IN IRAQ There had been some report about how strong Hussein’s hold on Iraq is now. Some contend that with his enemies out of the coun- 57 try, the Shiites and the Kurds, that Hussein’s hold on Iraq is stronger than ever. , Do you agree? Ambassador PICKERING. It is a judgmental question. My feeling is that the depletion of his military resources has to be balanced against what appears to be an unfortunate victory, at least at this stage, against those who were trying to push him out of power. I would say, in the light of that balance, certainly he is in a more precarious position than he was on the first of August. How much more precarious, I do not want to give you a figure on, because it is just a horseback guess. Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Bolton. Mr. BOLTON. Sounds reasonable to me. Ms. PELOSI. So you think that he has a less strong hold on Iraq than he did on August first? Mr. BOLTON. Certainly he does not have the fourth largest army in the world anymore. Ms. PELOSI. But his enemies are gone. Mr. BOLTON. They are not gone entirely. Ms. PELosI. I hope not. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to say in closing that I would have hoped that humanitarian considerations were in the lifting and hope that perhaps we may see that at the U.N. before too long. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Ms. Pelosi. Mr. Ambassador, following upon Mr. Owen’s concerns. The Sec- retary-General’s executive delegate to coordinate the interagency humanitarian program for the Gulf stated on April 19, that in pro- viding safety for the Kurds, the United Nations could not act as a police force. ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.N. MISSION IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE U.N. CHARTER LIMITATIONS Would it be consistent with the U.N. Charter to pass a Security Council, resolution creating a peacekeeping or observer mission for the Kurdish refugee camps? Ambassador PICKERING. I think that in strictly technical terms it probably would be, although I would think that a lot of people, and particularly some members of the Security Council, might object on the basis that the charter also provides protections against interfer- ence in internal affairs under Article 2, Paragraph 7. So, I think juridically my own view is that the council is not lim- ited in that regard. I think politically one would have to examine the question very carefully, and I think a lot would have to do as to whether in fact the Secretary-General came to us and said, “Gen- tlemen, I need this authority to carry out my mission in Iraq.” There is a tendency on the part of the council to be supportive of the Secretary-General if he feels he needs something. All of those would have to be weighed in the hopper. So it is not, in a sense, a question which, given its hypothetical nature, is completely and 58 specifically answerable under those conditions. But those are the factors that I think would have to be weighed in any answer. Mr. YATRON. Well, I would not want to be a Kurdish refugee in one of those camps as long as Saddam is around. U.S. SUPPORT FOR A U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE FOR THE KURDISH REFUGEE CAMPS Would the U.S. support a U.N. peacekeeping mission for the ref- ugee camps? Ambassador PICKERING. We already have, and that is in U.N. Resolution 866. The Secretary-General and Sadruddin Khan are now engaged in that mission. We have done it unilaterally by saying we must move now to deal with these problems, to help set up those camps. We want to see those two dovetail, so we have been out in front on this. Mr. YA'rRON. How about after we leave? We are not going to stay there for the duration? What happens after we leave? Ambassador PICKERING. After we leave, we certainly have been fully supportive of the fact that the United Nations has to take on this role, and we are gratified they have an agreement with the government of Iraq to start that process, but we want to monitor that very carefully. Mr. YATRON. We want to thank you, Ambassador Pickering, and Secretary Bolton. I want to say that you both have enormous re- sponsibilities ahead of you and I want to assure you that Congress and the subcommittees are very much interested in working with you regarding this particular area. The subcommittees will have some additional questions that we would like to submit to you in writing, and we would appreciate your response as soon as possible. We thank you both for being here and testifying, and we will cer- tainly have you back again. Mr. BOL'roN. Thank you, and we appreciate your continuing sup- port, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you again very much, Mr. Chair- man. Mr. YA'rRoN. The subcommittee is adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair. [Whereupon, at 10:48 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.] U.N. ROLE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. RESOLUTIONS THURSDAY, JULY 18, 1991 House or REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF- FAIRS, SUBcoMMITTEEs ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAsT, AND ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL OR- GANIZATIONS, Washington, DC. The subcommittees met at 9:00 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee Hamilton presiding. Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittees will come to order. The subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East and on Human Rights and International Organizations meet today in open session to discuss the U.N. role in the Persian Gulf and Iraqi com- pliance with U.N. resolutions. This is the second hearing in a series of hearings on the U.N. role in the Persian Gulf. The first hearing was held on April 23rd at which Ambassador Pickering and Mr. Bolton both testified. The subcommittees today will focus on the performance of the United Nations in its various roles involving Iraq, including the U.N. force in a safe haven zone in northern Iraq; the peace keeping force, UNIKOM, along the Iraq/ Kuwait border; the international humanitarian role in Iraq; and the implementation of U.N. resolu- tions including U.N. 687. Our witnesses today include the Honorable John R. Bolton, As- sistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, Department of State; The Honorable Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Department of State. Gentlemen we are very pleased to have you. We welcome you back before the subcommittees and appreciate your coming. We have your prepared statements, they will, of course, be entered into the record in full. And you may introduce those statements as you see fit. And as soon as you finish, of course, we will begin with questions by Members. The Chair wants to advise the Members that at an appropriate time it is his intent this morning to take up H.R. 2901, to authorize the transfer by lease of four naval vessels to the Government of Greece, introduced by Chairman Fascell. This bill was introduced also at the request of the administration. Are there any statements from my colleagues? Without objec- tion, we will accept a statement from Congressman Yatron. [The prepared statement of Mr. Yatron follows:] (59) 60 olummittzz an jezign Qrfairs "ms HONORABLE cus YATRON July 18. 1991 The Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and on Europe and the Middle East meet today to receive testimony from the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Thomas Pickering, and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, John Bolton, concerning the United Nations’ role in the Gulf and Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions. The U. N. Security Council adopted resolution 687 on April 3 establishing a permanent cease-fire. The cease-fire resolution mandated Iraq to comply with a series of conditions including boundary settlement, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and compensation to those injured by Iraq's aggression. Today's hearing provides the Subcommittees with an opportunity to review Iraq’s compliance with the cease-fire agreement, other U.N. resolutions relating to the Gulf , and the U.S. policy response. 61 Mr. HAMILTON. Secretary Bolton. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. BOLTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do have a prepared statement as you indicate, which I request be submitted for the record. I will confine my present remarks to commenting on pending policy issues and their implications for the U.N.’s future role in bringing lasting peace and security to the Persian Gulf. Let me say at the beginning though, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Department and for the Secretary, that we all regret that Chairman Yatron couldn't be here and we wish him a speedy re- covery and all the best for him. Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, we will convey that to Congressman Yatron. Mr. BOLTON. It is fortuitous that you called this meeting at the present time, Mr. Chairman. The political declaration that was issued on Tuesday, by the G—7 summit contains elements which bear directly on the matters before us. The leaders said, among other things, that: “It is a matter of hope and encouragement that the United Na- tions Security Council, with the backing of the international com- munity showed during the Gulf crisis that it could fulfill its role of acting to restore international peace and security and to resolve conflict. “We commit ourselves,” the leaders said, “to making the U.N. stronger, more efficient and more effective in order to protect human rights, to maintain peace and security for all and to deter aggression.” We note that the urgent and overwhelming nature of the hu- manitarian problem in Iraq caused by violent oppression by the government required exceptional action by the international com- munity following Security Council 688. We urge the U.N. and its affiliated agencies to be ready to consider similar action in the future if circumstances require it. Unfortunately, however, the events of the last few weeks have provided further evidence of the fundamental untrustworthiness of the Iraqi regime headed by Suddam Hussein. The government of Iraq has cynically violated its solemnly given commitment to abide by the requirements of Resolution 687. It has lied to the U.N. in its declaration on nuclear activities. It has ignored the requirement contained in the Resolution 688 to cease harassing and threatening its own civilian population. It has refused to cooperate with the provision of humanitarian relief to elements of that population and has attempted to manipu- late distribution of that relief to its own political advantage. In short, Suddam Hussein is a liar. The behavior of Suddam Hussein, while no surprise to those who have followed carefully the events which began last August 2nd, does present a tough challenge to the United Nations and the international coalition which expelled Sud- dam’s forces from Kuwait, and which has been providing relief and 50-323 O - 92 - 3 62 assistance to Iraq’s hard pressed Kurdish minority and other groups. In a nutshell, this challenge is to maintain credibility in imple- menting the complex requirements of Resolution 687 and related Security Council directives. The series of resolutions enacted since last August concerning Iraq, do provide the basis for continuing pressure on the government of Iraq and for the dismantling of its formidable aggressive capabilities, and for seeing that those capa- bilities are not redeveloped. The key to their success lies in main- taining the pressure. At the London Summit, the leaders of the group of seven ex- pressed their desire to strengthen the role of the United Nations in fostering international peace and security. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the United Nations has established new practical securi- ty mechanisms that point the way for the international community to maintain the peace in the future. The Special Commission was established by the Security Council as an instrument to oversee the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Despite the attempts of the government of Iraq to hide its capabilities and obstruct that work, the Special Commission and the IAEA have worked well together. During a program of intensive inspections the IAEA and the Spe- cial Commission uncovered a huge covert nuclear weapons related program. This revelation elicited a major international outcry. Today we expect the IAEA to decide that Iraq is in violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Non—Proliferation Treaty and Iraq’s Safeguards Agreement. This is the first such decision in IAEA’s history and a potentially major step in the agency’s development. The head of the Special Commission and the Director General of the IAEA briefed the Security Council last Monday. They present- ed clear and incontrovertible evidence that Iraq was indeed en- gaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Indeed, Suddam said only yesterday in a speech commemorating the anniversary of the Baathist Revolution, that “Iraq would one day strike back at it; enemies and that its capability to do so would be reconstruct- e .” The Special Commission has been able to react swiftly to Iraqi violations because of the strong response of the Security Council and the international community to its grave and serious revela- tions about Iraq’s nuclear program. The Special Commission is a mechanism that is appropriate to its task. It has been staffed with the caliber of experts who can do the job and it is effective because it has the full political support of the international community. Iraq’s failure to accept the judgment of the international commu- nity, if it continues to hinder the work of the Special Commission, can only have the gravest consequences. This is exactly how the Special Commission should be working. As such the Special Com- mission should serve as a model for the future when the interna- tional community is faced with a clear danger and must assure that another brutal aggressor can no longer threaten international peace and security with weapons of mass destruction. Similarly the arms embargo, which the Security Council has maintained against Iraq, will help check future Iraqi aggression. ..____._____ _—L*_ .._.__?. 63 Its success has also inspired world leaders to seek greater U.N. in- volvement in helping to curb regional arms races, including the proposal for a U.N. monitored arms sales registration program which leaders at the London Economic Summit have endorsed. We should understand, however, that Resolution 687s modifica- tion of Resolution 661 sanctions regime and possible future modifi- cations make it operationally more difficult in preventing evasion of the continuing arms embargo. This is a matter that will require careful and continuing attention in the months and years ahead. If I could turn now, Mr. Chairman, to the question of the sanc- tions and humanitarian needs in Iraq, President Bush has made it clear that we will not turn our backs on the suffering of the Iraqi people, largely caused by Suddam Hussein’s cynical exploitation of hardship for political purposes. Iraq under normal circumstances and under an ethical government has the full capability to take care of its own needs. We are fully prepared to meet our humani- tarian obligations. However, the cost of assisting vulnerable populations should ulti- mately be born by Iraq itself. As should the costs of implementing Resolution 687. Under no circumstances should Suddam Hussein’s regime regain total control of the considerable resources available if Iraq resumes oil exports, even on a limited basis. The most recent assessment of the needs of the Iraqi people, un- dertaken by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, recommends that Iraq be permitted to export oil sufficient to pay for the import of humani- tarian necessities. And this really brings us to the dilemma that Saddam’s conduct so starkly poses because of his manipulation of existing food supplies. On the one hand you could contemplate simply the unlimited provision of humanitarian assistance with no monitoring and no controls. That would be unacceptable because the clear record here is that Suddam Hussein would manipulate those supplies for his own political purposes. Another alternative simply would not be to provide any assist- ance at all, which would lead potentially to grave suffering among the vulnerable groups in Iraq’s population. There is, however, a third way and that is to provide assistance under a regime of tight controls and strict monitoring. There has never been any question about President’s Bush’s willingness to see to the needs of vulnera- ble groups in Iraq. The President has said that we would help and that humanitari- an needs can be met within the existing sanctions regime. But Suddam Hussein has proven that he cannot be trusted. Any mecha- nism developed to provide essential supplies to the Iraqi people must include strict control and close monitoring by the internation- al community. We are now consulting closely with members of the Security Council and our coalition partners on the appropriate operational ways to do this. We would note that food and other relief supplies from foreign sources have been moving into Iraq at a steady rate for the past two months. Since food shipments were permitted by the sanctions committee on March 22, very substantial amounts of food have been notified to the committee and substantial amounts have moved into Iraq, as well, physically. 64 Donations from humanitarian organizations and individual gov- ernments, including the U.S., have amounted to hundreds of mil- lions of dollars. Additionally the Iraqi government has access to foreign exchange that can be used to buy food from abroad. Recent- ly the Iraqis notified the sanctions committee that they had pur- chased 100,000 tons of grain from Australia. We would also note that a study by two Tufts University nutri- tionists commissioned by UNICEF, indicates that while there are problems with malnutrition, particularly in southern Iraq, these problems are endemic due to long standing Iraqi government poli- cies. Dr. John Meer, President of Tufts said, and I quote “The Iraqi government appears to be using food as a weapon by cutting off the shipment of food and medical supplies to the southern part of the country. This situation must be monitored closely.” In the light of these facts, it is clear that while we are prepared to move quickly to provide food to victims of Suddam Hussein's regime, the international community must also be prepared to ensure that none of this assistance ends up in anyway supporting that regime. _ In this regard, Mr. Chairman I would like to address the resolu- tion that has been offered by Mr. Penny, which would have the U.N. unfreeze Iraqi assets and turn them over to UNICEF for the provision of relief in Iraq. While we are all sympathetic to the needs of the Iraqi people, and to the intentions of this amendment, we believe that the first initiative must come from Baghdad. They have shown no such humanitarian indications. There are many legitimate claims against the frozen assets by U.S. citizens and sorting that out would be a lengthy and difficult process. President Bush has made it clear that we would not lift sanctions in that regard against Iraq while Suddam Hussein re- mains in power. It is ironic, Mr. Chairman, that as Iraq’s pleas to ease sanctions become more high pitched, the Iraqi regime continues to flout and challenge the U.N. Iraq’s well documented attempts to evade detec- tion of its nuclear weapons program by the joint IAEA/ Special Commission inspection teams, its false declarations and its harass- ment of the inspectors are unacceptable. Two weeks ago disturbing reports reached Geneva of intense military harassment of a group of Shiites, thought to be trapped in the marshes of Southern Iraq. The Secretary-General’s executive delegate, Prince Sadruddin went himself to look into the situation. He was first denied permission by Iraqi authorities, then stalled long enough for Iraq’s forces to reportedly be withdrawn. Two days ago, the U.N. staff, including U.N. guards, who Prince Sadruddin left to remain in the vicinity of the marshes were told by the government of Iraq to leave the area because they were no longer needed. This is a direct contravention of Resolution 688s re- quirements not to interfere with U.N. relief efforts in Iraq. It also contravenes Iraq’s own Memorandum of Understanding with Prince Sadruddin. These and other examples provide a clear pattern of Iraq’s in- transigent refusal to comply with the U.N.’s requirements under Resolutions 687 and 688. The Iraqis are well aware that they are fooling no one, and yet their actions continue. Clearly the present 65 Iraqi regime cannot respond in good faith with the requirements of the international community. Therefore, the only course left to us and our allies is to maximize the pressure of the economic sanctions and to maintain the active possibility that there are other options. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And after Ambassador Pickering gives his statement, we would be pleased to answer questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton follows:] 66 PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN R. BOLTON ASSISTANT SECRETARY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF STATE In my last appearance here in April, I explained how the UN system would go about implementing this resolution which is the most far reaching and ambitious in scope of any adopted by the Security Council. At that point, because this resolution had only just been adopted, our discussion was mostly theoretical. Now, however, all aspects of the resolution including withdrawal of forces, interposition of the UN observers in UNIKOM, demarcation of the boundary, return of citizens, return of stolen assets, compensation, disclosure and destruction of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missiles with ranges in excess of 150 kilometers capable of delivering such weapons, have either totally or partially been implemented by the United Nations. Iraqi compliance, however, has been problematic, as you know, with regard to inspection of its nuclear program. The UN-IAEA task has been made extremely difficult by Saddam Hussein’s continued intransigence and efforts to evade the requirements imposed on Iraq by the international community; I will discuss that later. As for the UN, I am pleased to be 67 _ 2 _ able to report the UN is performing completely up to specification, and enjoys the full confidence and support of the United States. We continue to believe that working with our partners in the UN Security Council and the international coalition under the framework of Resolution 687, as well as 688, is the most effective manner of holding Hussein in check and preventing his regime from continuing as a threat to'Iraq’s neighbors and to its own people. Border Demarcation: The Border Commission was mandated under Resolution 687 to demarcate the international border between by Iraq and Kuwait, which was declared and guaranteed in UNSC Resolution 687. The Border Commission made its first trip to the border and began its first formal meeting in Geneva to discuss its findings on July 2. The methodology to be used in marking the western portion of the border, on the approximate location of the boundary in the vicinity of Safwan, and on further surveying and mapping were decided. Further surveying by a joint Sweden-New Zealand team will be carried out this fall. The next round of talks is scheduled for August 12. The Border Commission is comprised of representatives from Iraq and Kuwait and members from three neutral nations: Sweden, New Zealand, and Indonesia. 68 - 3 _ UNIKOM: The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission is deployed and functioning smoothly. The armed infantry units which provided security for the Observers at the outset of their mission have been withdrawn and will not be replaced. Return of missing Kuwaiti cimensr The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is working with Kuwait and Iraq to identify and repatriate Kuwaitis still being held in Iraq. We do not know the exact number of these persons. Return of stolen property: UN Assistant Secretary General Foran is in the process of finalizing transfer of stolen gold, coins and banknotes from Iraq to Kuwait. He is working out transportation problems related to the return of the gold. Although Iraq is required to provide an inventory of looted cult1n'al property, and facilitate its quick return to Kuwait, there has been little progress made on this aside from vague Iraqi assurances given to the UN. Compensation: The Security Council has approved the Secretary General’s proposal to establish a Compensation Commission. The Commission will be composed of a Governing Council (which is comprised of the 15 UNSC members) and experts who will establish mechanisms to compensate those who suffered losses and damages as a result of Iraq’s illegal invasion and 69 _ 4 _ occupation of Kuwait. The Governing Council of the Commission will establish the actual percentage of Iraq’s eventual oil export revenues to be made available for such compensation. The Security Council, which must establish a ceiling for the percentage, has not yet done so. The U.S. could support a ceiling lower than 50% as we originally wanted, as long as the actual amount paid into the Compensation Fund be set initially at 30%. We believe this will leave Iraq ample funds to pay for its humanitarian and essential civilian needs, particularly since Iraq is barred by Resolution 687 from the huge military expenditures it had made in the past. The first meeting of the Compensation Fund’s Governing Council (made up of representatives from Security Council members) will be held at the end of July. We hope the Governing Council will focus at that meeting on its highest priority tasks: 1) establishing procedures for the flow of contributions into the fund and their use by the Commission, and 2) actions needed to begin work on the most urgent claims. Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Security Council is actively discussing how to deal with Iraq’s blatant deception concerning its nuclear program, including its uranium enrichment program. The Iraqis have tried to thwart the work of the IAEA and the Special Commission established under 70 - 5 - Resolution 687 which is made up of experts from several countries. Iraq has lied to the UN and the IAEA about the existence of its uranium enrichment program and attempted to hide equipment related to that program fi-om the IAEA-Special Commission inspection team. Iraq finally admitted it had a uranium enrichment program, but information it provided about that effort we believe contains significant omissions about its extent and nature. The Commission’s chairman is a distinguished Swedish diplomat, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, who has considerable expertise in arms control issues. Its deputy Chairman is an American, Dr. Robert Gallucci. The IAEA and the Special Commission are charged with working together to carry out the task of identifying and destroying or rendering harmless Iraq’s nuclear-weapons related capabilities. The Special Commission has a similar task for Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons-related capabilities, and its ballistic missiles. ' In May, as required by Resolution 687, Iraq submitted to the UN a letter declaring all of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons material and productions facilities. However, this letter, as proven by subsequent events, fell far short of reality. Given Iraq’s demonstrated willingness to attempt to deceive the UN, we do not accept as complete or accurate Iraq’s July 8 letter which, among other things admits 71 -5- to a considerable uranium enrichment program. This letter was submitted only after a Council directive to comply fully with UNSC Resolution 687 and the visit of high level UN and IAEA officials following Iraqi interference with inspections at two facilities (including movement of equipment the team had asked to inspect). We do not accept Iraqi "assurances" that the activities disclosed in the most recent letter were for "peaceful uses." As provided under the terms of Resolution 687, the Special Commission-IAEA are continuing their inspections program to monitor and verify the full disclosure and destruction of all of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Iraq’s deceptions concerning its nuclear related activities call into question its declarations concerning chemical and biological weapons. As for ballistic missiles, an inspection team has witnessed the destruction Of 61 ballistic missiles which Iraq declared in its first letter to the UN. The team will continue its inspections of suspect sites until the Security Council is satisfied that all of Iraq’s capability and existing ballistic missiles arsenal have been fully declared and destroyed or rendered harmless. The role and performance of the IAEA-Special Commission in grappling with the thorny problem of disposing of 72 - 7 _ Iraq’s illicit nuclear capability has some positive implications for a stronger UN role in the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. What the international community learns from this experience may be applied if future aggressors attempt to develop nuclear weapons. It is an example of how the entire UN system needs to be involved in the international community’s efforts to maintain international peace and stability. Iraq’s policies and practices: Under the terms of Resolution 687 the Security Council is to review Iraq’s policies and practices every 60 days to determine if they warrant an easing of sanctions. The Security Council at the end of June undertook its first review and decided not to relax the sanctions regime. Subsequent events have born out the wisdom of that decision. Iraq has a request pending before the Sanctions Committee to be allowed to sell $1.5 billion of oil in order to pay for food, medicine and other humanitarian items. The Sanctions Committee has deferred consideration of that request pending a full disclosure from Iraq of its present foreign exchange holdings and other relevant financial information. ~: Iraq’s violations of Resolution 687 regarding its nuclear program underscore the need to maintain 73 . _ 8 I the sanctions regime against Iraq. We have been keeping a close eye on reports of food shortages in Iraq, particularly among children and other vulnerable groups. As President Bush has repeatedly made clear, we are very sensitive to the plight of innocent civilians under Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime, and the hardships it imposes on them. Resolution 687 permits import of purchased or donated food, medicine and supplies for essential civilian needs. We understand that prices for certain commodities are very high and there are pockets of malnutrition. The summer grain harvest now underway could provide significant relief for a few months. There are reports that wider food shortages could be in the offing later this year. To the extent that food is not getting to the Iraqi population most at risk, one major cause is the cynical manipulation of food stocks by Saddam Hussein’s government. Last month the UN reported the diversion by Iraqi authorities of a World Food Program shipment intended for hungry children, and other genuinely needy groups. Instead the food was sent to Saddam’s home town where there is not a pressing need. Saddam is diverting food to his loyalists in the Baathist party and to certain military units. 74 EESTI _ 9 _ A study on the needs of the Iraqi population by two Tufts University nutritionists commissioned by UNICEF concluded that although malnutrition was problem in Iraq, particularly in the South, it was an endemic and long-standing one caused by Iraqi policies and methods of distributing food, rather than an actual shortfall of food supplies in the country as a whole. On Monday, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan the UN Executive Delegate submitted his report. It highlights pressing needs of Iraq’s civilian population. The President has made it quite clear that there has never been any question of our willingness to feed vulnerable groups in Iraq. At the same time, Saddam Hussein has provided ample evidence of his willingness to exploit the good will of the international community and those who are genuinely concerned over the plight of innocent Iraqis. Food has been exempted from the sanctions regime since March 22. Medicine has never been subject to sanctions, and tons of medical supplies have flowed into Iraq before, during and after hostilities, thanks to the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF and other relief groups. Iraq does possess foreign exchange that can be used for the purchase of imported commodities. Recently, the Iraqi government contracted to purchase 100,000 tons of grain from 75 _ _ Australia. The key requirement remains for the government of Iraq to distribute these supplies equitably to those people who have been identified in Sadruddin’s report. Additionally, the Sanctions Committee has notified countries holding frozen Iraqi assets that Resolution 687 does not require them to continue to do so and that they are free to release such assets so that they may be used to purchase food, medicine and other humanitarian materials as specified in I687. We are aware of the amendment sponsored by Mr. Penny which would release Iraq’s assets held in the United States so that they could be turned over to UNICEF and used to purchase humanitarian items for Iraqi civilians. We oppose releasing Iraqi assets frozen in this country at this time. There are many legitimate claims against those resources by U.S. citizens, and sorting that out will be a lengthy and difficult process. Finally, President Bush has made it clear that he would not lift sanctions against Iraq while Saddam Hussein was in power. Given Saddam’s demonstrated capacity and willingness to turn international good will to his own sinister purposes, it is clear that simply relaxing sanctions to allow the government of Iraq to obtain humanitarian supplies will not alleviate the suffering of those in need. Any mechanism 76 -11- developed to provide essential supplies to the people of Iraq must therefore include strict control and close monitoring. This in turn will require an extensive UN presence and Iraqi non-interference, so that supplies provided do not bolster Saddam’s political control, and reach those targeted groups for whom they are intended;'__ The UN has responded effectively to the numerous humanitarian emergencies wrought through Saddam's savage policies directed at his own population. The UN Humanitarian Plan of Action issued on May 15 appeals for $449 million, including $65 million for the World Food Program. At a pledging conference held by the UN on June 12, I announced an additional U.S. contribution of $61.7 million for humanitarian relief in Iraq including $30.6 million for the WFP. This contribution brings the total U.S. humanitarian effort since January 1 to some $442 million, of which some $102.5 million has been provided through international organizations. During his assessment mission last week, Sadruddin made it a priority to personally visit Southern Iraq where it had been reported thousands of Shiites were trapped in marshes surrounded by heavily armed Iraqi military forces. The Iraqi authorities managed to delay his inspection of this area until 77 _ 12 - this military force had been withdrawn, but Sadruddin nevertheless insisted that the UN be allowed to establish a food distribution center with a detachment of UN guards. We hope this UN presence near the marshes will provide a degree of assurance to the population in Southern Iraq and allow them to return to their homes permanently. We have reminded the Iraqis of their obligations under Resolution 688 not to interfere with relief efforts intended for this particularly vulnerable group of people. The UN assumed responsibility for relief efforts in Northern Iraq on June 7 after the major success of coalition relief operations, and coalition forces have redeployed. UN Humanitarian centers are located in Dohuk, Mosul, Zakhu, Sulaymanieh, and Erbil. We estimate that some 400,000 returnees have been assisted at these relief points. As a confidence building measure, and to maintain a clear international monitoring presence in Iraq, a UN guard force of 500 is being deployed throughout Iraq, near to population centers which have been threatened by the Iraqi government. As of July 11, 271 of these guards have been deployed. The U.S. has contributed $5 million in cash and $1 million in kind to the force. The EC has pledged to make up cash or personnel shortfalls. 79 _ 14 _ requirements of Resolution 687. It is a job which requires the continuing full support of the international community, but when it has been successfully completed the entire UN system will have demonstrated a new found effectiveness. We hope to be able to build upon that success so that the UN can emerge a strengthened organization as it enters the next century. 80 Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Bolton. Mr. Ambassador. . STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING, U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you very much, Chairman Hamil- ton. I too would like to join in all the sentiments that have been expressed for the early and speedy recovery of Chairman Yatron. Chairman Hamilton and Members of the committee, I welcome this opportunity to be back with you to report on the implementa- tion of the major elements of the cease fire arrangement, Security gouricil Resolution 687, which Iraq as you know accepted last pri . Resolution 687 represents a comprehensive program designed to assure Iraq’s fulfillment of all resolutions occasioned by its inva- sion of Kuwait and to strengthen the basis for peace and security in the Northern Persian Gulf. Its central provisions cover the fol- lowing critical areas: elimination of nuclear, chemical and biologi- cal weapons and weapons related activities, and of ballistic mis- siles; guidelines for the control of future arms sales to Iraq; modifi- cations to and maintenance of the sanctions (the embargoes) on Iraqi exports and imports; demarcation of the Iraq/ Kuwait border; return of Kuwait and third country nationals; return of stolen Kuwait and other property; establishment of a compensation fund for direct loss or damage or injury as a result of Iraqi aggression; creation of a demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait and of a U.N. observer force to patrol it; and a commitment by Iraq that it will not in the future carry out or support acts of terrorism or ter- rorist organizations. Let me begin my remarks by offering an observation that our ex- perience with the implementation of the cease fire resolution has been sharply mixed. On the one hand, we have been very pleased with the effectiveness and with the professionalism with which the United Nations, its specialized agencies and especially the Interna- tional Atomic Energy Agency have embraced the many complicat- eii and novel challenges required for the implementation of the res- o ution. But at the same time, we have been repeatedly frustrated, and in the case of its nuclear weapons program dismayed, by a pattern of Iraqi behavior ranging from delaying tactics in some areas, such as in the repatriation of people and property, to grave and outright violations of the cease fire agreement in the area of Iraq’s nuclear activities. Dealing effectively with Iraq’s malfeasance has now become a central preoccupation of our efforts at the U.N. and of U.S. foreign policy itself. Let me therefore open my remarks with a summary of our concerns regarding Iraqi statements and actions, especially in the nuclear area. To ensure against the reemergence of an Iraqi nuclear threat to its neighbors and the region at large, the Security Council acting through Resolution 687 unconditionally bound Iraq not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons usable material, or any subsystems, components, or any research, development support or manufacturing facilities; 81 to disclose the locations, types and amounts of all of the above items; to place all of its nuclear weapons usable material under the ex- clusive control, for custody and removal, of the IAEA; to accept urgent on-site inspections and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all items specified above; and to accept a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and veri- fication of its compliance with these provisions. As committee Members are aware, we know now that Iraq has systematically violated every applicable injunction or prohibition I just listed. This is not the occasion to present an exhaustive record of Iraqi violations but let me just try to summarize. Iraq has not fully disclosed its uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons capability. Despite numerous letters and lists, Iraq has not provided a full and accurate accounting of its nuclear activities. In our view Iraq’s last such letters, the 29 page communication of July 7 and the subsequent addenda are still incomplete. To take one example, Iraq failed to notify the United Nations of a major enrichment facility and still insists that it is a plant with a peace- ful purpose. Iraq has obstructed inspection efforts. Baghdad repeatedly violat- ed the May 6th agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Iraq, which detailed the rights, privileges and im- munities for the Special Commission and IAEA and their inspec- tion teams and representatives. On June 23rd and June 25th at the Abu Gharaib site, and on June 28th at the Fallujah site, inspectors were denied access to and the opportunity to photograph suspected nuclear areas, objects and related activities. Efforts were made to confiscate cameras, to intimidate by means of small arms fire and to deny urgent medical care to a team member suffering from heat exhaustion. At both sites, objects to which inspectors sought access were re- moved before inspectors were permitted access. I should add that photographic evidence has the IAEA to conclude that the removed material was clearly related to previously undeclared uranium en- richment activities. The Iraqis, realizing that their attempts at con- cealment have failed, have now admitted to being engaged in a massive covert enrichment program. A senior U.N. team was sent to Baghdad by the Secretary Gener- al to exact commitments that would ensure immediate and unim- peded access to the objects sought on June 28. Iraq failed to give such commitment. Iraq has denied the right to use air transport. Notwithstanding their commitments to the contrary, Iraq has prevented inspection teams from using their own aircraft to support inspections, handi- capping the teams’ ability to conduct genuine challenge inspections outside the Baghdad area. Iraq now admits to having a secret program for uranium enrich- ment. In its letter of July 7, Iraq acknowledged that it maintained an unsafeguarded, covert uranium enrichment program involving three different processes for enriching uranium: electromagnetic isotopic separation (EMIS); ultra-centrifuge; and a chemical proc- ess. At the same time it has admitted producing no more than half a kilo of enriched uranium. The non-admission and continuation of 82 this secret program, and the unilateral destruction of elements of this program violate Iraq’s obligations under Resolution 687 as well as its safeguards responsibilities under the Nonproliferation Treaty and associated IAEA safeguards agreement. Inspection team mem- bers describe the EMIS program as “excellent quality, comparable in scope to the Manhattan Project” and estimate the total cost at as much as $5 to $10 billion. We believe that Iraq sought nuclear weapons. Iraq maintains that its extensive secret nuclear program was for peaceful purposes only. We and the IAEA disagree with Iraq on this point. As the IAEA experts explained to the Security Council on Monday, the Iraqi multi-billion dollar electromagnetic enrichment program makes no sense as a peaceful program aimed at nuclear power de- velopment and indeed no nuclear power reactors were procured. As an IAEA expert also confirmed, powering a nuclear reactor by en- riched uranium produced by this method by Iraq would consume five times the energy the reactor itself would create. The foregoing list suggests, as a minimum, that Saddam has not yet gotten the message. He does not yet realize that the United N a- tional Security Council, and the United States in particular are “deadly serious”, as President Bush said just a week ago. But we certainly are. As an earnest of our seriousness we joined with the other perma- nent members of the Security Council on July 12 to make the fol- lowing unconditional demands upon Iraq: _ One, that it provide by July 25, the full, final and complete dis- closure required by Resolution 687. Two, that it allow the Special Commission, the IAEA and their inspection teams unhindered use of Iraqi airspace for inspection, transportation, logistics and surveillance purposes on terms that the Commission and the IAEA shall themselves establish. Three, that it allow the Special Commission, the IAEA and their inspection teams immediate unconditional and unrestricted access to anything that they wish to inspect. Four, that Iraq cease movement immediately of any material or equipment related to its nuclear, chemical, biological or ballistic missile programs without notification to and consent of the Special Commission. Five, that it immediately make available to the IAEA, to the Special Commission and their inspection teams any items to which they were previously denied access. Six, that it provide or facilitate immediately any transportation, medical and logistical support requested by the Special Commis- sion, the IAEA and their inspection teams. Seven, that it respond fully, completely and promptly to any re- quests or questions from the Special Commission, the IAEA and their inspection teams. Iraq must not miscalculate a second time. Its pattern of reckless defiance of the expressed will Of the international community is in- tolerable. The United States, together with other members of the Security Council, is determined that it cannot be allowed to contin- ue. Now I would like to turn to other weapons of mass destruction. mi 83 In addition to its intensive work in the nuclear area, the Special Commission has conducted numerous inspections and some destruc- tion of other Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. In the case of bal- listic missiles, for example, a total of 61 have been inspected and destroyed, along with a quantity of launchers, related equipment and production capacity. While this number represents all of Iraq’s declared surviving missiles, our best estimates suggest that a larger number remains unaccounted for. The Special Commission's in- spections of designated suspected sites will therefore continue. As you know, Iraq has denied that it manufactured or possesses biological weapons. Here again we believe we have reason to be- lieve this declaration is false. The Special Commission will com- mence shortly inspections of sites which it designates in order to test the Iraqi claim. The chemical weapons effort is now fairly far along. The Special Commission has inspected one of the 12 declared sites, confirmed the presence of hundreds of tons of previously declared bulk agent and thousands of filled munitions, including missile warheads, bombs and rockets. Its overall finding is that Iraq’s chemical arse- nal is subject to widespread leaking and overpressure and is gener- ally in a highly unstable condition. The Special Commission is now preparing a destruction plan which will require bringing existing mobile and transportable disposal facilities from other countries to Iraq where the bulk agent and the munitions will be destroyed. The activities of the Special Commission not related to disposal work or long-term verification are expected to cost in excess of $35 million for 1991 alone. The removal and the destruction of chemi- cal and nuclear weapons-related materials will cost many times this amount. This week, as requested by the Security Council, the Secretary- General offered his recommendations for the most effective way of assuring payment. His report suggests an arrangement under which sanctions would be lifted for a limited period, under clearly defined conditions, to permit a supervised sale of oil or oil products. The proceeds of this sale would be deposited in a U.N. account and used to pay for the costs of carrying out the weapons of mass de- struction section of Resolution 687. Directly related to the provision on weapons of mass destruction are those dealing with the continuation of restrictions on exports to Iraq, and the prohibition on imports from Iraq. The Sanctions Committee of the Security Council has, since March 22, received notifications of exporters’ intentions to ship more than 2 million tons of foodstuffs to Iraq, or nearly one ton for every nine Iraqis. This total does not include notifications to the Sanctions Committee in which actual amounts do not appear, nor does it include much of the food provided by the coalition countries as part of Operation Provide Comfort. Using the “essential civilian needs” provision in the resolution Iraq has also imported a wide variety of goods over a similar period, including fuel, generators, medicine and medical equipment, water pumps and water treat- ment systems, motor vehicles, temporary shelters and so forth. And while I am on this subject let me say that the Sanctions Committee has routinely approved applications for provision of any equipment related to food production, water purification, sewage I 84 treatment, power generation or any other category integral to es- sential civilian needs which has been defined by the Sanctions Committee itself. Let me also add that a rapidly growing propor- tion of the above are commercial sales. This suggests that Baghdad has access to significant funds, notwithstanding official statements to the contrary. The 687 resolution provision for exports from Iraq is very clear. It provides for the complete lifting of the embargo upon the satis- faction of two conditions: (1) fulfillment by Iraq of all of its obliga- tions under Section C of 687, dealing with the elimination of nucle- ar, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles; and, two, approval by the Security Council of the Secretary-General’s propos- als for dedicating a portion of the value of Iraqi petroleum exports to a compensation fund for the payment of claims against Iraq. On May 20, the Security Council satisfied the second of these re- quirements. Unfortunately, Iraqi violations of Resolution 687’s pro- visions on weapons of mass destruction, which I described a few moments ago, suggest that the first condition for renewed Iraqi ex- ports under this portion of the resolution is a very long way from being fulfilled. You will also recall that under paragraph 23 of the resolution the Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council was empowered to approve exemptions to the prohibitions on Iraq’s exports when it is necessary to Iraq to have the additional revenue to meet essential humanitarian needs. This week the Committee received a report on conditions within Iraq prepared by the Secre- tary-General’s Executive Delegate, as a consequence of which the Security Council may soon explore a measure dealing with the pro- grams associated with this issue. Since Assistant Secretary Bolton has addressed the Sadruddin report and the humanitarian issues in some detail, I will focus on a related matter. Specifically, let me say that in the event that the Security Council were to adopt an exception to sanctions to meet the legitimate humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population, we would clearly want to protect two related concerns as well. First and foremost, we must continue to deny Saddam any external fi- nancial resources. This would necessitate a paragraph 23 regime that ensures total United Nation's control over all of the proceeds of any Iraqi oil sales and the purchases made with those proceeds, and that imposes, as Assistant Secretary Bolton has just said, strict monitoring to ensure equitable distribution of food and humanitari- an goods procured so that Saddam cannot continue his practice of diversion of foodstuffs from the needy to his party and military cro- mes. Second, we would be interested in developing a formula for allo- cating the revenues of any proceeds from oil sales to all of the criti- cal activities mandated by the ceasefire resolution for which Iraq is girgctly financially responsible, including the Special Commission u get. I would like to turn now to the arms embargo. Resolution 687 also called upon the Secretary-General to develop guidelines for the reinforcement and continuation of the arms embargo against Iraq. Chemical, biological and nuclear weapons technology and dual use technology are permanently banned. Conventional weapons are 85 also banned although with a provision for a review four months from the passage of Resolution 687 and regularly thereafter in the light of Iraqi compliance and regional progress toward arms con- trol. In Resolution 700, adopted on June 17, the Security Council accepted the Secretary-General's proposed guidelines. Another central component of the ceasefire resolution was a pro- vision calling for: a fund financed from Iraqi oil exports, to com- pensate those directly injured by Iraq’s aggression; a settlement process to handle claims; and a Commission to manage the process and award payments. Last May, as required by 687, the Secretary- General proposed a general plan for the organization and operation of the Governing Council of this compensation fund, which will ad- minister the fund as well as a specific number as the ceiling for the percentage of Iraqi exports of petroleum and petroleum products to be dedicated to the fund. The ceiling suggested by the Secretary-General, 30 percent, was lower than the 50 percent favored by the United States and which we believe is warranted by the need to assure rapid settlement of victims, claims against Iraq, by the need to capture a portion of any windfall gains that would accompany a sharp increase in oil prices, and by the speed at which we believe Iraq could recover its oil production capacity. Nevertheless, we could accept the 30 per- cent ceiling so long as 30 percent is also the portion of oil export revenues actually dedicated to the compensation fund by the Gov- erning Council. Resolution 687 demanded that Iraq and Kuwait respect the invio- lability of the boundary to which both agreed in 1963 and sought the assistance of the Secretary-General for its demarcation. This was natural since the boundary was an initial excuse advanced by Saddam Hussein for his aggression. The first Geneva meetings of the demarcation commission set up by the Secretary-General concluded on July 12. After initial ob- structionist tactics by the Iraqi delegate, the commission succeeded in deciding the western boundary of Kuwait and also made progress on the northern boundary through a voting process. As you will recall, the ceasefire resolution also reconfirms Iraq’s responsibility, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to repatriate and account for all Kuwaitis and third country nationals being held in Iraq. Over the past several months Iraq has been releasing these people in small numbers on a more or less regular basis, but Iraq has not yet fulfilled its responsibil- ities under Resolution 687. The return of Kuwaiti property has also moved at a slow and frustrating pace, explained in part by the disarray in Iraq itself but also, in our view, by delay tactics on the part of Baghdad. Unfortu- nately, the Iraqi government introduced a further complication by attempting to argue that the logistics of the transfer operation re- quired the release of Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft which were detained outside the country as required by Security Council decision. The Sanctions Committee has rejected this gambit and the United Na- tions officials are now exploring alternative means for transporting the stolen property to the transfer point. One of the early successes made possible by the cease fire resolu- tion has been the establishment of the demilitarized zone between 86 Iraq and Kuwait and an observer unit to patrol it. Established April 8th under the Security Council Resolution 689, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait observation mission, UN IKOM, has drawn participants from 32 countries. Violations of the militarized zone are now minimal, and typically involve nationals of Kuwait or Iraq who either lose their way in the region or make use of the mine cleared areas in an attempt to traverse the border safely. On June llth, Iraq presented letters to the Security Council president and the Secretary-General in fulfillment of Resolution 687’s demand for an official Iraqi statement forswearing terrorism. While making the patently false assertion that Iraq has never pur- sued a policy favorable to international terrorism, the text does ful- fill the technical requirements of this provision of Resolution 687 and does conform with recent General Assembly resolutions on the issue of terrorism. The humanitarian situation in Iraq in general and Saddam’s ac- tions towards the Kurds and the Shia in particular are matters of grave and immediate concern, which are directly relevant to the subject of this hearing. As I noted earlier, they were addressed by Assistant Secretary Bolton. And with your permission, I will omit a discussion of humanitarian issues from my prepared remarks, al- though of course I will be happy to try to address your questions. In conclusion, I want to return to the issue of the Iraqi compli- ance because it is impossible to overstate the importance which we attach to it. Iraq’s failure to fulfill the provisions of 687, particular- ly relating to its weapons of mass destruction program and its nu- clear activities, are serious violations of the ceasefire that would di- rectly imperil international peace and security in the area. Furthermore, noncompliance would seriously threaten the capac- ity of Resolution 687 to serve as a foundation for a new structure of peace and security in the region, one of the reasons that we and so many others fought a painful and costly war. Finally, it would have the transcendentally poisonous effect of subverting the respect for international law so long fought for and so dearly won in the recent crisis. Let there be no mistake. Defi- ance of the cease fire cannot and will not be tolerated. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Pickering follows:] 87 STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKBRING US PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS , before the JOINT CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS JULY 13, 1991 Chairman Yatron, chairman Hamilton, Members of the Committees, I welcome this opportunity to address the Committees this morning and to report on the implementation of the major elements of the ceasefire agreement, Security Council resolution 687, reached lest March between Iraq and the countries cooperating with Kuwait. As you know, SC 687 represents a comprehensive program designed to assure Iraq's fulfillment of all resolutions occasioned by its invasion of Kuwait and to strengthen the basis for peace and security in the northern Persian Gulf. Its central provisions cover the following critical areas: - elimination of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and weapons related activities, and of ballistic missiles; - guidelines for the control of future arms sales to Iraq; - modifications to and maintenance of the sanctions (embargoes) on Iraqi exports and imports; - demarcation of the Iraq-Kuwait border; - return of Kuwait and third country nationals; 89 _ 3 - Iraqi Nuclear Activities To ensure against the reemergence of an Iraqi nuclear threat to its neighbors and the region at large, the security Council, acting through resolution 667, unconditionally bound Iraq: - not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or weapons usable materiel, or any subsystems, components, or any research, development support or manufacturing facilities; ' - to disclose the locations, types and amounts of all the above items; - to place all of its nuclear weapons usable material under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the IAEA) - to accept urgent on-site inspections and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all items specified above; - and to accept a plan for the future ongiong monitoring and verification of its compliance with these provisions. Violations Al Committee members are aware, we know now that Iraq has systematically violated every applicable injunction or prohibition I just listed. This is not the occasion to present an exhaustive record of Iraq's violations but let me try to summarise: 90 -4- - Iraq has not fullydisclosed its uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons capebilties. Despite numerous letters and lists Iraq has not provided an accurate accounting of its nuclear activities. In our view Iraq‘: last two such letters, the 29 . )' page communication of July 7 and subsequent eddenda are still incomplete. To take one example, Iraq failed to notify the UN of a major enrichment facility and still insists that it is s plant with a peaceful purpose. - Iraq has obstructed inspection efforts. Baghdad repeatedly violated the May 6 agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Iraq, which detailed the rights, privileges, and immunities of the special Commision and IAEA representatives. On June 23 and 25 at the Abu Gharaib site, and on June 28 at the Fsllujah site, inspectors were denied access and the opportunity to photograph suspected nuclear areas, objects and related activities. Efforts were made to confiscate cameras, to intimidate by means of smell arms fire and to deny urgent medical care to a team member. At both sites, objects to which inspectors sought access were removed before inspectors were permitted access. I should add that photographic evidence has led the IAEA to conclude that the removed materiel was clearly related to previously undeclared uranium enrichment activities. The Iraqis, realizing that their attempts at concealment have failed, have new admitted being engaged in a massive covert enrichment program. 1 V 91 I _sI - High level team not satisfied. A senior UN delegation was sent to Baghdad to exact commitments that would ensure immediate and unimpeded access to the objects sought on June 28. Iraq failed to give such commitments. - Iraq has denied the right to use air transport. Notwithstanding their commitments to the contrary, Iraq has prevented inspection teams from using aircraft to support inspections, handicapping the teams‘ ability to conduct genuine challenge inspections outside the Baghdad area; - Iraq new gdmits having a secret program foruranium enrichment. In its letter of July 7, Iraq acknowledged that it maintained an unsafeguarded, covert uranium enrichment program, involving three different processes for enriching uranium: electron magnetic isotopic separation (EMIS); ultra-centrifuge; and a chemical process. At the same time it has admitted producing no more than half a kilo of enriched uranium. The non-admission and continuation of this secret program, and the unilateral destruction of elements of the program violates Iraq's obligations under 687 as well as its safeguards responsibilities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and associated IAEA safeguards agreements. Inspection team members describe the BNIS program as ‘excellent quality, comparable in scope to the Manhattan Project‘ and estimate the total cost at as - 010 billion. 92 - 5 - - we believe Iraq sought nuclear weapons. Iraq maintains that its extensive secret nuclear program was for peaceful purposes only. we and the IAEA disagree. As IAEA experts explained to the security Council, the Iraqi's multi-billion dollar electro-magnetic enrichment program (EMIS), makes no sense as a peaceful program aimed at nuclear power development. As an IAEA expert later commented, powering a nuclear reactor by enriched uranium produced by this method would consume five times the energy which the reactor would create. Next Steps The forgoing list suggests, at a minimum, that Saddam has not gotten the message. He does not yet realize that the United Nations Security Council, and the United states in particular are ‘deadly serious" as President Bush said a week ago . But we GIG. As an earnest of our seriousness we have joined with the other Permanent members of the Security Council to make the following unconditional demands upon Iraq: 1. That it provide by July 25, the full, final and complete disclosure required by resolution 687. 2. That it allow the special Commission (UNSCOM), the IAEA and their inspection teams unhindered use of Iraqi airspace for insepction, transportation, logistics and surveillance purposes on terms they themselves shall establish. 93 - 7 - 3. that it allow UNSCOM, IAEA and their inspection teams immediate unconditional and unrestricted access to anything they wish to inspect; 4. That it cease movement immediately of any material or equipment related to its nuclear, chemical, biological or ballistic missile programs wihtout notirication to and consent of UNSCOM. 5. That it immediately make available to IAEA, UNSCOM and their inspection teams any items to which they were previously denied QCCOII e 6. That it provide or facilitate immediately any transportation, medical and logistical support requested by UNSCOM,-IAEA or their inspection teams. 7. That it respond fully, completely and promptly to any questions or requests rrom UNSCOM, IAEA, and their inspection teams. Iraq must not miscalculate a second time. Its pattern or reckless deriance or the expressed will or the international community is intolerable. The United states, together with the other members or the Security council are determined that it will not be allowed to continue. 50-323 O - 92 — 4 94 - 3 - Other Weapons of Mass Destruction In addition to its intensive work in the nuclear area, the special commission has conducted numerous inspections and some destruction oi other Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. In the case of ballistic missiles for example, a total or 61 have been inspected and destroyed, along with a quantity oi launchers, related equipment, and production capacity. While this number represents all of Iraq's declared surviving missiles, our best estimates suggest a much larger number remain unaccounted tor. UNSCOM 's inspections of designated suspected sites will therefore continue. l As you know, Iraq has denied that it manufactured or possesses biological weapons._ Here again we have reason to believe this is false. UNSCOM will commence shortly inspections of sites it designates in order to test the Iraqi claim. The chemical weapons e££ort is now fairly far along. UNSCOM has inspected one or 12 declared sites, confirmed the presence of hundreds of tons or previously declared bulk agent (nerve and blister) and thousands or tilled munitions, including missile warheads, bombs and rockets. Its overall finding is that Iraq's chemical arsenal is subject to widespread leaking and overpressure and is generally in a highly unstable condition. UNSCOM is now preparing a destruction plan which will require bringing existing mobile and transportable disposal facilities from other countries to a central location in Iraq where the bulk agent and munitions will be brought tor destruction. 95 UNBCOM Budget The activities of UNSCOM not related to disposal work or longterm verification are expected to cost in excess or $35 million for 1991 alone. The removal and destruction of chemical and nuclear weapons related materials will cost many times this amount although a reasonably reliable estimate cannot be made until a destruction regime for chemical weapons - the most problematic element - is developed. However, projections on the order or $100 - $200 million have been made. These expenses are entirely due to the reckless and unlawful behavior of Iraq, hence the Security Council decided in resolution 699 that Iraq should bear the full costs or all activities carried out under the weapons or mass destruction section (c) or 687. This week, as requested by the Security council, the Secretary General ordered his recommendations for the most effective way or assuring payment. His report suggests an arrangement under which sanctions would be lifted for a limited period, under clearly defined conditions, to permit a supervised sale or oil or oil products. The proceeds or this sale would be deposited in a UN account and used to pay for the costs of carrying out the weapons or mass destruction section or resolution 687. While this or another arrangement chosen by the Security Council is being established, and in view or UN8COM's need tor immediate resources, resolution 699 encourages members to provide bridging assistance in cash and in kind. The us has already contributed $2 million dollars and a small number or vehicles, Japan has made a modest contribution and many other countries have provided in kind support. I -1- - 1° - SANCTIONS Directly related to the provisions on weapons of mass destruction are those dealing with the continuation or restrictions on exports to Iraq, and the prohibition on imports trom Iraq. Regarding the rormer, you will recall that 687 eased the strictures of the then existing embargo by permitting the sale or supply or foodstufts, with a notification to the Sanctions committee. It also permitted sale or supply, on a ‘no objection‘ basis, of materials and supplies for "essential civilian needs‘ as these were identified in the March report or UN Under Secretary General Ahtisaari. With the benefit of these changes, the Committee has, since March 22, received notifications of exporters‘ intentions to ship more than 2 million tons of toodstutfs to Iraq, or nearly one ton for every 9 Iraqis. This total does not include notirications to the sanctions Committee in which actual amounts do not appear, nor does it include much of the food provided by coalition countries as part oi operation Provide Comtort. Using the ‘essential civilian needs‘ provision Iraq has also imported a wide variety of goods over a similar period, including ruel, generators, medicine and medical equipment, water pumps and water treatment systems, motor vehicles, temporary shelters, and so on. \ 97 _ ‘L - while I'm on this subject let me say that the sanctions Committee has routinely approved applications for provision of any equipment related to food production, water purification, sewage treatment, power generation or any other category integral to essential civilian needs which has been denied by the sanctions Committee. Let me also add that a rapidly growing proportion of the above are commercial sales. This suggests that Baghdad has access to significant funds, notwithstanding official statements to the contrary. Finally, paragraph 21 of 687 provides for a security Council review of Iraqi government policies and practices every 60 days to ascertain whether there should be a further lifting of restrictions on exports. The emphasis on ‘policies and practices‘ of the Iraqi government is intentionally broad so as to permit its application both to Iraqi fulfillment of 687 as well as to the government's treatment of its own population. At the first 60 day review, which took place last month, a majority of Council members believed Iraq's actions in both areas were unsatisfactory and the existing restrictions were maintained. In view of Iraq's violations and lack of good faith on nuclear weapons activities described a moment ago, we expect a similar result at the review coming up in August. The 687 provision for exports Iraq is very clear. It from provides for the complete lifting of the embargo upon the satisfaction of two conditions : (1) fulfillment by Iraq of all ‘sas - 12 - its obligations under section c of 687, dealing with elimination or nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, and (2) approval by the security council of the Secretary General's proposals for dedicating a portion of the value of Iraqi petroleum exports to a compensation fund tor the payment or claims against Iraq. On May 20, the Security Council satisfied the second of these requirements by adopting, in resolution 692, the Secretary General’: report proposing the establishment or a Compensation Fund and Commission. Unfortunately, Iraqi violations or 687's provisions on weapons oi mass destruction, which I described a ’ few moments ago, suggest that the First condition for renewed Iraqi exports is a very long way from being fulfilled. You will recall that under paragraph 23 the ceasetite resolution also empowered the UN sanctions committee to approve exceptions to the prohibition on Iraqi exports when it can be shown that Iraq needs the additional revenue to meet essential civilian needs. This week the Committee-received a report on conditions within Iraq prepared by the secretary General's Executive Delegate Prince sadruddin Aga Khan, as a consequence of which the Security council may soon explore a measure permitting oil exports sufficient to generate resources to meet minimum humanitarian needs under full and complete United Nations control as suggested by sadruddin Aga Khan. 99 - 13 _ I believe Assistant secretary Bolton plans to address the Sadruddin report in some detail in his remarks, so I will focus on a related matter. Specifically, let me say that in the event the Security Council does adopt a paragraph 23 exception to sanctions to meet the legitimate humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population, we would want to protect two related concerns as well. First and foremost, we must continue to deny saddam any external financial resources. This would necessitate a paragraph 23 regime which ensures total UN control over 100% of the proceeds of Iraqi oil sales, and the purchases made with those proceeds, and that imposes strict monitoring to ensure equitable distribution of the food and humanitarian goods procured to ensure that Saddam cannot continue his practice of diverting roodaturrs from the needy to his party and military loyalists. Second, we would be interested in developing a formula for allocating the revenues or Iraq's paragraph 23 sales among all the critical activities mandated by the ceasefire resolution and tor which Iraq is directly responsible, including the special Commission budget. Arms Embargo Resolution 687 also called upon the secretary General to develop guidelines for the reinforcement and continuation or the arms embargo against Iraq. Chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons weapons technology, and dual use technology, are permanently banned. Conventional weapons are also banned :- 2 .~ .35 us. .4 ‘I’? I‘ 100 . - l4 - although with a provision for a review 4 months from the passage of 687 and regularly thereafter in the light of Iraqi compliance with 687 and regional progress towards arms control. In resolution 700, adopted on June 17, the security council accepted the secretary General's proposed guidelines, requested member states to report within 45 days on measures taken to conform with them, and entrusted the sanctions committee with the task of monitoring compliance. Compensation Another central component of the ceasefire resolution was a provision calling for: a fund financed from Iraqi oil exports, to~oompensate those injured by Iraq's aggression; a settlement process to handle claims; and a commission to manage the process and award payments. Last May, as required by 687, the secretary General proposed a general plan for the organization and operation of the Governing council which will administer the Fund as well as a specific number as the ceiling for the percentage of Iraqi exports of petroleum and petroleum products to be dedicated to the Pund. The ceiling suggested by the secretary General, 30%, was lower than the 500 favored by the United States and which we believe is warranted by the need to assure rapid settlement of claims against Iraq, by the need to allow tor windfall gains that could accompany a sharp increase in oil prices and by the 101 \ \ - 15 - speed at which we believe Iraq could recover its oil production capability. Nevertheless, we could accept the 30% level so long as 30$ is also the portion of oil export revenues actually dedicated to the Compensation Fund. while neither the executive secretary nor any of the Commissioners of the Fund have been appointed, we expect appointments shortly and are expressing our views regarding qualified candidates. The Geneva-based Governing Council will be holding its first session on July 23 which is scheduled to last for two weeks. The Belgian member has been selected to serve as council President. Regarding the agenda of this first session, one of our chief concerns is that the Council will treat settlement of claims by individuals as a priority and to that end will use this first meeting to adopt simple criteria for their submission. Boundary Demarcation Resolution 687 demanded that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the boundary to which both agreed in 1963 and sought the assistance of the Secretary General for its demarcation. The first Geneva meetings of the demarcation commission set up by the secretary General concluded July 12. After initial obstructionist tactics by the Iraqi delegate, the commission succeeded in deciding the western boundary of Kuwait 102 . 15 - and also made progress on the northern boundary. The off-shore border is slated to be on the agenda of the commission's August session. Once this phase is complete the commission will move to the actual physical emplacement of markers on a boundary line. This process, Which is of course climate dependent, could start as early as september and is likely to rely to some extent on marker placement by helicopter in view of the continuing hazardof land mines. Return of Kuwaiti and other Nationals As you will recall, the ceasefire resolution reconfirms Iraq's responsibility, in cooperation with the ICRC, to repatriate and account for all Kuwaitie and third country nationals being held in Iraq. _Over the past several months Iraq has been releasing these people in fairly small numbers on a more or less regular basis, but Iraq has not yet fulfilled its responsibilties under resolution 687. While the ICRC and Kuwait cannot state with absolute precision the number of Kuwaitis and third country nationals (claiming Kuwaiti residence) still held in Iraq, the best estimates are that there are as many as 1700 Kuwaitis and 1900 third country nationals from more than 20 states. Return of Property The return of Kuwaiti property has moved at a slow and frustrating pace, explained in part by the disarray in Iraq itself but also in our view by delay tactics on the part of 103 ' - l7 - Baghdad. The sides appear to have agreed to carry out the transfers at Ara: in western saudi Arabia and have also agreed that the contents of the first property restitution shall be gold, coins and bank notes. Discussions concerning the second transfer are now proceeding and it appears that this will involve either military hardware, which Iraq says it has inventoried, or museum pieces. Unfortunately, the Iraqi government introduced a further complication by attempting to argue that the logistics of the transfer operation required the release of Iraqi fixed wing aircraft which were detained outside the country as required by security Council decision. The Sanctions Committee has rejected this gambit and United Nations officials are new exploring alternative means for transporting the stolen property to the transfer point. UNIKOM One of the early successes made possible by the ceasefire resolution has been the establishment of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait and an observer unit to patrol it. Established April 8th, under Security Council resolution 689, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait observation Mission (UNIKOM) drew participants from 32 countries. UNIKOM'B original complement or more than 1400 personnel included 640 infantry temporarily assigned to provide security for the observer units until stability returned to the border area. UNIKOM’! early success in restoring calm however, made possible the withdraw of the 104 - 13 - infantry companies ahead of schedule. The mineclearing activities of the observer force have also been progressing well, with the focus of unison’: efforts new directed primarily to the southwestern sector where the borders of Iraq, Kuwait and saudi Arabia meet. Violations of the DMZ are now minimal and typically involve nationals of Kuwait or Iraq who either lose their way or make use of the mine-cleared areas to traverse the border safely. Terrorism On June ll Iraq presented letters to the security Council President and the secretary General in fulfillment of resolution 687's demand for an official Iraqi statement forswearing terrorism. While making the patently false assertion that Iraq has never pursued a policy favorable to international terrorism, the text does fulfill the requirements of this provision of 687 and conforms with recent General Assembly resolutions on the subject. Resolution 668 and Humanitarian Issues The humanitarian situation in Iraq in general and saddam's actions toward the Kurds and shia in particular are matters of grave and immediate concern which are directly relevant to the subject of this hearing. However, as I noted earlier in my remarks these subjects are treated at length in the testimony you will shortly receive from Assistant secretary Bolton, so 105 . _ 19 _ with your permission I will omit humanitarian issues from my prepared remarks, although of course I will be happy to accept 1 . your questions. “ Conclusion In conclusion I want to return to the issue of Iraqi compliance because it is impossible to overstate the importance which the United States attaches to it. Iraq's failure to fulfill the provisions of 687, particularly relating to its weapons of mass destruction and its nuclear activities, are serious violations of the ceasefire that would directly imperil international peace and security in the area. furthermore, non-compliance would unhinge the capacity of 687 to serve as a foundation stone for a new structure of peace and security in the region, one of the reasons we and so many others fought a painful and costly war. finally it would have the transcendently poisonous effect of subverting the respect for international law so long sought and so dearly won. Let there be no mistake, defiance of the ceasefire, cannot, will not, be tolerated. Thank you. 106 Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. And thank you, Mr. Secretary. ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION 2901 AUTHORIZING TRANSFER OF NAVAL VESSELS TO GREECE As the Chair indicated, he would like to take up the resolution submitted by Mr. Fascell and Mr. Broomfield on behalf of the ad- ministration, which authorizes the transfer by lease of four naval vessels to the Government of Greece. As far as the Chair is aware, there is no opposition to this. I intend to put it up for a vote now. Is there any further discussion? Mr. Gilman. Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I support the motion, and I urge its adoption. I move the resolution. Mr. HAMILTON. All in favor of reporting the resolution of the committee will say aye. [A chorus of ayes.] Mr. HAMILTON. Those opposed, no. [N o response.] Mr. HAMILTON. The ayes have it, and the resolution is reported. I thank the Members for their cooperation.‘ We will turn now to questions. U.N. ABILITY TO ENFORCE RESOLUTIONS CONSIDERING RECENT VIOLATIONS AND NONCOMPLIANCE BY IRAQ Gentlemen, we appreciate the testimony. Now as I listened to both of you, what comes across to me first of all is your strongly made point that there are massive violations of the U.N. resolu- tions by Iraq, you used as harsh a language as I have heard I think for a long time from diplomats on these matters. And if I heard you correctly, there is considerable confidence nonetheless in the ability of the United Nations to implement the I'}e1SO%l1iEI0I1S, which all of us agree, call for extraordinary activity by t e . . Is that a fair impression that I have? Mr. BOLTON. I think, Mr. Chairman, that one of the things that has been most impressive has been the unity of purpose of the international community as reflected in the Security Council. And I think that it is that continued unity of purpose that gives us con- fidence that we can continue to support the United Nations in the actions that it has taken. I think that this is a real change from earlier crises that we faced since World War II where international resolve has been strong for a short period of time, or has been demonstrated in reso- lutions that are then promptly ignored. I think that Saddam Hus- sein has done nothing since the end of the war to shake that inter- national resolve. I think that his continued duplicity in the face of his stated willingness to comply with U.N. resolutions is just going to drive him deeper into a hole internationally. Mr. HAMILTON. But, in your testimony, you go beyond the point of the unity of the U.N., which all of us agree has been impressive. 1 See appendix 6. 107 But Mr. Ambassador, you talk about the effectiveness and the professionalism of the U.N. I guess the question is, in the face of this massive violation, this non-cooperation and noncompliance by Iraq, do we have confidence that the United Nations can carry out and implement the resolutions? Ambassador PICKERING. I would like to address that, Mr. Chair- man, if I can. On Monday, the United Nations officials responsible for inspection reported to the Security Council. While I did not take a poll, it was clear that the Council itself was stunned by the revelations that were laid out for it. There was no questioning of either the facts or the conclusions, which were clear to the mem- bers of the Council about the clandestine programs, about the ob- struction, and about the lack of Iraqi cooperation up to that point. I think that this is extremely important to keep in mind. Secondly, I think that the statements of our president have made very clear our own determination in this regard. And it is this kind of combi- nation of factors that obviously was successful in the pursuit by the Security Council and the member states cooperating with Kuwait in the period leading up to January and February. I believe it still exists in the Council. And I believe, particulary in respect to the nuclear program, that it would be a mistake to underestimate that kind of feeling and solidarity. Mr. HAMILTON. So you have confidence in their ability to imple- ment the resolutions? Ambassador PICKERING. I have confidence in the technical ability of the United Nations inspectors to carry out any of the tasks that they are challenged with. And I have confidence in their technical capacity to report back. I also have confidence that the Security Council is prepared to address these issues in a straight up fashion, as it was in the period between August and February. REPORTS OF LACKING PROFESSIONALISM AND EFFECTIVENESS OF U.N. INSPECTION TEAM IN IRAQ Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Secretary, we have had reports that U.N. personnel are not as aggressive in inspecting these suspect sites or in carrying out the tests as they ought to be. They are not sufficiently expert to identify suspicious technologies and the like. In other words, we have had some reports indicating to us that the professionalism and the effectiveness of the United Nations is not as strong as we would like to see it to be. One report was that a U.N. team was in there to make a survey. Well, these resolutions go far beyond a survey. _You have identified in your statement, Mr. Ambassador, what they have to do. It is an exhaustive and tough list to achieve. So that is why I raised the question of your confidence in the United Nations. Ambassador PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, perhaps I could just make a couple of points. The performance of the teams, including the video material and the photographic material which they pro- vided to the Security Council, indicates that they were assiduous, even when physically blocked by Iraqis, in finding ways to escape 108 that blockage and expose Iraqi efforts to try to move material clan- destinely from other areas of the facility that they were inspecting. They took initiative, in fact, to seek vantage points from which they could take photographs. In addition while it is true that the IAEA does not normally have within its inspection teams the ca- pacity to work on all areas of nuclear activities because of its spe- cial focus, and indeed the requirement that it focus especially on safeguard inspections, that was envisaged and compensated for in the resolution. The special commission in assisting and cooperating with the IAEA has recruited and assigned to the IAEA teams indi- viduals with the special skills which the IAEA is not able to pro- vide in order fully to understand all aspects of the nuclear weapons program that Iraq is pursuing. CONFIDENCE IN U.N. ABILITY TO ENFORCE RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Mr. HAMILTON. Does your confidence extend as well to the chem- ical and biological aspects? Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, it does because here in fact the spe- cial commission is totally responsible and has been recruiting widely internationally, from countries including our own, experts completely familiar with the kinds of chemical weapons programs that they expected to find and indeed did find in Iraq. So I think that we can be confident about the technical competence question. I REPORT THAT UNITED STATES BOMBING RAIDS DESTROYED IRAQ S URANI- UM ENRICHMENT INSTALLATIONS BEFORE ANY WEAPONS GRADE MA- TERIAIS WERE PRODUCED Mr. HAMILTON. Now there is a report this morning in the New York Times about the U.N. inspectors. They have concluded ac- cording to their initial report that bombing raids during the Per- sian Gulf War probably destroyed Iraq’s uranium enrichment 1n- stallations before they produced any weapons grade materials. I am quoting here at random through the article. As a result of the inspector's conclusion that the enrichment installations were probably knocked out in the allied raids, the United Nations officials say that the team is likely to send the Security Council a new and more positive report on the Iraqi disclosures. The United Nations officials now say that they know all they need to know about these plants, and are reasonably sure that they hadn't produced any weapons grade enriched uranium by the time the allies destroyed them. In other words, the first optimistic report that we have had for some time. I understand that it is a very new one, maybe not even available to you at this point. What do you know about that report, and do you agree with it? Mr. BOLTON. We have seen the press report that you indicated, Mr. Chairman. There have been wire service reports to the same effect. I think that all that we are able to say at this stage, and I checked this morning with our people responsible for the substance of the work of the special commission, is that I would caution against putting too much reliance on that press report. I think that we need to see more information before we can con- clude that in fact Iraq has now disclosed all that they were sup- posed to. There has been such a repeated series of failures to dis- 109 close fully, that I think all of us have to take any of their subse- quent disclosures with a grain of salt. IRAQI POSSESSION OF WEAPONS GRADE MATERIAL Mr. HAMILTON. Do we believe that they have weapon grade mate- rials now in sufficient quantity? Mr. BOLTON. We know in fact, Mr. Chairman, that they have weapons grade material, which has now been repossessed. But that was material, highly enriched fuel, provided by other countries under safeguarded programs. Mr. HAMILTON. And fully accounted for now? Mr. BOLTON. Fully accounted for now, and in the possession under IAEA seals. So we believe that part is protected. The other question is what did they produce. We have seen a half a kilo, or the U.N. has seen half a kilo of material which they claim to have produced. The question is what don’t we know. And that is a much more difficult question to arrive at an answer to. But we know that they have capability, in the machinery that we have seen, to produce at least something. But all the technical judgments about that are not in yet. Mr. HAMILTON. I am going to move pretty quickly, because unfor- tunately, I have to leave this morning. I want to ask two or three more questions. UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION TO LIFT IRAQ; SANCTIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN AND DEBT-PAYING PURPOSES With regard to the lifting of the sanctions, the Secretary-Gener- al, as you put it in your statement, Mr. Ambassador, has recom- mended that IAEA be permitted to resume the oil sales, so that they could use the proceeds for scrapping the weapons and for other purposes in compliance with the resolution. Prince Aga Khan recommended a lifting for humanitarian purposes. Does the United States support those recommendations? Mr. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, we have under consideration a number of options for using a renewed flow of Iraqi oil revenues to meet the needs of the compensation fund of the special commission, including possible humanitarian relief efforts. They are being dis- cussed with coalition partners now and have been this week in London. I do not have a report back on what the reaction has been. But we expect to be moving fairly quickly once we get the re- sponses from our other coalition partners. Mr. HAMILTON. The problem for you is making sure that the pro- ceeds are used for genuine humanitarian purposes and for payment of debts, but not given over to the Iraqi government for distribu- tion to those that they want to favor, is that correct? Mr. BOLTON. There are basically three areas that require very strict controls, Mr. Chairman. The first is the question of what ex- actly the total proceeds from the sale of petroleum would be. And there are a number of different ways in which that can be ascer- tained, which in fact will be considered by the governing board of the compensation fund in Geneva next week. That is issue one, how much money there actually is. 110 Issue number two is what that money is then used for. Whether it is used to purchase food, medicine, and other humanitarian sup- plies, or whether it is diverted for other possible purchases. And there are a number of ways operationally in which that can be de- termined as well. And then the third question is if in fact the revenues are used to purchase food and medicine and other humanitarian needs, wheth- er those supplies are in fact distributed to vulnerable populations in Iraq, and not diverted for political purposes by the regime. MEANS OF DISTRIBUTION FOR FOOD AND MEDICINE PURCHASED WITH ASSETS FROM LIFTED SANCTIONS Mr. HAMILTON. We have pretty well established that we cannot trust Saddam Hussein, and we cannot trust him to distribute this stuff, right? Mr. BOLTON. I think that is a fair statement. Mr. HAMILTON. And that means that you have got to put into place some kind of a system for distribution of the food. You have got a big country, and you have got millions of people. How are you going to do that, I mean what kind of a distribution system can you put in to assure that the food, medicines, and pro- ceeds get to where you want them to be? Mr. BOLTON. Well, that is, as you say, a very daunting task in a country of 18 million people, assuming food distribution mecha- nisms will be something that will be a very major challenge for the international community. And as I mentioned earlier, we do have a number of possible options that are under discussion. But it will be Something that will tax the abilities of the U.N. We want to be very sure that we have either an effective distri- bution system where the supplies are not diverted or we have suffi- ciently strict and controlled monitoring, so that whatever system is used using, Iraqis themselves, the food is not diverted or otherwise used for political purposes. Ambassador PICKERING. We face a special problem in Iraq, as you know, Mr. Chairman because I think that roughly 70 percent of the food is currently distributed by government organizations, and 100 percent is carefully supervised by the government. It would be ideal if we could find private sector means for distribut- ing food, as well as using international organizations and voluntary organizations. But you have put your finger on a daunting task. The objective here is, if we do have to move in this direction, to ensure that Saddam and his regime do not derive the benefits from it in any way possible. This means maintaining all of the funding in the hands of the U.N. certainly, which can be done at the beginning of the process. But secondly, we must try to assure to the greatest extent possi- ble that there are no diversions of food. Thus far, we have seen, for example, attempts to divert food from the World Food Program. In- terestingly enough, when they told the Iraqis that they would stop distribluting food until that diverted food was returned, it was re- turne . 111 Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think that it is possible and practical for the U.N. to deliver this food and medicine to prevent malnutrition and disease? Ambassador PICKERING. I think that it is possible with a broad degree of international cooperation. But I could not sit here and tell you that I think every pound of it will certainly get only to the neediest. I think that there will be some diversions and some slip- pages. There always are in these programs, and we know that they take place. I would think, however, that the effort now, in examining the op- tions, is to try to design the system best equipped to do that with the most efficiency and the least diversion. UNITED STATES AUTHORITY UNDER CURRENT RESOLUTIONS AND LEGAL PROVISIONS TO USE FORCE TO ASSURE IRAQI COMPLIANCE TO U.N. RES- OLUTIONS Mr. HAMILTON. A final question that I have, although I have a lot of questions, is with regard to the use of force. Is it your impres- sion now that the United States under current resolutions and le- galities has the authority to use force to assure compliance, or is it necessary to get additional support? Mr. BOLTON. The President has said on two occasions that he thinks that the existing resolutions do give us sufficient authority. Mr. HAMILTON. Can you point to the language that gives us that authority? I do not want to put you on the spot, but maybe you can furnish it to us at a later time. Mr. BOLTON. Well, I can say that for instance Iraq’s actions in regard to the nuclear weapons related materials constitutes serious violations of the terms and conditions of the cease fire agreement which threatens international peace and security. And as the President has said, that violation of existing resolutions does give us authority for the use of force. Mr. HAMILTON. Are you considering an additional resolution in the United Nations to buttress that? Mr. BOLTON. That has been discussed. It has been discussed in London this week during the course of the summit. There is no final decision on that at this point. Mr. HAMILTON. Could you supply for us, Mr. Bolton, at your con- venience, the legal brief in support of that position? Mr. BOLTON. We would be pleased to. [The information follows:] The issue of the authority of the United States and other states to employ force to restore peace and security to the region and to ensure compliance with UNSC reso- lutions involves an analysis of the United Nations Charter, Security Council Resolu- tions 678, 687, any other relevant Security Council resolutions, and any relevant principles of customary international law in light of the factual circumstances pre- vailing at the time such action is under consideration. As the President has stated, the existing Security Council resolutions provide authority to use force in certain circumstances. (Note: Since this hearing, the UN Security Council adopted UNSC Resolution 707, which condemns Iraq’s violations of Resolution 687 with respect to its nuclear, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile provisions. Also, on August 2, 1991, the Senate debate and passed an amendment to the National De- fense Authorization Act expressing support for the use of all necessary means, in- cluding the use of force, to achieve the goals of Resolution 687.) 112 _ Mr. HAMILTON. And it is correct that the permanent five of the fU.N.9Security Council support the U.S. interpretation on the use of orce. Mr. BOLTON. That is still under discussion. But clearly, as I think you saw in the run-up to the G—7 summit, that the coalition part- ners certainly support that. Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Bereuter. Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony. What you have presented here today is very important to share with the American public and with the world at large. IRAQI IMPEDIMENT TO U.N. PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN SHIITE MARSH AREAS Following what the Chairman has already alluded to, we have a willful and widely distributed set of impediments that Saddam Hussein is putting in place against the United Nations actions. In short, he is thumbing his nose at the United Nations wherever pos- s1 e. Let me ask about the example that you used, Mr. Bolton, about the U.N. guards being asked to leave the marsh area. Did those U.N. guards leave? Mr. BOLTON. Yes, in fact, they did. We believe that they are back in ‘Basra now, which is where the Iraqi authorities had asked them to go. UNITED STATES INFORMATION CONCERNING IRAQI VIOLATIONS BEING PROVIDED TO THE UNITED NATIONS Mr. BEREUTER. It seems to me that eventually we have to have a confrontation, and the sooner the better. Otherwise, the kind of violations and the kind of actions by Saddam Hussein will only ac- celerate. The United States has certain types of information that only the United States by special collections means can provide the United Nations. Otherwise, we would not know about some of the viola- tions that have taken place, for example in the nuclear program. Does the United States provide that routinely and in a timely fashion, the United States to the United Nations? Ambassador PICKERING. Yes. We are in extremely close touch with the United Nations. And we, like all others, have been invited to provide all of the information that we can in order to make sure that the inspection teams are fully effective. DIVERSION OF WFP ASSISTANCE BY IRAQI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO BAATH PARTY MEMBERS AND SADDAM’S FAMILY Mr. BEREUTER. We have heard reports, in fact one of the two of you alluded to it, that the food stuffs provided under the World Food Program to Iraq for humanitarian purposes have been divert- ed by government officials to the Baath party members, and to members of Saddam Hussein’s extended family. If those reports are accurate, to what extent are they taking place, and what is the essence of the food that is being provided that is being diverted? 113 Mr. BOLTON. There is no question that there have been diver- sions. The World Food Program, since the end of the hostilities, has delivered approximately 28,000 tons of food to Iraq, of which they believe approximately 3300 tons was diverted the standard Iraqi distribution system, largely to be distributed in areas politically supportive of Saddam Hussein. What the World Food Program did, as Ambassador Pickering said, was to suspend food deliveries to the Ministry of Social Af- fairs and Labor, which was the Iraqi government institution which diverted the food. And it has said that it will not supply additional resources to that ministry unless there is a full accounting for what happened to the food diverted, and until the diverted food is replaced. The World Food Program has, however, continued to deliver food directly or through Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies to vulnera- ble groups. I think that their reaction is correct: not to suspend all deliveries but to continue to provide aid to vulnerable populations through non-governmental channels. But I can tell you that the President has addressed directly, and has instructed us to raise as well, this Iraqi diversion in the sanc- tions committee, which in fact we did. It is this sort of thing that makes us very worried about the unrestricted provision of even hu- manitarian assistance, because Saddam Hussein has proven that he will use food and medicine as a political weapon. PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING IRAQI ASSISTANCE DIVERSION Mr. BEREUTER. And as we have that malnutrition or starvation, and as we have disease rampant, unless this information about his diversion, and about the impediments that he has placed in the way is made available to the public of the world at large, it is going to be used against the United Nations and its member countries that are taken against Iraq. INTENTIONAL DIVERSION OF FOOD AID FROM CERTAIN GROUPS IN IRAQ Now do you have any evidence that food at this point is being iiivegted intentionally from certain groups or from certain parts of raq. Mr. BOLTON. I think that there is clear evidence that food sup- plies, medical supplies and the like are being concentrated basical- ly in the Suni areas of Iraq, those areas that are and have histori- cally been politically supportive of the Baathist regime. There are clear indications from a number of the survey missions that have gone in that conditions in the southern part of Iraq, the Shia areas, are particularly bad. In the north—because of Oper- ation Provide Comfort and the efforts of the international commu- nity—things are relatively better. But we do question, for instance, what will happen in the north in the wake of the withdrawal of the coalition forces. The rationing system that was set up was established when the Kurdish refugees were in the mountains, and so their access to the normal or routine Iraqi food distribution system is at least open to 114 question. We hope that they will be brought into it, but it is some- thing that we continue to worry about. INSTRUMENTATION WITHIN THE U.N. TO DISTRIBUTE FOOD AND MEDICINE AID WITHIN A RECIPIENT COUNTRY Mr. BEREUTER. As you gentlemen may know, I am concerned that we do not have in place an instrumentality within the United Nations for peacekeeping and for internal distribution of food and medical supplies within a country, if called upon to do that. You, Ambassador Pickering, in your exchange with Chairman Hamilton talked about the extent to which food is distributed by the government. In the case of Iraq it was supervised totally by the government. That is a particular problem. Is there any precedent for large scale independent U.N. distribu- tion of humanitarian food stuffs inside a recipient country that we can use if necessary to replace the existing system? Ambassador PICKERING. I would say this, Mr. Bereuter. There are a couple of questions that are tied up in that. First, with re- spect to your last, I think that there is probably no precedent that involves the U.N. totally and alone. But after all, what we are talk- ing about in terms of the U.N. is a collection of specialized agencies and funds. And there has been precedent for those people taking a fairly serious role in that regard. But generally, it has been seen as an international cooperative program, earlier in the Sahel, and later in Ethiopia and other places. It does, however, in my view in no way exclude the possibil- ity, particularly if the U.N. is put in charge of the funds, which is the direction of present thinking. The expenditure of those funds could be subject to full down-the-line supervision to the greatest extent possible. It may not be 100 percent perfect, but it certainly can be a fairly strong effort. The other important point I think is to recognize that this is a new venture for the U.N. in terms of bringing all of this together. And there has been extreme concern expressed in New York and elsewhere that the U.N. has not in the past been well equipped to undertake a kind of fully coordinated and fully integrated oper- ation of this magnitude. So there are now plans and ideas being advanced to try to rectify that as part of a general reform of the U.N.’s capacities in this regard. I think that is the good news. The bad news is obviously it has not all taken place yet, and it will tax the resources. But I do not think that given the need for the humanitarian as- sistance and the importance of avoiding diversion that at this stage that we could walk away. I think that it is important that this issue be looked at and the options explored. The U.N. can coopt and work with a wide number of other orga- nizations, and it has private voluntary organizations and others. Even the private sector, I would suggest once again, should be looked at as a way to try to avoid some kind of mass diversion by government resources in Iraq. - : J \ Y 115 U.N. REFORM FOCUSING ON ELECTION OF OVERALL COORDINATOR AND RESPONSE TO DISASTER RELIEF SITUATIONS Mr. BOLTON. Mr. Bereuter, if I could add one point to that. We had pressed very hard early on in the crisis involving the Kurds for the Secretary-General to select someone who could act as an overall coordinator and director of the U.N. effort to avoid duplica- tion and overlap. We welcome his appointment of Prince Sadruddin as the executive delegate for the relief effort. We have viewed his activities as an exercise in what we call the unitary U.N. concept—getting the diverse parts of the U.N. system to work together and to cooperate. But I think that we all recog- nize that there is a lot more work to do on that. And that is why you will see in the political statement of the G-7 summit leaders that they have focused on making the U.N. more responsive in dis- aster relief situations. And as Ambassador Pickering said, as we begin the process to elect a new Secretary-General, we are very interested in an overall look at U.N. reform, and specifically focusing on disaster relief ef- orts. Mr. BEREUTER. I am glad to hear about that new focus. I think that it is appropriate that we have to learn something from this. We are undoubtedly going to have more and more examples of where this kind of concerted delivery of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping is necessary within countries. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. . Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Levine. Mr. LEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I am sorry that I was not here to hear your opening statements, although I have leafed through them. And there are really three questions that I have for each of you. POINT AT WHICH FORCE IS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN IRAQI COMPLIANCE TO U.N. RESOLUTIONS Ambassador Pickering, it certainly seems to me that Saddam Hussein is essentially saying both to the United States and to the United Nations I dare you to enforce the sanctions, and I dare you to obtain compliance. He is doing everything that he possibly can to make it more difficult, and again to defy the will of the interna- tional community. I do not quite know what the options are. I mean I guess I do know what the options are. But I would be interested in your view as to at what point the international community of the United States has no choice but to use force in order to obtain the compli- anceéhat Saddam has promised, but that he continually refuses to provi e. Ambassador PICKERING. If you would like, I will go ahead and do these one by one. I think essentially your conclusion is right. Al- though we have seen what could best be looked at in an oscillo- scope as a kind of sine curve of Saddam’s reactions. At times, he appears stupidly to defy. I say stupidly, because I believe it is stupid to think that you can get away with it with the internation- al community, the United States, and the Security Council. 117 The one suggestion that I have heard for obtaining some humani- tarian assistance, which does not play into Saddam’s hands, is the notion that the international community force essentially Saddam to export oil, and then implement through their own mechanisms a humanitarian relief program by taking the resources from Iraqi oil and dispensing those resources through international mechanisms to those Iraqis who need the help. Is this something that is being considered? Ambassador PICKERING. Yes. That is essentially what we had been talking about, both John Bolton and I, in our testimony. We are studying all of the various options. As you recognize, they are difficult areas. One of which is the kind of downstream following of the distribution of the assistance to assure against massive or even slight diversion, I would say. These alternatives are being looked at as well as the fact that if there is oil income being generated, then there are other activities undertaken by the United Nations including the Special Commis- sion, which the U.N. has decided that Iraq should fund. And there- fore, it would make sense at least to consider including it in the funding pot that might be controlled by the United Nations rather than by Saddam. So these are all ideas that are out on the table, and they are being looked at. I must say that I have been hearing from my col- leagues in New York quite a bit of interest and indeed support for these ideas on a broad basis. Because they recognize that the hu- manitarian and other needs need to be met now. U.N. INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO AVOID SADDAM’S DIVERSION Mr. LEVINE. I assume that there would be an assumption that the U.N. or some international entity needs to administer this itself rather than allow the administration to be in any way con- trolled or directed by Saddam Hussein. Ambassador PICKERING. I think that is fundamental. Mr. BOLTON. There are a number of options that we could follow in terms of actually implementing this program, but it has been covered over in London at very high levels, as to exactly what the modalities would be. , I think that we can say that whatever the modalities turn out to be or whatever the specifics are, that there are two principles that we should keep in mind. The first principle is that there is simply no question but that the United States will fulfill its humanitarian obligations as it always does. The second principle is that we will not permit resources to be diverted by Saddam Hussein for political purposes. Those two principles are fundamental, and I believe they will be carried out. Mr. LEVINE. Good. I was not in the room when you testified to that effect earlier, and I am very pleased to hear it. I just have one other question. FOCUS AND PROVISIONS OF POST-WAR COMPENSATION Mr. Bolton, I was leafing through your testimony. And I saw on page three and four your reference to the compensation commis- 118 sion. And one area that I have been interested in, and I know a number of us on the Hill and I believe in the administration as well have been interested in since the war, is who will be compen- sated. And in particular, whether the compensation commission will be considering compensation to Israeli victims and to Israel for the suffering that they incurred as a result of Iraqi scud missile at- tacks. Mr. BOLTON. We are presently considering a number of adminis- trative and organizational questions for the compensation fund. I think I mentioned earlier that the governing council of the fund, which will consist of the fifteen permanent representatives in Geneva corresponding to the members of the Security Council, will meet to go over these questions. We have a number of issues. Certainly, anything that is covered by Resolution 687 is entitled to be considered for compensation. We have questions for instance on how the claims will be aggregated. The resolution calls on member states to aggregate the claims. We have questions on the priority in which the claims would be paid. Certainly, there are strong arguments for Kuwaiti claims to be paid early, given the enormous destruction in that country. But in fairness, there are also the claims of relatively small claimants. And I am thinking of Palestinians and others who were displaced by the Iraqis--where the total value of the claims may be relative- ly small monetarily, but because of the disruption in their lives and other things they have a compelling argument that they should be paid early as well. As I say, the smaller claimants. This is one of the reasons, if I may say so, that we took the very strong position that we felt that the amount of the ceiling on Iraqi oil funds to be paid into the compensation fund should be fifty per- cent. We think that the earlier that the claims are paid and the sooner the people are recompensed, the fairer the situation will be. There is the old saying justice delayed is justice denied. We want these people recompensed as soon as we can. And that is why we are encouraging the work of the compensation fund to move for- ward quickly. Ambassador PICKERING. If I may make one point on that. I think maybe I will come to the answer of your direct question. When we drafted the resolution, we specifically said direct injury loss or damage. I cannot conceive of anything more direct than either having your house blown up or being injured by a scud attack. And as a result, it is difficult, although I am not called upon to inter- pret this, and John was perfectly right that we have to set up the mechanisms for doing it, but it would be very difficult to conceive of the fact that such a claim would not be meritorious at least-in terms of its submission. "i ‘ And of course, it is up to the Israeli government to aggregate those claims. I have seen no one suggest that there is a bar to any government coming forward with claims to the commission once it gets operating. 119 IMPROVEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS AS A RESULT OF SIMILAR ISRAELI-SAUDI COMPENSATION CLAIMS FROM IRAQ Mr. LEVINE. One of the interesting aspects of it to me would be that the Israeli citizens and Saudi citizens would be essentially in the same situation in dealing with the Iraqis. And it would certain- ly be a new approach to Middle East relationships for both the Is- raelis and the Saudis in a somewhat like minded fashion to receive similar compensation from the Iraqis. And I believe that it would be appropriate in both instances. Mr. BOLTON. As with much of what we do these days, this is an- other unprecedented result of the cooperation that has resulted from the Gulf War. COMMENDATION OF AMBASSADORIAL EFFORTS OF WITNESSES Mr. LEVINE. Let me just conclude by commending both of you. I have watched with admiration, Ambassador Pickering, as you have conducted yourself as our representative in the United Nations throughout this entire period just magnificently. That comes as no surprise to me in light of having watched you in your ambassadori- al positions around the globe do that before. But you have given me, and I know other Members of Congress and my constituents, a great deal of price as our representative in the United Nations. And I want to compliment both you and Mr. Bolton on your tes- timony and on the direction in which you have indicated that the administration is headed both in terms of humanitarian issues and in not countenancing further defiance, duplicity, and deception by Saddam Hussein. Thank you. Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you. Mr. JOHNSTON [presiding]. Mr. Smith. Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our two distinguished panelists, Ambassador Pickering and Mr. Bolton, to our committee. I join my colleagues in the accolades that you are receiving this morning, because you are truly America’s front line team in providing that effective leader- ship at the United Nations on behalf of the President and the American people which we have come to expect. It is always good to see that the leadership, indeed, is there. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNICEF MEDICAL TEAM CON- CERNING IRAQI CHILDREN SITUATION AND U.S. FINANCIAL AID DONA- TION TO UNICEF I have a number of questions. First, to make a brief observation, I think there is very broad agreement that Iraq’s self-imposed nightmare continues to have its most devastating impact on that country’s most vulnerable population, their children. Could you summarize for the committee what were the essential findings and recommendations of the UNICEF medical fact-finding team which spent some days in Iraq? Were they able to assess the number of children who were at risk, how many children have died? Is there any action planned which they have conceived to al- leviate that suffering? 120 Finally, it is my understanding based on submissions to this com- mittee that in May we obligated $3 million to UNICEF. What is the status of that check? Mr. BOLTON. Yes, that has been transmitted to UNICEF. The team that went in, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, found difficult conditions, particular in southern Iraq, that were endemic. That is to say they have been in existence for a long time—that there were cases of malnutrition and growth stunting not caused by the Gulf War; but caused more by long- term and continuing distribution policies pursued by Saddam Hussein. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan will be in this country in the next couple of days to present his findings to the Sanctions Committee, and we expect to begin to move along the lines that Ambassador Pickering and I mentioned earlier today. And I would also mention that, at Secretary Baker’s request, I met for two hours on Monday with Elliot Richardson, who accompanied Prince Sadruddin on his trip. We had a very extensive discussion of what their findings were and what the modalities of our provision of our assistance might be. So I think we are making progress. We are hoping to get a report from London on what our coalition partners have indicated and then with that in mind, taking their comments into account, we will be ready to move expeditiously. Mr. SMITH. For the record, could you provide us with some of those essentials as to how many children are at risk just so we have a better gauge of the numbers of children who have died or are at risk of dying or being seriously affected by this endemic problem that you have cited? Mr. BOLTON. Sure, be happy to. [The information follows:] It is difficult, if not impossible, to provide a single statistic. The population of Iraq is over 18 million. Half or more of the population is under the age of eighteen. The number of infants and children under the age of five is less certain. Not all of these children are at risk, nor is the degree of risk the same for all. One study predicted 170,000 deaths among children under 5, double the mortality rate before the war. What is certain is that the threat to Iraqi children is real, and that it is due, in large part, to the policies of the Iraqi government. Current planning is meant to address this problem. REQUEST OF PRINCE SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN FOR A FOOD DISTRIBUTION CENTER IN SOUTHERN IRAQ Mr. SMITH. You point out, Mr. Bolton, on page 12 that Prince Sa- druddin Aga Khan insisted that a food distribution center be estab- lished in southern Iraq. Could you tell us what the status of that request is at this particular time? Mr. BOL'r0N. Well, he had begun, he and his team had begun to do that and to position U.N. people in a U.N. humanitarian center in the southern part of Iraq. But recently they were ordered by Iraqi authorities to return to the city of Basra where they are now. We had been quite concerned about this. We want to discuss this with Prince Sadruddin when he comes to the United States. Am- bassador Abram has discussed it with him in Geneva already. We think it's clear that the Iraqis need to understand that they have to abide by the terms of the applicable resolutions, in this case, 121 Resolution 688, and their own memorandum of understanding that they had reached with Sadruddin earlier in this process. We are very disturbed by this evidence of a lack of Iraqi coopera- tion, and, as I say, we intend to consult with the Prince when he arrives here. U.N. MONITORING EFFORTS OF THE END USE OF IRAQI U.N. SANCTION COMMITTEE APPROVED IMPORTS Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Pickering, in your testimony you have indicated that the U.N. Sanctions Committee has routinely ap- proved applications to allow Iraq to import food products, water pu- rification systems and the like. Could you tell us, and I think you began to answer this in answer to some of my colleague's question, how is the U.N. monitoring the end use of these commodities? Ambassador PICKERING. The U.N. does not have the capability to monitor in a significant and serious way the end use. As you know, we discussed just a few minutes ago diversion of World Food Pro- gram resources. I must say I fear that additional resources might be diverted, or have been diverted probably is a better way to state it. Some of our thinking for the future should focus on the terms of the incongruency, if I can phrase it that way, that the world chari- table community should now in fact have to foot the bill when the Iraqis themselves, through oil exports, could pay. The notion that the U.N. could, through capturing these resources and using them for humanitarian assistance, assure a better program against diver- sion is, I think, a real advantage of looking in this direction, and it has, I think, positive benefits. You might even say it has negative consequences for Saddam if he is able to divert less food in the future to his party and to his friends as he has done around his home town of Tikrit and so on. So we need to look creatively at this process to see whether in fact we can, by moving in this direction, achieve our humanitarian objectives and at the same time achieve our objectives of diplomati- cally and politically continuing totally to isolate Saddam on the one hand and put financial pressure against his regime on the other. I think all of these are within the range of possibility. But in answer to your question under the present set of circum- stances, there is not a great deal of monitoring that can be done, particularly of commercial sales. In fact, they go to the Iraqi gov- ernment agency that has the money to purchase them. There is a final point that I mentioned in the testimony but would like to bring home. For several months we have insisted in the Sanctions Committee that there should be a full accounting by Iraq of its reserves and funds available to purchase this humanitar- ian assistance so that in fact we do not move in directions which tend to provide additional benefits to the Iraqi regime. I would like to see us remain strongly committed to that particular principle and, in any effort we make to move ahead here, to continue to insist on full disclosure to the greatest extent possible. Mr. SMITH. Thank you for that answer. That would move us in the right direction and I think there would be unanimous support for that resolution of this problem. 122 REFUGEE STATUS OF KURDS WHO PROVIDED ASSISTANCE TO THE ALLIED RELIEF EFFORT AND WHO WERE AIR LIF'I‘ED OUT OF IRAQ I have one final question I would like to pose, Mr. Chairman. We have been contacted by Refugee International concerning 11 specif- ic cases of Kurds who provided substantial assistance to the allied relief effort in northern Iraq, and these individuals were air lifted out of Iraq when the allied forces left because their lives were deemed to be in danger. However, I have been advised that there is confusion as to whether or not these individuals will be given refugee status and permitted to come to the United States. I know that this is some- thing you may have to respond to later but I would ask you, par- ticularly Mr. Bolton, if you could look into this and provide us with some background. Mr. BOLTON. Yes. Congressman Smith, I just learned of this prob- lem this morning, but we would be happy to look into it and pro- vide a complete answer as to their status as soon as possible. Mr. SMITH. I would appreciate that very much. Thank you both, Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Bolton. [The information follows:] Ten “cases” totalling approximately fifty people who were of special interest to U.S. Forces were airlifted to Ankara. They were among a total of approximately seventy persons of special interest to coalition members. They are due to be inter- viewed by UNHCR to determine refugee status and eligibility for resettlement in mid-August in Ankara. Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Bereuter, I have a series of questions. Would you like to play through or Mr. BEREUTER. No, go right ahead. INTELLIGENCY COMMUNITY MISINFORMATION WITH REGARDS TO IRAQ,S URANIUM ENRICHMENT CAPABILITIES Mr. JOHNSTON. Okay. Ambassador, I am looking at your testimo- ny here and you have outlined it so it is very readable and present- able. But on page 3, you say, “Iraq now admits having a secret pro- gram for uranium enrichment,” and you describe the electromag- netic isotope separation, EMIS. Well, that is something that we had back in 1940. There were a series of congressional hearings back in December and January with the intelligence community open to the public before the House Armed Services Committee, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, before this committee. Each one saying that the Iraqis had no capacity for nuclear weapons for a decade, and yet they are now using a procedure that we have been notified that the Iraqis now have capacity to produce bombs right away. Where did the intelligence community break down in what they know now than what they knew then? Ambassador PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that I do not have to speak for the intelligence community on this issue, but I am sure that they will be delighted to provide you with a com- plete and full response to that question. What does seem to be extremely interesting and important to know is that among the bombing targets, as is implied in this 123 morning’s statement, were some of these large plants, and I do not know precisely the rationale and reasoning that went behind it, but it was clear we suspected at least some nuclear activity there. Secondly, I do not know what went behind the tenure to weapon judgment that was briefed and made to you, but I do think that it is fair to say that the degree of Iraqi activity in the EMIS area, at least as we discovered it through the U.N. inspections, was more than I had been briefed on in terms of what I knew in New York about the Iraqi program, and we were kept pretty clearly_ up to ate. So it does seem to us that that was perhaps an aspect of Iraqi nuclear activities that was not all crystal clear to us as the process went on ahead, but it is clear that we knew something important was going on in the plant areas because some of those plant areas were in fact bombed and some of the interesting pictures brought back by the U.N. inspectors show the full extent of the bomb damage. The difficult that we had was that the Iraqis did not allow access to those plants until they had moved a lot of the machinery out, so that it is not a complete look at it yet. Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes. Mr. Bereuter. INFORMATION CONCERNING IRAQI ABILITY TO PRODUCE A TRUCK DELIVERY-SIZED NUCLEAR WEAPON Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you for yielding, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman is right in his comments, but perhaps I should try to clarify the issue. The problems in deliverable nuclear weapons are miniaturization and the delivering mode. I can say as a Member of the Intelligence Committee, we were told in open ses- sions that in terms of delivery, a truck delivery-sized nuclear weapon could be available in 12 to 15 months. It seems to me that projection is easily now achievable; that the Intelligence Communi- ty was right, in fact, even not knowing what was available. So they were correct to say that some sort of crude truck-delivered nuclear weapon could be ready in 12 to 15 months. Ambassador PICKERING. I think that is certainly right, because if there had been diversion of the safeguarded nuclear material, that probably could have been achieved and I think we were looking at that as the shortest route. That probably still is the shortest route because of the doubts about whether they have been able yet to ac- complish large-scale enrichment. There are serious doubts about that, but there is no certainty. Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes, because again I can remember Mr. Webster making a statement that the IAEA had inspected them and the only thing the Iraqis were doing with their uranium was for peace- ful purposes, and now you can get a procedure out of Popular Me- chanics, you know, which is available to the world, to produce, and now you say there is enough uranium to produce three to four bombs a year. PUBLIC HEALTH SITUATION IN IRAQ Let me ask some other specific questions about Iraq today. If you could tell us what is the public health situation there in Iraq. 125 Now, as you have heard during the testimony, we are talking about a substantial U.N. presence to monitor the distribution of humanitarian food and medicine shipments, if that comes about. So I would expect that that number could go up fairly substantially. Mr. JOHNSTON. You do not know when they will have the 500 guards in northern Iraq? Mr. BOLTON. It is projected within the next couple of weeks, I be- lieve, but that will be something we will want to discuss with Prince Sadruddin when he is here. MOVEMENT OF U.N. FORCES LOCATED IN NORTHERN IRAQ Mr. JOHNSTON. You do not know. Can they be easily moved around the country or are they nailed to northern Iraq? Mr. BOLTON. No, they have requested and we have supplied jeeps and communications equipment and so far they have been concen- trated in the north of Iraq because that is where the principal problem has been, the movement of the Kurds and the other mi- norities in the north out of the mountains down to their original places of residence. But it is intended that they will be dispersed throughout the country. Mr. JOHNSTON. Do these guards have the authority to move or do they have to come back and get authority? Mr. BOLTON. No, they have, under Resolution 688, full authority to do their work. And in addition to that, the Iraqis have agreed to it in the memorandum of understanding they reached with Prince Sadruddin some weeks ago. PAYMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN IRAQ Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me shift back to you, Ambassador. Who is paying for this? Ambassador PICKERING. The sum total of our contributions al- ready is about $450 million including Operation Provide Comfort. What has been requested by Prince Sadruddin is also in the neigh- borhood of $450 million. It is not the same $450 million. He has now received about $220 million of that, and we have contributed roughly a third, almost $70 million in cash and in-kind contributions. So there is a shortfall. These are voluntary contribu- tions. Prince Sadruddin has recommended that we have probably reached the limits of the international community to pay for this in voluntary terms and thus we need to go to the Iraqis, who have the capacity to pay through their oil revenues, and study the possi- bility of using their funds. Certainly the Security Council and other members of the U.N. have felt for a long time that this was a le- gitimate charge for the Iraqis to pay as long as they were capable of doing it. So we are now studying those possibilities. PROJECTED COST FOR UNIKOM FORCES ON IRAQI-KUWAITI BORDER Mr. JOHNSTON. We have four areas there. Do you know what the annual cost, projected cost is going to be for the UNIKOM forces on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border? Ambassador PICKERING. Well, the UNIKOM force cost initially was in the neighborhood of $60 million, but that included double the current size because it included infantry companies which have 50-323 O - 92 - 5 127 Ambassador PICKERING. But I would want to stress to you that to immediately assign all of these to that kind of accounting would be, in our view, a serious policy mistake. Iraq is capable of doing it and we are now searching out the ways to do it. We, of course, have been seeking voluntary contributions to pro- vide the bridge funding until in fact we can find ways to tap Iraqi resources, but the major effort is in the direction, as the Council has decided, for Iraq to pay for the major share of what you have described. Mr. JOHNSTON. Okay. Mr. Leach? I did not see you come in. PROFICIENCY OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE IN INTERPRETING NUCLEAR POTENTIAL OF IRAQ Mr. LEACH. Well, it seems to me there are two great kind of issues before us right at the moment in Iraq. One is very humani- tarian and one is relatively forceful, involving two different subject matters. I would like to start with the first and simply stress that I think from the Congress’s perspective there would be no restraint whatsoever in Executive Branch discretion when it comes to this issue of nuclear potential in Iraq. In thinking about the Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf, in post- mortems has made some observations regarding things that did not go perfectly as well as things that seem to have gone well, in most of the postmortems, both of his and outsiders, is the judgment that operations went rather exceptionally. The intelligence was less than perfect. Interestingly on the intelligence issue, and there are many as- pects of it, both in how the war was conducted and why the war came about in the first place, we seem to have gone all over the place on whether Iraq had a nuclear weapons capacity to the view that it really didn’t, to views suddenly today that it really does. One of the implications of that is, and I would like your judg- ment as a professional diplomat, Mr. Pickering, how do you rate American intelligence in this? It appears that what has become suddenly in the forefront of concern in the last six weeks involves a perspective that was not known 15 weeks ago, or 30 weeks ago, or two years ago. Do you think our intelligence gets very high marks? Ambassador PICKERING. I would say this, that for a period of three years, 10 years ago, I was intimately involved in the nonpro- liferation efforts of the then current administration. Our intelli- gence, with respect to the activities many countries were undertak- ing around the world, was the best available, and I think the best available in the world. It was a source of a great many very impor- tant actions that we took to slow down and try to block the prolif- eration of nuclear weapons in particular. So I would not want to malign our intelligence capacity in that regard. With respect to what we knew about this one technique that the Iraqis were obviously highly advanced in developing, the electro- magnetic isotope separation, I would want to have you receive a briefing from the community about precisely what they knew. I would not want to sit up here and criticize or say things, particu- 128 larly without having available to me the kind of material that they had. I just do not know the answer to that particular question. I do know that we knew a great deal about many aspects of Iraqi work in this area and we were very concerned about it. The Presi- dent’s remarks at the time of the fighting and General Schwarz- kopf’ s public focus on it, are sufficient to encourage me that we were enough concerned—we were seriously targeting this program and knew a great deal about it. But precisely when and where and how I would really think is the product of a much better Mr. LEACH. I appreciate that, and this committee has received a good number of briefings on that subject and, frankly, they have not been enormously consistent. Beyond that, I do not want to com- nent further. But my own personal kind of appraisal of the fall build up to the war was that Iraqi nuclear capabilities were kind of a surprise. American public opinion polls indicated enormous concern about the potential of nuclear weapons, and upon that the administration then hinged certain actions, and it appeared to be public opinion polls that drove concern rather than intelligence that drove con- cern. And whether that is the case or not, it certainly seemed sit- ting from this perspective to have been the circumstance. Now, it ends up that it was correct. Ambassador PICKERING. I would just add the last time I was ac- tively involved in this was 10 years ago or a little less. This pro- gram was of intense concern. We followed it with a great deal of care. Mr. LEACH. Sure. Ambassador PICKERING. There was, I think, no misjudgment on our part that what Saddam was busy acquiring in those days and what he has acquired since was devoted toward obtaining a weap- ons capability. Mr. LEACI-I. But very little knowledge of where this was happen- ing or what technology was being employed. These are all new de- velopments that are of spring’s duration rather than of a decade knowledge. But having said that let me say the concern of the American public with nuclear proliferation is real. The evidence regarding Iraq appears to be powerful. The discretion the administration has is very wide. And I think from a congressional perspective you will get very little contrary kind of reflection of view. NATURE AND VALUE OF FROZEN IRAQI ASSETS IN THE WEST Having said that, on the humanitarian side can you tell the com- mittee what is the nature and the totality of frozen Iraqi assets in the West? What sums of money are we talking about? What sums of value? Ambassador PICKERING. Well, I think with respect to the U.S., we are talking in the neighborhood, I think, of a half a billion dol- lars or more. The policy with respect to those frozen assets, which we had earlier discussed, I think perhaps John mentioned it in his testimony, is that we have an enormous number of potential Amer- ican claims against those assets. 129 We are therefore not unfreezing the assets ourselves, nor are we recommending that other governments do that. In fact, we are looking at the other alternative: the potential that Iraqi oil reve- nues can meet some of the needs right away to which it has been suggested by some that the frozen assets of Iraq be devoted, and I think that is the appropriate and proper way to go. As you may know the Security Council and the Sanctions Com- mittee of the Security Council, when they removed food and other humanitarian assistance from the list of embargoed or sanction commodities, at the same time lifted the freeze on financial trans- actions in order to provide necessary resources. So, governments are free to do that if they wish to. I think up to now only one gov- ernment has made available frozen assets for humanitarian relief. Mr. BOLTON. The total amount of assets frozen in the West and elsewhere and available to the Iraqis in reserves they have in their central bank we estimate, and I stress it is an estimate, to be ap- proximately $5 billion. , USE OF FROZEN ASSETS AS A FINANCIAL RESOURCE TO ASSIST NEEDY TARGET GROUPS Mr. LEACH. That is a substantial sum. In terms of what they con- trol, is there any indication that they are willing or that pressure can be brought upon them to use resources, to match resources through the international institutions to assist target groups? Let’s say children. Mr. BOLTON. That certainly would be our preference. They have come to a number of governments to request that assets be unfro- zen, but they have not specified how the unfrozen resources would be used, and that is why, as Tom was saying, with one possible ex- ception, governments have not unfrozen them. DECLINATION OF IRAQ TO DISCLOSE ASSETS DESPITE NOTIFICATION OF RECENTLY FINANCED COMMERCIAL PURCHASES We know from notifications to the Sanctions Committee of com- mercial purchases that they have financed somehow: either by using resources that they have at their disposal inside Iraq or using other assets that we do not know about that were not subject to being frozen. As Tom mentioned earlier, we have asked the gov- ernment of Iraq to disclose assets that they may have in Western financial institutions that were hidden or whatever, and they have declined to do that. It could well be they have substantial assets at their disposal right now in Western financial institutions. Ambassador PICKERING. Just to add, there have been stories, again difficult to verify, in a lot of the Western press about finan- cial resources personally accruing to Saddam put in banks around the world. Whether in fact those have been successfully frozen or are hidden, we do not know. But we have seen the purchase, on commercial terms as far as we know, of up to two million tons of food already. A good share of that has not been shipped and we do not know whether in fact those are serious transactions that have been consummated or only shopping around for other reasons. But in fact all of this is going ahead and just to reemphasize what we have said before, we would like to see and would like to use the 130 ongoing actions of the Security Council to get as full a disclosure as we can in order not to put Saddam in a position of hoarding with the idea in mind that he can buy his way around the sanctions now or some time in the future. It is a concern to us, particularly the arms sanctions issue. It is clearly part of our unified effort to con- tinue to put the maximum squeeze on him. QUESTION CONCERNING WHETHER THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS AT- TEMPTED TO DISCOVER IF MR. HUSSEIN OR HIS GOVERNMENT HAVE ASSETS, AS WAS DONE IN THE MARCOS CASE Mr. LEACH. Let me just conclude by noting that an analogous subcommittee, in this case the Asian Affairs Subcommittee, three or four years ago did a kind of a Sherlock Holmes sleuthing investi- gation of the assets of one Ferdinand Marcos, and it was truly a bizarre undertaking and it started off with somewhat risky dimen- sion but ended up proving to have a certain validity. In that undertaking over time the United States Government’s resources were listed as were a number of foreign governments. And I am just wondering has our government assiduously, a la Mr. Marcos, attempted to discover, using the highest kinds of influ- ences that we can employ with governments that traditionally shoulder resources, attempted to discover whether Mr. Hussein or his government have certain assets? Mr. BOLTON. Well, I would not want to get into enormous detail, but, yes, we are obviously concerned about that. We need to know for a lot of reasons what those assets might be. Mr. LEACH. There is a distinction. I mean, many, many times when we ask questions of the administration the response is we are concerned, of course we have thought about that; you know, gener- ally we are knowledgeable or et cetera. So what I want to do is really ask whether as a matter of ex- traordinarily high priority using the Department of Justice, using the Office of the President, using the Office of the Department of State, have we undertaken a worldwide, global effort to ascertain precisely what the resources the government of Iraq is, or Mr. Hus- sein himself out of the country, and where they might be located, and using as an analogy the efforts that have been undertaken, that eventually were undertaken against Mr. Marcos? Mr. BOLTON. I really am not in a position to give you an answer to that in any detail, but we would be happy to get back to you with specifics there are. Mr. LEACH. I am taking this as a weak response, I must tell you, Mr. Bolton. I mean, is that where you are intending to leave it, or are you intending to say, I really have a powerful answer but I cannot reveal it? Mr. BOLTON. I wish you would take it as an answer from some- body who is not directly involved in it. Mr. LEACH. I see. Mr. BOLTON. And that is why I prefer to get back to you with more specifics. Mr. LEACH. Okay. So I read that as we have not yet undertaken it. Mr. BOLTON. I would not necessarily read? 133 Mr. LEACH. Fine. Well, I appreciate it and I must say again, just because we sometimes miss the big picture when we have current problems at issue, the work of Ambassador Pickering and implicit- ly the State Department jurisdiction has been as impressive as any amount of work on any given subject that I have observed as a Member of Congress, and so I think the two of you are to be com- mended for the general framework of our diplomacy in this arena. Thank you. Mr. BOLTON. Thank you. Mr. JOHNSTON. I would like to welcome Congressman Tim Penny, who is on the Agriculture Committee, but is also on the Select Committee on Hunger, to ask some questions. 1 AMOUNT OF IRAQ S ASSETS PROJECTED TO BE FROZEN IN THE U.S. AND ALLIED COUNTRIES Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I will start with Mr. Bolton since there is some dispute as to the level of Iraqi assets known to be frozen. I heard a statistic yesterday that indicated the U.S. had maybe as much as $2 billion in assets that are frozen here. You mentioned today a $5 billion figure. I assume that’s an aggregate figure. Mr. BOLTON. That is a worldwide figure. Mr. PENNY. U.S. and allied nations. How does that break out? Mr. BOLTON. I do not have the specifics on that, Congressman. It does include—just so I can be clear on this—it includes not only our estimates of assets frozen outside of Iraq, but financial assets we believe are available to Iraq’s central banking authorities in Baghdad, so that is a worldwide total. Mr. PENNY. Would the $2 billion figure be close to what we know to be frozen here in the U.S.? Mr. BOLTON. Congressman, my impression is the same as that what Tom’s: more like a half a billion is closer to the figure, but I do not want to rely on memory. Let us, if you will get back to you writing on what that breakout is. Mr. PENNY. Well, it is an important matter and I would like some specificity because I have heard numbers all over the board on this, and I would like to nail it down. Mr. BOLTON. I would say, as I mentioned earlier, these figures are in some sense estimates in any event, but we will give you the best estimates we have. Mr. PENNY. I would appreciate that. [The information followsz] 134 is I mentioned in my testimony, the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury has conducted a survey of claims against Iraq and Iraqi frozen assets within U.S. jurisdiction. On May 1, 1991, R. Richard Newcomb, the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, testified before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, concerning this matter. He stated that the value of blocked Iraqi property in the U.S. exceeded $1.2 billion. He also reported that this property consisted principally of bank deposits frozen on August 2, amounts subsequently paid into blocked accounts by purchasers of Iraqi oil en route to the United States on August 2 and a miscellaneous variety of Iraqi government-owned tangible properties and credits. An additional $420 million was reported as blocked in offshore branches of U.S. banks, primarily the United Kingdom. Mr. Newcomb further testified that approximately 1100 individuals. corporations, Banks, and U.S. government agencies has reported billions of dollars in claims against Iraqi, He reported that these claims range from claims asserted by individuals for personal property looted in Kuwait to losses of future business and concession rights. He also stated that inasmuch as these claims have not been submitted to a formal claims resolution body, it would be inappropriate to speculate as to their actual aggregrate value. 135 USE OF IRAQI FROZEN ASSETS FOR PAYMENT OF DEFAULTED CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS TO AMERICAN BUSINESSES In your testimony, your written testimony, you made specific ref- erence to my resolution, H. Con. Res 168, indicating that you—I do not think that you dispute that there is humanitarian need within Iraq-but you specifically object to the use of the frozen assets for that purpose largely because there are other claims against those assets. Could you elaborate on the types of claims that exist and that might lead to some other questions I have in that regard? Mr. BOLTON. Well, there are believed to be a number of contracts that existed before the war where the Iraqis could be liable to American businesses for fairly substantial amounts of money that they have not paid under defaulted contractual obligations. Mr. PENNY. Is it largely corporate claims? Mr. BOLTON. It almost certainly will be. Mr. PENNY. For goods and services of some sort? Mr. BOLTON. Commercial transactions. Mr. PENNY. Are these transactions in which the goods and serv- ices have been delivered but not paid for? Mr. BOLTON. Well, I do not really have a clear idea. But it knows that they are out there. We know they are very substantial in this country and in Britain and in France. CLAIMS OF IRAQI CONTRACTUAL DEFAULT IN EXCESS OF ASSETS HELD Mr. PENNY. I was told yesterday that the claims are well in excess of the amount of assets that we hold, claims by U.S. entities are well in excess of the assets held. Mr. BOLTON. I have seen similar kinds of reports and it would not surprise me if that conclusion is correct. OBLIGATION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT WITH REGARDS TO HONORING CLAIMS Mr. PENNY. What is the obligation of our government in regard to these claims? Is there a history of holding claims to honor, or holding assets in order to honor claims or is there not a history in that regard? ' Mr. BOLTON. I really am not in a position to answer that. I just do not know. I think this is basically an unprecedented situation. RECOURSE OF FIRMS OR INDIVIDUALS IF ASSETS AREN’T HELD TO HONOR CLAIMS Mr. PENNY. If we do not hold the assets to honor these claims, then what recourse do these firms or individuals have if they are in fact a claimant against the government of Iraq? Mr. BOLTON. Well, one alternative to pursuing their remedies in U.S. judicial fora and using the seized assets to satisfy any judg- ments they may get would be to proceed against the government of Iraq in Baghdad. While I am not intimately familiar with this al- ternative, it would not seem to be propitious. 136 SHOULD ROLE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT BE IN CONTROLLING ASSETS FOR THE PURPOSE OF FACILITATING U.S. CLAIMS AGAINST IRAQ? Mr. VINNY. For our government to control these assets with the purpose of facilitating the claims against the Iraqi government, is that in your judgment the fundamental role of our government in regard to those assets? Mr. BOLTON. I think that the first principle in keeping the Iraqi assets frozen here is that they not be made available to Saddam Hussein to avoid obligations under the cease fire resolution and the arms embargo specifically. But because of the likelihood that there will be substantial U.S. claims, we are holding them frozen until at least we can sort out exactly what the various priorities are. It is not that they are irrevocably committed to satisfying judg- ments brought by claimants against Iraq, but we are just holding them there until we do have a better sense. IRAQI FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS FOR REPARATIONS Mr. VINNY. How about Iraq’s obligations for reparations? Mr. BOLTON. Well, under Resolution 687, and we had discussions about this earlier today, we are in the process of setting up the compensation fund and of ascertaining what percentage of Iraq’s oil revenues will go into that fund to make recompense to the vic- tims of Iraq’s aggression. POSSIBILITY OF LINKING FUTURE OIL SALES TO THE HONORING OF CLAIMS Mr. VINNY. Can we also link future oil sales to the honoring of the various claims that have been filed? Mr. BOLTON. That is what was done for claims related to the in- vasion and occupation of Kuwait. But the pre-war debts were not encompassed in the compensation fund. In other words, those debts remain valid under Resolution 687, and the resolution specified that as well. But not, under existing resolutions, to be paid out of the oil revenues or the compensation fund. The compensation fund is for the purpose of recompensing the victims of the aggression. Mr. VINNY. But the compensation fund would be fueled by future oil sales? Mr. BOLTON. That is correct. U.N. RESISTANCE TO BROADENING PURPOSE OF COMPENSATION FUND TO TAKE CARE OF PRE-WAR, INDIRECT DAMAGE CLAIMS Mr. VINNY. Ambassador Pickering, is there any reason that the U.N. would resist the notion of broadening the purpose of that compensation fund to take care of various claims? Ambassador PICKERING. Yes. When the resolution was negotiated after a lot of effort, agreement was reached on the language of direct loss, injury or damage resulting from Iraqi aggression. The question relating to prior claims and debts was decided on the basis that the Secretary-General would recommend a ceiling for deduc- tions from Iraq’s oil revenues for deposit into the compensation fund; the ceiling would take into account prior debts, but they would not be paid out of the compensation fund. 137 So I think first that there is a well-established thesis in the reso- lution that prior claims and indirect claims cannot be paid from the compensation fund. Secondly, my sense of the political will in the Security Council is that it is limited to providing Iraq’s respon- sibility for direct loss injury and damage. The Security Council Members feel that any inclusion of prior claims or indirect damage would bring the U.N. into a huge morass that it would not be able to deal with. And the feeling overall that the oil revenues, even under the best of conditions, would take considerable time to pay for a significant percentage of the direct losses, which had to have priority. Mr. VINNY. Let alone the preexisting claims. Ambassador PICKERING. Let alone the preexisting claims. Mr. VINNY. The process of filing claims and adjudicating those claims is one that would take a long time in any event. USE OF FROZEN IRAQI ASSETS TO SPEED ALONG SETTLEMENT OF PRE- WAR DEBT CLAIMS By holding these assets, if we develop a policy that gives people access to these funds, is it assumed that we speed the process along for the various claimants? Mr. BOLTON. I am sorry, when you refer to claimants, are you re- ferring to claimants under the compensation fund or claimants op- erating under pre-war debts? Mr. VINNY. Pre-war debts. Because I assume those are the ones you are referring to in your testimony when you say that there are claims against these assets well in excess of the amount of the assets held. You know, if we establish a policy at some point that indicates that we are not going to release these assets to Iraq but that we are going to dispose of them in some other fashion to settle these claims, would you view that then as a policy that would eliminate the need for any further action against Iraq on those claims, every- body gets so much on the dollar and the claims are settled by the use of these assets? I am trying to get a handle on why we are focusing on these claims and holding that money, and yet we do not really have a policy as to how those assets will be used. The two seem to be relat- ed, but you do not seem to have a policy in place that obligates the assets for those claims. ALLOCATION OF ASSETS AGAINST CLAIMS ONLY UNDER LITIGATION FROM CLAIMANTS Mr. BOLTON. The executive branch has not taken a position on locating the assets against the claims. One way that this could play out would be if an American business had a claim against Iraq for breach of contract, or non-payment, or whatever it was, they would litigate that, and they would get a judgment in their favor for a certain amount. Mr. VINNY. They would get that in what? Mr. BOLTON. Pardon me. 138 COURT JURISDICTION CONCERNING CLAIMANT LITIGATION Mr. VINNY. In what court? Mr. BOLTON. In whatever court had jurisdiction. It would be the U.S. District Court, if it satisfied the jurisdictional limit. So they would have a judgment for whatever the amount was. And then they would seek to levy on that judgment against frozen Iraqi assets. And we would at that point, we the executive branch, would have to make a decision whether to unfreeze the assets in an equiv- alent amount, so that that could be paid to satisfy the judgment or to consider an alternative process. U.S. GOVERNMENT OBLIGATION TO HOLD ASSETS IN ANTICIPATION OF CLAIMS Mr. VINNY. But there is no obligation on the government of the U.S. to hold the assets in anticipation of those claims. We could dis- pose of the assets in some other fashion if we chose to. We do not have an obligation as a government to hold them for that purpose, do we? Mr. BOL'roN. No. We could by order unfreeze the assets. They are frozen in this country because of executive branch action. That is the legally binding step that was taken, to put them into a frozen status. USE OF ASSETS FOR OTHER PURPOSES BESIDES THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS Mr. VINNY. Just to be clear on this. The Administration has de- cided that it will not free up these assets for another purpose. You specifically rejected the suggestion of unfreezing these assets for the purpose of humanitarian programs. Am I correct on that? Mr. BoL'roN. That is because we are looking at the oil revenues that would be produced when Iraq is permitted to sell oil again to finance the humanitarian activity that might be needed in Iraq. U.N. CONTROL OF OIL SALE FINANCING FOR IRAQI HUMANITARIAN EFFORT Mr. VINNY. So that would be your preference. But you have also said in your testimony that it is the U.S. position that if we do allow oil sales to finance the humanitarian effort, that it would have to be 100 percent in the control of the U.N. or U.N.-contract agencies? Mr. BOLTON. We have discussed a number of different modalities under which the program could be made operational, and we have not made a final decision. But we can certainly say that there has to be the strictest kind of U.N. scrutiny of the whole chain of the transactions. That is certainly correct. ALLIED RESPONSE TO USE OF IRAQI OIL SALES TO FINANCE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT Mr. VINNY. And at this point, I want to turn to Ambassador Pickering and ask about his sense of the position of our allies in this regard, to what degree they want conditions applied to the use of the proceeds for that purpose, how soon a decision in this regard 139 could be made, and how much money would we be talking about. You have several reports at your disposal now to help assess the dimensions of the problem. How far down the pike are we at the U.N. in terms of pursuing the use of oil sales to finance an international relief effort? Ambassador PICKERING. As John had said earlier, we are in the early stages of discussions with close allies about this possibility and all of the various options that might be available to us. I do not think that we can take it beyond that. Some of this was clearly discussed in London at the recent G—7 summit meeting. And we would have to clearly open up discussions in New York further than they have been opened to give you any reasonable point of view. But there is a current of interest not just in the United States and its close friends, but among a number of states that have ex- pressed to me similar ideas to this, and that is to find a way of pro- viding for humanitarian assistance through the oil shipment proc- ess without providing Saddam Hussein any of the advantages of actual lifting sanctions. We think that is a very useful option to ex- plore, and it is an option that we are now looking at with all of the various ramifications. It has the value that it might help us to tighten downstream control rather than permit the kind of loose arrangement that now exists with respect to commercial sales. I cannot tell you, however, all of the options. And I do not think that we have reached a point yet where it is possible to say that any particular formula can or cannot command support. My own feeling, however, is that the interest in the humanitari- an side of this is sufficient to compel very serious attention to these kinds of alternatives. And I would expect that we would start with a slight positive advantage in terms of the way that U.N. members are looking at this. 1 VINNY. You say that the review is at a very preliminary eve . Ambassador PICKERING. Preliminary level in New York. TIME FRAME BY WHICH CONSENSUS MAY BE REACHED CONCERNING FINANCING OF HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS BY OIL SALES Mr. VINNY. Can you give us any indication of a time frame or a deadline by which consensus may be reached? Mr. VINNY. No. I think that it is too early to give you any kind of indication of that. I think that there will be more discussions in celipitals before there are any further kinds of discussion taking p ace. Mr. VINNY. At the very least, however, we can say that there will be a response in terms of some kind of humanitarian program? Ambassador PICKERING. We have a report before the Security Council, and specifically the Sanctions Committee. Prince Sadrud- din Aga Khan will be here next week to present it personally. People will take this extremely seriously. They will want to study it themselves. That will be one of the trigger mechanisms for fur- ther action. In addition, there was a report recently submitted by the Secre- tary-General suggesting using oil exports to finance the Special 140 Commission, and that also will be studied. So these things are coming together now. FORMATION OF ANOTHER U.N. RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE USE OF OIL SALE ASSETS FOR HUMANITARIAN EFFORT Mr. VINNY. It would take another U.N. resolution specific to this issue, would it not? Ambassador PICKERING. It is one of the issues that we have to study. The Sanctions Committee has authority to make decisions on some of these issues itself. Mr. VINNY. But the Sanctions Committee would not have author- ity to make decisions on the disposition of oil revenues for a hu- manitarian aid program or release of assets for a humanitarian program. Ambassador PICKERING. If I read paragraph 23 of the resolution correctly, you might be able to make the case that it does. Mr. VINNY. That it could? Ambassador PICKERING. Yes. Mr. VINNY. So we could see it at that level, and that would not necessitate a full-blown resolution? Ambassador PICKERING. Well, I think that the point to remember is that the U.N. parliamentary process tends to turn the congres- sional process upside down. We have to have consensus in the Sanctions Committee, that is everybody has to agree. In the Securi- ty Council, we have to get nine positive votes including affirmative votes or supportive votes from those people who hold the veto. So the parliamentary process is a little different in the United Na- tions than it is here in terms of committees. SWISS USE OF UNFROZEN ASSETS FOR A HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM Mr. VINNY. There is one nation that has already unfrozen assets, or at least a portion of the assets that they hold. Can you give me the name of that country? Ambassador PICKERING. Yes. I do not think that it is a secret. It was done in Switzerland to provide humanitarian relief. Mr. VINNY. And what was the amount of the aid and what was the result of that. And how was the relief administered? Ambassador PICKERING. I am sorry, I do not have the details, but we will do our best to supply that to you for the record. [The information follows:] It is our understanding that Swiss authorities have adopted an informal system whereby commercial banks are allowed to release Iraqi assets for payment for im- ports permissible under the U.N. sanctions regime. This policy is consistent with UNSCR 687 which allows for the unblocking of Iraqi assets for payment for imports of: foodstuffs notified to the Sanctions Committee; medical supplies; and items for essential civilian needs, as defined by the Sanctions Committee. Each individual transaction must be approved by the Swiss government. The Swiss prefer to finance exports only from their own country. If the assets are to be used to pay for non- Swiss exports to Iraq, the Swiss authorities require the company to provide an export license and to notify the U.N. Sanctions Committee. A total of about $50 mil- lion in letters of credit has been approved by the Swiss. At least three other nations have adopted similar policies. 141 DIMENSIONS OF MEDICAL REPORT CONCERNING CHILDREN MORTALITY RATE IN IRAQ Mr. VINNY. I have seen a number of reports already. The Har- vard report, a report by an Arab-American medical team, and the Tufts study. I have not seen the Aga Khan’s report as of yet, but I look forward to reviewing that. How do you characterize the dimensions of the problem? Let me just use one statistic and see if you can balance that with a statis- tic that you think is closer to the right number. The Harvard medi- cal team said upwards of a thousand Iraqi children a day are dying from various diseases. What do you think is a more accurate number in that regard? Ambassador PICKERING. I would say this. While you were not in the room, Assistant Secretary Bolton reviewed extensively precise- ly the same question. But let me address the specifics. He said that we thought, and I agree with him, that all of these reports are in the same ball park. The problem with the Harvard study, and it is a problem with others, is that there is no clear knowledge of the statistical basis. There is an indication that some of the statistics in the Harvard report have been based on mortality rates as a result of the period immediately following the war, before the humanitar- ian effort had gotten going. So in fact, there is some skepticism that those figures are totally reliable and totally projectable out over the future period. We are dealing with a big country of eighteen million people, in which sta- tistical networks and statistical collection is very hard. We do see, however, that there are disease problems, and there are problems of food availability and distribution. They are increas- ing. And that is certainly the tenor of the Aga Khan report, which will have to be looked at as a basis for moving further. Mr. VINNY. Do you think that it is accurate to say that that tens of thousands of Iraqi children have already died since the war’s conclusion? Ambassador PICKERING. In all honesty, I do not know. Mr. VINNY. Would it be fair to say that tens of thousands cer- tainly will die in the next several months?y Ambassador PICKERING. I would say that that is the general tenor of the reports that we have been seeing, and they are in the same category. The question of what time period and how many in specific terms is hard for me to pin down. But I would say that it is clear that the reports indicate that people are dying and suffering as a result of what happened before, during, and after the conflict. Mr. BOLTON. I think that it is important to understand exactly that point. There is no question that many thousands of people died when Saddam Hussein’s forces ejected the Kurds from their places of residence, and forced them into the mountains along the Turkish and Iraqi border. There is also no question that thousands of pelzlople died in the brutal repression of the Shia uprisings in the sout . So it is a question that we have to find answers to. Because the provision of humanitarian assistance, which we think is extremely important and which we will do as the United States always does to vulnerable groups, needs to be provided to the vulnerable groups 142 and not provided in a way that allows Saddam Hussein to use it politically. Mr. VINNY. I understand, and I do not have any quarrel with that, and I will come to that point in one second. But every report that I have seen indicates a tremendous increase in the presence of cholera and typhoid and other diseases primarily with the children population. Some of the reports say that these diseases are at epi- demic proportions. AGA KHAN REPORT’s DISPUTATION OF EARLIER STUDIES CONCLUSIONS Is there anything in the Aga Khan report that would dispute the earlier studies that made those conclusions? Mr. BOLTON. The impression that we have from the reading of the Aga Khan report is that there is an increase in typhoid and cholera, but it does not talk about those in epidemic proportions. Again I am not a medical statistician, so I cannot tell you what that means. But there is concern, perhaps maybe not total alarm, but concern enough for everybody to pay serious attention to it. And I think that we have to emphasize again that our sense of responsibility toward our humanitarian duties is extremely strong, and we will clearly look to provide that to the groups that need it. NEED FOR U.N. CONCENSUS AND FINANCIAL AVAILABILITY WITH REGARDS TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQI CHILDREN Mr. VINNY. We are counting on you to do that. I trust that be- tween the State Department and your work at the U.N. that the U.S. is going to play a lead role in bringing together a consensus within the U.N. on this point. And whether it is unfrozen assets or the disposition of proceeds from oil sales, one way or another we know the money is available to us for humanitarian purposes, and that something must be done sooner rather than later. Whether it is 1000 children dying a day or 200 children dying a day, we can dispute the numbers. But it is an alarming number in any event, and it is an unnecessary loss of life. COOPERATION FROM THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT CONCERNING DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN SERVICES That gets me to the last point that I would like each of you to address, and that is the level to which we can expect cooperation by the Iraqi government. Because I think as well that we cannot be trustful of their involvement in the distribution effort, but we are certainly going to need their cooperation. We have already had some problems, as I understand, with the food distribution center in the south of the country. Is this going to be a major problem getting the services, and the medicine, and the food to the affected population? Ambassador PICKERING. There are two issues here. One is the question of cooperation in principle. Could he refuse, even though the United Nations would permit him to export oil as part of a scheme to provide humanitarian assistance? Of course he could. I do not know whether he would. My feeling is the enormous inter- national pressure against him and the responsibility that he would 143 have to take on his own head for so seriously maltreating his own people would lead him against that approach. The other question is the down-the-line supervision and detail, and this is where it is most difficult with Iraq. We have consistent- ly emphasized in our testimony today that it will be extremely dif- ficult on the one hand, to be sure that no diversions take place but that there are ways, and we are exploring them, to further tighten the downstream supervision of food and medicine under such a pro- gram. Mr. BOLTON. We are certainly going to make it plain to the Iraqi authorities that we expect their cooperation, and that they have an obligation to Cooperate so that their own vulnerable populations get the humanitarian assistance that we think they deserve. But one looks at his actions before, during, and after the war, and it is hard to find any pattern or rationale on whether he will in fact cooperate or not. We do not know. Mr. VINNY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have been more than generous, and I appreciate the time to be a part of the committee and address this question. Mr. JOHNsTON. Thank you for coming. Mr. Bereuter. Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I just have one related request of the gentlemen. APPOINTMENT OF AN ON THE GROUND U.N. COORDINATOR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA If you could switch your geographic focus to the Horn of Africa. The Pvos contend that there needs to be an on-the-ground coordi- nator appointed from the United Nations for relief efforts. It seems to me that, in fact, that is the role that Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan is playing in Iraq. I would like to ask you gentlemen to pursue this idea, to get an appointment as soon as possible of a relief coordinator in the Horn of Africa for those three countries that are most affected. Mr. BOLTON. The Secretary-General recently sent James Ingram, the head of the World Food Program, to the Horn to assess the sit- uation there, which is critical in many respects. And he has now reported back. We will certainly look into that. There is no ques- tion that there is a substantial need there as well. And we want to work with the U.N., so that they can meet it. Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Solarz. Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me say first of all that I am delighted that our witnesses could be here with us today, particularly Ambassador Pickering, who I think has conducted himself over the course of the last sever- al months with extraordinary distinction and effectiveness. I do not think that it is an exaggeration to say that he was worth two divi- sions in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. The history of the Gulf crisis will record the inestimatable sig- nificance of the contributions that he made in forging the kind of diplomatic coalition which was the political foundation for our suc- cessful military efforts in the Gulf. 144 $- PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY TO RESUME THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ AS A RESULT OF IRAQ’S VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT I have a number of questions that I would like to ask the wit- nesses. First of all, I gather from what you have said previously in this hearing, and I apologize for the fact that I would not be here for its entirety, that you believe that the President has the existing authority to resume the use of force against Iraq as a result of Iraq’s violations of the cease fire agreement if he should choose to do so. Is that correct? Mr. BOLTON. For serious and material breaches, that is correct. U.N. RESOLUTION AND PROVISIONS WHICH AUTHORIZE THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ Mr. SOLARZ. And could you tell me pursuant to what resolution of the United Nations or what other provisions of law that the President claims that authority? Mr. BOLTON. Well, under 678 and 687, as well as our inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, but specifically be- cause of the resolutions’ requirement to further international peace and security in the region, a material breach of the cease fire would call that into question. Mr. SOLARZ. Would it be the legal position of the Administration that a material breach of the cease fire renders a cease fire null and void, and that, therefore, pursuant to the resolution which au- thorized the use of force to implement previous resolutions, we would be legally entitled to resume the use of force? Is that in es- sence the legal position? Mr. BOLTON. Well, Mr. Bereuter asked earlier, I believe that it was Mr. Bereuter, he asked earlier if we could provide sort of the legal justification for it. And rather than sort of do it in horseback, I would like to try to do it in writing. But the position clearly is that if there is a material breach which threatens international peace and security that the provisions of 678 provide full authority for the use of force. Mr. SOLARZ. Which one is 678? Mr. BOLTON. That is the November resolution. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR A RESUMED USE OF FORCE IF IRAQI VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT CONTINUE Mr. SOLARZ. I gather that the British and the French have both indicated that they would support a resumed use of force if Iraqi violations of the cease fire continue. Is that correct? Mr. BOLTON. They have so indicated publicly, I believe. Mr. SOLARZ. Could you tell us what the Soviets and Chinese have said on this question? Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think that is still under discussion at this point. And I would prefer not to get out of front of our leaders on it. Mr. SOLARZ. Ambassador Pickering, have you heard any whisper- ings up in New York? Ambassador PICKERING. No, I have heard no discussions in the specific sense of this. But I can assure you that the relationship be- tween the cease-fire, its continuation of material breaches and 145 threats to international peace and security in the region, were clearly established in the five power demarche made on July 12th, more or less the text of which is incorporated in my testimony today. So the basic underlying thesis is known to them, and is ac- cepted by them as part at least of an approach to Iraq. DEMARCHE REQUIRING IRAQI MILITARY FORCES TO STAY OUT OF SECURITY ZONE Mr. SOLARZ. Is this the demarche in which we said that we did not want any Iraqi military forces in the security zone even after the withdrawal of the coalition forces? Ambassador PICKERING. N o, that was a different demarche made earlier. Mr. SOLARZ. With respect to the demarche in which we, as I un- derstand it, said to the Iraqis, we do not want any of your military forces entering the security zone, pursuant to what authority was that demarche given? Mr. BOLTON. I think that that was pursuant to 688, which re- quired that Iraq not interfere with various U.N. and other interna- tional humanitarian relief efforts. And it was on that basis that all of the actions of Operation Provide Comfort were undertaken. SECURITY COUNCIL OBJECTIONS TO DEMARCHE Mr. SOLARZ. Have we had any objections to that demarche from any of the permanent members of the Security Council? Mr. BOLTON. I am not aware of any. Ambassador PICKERING. I am not aware of it either. I do not think that all of them were asked to join in it. I think that that has been our consistent position vis-a-vis Iraq all along. SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL OF A NEW U.N. RESOLUTION AUTHORIZ- ING USE OF FORCE IF IRAQ CONTINUES TO VIOLATE THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT Mr. SOLARZ. I gather that you have indicated, and you just reaf- firmed it, but you believe that we already have the authority under existing resolutions to use force once again if Iraq remains in viola- tion of the cease fire agreement. Ambassador Pickering, in your judgment, if we made a decision to go back to the Security Council for political purposes to get a new resolution to authorize a continuing use of force in the event that Iraq continues to willfully violate the cease fire agreement, do you believe that we could get the approval of the Security Council? Ambassador PICKERING. I think that your question itself postu- lates the answer for me. It is so situationally determined, it is so much in terms of how you spell out the various ifs, I think that it would probably be difficult for me on a horseback basis now to give you a serious answer to that particular question. The point that I would make is if you look at the Chinese vote on 67 8, you have to find with all honestly that they were seriously concerned. And in fact, the Chinese explanation of vote on 678 was a very serious and important one. Mr. SOLARZ. Which one was 678 again? 146 Ambassador PICKERING. 678 is what we call the use of force reso- lution. The Chinese at that point said that they do not believe as a matter of principle that big powers should use force in the resolu- tion of regional problems. But they said they believed, equally and firmly that international aggression should not be given a chance to succeed. And as a result, the only position that they could take was abstention. So I think trying at this point to speculate in advance about pre- cisely how each country would vote would require a very clear sense not only of what the conditions would be, but maybe a chance to view the reactions to those conditions when they actually existe . What I can tell you is in addition to the demarche on July 12th, the text of which you essentially have, there is a very strong feel- ing of revulsion among all of the members of the Security Council about the Iraqi behavior on the nuclear weapons question, a very strong feeling. ‘ DELAY AND INEFFECTIVENESS IN INSPECTION OF IRAQ,S BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS FACILITIES BY THE UNITED NATIONS Mr. SOLARZ. Most of the attention, as you have implied, is fo- cused on the nuclear weapons question. But I must say that I am equally concerned with Iraqi noncompliance with respect to other weapons of mass destruction. I have been given the impression by the staff that in my absence some kind words were heard from the witnesses about the effectiveness of the U.N. teams that are trying to implement the cease fire resolution. My understanding, and please correct me if I am wrong, is that there has not yet been a single inspection of a suspected biological weapons facility. Is that true? Ambassador PICKERING. There has not yet been, but there is about to be one I understand. Mr. S01-ARZ. Why has there not been one so far? Ambassador PICKERING. There has not been one so far probably for (a) the reason that there was so much to do on chemicals and nuclears; and (b) there were no declared sites. And so sites had to be designated by the Special Commission. That requires a little more work to be done than the Special Commission has been able to do under the circumstances. Mr. SOLARZ. But do you not think that it should have been done by now? Ambassador PICKERING. I believe that it should be done as quick- ly as possible. Mr. SOLARZ. When was this cease-fire resolution adopted? Ambassador PICKERING. The cease fire resolution was adopted on April 3rd. Mr. SOLARZ. April 3rd. I have to say, Mr. Ambassador, that I do not hold you personally responsible for this. But I think that it is deeply disappointing, if not shameful, that more than three months after the cease fire resolution, which requires Iraq to disclose, de- stroy, and dismantle its biological weapons, that not only has Iraq refused to disclose any sites, but the United Nations which presum- ably under the cease fire resolution has the right to designate 147 spots, has not inspected any sites. Presumably we are convinced that they do have biological weapons. We believe, as I understand it, that we know where some of them are. That information should have been provided to the U.N. teams, and I presume it was. And if it was provided, they should have sent in teams to inspect it. The delay has given them three months to shift these materials to other sites whose location we might not know. Mr. HAMILTON [presiding]. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. SOLARZ. Yes. Mr. HAMILTON. And the resolution in many instances asks them to do it within fifteen days, does it not? Ambassador PICKERING. The resolution, Mr. Chairman, and I wanted to get back to Congressman Solarz’ question, asked them to make the declaration in fifteen days, which they did on the 18th of April. The Special Commission and the IAEA, to give them their due, have inspected 31 sites already. Mr. SOLARZ. Nuclear. Ambassador PICKERING. Nuclear and chemical. And they are now engaged in an intense activity to move ahead with these. The notion in fact that they have been sitting quietly by and not doing their job, is, I think a mistaken notion, and I will take objection to that. The question of being able to organize all of these teams and move them into the field, particularly given the fact that there has not been the kind of Iraqi cooperation that we all have expected, and that they have an enormous chain of additional inspections to carry out under conditions of 120 degree weather and all of the rest,dI think has to be looked at in evaluating the ability to re- spon . Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Ambassador, you said there were how many site inspections? Ambassador PICKERING. Thirty-one. Mr. SOLARZ. And how many of those were chemical sites? Ambassador PICKERING. I think only one or two were chemical. But this is a huge site. This is a site of 46 square kilometers. Mr. SOLARZ. Are you in a position to tell us how many suspected chemical and biological sites there are? Ambassador PICKERING. I am not in the position on the biologi- cals. But I will check and give you an answer, I think that there are between twelve and twenty chemical sites at least that have to be looked at. [The information follows:] Attached for the record is the information on biological research provided by Iraq to the U.N. Special Commission on May 22, 1991. You will note that according to the attached chart, Iraq claimed that its biological research program did not have a weapons component. This claim is generally not accepted by the UN experts. The first inspection of biological research sites will take place in early August and the team will endeavor to uncover more complete information. - Company Tvpus of vaccines . 0 _ site-institute _ _ H produced _ _ . A1-Kind: Company. f Livestock vaccines ukhdud. Abu Ghrnib. near 5 l. CO - Baghdad vaccine he Faculty of Agriculture. 3 2. HS vaccine " O km from tho city centre. - 3. Anthrax vaccine _ __- Thieieria vaccine - . 5. Blackleg disease 6. Sheep-pox disease 7. Kewcnutle vaccine 5 5. Fowlpox vaccine " | 9. Gumboro vaccine ~ T 1. Rinderpest vaccine l2. Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Department, Baghdad. i Devrah, south Baghdad. 2 Foot-and-mouth disease vaccine . tfHD vaccine) “iii -~ _. ' Tyne of laboratory. and facilities available - i Laboratory classification: . Bu5lc, with flICfOhIOluQ!cn| cnhinvts lhnndt, Laboratories and equipment were destroyed by bombing. 3. Serum and Vaccine , Institute, Baghdad. l Amiriyah. near the Faculty I of veterinary Medicine. 15 * km from the city centre. I km from the city centre. g T I . Human vaccines 1. Z. Cholera vaccine Typhoid vaccine » tfl -I’ i ' ’* Laboratory classification: Maximum containment; plant equipped by the French Iva ' Mflfflv L?1 companv. is Laboratory classification: Basic. with microbiological cabinets (hood). Lab-scale production (Flasks). 4. A1-Hukm plant. On the Euphrates River 25 km from the Saddam Euphrates Bridge to the south-west of - Baghdad in the Babil Governate. . H-.,f"fi!-l‘*Il ...-_ _. l‘\ v I | . I The plant is at a preparatory stage and one where maintenance and repair operations are bein‘ carried out on old imported production systems in an attempt to return them to service and to produce vaccines . or other materials produced by , micro-organisms such as sing1e- . cell protein or other synthetic 1 products. _ ' Laboratory classification: Ba5ic. 1...-4 »< M -- -L -- —' 1*.“ t ,___,,___._ . _ 1 ;_ - _____ ,<>=> 149 ~ 4 1 —~ HATES 91-16827 report of the 1987 Ad-Hoe Meeting of Scientific Experts] l- INTRODUCTION Iraq did not participate in the 1987 Meeting cf Experts referred to in the letter of the Executive Chairman of tho Special Commission and was not previously auqualnt¢d with the recommendations and decisions of the Meeting. In the coming days, we shall try to provide the information requested immediately on completion of its collection. Furthermore. some of the information is not officially documented. More details can do provided after the arrival of the biological uonpons Commission in Baghdad. II. MODALITIES FUR THE EXCHANGE CF INFORMATION A- l;~;chirl_§=:..QLdato.en._1:ses.t¢h centres .1_abots.mri.ea (9.) The F0-sf. mv.(-Mnutzh Dir.-..>ae¢ Va/~nina Dr.- l||r~fir |'lr'»1\.'|l"i‘.I\|ifl1' IIIP6’-i'..¢i Il‘lG criteria for n "maximum containment laboratory", and it produces foot-and-mouth disease vaccine. - . (bl None. B. Exchange of jnjgymntionfon outbreaks of infgctiou§_gjseasgg_gnQ_gQmilar ggggggnces capped by toxins There are no cases of outbeaks in Iraq except for the current (1991) outbreak of cholera. The last epidemic of this disease in Iraq was in 1964. With regard to the remaining questions in this section, these have not occurred in Iraq. just as there are no epidemic cases of poisoning. We are prepared, I-rhnn Hm 1".-.-nmianinn arrives. to arranfle nee-tins‘; with specialists in infectious and endemic diseases in the Ministry of Health in order to clarify the questions contained in this section. C. Encouragement.of_publication o[Hresults_gnQ_promotion of use of knoylsdse Iraq is prepared to cooperate on the matters set forth in this section. The process of gathering and documenting research published in the biological field will. however. take some tine. E. [firoccgural modalities] Iraq is prepared to cooperate on the matters set forth in this section. 150 "- . 9 iRnqponsv to the request for information contained in tho third paragraph of tho F vniiv~ Phairmnn's letter of i1'May'l99l concerning biological weapons) n.--~..<.u ' Iraq docs not have n central military research laboratory. in-*m..i_i_il Iraq has not carried out the largo-scale immunization of the members of its armed forces, although there is a biennial immunization against typhoid fever that is part of the civilian campaign carried out in Iraq. lL£m_iJii) The Foot-and~Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Dnpartmcnt has P4 high containment facilities and produce: foot-and-mouth vaccine. There are laborntprieg which produce vaccines, but they do not fall into the category of _P3 or P4 high containment facilities. Q 151 ’. Mr. SOLARZ. Once again, let me make it very clear here. The pri- mary responsibility for this sad state of affairs lies within Iraq. It is massively, willfully, systematically violating the cease fire agree- ment. It is thumbing its nose at the United Nations and the inter- national community. It speaks with a forked tongue. It repeatedly cheats and deceives. So the primary fault-lies with them. But precisely because we know they are an untrustworthy lot, precisely because they have used these weapons of mass destruction before, it seems to me that the United Nations has a very special responsibility here to do the job effectively. I am shocked that, even though there are several or more than several chemical weapons suspected facilities, and presumably sev- eral biological weapons suspected facilities, that the U.N. teams only looked at one of them. I am glad that they looked at thirty nuclear ones. But let us not forget the chemicals and biologicals. And once again, I am not blaming you here. But I have another concern. REFUSAL OF U.N. INSPECTION TEAM REQUEST TO TAKE SAMPLES FROM IRAQ CHEMICAL FACILITY Is it not true that in the inspection of this chemical site that one of the inspectors urged that samples be taken from the site, and the gentleman who led the U.N. team refused to take the samples, because he said that was beyond the scope of the authority of the team‘? This sounds like sabotage rather than sound investigative wor . Ambassador PICKERING. I do not know the answer to your specif- ic question. But it is clear to me and it is clear to the members who run the Special Commission that they have the right to take sam- ples and have been taking samples all along. But we will get a spe- cific answer. Mr. BOLTON. There is no question on that point that they have taken extensive sampling on the nuclear side. I am not aware of that incident either. Mr. SOLARZ. I am told on good authority that when it came to taking a sample from a chemical weapons site that the leader of the team, an Australian I am told, carried neutrality to absurd lengths and refused to take the sample, and said that his mandate was only to observe. Now this hardly gives one a sense of confidence in the determi- nation Of these teams to get to the bottom of the matter. Ambassador PICKERING. First, I do not know whether the story is true. But secondly, the conclusion is wrong. And the Special Com- mission constantly reaffirms to us that it knows that it has the right to take samples. SOURCE OF IRAQI ABILITY TO CREATE A BOMB FROM ENRICHED URANIUM PRODUCTION Mr. SOLARZ. I just have two other questions, Mr. Chairman. First, with respect to this article that appeared in todays Time’s, which you asked about at the beginning of the hearing. According 152 to this report, the U.N. team concluded that Iraq did not produce enough enriched uranium to have a bomb. Is the article referring to the enriched uranium produced only by the Iraq nuclear reactor which was destroyed during the war, or is it also referring to the enriched uranium which we have some reason to believe was produced by the entirely clandestine nuclear weapons program involving the use of the Hiroshima technology, the calutrons? Ambassador PICKERING. Well, let me say this. First, it is not clear. I have only the newspaper story to go by. It refers to a plant, and it may be only plant specific. I cannot tell you. I noticed that. Secondly, as you know, the reactors do not produce enriched urani- um, but they produce plutonium. And the separation of plutonium involves a different process. We have been looking at the reprocessing process. We see some evidence that they have been experimenting with it, but no evi- dence that they have entered into the kind of production that could recover fuel. And the fuel in that reactor was under safeguards. So we are pretty sure, and in fact it is in the hands of the IAEA that it has not been tampered with. The other side of the process, however, there is a big question mark. And at this stage, we have just seen the report, and we do not have any details. And it is diffi- cult for me to give you any conclusions, but again for the record we can certainly provide that. [The information follows:] Attached for the record is a copy of the report from the third IAEA inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities. This is the inspection that is referred to in the July 18 New York Times article already entered into the record of this hearing. The report pro- vides the most complete account of the Iraqi nuclear program as of the date of this hearing.1 Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you. USEFULNESS OF CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION NOTING IRAQI CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS AND RECOMMENDING THE USE OF FORCE TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE Finally, what would be your feeling about the usefulness of a congressional resolution which would take note of the kinds of sys- tematic, willful, egregious violations of the cease fire agreement, which you gentlemen have testified to this morning, and then went on to express the sense of the Congress that the President, together with our coalition partners, should take whatever action is neces- sary, including the use of force, to bring Iraq into compliance with the cease fire agreement? » This would not be an instruction, nor a mandate. Rather it would be a sense of the Congress resolution, to make it clear that we share the Administration's concerns. As I understand it, the resolu- tion would more or less reflect what has been the stated view of the Administration. The resolution would be one more way of making it clear to Saddam Hussein that, on the issue of compliance with the cease fire resolution, the Congress and the Administration stand as one, and the Congress will not flinch from the necessity to 1 See appendix 10. 153 use force if that should prove necessary in the President’s judg- ment. Mr. BOLTON. I will give you a very courageous answer on that one, Congressman. I would want to consult with the Secretary before responding. Obviously, there are political pluses and min- uses and risks involved in going into that. And I just would not want to comment off the top of my head on it. Ambassador PICKERING. I would say that we really ought to talk with the people who have responsibilities at the top for this. It is difficult to object to a resolution, which would be totally supportive of the President’s policy, and it always is. On the other hand, the timing, and the circumstances, and the text are more serious sorts of questions. And the issue of how will the vote come out and other kinds of questions are important to be considered down the line. Those are the kinds of things that you clearly want to consult about. Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding these hearings. I think that this has contributed very significantly to our understanding of this situation. Mr. HAMILTON. I thank the gentleman. Without objection, the Chair would like to enter into the record this New York Times article that has been discussed much today, dated, Thursday, July 18, 1991. The headline is, “Iraq Atom Effort Ruined, Inspectors Say.” And also, I would like to enter into the record, without objection, a letter and article from the American Friends Service Committee.‘ Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Johnston had a question or two. Mr. JOHNsTON. Mr. Chairman, just one. First, an observation. Ambassador Pickering, you may want a copy of the transcript today and laminate it with the praise which you have received, which I join in. TIME TABLE CONCERNING ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AGAINST IRAN'S RESOLUTION BREACHES Mr. Bolton, just one question. You have already stated that there are serious and material breaches of the U.N. resolution. With Mr. Solarz, you ducked the question of a sense of Congress resolution. But let me ask, is there a time table at all set up within the State Department as to when you knew? The resolution gave them fifteen days. There obviously have been very serious breaches by them. We have discovered things now that we did not know back in December and January as to their nuclear capacity. And how long do you wait? Mr. BOLTON. Well, there is no time table. And I would not want to prejudge what our options are. I think the President has made clear that he believes that existing resolutions give us the author- ity to use force, and that the decision on timing is ultimately his. And I really would not want to go beyond that. Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1 See appendixes 7 and 8. = 154 STAFFED NUMBER OF THE NORTHERN IRAQI U.N. FORCE Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, I know that you have been here quite awhile. We will try to wrap it up quickly. I wanted to ask a ques- tion about the U.N. force in the north. Is that fully staffed now, at about 500 people? Ambassador PICKERING. I think that was just addressed. The 500 are not there. 250 U.N. guards are there and the effort is in the next two weeks or as rapidly as possible to get that fully up to speed. Mr. BOLTON. I think that there are approximately 625 U.N. hu- manitarian workers who are up there as well. RESPONSIBILITY AND FUNCTION OF NORTHERN IRAQI U.N. FORCE Mr. HAMILTON. Now, is that U.N. force there to protect the Kurds, or simply to observe the situation? Mr. BOLTON. The intention when Prince Sadruddin set up that force was that it was inherent in the authority given to the United Nations under Resolution 688 to be able to protect U.N. and other humanitarian relief workers and to protect U.N. and other sup- plies. So that is the basis of it, as well as helping to provide observ- ers throughout. Mr. HAMILTON. But not to protect the Kurds? Mr. BOLTON. Not specifically to protect the Kurds. The hope was that a relatively large presence of international humanitarian relief workers as well as the guards would be a deterrent by their mere presence to Saddam Hussein taking further reprisals against the Kurds. And so far at least, that seems to be working. FUNCTION AND PRESENCE OF U.N. AGENCIES IN SOUTHERN IRAQI Mr. HAMILTON. And in the south, are the U.N. agencies provid- ing food and assistance to the population there? Mr. BOLTON. They really are not present to the extent that they probably will be in the near future. The ICRC has been present. And Prince Sadruddin has made it clear that he does want to es- tablish his presence down there in much larger numbers as soon as possible. Mr. HAMILTON. So it is likely to see a strengthened U.N. pres- ence there? Mr. BOLTON. Well, that would be our intention. I think that I noted earlier, Mr. Chairman, our distress at the Iraqi order to Prince Sadruddin’s people to move out of the area around Hamar back to Basra where they are now. That constitutes an unaccept- able interference in the work of Sadruddin’s people. And that is going to need to be worked out. FINANCING PROBLEMS WITH U.N. INSPECTION AND HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS Mr. HAMILTON. I know how you responded to some questions from Mr. Johnston on the financing arrangements, and I do not want to repeat. But is there a financial crunch now, because of the expenses that are being incurred, and where is that crunch occurring? i 155 , Mr. BOLTON. There is one specific crunch in connection with the funding of the work of the Special Commission, which estimates that its budgetfor the rest of this year will be in the range of $35 to $40 million. We have asked a number of countries for voluntary contributions to make sure that the work of the Special Commis- sion is not interrupted. That has not all come in yet. And we are going to have to look at ways as we discussed earlier to fund the work of the Special Com- mission until we can get the revenues or the proceeds from the Iraqi oil sales, which we would expect would largely over time fund the work of the special commission. Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Solarz. Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. One final question. PROPOSITION OF A RESOLUTION USING IRAQI OIL SALES AS A MEANS OF FINANCING HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE U.N. In light of the reports that have been coming out of Iraq about the problem of malnutrition and some of the medical problems, what would be wrong with a resolution which permitted Iraq to export a certain amount of oil, which set aside an amount agreed upon for the victims of their aggression, and then put the remain- der of escrow account which would be used, either by the United Nations or some designated agency for the acquisition of food stuffs and medicines. This humanitarian aid would then be distributed under direct U.N. supervision, in order to make sure that it got to the people who needed it. Ambassador PICKERING. You missed the earlier testimony when we said that those are precisely the options that we are looking at now. Mr. BOLTON. There are discussions that have taken place in London on the margins of the G-7 summit with interested parties. We hope to have our instructions back from the Secretary in the very near future. Mr. SOLARZ. It does strike me that that is the way to square the circle between our humanitarian sensitivities to the plight of the Iraqi people and our absolute determination not to permit Saddam to get a single cent from the oil in order to strengthen his own regime. Mr. BOLTON. That is exactly the direction that we are moving in. Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. CONCERN OF AGGRESSIVENESS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SURPRISE INSPECTIONS BY THE U.N. TEAMS Mr. HAMILTON. I think that our concern is that these U.N. teams very aggressive, and that they have the opportunity to conduct sur- prise inspections on site. I presume that you look at it in the same way. Mr. BOLTON. Yes. Mr. HAMILTON. That being the key to fulfilling their functions under these U.N. resolutions. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We have had an excellent hearing. We appreciate your participation. 156 Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HAMILTON. The hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:00 noon, the subcommittee was adjourned.] U.N. ROLE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. RESOLUTIONS MONDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1991 HOUsE OF REPREsENTATIvEs, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF- FAIRS, SUBCOMMITPEES ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAsT, AND ON HUMAN RIGHTs AND INTERNATIONAL OR- GANIZATIONS, Washington, DC. The subcommittees met at 2:08 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gus Yatron (chairman of the Subcom- mittee on Human Rights and International Organizations) presid- mg. Mr. YATRON. The Subcommittee on Human Rights and Interna- tional Organizations and on Europe and the Middle East meet today to receive testimony from the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, the Honorable Thomas Pickering, and the Deputy Assist- ant Secretary of State for International Organizations, Mr. John Wolf, concerning the United Nations’ role in the Persian Gulf and Iraqi compliance with U.N. Resolutions. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 687 on April 3rd, establishing a permanent ceasefire. The ceasefire resolution man- dated Iraq to comply with a series of conditions, including bounda- ry settlement, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and compensation to those injured by Iraq’s aggression. Since then, the Security Council has passed several Gulf-related resolutions, including Resolution 706, which would permit the sale of $1.6 billion of Iraqi petroleum. The proceeds of this transaction would be used to pay for humanitarian shipments and U.N. oper- ations in the Gulf. Iraq has raised objections to the terms of Reso- lution 706. Today’s hearing provides the subcommittees with an opportunity to review Iraqi compliance with the U.N. Resolutions and the U.S. policy response. Now, I would like to call on the Chairman of the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee, Chairman Hamilton, for any state- merits that he may wish to make at this time. Chairman Hamil- ton. Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Yatron. I have no statement, just welcome to the witnesses; we look forward to their testimony. Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Do any other members have statements they would like to make? The gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos. (157) 50-323 0 — 92 - 6 158 IRAQI BEHAVIOR Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to commend Ambassador Pickering for the outstand- ing job he has done during a very difficult period at the United Na- tions. And I hope that in his comments, he will address candidly Saddam Hussein’s persistent defiance of United Nations Resolu- tions, which he has done in the most egregious and blatant fashion in recent history. I would like him to indicate what, if any, plans we have, and what, if any, plans does the United Nations have to deal with con- tinuing violations of U.N. Resolutions. We have had a pattern of lies, deceits and denials, and had it not been for the creativity and ingenuity and courage of the U.N. in- spection teams, the most horrendous developments, ranging from nuclear to missile—chemical, would still be going on within Iraq, and for all we know are still going on today. So, I hope that we will get to the bottom of Saddam Hussein’s deceitful behavior, and I would also hope that Ambassador Picker- ing will address the basic issue as to whether it is realistic to expect compliance with Iraq as long as Saddam Hussein is in power. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. YATRON. Thank you. I would like to recognize the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Penny, for a statement he would like to make. IRAQI COMPLIANCE AND HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS Mr. PENNY. Thank you. I again appreciate the subcommittee offering me an opportunity to participate. I may not be able to stay for very long. My daughter has a piano recital today, but this is an issue that has been very dear to my heart. I want to express to Ambassador Pickering, first of all, my appre- ciation for U.N. Resolution 706. While we are a long ways from full implementation of that resolution, I do appreciate the seriousness with which we are proceeding to achieve compliance with the reso- ution. If the oil sales occur, that money will then be made available in part for humanitarian relief effort, which would benefit dramati- cally the civilian population in Iraq. I also appreciate the letter that Mr. Pickering sent to me recent- ly, in response to questions that I raised about the implementation of U.S. Resolution 706. Toward the end of the letter, there was some hint that the fund established could accept contributions from other revenue sources, and that might include assets at some point, and I would appreciate it if the door weren't totally closed on the possibility of using assets to supplement the relief effort at some point in the future. Because, clearly, the problem persists and, in fact, grows worse. I’ve received a study that hasn't been finalized as yet, but it was conducted by the International Commission on the Gulf Crisis, which estimates the mortality rate in Iraq for children under 5 is 380 percent higher today than prior to the war. 159 Nearly 29 percent of the children assessed in the study were mal- nourished and some 900,000 Iraqi children suffer from malnourish- ment today. Thirty to 50 percent of the children born in Iraq today suffer from low birth weight compared to 12 to 14 percent prior to the war. Food shortages have resulted in increases of 2,000 to 3,000 per- cent for the price of infant formula. Water supplies continue to be inadequate for many hospital facilities-the list goes on and on. And these are the kinds of needs that can be addressed when and if we receive proceeds from those oil sales or other sources. I would again ask that the administration and our allies act with some ur- gency to see to it that no more time is wasted in securing the reve- nues necessary to provide for a meaningful relief effort. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for your holding this hearing, and for the opportunity for me to appear. Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Penny. Ambassador Pickering, we welcome you and Mr. Wolf here today. We recognize that you have to leave by 3:30, so if possible, please summarize your statement so we have more time for ques- tions. You may proceed any time you would like. Mr. Wolf, we have your statement. If there is anything you want to add, you can do so after the Ambassador finishes, but if not, we will just go ahead with questions. Mr. Ambassador. STATEMENTS OF HON. THOMAS R. PICKERING, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND HON. JOHN S. WOLF, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you very much, Chairman Yatron and Chairman Hamilton, and members of the committee. Once again, I welcome the opportunity to brief you and examine the implementation of the ceasefire resolution, Security Council Resolution 687. I will try to summarize and move through what is a very long statement, with a few of the key points and hope you will have an opportunity to draw out and question any further in- formation you would like. By way of introduction, before reviewing developments since July 18th, let me make a more general observation. As I commented before you last April, Resolution 687, the foun- dation of the most comprehensive ceasefire program in modern his- tory, is an historic document with many unprecedented elements. Consistent with the path-breaking character of 687 is the plan re- cently adopted by the Security Council to carry out a part of these resolutions providing for the long-term monitoring of Iraq’s nucle- ar, chemical, biological and ballistic missile programs. This plan mandates the strongest, most extensive verification procedures and the most effective enforcement provisions in the history or arms control. 160 IRAQI NON-COMPLIANCE The Iraqi Government has repeatedly violated the provisions of the Security Council’s resolutions. The first six months of inspec- tions by the Special Commission and IAEA have begun to illumi- nate Iraq’s covert programs for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Iraq has misrepresented the number and scope of development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Then it has revealed that information when compelled by U.N. in- spectors and inspectors and international pressure, in a way that is calculated to avoid further action by the Council. It has used deception and concealment to prevent U.N. inspec- tion teams from locating equipment subject to elimination under 687; and it has denied U.N. inspection teams full and unrestricted access to facilities associated with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With these comments, let me just turn to one of the most impor- tant challenges at hand, the task of inspecting and destroying Iraqi strategic weapons program, elements in developing a plan for the future ongoing monitoring of Iraq’s strategic weapons-related ac- tivities. NUCLEAR PROGRAM Then, as you will see in my statement, a number of points are made, the most important of which is that Iraq was engaged in an ambitious nuclear weapons development program, which may have been within one to two years of producing a nuclear weapon at the time it was interrupted. It deployed at least three different methods of uranium enrich- ment to attempt production of sufficient quantities of weapons grade material—centrifuge, chemical and electromagnetic isotope separation processes. It produced several pounds of lithium 6, and documents showed plans to produce approximately 220 pounds a year. The most likely use of this element is in the manufacture of enhanced or boosted nuclear weapons. The program also made substantial progress on weapons design and development as shown by evidence of five successful refine- ments in the design of a nuclear explosive device, by testing of a surface-to-surface missile as a potential delivery system; by comput- er simulations of nuclear explosions; and by high explosive testing and the shaping and fabrication of some key prototype parts of the evice. EXTENSIVE PROCUREMENT PROGRAM This process was supported by an extensive program of interna- tional procurement, using both dual-use technology and sensitive nuclear weapons-related technology, some of the purchases of which probably violated the laws of the exporting countries. Com- mercial relationships also included training and operation of the equipment procured and were protected by an elaborate system of false end-use certifications and code names. These and earlier findings have twice led the International Atomic Energy Agency to declare Iraq in violation of its safeguards 161 , agreements, and twice led the Security Council to declare Iraq in violation of its resolution. Additional findings may well result in further such declarations. The documents in theU.N.’s possession suggest that Iraq may still be withholding information and equipment associated with it for its clandestine nuclear weapons program. It continues to conceal the true extent of that program. And, in the view of the U.N. inspectors who have examined recent Iraqi correspondence found at one of the sites, it may still actively enter- tain nuclear weapons aspirations. Then, in addition to these activities, Iraq has continued system- atically to violate Resolutions 687 and 7 07 , as well as their agree- ment with the United Nations on the activities of inspection teams. Some of those are detailed in my written remarks. MONITORING PROGRAM I then discuss the question of future ongoing monitoring in some detail, the initial aspects of which are covered in an earlier part of my statement. But it is true that the obligations established by the provisions of 687 and 707 are more extensive and intrusive than those required under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. They require methods of verification and monitoring which are much greater in scope and intensity than those used by the IAEA to sat- isfy Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty safeguards requirements. The evasion and deceit by which Iraq has sought to dodge the non-nuclear provisions of the ceasefire resolution are similar in its performance, to what it has been doing with respect to nuclear weapons of mass destruction. CHEMICAL WEAPONS When we met in July, I reported that the chemical arsenal of Iraq was in a highly unstable condition. There is no clear under- standing of the content of individual munitions, and Iraqi employee injury from agents is extremely high. On top of this generally deplorable state of the munitions them- selves, we now know that Iraqi authorities grossly underdeclared their stocks of chemical weapons to the Special Commission. Iraq now acknowledges possession of 46,000 agent-filled munitions and 79,000 unfilled munitions. The destruction program has begun. In July, when we met, you may recall we were skeptical of Iraq’s denial that it had a biological weapons program. In August, the Special Commission conducted its first biological weapons inspec- tion, and Iraq acknowledged work in the Salman Pak facility on several microorganisms for military applications. Following the second biological inspection, the Special Commission concluded three sites in Iraq would require continued monitoring to guard against the future BW-related use. On ballistic missiles, since destroying Iraq’s declared ballistic missiles, launchers, related equipment and production capacity, as well as its so-called “Super Gun,” the Special Commission is now concentrating its efforts on locating what is believed to be several hundred or more undeclared Scud or related missiles. With the recent addition of several helicopters, the Special Commission’s ca- 162 pacity to search for the missing missiles will, we hope, be greatly enhanced. ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS On the question of enforcement, as we have seen, Saddam is com- prehensively untrustworthy. Therefore, it is vitally important he not misunderstand either the seriousness of the Security Council or the determination of the United States to ensure the intent of Res- olutions 687, 707 and 715 is obeyed. As you know, we have had to emphasize this point on two recent occasions. On one of these, regarding the use of helicopters for Spe- cial Commission transportation and surveillance, you will note Saddam tried to reject the Security Council’s authority. We and the Security Council made crystal clear that his persistence could only result in very severe consequences. He understood the message, and helicopters are now used in conducting ballistic missile searches. The second occasion had to do with custody of documents. After interfering on September 23rd, he attempted to deny access again the following day, and went so far as to detain the inspection team for four days. The Security Council reacted, and let it be known that refusal to free the team and relinquish the documents could only lead to very grave consequences. Again, he comprehended the message. The inspectors were freed with the documents in their possession. But, Mr. Chairman, Saddam is playing a risky game. His recent speeches cast a doubt on his willingness to implement the resolu- tion thoroughly and completely. POSITION OF SECURITY COUNCIL The Security Council is, as are we, deadly serious about this. Saddam must understand the real costs of miscalculation in this area. On the subject of the U.N. sanctions regime, the most important news is the international community remains stalwart and firmly behind it. Relatively small amounts of smuggled goods do continue to cross Iraq’s borders, yet with this exception, the regime is being applied by virtually every government in the world. At the same time, the Council has maintained an active concern for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. In the period from March up to the present, planned shipments to Iraq of some 3.3 million tons of food, as well as other essential supplies needed by the Iraqi civilian population, were notified to the Sanctions Com- mittee under procedures established in Resolution 687. It is also es- timated by the U.N. that about half of this tonnage has actually gone in to Iraq. On the 15th of August, the Security Council took a major further step. It adopted Resolution 7 06, allowing Iraq to sell up to $1.6 bil- lion worth of oil. About two-thirds of this sale would be applied to the purchase of additional food and essential civilian goods, and to compensate the U.N. for the cost of carrying out this and other hu- manitarian functions in Iraq. 163 The balance of the sum would provide interim financing for the U.N. Compensation Fund, the costs associated with the Iraqi weap- ons of mass destruction program, expenses associated with the return of Kuwaiti property, and half the costs of the Boundary Commission. The United Nations has adopted inspection and monitoring pro- cedures designed to assure equitable distribution of humanitarian imports permitted by Resolution 706, and to deny direct benefit to Saddam and his regime. My written statement sets out these points in some detail. I would like also to talk about the ceasefire resolution, which has mandated a tough permanent arms embargo against the Iraqi im- ports of technology for weapons of mass destruction, as well as a ban on the import of conventional weapons until such time the Se- curity Council finds Iraq in compliance with 687 and subsequent relevant resolutions. Needless to say, the tight noose which continues to encircle Iraq is a consequence of the overall—- Mr. YATRON. Mr. Ambassador, excuse me for interrupting, but if you could try to conclude in another minute or so, and members want time to ask questions. Ambassador PICKERING [continuing]. Is also a highly effective antidote to arms acquisition. I then briefly discussed the compensa- tion fund, the successful United Nations Border Observation Force, the Boundary Commission, the problem of detainees and return of property, humanitarian issues, and financing the ceasefire imple- mentation, which we are, as I just noted, looking to Iraq to finance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for a very thorough statement. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Pickering follows:] 164 V ,_ -4 -_ fie‘ P as STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING US PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS .m~ before the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, and SUBCOMMITTEE ul'ECROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST _.. ‘I OCTOBER 21, 1991 Chairman Yatron, Chairman Hamilton, Members of the committees once again I welcome the opportunity to brief the Committees on the implementaion of the ceasefire resolution, Security Council resolution 687. I Before reviewing developments since July l8, the occasion of our last discussion of the various elements of the ceasefire accord, let me make a more general observation. As I commented before this body last April, resolution 687, the foundation of the most comprehensive ceasefire program in modern history, is an historic document with many unprecedented elements. Consistent with the pathbreaking character of 687 is the plan recently adopted by the security council to carry out a part of these resolutions providing for thelong term monitoring of Iraq's nuclear, CBW and ballistic missile programs. This compliance monitoring plan mandates the strongest, most extensive verification procedures and the most effective enforcement provisions in the history of arms control arrangements. .h~ " f‘fl€£ Like many of what I would call the ‘brave new institutions‘ established by resolution 687 - the Compensation Fund,-tflg Boundary Commission, the special Commission on weapons of male destruction, the sanctions committee, and the security Council guarantee of Kuwaiti borders - the compliance monitoring plan adds another chapter to the book on robust international action. It is our hope that the plan may prove to be a formative experience which strengthens global cooperation in other security and non-security contexts. But if these arrangements are to serve future needs they must first meet the challenges of the present. I. weapons of Mass Destruction: Nuclear The Iraqi government has repeatedly violated the provisions of the Security Council's resolutions. The first six months of inspections by the UN Special Commission and the IAEA have begun to illuminate Iraq's covert programs for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Iraq has: -- misrepresented the number and scope of development of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, then revealed that information, when compelled by UN inspectors and international pressure, in a way calculated to avoid further action by the Security Council; \ .7%§ . . '-_'_':_ P I‘ 165 ’_ Ir". -. ?e -2.. - -- it has used deception and concealment to prevent UN inspection teams from locating equipment subject to elimination under resolution 687; -- and it has denied UN inspection teams full and unrestricted access to facilities associated with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. with these comments let me turn to one of the most important challenges at hand, the task of inspecting and destroying the Iraqi nuclear weapons program and developing a plan for the future ongoing monitoring of Iraqi nuclear weapons-related activity. Since Iraq declared only one nuclear-related site back in April, the IAEA and the speical commission utilized fully their mandate to designate and inspect suspect sites. It is this courageous and aggressive use of short notice inspections at suspect nuclear sites, despite Iraqi efforts at cat—and-mouse obstruction and even in the face of Iraqi intimidation, that produced the deeply sobering discoveries concerning the Iraqi nuclear program. Let me summarize them for you: -- Iraq engaged in an ambitious nuclear weapons development program which may have been within one to two years of producing a nuclear weapon at the time it was interrupted; -— Iraq employed at least three different methods of uranium enrichment to attempt production of sufficient quantities of weapons grade material -- centrifuge, chemical and electromagnetic isotope separation. -- Iraq has already produced several pounds of lithium 6, and documents showed plans to produce approximately 220 pounds a year. The most likely use of lithium 6 is in the manufacture of enhanced nuclear weapons: -- The Iraqi program had also made substantial progress on weapons design and development as shown by evidence of five successive refinements in the design of a nuclear explosives device, by testing of a surface-to-surface missile as s potential delivery system; by computer simulations of nuclear explosions; by high explosive testing and by the shaping and fabrication of some key prototype parts of a device. -- Iraqi weapons development was supported by extensive international procurement of both dual-use technology and sensitive nuclear weapons related technology, some of the purchase of which probably violated the laws of the exporting countries; -- Such commercial relationships often included training in operation of the equipment procured and were protected by an elaborate system of false end-use certifications and code names; e 1 166 -3- -- These and earlier findings have twice led the Iara to declare Iraq in violation of its safeguards agreements and twice led the security Council to declare Iraq in violation of its resolutions. Additional findings may well result in further such declarations. -— Finally, documents in the UN's possession suggest that Iraq may still be withholding information and equipment associated with its clandestine nuclear weapons program. It continues to conceal the true extent of that program and in the view of UN inspectors who have examined recent Iraqi correspondence found at one of the sites, it may still actively entertain nuclear weapons aspirations. In addition to these illegal activities - and in large part to prevent information about them from reaching UN hands - the Iraqis have continued systematically to violate resolutions 687 and 707, as well as their agreement with the UN on the privileges and immunities of the inspection teams, by: -- Forcible detention of the inspection teams; first for five hours, and a second time for 92 hours; -- Confiscation of documents collected during the sixth team's first inspection visit; -- Interruption of access to the second inspection site before the team had completed its work. -- Refusal to disclose the location of equipment (centrifuge, EMIS devices) and other documents related to its nuclear program. Future Ongoing Monitoring This stark and sobering record, mirrored in important respects by Iraq's deceitful performance regarding its chemical, biological and missile weapons programs, has had a galvanizing effect upon the Security Council, reinforcing its determination to compel Iraqi compliance. The perfect clarity and unmistakable seriousness of the Council's intent was once again communicated to Saddam on October ll in the form of resolution 715, which was adopted unanimously, and provided for permanent, extensive oversight of any Iraqi activities with possible bearing on nuclear and non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear monitoring plan incorporated in Resolution 715 was prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and will be implemented by that agency in cooperation with the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). Let me take a few moments to summarize its salient features: 167 -4- ' -- The plan took force at the time of its adoption by the Council two weeks ago. -- Like the non-nuclear monitoring plan, the nuclear plan incorporates relevant aspects of both Resolution 687 and Resolution 707. The 687 provisions are those on non-acquisition or development, site declaration, aerial surveillance, custody of materials related to the nuclear weapons program, site inspection, and compliance with future monitoring. The relevant provisions of Resolution 707, adopted August 15 after a Security council finding of flagrant Iraqi non-compliance with 687, constitute specific and detailed directions to Iraq on actions necessary to bring it into compliance. These directives are now central to the new monitoring regime. They include: -- immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all facilities, equipment, personnel, records, or any item the inspectors may wish to inspect; -- immediate cessation of efforts to conceal or deny access; -- non-interference with the special Commission, the IAEA and inspection team conduct of fixed wing and helicopter flights; and -— cessation of nuclear activities of any kind - including production of nuclear materials - except for isotopes for use in medical, agricultural or industrial purposes. The obligations established by the provisions of 687 and 707 just summarized are more extensive and intrusive than those required under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They require methods of verification and monitoring which are much greater in scope and intensity than those used by the IAEA to satisfy NPT safeguards requirements. Let me cite some examples: -- First, within 30 days Iraq shall provide the IAEA and thereafter maintain current information regarding: inventories of all nuclear material, all facilities where nuclear activity of any kind has been or may be conducted, all isotopes used for medical, agricultural or industrial purposes, all sites supplied with greater than lo Megawatts of electricity and all existing or proposed programs of nuclear activities of any kind. -- Second, before importing or even using certain dual use and other items not specifically proscribed by resolutions 687 and 707 Iraq must first satisfy stringent criteria and secure the approval of the IAEA and in some cases the Security Council itself. 168 -5- ' -— Third, before Iraq may engage in the wider field of civilian nuclear uses initially permitted under resolution 687, but subsequently prohibited by the more restrictive resolution 707, the security Council must find it in full compliance with the relevant provisions of both resolutions and the IAEA must conclude that it is in full compliance with that agency's safeguards agreement. -- Finally, once such determinations have been made, Iraq must obtain specific approval from the security Council before it is allowed to resume peaceful nuclear activities permitted under resolution 687. Given the sorry record of the current Iraqi regime, the United states intends to oppose such Security Council approval until we are convinced that Iraq intends to fully comply with international obligations, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. II. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Non Nuclear The evasion and deceit by which Iraq has sought to dodge the nuclear provisions of the ceasefire accord are similar to its performance with respect to non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Chemical You may recall that when we met in July I reported that Iraq's chemical arsenal was in a highly unstable condition, jeopardized by overpressure and widespread leakage. There is no clear understanding of the content of individual munitions and employee injury from agents is extremely high. On top of the generally deplorable state of the munitions themselves, we now know that Iraqi authorities grossly under-declared their stocks of chemical weapons to the special Commissiori Iraq now acknowledges possession of 46,000 agent-filled munitions and 79,000 unfilled munitions. The destruction program has now begun. It involves bringing to a central Iraqi location existing transportable facilities from other countries and using those for in-situ destruction of bulk agent and munitions. The special commission's inspectors have now witnessed the destruction of some 12,000 unfilled artillery shells. Destruction of filled shells should begin in early 1992 following completion of the special Commission's effort to catalogue all filled munitions. Biological 172 \ \ -9- Import Inspections and Distribution monitoring Equally specific procedures would apply to import inspections and in-country monitoring. In the former case we expect designation of specific import routes and entry points, and careful monitoring at those points. Documentation would be checked, packages could be opened and contents examined, and careful logs would be maintained. For distribution monitoring we seek a system that would facilitate rapid notification of leakages or diversions to the committee. While we regard the UN role as key, we would welcome NGO participation in distribution monitoring in light of valuable NGO experience in this area. Before any import program begins we would expect to have a cut-off mechanism in place for use in the event of significant fraud, leakage or diversion. I Unfortunately, although we have provided, in resolutions 706 and 712 the means to feed hungry Iraqis, and to aid the sick and infirm, there is still no sign that saddam will use it. Ironically, after stridently criticizing the us, the coalition and the UN for subjecting the Iraqi people to unprecedented hardship, Saddam is himself intensifying that suffering by rejecting an opportunity to greatly lessen it. IV. Arms Embargo The ceasefire resolution also mandated a tough, permanent arms embargo against Iraqi imports of technology for weapons of mass destruction, as well as a ban on import of conventional weapons until such time as the Security Council finds Iraq in compliance with 687-and subsequent relevant resolutions. Needless to say, the tight noose which continues to encircle Iraq as a consequence of the overall sanctions and embargo regime is also a highly effective antidote to arms acquisition. You may recall that the secretary General developed detailed guidelines intended to help ensure effective and universal observation of the arms embargo. On June 17 the Security Council adopted those guidelines in resolution 700 and directed member states to bring their national legislation and practices in conformity with them. To date, approximately 50 countries have reported to the Secretary General on domestic measures taken to give effect to the arms embargo. V. Compensation Commission and Fund The ceasefire resolution provided a three part arrangement for dealing with Iraq's financial liability for the massive economic damage arising from its illegal aggression: a fund, financed by Iraqi oil exports, to compensate injured parties; a settlement process to handle claims; and a commission to manage the process and award payments. 173 -10- ' Resolution 687, the Secretary General's May 2 report on the Compensation Fund, and resolution 692 which adopted that report, set the basic approach to compensation: -- A percentage of Iraq's oil revenue will be set aside to 22 pay for claims and the Compensation Commission's costs. -— While the Commission itself will make this decision, the Secretary General has proposed a 30! ceiling, a figure the Security Council endorsed in resolution 705 in connection with the oil and humanitarian imports resolution. Our strong preference is that the actual contribution be set at 30t. -- The approach also requires an escrow account to ensure that funds flow to the UN. : The Executive Secretary of the Commission is Carlos Alzamora, the former Peruvian ambassador to the united Nations. Mr Alzamora has chosen a US citizen as one of his two senior deputies. At its first formal session, in July. we were pleased that the Commission decided to award priority to claims of individuals suffering personal losses up to $100,000. and then designed a simplified procedure for claims not exceeding $2,500. During informal working meetings last month the Commission also made progress on the oil mechanism to be adopted. Under this arrangement once sanctions are actually lifted oil sale proceeds will go to an escrow fund from which a percentage (yet to be agreed) will go to the Compensation Fund and the remainder to Iraq. On October 14 the Compensation Commission began its second formal meeting. At this session we are hoping for final agreement on the oil mechanism, further work on claims criteria and progress on decisions affecting the filing of claims. Of course, until Iraq's performance merits the lifting of sanctions this process will not be fully operational. In the interim the essential features are being developed and refined, a sophisticated but straightforward and I hope expeditious process is coming into being and of course the Fund itself will function if oil is pumped under SC 706 (oil/humanitarian imports program). VI. UNIKOM One of the cornerstones of the ceasefire resolution was the establishment of a demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait and the creation of an observer unit with participants from 32 countries to patrol it. The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) has recently completed its first six months of operation and the us is very pleased with its performance. It has been well led and well manned in harsh and trying Conditions. UNIKOM should continue operation for the forseeable future and we believe that no reductions in strength should be considered at this time. 174 -11- The recent six month review of UNIKOM provided an oppogtungty for the Security Council to address a pattern of Iraqi violation; and obstructionist tactics of growing concern to the Secretary General, the Council and ourselves. Particularly serious is the establishment of five Iraqi border posts inside Kuwait and an additional two posts within one kilometer of the DMZ in violation of UNIKOM ground rules accepted by both sides. In addition we have been troubled by the presence of significant numbers of Iraqis engaged in mine recovery efforts as well as others scavenging for weapons on the Kuwaiti side of the border. while ostensibly civilians, individuals collecting mines appear to be directly organized and coordinated by the Iraqi border police and are regularly subject to injury and loss of life. UNIKOM has made strenuous demarches to the Iraqis both in New York and Baghdad to stop these activities. I want to stress that we will not accept continued Iraqi violation of Kuwaiti borders. We have asked the Secretary General to take whatever steps he deems necessary to have the Iraqi border posts relocated and the other activities halted. we expect him to report back to the Security Council on these efforts so that the Council may take whatever additional steps may be required to assure Iraqi compliance. The United States believes UNIKOM has a critical role, not only now but in the future. The evidence of the scope of Iraq's weapons development program, its continuing efforts to conceal and preserve elements of its nuclear, chemical, ballistic and biological capacity stand as an admonition to vigilance on the part sf us all. As the UN's eyes and ears along the Iraq-Kuwait border UNIKOM is as much a means for vigilance as it is a symbol of the Security Counil’s guarantee against renewed Iraqi aggression. VII. Boundary Commission A vital part of building durable peace between Iraq and Kuwait involves defining tneir common border, which has given rise to a half century of disputes. The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission created for this purpose by resolution 687 is the first to be established by the UN under the aegis of the Security Council acting with the mandatory authority of Chapter VII. The Commission has already succeeded in demarcating Kuwait's western boundary, and is now reviewing means for addressing the Khawr Abd Allah. It is also engaged in surveying and mapping the northern boundary area in order to facilitate actual demarcation. Although the ground surveying operation has been complicated by the presence of mines, the Commission has received assistance from UNIKOM in mine removal and in surveying. It has also made use of Swedish aircraft for aerial photography. If the surveying-mapping process proceeds as expected the Commission should complete the demarcation itself by the end of February 1992. 175 -12- VIII. Detainees The sheer violence of Iraq's invasion and occupation produced mass refugee flights and resulted in extensive and brutal incarcerations of Kuwaitis and third country nationals, many of whom were forcefully removed to Iraq. The ceasefire resolution therefore attaches particular importance to dealing with the plight of missing persons. Although 6888 prisoners of war have been repatriated to Kuwait in the period from March to September, Kuwait asserts that there are an additional 2101 Kuwaiti nationals or former residents (1583 nationals, 518 non-Kuwaitis) who are either missing persons or detainees still held by Iraq and that Iraq is denying ICRC access to locations where many are held. The list has been passed to Iraq via the ICRC but there has been no Iraqi response. In the meantime the ICRC has registered an additional 3506 persons in Iraq wishing to return to Kuwait. Kuwait, which has admitted only about 200 from the list, is in the process of checking the balance of the names against its national register. However, it is contending that a significant number appear to be Iraqi agents, and that a large majority are not Kuwaitis and departed freely anyway. The Arab League is attempting to mediate the dispute. IX. Return of Property The ceasefire resolution also provided for UN supervised transfe" of Kuwaiti property stolen by Iraq. After a slow start, Iraq has now returned Kuwaiti gold, banknotes, coins, national library books and manuscripts, Islamic heritage museum items, Kuwaiti Press Agency equipment, and a Kuwaiti Air airplane. Iraq is also in the process of returning National Museum items. Kuwaiti officials, museum curators, librarians and others are still checking returned items for condition and completeness, a process hampered by Iraq's failure to make an accounting of the property taken from Kuwait. outstanding items of special interest to Kuwait include Hawk missile batteries, equipment belonging to the Ministries of Health and Defense (including airplane spare parts and engines) and Kuwaiti Maritime Company equipment. X. Humanitarian Issues Since its inception the UN humanitarian aid program in Iraq has provided care and protection for Iraqi refugees and internally displaced civilians returning to their homes. The effort, under the overall supervision of Sadruddin Aga Khan, the Secretary General's Executive Delegate (OED), has involved UNHCR, UNICEF, H80, and wrr as well as large numbers of NGO personnel. These agencies and private organizations continue to provide food, clean water, and basic health and sanitation programs to at least two 176 -13- million refugees and returnees and millions of other vulnerable people inside Iraq. In addition, some 470 UN guards have been deployed, mainly in northern Iraq, to protect the over 800 UN personnel there and also as a visible expression of international concern regarding - and another source for monitoring - the human rights of the uprooted or at-risk population. One way to measure the effect of these efforts and the remarkable contributions of Operation Comfort is to look at the numbers. At the end of September there were only 4,000 Kurdish and other Iraqi refugees remaining in Turkey from the original total of about 450,000. or the 1.4 million who fled to Iran during April and nay, about 120,000 remained. A large number of those returning were assisted by transport, food and basic household items provided through the UN in order to facilitate reintegration into their former towns and villages. Yet their have been significant problems. While UN personnel, including UN Guards, have established a full-time presence in Baghdad, Dohuk, Erbil, Mosul, and Sulamanya in the north, and Basra in the south, they have been prevented from doing so in Kirkuk or Nasiriyah. In fact about 200,000 returnees remain in temporary shelter in the Kirkuk region waiting for the UN to establish a full-time presence in the city itself so that they will feel safe to go home. In addition, fighting has recently broken out again between Kurdish troops and Government forces in the northeast. This has caused a reverse flow of refugees as people who had recently returned to their homes were again forced to flee to safer areas. Luckily, there are no reports of UN casualties, but UN personnel have nonetheless been caught in the crossfire and UNHCR vehicles have been fired upon. Overhanging the Iraqi humanitarian situation is the fact that the Memorandum of Understanding between the Executive Delegate and the Iraqi government, outlining the privileges and immunities of UN personnel in Iraq, expires December 31. However, large sections of the Iraqi population will continue to require significant assistance beyond that date. It is our hope that resolutions 706 and 712, the basis of the proposed oil-humanitarian import program, will provide the umbrella under which continued assistance will be extended to the at-risk Iraqi population. However, since Saddam has not yet accepted the terms of this program, the future of the humanitarian situation remains unclear. 178 Mr. YATRON. Mr. Wolf. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN S. WOLF Mr. WOLF. Just a couple comments to augment in the areas that Ambassador Pickering did not cover. I have a longer statement that Assistant Secretary Bolton would have liked to have presented for the record. As you know, he is in Paris completing the details on the Cambodia agreement. Mr. Chairman, the situation in Iraq remains multidimensional and very complex. The humanitarian side is one which has had a lot of scrutiny. Saddam Hussein would have sought to gain political advantage by depicting the misery of Iraq’s civilian population as a result of the war, and the continued economic sanctions. For a number of the reasons Ambassador Pickering has mentioned, and others, we believe this is false. The international community has continued to focus a great deal of attention on this. There have been a number of studies that have been done. There is a considerable amount of food that is going in. IRAQI GOVERNMENT IS THE PROBLEM The problem in Iraq is not so much an issue of sanctions but rather the availability. There remains the consistent pattern of the Iraqi Government to deny food, medicine and other humanitarian needs to broad segments of the Iraqi population. That is why the procedures that have been established in Resolu- tions 706 and 712 are so important, because they provide the means by which the international community can sell food for Iraqi oil and ensure it is distributed to those people in Iraq who most need gt. It is not a problem of availability as much as a problem of distri- ution. The weapons of mass destruction subject which Ambassador Pickering has mentioned is of enormous concern. Saddam Hus- sein’s continued efforts to defy the Resolutions of the Security Council pose grave risks to the entire world. The courage and sense of duty demonstrated by the U.N. inspectors are a tribute to the inspectors and a heartening symbol of the more effective United Nations. . We, and other nuclear weapon states, have assisted the United Nations by providing critical intelligence information and skilled experts who have been critical to the inspection process. The Secu- rity Council has demonstrated the will to see this effort through. Mr. Chairman, Saddam Hussein’s continuation in power chal- lenges the values of civilized people everywhere. For our part, we intend to do what we can to reduce the threat he poses to his people and to ensure he cannot threaten its neighbors and the rest of the world. 179 The road ahead is long; there are bound to be more difficult mo- ments. Yet, the U.N.’s perseverance over the 15 months since August 2, 1990, reaffirms that faith in the United Nations has not been misplaced, and shows well for an increased U.N. role in inter- national problem-solving as the international system continues to evolve. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Wolf follows:] Q E 180 . as I .1» " 9)‘ ' . Thank you Chairman Hamilton and Chairman Yatron. I appreciate this opportunity to update you and the other members of your two subcommittees on Iraq’s compliance with the requirements of Security Council Resolution 687 and related issues. As you are well aware, there have been several developments since my last appearance here in July. Weapons of Mass Destruction The most serious of these is Iraq’s continued efforts to evade and obstruct the UN in discovering and destroying its weapons of mass destruction. It has become even clearer that Iraq was pursuing a multi-faceted program aimed at developing nuclear weapons, as well as other programs related to chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles. Despite firm and clear requirements spelled out in Resolution 687, which Iraq accepted, Iraqi authorities failed to disclose major aspects of these programs. In fact, despite being confronted with clear incontrovertible evidence -- a literal "smoking gun" -- on its nuclear weapons program, Iraq has yet to admit that its nuclear program was anything other than research for peaceful applications. 181 JOHN S. WOLF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE Since July, Iraqi authorities have continued to lie, evade, and obstruct the UN. They have tried unsuccessfully to prevent use of UN helicopters to transport inspection teams throughout Iraq -- even after the Security Council passed Resolution 707 which explicitly affirms the UN’s right to use its own aircraft in Iraq -- and then tried to impose conditions on use of these helicopters. They have tried at gunpoint to prevent inspectors removing documentary evidence from suspect sites in Iraq; on one occasion seizing incriminating documents and removing critical items before returning them; on another, blockading the inspectors in a parking lot for four days before allowing documents to be removed, thereby giving themselves time to remove or destroy documents from other facilities. They actually had a bonfire in the building adjacent to the parking lot to destroy documents while the inspectors were being detained. The Iraqis continue to play shell games seeking to prevent evidence from falling into the UN’s hands. They have failed to disclose the existence of all ballistic missiles and launch facilities, but some have been subsequently discovered by the inspectors. In short, despite solemn pledges of cooperation, the government of Iraq continues to demonstrate an outrageous cynicism toward the Security Council and its mandatory resolutions. 182 . - 3 - Despite Iraq’s behavior, the UN continues to persevere in its critical job of ferreting out all aspects of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The courage and sense of duty demonstrated by the UN inspectors in the face of adversity and danger is a tribute to themselves and a heartening symbol of the more effective United Nations this country and others have worked for. We, and other nuclear weapons states have assisted the UN by providing critical intelligence information and skilled experts which have been critical to the success of the inspection process. The Security Council has demonstrated the will to see that Iraq does not reemerge as a threat to international peace and security, and the determination to provide UN personnel with the writ and the wherewithal to do the job outlined in Resolution 687 thoroughly. Saddam Hussein is seriously miscalculated once again if he believes he can outlast the international community’s determination in this matter. Saddam’s activities have only caused the UN to stiffen the terms contained in Resolution 687. The net result of Iraq’s intransigence is even more intrusive and comprehensive scrutiny. For example, under 687, Iraq might have been able to continue some benign nuclear-related activities. However, after Iraq’s obstructions and evasion of that resolution’s requirements, and the discovery of evidence that it had 183 _ 4 _ flagrantly violated the terms of the NPT and its IAEA safeguards agreement, the Security Council enacted Resolution 707, which, among other things, stipulates that Iraq will no longer be permitted Q1 nuclear programs, except for isotope use for medical, agricultural, or industrial applications. Iraq has squandered any benefit of the doubt which it may have enjoyed among some members of the international community. The pace and scope of inspections have been increased; the U.S. has provided reconnaissance aircraft to the Special Commission for its use in identifying weapons sites and tracing movements of equipment and weapons. It is up to the Security Council to relax the proscription on resumption of any nuclear programs in Iraq, and we, Mr. Chairmen, have no intention of approving such a relaxation under the present circumstances. UNIKOM and Border Demarcation We are also concerned with a recent series of apparent attempts by Iraq to test the UN role in monitoring the Kuwait-Iraq border area. Under the terms of Resolution 687, Iraq and Kuwait agreed, pending the UN’s demarcation of a border between them, to the establishment of a swath of territory that would be a demilitarized zone, patrolled by the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM). Iraq has taken advantage of provisions that allow the presence of lightly 184 . - 5 - armed police forces in this zone to establish Iraqi police posts in areas beyond Iraq’s legitimate borders. There have been numerous incidents in which Iraqi "civilians" (whether they are actually Iraqi military out of uniform is not clear) have been intercepted in the process of foraging for weapons and munitions, well inside Kuwait. Iraq has offered bounty for munitions and weapons found and is clearly encouraging this activity. We have received recent reports that Iraqi police are escorting these "civilians" to the border. UN IKOM has protested these recent incidents to Baghdad, and to the Iraqi Permanent Representative in New York. The work of the Boundary Commission is progressing slowly, largely because of the obstructionist behavior by the Iraqi member. The Secretary General has instructed the Commission to demarcate the water boundary in the Khor Abdullah, as well as the land between Iraq and Kuwait. Preliminary boundary markers are being set up in no-man’s land with the assistance of UNIKOM, and the Commission is holding its second formal session this month. Ret_urn of stolen Kuwaiti assets andmissingpersons After getting off to a slow start, return of stolen gold, currency and cultural property (museum pieces and books) 185 - 6 - is now proceeding. The UN is working on arrangements for the return of Kuwaiti aircraft from Iran. The one surviving civilian aircraft in Iraq has been returned. Iraq has not, however, returned stolen Kuwaiti military equipment, including I-Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, hospital equipment, or items stolen from commercial firms. As of September 28, the Kuwaitis state that 2,150 persons are missing. In Iraq, the ICRC has compiled a list of over 3,000 persons who applied for repatriation to Kuwait. According to the Kuwaiti National POW Committee, the ICRC list includes "anyone who wanted to go to Kuwait," and are clearly not those who are being held in prisons or other detention centers. The Kuwaiti’s claim most of these are non-detainees; the vast majority left Kuwait voluntarily before the outbreak of the war; and most are not Kuwaiti. Kuwait is endeavoring to check these names against their civil registration lists before agreeing to their return to Kuwait. Iraq is required to provide the ICRC with a complete list of Kuwaiti detainees, and to permit ICRC access to these persons, but has yet failed to do so. 186 -7- Humanitarian Issues On August 15, the Security Council adopted Resolution g 706 in response to repeated Iraqi requests to be allowed to resume sale of oil for the purchase of urgently needed food and other humanitarian items, and to fund other Iraqi obligations. While approving the sale of oil in order to meet the needs of Iraqi civilians before Winter, this resolution imposes very strict guidelines for Iraq to sell $1.6 billion of oil for these purposes. As part of the humanitarian aid component, the resolution requires the Secretary General to establish a system of monitoring and control that would prevent any revenues from this one-time sale of oil from reaching the coffers of the government of Iraq, and to ensure that humanitarian supplies are distributed throughout Iraq to population groups who are most in need. It should be noted that since March 22, when the Sanctions Committee lifted the embargo on food, shipments of some 3.3 million tons of food have been notified to the Sanctions Committee. On September 28, the Security Council adopted Resolution 712 which approved the Secretary General’s proposals for implementing Resolution 706. Over two months after passage of Resolution 706, and nearly a month after passage of 712, Iraq has still neither accepted nor rejected the terms of these resolutions, although various Iraqi officials have made highly critical comments concerning their provisions. 187 -3- A number of international teams have visited Iraq to assess humanitarian requirements. There is general agreement that certain groups in the Iraqi civilian population do indeed face serious food shortages and lack adequate medical care. These groups include, in particular, the Shia in southern Iraq, Kurds in the north, and poor Sunnis living in central Iraq, especially women and children. There is evidence that some of these groups have been deprived of adequate nutrition and medical care for an extended time, predating the invasion of Kuwait. While Saddam Hussein cynically calculated that the misery he has inflicted on his own people might serve to sway the international community on the lilting of sanctions, Resolutions 706 and 712 have disappointed him. However, if Iraq wants to obtain food and other humanitarian items, these Resolutions provide the mechanism for that to be done, and it is now up to the government of Iraq to permit these Resolutions to be implemented. There have been numerous Iraqi violations of both the letter and spirit of Resolution 688 which was adopted by the Security Council last April following the brutal repression of uprisings by both the Shia in the South and the Kurds in the North against Saddam’s regime. This resolution demands that the government of Iraq cease attacks against civilians and that 188 - 9 _ it permit unhindered UN access to the Iraqi people for the purpose of providing them assistance. Shia in the South In July, we received credible reports that a number of Shia, who had fled their homes following the brutal put down of their rebellion by Iraqi forces, were trapped in the vast marsh areas separating Southern Iraq and Iran. What made these reports most ominous were eyewitness accounts by UN personnel that the Iraqi army had surrounded part of these marshes and appeared intent upon keeping the Shia pinned down in an area totally unfit for human habitation. The Secretary General’s Executive Delegate, Saddrudin Aga Khan, in the course of his assessment mission to Iraq in July requested permission to visit the marsh lands and to establish a base for the UN to monitor the situation and provide assistance to the people in that area. Following several days of stalling, the Iraqi authorities finally allowed Saddrudin to travel to the area. It was clear to Saddrudin and his team that Iraqi military had been hastily withdrawn just prior to his visit. The UN staff which Sadruddin left to keep an eye on the situation were subsequently ordered out of the area by Iraq on the grounds that they were no longer needed, and as of now have not been permitted to return. 189 -10- We are disturbed that reports indicate that there are still numbers of people, including women and children, trapped in the marshes with little food, only swamp water to drink, and unable to return to their homes because of the continuing large military presence in the area. Kurds in the North Earlier this month, fighting again flared up between Iraqi forces and the Kurds in Northern Iraq. This renewed fighting came despite Saddam’s promise to work out a plan for increased Kurdish autonomy and some degree of democracy throughout Iraq. The fighting resulted in thousands of Kurdish men, women and children fleeing toward Iran and Turkey once again. This most recent fighting is only the latest in a series. It is clear that failure to work out an agreement that would provide for a degree of autonomy for the Kurds, as well as allow them to exercise there right to chose their own form of government will create further instability in northern Iraq, and fuel the deplorable cycle of violence in that region. Saddam’s continuing repression of the Kurds -- including indiscriminate sustained artillery bombardment of residential areas -- vastly complicates the UN s efforts to provide adequate shelter in the North before the onset of winter. so-323 0 - 92 - 7 190 -11- The UN has proposed that it open humanitarian centers in Kirkuk and Nasiriyah, but the government of Iraq has refused to concur. It bases its refusal on a deliberate misinterpretation of the Memorandum of Understanding it signed with the UN in April which provides for both the Iraqis and the UN to agree on locations for UN humanitarian centers. The Iraqis now claim the unilateral right to designate the location of these centers, and they have refused UN requests despite the 250,000 refugees located near these towns who have recently returned from Iran, but are prevented from getting to their homes by the Iraqi authorities. There are an estimated 300,000 people who have returned to the vicinity of their homes, but are still living in tents or other temporary shelter because their homes have either been destroyed or are unsafe because of fighting or the interposition of Iraqi forces. It is an outrage and a clear violation of Resolution 688 that the UN has been prevented from reaching these people to provide assistance. Implicatign_s The sweeping magnitude of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program as uncovered by the UN Special Commission and IAEA inspectors has taught the international community a valuable lesson. Iraq’s ability to evade and circumvent the safeguards of the IAEA and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which 191 - 12 - Iraq is a signatory, has dramatically demonstrated the need for an augmented non-proliferation regime. IAEA Direct:ciriGeneral Blix has made several proposals to members of the Security Council which would make possible much closer scrutiny of suspected violators of the NPT by involving the Security Council and by having countries providing information in their possession directly to the IAEA. We strongly support these recommendations, and are examining other ways of strengthening the oversight capability of the IAEA. Under Resolution 715, adopted October 11, the Security Council adopted plans submitted by the Secretary General and the Director General of the IAEA for long-term monitoring of Iraq in order to ensure that, after the Special Commission and the IAEA have completely and thoroughly carried out their mandates under Resolution 687 to eliminate all of Iraq’s present programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, Saddam cannot resume or reassemble any of these programs. The discovery of Iraq’s massive deception of the international community and -- in the case of its nuclear weapons program -- its blatant and wholesale violations of the NPT, have led to the development of a highly intrusive scheme that will keep Iraq under the closest possible international scrutiny for the foreseeable future. Although Saddam’s behavior and his ability to get as far along as he had in developing a nuclear weapons 192 - 13 - capability has called into question our reliance on the previous safeguards regime, this new plan of action does provide us with confidence that Iraq will not be able to realize its aspiration to become a nuclear power in the Middle East. Saddam Hussein’s continued brutality against his own people has driven many hitherto reluctant countries to concede that there may indeed arise circumstances in which extraordinary humanitarian needs compel the international community’s intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. This concern lies behind the substance of Resolution 688, and also indicates why Resolutions 706, and 712 are so strict in their requirements for UN control over Iraq’s future oil revenues. Under Resolution 687, the Security Council is to consider every 60 days whether Iraq is in compliance with the Resolution so that the economic sanctions can either be modified or terminated. There have been three such reviews to date. Saddam Hussein’s regime has done its utmost to evade requirements to disclose all details of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. It continues to make war upon Iraqi citizens who reject it. It has probed the firmness of the international community in enforcing Iraq’s border with 193 - 14 - Kuwait. It has not been difficult for Security Council members to agree that, given the continued blatant disregard for the requirements of resolution 687 by the government of Iraq, it would be completely inappropriate to consider lifting sanctions or modifying them in any way for the benefit of Iraq. In conclusion, Mr. Chairmen, Saddam Hussein’s continuation in power will present the international community with the challenge of seeing that he remains incapable of once again posing a threat to his own people, his neighbors and to the rest of the world. The UN has lived up to the daunting challenge of fulfilling the requirements of 687. The UN’s perseverance in this matter demonstrates that our faith in the UN has not been - misplaced, and bodes well for an increased UN role in international problem solving as the international system continues to evolve. 194 Mr. YATRON. Thank you. Now I would like to call on Chairman Hamilton. Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent to include the letter from Mr. Bolton, explaining why he could not be here today as part of the record. Mr. YATRON. Without objection.‘ COSTS OF MISCALCULATION Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Ambassador, you have interesting sentence in your statement which caught my eye on page 7. The sentence is “Saddam misunderstands the real cost of a miscalculation.” What are the real costs of a miscalculation? Ambassador PICKERING. Saddam must understand that the world community is united in not permitting its resolutions to fail to be implemented. The lesson he must draw is the one he failed to draw in August through February of last year and this year. The last several resolutions that had been passed on this issue, including specifically condemning the violations, by the Security Council, have brought all 15 members of the Security Council together. So, there is world unity on this issue. There is great strength de- ployed in the region to deal with any violations that might come up. I don’t want to carry it beyond that because, obviously, deci- sions that have to be made are well above the pay grade level of the people sitting here opposite you. Mr. HAMILTON. The real cost of miscalculation includes the possi- ble use of force, does it not? Ambassador PICKERING. It always has, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HAMILTON. Your statement is just filled with all kinds of in- dications that Iraq is still refusing to comply. Ambassador PICKERING. My statement is filled with indications of half-hearted, sporadic, lame, halting compliance. Nevertheless, as noted in the portions I read out on the essentials, time after time, he balks and then he seems reluctantly to come along, at least to the point that the inspections can continue. POTENTIAL USE OF FORCE Mr. HAMILTON. Does that pattern make you optimistic that we ?an g)et compliance with these U.N. Resolutions without the use of orce. Ambassador PICKERING. I hate to judge that, because he seems to be in a time of testing, and my sense is that the possible option of the use of force that you just described must remain out there and must remain continually in his eyes if we are going to secure the kind of compliance that we need. Mr. HAMILTON. At this point, we have no intention or no plan to use force. It is just a potential in reserve. Ambassador PICKERING. You know, Mr. Chairman, we get into hot water talking about plans and contingency plans. I cannot tes- tify to that. I am not privy to that material. I would only say what the President has said, and what the Security Council has said, and ‘ See appendix 11. 195 what has happened in the past. These are the kinds of object les- sons from which he should draw his conclusions. HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS IN IRAQ Mr. HAMILTON. You have perhaps seen the report by the Interna- tional Commission on the Gulf Crisis that was issued. It was funded by UNICEF and the McArthur Foundation, the Yarmouth Fund and OXFAM, I understand. They say that-and I recite now some of the key findings—that the mortality rate in Iraq for children under 5 is 380 percent higher today than prior to August 1990. That nearly 29 percent of the children assessed in the study were malnourished, and some 900,000 Iraqi children are malnourished today. Thirty to 50 percent of children born in Iraq today suffer from low birth weight, com- pared to 12 to 14 percent before the gulf war. Food shortages have resulted in an increase of 2,000 to 3,000 per- cent in the price of infant formula since August of 1990. The supply of water to most hospitals and health centers is sporadic and 30 percent of the hospital water resources is grossly polluted with fecal contamination. The report concludes that nearly two-thirds of the children inter- viewed believe they will not survive to become adults. Now, in the face of all that, we read in the paper this morning that Iraq refuses to accept the U.N. plan to sell oil for food and medicine. So, we have the situation where we have tried to help on the humanitarian side, giving them a plan, as it were, by which they could meet these urgent needs; even if this information is half correct, it still urgent—I think you would agree with me. We have given them a plan. Iraq says no, apparently, as far as I know, that is the status of it. What happens in that situation? They continue to say no to this plan. Awful suffering continues in Iraq. What do we do? Ambassador PICKERING. Well, I don’t want to quibble with the data. I don’t think we know specifically, but they do appear to be consistent with past data we have received and the recent resolu- tion that you referred to provides for a new baseline study. The question of next steps is important. In the last week the United Nations Sanctions Committee approved the exact steps that will have to be taken by Iraq to implement that resolution. The effort was to make these clear, straightforward, consistent with past Iraqi practice, and consistent with the requirements of the res- olution that Iraq and Saddam not derive any specific benefit. It also approved the procedures which would take the food from the point of export to the borders of Iraq. In addition to that, the Secretary-General and his special representative in the humanitar- ian area are looking at the procedures required to distribute the food inside Iraq. It is our hope that when those become available to Iraqis, they will see in fact this is a genuine program designed to provide hu- manitarian relief. I don’t know what their answer will be. I have heard the speech that you have just talked about referred to. It comes from a minister in the transport sector. We have con- sistently seen Iraq, before every one of these resolutions was ac- 196 cepted, make similar speeches and similar declarations, before they have accepted the resolutions. At this stage, I think the next steps are clearly Iraq’s. Iraq must become familiar with what is actually being required of it, in addi- tion to the general precepts of the resolution and the detailed im- plementation procedures. HOW LONG WILL SUFFERING OCCUR Mr. HAMILTON. How long do we let this suffering go on in Iraq to the children of Iraq? Ambassador PICKERING. TheU.N. is currently undertaking a pro- gram of providing assistance without charge to Iraq and that pro- gram involves a contribution of well over $500 million from the United States (including Operation Provide Comfort) of several hundred million dollars from Japan and Germany and other coun- tries as well. So there is a process of food flowing. I mentioned to you that 3.3 million tons of food have been or- dered by Iraq. At least half of that has apparently been shipped and is apparently being paid for by Iraq. In addition to that, we have just found out the Bank of Interna- tional Settlements which holds over $300 million of Iraqi assets is prepared to contribute those assets to the humanitarian relief pro- gram once the Iraqis approve the use of this funding. Mr. HAMILTON. You seem to be suggesting there is massive hu- manitarian effort now going on inside Iraq through these dona- tions. Ambassador PICKERING. I believe there is, both through Iraqis own purse and through the donations. Mr. HAMILTON. Who is carrying out that humanitarian effort? Ambassador PICKERING. It is being coordinated by the Secretary- General of the United Nations using his executive delegate as the major centerpiece and it involves the cooperation of many United Nations organization and many private voluntary organizations. This is in addition to food directly purchased by the Iraqis which finds its way into their own distribution system. Mr. HAMILTON. If we have got such a massive humanitarian effort going on, why do we get these statistics? Ambassador PICKERING. As I told you, sir, we need a good base- line study by the United Nations of precisely what the situation was. I don’t know enough to quibble about those figures. I don’t know what the baseline figure is. We know from our own experience that Southern Iraq and Northern Iraq have been massively deprived because of the un- equal distribution system organized by the government. So it is quite a complex situation. I don’t want to sit here and say there isn’t a problem. But I do want to say there are also other things going on besides the current Iraqi refusal to accept the provision of food which they would pay for under Resolution 706. SHORTFALL IN FUNDS Mr. HAMILTON. Is it correct the U.N. has only received about 50 percent of the amount pledged for the entire international humani- tarian effort? 197 Ambassador PICKERING. I believe that is possibly true. All I can tell you is the U.S. figures, which are very clear to us, involve $117 million through international organizations and over 500 million in total humanitarian assistance. This includes our in-kind contribu- tions. Mr. HAMILTON. How much of this money is actually going to Iraq to help relieve the humanitarian situation? Ambassador PICKERING. The 500 million plus relates in large part to the operation of the coalition forces in assisting the Kurds and I would think a large share of that is already there. Mr. HAMILTON. That was spent already in the North, almost all of that? Ambassador PICKERING. That is right. Mr. HAMILTON. The Kurdish situation? Ambassador PICKERING. That is in the North and that is a tradi- tionally deprived area. EXTENT OF HUMANITARIAN EFFORT Mr. HAMILTON. My concern here is the report of enormous suf- fering on the one hand--and I know you share concern for that, I don’t have any doubt about that-and the absolute position of Iraq. I know who gets the first blame here, it is Saddam Hussein for not permitting this to go forward. I understand that and agree with you on it. I also see the situa- tion we are in. If we are going to wait for a long, long time for Iraq to comply with that resolution, the amount of suffering that is going to take place in that country is going to be horrendous, ac- cording to the figures I have which may or may not be correct. In listening to you, I get the impression there is quite a large hu- manitarian effort going forward at this point in time. I am not aware of the extent of that, but that is outside the U.N. resolution. Ambassador PICKERING. That is outside the resolution on oil for humanitarian assistance, but it is inside Resolution 688 and some of the other resolutions which allow the Secretary General to engage himself. We would like nothing better than to have the United Nations provide us with an up-to-date assessment of the situation in all areas of Iraq. In the meantime, we have no way of saying that as- sessment you read from, or any other, is inconsistent with reality. We just don’t know. COMPANIES INVOLVED IN NUCLEAR PROGRAM Mr. HAMILTON. One other point I want to make before going back to Chairman Yatron. My understanding is that the United Nations special commission has developed a lot of information about the companies that provided Iraq with equipment and en- abled it to develop its nuclear weapons program. The question is: Does the Security Council intend to release that information specifically about what companies and countries were involved? What is the U.S. position with respect to whether they should do that or not? 199 supply that to me in writing as carefully as you can and correctly and what your assessment of it is. I would like to know exactly what you think the extent of the suffering is in that country. Your position is that you don’t really know puzzles me a lot. We have a lot of U.N. teams in there for a long time looking at a lot of places now. It seems to me we ought to have a pretty accurate assessment of whether this report by the International Commission on the Gulf Crisis is on the mark or way off the target. Ambassador PICKERING. The last comprehensive U.N. report was done in April and May of 1991. We have consistently pushed for a new update. We hope that will be forthcoming. Obviously the ques- tions here are how much can be spent on an update and how much can be spent on delivering humanitarian assistance. We will do our best to give you in writing the answers to the questions you raised. Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.1 U.N. RIGHTS IN IRAQ Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Ambassador, referring back to your testimony on Resolution 716, relating to weapons of mass destruction, should I take it to mean that as long as Saddam is in power, the U.N. reserves the right to enter Iraq at will for inspection purposes? Also, isn’t the U.N. risking future altercations with the Iraqi military by remain- ing so heavily involved in Iraq? Ambassador PICKERING. First, you are partially correct. The on- going, long-term monitoring plan stays on forever. It does not move when Saddam leaves. The question of future altercation with the Iraqi military, I think, relates to who is in charge. Our hope is if Saddam disap- pears from the scene we will keep sanctions on and continue in- spections as part of our policy. We would hope any future Iraqi military would not be in conflict with the U.N. We don’t think Iraq has any right or place to develop weapons of mass destruction. It was a committed member of the Nuclear Non- proliferation Treaty. What it was doing was completely contrary to its international obligations, to everything it said. We believe the ongoing monitoring program is now required in the face of these consistent violations, to insure that the world community knows and understands what Iraq is doing and whether it is in consonance with its obligations or against its obligations. FUTURE U.N. ROLE Mr. YATRON. Are you saying Iraq is going to have continual in- spection privileges? Ambassador PICKERING. The United Nations is going to have con- tinued inspection requirements. I would rather have it that way to insure Iraq does not in any way return to develop weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles over 150 kilometer range. ‘ See appendix 12. 200 Mr. YATRON. Your testimony details serious border violations by Iraq. Is Iraq rejecting UNIKOM’s mandate and does UNIKOM’s mandate need to be strengthened to deter Iraqi border violations? Ambassador PICKERING. I believe the Iraqis are testing UNI- KOM’s mandate and I believe the UNIKOM mandate is very clear. There should not be Iraqi police posts on the wrong side of the border and there should not be Iraqi-encouraged armed scavengers inside both Kuwait and the demilitarized zone. Recent efforts on the part of the U.N. have reduced, if not elimi- nated, entirely the scavenging effort being conducted by Iraq. At least one of the five police posts, I believe, has been moved and there is great pressure to move the others. The Security Council will follow this very closely and that if fur- ther action is required, I believe the Secretary General can depend upon the Security Council to support him in any action he needs to take under this particular provision of the resolution. IRAQ CHALLENGES UNIKOM Mr. YATRON. But then is Iraq continuing to challenge UNIKOM’s mandate? Ambassador PICKERING. I would say Iraq is continuing to find ways at least to slip around the mandate but these aren’t direct challenges. They are however, recognized clearly, in our view, as challenges and there are clearly efforts the United Nations is making to meet them. Mr. YATRON. Is there any evidence to suggest private voluntary organizations are having more success in delivering food and medi- cal shipments to vulnerable population centers in Iraq and the United Nations? Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t see any evidence that I know of to suggest one is any better than the other. They all operate under the same ground rules with respect to the Iraqi Government. The ground rules were negotiated by the United Nations and set down the arrangements for all these organizations cooperating with the United Nations in terms of their right to access and their ability to move around the country and distribute food. I don’t see competition there. I have no reports that one group is doing it better or less well than another. MILITARY ACTION IN NORTH Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Wolf, according to your testimony, the Kurds in northern Iraq are being continually bombarded by Iraqi artillery shells. What steps are being taken by the U.N. Security Council to stop Iraq from bombing these areas, and does the U.N. have any author- ity under the relevant Security Council resolutions to dispose of any of the artillery pieces being used against the Kurds? Mr. WOLF. I think the answer to the latter question is no, Mr. Chairman, but Resolution 688 was very specific in terms of requir- ing the Iraqis to cease repression of its various populations; that resolution remains in force. The U.N. has tried to use its good of- fices to try to attenuate the fighting. 201 The fighting has, in fact, gone down in the last few days. It was a major problem earlier in the month and it was a problem which slowed down U.N. operations in terms of providing relief. It also caused, as you have read in the newspaper, some large numbers of people to flee from the mountain areas and away from the urban areas. This, again, is one of these instances wherein Iraqi Government actions make it more difficult for the United Na- tions to provide the assistance they are able to provide. Mr. YATRON. Iraq is ignoring those resolutions regarding the Kurds, Mr. Wolf. Mr. WOLF. There was a flare-up of fighting. It has now ended. Mr. YATRON. Thank you. The gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos. VIOLATIONS OF SANCTIONS Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. Mr. Ambassador, in this exceptionally fine statement you made, you indicated that we are deadly serious and the Security Council is deadly serious. You have also indicated that Saddam Hussein is comprehensively untrustworthy, but very distressing television re- ports coming out of Iraq indicate that the reconstruction of the country is proceeding at a remarkable pace, that, obviously, the sanctions are being violated by several countries. It is clear that imports are reaching Iraq in huge quantities that enable them to re-build their infrastructure. There are reports that Jordan is importing food at a rate far exceeding its own domestic needs. I am just wondering if you will be able to tell us with as much specificity as you have who is violating the sanctions at the moment, because it seems to some of us we haven’t only got a smoking gun, we have a whole smoking arsenal. Are we prepared to release the names of the companies that contributed to this international criminal act of making Saddam Hussein the head of a country with chemical, nuclear, biological, missile capabilities? Unless we are now prepared to speak plain English as to who is violating the sanctions today, Saddam Hussein will continue to laugh at us. He just sent his prime minister who advised him to respect the sanctions, live up to the sanctions. He clearly has a very simple battle plan, and his battle plan is to lie and conceal at every step of the way, given only when he is caught red-handed, and hope that the pressure from the U.N. will diminish, that people will get tired, that new international issues will emerge, and he will be able to consolidate his capability to rule Iraq into the indefinite future. What I am really asking is: are we prepared, and through our influence as the United Nations Security Council, to stay there until all chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile capabilities are destroyed? Are we prepared to continue inspection, intrusive inspection, on a permanent basis, as long as the Saddam Hussein regime stays in power? 202 Because if we don’t, it is self-evident that we will merely provide him with an opportunity to prepare and move more intelligently next time. Ambassador PICKERING. Congressman Lantos, with respect to your last two questions, the answer is very clearly yes. That is a requirement we originated, that we supported in the Security Council and, in fact, in voting for it we made it mandatory upon ourselves, as well as upon Iraq, to do all this. There are one or two factual points that I think we need to clari- fy. I don’t have information that shows massive re-building. I have information that shows sporadic re-building of certain key ele- ments of his infrastructure. He is cannibalizing some power plants in order to bring up one or two that were knocked out. There is some work going ahead on bridge structures and that kind of thing, possibly using military elements, possibly using cement and other facilities in-country. The other point I would make is food shipments are not prohibit- ed. They should be notified. Thus far Jordan and Turkey and other countries are notifying food shipments to the United N ations, which are permitted under the sanctions regime to go ahead. The question is does Iraq have the money to pay for these. So far that seems to be the case. There is even some evidence Iraq is moving gold reserves out to pay for this food. Mr. LANTOS. Is any country at the present time violating the sanctions? Ambassador PICKERING. There may well be some such violations. If they are, generally speaking, we are bilaterally in touch with the country involved in order to try to put a stop to it. That is our first recourse. Mr. LANTOS. What countries have you been in touch bilaterally? Ambassador PICKERING. I can’t give you that information. I will see if we have some such information available. Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. [The information follows:] We have had confidential bilateral contacts with a number of governments on the issue of sanctions compliance as part of the ongoing cooperative effort to monitor and maintain the UN-mandated sanctions against Iraq. Such contacts are not neces- sarily indicative of government-backed violations. Periodically, the US will receive indications of potential violations, occasionally unwitting, on the part of individual public or private entities and will ask the appropriate government to look into the matter. A spirit of cooperation is predominant in our bilateral contacts. We do not see any significant weakening of the sanctions regime. The international community re- mains resolute in its commitment to ensure that Saddam Hussein cannot again obtain the tools to exercise aggression in the region. Mr. Goss. ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE Mr. Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the timing of this. Other committees are carrying forth committees on this subject also. I want to hit two areas that haven't been covered, and then go back to some of the comments that you have made on some areas that have already been opened. 203 The first area is what I would term “environmental damage to the oil well situation” and the question of who is going to pay for that damage. The United States House of Representatives passed a resolution, said that the cost should fall to Saddam Hussein. My question: has there been any thought of earmarking any dollars of the sale of oil that may or may not be sold to offset the environ- mental damage cleanup that will go on? Ambassador PICKERING. First, with respect to the environmental damage and to cleanup, I am happy to report that the progress being made by those putting out the oil fires has been ahead of what has been expected. The old target date was March 1992. There is some hope that it may well be completed this year. Second, there is no earmarking per se, but there is a compensa- tion fund to be derived from up to 30 percent of the revenue from oil sales by Iraq when permitted either under the Humanitarian Resolution 706 or at some time in the future when the Council might make such a decision. That money is available for payment to those who have suffered direct loss or damage. The administrators of that fund decided to give priority to claims of up to a hundred thousand dollars from grédgvgduals and designed simplified procedures for claims up to , 0 . Nevertheless, I believe, that those suffering direct damage from the oil fires set by Iraq should receive compensation from the fund. They will have to go through the process of making the claims; but if a claim fits the category of direct loss or damage, it is claimable and eligible for restitution from the fund, which is not specifically earmarked but involves a set-aside. SADDAM AS WAR CRIMINAL Mr. Goss. We are committed to pursuing that policy. On war crimes, some feel Saddam Hussein is a war criminal, in- cluding myself and other Members of this body. If there is a mechanism to proceed, are we proceeding to identify him as a war criminal? Is anybody doing that, and should we? Ambassador PICKERING. Statements on that would indicate that anyone in Iraq who committed war crimes, and those were at least in general defined, would be held responsible. We have always had a problem, and during our last testimony it was extensively discussed, that we are not prepared to move with- out jurisdiction. We don’t have the gentleman in custody and therefore obviously are not in a position to move. That has been our position as we have moved ahead. Mr. Goss. I am not sure having him in custody is a requirement, but I think that is a matter that needs further attention. It leads to the question about the UN . I see testimony on Page 7 quoting from your submitted statement that the UN security is deadly serious in proceeding-following on Chairman Hamilton’s question, the same part of your testimony that you referred to, my question is we have seen a lot of harassment to UN forces over t ere. And I am not sure that after dealing with all the explanations we have had about Saddam Hussein not cooperating, about his 204 willful disregard of promises, about repeated violations concealing his clandestine nuclear program-gthat is diplomatic language to say the guy is cheating, lygg and stealing in a nice way—are we going to keep sanctions on get to the final resolution of this? fi . LOOKING TO THE FUTURE Ambassador PICKERING. It may not be perfect, but it is the mech- anism that we currently have to work with. The point may be whether it is sufficient. I certainly think it is necessary. I think that our approach on this problem has to be worked through the United Nations. -1-1. We have the longstanding question of what was our original ob- jective, which is to get the Iraqi forces unconditionally and immedi- ately out of Kuwait. We achieved that objective through the use of military force. We would have hoped that in the course of achieving that objective that Hussein would disappear. He didn’t. We are going to continue to keep the sanctions on. The UN is the central authority of the Security Council that provides for continuing sanctions. We are going to keep the inspections up. Those are mandatory and strong- ly supported by the U.S. We are going to do what we believe is required and necessary to get Saddam Hussein to pay for humanitarian assistance and we have opened up a passage for that to happen. He is continuing to refuse. He holds responsibility for the people of Iraq in his hands. The international community has not only made available a pro- gram of oil for humanitarian assistance, but, in addition, the UN has taken the sanctions off food and medicine and other items under certain circumstances in order to deal with the humanitari- an problem. That is where we are. I don’t yet see any better ideas around. The air war went on for two months, as we all know, I can’t imag- ine a higher priority target than Saddam Hussein in a military sense, not in an assassination sense. The UN is therefore necessary. Maybe it is not sufficient at this time. Maybe there isn’t a sufficient answer to that problem; but that is our policy and the way we will continue to work. CAN SADDAM OUTLAST THE WORLD Mr. Goss. Mr. Wolf, page 3 of your testimony that I will quote, Saddam Hussein is seriously miscalculated once again if he be- lieves he can outlast the international community’s determination in this matter. I think despicable is not a strong enough term for his use of the poor and the suffering for international political leverage, which is pretty much what the portrayal has been. Do you believe he can succeed in waiting out the international community? Why is that statement in your testimony today? Mr. WOLF. For the same reasons that Ambassador Pickering has just bieen dealing with, his effort is to project an Iraq which is be- siege - Mr. Goss. Will he succeed in creating that misconception? 206 Secondly, it is clearly a sense that we have at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue that we share with you the responsibility for meeting the costs of success. While I don’t sit here and make policy on the subject, my hope is, and I believe it is a hope widely shared, that this process will go ahead through one of consultation. The kinds of figures you mention have been the kind that have frequently been mentioned about the potential costs of the Cambo- dian operation, for example. We obviously won’t know more specifi- cally what those will be until the Secretary General prepares a report following the completion of the Cambodian accords which we hope will take place on Wednesday of this week. With the Namibian exercise we had an opportunity in the Secu- rity Council, and again before the process got too far ahead in the General Assembly of making sure that the costs were adequate to do the job but not excessive. We try to exercise a great deal of re- sponsibility in that regard. So I do see it as a shared question. BEARING THE (.9-USTS Mr. LEACH. Let me just tag on it slightly because there are other issues I want to raise. I feel strongly that peacekeeping costs are costs that this country is going to be willing to embrace. There are other aspects to the UN issue on which there is some dissent within the Department. For example, UNESCO. It is my view that as you start parceling a given sum of money between the UN kinds of circumstances you may be undercutting your capacity to deal with peacekeeping. If I were to make the recommendation, because you have suggested certain consultation, it would be to take the whole UN package and recognize that partly because of your leadership, because of the President’s leadership, because of the leadership of the Secre- tary General, the UN is an institution that we are going to have to upgrade and get away from some of the ideological decisions that our government has gotten backed into in the past. I hope that you look at this as a package commitment with the understanding that it is very difficult to take out the separate parts and expect that the international community is going to say that America can lead in this way but America will shirk its re- sponsibilities in other ways. We are, after all, in a financial sense not quite an international outlaw—that would be an exaggeration—but we are in arrearage the greatest amount of any country ever to the United Nations; ancll that is an embarrassment and puts you in a difficult position to ea . I want to move onto a couple of other points. Mr. Goss raised the issue of a war crimes tribunal. My sense is that one of the disadvantages we are in at this time is that all war crimes are still ad hoc, in terms of setting up a tribunal much the way of Nuremberg and the Tokyo circumstance, and that the case is growing for consideration of a international criminal court to be established that would relate this specifically to violations of inter- national conventions. The Court of the Hague only deals with disputes between na- tions. This would deal with hijacking, crimes of terrorism, et 207 cetera, that might be of a nature that could fit not only Saddam Hussein but also Pol Pot. I would hope that this particular issue, which is growing in inter- national discourse and which this Member has put a great deal of time on along with Senator Specter in the other body, would be the type of thing that the Administration could consider leading more dramatically than it has to date. EXPANDING THE U.N. ROLE Ambassador PICKERING. I have your message clearly on the sub- ject. I am sure we will take a careful look at this. Last year, one of the Caribbean countries proposed a similar court for those accused of being involved in international narcotics trafficking. That didn't get a great deal of enthusiastic acclaim among many states, many of which are worried with how the non- intervention doctrine would fit in such a court. But we see that doctrine in a sense being re-interpreted for things like human rights, humanitarian assistance and other ques- tions. This is a difficult issue. I would certainly want to have more authoritative interpretation from people whose business it is to study this. But I will take your message back. Could I say something about the money, because I think we want to express our thanks to the Congress this year for beginning the process of paying back the debts and for once again meeting our regular obligations in the United Nations. It is very hard to work there under the situation where we are the largest debtor, but your appropriations this year and last year are beginning the process of really reducing our debt, and for that we are very grateful and thank you. OTHER AVENUES FOR THE U.N. SYSTEM Mr. LEACH. We are taking steps in the right direction, but we are still apprehensive about rejoining “one of the most dangerous international bodies ever created,” UNESCO, and I say that face- tious y. I would hope it would bolster the spine of the Department to re- think that particular issue. I want to raise one other major issue, and it relates to you in your job particularly. That is, the history of arms control over the last several decades has become increasing a U.S.-Soviet issue al- though there are other aspects of arms control that are outside the U.S.-Soviet orbit. One aspect of the recent history of arms control has been a great deal of attention to delivery systems but not what happens to war- heads after delivery systems are cut back or eliminated. One of the oldest arms control issues is, of course, the test ban, for which some of us feel strongly, but I don’t want to raise that at this moment. A second issue—under President Eisenhower there was the Atoms for Peace proposal and the utilization of warhead material perhaps under IAEA safeguards for peaceful purposes. 208 Has there been attention in our government to discussing that kind of approach-because it has many implications for the United Nations? Ambassador PICKERING. I am not directly involved in that part of the government which would be thinking about that particular pro- gram. Perhaps on the basis of your question I will get you an. answer for the record, if I may. DEALING WITH ARMS CONTROL Mr. LEACH. I would appreciate that. . [The information follows:] This is a very complex issue which can’t be fully addressed in the limited context of your question. The Administration is engaged in an ongoing study to how best to dispose of nuclear materials derived from the elimination of nuclear warheads. Finally, let me say philosophically, partly because of Iraq, partly because there could be other similar circumstances in the world, one of the greatest issues is whether individual countries or the international community can intervene to obviate the development of weapons of mass destruction by an outlaw state which has vio- lated international law? And it has always struck me that this is an area that becomes much more manageable if the international legal regime is more clear-cut. These are issues that I think are going to be growing and of United Nations significance in this decade of the 1990s. If you have any thoughts on that subject, I would appreciate your Ambassador PICKERING. Two things: As you know, in the IAEA there is currently much thinking going on as a result of the Iraqi experience about the possibility of their conducting special inspec- tions that might go beyond purely standard safeguards inspections when there is available information to indicate that violations might take place. The second set of issues has to do obviously with the Iraqi prece- dent. It is a narrow precedent. You had a country that was an ag- gressor, found to be in violation of many of its obligations, includ- ing under the NPT. And a special resolution was passed sanction- ing it for developing weapons of mass destruction and asking for their removal. Whether that precedent is applicable in other less distinct cases, I don’t know. One would have to see. The important point is that there is the political will on the part of the Security Council to deal with such problems in a manner that is so forthright that we wouldn’t have dreamed of being able to do it 10 years ago. That is something of an advance. Obviously, we in the Anglo Saxon tradition make law in the cases as well as in the statutes; so this, I think, is an important case for international law. But I wouldn’t think we could construe the precedents too widely at this stage. They have to be looked at in the context. UNITED STATES NOW USING INTERNATIONAL GROUPS Mr. LEACH. I appreciate that. I would like to conclude with the observation that in case the world hasn’t really observed, this Ad- 209 ministration has moved very profoundly in utilizing international institutions more forthcomingly. I remember as a Subcommittee Ranking Member less than a decade ago being approached by insiders of the last Administration yg%iAthe idea being broached that we might withdraw from the Now it is clear cut that that institution is of enormous signifi- cance in our whole effort to hold down non-proliferation, and the U.S. is pursuing a consistent pattern of constructive leadership in it; and I appreciate the attitudes and judgment of our Ambassador to the U.N. in that regard. Thank you. Mr. YATRON. Chairman Hamilton? REPORT PURSUANT TO U.N. RESOLUTION 706 Mr. HAMILTON. One of the reasons the Congress is acting more responsibly on these appropriations for the international institu- tions has been the leadership of the gentleman from Iowa and others. I am pleased that we are going to catch up on our assess- ments. Back to the humanitarian business for a minute, I wanted you to know that Resolution 706 has a provision in it requiring the Secre- tary General to submit a report with respect to how the implemen- tation is going. I was quoting from that report to you. That report says, among other things, that the humanitarian efforts here are very limited, reaching only 5 percent of the population. That was my concern. If I understood your response to that, you said you needed to study it further. My question is why do you need to study it further if you have this P:?N. report saying that you are only reaching 5 percent of the peop e. Ambassador PICKERING. I would say this: we don’t know on a broaid-based, country-wide basis exactly the full extent of current nee s. We have the report that you cite. We have other reports. Such as a report that is now some months out of date from Mr. Ahtigaari, who went to Iraq. We have the confusion between the 3.3 million tons of food au- thorized to go in and some reports of poor distribution. So there is a great deal that frankly is not in our view verified to the point where we can say okay, what are the needs for the next program under 706. If you look at the preamble to 706, you will see a strong fiaquest for a needs-based assessment to be made as soon as possi- e. EXTENT OF SUFFERING Mr. HAMILTON. There is no doubt in your mind now that massive suffering is taking place right now? Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t think there is any doubt about that. The doubt might rest in where the distribution should go, Congressman. 210 Mr. HAMILTON. Is 5 percent adequate? Ambassador PICKERING. It doesn’t sound adequate, but we don’t really know. It sounds too small a number. On the other hand, there may be such vulnerability in 5 percent of the population that in terms of existing food availabilities and other things it makes sense. Those are all questions that I think we should find the answer to. COSTS OF OPERATIONS Mr. HAMILTON. Let me ask about the funding problem. If you put all these various U.N. activities together, the special commission, the boundary commission, UNIKOM and all U.N. ef- forts relating to Iraq, how much will it cost the U.N.? Ambassador PICKERING. Aside from UNIKOM, which has to date been assessed to members at $62 million (of which $18.5 million was the U.S. share), the intention is that Iraq, not the UN , be re- sponsible for meeting costs incurred as a result of its aggression. The Secretary General has prepared a report outlining the pro- posed allocation of the $1.6 billion in Iraqi oil sales allowed under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 7 06 (if Saddam Hussein accepts the offer to pump oil). $576 million is to go towards paying the costs associated with requirements of UNSC Resolution 687. The bulk of that, $480 million, is to go toward the Compensation Fund. $90 million would be for Special Commission and IAEA ac- tivities, $3.5 million for return of Kuwaiti property and $2.5 mil- lion for boundary demarcation. These are costs outside operation of the humanitarian assistance program. Mr. HAMILTON. The total figure is what? Ambassador PICKERING. $576 million out of $1.6 billion. The re- maining $1.024 billion would be used for costs associated with UN SC 706. $933 million would be available for purchase and trans- portation of humanitarian assistance. Of that, program costs, and I am recollecting the figures from when we passed 706, are on the order of $200 to $300 million. The final $90.3 million would be used as follows: $5 million to monitor oil sales, $2 million to manage the escrow account, $18.3 million for in-country monitoring of U.N. dis- tribution of humanitarian assistance, and $65 million for direct procurement of food and medicine by the U.N. Mr. HAMILTON. What period of time are you talking about? Ambassador PICKERING. The humanitarian assistance costs to cover through March of 1992 presuming that the actual program began six months before March. So that would have it begin in September, the end of August. Mr. HAMILTON. If you don’t get this money from Iraq through the sale of oil, where is it coming from? Ambassador PICKERING. That money, if it doesn’t come from Iraqi oil, is going to continue to come from the generosity of the international community, which is drying up. Mr. HAMILTON. So right now you have a critical physical prob- lem? 211 Ambassador PICKERING. I would say we do, but the Government of Iraq is also financing, out of something, some food imports. Mr. HAMILTON. But there is a large deficit here until Iraq begins to perform under the resolution? Ambassador PICKERING. I think there is a growing deficit until Iraq begins to perform. Mr. HAMILTON. What is the magnitude of that? Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t have that figure. Mr. HAMILTON. Have we made an extra contribution of some kind? Ambassador PICKERING. I pointed out that we have provided over $500 million, at least $102 million directly through international organizations. Mr. HAMILTON. Is Saudi Arabia helping? Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t know. Japan and Germany certainly have. I do have those figures. Mr. HAMILTON. I would like as much information as we can get about that funding. [The information followsz] / 212 J Both during and after the Gulf war, there have been extensive bilateral and multilateral efforts to address the human costs of Saddam Hussein's aggression. The UN issued a consolidated appeal for funds to be used by the relevant UN agencies (e.g. UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO) for a number of humanitarian relief activities in the area. Total requirements through December 1991 are estimated to be $417.1 million. Of that, $285.5 million, or 68% has been received and $241 million has been spent or obligated by the UN. Forty-two nations plus the EEC have contributed to the appeal. Funds continue to be pledged, albeit at a somewhat reduced pace given that a mechanism for Iraq to fund humanitarian relief is now available through UN Security Council Resolution 706. It is up to Saddam Hussein to set that process in motion. The ICRC and Licross have also been active in the region. The ICRC has received approximately $124 million in cash and in-kind donations from 22 governments and 41 national Red Cross societies. Licross has received about $1@ million in donations (most of it in-kind contribui~uu\ fv~m iln national societies for relief activities in Iran. 213 _2_ The United States has made approximately $117 million in cash and in-kind contributions to international organizations, in addition to the approximately SE65 million costs of Operation Provide Comfort (much of which was in the form of in—kind contributions). Attached is the most recent country-by-country listing of contributions to the UN consolidated appeal. While somewhat dated, it provides an indication of the major donor countries and the types of multilateral assistance they have provided. Saudi Arabia, which you specifically asked about, is not represented on this list. Nonetheless, the Saudi contribution has been notable. Saudi Arabia took on the task of building and maintaining numerous camps for persons displaced by the war and has provided approximately $5 billion dollars worth of economic assistance to neighboring states affected by the war. - 216 - 4 _ \ p:1aeee as-01-91 uecao cneraxeurzoe Ilioer ; ‘I Donn: Dieaater Id YIILAI oot91n:n tlalol OUL91NXN CIRHAIY OUL91NXN W dwvr "rem? 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Set relief iteeex blaakate, teoca, aleepinq begs 6-20 helicopter: to: dilttlb. of tellet euppliee b1anneca,tan:a,tie1d boepitelu,vatex ye:i!.eiet,£ood tbertet eoete local purchase of xel1et supplies cl!“ ' (“I/1lPl ’ 1144 Pffiifllfll air trenepott ooete (Kin. ct Auteuil air txenepozt coete (Kin, at Oeteee) chaxte: ceete Chltilt Cbltl clothing, baby tcod,Iediealnnta(throuqa Hin. 0! bet.) construction of refugee oaep,t1e1d noep.,l -d. teen: oontxibutioe to 128$ aaa1atanee local purcnaee of relief qoooe euppott of ICIC probrellee incl. coutxib. via led C. tzeneport of 4OOIt relief auppllea {roe lad C/oexlany Cash and eervicee caau and eetvioae (U!/IA!) eixlitt ooete caeh caan - euppurt to German NOD proqraanee Cash (UM-IA!) caan for U! ouarce (uu/rant Cate inputted: date ca which aata reached urnao Decision Cate: Dace leporteo ueed ehec un4v-11-t1q n.!. : not :epc-te< to VIDEO 1,1:e,11: 2,150,004 411.090 1,500,000 199,120 ----___.__ 0,403,073 707,065 707¢.65 17,000 1,612,030 1,llj,4]2 046,154 14,560,047 1,512,944 2,016,921 3,714,206 16,390,134 51,1lj.4j1 591,114 2,201,101 1,717,010 14,s1e,eee 5,017,180 1,775,100 11,093,491 1|.1ao,111 11,142,057 5,621,101 s,114,1ae 5,411,101 2,923,011 1,111,111 /J./,,,,;x & Iii.‘ 3 Channel Date Reported UIUI 01/05/91 VII 1'/05/91 " 11/05/91 OCO 37/05/91 ‘F? 1‘/O1/Q1 ll/O1/I1 11/04/$1 ll/O4/Q1 ll-o4-01 ll-o4-91 18/04/91 33V 11/06/91 16-O4-il 16/04/11 ll-Q4-Q1 1‘/O4/ll IOOU ll/O5/91 1.105/91 1]/05/91 UIICHI 27/06/$1 21/O5/9l 21-Q5-91 11/05/91 1IlOS/,1 11/05/91 28-OS-91 ICQ-FIB C ll/CS/91 ll/OS/91 ICIC/‘ID C ll/O5/91 ICIC 21/05/91 UIBCR 21iO5/91 UIICR IS-06-91 KID C-CK] Z'/US/Q1 UCZT 28/05/91 I00 28/05/91 ION 27-O6-9l UNDIO Q9-C7-91 217 _/J9 £7" 2 /78"‘! L‘-'5 4! -— .1":/" J" Al-Mt' l 4"‘ ,. ptlmtcd as/e1/ei wuss oourasurrss anus a Q ,..,.', , W 66661‘ "$00087 (ow, res ole. seas: ago. limo] L Z Ilodle lest-permian Gulf 1 Ia(vqmm.IJnyvq.. ma:.inm._. - ( 0 Fluff. 0- 1/ @244 Passe III (since l April 1901) 908$! Closets: Decisicma Oeecriptioa Value Channel heme Id beta (U leported lllalelilll RAM WLOIIDI 27/O‘/Il SO Ouud personnel - (UI-IA!) 1,501,000 CID 27/05/61 1.301.000 dlltool 48111384 21/08/91 JO Guard personnel — (L!/{U} 901.000 Otn :1/oe/e1 903:0“! IMO WLIUDI 27/06/91 Cleh - (W-Ill) - Iraq preqransn 401,011 UIICU 27/06/Ii 401.071 118$!!! 01191381 12/04/91 cash 39.851 RID C-IN 11/04/91 as-as-ea. as-1. i:e.su ccnrxu as-os-91 tllli l58,22l ‘$11.11! 1]/O4/Ql I'll l1I.(lO ID G./Xlll J1-O4-O1 IO,/CS/91 Cllh 2J7,JC2 UIIICI 10/05/'1 ‘Milli TQM’ GALILEI 11/94/91 ll =46!-I, J00 plastic lI:OOtl 11/04/01 l2/04/ll al mt medicines 12/04/91 URIII UUhIAB¥\ AV-VOID! HAIR-HAIR-IQ\'-I\'-I, LQDCI in-U ZCLIQLZI QIU,a\1 QUIUOIIL blankets, teats and medicines 291,016 10/04/91 medical mam (6 experts) l0/O4/91 ‘.2/04/91 Cash (us/tn) 300,600 tnrpmo 12-04-fl HQ: ' W!/W1 ' inn mime! Mfiim wm iiliilll cm 1,300, UIDE 11-Cl-I1 cash 5,000,000 LEM 12/04/91 cash 525,000 UIDK) 11/04/,1 clash 1,600,000 wax: 11-04-Ii cseb. 1,000,000 AGO 13/04/11 cash 1,000,000 UIDJ 12/04/91 casa l,OO0,0(‘€ UIUD 12/04/11 fill-h Z,°Q0,QOC UNDRO 12/04/I1 cmm.!l~alr1.lft 475,000 UIIIE 11/CA/,1 raensrrsneporr hf rtlief goods i,0-n1 food :1s.ooo ll-o4-91 ' sate: purification supplies 111,000 ICE 11/04/91 1:/04/91 my or tinaaoial/contracting support 2,926 07/05/91 emergency operations etticer (ID! of M) 4,140 13/04/91 15/O4/'I1 caan (Ir) to: mrxq 500,000 IIICDID 22/04/91 is/O4/91 cast: tor purchase ct 500,000 peck. 095 4C,O00 W161! 07/05/91 1G/fl‘/"1 flesh fnr lrrrel prtmtirlfi of fwd !,§Q6,§§fl Q7/Q5/,1 33-Q4-91 cash 12,900,000 ZCF ll/O4/91 Date nsportscs case as vaica eats rescued UIORO - 221 Oecisicn Date: Date lepcrtee used when unavailable n.r. 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(1) bwn“ usa dtmsilm :3-oe-si sass _ 11,000,000 mrlcm :4/04/9; as-as-91 100,000 eases er mssela vsocims ' _ 11,000 09/05/91 07/OSIQI lntsrtant emergency Illllf 600l01tants 111,244 l7/01/01 ilI"l1ll¢1°1 ¢q"1FIIat 11,000 I1/07/01 10001 procurement of relief supplies 5,060,000 07/qg,/91 0e/cs/ea us mu, 10 repels’ kite - 4as,m 11/01/ei 20/05/91 Cash - (U!/IA!) - ltlq 0:0-are-0 175,000 Witt!/Om 20/05/01 Cash - (WRAP) - turkey progrsmln 115,000 UIICII/om 20/05/01 I2-06-Oi (UI/Isl)-equ1p,vehic.,cloth.isg,geoers.,ewapliee (see) 1,000,000 ow l2/00/01 cesa 6,700,000 I000 12/06/11 Cash - (UII1A2l 5,000,000 CID 12/00/01 0000 - (W-IMI 3,000,000 WK" 82/04/78 Ceeh - (W/{All _ ' $00,000 \@ 12/00/01 Cash - (UI-IA-Pl ' 2,000,000 Ion 12/00/01 case - (vs/IA!) ' 12,500,000 umca 12/06/11 '00! and Cash — (U!/Ill) 10,000 000 IT? 12/06/91 10/01/01 Cell (UI-1-9} 400,000 020 11/01/01 l7/07/91. DAM support fonds 120,000 17/07/91 [YO - Icvwi, Qtfife, cfn 7. \'"'l.NVl 17/01/I1 D00 - Operation Ptovtde Comfort 320,000,000 17/01/91 I7? Assistance since April 16,400 mt through VT? W? 17/07/91 lelief - Abdell Camp, Kuwait (ll) _ 250 000 Lacs I1/01/01 ltnctpile Coexoditius (Orbs: es: 702 11/01/91 cost for travel for burr es In _ i1-01-si 420,504,060 TUOOGLAVIA 0UL9lRIH l0-o5-91 Medicines, food, equipueat — (UI-25!} 325,225 UNECS $0/05/91 225,225 IIC 0'JI,li!lD1 0!/00/il I00 mt relief supplies l2l,05l 8tC.POP.r. 07/05/01. 2 mt medicaments, 100 mt relief goods 207,317 rwuo1.s.1 07/05/91 -.iie.,...,.,i=.i -q..l,,.,as? t-L-, l5,l25 blankets $13,010 mar-rmru 07/05/01 msaie..ser~qie.sl equip.,rood,is0 tents.a7s biamrsu s1:,sio nu-in. 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'00: zoqp ':>/:1 9-1 mi loo; M00) Lzobvua xouop Lq °‘ ""4 2 mom noummmoo ovum 18-LOIS! nnund 7 XIVV/vgy ' ' 225 INTELLIGENCE ON IRAQ NUCLEAR PROGRAM Mr. HAMILTON. On the nuclear capability; on January 23, Presi- dent Bush says, “Our pinpoint attacks have put Saddam out of the nuclear bomb-building business for a long time to come.” How come he is so far off? Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t believe he is. In fact, as you know, the U.N. said without either the inspections or the military activities, he might have been able to build a weapon in one or two years. But the fact is that such sites as one of the uranium enrichment plants, which apparently had 10 or 12 of the 90 projected machines actually operating, was destroyed by American bombing attacks. Mr. HAMILTON. It is your estimate that Saddam Hussein is out of the nuclear bomb-building business for a long time to come? Ambassador PICKERING. I believe he is. I think we will want to continue the ongoing monitoring pro- gram. I believe that is essential to continuing to assure that. Mr. HAMILTON. Do you believe we had a failure of intelligence here in estimating their nuclear capability before the war‘? - ’ Do you believe we had a failure of intelligence in estimating the damage to the nuclear facilities during the war? Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t know that I am expert enough to give you a full sense of that. Obviously, there were pieces of his nu- clear program we didn't know that we found after the war. _ I would emphasize that one of the contributions to the U.N. pro- gram is from the United States and the Soviet Union and other countries to provide intelligence to guide the inspections and to de- velop further information on this. So the ongoing intelligence capability, I believe, is effective and is useful here. Mr. HAMILTON. My impression is that they were much further advanced in their nuclear capability than we thought they were? Ambassador PICKERING. I believe that is right, but I would want you to get the appropriate testimony from the intelligence commu- nity. Mr. HAMILTON. Now, what does it tell us when the Israelis bomb a reactor in 1981 and put it out of commission, and then we bomb for a period of six weeks or more, whatever the period of time was, thinking that we had put him out of the business and then the U.N. inspectors go in and find that their knowledge and their de- velopment was far beyond what we had anticipated? What does that tell you about the inspection system and our own ability to assess it? Ambassador PICKERING. That with a determined violator, the pure N PT safeguards inspections, which are something we have been worried about for some time, are not sufficient. If a man is prepared to lie, cheat, murder, and steal to do these things, including develop a nuclear weapon, that is probably not sufficient. And to have ongoing control of somebody like that, something like what we have put into effect in Resolution 67 8 and the ongoing monitoring resolution, 715, are very important. 226 MONITORING NEEDS Mr. HAMILTON. Is the only way to assure that we know that they are not developing a nuclear capability to have U.N. inspectors or some inspectors internationally sanctioned on the ground going wherever they want to, wherever they want to? Ambassador PICKERING. I believe that that is a very important element of being able to guard against that; yes. Mr. HAMILTON. If you don’t have that, you are not going to be able to protect against clandestine programs. Ambassador PICKERING. We have all felt that and that is the cen- terpiece of the ongoing work of the Security Council. IRAQI scuds Mr.‘ HAMILTON. Does Iraq today have operational Scud missiles and launchers in violation of Resolution 687? Ambassador PICKERING. We think they might. I don’t believe we have turned up the evidence yet. Mr. HAMILTON. Some reports say they have 100 to 400 missiles unaccounted for. . Ambassador PICKERING. My statement indicates in the neighbor- hood of several hundred are being looked for. Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think the United Nations has the capabil- ity then to resolve the question of their Scud missiles and the oper- ational capabilities of those missiles? Ambassador PICKERING. If the inspection process is not thwarted by the Iraqis, as they tried to do when they didn’t permit the use of helicopters, no. But if the inspections continue to be permitted access, then I believe they have as good a capability as anyone does to determine that. I don’t believe it is a perfect capability. KURDS IN IRAQ AND TURKEY Mr. HAMILTON. With respect to the Northern border, we have had reports from Ankara that the Government of Iraq is providing arms to the Kurdish rebels operating in Southeastern Turkey. Is that report accurate? Ambassador PICKERING. We have seen the reports. The latest information I have is that we cannot confirm those re- ports. Mr. HAMILTON. We have U.N. monitoring groups there? Ambassador PICKERING. Southeast Turkey is a big place and so is Northern Iraq. It is not necessarily true that the humanitarian people would detect those things. Mr. HAMILTON. Are we checking those reports? Ambassador PICKERING. I believe we are. Mr. HAMILTON. Would Iraq have the capability to provide arms? Ambassador PICKERING. I believe it would; yes. Mr. HAMILTON. These would be conventional arms, of course? Ambassador PICKERING. I believe they are; yes. Mr. HAMILTON. You think they would have that capability? Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, I believe they would. Mr. HAMILTON. There are also reports of Turkish Cross-border military activities in pursuit of Kurdish rebels in Northern Iraq. Are those reports correct? 227 Ambassador PICKERING. I believe they are. Mr. HAMILTON. What is the implication of that? Is the U.N. trying to talk with the Turks about that? Is that in violation of any resolution? Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t believe it is in violation of any specific resolution. The Turks were in hot pursuit of people they believed were committing terrorist acts in their own country. DOES UNITED STATES SUPPORT TURKEY Mr. HAMILTON. Do we support what the Turks did? Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t believe we support it. At the same time, I don’t believe that under the circumstances we can tell the Turks they cannot defend themselves against such actions. Mr. HAMILTON. Does defense mean they can go across the inter- national border? Ambassador PICKERING. We have urged them to do whatever they have to do and end it as rapidly as possible. Mr. HAMILTON. Including going across the international border? Ambasador PICKERING. I don’t believe we sanction that, but I don’t believe we can say they can’t defend themselves. Mr. HAMILTON. So they can defend themselves in our policy within their own country, but if they go across the border, they go too far—- Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t want to qualify it that far. We would like to see these attacks stopped against the Turks. We would hope the Turks, if they have to chase these people, would do it and get back into Turkey as quickly as possible. Mr. HAMILTON. Are Iraqi forces in the north massing for some kind of attack? Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t see any signs of that. Mr. Wolf spoke about Iraqi activity against Kurds in their own country in the north. Mr. HAMILTON. I understand, Mr. Chairman, that the ambassa- dor has to leave. I want to express my appreciation to him. We have all kinds of questions about these activities. We are grateful for you coming down to talk with us. Mr. YATRON. I have one quick question. Ambassador PICKERING. If I can answer, I will speak as quickly as can. MECHANISMS FOR HUMANITARIAN AID Mr. YATRON. If Iraq chooses to sell petroleum in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, how does the U.N. plan to continue to provide humanitarian relief for Iraqi civilians; and is the Security Council considering any alternative funding mecha- nisms for humanitarian purposes? Ambassador PICKERING. No alternative funding mechanism is being considered and the U.N. is very concerned that their re- sources and the resources of others are running down. Mr. YATRON. Would we consider unfreezing some of the assets? Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t believe that we would. 228 We have addressed that question extensively. Others may, and we have no objection to the others doing so. Mr. YATRON. Chairman Hamilton has a quick question. NEED TO RENEW ACTIVITIES Mr. HAMILTON. Do the U.N. activities in Iraq come up for renew- al at the end of this year? Ambassador PICKERING. The memorandum of understand, as I in- dicated in my report which covers United Nations humanitarian activities, is up for renewal in December of this year. Mr. HAMILTON. What about the other aspects? Ambassador PICKERING. No, the others continue on because they are part of mandatory resolutions that are open-ended. Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Penny may have some questions he may want to submit in writing. Ambassador PICKERING. We would be glad to take any questions in writing.‘ Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much for being here, Ambassador. Chairman Hamilton, do you have further questions for Mr. Wolf‘? U.S. POSITION ON RENEWAL Mr. HAMILTON. Let me-on this question of renewal, what is the position of the United States on renewing these various activities? Mr. WOLF. As Ambassador Pickering said, a number of resolu- tions, including 688, which was the resolution dealing with the hu- manitarian situation in Northern Iraq, continue. There is no expiration date. Mr. HAMILTON. What is the humanitarian resolution that we are talking about? Resolution 706? Mr. WOLF. The memorandum of understanding, which the execu- tive delegates signed with the Government of Iraq, ends on Decem- ber 31. Everything else that the Security Council has passed continues without a date for termination. Resolution 706, which was the food-for-oil resolution, provides a one-time sale of $1.6 billion. Mr. HAMILTON. So what needs to be renewed? Mr. WOLF. The memorandum of understanding which the execu- tive delegate negotiated, which is--- Mr. HAMILTON. With Iraq? Mr. WOLF. With Iraq, which is an element that helps to regulate U.N. presence in Iraq, expires December 31. Mr. HAMILTON. For example, the presence of the inspectors? Mr. WOLF. No. That is a separate thing. Under Resolution 688 it would be our view that the U.N. authorities continue with or with- out a memorandum of understanding. ‘ See appendixes 12-15. 229 IS UNITED NATION REDUCING IRAQI PRESENCE Mr. HAMILTON. We have had reports that some U.N. agencies and groups are now reducing their presence in Iraq. Do you know anything about that? Mr. WOLF. I am not aware of that. The guard program which is part of Sahd Raden’s activities has recently reached near full strength, 470. Mr. HAMILTON. There has been no reduction of U.N. presence in the north? Mr. WOLF. I would have to look into that. In the wake of the fighting which took place earlier in the month, some of the U.N. presence may have had to withdraw to be out of the area of hostil- ities, there is no scheduled draw down of U.N. presence. In fact, the activities continue. Mr. HAMILTON. Any reduction in UN IKOM? Mr. WOLF. The security element which was initially there and some of the engineering elements that were there have been re- moved. The observer force itself has been maintained. There was discussion of reducing the size of the observer force. It was the view of the Secretary General and of the Security Council that the ob- server force should be maintained. Mr. HAMILTON. How many U.N. personnel are now inside Iraq? Mr. WOLF. I believe there are 800 people associated with the hu- manitarian assistance program. UNIKOM in the south I believe is 295 observers plus civilians who are attached to it. There are a number of teams which come and go related to the weapons of mass destruction. Mr. HAMILTON. How many U.N. personnel in the north? Mr. WOLF. Country-wide the humanitarian program is roughly 800, and they are mostly in the north it is my understanding. Mr. HAMILTON. There are some armed guards, aren't there, with the U.N. in the north? Mr. WOLF. They are not armed guards, per se. They are guards who are related to the humanitarian assistance program. They guard the food resources, the building supplies, the warehouses and they are responsible for security of the U.N. offices. They are not peace-keeping forces. They were not authorized by the Security Council as a peace-keeping force. Mr. HAMILTON. Is the Red Cross leaving Iraq? Mr. WOLF. I don’t have a good enough feel for that. They were operating in Iran—their largest concentration of activity was in Iran and most of the 1.4 million refugees in Iran have now re- turned to Iraq. In Iraq displaced persons are being dealt with by the U.N. hu- manitarian assistance effort, to the extent the U.N. can reach them. Some are in the mountains. Mr. HAMILTON. We heard through UNICEF that the Red Cross was withdrawing its presence in the south. Mr. WOLF. I don’t know. They have not been able to operate as effectively as they would like. There are some tens of thousands of people in the marshes south of Basra where the U.N. has not been able to establish a presence. 230 l Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Wolf, we appreciate your presence. We will submit questions to you in writing. We have had difficulty in get- ting responses promptly; is that not correct, Mr. Chairman? Mr. YATRON. That is correct. We would appreciate if we could have a quicker turnaround on these questions, Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Mr. Leach. ADDRESSING HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM Mr. LEACH. Just very quickly, Mr. Penny had offered some sug- gestions, and I just want you to know that what he and Mr. Hamil- ton are referring to in terms of humanitarian assistance are pretty well shared by both parties in this body, particularly the notion of unfreezing assets. I understand that there is reluctance, certainly legal problems that are quite massive, but if time goes on and young people are dying for no reason whatsoever, if we don’t come up with a meth- odology, it is going to be awfully awkward, so as much as you have internal conclusions against this particular methodology, I hope you have them under continual review. The other issue I wanted to raise is that a chance always exists, which may arise suddenly, that possibly Saddam Hussein could be apprehended. I would certainly __hope that the U.S. Government would have a pretty good legal case ready to go at that instantane- ous point in time and would be prepared to seek out a war crimes tribunal. Mr. WOLF. On the two points, Mr. Leach, clearly our preference will be to see Resolution 7_06 and 712 implemented. The various as- pects that the United Nations can prepare seem now to be in place. The decision to go forward or the lack of decision is a reflection of the government of Iraq. It is their policy and practice which is stopping this program from going forward. However, I have heard you view, and Mr. Penny’s, and will keep them under consideration. It has never been our policy to deprive needy Iraqis of food and medicine and the Resolution 687 and 706 and 712 were crafted in order to take ac- count of concerns for people for whom the government of Iraq has shown no concern. On the question of Saddam Hussein and what to do if he is ap- prehended, a number of governments have been collecting evidence on preparing cases. There is a body which derives from the resolu- tions that were passed during the fall and winter which would bear on it, and I believe a lot of thought is being given to that. Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. NEED TO ADDRESS HUMAN SUFFERING Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Wolf, I want to leave one impression with you that I have from the testimony, that you really have not come to grips with the depth of suffering in Iraq and the humanitarian problem there. I think I understand why you have not. You are in a difficult spot, I appreciate that. You want Iraq to comply, and in a sense we are kind of playing chicken with one another. But the responses we received from Am- 231 bassador Pickering do not indicate to me that he understands the depth of real human suffering taking place in Iraq today, and nor do I think he understands the depth of the problem accurately- maybe you understand it accurately-I don’t think he understands it accurately. There is a very limited response that has thus far been made. He cites these very large figures, but I don’t think that is actually on the ground now. We have given—for example, the figure he cites, $450 million in humanitarian assistance, but $330 million of that is for Operation Provide Comfort, which is a Defense Department operation in the north. And my impression is that very, very little is happening in Iraq to alleviate the suffering. If I am wrong in that impression, I would like to know it, but I certainly don’t get the impression that Ambassador Pickering understands the depth of it. Mr. WOLF. I understand the concern that you are expressing and we have met with various U.N. officials who have been in Iraq and they have talked about groups of Iraqis who are systematically denied food. This is something that has been going on since long before the war and there clearly is a problem. What we are trying to craft is a response that meets those needs. The international community has provided a great deal, but I think you understand the limitations under which the internation- al community operates. I believe it would be a mistake if we left this room, though, thinking that it is somehow the fault of the U.S. Government or the fault of the United Nations and the interna- tional community that people in Iraq are suffering. Blame does need to be first affixed where it belongs. It is the gov- ernment of Iraq which has prevented the UN from going forward. CRUX OF U.S. DILEMMA Mr. HAMILTON. I have no quarrel with that. The report that I cited to Ambassador Pickering at the outset of my remarks is a report that gives us the situation that has occurred since the war. It is the situation on the ground right now. I appreciate the policy problem for you and I certainly agree with your statement that in the first instance it is Saddman Hussein who is responsible. But once you say that, you still have the fact that you have enor- mous human suffering there. I am not comfortable just leaving it at that. My impression is we are kind of at a stand off. We have 706 passed. We think that would be the way to solve it. It is cer- tainly the preferred way to solve it. We are not getting any help from Iraq. We think he is acting with great cruelty towards his own people, I agree with that, and we are waiting for him to move. How long do you wait, how long do you dlet these people suffer? That is the question that is on my mm . I don’t have a solution, but it looks to me we are at a stand off now. IRAQI RESPONSIBILITY BUT WORLD PROBLEM Mr. LEACH. Would the gentleman yield? If you take the philo- sophical perspective that it is primarily the responsibility of the government of Iraq for the suffering, then I think one can take the 232 l next step and say then why shouldn't it be reasonable to take re- sources of the government of Iraq which are controlled by the international community to do something about the suffering in Iraq? And that is one of the reasons that is as constructive an idea as I know of that has arisen. It comes not from the Congress, it comes from parties in the Middle East who have raised what I consider to be a very constructive idea, recognizing that there are legal ramifi- cations that are very difficult. Chairman Hamilton’s point is very profound. You have real suf- fering, but your point is also right, it is Saddam’s fault. Therefore, what can we do to move in the direction of alleviating it, and since there are enormous resources of the government of Iraq abroad, why don’t we seek a resolution authorizing the utilization of those resources to help the suffering people? So as much as it is not our government’s fault, that doesn’t beg the fact that our government shouldn’t lead. Chairman Hamilton, I don’t know if I am presuming on your ideas but I think we are pretty much in tandem. Mr. HAMILTON. I agree. As usual, my colleague is on the mark. This has been a good hearing and I found it helpful. I didn't get the sense from Ambassador Pickering that he is aware of what is going on there to the extent I guess that I had hoped. You will convey that I am sure. Mr. WOLF. Absolutely. Mr. HAMILTON. I make these remarks when he is not here to defend himself. In some sense that is unfair, but he had to leave. You have an extremely difficult policy question before you and I have some appreciation for that. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. DIVERSION OF FOOD Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is Iraq still diverting significant amounts of humanitarian food shipments and if so why are we not speaking out more forcefully against this? Mr. WOLF. There have been episodic occurrences of diversion, for instance of World Food Program food. The World Food Program has moved actively to stop that and I am not aware of any system- atic diversions taking place. The national ration system which is designed to get food country-wide is systematically being torqued around in order to deny to specific groups, the Kurds in the north, the Shias in the south and vulnerable groups in central Iraq. It is being systematically manipulated in order to deprive those people, and Chairman Hamilton is right, there are groups which are seriously affected. We are making efforts to reach them, 706 and 712 are the preferred way. If it doesn’t work, the international community is going to have to look at alternatives. We looked earlier about the possibility of including assets in the U.N. resolutions. The idea did not have gen- erally favorable support in the Security Council at that time so we decided to move forward with the mechanism we constructed be- 233 cause it provided us with the best mechanism we could devise which had broad international support. Mr. YATRON. We are successful with the nuclear but not with food shipments, though? Mr. WOLF. We are making the best effort we can. Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much for being here. We appreci- ate your participating as well as the Ambassador. The subcommittee stands adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair. [Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] i - _-;:Ii1-I-_: E’: TE};-:3-' --:3-iIlve::-I5-I-'.=_-1:7 - I I , , I , - I n Q -P l . I I -1 _ i |- | -:: p .-. -2 _ _.---:_ -5 ‘ ' -_---' _p _ - - -Q -I I I — I - _ I I I --Q ' 1 _ - - I I - _ 11- | -: F:-_' . , . ' _ I “'- - - .__ I‘. '- I I 4' -' I ‘:- . _ _..' | F - *.' = - - -°. L ' I. ' , - r’ C I I O _ APPENDIX 1 SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RESPONSES THERETO _ ._ _ON THE POST-WAR ROLE OF THE U.N. IN THE GULF I GENERAL: QUESTION: 1. Have any funds from the U.N. operating budget for the current fiscal year been obligated for the Persian Gulf? ANSWER: ' No estimates are available from the UN in terms of how much they have obligated from their current operating budget for activities relating to the Persian Gulf. We understand, however, that some administrative expenses are being incurred, e.g., travel of UN officials to the region. QUESTION; 2. What other U.N. agencies have committed funds to the Gulf since August? ANSWER: Many UN agencies have been active in humanitarian relief work in the Gulf. UNHCR. UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, and UNDRO have all committed personnel and funds. In addition, non-UN entities such as ICRC, IOM. and LICROSS have made valuable contributions. QUESTION: 3. Beyond our assessed contributions, how much will it cost the U.S. for special U.N. activities for the Gulf? ANSWER; The Gulf situation is too fluid and the dimension of longer term needs too uncertain to project precise figures for U.S. costs beyond assessed contributions at this stage. The following are estimates, which will vary as events unfold in the region. Some items, such as UNIKOM funding. will come from assessed contributions. The U.S. cost for the Special Commission on ballistic missiles, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons is not yet known. No UN decision has been reached on methods for its financing, including whether funding will come from assessed or voluntary contributions. Overall cost estimates are very preliminary, but between $90410 million or more may be required for the first phase, which includes setup and on-site inspections. There are no estimates as yet for destruction of Iraq's ballistic missiles (range over 150 km), chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. This can only be done on the basis of the Special Commission's findings on the material Iraq possesses. Destruction costs could be very high, depending on the amount of such material and the complexity of destruction procedures. (235) 236 -2- On the refugee situation, as of May 9 the U.S. had committed a total of $207,454,600 to the overall relief effort. However, the bulk of this was given as direct assistance, including DOD contributions totalling $140,107,540. International appeals, including UN agency appeals, totaled more than $700 million as of May 9. The UN Secretary General's Executive Delegate, Sadruddin Aga Khan, issued a new. consolidated UN appeal on May 15 in the amount of $415 million. International estimates of the cost of the relief effort in the short term are in excess of $1 billion. With publication of the consolidated UN appeal and the anticipated takeover of coalition relief efforts by the UN, the U.S. will be expected to contribute its share to this effort. QUESTION: 4. Does the U.N. have a formalized structured plan to coordinate the activities of other specialized agencies operating in the Gulf? — Are_the specialized agencies operating independently of the United Nations? ANSWER: UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has designated Sadruddin Aga Khan as his Executive Delegate to coordinate the UN humanitarian assistance to displaced persons in Iraq. Sadruddin is overseeing the work of various specialized agencies of the United Nations, including the UNI-ICR, UNICEF. WFP. UNDRO and WHO. Sadruddin Aga Khan has named an on the scene coordinator, Berndt Bernander, and has designated the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as the lead agency in the relief effort for Iraqi displaced persons. A number of private voluntary organizations are acting as implementing partners or are coordinating their efforts with the UN agencies. The ICRC and LICROSS are operating independently of the UN but are cooperating with the UN agencies where appropriate. QUESTION: 5. Is the United Nations Security Council planning on setting up a special office to coordinate the U.N. efforts in the Gulf? ANSWER; No. While the Security Council remains fully engaged in establishing policy for various aspects of the implementation of UNSC Resolutions 687 and 688, various parts of the UN system will be responsible for implementation. The UN Secretary General has responsibility for overall coordination. QUESTION: 6. Will the costs of environmental cleanup peacekeeping and other activities be handled by special assessments and if so what percentage will the U.S. be obligated to ANSWER; UN Security Council Resolution 687 has a number of different provisions, funded from different sources. — Environmental cleanup is a direct cost resulting from the Iraqi invasion and 237 -3- occupation of Kuwait and is explicitly dealt with in paragraph 16 of UNSCR 687. Claims for reimbursement for costs of environmental damage may be paid by a Fund established pursuant to UNSCR 687 which will be funded from a percentage of Iraqi oil revenues. — Peacekeeping costs of the United Nations Iraq Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) will be funded by special peacekeeping assessments. The United States assessment for this account is approximately 30.37-1%. The U.S. has also provided in-kind services, the costs of which will be credited against our UNIKOM assessment. QUESTION: 7. Resolution 688 calls for Baghdad to allow immediate access by humanitarian organizations to all in need of assistance in Iraq. —- To date, is Iraq cooperating with relief organizations? — Has Iraq refused entry to any of these organizations? — Has the International Committee for the Red Cross been permitted in Iraq? ANSWER: On April 18, Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Secretary General's Executive Delegate for Humanitarian Relief, Sadruddin Aga Khan, and has allowed the United Nations agencies, the ICRC and private voluntary organizations acting as their partners to provide relief assistance to populations at risk inside Iraq. Iraq has not refused entry to these organizations. The ICRC has had a presence in Iraq continually since before August 2 to deal with exchange of POW's from Iran-Iraq. It has been conducting a variety of relief operations throughout Iraq since the end of hostilities. QUESTION: 8. Given that a great many U.N. agencies and other international organizations are involved in the Persian Gulf , have some efforts become duplicative or competitive? ANSWER; The enormity of the relief effort has created enough work for all available relief agencies. Cooperation between the various agencies has been excellent, and the appointment of the SYG's Executive Delegate has further facilitated their coordination. QUESTION: _9. I_-Ias the United Nation Secretary General utilized and cooperated with regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Red Crescent? ANSWER- Both the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Gulf Cooperation 238 -4- Council have mounted thei_r own relief efforts. The Secretary General’s Executive Delegate has cooperated With these organizations in organizing the UN relief effort. QUESTION: 10. Could you explain the function of the United Nations Office of the Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO)? — Does the United States anticipate UNDRO playing a role in the post-war activities in the Persian Gulf? — How would UNDRO activities be funded? ANSWER: Established in 1972, UNDRO has a three-fold mandate in the organization of emergency assistance provided by individual governments, UN agencies, the Red Cross and other voluntary organizations. The mandate directs UNDRO to: mobilize, direct and coordinate relief activities among organizations of the UN system; to assist governments of stricken countries to assess relief needs, disseminate that information, and coordinate the donors’ response; and to promote disaster prevention and preparedness activities. Disaster relief coordination is the core of UNDRO's activities and receives the highest priority in the allocation of resources. The Geneva-based organization is headed by the UNDRO Coordinator. who holds the rank of Under Secretary General and reports directly to the UN Secretary General. UNDRO also maintains a liaison office in New York. The U.S. expects UNDRO to continue the role it has played throughout the Gulf crisis, under the guidance of the UN Secretary General and his Executive Delegate for Humanitarian Assistance in the Gulf region — Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan.’ The Executive Delegate has described UNDP's role as one of facilitating information exchange and tallying of the donations and utilization of resources committed. He has also said that UNDRO can be helpful in identifying people who have the skills to carry out field functions and can also provide briefings for such persons as they are deployed. The UNDRO office in Geneva has hosted information meetings with other UN agencies, NGOs, and donor countries to report on the assessments of humanitarian needs in the Gulf and the status of the international response. On April 8 and 9 the UN Secretary General issued two consolidated UN appeals for humanitarian assistance to the region: (1) $178 million for urgent needs inside Iraq and (2) $400.27 million for the regional humanitarian plan of action, covering refugee needs within the Turkish-Iraq-Iran border areas. These appeals incorporated funding requests from each of_ the UN agencies involved in the relief effort, including UNHCR, IOM, WFP, WHO, UNICEF and UNDRO. The Secretary General has designated the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as the lead agency for humanitarian relief for refugees. On May 15 a follow—up appeal for $415 million was issued to cover the needs of refugees-displaced persons on the Turkish/Iraq borders and in Iran, emergency humanitarian assistance in Iraq, and health and environment projects in Kuwait. This azppeal included $208 million in unmet contributions from the April appeals, and a ditional funding for requirements which were not previously covered. QUESTION: 11. How does U.N. activity in the Persian Gulf affect the selection of a new 239 _ 5 - Secretary General to the United Nations? — Has the U.S. taken a position on the new Secretary General? ANSWER: Recent events in the Persian Gulf underscore the growing role of the United Nations as a force for peace and security, and highlight the importance of selecting strong, competent, and creative leadership of the organization. To date, the United States has not taken a position on any particular candidate for Secretary General. In our view, personal qualifications — including strong policy, management, and statesman-like capabilities — are key criteria in making a selection. QUESTION: 12. A February mission conducted jointly by the World Health Organization and UNICEF reported that the situation for women and children in Baghdad is very bad. The report indicates that there are severe shortages of medical supplies and services, clean drmking water, and foodstuffs. The report also indicated that the immunization of children had stopped. — Since the end of the war, has UNICEF or any of the other humanitarian agencies been able to address the health needs of women in children in Baghdad? — Does the U.S. support efforts by humanitarian agencies to meet the urgent needs of Iraqi women and children? ANSWER: UNICEF has been contributing to the coordinated UN humanitarian relief effort directed toward the needs of people in the Gulf region. In March 1991, representatives of UNICEF, UNDP, UNDRO, UNHCR, FAO, WFP and WHO participated in a mission, led by Under Secretary General Marti Ahtisaari, to assess umanitarian assistance needs In Iraq and Kuwait. The mission also delivered 20 tons of relief items to Iraq. All UN efforts are carried out under the direction of the UN Secretary General's Executive Delegate for Humanitarian Assistance in the Gulf - Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. The United Nations High Commission for Refufgees (UNHCR) has been designated as the lead agency for the post-war refugee relie program. The United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) facilitates information exchange and coordinates funding appeals for the UN agencies involved in the Gulf relief effort. The UN Secretary General has issued two consolidated UN appeals for humanitarian assistance to the region: (1) $178 million for urgent needs inside Iraq (issued April 8 and based on the Ahtisaari mission to Iraq) and (2) $400.27 million for the regional humanitarian plan of action, rincipally for refugees in the Turkish-Iraq-Iran border areas (issued April 9i). These appeals include funding requests from each of the UN agencies involved in the relief effort, including UNHCR, IOM, WFP, WHO, UNICEF and UNDRO. The UNICEF components of the two appeals are $15.8 million and $23.7 million, respectively. AS of April 30, 1991, UNICEF had received $7.2 million in response to the first appeal and $4.3 million in response to the second appeal. UNICEF is focusing its response on health, sanitation and nutrition needs, particularly of vulnerable groups such as women and children. Its efforts are directed toward Baghdad residents as well as toward refugee populations in the border areas of Iraq. II. ‘ _ 1' 240 -5- Since December 1990, UNICEF has delivered 440 metric tons of medical supplies and equipment into Iraq. UNICEF has had staff in Baghdad throughout the 9-month crisis and recently set up branch offices in Basra and Dohuk. It is providing technical assistance to the Iraqi Ministry of Health to ensure the surveillance of communicable disease and is procuring fuel and water purification agents to imlprove water quality and quantity for the civilian population of Baghdad. T e U.S. Government contributed $869,000 toward the purchase of supplies for a UNICEF immunization program in Baghdad. UNICEF has also begun an immunization program for refugees in Turkey and in northern Iraq. The UNHCR is assisting displaced persons and is preparing conditions which would permit the voluntary repatriation of refugees. T e ICRC and WFP are handling ood distribution. NGOs have also started relief operations in Iraq. The U.S. Government is fully supportive of all humanitarian relief efforts in the region and has continually urged eir coordination through the UN system for maximum e ect. QUESTION: _ 13. What is the role of the United Nations Development Program in the Gulf? — Is UNDP coordinating its efforts with the Secretary General's special coordinator, Prince Aga Khan? ANSWER: The UNDP Resident Representatives in Ankara and Teheran serve as the UN Resident Coordinators and UNDRO Representatives for those two countries. They arqflpllayinga major role in the coordination of relief efforts by facilitating contacts at leve with governments, donors and NGOs responding to both emergency and long-term needs. The UNDP Resident Representative leads the local inter-agency emergency groups in each country. The Deputy Resident Representative manages WFP food aid. The Resident Representatives carry out their work under the guidance and direction of Prince Sadruddin. UNDP has-established a Gulf Task Force within its Regional Bureau for Arab States and Europe. The task force has developed a plan of action for UNDP which focuses on four broad categories: basic human needs, institutions and infrastructure, economic management, and environmental recovery. . UNDP will, within the framework of a coordinated approach by the UN development system, assist affected countries in carrying out needs assessments, identifying priorities and activities in reconstruction and rehabilitation, and developing country and inter-country programs and projects. UNDP will also play a vital role in the management of the delivery of aid to countries as well as assessing the impact of that assistance. PEACEKEEPING QUESTION: 1. According to the United Nations, the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission will cost approximately $83 million for the first six months and $40 million for the next 6 months. _ — What will be the U.S. assessment for this operation? 241 _7_ — Will the U.S. assessment be based on the percentage we are obligated to pay for the U.N. operating budget or will the .S. pay more which has been the case for some peacekeeping operations? ANSWER: The U.S. assessment for the first six months of the UNIKOM operation will be approximately $18.5 million. This is based on the UN General Assembly approved budget of $61 million for the period April 10 through October 9. As with most other current UN peacekeeping operations, assessments will be based on the special peace and security scale of assessments. Under this scale, the U.S. pays approximately 30.374 percent of the costs. If the Secretary General believes it necessary to extend the security force temporarily deployed in southern Iraq, costs would rise substantially. QUESTION: 2. What is the troop composition of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission? — Have any countries declined to contributed forces? — Did Kuwait play a role in which country's forces would participate in the UNIKOM operation? — What is the formal relationship between UNIKOM and U.S. military forces remaining in the region. ANSWER: The United States has joined 33 other countries, including all permanent members of the Security Council, in providing military observers and logistic support for UNIKOM. Other countries participating in the observer mission are Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, the Soviet Union, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Turkey and Ecuador declined an invitation to participate. Several countries volunteered observers, but were turned down. The United Nations consulted with Kuwait on the composition of UNIKOM, but did not seek its concurrence. Leadership of UNIKOM is in close consultation with the U.S. Central Command. One of twenty U.S. observers detailed to UNIKOM has been designated as official liaison between that organization and CENTCOM. QUESTION: 3. UNIKOM will have an air unit. How many fixed wing aircraft will be part of the unit? — What is the mission of these aircraft? — Will they have any have any weapons systems-either offensive or defensive? ANSWER: UNIKOM's air unit will consist of two Pilatus PC-9 observation aircraft provided x ll -3- b Switzerland at no cost to the United Nations. The unit's mission will be aerial observation of the demilitarized zone and providing liaison services between various UNIKOM installations. The aircraft will ave neither offensive nor defensive weapons systems. QUESTION: . 4. What countries are expected to at least pay the costs to maintain the peacekeepers? ANSWER: - "'- All member states of the United Nations will be assessed their respective share of the UNIKOM budget. Accordingly, all will pay a portion of the costs to maintain the peacekeepers. QUESTION: 5. The UNIKOM mission is prohibited from taking physical action to prohibit military personnel from entering the demilitarized zone and its personnel can only use force in self-defense. — Do you consider the UNIKOM mission tobe a credible deterrent to an Iraqi military incursion into the demilitarized zone? ANSWER: UN Security Council Resolution 687 "guarantees" the inviolability of the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and undertakes to use "all necessary measures to that end“. The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was established to deter violations of the boundary throu h its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone. UNIKOM is not intendged to comprise a force capable of engaging and resisting armed elements violating the UN ceasefire. Rather, it affords the United Nations an independent capacity to monitor events and, if circumstances require, report violations to the Security Council. QUESTION: _ __ . .. 6. What is the capability of U.N. peacekeepers and U.N. agencies to monitor the cease-f ire agreement? — Will UNIKOM be able to engage in mineclearing and munitions control? — Will the U.N. be able to enforce Iraqi compliance on the destruction of ballistic missiles, and chemical and biological weapons? g ANSWER: With 300 observers, the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission is adequately staffed to perform its deterrent and surveillance mission. It will have no direct role in munitions control and will engage in mineclearing activity only to the extent necessary to ensure the security of its personnel in the demilitarized zone. Mineclearing in outlying areas of Iraq and Kuwait is the respective responsibility of those governments. By specifically reaffirming earlier Gulf-related resolutions, the UN Security Council 243 -9- continues, except as amended by Resolution 687 (1991), to authorize UN member states to use all means necessary to restore peace and security to the region. This residual grant of authority is the basis for enforcing Iraqi compliance with directives of the United Nation's Special Commission established by UNSCR 687 to oversee the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. We believe the Security Council has amply demonstrated to Iraq its willingness to take such measures as may be required to implement its decisions. III. PERSIAN GULF ENVIRONMENT: QUESTION: 1. Iraq signed but never ratified the 1977 U.N. Environmental Modification Convention. . — Is Iraq bound b‘y international law not to undermine the Convention prior to its rati ication? — Do you believe there is some basis to hold Iraq liable for violating the principles embodied in the Convention? — Is this Convention a subject in discussions with other members of the Security Council regarding the possibility of pursuing war crimes against Saddam Hussein? — Is any consideration being given to have the International Court of Justice determine that the principles in the Convention reflect customary law, thereby strengthening the case against Iraq? ANSWER: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the United States regards in this respect as reflecting customary international law, provides that a treaty signatory must, pending ratification of the treaty, refrain from acts that would defeat its object and purpose. This does not mean that a signatory is required to abide by all, or perhaps any, of the specific terms of the treaty during this interim period. Rather, the obligation not to defeat a treaty's object and purpose means that a signatory must not act in such a way as to make its compliance impossible, or to deprive its treaty obligation of meaning, once it ratifies. In the case of obligations to refrain from particular methods of warfare, or to limit the deployment of particular types of weapon systems, the United States would not find that use of the prohibited method of warfare, or deployment of the particular weapons system pending ratification, would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty unless it was clear from the terms of the treaty itself that such was the intent of signatories. Given the extremely narrow nature of the obligations contained in the ENMOD we would not have a very good basis to charge Iraq with a violation of its obligations with respect to this particular treaty. It is, however, a matter that we will keep under review. We have consulted with our Allies on the issue of war crimes generally, but the specifics of the ENMOD Convention are not currently the subject of discussions within the UN Security Council. We do not have, and are not aware of, any plan to refer the question to the International Court of Justice. We are working actively to ensure that Iraq provides compensation to governments and persons suffering damage as a result of its acts. Specifically, the UN Security Council has already adopted proposals by the United States which, among other things, declare specifically that Iraq is liable under international law for all environmental amage and depletion of natural resources resulting from Iraq's _10- invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and create a fund to pay claims for such damage from Iraqi oil export revenues. We intend to vigorously follow up on this initiative, with the objective of providing a source of funds to restore the environment of the region and of deterring such unconscionable conduct in the uture. QUESTION: 2. In addition to the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention, The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on Chemical Warfare, the 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the World Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention of 1972, all place restrictions on the use of war with respect to certain aspects of the environment. — To what extent have these conventions been studied to determine their applicability to Iraq? - To what extent have these conventions been reviewed to determine whether the U.S. and other members of the coalition may have violated any of their provisions? — Has the International Court of Justice ever ruled on whether any of the provisions in these Conventions reflect customary law? ANSWER: The review and study by the_ Executive Branch of international conventions as they relate to the armed conflict in the Gulf IS in process. The Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-25, April 6, 1991) requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress a_ preliminary report no later than July 1, 1991. and a final report no later than January 15, 1992, on the conduct of hostilities in the Persian Gulf theater of operations. Pursuant to Section 501(b)(12) of P.L. 102-25, this report will contain a discussion of the role of the law of armed conflict in the planning and execution of military operations by U.S. forces and the other coalition forces, and the effects on operations of Iraqi compliance or noncompliance with the law of armed conflict, including a discussion o environmental terrorism. We have been informed that the Department of Defense will be coordinating this report with the Department of State and other departments as appropriate. The International Court of Justice has not ruled on whether the provisions of these conventions reflect customary international law. QUESTION: 3. To what extent have there been discussions in. the _U.N._regarding the need for a new Convention to further clarify a country's responsibilities With respect to the environment during international conflicts? — Do you believe a new Convention is needed? ANSWER: We are not aware of any proposals for a new convention in the UN. For our part, we do not believe that a new convention is needed. In our view the actions taken by Iraq are already a violation of international law. 245 _ 11 _ QUESTION: 4. There are two issues with respect to the environmental destruction during the Persian Gulf war. One was the massive destruction of the environment as a direct consequence of the conflict. The other was the deliberate use of the environment as a weapon. - To what extent do you believe these two issue require separate approaches, not only m addressing what occurred in the Persian Gulf, but to deal with future situations. ANSWER: The laws of war deal with the environmental consequences of conventional methods of warfare, while the Environmental Modification Convention prohibits the use of environmental modification techniques as a method of warfare. These two issues present different military and environmental considerations and logically require separate approaches, and this is the pattern followed by international law to date. QUESTION: 5. Has the Security Council undertaken any specific steps directing Iraq to assist in environmental clean-up efforts in the Gulf, or to establish Iraq’s precise financial liability for environmental damage? ANSWER: UN Security Council Resolution 674, adopted October 29, 1990, reminded Iraq of its liability under international law for any loss, damage, or injury resulting from its invasion and illeglal occupation of Kuwait. Resolution 687, adopted April 3, reaffirmed that 'ability and specifically defined it to include environmental damage and depletion of natural resources. In accordance with the latter resolution, the Secretary General submitted recommendations earlier this month for establishment and administration of a fund through which Iraq can meet its obli ations. His proposal, including procedures for evaluating losses and setting the level of mandatory Iraqi contributions, is presently pending before the Security Council. QUESTION: 6. _There have been discussions regarding the possibility of establishing some type of international emergency mechanism to enable a much more rapid and effective response to the type of devastating environmental damage like that which occurred in the Persian Gulf conflict. — What is your reaction to this idea, and have any specific steps been taken toward this end? ANSWER: The U.S. supports efforts to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of international responses to emergencies. At the 16th session of the UNEP Governing Council, held from May 20 to 31, the U.S. supported the launching of a pilot UN communications and coordination center for urgent environmental assistance. The response capability envisaged would consist of a means to facilitate access to databases or other sources of information on available experts and equipment, along with appropriate communications arrangements. It will be important for the center 246 -12- to interlink and coordinate with existing networks, such as UNDRO's UN International Emergency Network (UNIENET), IMO's Disaster Coordination Center, and WMO's Global Telecommunications System (GTS). to avoid duplicating or interfering with their functions. The problem is to devise an arrangement that genuinely facilitates the necessary communication without imposing detours that would delay achieving the needed contacts. QUESTION: 7. In its report on the environmental consequences of the Persian Gulf conflict, UNEP maintained that an accurate assessment of the damage was hampered by restrictions on free access and the classified nature of information. — Have these issues been resolved? ANSWER.- The U.S. is providing available information to the relevant international organizations engaged in responding to the environmental situation in the Persian Gulf. Efforts are also underwafy to work out the arrangements needed to expand the collection and improve the low of information necessary to monitor and assess environmental conditions in the region. QUESTION: 8. UNEP's report on the environmental consequences of the Persian Gulf conflict was circulated to all U.N. agencies at the March 15 Inter-Agency meeting in Geneva, and at an informal Ministerial meeting in Nairobi March 11-13. — What was the reaction to the report? — Was a Plan of Action agreed to at the Inter-Agency meeting? ANSWER.- The UNEP meeting was an important catalyst in mobilizing international cooperation through the UN to deal with the results of the environmental devastation in the Gulf. UNEP's efforts resulted in an initial plan of action which the Gulf states and the international community have used in conducting an evolving assessment of the situation and the resources available to respond to it. UNEP has opened a UN Interagency Core Group in Kuwait to coordinate UN-related activities and the contributions of specialized UN agencies, such as WMO through its Gulf Regional Air Monitoring Program. QUESTION: 9. In early February, several U.N. agencies met in Geneva regarding the environmental damage in the Persian Gulf. They expressed an urgent need to support the Kuwait Action Plan of 1978. (a UNEP Regional Seas Program), through revitalization of the Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME) and the Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Center (MEMAC). — How have these two programs been strengthened to respond to the environmental damage caused by the Persian Gulf conflict, and what actions are they prepared to undertake? ANSWER 247 -13- ROPME and its associated MEMAC are essentially regional activities primarily involving the eight nations in the Persian Gulf area. As a result of the interagency meetings conducted at UNEP's instigation, ROPME has for examplveqfirovided facilities in Kuwait City for the UN Interagency Core Group that ' coordinate ' the implementation of the UN Interagency Action Plan in e ROPME Region. Other efforts were planned through ROPME to encourage greater involvement by the Gulf regional states in addressing the environmental situation in the Gulf , with the support and assistance of UN agencies and contributions from interested states outside the region. QUESTION: 10. The Government of Iran called for a ROPME Council meeting to be held in Teheran for April l7. — Did this meeting occur, and if so. can you tell us what happened? ANSWER: We understand that ROPME meetings were held in Tehran April 22-24 at the technical level, and April 24-25 at the ministerial level. As these were regional meetings, and the U.S. is not part of the region, we are not privy to the etails of discussions conducted at those meetings. We understand that efforts were planned to encourage greater involvement by and contributions from the states in the region to the international effort to respond to the environmental consequences of the Gulf conflict. These meetings and similar efforts can be expected to make the regional states more aware of and responsive to the need to support and participate in the activities underway or planned to address the environmental situation in the Gulf. QUESTION: 11 To what extent was any U N a ency involved in EPA's preliminary findings and report assessing the health impacts of oil well fires in Kuwait? — Has W.M.O. or W.H.O. made any similar assessments? ANSWER; EPA's initial efforts were coordinated primarily among U.S. elements in the region. Recognizing the need for international coordination and cooperation, the WMO convened a meeting in Geneva from April 27 to 30 to address the measures needed to assess the consequences of the oil fires. More than 50 experts from 14 countries, including strong representation from the United States, attended the meeting, as well as representatives from WHO, UNEP, and the Commission of the European Communities (CEC). As a result of the meeting, efforts are well underway to implement a Gulf Regional Air Monitoring Program, and WHO is cooperating with O and other UN agencies on the impact of the oil fires on human health. The U.S. is sharing monitoring information through these organizations as well as bilaterally with particular countries in the region. QUESTION: 12. How would you assess the performance of the I.M.O.'s coordination center in London in attempting to match environmental clean up needs with offers of assistance? — How has this effort been funded? 248 -14- ANSWER: The Secretary General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) a plied the concepts of the recently negotiated International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooaperation (OPRC) when he established a center with IMO to coordinate government offers of assistance to help combat the oil spill in the Gulf. The conference which adopted the OPRC Convention agreed that its provisions should be implemented immediately, even before the convention entered mto force. The Secretary General also established, under the auspices of IMO, a Gulf Oil Pollution Disaster Fund for voluntary contributions from governments, industry and other sources to complement efforts already being made in the Gulf and to facilitate the fielding of equipment and services. From all accounts, the handling of this fund and the coordination of offers of assistance was outstanding. Using existing resources, the IMO provided employees, office space, telephones and other equipment for the command center at IMO Headquarters in London. The United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, Canada, France and Japan also seconded personnel to coordinate this undertaking and to act as a clearing house for the overwhelming offers of assistance. Voluntary funding has come from the United Kingdom (one million pounds sterling) and Japan ($1.5 million). Luxembourg committed to 40 milhon Luxembourg francs in clean-up services and equipment, and Germany also provided an in kind contribution of equipment. Pledges were received from the Netherlands for 1.25 million guilders and Switzerland for 250,000 Swiss francs. The EEC has indicated that it will contribute one million ECU. QUESTION: 13. To what extent has the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) assessed the damage to nuclear plants in Iraq? —— Does the IAEA have the capability to monitor compliance with the cease-f ire provisions on nuclear weapon production capability? ANSWER The IAEA has been in communication with the Government of Iraq to seek the information necessary to fulfill the IAEA’s responsibilities under UN Security Council Resolution 687. The IAEA also visited Iraq from May 14 to 21 as part of the effort to implement Resolution 687. The IAEA will continue to carry out its responsibilities under Resolution 687 with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission formed to carry out the inspection and elimination of chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons usable material and related subsystems or components. QUESTION: 14. What role has the F.A.O. played in responding to the environmental damage of the Persian Gulf conflict? ANSWER: To date, the FAO has not been involved in the system response to the environmental damage in the Persian Gulf countries. In the near future, however, 250 U.N. -16- As of the end of April, a UN Interagency Core Group was fully installed in Kuwait City under UNEP auspices to coordinate UN-related activity on the environmental situation in the Persian Gulf, in implementation of the UN Interagency Action Plan in the ROPME Region which was adopted in Geneva on March 15. Contributions in cash and in kind will support the effort. To date, the United States has made in kind contributions worth more than $5 million to the effort, Japan has contributed $1.1 million in cash, Norway has pledged about $1.5 million, and the Netherlands has pledged about $0.5 million. The affected countries in the region are also expected to make substantial contributions. QUESTION: 19. I-low_ would you assess the overall coordination and cooperation of the various agencies m responding to the environmental catastrophe resulting from the Persian Gulf conflict? — Would you say it has b_een_ harmonious and relatively efficient, or has it been rather duplicative, slow and contentious? ANSWER: UN-related coordination and cooperation in dealing with the environmental consequences of the Gulf conflict has been generally satisfactory, bearing in mind the inherently unique and unpredictable nature of the situation. There is of course always room for improvement in interagency coordination in the UN system, and we will be looking to the experience gained in responding to the Gulf crisis for guidance in further improving the responsiveness of the UN system and its constituent elements in dealing with future emergencies. 20. I-low would you assess the cooperation between U.S. government agencies and the U.N. with respect to the environmental damage in the Persian Gulf? — For example, has there been contention between the Department of Defense and UNEP? — Has EPA been able to utilize the expertise of WMO for example, or vise versa? ANSWER Cooperation between U.S. agencies and UN elements in dealing with the environmental situation in the Gulf has been quite good, overall. We are not aware of any contention between the Department of Defense and UNEP. The primary U.S. governmental interface with WMO involves NOAA, especially the National Weather Service, as much of the air quality monitoring is or will be performed through the operation of existing and planned meteorological stations. Similarly, HHS will undertake the bulk of the U.S. collaborative effort with WHO. The U.S. will continue to participate as appropriate in international efforts being undertaken under the UN lnteragency Action Plan for the ROPME region. QUESTION: 21. How would you assess UNEP's role is addressing the monumental environmental problems resulting from the Persian Gulf conflict? — Does UNEP possess sufficient resources to respond in the way the international community expects? 4.‘. 252 -13- The success of this program has been remarkable. As of June 3 only 6,500 Iraqis remained in camps m Turkey. The rest had returned to Iraq. Coalition forces constructed camps in the Zahku area which have evolved primarily into transit camps for people returning to their villages. Coalition forces also operated waystations to assist returnees during their journey from Turkey. A similar situation is occurring from Iran and the border areas near the Iran-Iraq border. As of May 23, 12.295 U.S. personnel were participating in Operation Provide Comfort, out of a total of 21,551. QUESTION: 2. On April 5, the President announced that the Department of Defense would begin airdropping supplies to displaced persons along the Iraq-Turkey border. - How extensive has this effort been? - ANSWER; As of May 22, Operation Provide Comfort has delivered approximately 15,500 tons of relief supplies to sites along the Turkey-Iraq border. Originally delivery was by air drops. At present, the supplies are being delivered by truck. QUESTION: 3. How is the UN coordinating with the multi-national forces in the effort to assist displaced persons in Iraq and refugees in Turkey and Iran? ANSWER: The UN is coordinating its relief efforts with those of the multi-national forces through the office of the Executive Delegate in Geneva. The UN has placed a liaison officer at EUCOM headquarters in Stuttgart and EUCOM has a liaison officer in Geneva. An OFDA Disaster Assistance Relief Team is in Turkey and northern Iraq and closely coordinates with UN agencies on the ground. QUESTION: 4. Does the UNHCR now have a presence in the affected provinces and border areas of Turkey and Iran? ANSWER: The UNHCR has more than 100 staff people in Turkey and Iran along with additional relief personnel from WHO, UNICEF, WFP and UNDRO. QUESTION: I 5. Is the UNHCR prepared to take over the relief effort from the military, and, if so when? — What emergency assistance is the UNHCR receiving and from whom? ANSWER: The UNHCR has prepared a plan _for the staged takeover of the camps and relief activities in Northern Iraq. The timetable for this takeover will be established 253 - 19 - subject to the resolution of security and protection issues and to agreement on logistical and resource aspects of the transition. The UN plans to assume responsibility for U.S. run camps on June 7. The appeal for assistance for UNHCR activities is included in the coordinated UN appea which was re-issued by the Executive Delegate on May 15. As of May 10, the U.S. contribution to UNHCR was $12.5 million. QUESTION: 6. What is the U.S. contribution to the multilateral appeal for refugee assistance in the Persian Gulf? have ANSWER: As of May 22, the U.S. authorized contribution to relief programs totaled $212,706,360. The vast majority of this amount was given in the form of direct aid through Operation Provide Comfort. Further expenditures have also been authorized under the UN Partiqifpation Act which will provide additional support through Ocperation Provide Co ort. With the publication of the combined UN appeal an an additional supplemental appeal for the UN police force, and as the UN assumes control of the relief operation. We will adjust the contribution to respond to the situation. QUESTION: 7. International organizations report that as many as one million Iraqi refugees entered Iran, and 500,000 more are moving toward the border. — Has Iran indicated that it will grant asylum to this new influx of refugees? ANSWER: Refugees have begun moving back into Iraq from Iran as they have from Turkey, and numbers in the camps in Iran have begun to drop. The UN reports an estimated 900,000 remain in Iran with as many as 20,000 returning to Iraq each day If the present situation continues, there is no indication that Iran will be called upon to accept additional large numbers of refugees. QUESTION: 8. Reports indicate that almost 400,000 Iraqi refugees are massed at the Turkish border and 400.000 displaced persons are on the Iraqi side of the border. — Has Turkey indicated it will grant asylum to more refugees? ANSWER: Since this question was posed, the situation has changed. All but a few thousand Kurds have returned to Iraq. If the situation remams the same, it is unlikely that Turkey will be called upon to admit significant new refugee flows. 9. According to a Physicians for Human Rights team, the death rate for refugees along the Turkish-Iraqi border was as high as 400 to 1.000 per day, and lack of potable water and poor sanitation conditions could cause epidemics once the weather becomes so-323 0 - 92 - 9 254 -2Q_ WHTIIICT. — What is being done to prevent this potential situation? ANSWER: Happily, the medical situation has improved markedly. The death rate in the camps is now 3-6 per 10,000. Although cholera has been reported, doctors from U.S. CDC report that the outbreak is under control. Potable water is being supplied in both Turkey and Iraq and work to improve sanitary conditions is underway. Unfortunately, the situation on the border between Iran and Iraq has not improved and the international relief effort has encountered difficulties with Iranian officials. REPARATIONS QUESTION: l. What are the mechanisms to provide restitution and compensation to those nations who have suffered as a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait? - How will the U.N. acquire the funds to provide restitution? ANSWER: Paragraph 18 of UN Security Council Resolution 687 creates a fund to pay compensation for claims against the Government of Iraq for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damzigp and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nation and corporations as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Paragraph 18 also establishes a Commission to administer t e Fund. The Fund is established without prejudice to claims which can be pursued at the domestic level. QUESTION: 2. Has the U.N. Human Rights Commission established a special rapporteur for human rights in Kuwait and Iraq? ANSWER: The 1991 session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) overwhelmingly adopted two resolutions dealing with the Gulf crisis and human rights. One resolution on human rights in occupied Kuwait established a new rapporteurship to investigate that subject and report to the 1992 UNHRC session. The other resolution dealt with the domestic human rights situation in Iraq. This resolution also established a new rapporteurship to investigate allegations of human rights abuses in Iraq and report to e 1992 UNHRC session. There will be interim reports on both issues to the 1991 U.N. General Assembly. Each of these resolutions is subject to endorsement by the spring session of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (May 13 - 31), and both resolutions are expected to be promptly endorsed. The United States and other countries have been examining various potential candidates for these two ragporteurships and will provide their suggestions to the U.N. Human Rights Center an the Chairman of the NI-IRC. 255 APPENDIX 2 SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE NANCY PELOSI. A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RESPONSES THERETO ON THE POST-WAR ROLE OF THE U.N. IN THE GULF QUESTION: 1. _What suggestions do you have on improving the international response to an international environmental problem? ANSWER: The United Nations is a natural focal point for monitoring and coordinating responses to environmental issues of g obal importance. However, it cannot necessarily take responsibility for all aspects of implementation. Member states must also shoulder a significant amount of responsibility. The U.S. supports a strengthening of the UN’s ability to respond to environmental emergencies as well as longer term concerns such as climate change. We have submitted to the UNEP Executive Director a paper entitled "Improving UN Institutional Involvement in Environmental Af airs: Enhancing Central Coordination and the Role of UNEP." Key recommendations focus on insuring that UNEP acts primarily as a catalyst and coordinator, engaging in only limited operational activities. For example, UNEP should further develop its Earthwatch program (a collection of assessment and information exchange programs) — perhaps in conjunction with other UN agencies with the requisite expertise so that there is an effective rapid response "switchboard" to put countries in need of emergency assistance in touch with appropriate available expertise and services. On a broader scale, the UN members are busy preparin for the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development %UNCED). The issues that are to be addressed are complex and sometimes controversial. Nevertheless, we hope to have ready prior to the UNCED agreements on important subjects such as global forests and climate change. QUESTION: 2. When there are adverse environmental impacts of global importance, do you believe that a stronger United Nations response is warranted? — If UNEP is not charged specifically with the response effort, do you think its role should be strengthened to encompass responsibility for organizing and supervising the emergency response? — Is there any other international body equipped to fulfill this role? ANSWER: As stated above, there is room for strengthening the UN response to international environmental emergencies and UNEP’s role should be primarily that of coordinator. Depending on the scope and nature of an emergency, there 256 -2- are international bodies that can take responsibility for organizing and supervising the regponse. For example, it the wake of the release of oil into the Gulf by Iraq, the ntemational Maritime Organization established a trust fund and took the lead in removing the oil from waters and coastal areas of the Gulf. As the scope of the environmental damage in the region increased with the oil fires, UNEP established a UN Interagency Action Plan to coordinate response to the full range of environmental damage: marine and coastal environment; the atmosphere; the inland terrestrial areas; and hazardous waste management. Other international bodies that are engaged in environmental issues include the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, the Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME). the World Wildlife Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization, Habitat, and the World Meteorological Organization. QUESTION: 3. Would you support and initiate the develo ment of a comprehensive regional environmental plan for the Gulf region, similar to UNEP's "MED PLAN" for the Mediterranean. ANSWER: We do support such an effort and it already exists as part of UNEP's Regional Seas Program. Responding to a request from governments of the region, UNEP organized a fact-finding mission in the niid-seventies to identify and define environmental problems of the region with a view to developing an action plan. In 1978 an action plan and the Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution were adopted. At the same time, the Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME) was set up to act as a Secretariat to manage the implementation of the action plan. ROPME is funded through a trust fund set up by the member states (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) but also receives some program support from UNEP. QUESTION: 4. President Bush, in his address to the General Assembly on October 1, stated, That the machinery of the United Nations will no longer be frozen by the divisions that plagued us during the Cold War." and stressed, "The emergence of a stronger United Nations." — What steps would you propose, in your representation to the United Nations, to cultivate a stronger united role to address refugee concerns, environmental damage, reparations and other issues now facing the Gulf region? ANSWER: In recent years we have seen a remarkable evolution of the ability of the United Nations to address current problems of global concern. Increased cooperation among the Five Permanent members of the Security Council made possible by the ebbing of East-West tensions has enabled the Security Council to function as the founders envisioned. The series of resolutions pertaining to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and the 258 -4- knowledge, no state has requested that such a review be held. The U.S. is satisfied with the functioning of the convention. We encou_rage states - that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention. QUESTION: 6. Will you pursue the possibility of including the costs of environmental damage in the reparations agreed to under the cease fire agreement with Iraq? ANSWER: We have already established that this will occur. UN Security Council Resolution 687 reaffirms that Iraq is "... liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, inclu ing environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait." As called for in Resolution 687, the Secretary General has developed general recommendations for establishing a fund, and a special commission to administer it, that will be used to pay claims for reparations. Iraq's contribution to the fund will be based on a percentage of its petroleum-related revenues. We are currently engaged in discussions with other UN members to determine the most effective mechanisms for ensuring that Iraq meets its obligations to make the required reparations. 260 a an Torres , I/\ L-¢\ I-toward Berman, I ‘ M.C. I} I I ‘\ /, . / in ’<”“”5@\ \ Tom L-ant s , atthew Martinez, M C. O '“= \ Gary Condit , DP Bill Lowery, M Pe e' Stark, M.C. Thomas Downey, M‘C. 24$ rles Rangel ,M.C . Norm Dicks, M C Donald Pease M . . , ‘- Ronald Dellums, M. . Jim , M.C. / l“"'“'~ ~' Connle Morella, M.C. Joe Kennedy, M.C. / ' M.C. ' E ' . .}_. AU V Don Edwards , M . C . '&_ 261 Elton £a2e ly, M.C 1 tr l .1 C5117, Gerry bS'i:udcls, M.C. Frank McCloskey, M.C. ,-3 FD /‘ 2 /. ‘Wu-6/4.“ ' -.2:-L4 -, at X 4)’? W Ba ra Boxer,‘ M.C. Susan Molinari, M.C._ ’ X ' Rosa DeLauro, M.C. John ller, M.C. / / / /' ” K flz ( Arthur Ravene Bob Borski, M.C. Wayne gens, M.C. Thomas Andrews, M.C. 4/a-Q " ~ 120.2 Jim tfcDerInoi:t:, ‘M.C. Frank Riggs Jill L~.C. 5 i/.1;-t—' Tim Valentine, M.C. Y Jim Jontz, M.C ouise Slaughter, M . L .C -) I/-\~ /7 /Q ‘ g / / ' /L/\~ l , M. David Price, M.C. /is ii I3 C‘ 262 Alirank Horton I M-C Pat Schroe er , E l)..=Q;-1:_/’/M I lliam Je Mel Levine, M.C. Norman Minet Chris Smith, M.C. Patsy Mi , M.C. 263 APPENDIX 4 STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PELOSI SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS APRIL 23, 1991 MR. CHAIRMAN: THANK YOU FOR HOLDING THIS HEARING TODAY. I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE. THANK YOU FOR ADDRESSING THE SERIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS IN THE GULF THAT HAVE RESULTED FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN'S ECOTERRORISM. GIVEN THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN TRAGEDY THAT HAS DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF THE WAR, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT CONCERTED MULTILATERAL ACTION CONTINUE. I AM CONCERNED HOWEVER THAT THIS ACTION HAS NOT BEEN AS MASSIVE OR AS IMEDIATE AS NEEDED. OIL FIRES CONTINUE TO RAGE -- EACH DAY MORE OIL BURNS IN KUWAIT THAN IS USED IN THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES, THE WORLD'S LARGEST OIL CONSUMER. OUR TROOPS CONTINUE TO BREATHE CONTAMINATED AIR -— AS ONE ENLISTED MAN SAID "THEY'RE TELLING US THERE'S NOTHING WRONG WITH THE AIR —- COME ON, MAN, YOU CAN TASTE THE OIL IN YOUR MOUTH." THREE THOUSAND BARRELS OF OIL POUR EACH DAY INTO THE PERSIAN GULF -- THE SPILL SO FAR IS EIGHT TIMES THE SIZE OF THE EXXON VALDEZ. THE HUMAN TRAGEDY IS STAGGERING —- THOUSANDS OF KURDS HAVE DIED ALREADY IN THE MOUNTAINS OF NORTHERN IRAQ AND 1,000 PEOPLE A DAY CONTINUE TO PERISH FROM TREATABLE DISEASES. MR. CHAIRMAN, AS WE WORK TO REBUILD THE LIVES SHATTERED BY THE PERSIAN GULF WAR AND AS WE SEEK TO RESTORE THE REGION'S ' THREATENED ENVIRONMENT, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HEAR IN DETAIL WHAT EFFORTS OUR GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED NATIONS IS TAKING. I THEREFORE LOOK FORWARD TO THE TESTIMONY OF OUR WITNESSES TODAY. 264 ZS MR. CHAIRMAN, WHILE AGENCIES AND TASK FORCES TAKE SAMPLES AND ANALYZE DATA TO DETERMINE THE HEALTH RISKS OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S ECO-TERRORISM, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT U.S. TROOPS STATIONED IN THE GULF ARE BEING EXPOSED TO AN UNUSUALLY HIGH AMOUNT OF AIR POLLUTION. "WE'RE NOT STUPID," SAID STAFF SERGEANT JOHN BRANDON OF THE U.S. ARMY 3RD ARMORED DIVISION, "THEY SAY THE POLLUTION IS NO WORSE THAN NEW YORK CITY. I'VE BEEN TO NEW YORK, AND IT DOESN'T LOOK ANYTHING LIKE THIS." O THICK CLOUDS OF BLACK SMOKE FROM THE WELL FIRES HAVE BEEN SPEWING INTO KUWAITI SKIES FOR OVER A MONTH, OBSCURING THE SUN WITH AIR BQLLQIANI§_§§I1flAI§D AI TEN TIMES THE AMOUNT PRODUCED BY ALL THE INDUSTRIAL AND ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES COMBINED. O AIR POLLUTION FROM OIL WELL FIRES IS SO BAD THAT SOLDIERS STATIONED IN THE GULF NEED FLASHLIGHTS TO SEE IN THE DAYTIME AND THE FLAGS THAT FLY OVER NEWLY LIBERATED KUWAIT ARE STREAKED WITH SOOT. O THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY HAS DETECTED SOME AIR POLLUTANTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE GULF FIRES HALFWAY AROUND THE WORLD —— AT ITS MAUNA LOA STATION IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. 265 ’ " O LARRY FLAK, THE AMERICAN ENGINEER COORDINATING THE FIREFIGHTING EFFORT SAYS, "WE GUESS ABOUT 520 OR 530 WELLS ARE BURNING, BUT SURVEYS ARE STILL GOING ON." O DOUGLAS DOCKERY OF THE HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH WARNS THAT CANCER AND CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE MAY INCREASE DUE TO THE FIRES, BUT THAT IT WILL BE YEARS BEFORE WE KNOW THE FULL EXTENT OF THE HEALTH RISK. O MORT LIPPMAN OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL SCHOOL SAID - "NOBODY HAS EVER BEEN EXPOSED TO SOMETHING LIKE THIS BEFORE." ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION ON THIS SCALE HAS NOT OCCURRED IN OUR HISTORY. WE NEED TO BE AGGRESSIVE IN OUR PURSUIT OF DATA SO THAT WE HAVE A BETTER NOTION OF THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF THE TOXICS OVERWHELMING THE AIR, LAND AND WATER OF THE GULF REGION. SOME OF THESE POLLUTANTS MAY TURN OUT TO BE CARCINOGENIC. FOR OUR TROOPS, WE COULD HAVE ANOTHER "AGENT ORANGE". MR. CHAIRMAN, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE PROVIDE OUR TROOPS WITH WHATEVER MEDICAL ATTENTION THEY NEED, NOW AND INTO THE FUTURE, TO COPE WITH THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO POLLUTION RESULTING FROM THE GULF WAR. THE UNITED STATES, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ITS COALITION PARTNERS, HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE. WE CAN AND MUST STEP UP TO THE TASK. 266 O OUR SOLDIERS NEED MEDICAL ATTENTION TO ENSURE THEIR FUTURE --. WELL-BEING. O THE PEOPLE OF THE PERSIAN GULF NEED OUR HELP TO STAVE OFF THE HEALTH RISKS AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIP THAT WILL FOLLOW THIS ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS. O AND THE WORLD COMUNITY NEEDS AN INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT THAT WILL STRONGLY DISCOURAGE FUTURE MILITARY AGGRESSORS FROM USING ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION AS A WEAPON r OF WAR. THE GULF ENVIRONMENT DAMAGE REPORTS NOW FILTERING IN ABOUT THE GULF ENVIRONMENT CAUSE US SERIOUS CONCERN FOR OUR TROOPS WHO REMAIN IN DANGER FROM POTENTIAL THREATS TO THEIR HEALTH AND COMPEL US TO ACT FOR THEIR SAFETY. THICK CLOUDS OF BLACK SMOKE FROM HUNDREDS OF OIL WELL FIRES HAVE BEEN SPEWING INTO KUWAITI SKIES FOR OVER A MONTH, OBSCURING THE SUN WITH AIR POLLUTANTS ESTIMATED AT TEN TIMES THE AMOUNT PRODUCED BY ALL THE INDUSTRIAL AND ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES COMBINED. THREE TO SIX MILLION BARRELS OF OIL ARE BURNING FROM WELLS EACH DAY. THE AIR IS SO THICK IN SOME AREAS, IN FACT, THAT TROOPS NEED HEADLIGHTS AND FLASHLIGHTS TO SEE DURING MIDDAY. RECENT REPORTS HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED ABOUT THE HEALTH DANGERS RELATED TO SECONDARY SMOKING — - CAN YOU IMAGINE THE EFFECTS OF CONSTANT INHALATION OF CARCINOGENIC SMOKE? THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY HAS EVEN DETECTED SOME AIR POLLUTANTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE GULF FIRES HALFWAY AROUND THE 267 WORLD AT ITS MAUNA LOA STATION IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS; AND BLACK SNOW HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE HIMALAYAS. EVEN THE BEST ESTIMATES CONCLUDE THAT IT COULD TAKE YEARS TO EXTINGUISH ALL THE OIL FIRES. THREE THOUSAND BARRELS A DAY CONTINUE TO POUR INTO THE GULF FROM OFFSHORE OIL RIGS. THIS AMOUNTS TO AN EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL EVER! THREE MoNTHs. ACCORDING TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE NATIONAL ATMOsPHERIC AND OCEANIC ADMINIsTRATION, OVER 4 MILLION BARRELS HAVE BEEN sPILLED INTO THE GULF wATERs, MAKING THIs THE LARGEsT OIL SPILL IN THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD, EIGHT TIMES THAT OF THE EXXON VALDEZ. DR. SYLVIA EARLE, A NOTED WORLD MARINE SCIENTIST WITH NOAA, REPORTs THAT THERE ARE LAKES OF OIL ON THE LAND, THREATENING GROUND WATER SUPPLIES. THE GULF sITUATIoN ALsO HIGHLIGHTs THE NEED FOR A MORE STRUCTURED INTERNATIONAL CRISIS REsPONsE CAPABILITY WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONs ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME (UNEP) THAT CAN RESPOND QUICKLY TO LIMIT DAMAGE FROM ENVIRONMENTAL CATAsTROPHEs, WHETHER CAUSED BY WAR OR BY ACCIDENT LIKE A "CHERNOBYL". CURRENTLY, UNEP HAs soME CAPABILITY TO MOBILIZE RESOURCES AND EXPERTISE ON A sCALE NECESSARY TO MITIGATE QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY INJURY TO HUMANs, AIR, LAND AND WATER. ON MARCH 15, UNEP EsTABLIsHED A sPECIAL TAsK FORCE TO "STUDY" THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF THE GULF WAR. UNEP PLANS TO CONDUCT A 90-DAY SURVEY OF THE REGION AND REPORT THEIR FINDINGS TO DEVELOP AN ACTION PLAN RECOMMENDING SPECIFIC sTEPs TO ADDREss THE WAR'S ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. EVERY EFFORT WE MAKE Is IMPORTANT, BUT WE MUST BE BETTER PREPARED AND WE MUsT HAVE A MORE TIMELY REsPONsE TO GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENcIEs. I WOULD LIKE TO sEE THIs FRAMEWORK FOR REsPONsE sTRUcTURED 268 IN A MORE EFFECTIVE WAY SO THAT EXPERTS FROM ALL UNITED NATIONS MEMBER COUNTRIES WOULD BE MOBILIZED FOR ANY ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER OF GLOBAL CONSEQUENCE. THE UNITED STATES CURRENTLY HAS AN INTERAGENCY TEAM, COMPRISED OF EPA, NOAA, STATE, DOD, DOE, HHS AND THE COAST GUARD TO MONITOR AND REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION IN THE GULF. WHILE MONITORING IS IMPORTANT, IT DOES NOT REPLACE THE NEED FOR IMEQIATE RESPONSE TO AN ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS. WE MUST HAVE A RESPONSE PLAN THAT INCLUDES ASSESSMENT AND CONTINUED MONITORING, BUT ALSO INCLUDES A DATA BANK OF RESOURCES THAT ARE READILY AVAILABLE FOR ACTION AND RESTORATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT. IF EVERY U.N. MEMBER COUNTRY HAD AN INTERAGENCY TEAM THAT COULD BE ACTIVATED WHEN TRIGGERED BY UNEP, WE WOULD HAVE A MORE FORMALIZED MECHANISM FOR RESPONSE, UTILIZING INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS FROM HEALTH, SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY. I WOULD ASK AMBASSADOR PICKERING TO PRESENT AND DISCUSS THIS IDEA AT THE U.N. LEVEL TO IMPROVE THE CURRENT STRUCTURE FOR ADDRESSING A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS. THE ENVIRONMENT CANNOT BE HELD HOSTAGE; WAR ON THE ENVIRONMENT IS UNACCEPTABLE. I WOULD ALSO SUGGEST TO AMBASSADOR PICKERING AND TO SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER THAT A STRONGER INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CODE EXIST TO INCLUDE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AGAINST VIOLATING NATIONS. SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY HAS INCREASED THE RANGE, SPEED AND ACCURACY OF WAR WEAPONS. DURING THE GULF WAR, OIL WELLS, REFINERIES AND CHEMICAL PLANTS AND NUCLEAR FACILITIES WERE BOMBED, WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR EMITTING POISONOUS GASES INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. CONGRESSMAN GILMAN AND I CIRCULATED A LETTER, WITH 58 OTHER MEMBERS, TO THE PRESIDENT URGING HIM TO TAKE QUICK ACTION TO 269 IMPLEMENT THE LANGUAGE INCLUDED IN THE DIRE EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991. THE LAW CALLS ON THE PRESIDENT TO CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING, ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION AND RESTORATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION. I HAVE ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS DETERMINE AN AMOUNT TO CONTRIBUTE TO UNEP'S "SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTAL FUND" TO ASSIST IN COVERING SOME OF THE COSTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION IN THE GULF REGION. WE MUST NOW MOBILIZE OUR EFFORTS TO MEND THE ENVIRONMENT WITH A RESPONSE AS SWIFT AND AGGRESSIVE AS OUR DRIVE TO SUCCEED IN WAR. THE ENVIRONMENT MUST NEVER AGAIN BE USED AS A TOOL OF WAR. OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE ARE MOTIVATED BY A CONCERN FOR HUMAN WELFARE AND THE PRESERVATION OF OUR WORLD. THIS SAME SENSE OF HUMANITY MUST GUIDE US TO PROTECT THE FOUNDATION OF HUMAN LIFE —- OUR NATURAL ENVIRONMENT. I CALL ON THE PRESIDENT TO INITIATE A NEW U.N. TREATY TO BAN THE USE OF ECOLOGICAL WARFARE. SPECIFICALLY, MILITARY STRIKES ON NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, OIL FIELD INSTALLATIONS, CHEMICAL AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES WHICH COULD WREAK GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL HAVOC SHOULD BE OUTLAWED BY INTERNATIONAL TREATY. A DELIBERATE WAR ON THE ENVIRONMENT SHOULD BE CONDEMNED BY ALL NATIONS. WE MUST CONTINUE OUR LEADERSHIP AND RESTORE THE PEOPLE AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE GULF REGION. WE MUST ALSO LEAD IN THE CREATION OF A STRONGER CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN WAR. 270 L». NANCY PELOSI “""'"' inn msvlncv cmooonu APPENDIX 5 *"*'.::.‘:'.m.’.°.‘.‘.""°‘ illnngress at the United States wfi'.z".z'.'zz. house at Representatives ="=~'~"°""'"" S" "'f;,";_=,§;};;;"-1"“ Ilumngtoii. it 20515-0505 January 25, 1991 Mostafa K. Tolba United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) United Nations Plaza #2 Room 803 5 New York, NY 10017 Dear Mr. Tolba: While we are aware that the immediate cost in human life of this conflict is of paramount importance, we also believe that the likely environmental consequences of a full—scale war on the Persian Gulf region may result in significant human casualties as well and must be examined; We are thus writing to request that the United NQCLODS Environmental Programme conduct an investigation to determine the potential environmental consequences of the ongoing war in the Middle East. Several noted scientists contend that devastating environmental effects Could result from the current military operations underway in the Gulf region. Because of the proximity of vast oilfields near the battlefields, the threat that they will sustain considerable damage and the difficulty of controlling resulting oil and air pollution, and the disastrous oil spill already spreading through the Persian Gulf, we consider the investigation a :r;:ritv. we are requesting that the investigation include the following components for study: computer modeling of the actual and potential effects of war on the environment, including greenhouse gas production consequences of combat on further degradation of the Gulf marine environment impacts on the ozone layer, and other atmospheric impacts. particularly as they relate to equatorial climate change that could affect growing seasons and crop production in the region and beyond we believe that there is sufficient preliminary data from eminent scientists throughout the world to justify such an important investigation. The potential for environmental disaster compels us to do everything conceivable to address these issues as soon as possible. ‘mg grnionglv Imuflex OI IAIN I00! OI KCYCLID Flllll 271 Hr. Tolba UNEP Page 2 The considerable expertise and distinction of the U.N. Environmental Programme could make a significant contribution to developing a better understanding of the global environmental consequences of our military actions in the Gulf region. Your cooperation in this effort is very important and very much appreciated. O Sincerely, I g Q ’ O BOB WISE, M.C. TOM CAR / cacao: saoi-ht, :-i.c. / yam DELLC BARBARA BOXER. M.C. DON EDWARDS. M.C. Z ' (I WAYNE OWENS, M.C. S] E! i \§AU _d__ BOB MRAZEK,‘T:iE§£4;¢> 272 FASCBL022 APPENDIX 6 ‘Y3? §9!FE'§E§$ H. R. 1.91/‘ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Mr. Fnscsu. (for himself and Mt. BROOKFIELD) (both by request) introduced the following bill; which was referre to the ‘Committee on A BILL To authorize the transfer by lease of 4 naval vessels to the Government of Greece. HLC 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 2 of the united States of America in Congress assembled, 274 PASCELOZZ 3 1 enactment of this Act unless the lease authorized by that 2 section is entered into during that period. 275 Appendix 7 New York Times Article July 18, 1991 - Atom Effort Ruined, Inspectors Say I BY PAUL LEWIS spmiuna ::- van 'n-ei BAGHDAD, Iraq, July I7 — Contra- dlcting reports that Iraq had produced- enough nuclear material to build at least one atomic bomb, United Nations inspectors have concluded that bomb- ing raids during the Persian Gulf war‘ probably destroyed Iraq‘: uranium en-- rlchnicnt installations before they- produced any weapons-grade material. ‘ The inspectors, pan of the team sent here by the Security Council to check on Iraq‘: nuclear potential, say Iraqi officials have deluged them with infor- mation about the enrichment program since Monday. On that day, the Interna- tlalal Atomic Energy Agency's Direc- tor General, Hans Blix, told the Se purity Council that Iraq's disclosures about its nuclear installations were still Inadequate, even though Iraq had‘ acknowledged that it had a secret en-f richment program. The inspection team's conclusion ap- peared to support Iraq's claim that it is. not hiding nuclear installations A re- port in May by an Iraqi defector said Iraq had produced so rounds of en- richeduranium, enough or two bombs. After this report, Mr. Btish said Presi- dent Saddam Hussein was lying and in-' dlcated that the United States might re- sume attacks on Iraq if it kept trying to produce nuclear weapons [State Department and other offl- cials familiar with lntellglenoe re- ports on Iraq's nuclear ability said they remained skeptical of the new report. "That doesn't ring right," an . of iclal said. "We know they produced some highly enriched ma- terial and that material was taken out of some of those facilities."| U.N. Council to Get Report As a result of the inpsectors' conclu- sion that the enrichment installauons were probably knocked out in the allied raids, the United Nations officials say the team is likely to send the Secunty Council a new and more positive report on the Iraqi disclosures. Mr. Hussein, in a 45-minute televised address marking the anniversary of his Baath Party's seizure of power in I968, made no reference to his clandes- tine nuclear weapons program, to the renewed threat of Amencan bombing. A positive report by the United NI- tions inspectors to the Security Council on Iraqi nuclear disclosures could lead some diplomats and officials to argue that the United States should not be; quick to fulfill its threat to resume at-5 tacks on Iraq if it continues to refuse to disclose the location of llS nuclear ll'i~ stallations, as required by a Security, Council resolution. But the United Nations team has also asked Iraq for a categorical assurance that it is not concealing other nuclear installations Nations is giving Iraq a last chance to come clean about any other secret nu- clear installations, Demitri Pericos, the chief United Nations inspector, said, "Yes, you could say that is what we are doing." Alled tonight Whether the Untted\ U.N. Aides Satisfied The United Nations officials now say they know all they need to about these plants and are reasonably sure that they have not produced any weapons- grade enriched uranium by the time the allies destroyed them. Tonight, Hr. Perricos said he did not believe the press reports that Iraq had enriched nearly 90 pounds of uranium up to weapons-grade level. The United Nations inspectors dis- lcovered that one of the installations ‘bombed by the allies — at Tarmta about 30 miles from Baghdad — was an ienrichment plant using electromag- i netic technology and was about six months from becoming operational. It was equipped With some 30 calu-: Iron machines used for enriching ura- nium. The machines, all of which were damaged by the raid, were spotted by the inspectors being removed from the plant on trucks and were subsequently buried at sites around the country Iraq has now dug up the remnants and showed them to the inspectors "They were trying to hide the evi- dence," an official said. Iraqi nuclear officials have told the inipectors that Baghdad has tned to- keep its enrichment program secret because it was afraid that Israel would bomb the plants otherwise. In IQI Is- raeli warplanes destroyed an Iraqi nu- lclear reactor that the Israelis said was being used to develop an atomic bomb. 277 _* Quaker Middle East Representatives T . JUIY7 _ \ THE STARVATION OF A NATION: THE MYTH AND REALITY OF SANCTIONS by Anne Grace, Quaker Middle East Representative May 1991 %1ii>3£"-*m¢,, ' ""“’*1$133’»Z’"% "‘"~¢»t.,=-». mi’ 42 -Qcgamzg Anne Grace and Brewster Grace are Quaker International Affairs Representatives for the American Friends Service Committee. Based in Amman, Jordan, they travel widely throughout the Middle East. They meet with a wide range of religious and political leaders, including senior government officials. In May 1991, Anne Grace visited Baghdad, Iraq. American Friend: Service Committee Quaker Peace and Service, London Canadian Friends Service Committee Friends World Committee for Consultation 278 THE STARVATION OF A NATION: THE MYTH AND REALITY OF SANCTIONS by Anne Grace Quaker Middle East Representative \ Sanctions against Iraq, authorized by the United Nations under Security Council Resolution #661, were a valid non violent attempt to avoid a war. The war was fought anyway. The United States says the war was won. The Iraqi people know the war continues——through continuing sanctions. The coalition partners say the war was not against the Iraqi people, yet the U.S. and its allies chose to prosecute it in a manner that destroyed the undergirding of an urbanized and mechanized society of 18-million people. The destruction of the "command and control" centers included destruction of the electrification, communication and transportation systems, as well as of the water system of the country. The result is catastrophic. There is not an aspect of life untouched. Food and clean water, medicine and health care and employment, all considered basic human rights in our "kinder and gentler" world, are being denied to the people of Iraq. Again and again, the Iraqi people ask "If you won the war, why do you continue to fight us?" "Why can't you leave us alone to pick up the pieces?" The human tragedy in Iraq today, unlike in Africa or Bangladesh, is that a purposeful decision by a few leaders in a few countries is causing what may well end up being the destruction of a nation of people. Through sanctions and the concomitant freezing of assets, we are day by day responsible for needlessly mounting deaths. The myth that humanitarian sanctions have been lifted, as prescribed under U.N. Security Resolution #661 and clarified under Resolutions #666 and #687 is belied by the Sanctions Committee's refusal on May 21 to approve the Iraqi request to export $1 billion worth of oil in order to import food, medicine and necessary equipment for reconstruction. It is belied when frozen assets are not released to cover letters of credit for purchases of Australian wheat. It is belied when Iraqi purchases, made prior to the war, of powdered milk cannot be released from friendly "allied" ports for lack of foreign exchange to cover storage charges. Baghdad itself is magically deceptive to western eyes. The shops are full of consumer goods. Most of the capital has electricity for some hours of the day. On the streets, 279 2 there is some traffic, at least at some hours of the day. The garbage is collected, at least in some parts of the city. Children are back in school. One can find the exception to the accuracy of "precision bombing," but for the most part, on the surface, Baghdad, the cradle of civilization, is beautiful. Scratch the surface and the reality totally belies the appearance. The shops are full of non-essential consumer goods - what are more commonly known as soft and hard durables. The shops are, for the most part, open. Yet most do not have electricity. Why are they open? Apparently, the proprietors have little else to do. They say, "Even at a loss or selling below cost} there were only a few customers from August to January, and since the ground war, no one buys anything." Inflation from August to March was, on an annual basis, l,0O0%. It is now estimated at an annual rate of 1,300 to 1,400%. Electricity is rationed within the city, with priority given to hospitals and emergency services. Government offices, hotels and private homes may receive an allotted number of hours per day. A home or an apartment with hot water is a rarity. Baghdad is a modern city with many of its office buildings and homes dependent upon heating and air- conditioning or fans. Many of its buildings do not have windows which open. What is electricity in a modern city? Take sanitation. The treatment of sewage requires electricity. Before the war, Iraq prided itself that the Tigris and Euphrates were among the cleanest rivers in the world. The electricity which has been restored is insufficient for treating sewage which now is being dumped into the rivers, causing contamination. The bombardment of Baghdad destroyed the power plants, the oil refineries, oil storage facilities and water treatment chemical plants. Electrically operated facilities ceased to function. Diesel operated generators are hampered by lack of fuel, lack of maintenance and lack of spare parts. In Iraq, water purification facilities are operated on electric power, some with stand-by diesel power generators. Drinking water requires chemical treatment and imports of aluminum sulfate and chlorine. Even in Baghdad, where some chemical testing has occurred, water quality varies widely. Bacteriological testing had not been possible due to the lack of electricity for laboratories and a lack of necessary chemicals and reagents. Only recently, after assurances from UNICEF and the ICRC of resupply availability, did the water authority use its remaining stocks of aluminum sulfate and chlorine. This has somewhat improved the quality of drinking water in Baghdad. 280 3 Yes, the children are in school. Yet, over one million students do not have desks and must bring cans from home to sit upon. They have exams for which they cannot prepare as there is no electricity at night. Traffic on the streets would in normal instances indicate some underlying economic activity - people working, shopping, playing. Not so in Baghdad. Cars are on the street solely to carry messages since, while telephone lines have been restored in many areas of the city, communication lines between exchanges are almost non-existent as are, of course, lines to the outside world. As to underlying economic activity, it is virtually non- existent. Over 90% of the factories are closed. Even agriculture at harvest time is paralyzed. Power and spare parts are not available. Iraq is a nation of people on "forced leave without pay." Of those lucky enough to retain employment in services, industry, agriculture or in government, the purchasing power of their incomes has eroded to almost nothing. Yes, garbage is being collected —- but only in some areas. Many incinerators are not working due to a lack of spare parts and electricity, and as a result, garbage is accumulating in growing piles. Insects will become a major problem as summer approaches and insecticides or the chemicals to produce them cannot be imported. Food is of the highest priority. Stocks of essential food staples are either now depleted or at critically low levels. Before the war, livestock was a thriving industry. Iraqis produced and consumed a lot of meat. Livestock herds were highly dependent upon imported feeds and locally produced veterinary vaccines. Feed could not be imported, the only factory producing vaccines was destroyed in the bombardment of Baghdad, and the herds were slaughtered. Poultry production, again dependent upon imported feed and on power, no longer exists. There is no fruit and few vegetables in the country. Many fruit trees, a major investment, were lost due to the lack of power-generated irrigation facilities. Seed warehouses were destroyed in the bombing — — Iraq had been nearly 100% dependent upon imported seeds. Flour, sugar, rice, tea, vegetable oils, and pulses are imported - with only minor domestic production under normal circumstances. What does exist in the markets is priced far beyond the reach of most Iraqis. Eggs are now imported from Jordan and at the local currency exchange rate, cost a little over 50 cents apiece. For the six months following the imposition of sanctions in August, no food imports at all were allowed into Iraq. Since that time until the week of May 20, only the equivalent of a single day's food requirement for the Iraqi 281 4 population, or 10,000 metric tons had been imported. The World Food Program, that same week, allocated two shipments of food staples, one valued at just under $20 million and one at $24 million. 2.4 dollars worth of food per person will hardly alleviate the hunger. To Canada and Australia's credit, both countries signed commercial contracts (for 500,000 and one million tons respectively) for the export of wheat to Iraq. It is likely that the Canadian shipment will go through. The Australian shipment was halted because a third government refused to release frozen bank assets which Iraq would use to pay for the food. Iraq normally produces about 1 million tons and imports 2.5 million tons of wheat. This year, Iraqi domestic production is not expected to exceed 850,000 tons - probably an optimistic estimate — primarily due to the level of mechanization and the lack of spare parts and fuel. Milling of the wheat will face the same difficulties. Iraq does not need to starve: the world community is forcing the starvation of Iraq. With medicine, the situation is no better. Medicine and medical equipment depend upon imports valued between one- half and three—quarter billion dollars per year. The government, for lack of vaccines, was forced to cease its child immunization program one month after the imposition of sanctions. And again, many purchases made by Iraq prior to August 1990 remain in foreign ports. Antibiotics, anaesthetics, insulin and anti-dehydration tablets remain in critical shortage. The rate of increase in diarrhea cases, particularly among vulnerable populations (four million children in Iraq are under the age of five) rises daily. Some cholera and typhoid cases have been confirmed, even though many go unconfirmed due to the lack of testing agents in the hospital laboratories. Health conditions in Baghdad and throughout Iraq are precarious. Under current conditions, the Ministry of Health, basing its figures on a recent report by a Harvard study group, projects that at least 150,000 children will die from war related causes. The water and sanitation conditions will be exacerbated by the long, hot summer which in turn makes imminent communicable, particularly water- borne diseases, quite likely of epidemic proportions. The lifting of sanctions on humanitarian assistance which has already occurred, is necessary but insufficient. The little that does work in Iraq today works only because, out of necessity, "Peter is being robbed to pay Paul." The cannibalization of industrial and agricultural assets, while necessary under current crisis conditions, will ultimately result in much greater suffering. A food system, a health care system, not to mention employment-generating productive capacity, require supporting materials, inputs, spare parts, and a transport system. 282 5 All non-military sanctions must be lifted and financial assets unfrozen. Iraq has the capability to finance most of its own relief and reconstruction needs -— only if it is allowed to import and export. If all non-military sanctions are lifted, certainly the United Nations and the international community have the capacity to monitor the use of critical imports. Iraq has indicated it would accept such international supervision. If sanctions are not lifted, the toll on the Iraqi population will be terribly high. Over 50% of the population is under 16, an additional 10% are elderly. Even if the sanctions were lifted tomorrow, it is highly unlikely that major epidemics could be avoided this summer. They will take their toll among, particularly, these most vulnerable groups; The punitive sanctions against the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein are acutely punishing and indeed killing the people of Iraq. The madness must end. Non—military sanctions must be lifted. I283 E‘_€2!~'YL‘fl’l ZTul.y 'lk?9l> War’s other victims: Iraq’s children Anne Grace ot the American Friends Service , Committee says war-related military destruction is threatening the lives ol UN 1531115 hundreds of thousands oi Iraqi children. abQ\_1[ fugges Q: All eyes are focused on Iraq's nuclear sites. Bot you've had a rare view ol the rut of trad What doa Bagh- dad look like since the war? A: It looks horrific. The bridges that have been botnbedhave great big craters in them. The building. the otanmunlatlons center. yoti an see the damage. you an see where we missed. and you an see where the collateral damage took place You an see the residential houses that were hit near the communim- has center. And that's pretty awful. But it's limited Q A Harvard study says at least l7l.00l children will dle from delayed elects ol the war. Do you agree? A; They will die. The Iraqis would tend to say that [the lig- ure is] much higher, but there are tnyunes trorn the bombing inrunes from the lack or food. inprries tron: all oi the war-re lated incidents. You can't say, ‘Hey, these are simply ldds who were bombed.’ because they are not They are all of the impacts that have come tron: the war. Q:Whataresomeo!thelrn- pacts? A:F‘lrsrotalLyou'renotpt- ting anything but a dnp ot whafsneededtor thepopula- tltaitnterunotmedidneand tood.1heelecn'icityhasbeen repiredtothe extent that|t can be repaired But all the sewage is pumped by electric- iry and. it you dont have the sewage pumps. you are going to have mayor contaminauort Q: Isn't lood being grown? A; They dont have any seeds to plant The seed tactones were bombed. The storage tac- tories and tacillties were bombed. So there are no seeds and there's no ability to plant Iraq was highly dependent upon the United Qata both for agriculoltal produce as well as agricultural equipment and machinery and spare para None oi those have come in since August. They rust don‘t have it They don't have the ta- cilitla. Their wheat and vege~ table crops are down like 50% from their annual average. Q: So what do most babies have to eat? A; It they‘r'e eating theyre being brx-ted. And that's go ing to depend upon their moth- ers welkbeing You have peo- ple who live in tniddleclas neighborhoods. And they're having to go to their neighbors now and sy. ‘You've eaten. Do you have anything left over tint we might have?’ Q: ls It puctble that more peopletnaydlelrotndlsease thandledlrointhewar? A: That‘: probably very, very true On top or that you tnightevaisay thatmorepeo plewilldietrointhecivilrebel- lion than will dietrorn theini- Anne Graceis the Qiialeerhtiddle East representative forthe American FrimdsServtoeComrni:tee.Grncewci.: .dll0wedtov'isi1Baghdnd|as1monLhwi- dathaou.sptoao{thelroqiRedCreo- oentflieisbasedinmwrimtlorddn. Stawnsinurviewedbytelephor-mby !.5AT'ODAY'sB~arbaraReynolds. tial bombing ot the war. What Ls important is that with the war, we set in proces a tor- ward rnouon. That forward rnociori dstroyed the ability ol a civilization. a country, a peo- ple to live. Those people have had their whole lives changed. There are many people with- out family who dont know where their hushanrn or kids are still tnchy. You have al- most all of your industrial Q- pocity, all oi your tactoria dosed down QWhatshapearetbebos- pltalsln? A'There‘snotooemedicine thatyoucouldnamethatisnot in absolute. venlled shortage Thereare medicinasome hospitals tnsomepartsot the counoythatareinnixpltisbut toeventrackthatuveryhard. Q:Lsn"ttheRedCrosahelp- lnfl It The Red Cruz is there TheRedCresoenttsthere.T'he United Nationsistherewhat allotthemaneabletndoissuo stantlal but ininitnaL ll can By Boo Lard. USA TODAY help. at best les than 1% oi the population. This is the sad thing You've had B-angladsh. you‘ve had the Philippines. you've had Japan. even. You've had all of thee natural disasters You have Atrica. Tremendous needs. Iraq doesnt need the help. Iraq an paytoriselliiweyustliftthe auctions Q:TheU.N.lltt loodahlpmentatn doyoothlnktheochersane dons. including healing aa- sea and a ban on Iraqi oll salesshouldbeuhed? A:T‘hesancoonsareclarty aplnst 18 rriillionlnqtxthey are not apitst Saddam Hus seinlipeoplereelthatthnn going to move the people or 1r'aqag.insSaddaml'lilseuLl wotudnytharsatbestavery, veryrisltyproposiuon If any thing what I see among the people is that the more the West pushesaipmsthe pra- dentotlruithetnorethepeo ple are ping to sxpport the _teelingthattheyTebeingpun- ti Es 6 \ The U I d Nations Higr Com for Ftelugees Sad , says sne le a lot how tc deal with refuge roolems [om the Persian G war. / B. who met wttikf i- dhn.tg'8usn last week cuss the status or ir-qi ovu- tans. ys the will Ufi moéfifififihw lugee proo W000. ones who ex- perienced e know where the we ne ses are anc where ststanoe. It we can man- tho lraqi srtuadnnl" gata says the commis- sion's 1991 budget »s\saoo million. These volunteer 'c: funds go toward :- ugee problems arou the W000. Ogata says the SSOIT the rm must raise all of S800 mil- lioo to be able manage F5 agenda Sofa about $556 milli has en donated. which -stasrnucnas lastyears - -- shesays lraqsreptoblernalone will co aut $267 million U18 -. _,.. I . to Ufi {URE- ’ ..;- $131 "e DUIM'E8$tE1:'. growing - --- around 7 nylon ( ' . ailand, 99.. 495001 ~ AIritz;4.6nion - alawi. 0: Sudan, 77,700 = 710207) - North » - 1.4millior~. (US . 1 rnilli ; Canada. (41 at §v§§v?f 3 .§.E 5.} ~ " 12 million .4(0.costarica. - . 237,10): _1@) 487-France. .F --. ep.other~ m , 150.700. Sweden. 1 9.g00: United ' ngdom 00.000) -Leo /- ~_ Kat: ‘(Q way’ : ,. ..- §;§§§v __§f. . . 28.6. t r 1 APPENDIX 9 SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO TI-IE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RESPONSES THERETO U.N. SPECIAL APPEAL FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF IN TI-IE GULF QUESTION: 5.. 1. What percentage of Ihe U.N. special appeal has been disbursed to UNICEF? The latest, revised May 15 special UN appeal for the Gulf , totalling $460.3 million for all UN agencies, includes almost $49.3 million for UNICEF for refugees and repatriation assistance and for emergency aid to vulnerable groups in Iraq. Donor pledges per the latest UN rejecting equal only 51% of the total appeal. However, the response to UNICEF been somewhat better: UNICEF had received and committed as of August 9 nearly $30.8 million, or 62%, of its rtion of the appeal. Given the liimted funding available, all funds pledged to UNICEF are committed within 30 days of pledge or receipt against already identified immediate needs. The Bureau for Refugee Programs contributed $3 million toward for UNlCEF's budget of $16.6 million for refugees and repatriation activities. Those funds from the FY 1991 Gulf supplemental were transferred to UNICEF when supplemental monies were released to the Bureau in J u y. QUESTION: 2. What is the total dollar figure of U.S. assistance-through bilateral programs and multilateral agencies for humanitarian and medical relief for Iraq and could you specify how much of that has been committed for Iraqi Kurds and how much for the rest of the population? — Has all the assistance obligated by the U.S. for humanitarian relief been delivered? ANSWER: Through August 31 the USG had rovided over $450.3 million for emergency relief to Iraq, including about $18.2 million contributed to international organizations or to U.S. PVO's carrying out activities supporting their operations in Iraq. The majority of U.S. funding was for bilateral assistance in connection with Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq per the attachment. No data is available on the number of Kurds who were among the estimated 425,500 Iraqis who fled to Iraq's border with Turkey or who were among the 1.3 million who fled to Iran. The Iraqi refugees included many other ethnic minorities, i.e. Turkomen, and religious groups (Shia and Assyrian Christians, for example) besides Kurds although Kurds were the majority of those who fled Northern Iraq. No bilateral USG funds or U.S. contributions to the UN and ICRC were earmarked specifically for the Kurds or for use in Turkey, Iran or Iraq; therefore, there is no way to identify amounts of U.S. assistance received by Kurds as a group. 288 -3- Recent years have witnessed a substantial expansion in the sco and number of UN peacekeeping activities. This development, however, shouldnot obscure the basic purpose of these operations; i.e. to maintain international peace and security. We believe dispatch of peacekeeping forces must be tied to this requirement of the UN harter. I would note that the United Nations, through specialized agencies such as the UN High Commission for Refugees, has numerous means short of introduction of armed force through which it can achieve humanitarian objectives. QUESTION: 4. Could you evaluate the performance during OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT. the international peacekeeping action in Northern Iraq? — Could you provide an assessment of its effectiveness? ANSWER: In March and April of this year 2 million Iraqis, mostly Kurds, fled to Turkey and Iran seeking protection. Operation Provi e Comfort fed, sheltered and clothed those in Turkey or near the Turkish border and created a security zone in northern Iraq into which most felt it safe to return. Provide Comfort was a massive international effort of which the coalition states can be justly proud. QUESTION: 5. The U.S. armed forces has recently assisted in international relief efforts in the Persian Gulf and in Bangladesh. — How was this assistance coordinated? ANSWER: In both cases, the President exercised the special authority in section 506(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, to authorize the Department of Defense to drawdown defense articles and defense services to provide international humanitarian assistance for Iraqi refugees and displaced persons and for disaster victims in Bangladesh respectively. Dod used this authorization to commit over 12,000 U.S. military personnel to Operation Provide Comfort between early April to mid-June 199 . For Operation Provide Comfort: — The Department of State established a joint State - Agency for International Development Task Force to coordinate the relief effort for Iraqi refugees and displaced persons. - As is standard practice, the Task Force included representatives from the concerned bureaus and offices: the Bureaus for European and Canadian Affairs, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Politico-Military Affairs, International Orglanizations Affairs, and Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, efugee Programs, as well as AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Agencies. The Deputy Secretary of State and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs were also represented. State's Bureau for Refugee Programs chaired this Task Force. 289 -4- — In Washington. the State-AID Task Force worked with the Department of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Crisis Action Team in the Pentagon, especially the officers of the Joint Staff's J—5 Strategic Plans and Operations Directorate. DoD's primary point of contacts were the staffs of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs and the Defense Security Assistance Agency. — In Turkey, the State-AID Task Force worked with the American Embassy in Ankara through its Refugee Task Force, which included staff from all of the concerned sections and offices from the U.S. Country Team there. The Embassy also sent Liaison Officers to help with the relief effort to the American Consulate in Adana, to temporary embassy Task Force offices in Silopi and Diyarbakir, and to Incirlik Air Base. , — DOD-JCS coordinated the U.S. military relief effort through the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, which set up its own Crisis Action Team. — EUCOM established a Combined Task Force (CTF) commanded by LTGEN John Shalikashvili that included U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine units in Turkey, Northern Iraq and on ships in the Eastern Mediterranean. — Under a unique peace-time arrangement, LTGEN Shalikashvili's CTF also coordinated the field operations of the nearly 10,000 British, French, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, Belgian, Australian, Canadian and German forces participating in Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey and Northern Iraq. — The State-AID Task Force coordinated U.S. efforts with international relief efforts through the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, and through the U.S. Mission to the United Nations headquarters in New York. The Missions worked closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refu ees (UNHCR). the International Committee of the Red Cross &CRC), and the League for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LICROSS) in Geneva, and the U.N. Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) in New York, and through the U.S. Embassy in Rome with the World Food Program (WFP). U.S. Embassies in Europe and around the world also participated in this relief effort. — EUCOM sent a liaison officer to U.S. Mission Geneva. For Operation Sea Angel (initially Productive Effort): - As is often the case with country specific disasters, State and AID coordinated their work in Washington through AID's Office of U.S. ForeigsDisaster Assistance which worked with State's Bureau for Near tern and South Asian Affairs and AID's Bureau Asia and Private Enterprise. These offices coordinated daily with staff of the Deputy Secretary of State and the Under Secretary for Political Af airs, and as necessary with other State and AID bureaus and offices. 290 -5- — State and AID worked through State's Bureau for Politico-Military Affairs with the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff's J-5 Directorate for Strategic Plans and Oiptfarations, and the Assistant Secretary for International Security fairs, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency. — In Bangladesh, the State-AID Task Force worked with the American Embassy in Dacca through its Disaster Task Force, which included staff from all of the concerned sections and offices of the U.S. Country Team there. — The Embassy Task Force worked with the Decca's offices of the U.N. Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO). the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the League of International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LICROSS) and the participating private voluntary agencies, such as CARE. — DOD-JCS coordinated the U.S. military relief effort through the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), headquartered in Honolulu, awaii, which set up its own Crisis Action Team. — PACOM established a Joint Task Force (CTF) commanded by MGEN Henry Stackpole in Dacca, Bangladesh, that included the U.S. Army, Air Force. Navy and Marine units in Bangladesh and on shgps in the Indian Ocean. The Navy's 3rd Amphibious Group and the th Marine Expeditionary Brigade were the primary deliverers of the disaster assistance. — Dod's Global Affairs Office, which handle Dod's worldwide Humanitarian Assistance Program, was a key participant in both relief efforts. QUESTION: 6. U.N. operations in the Gulf appear to have set several precedents concerning the use of peacekeeping and guard forces. — Has there been any recent discussion at the United Nations with respect to expanding the mandate of peacekeeping operations to respond to international crises including cases in which governments are committing human rights violations on a massive scale? — Would an expanded tpeacekeiping mandate entail a revision of the traditional notions 0 nation sovereignty? ANSWER: The dispatch of UN 'Peacekeeping forces to the Gulf was based on a determination that eir presence is required to maintain international peace and security. That rationale is consistent with accepted international practice of more than 40 years. The proliferation of UN peacekeeping activities in recent years reflects a new spirit of international cooperation rather than a redefinition of the objectives for which armed forces are placed at the disposal of the United Nations. Respect for human rights is a key concern of the United Nations. In the absence of a threat to or breach of the peace, however. we believe violation of 291 III. 1 -6- human rights is best addressed by UN specialized agencies such as the UN Human Rights Commission. Of course, the Security Council may act at the r uest of mterested parties and send unarmed observers to investigate human rights abuses. We wholeheartedly support such initiatives and hope the mission recently dispatched to El Salvador serves as a model for UN inquiry into human rights abuse elsewhere. Because of their voluntary nature, observer missions established in the absence of a threat to international peace and security do not require revision of traditional notions of national sovereignty. HARVARD STUDY QUESTION: 1. Could you comment on the findings contained in the Harvard study? ANSWER: The stated objective of the study was to evaluate health conditions in dpost-war Iraq within a short period (9 working days). While the team provide some use ul impressions of medical and sanitary conditions, the assessment, like other brief surveys that followed it, cannot be considered completely comprehensive. Nevertheless, the findings of the Harvard study do point out the potential risks of disease and malnourishment in Iraq, particularly for young children. In this they are consistent with other independent assessments. The value of studies such as this one lie in their ability to increase international awareness of real humanitarian problems that exist in Iraq and to motivate both the government of Iraq and the international community to provide humanitarian assistance. QUESTION: 2. The Harvard study estimates that 170, 000 children will die by the end of the year in Iraq. — Is that an accurate projection? ANSWER: It is difficult to ascertain the accuracy of this proijection, given the variables involved. It is certainly true that children are su fering from the effects of the aftermath of the Gulf crisis and are especially vulnerable to changing health conditions, including a lack of safe water supply, immunizations and normal diet. The UN and many NGOs are working together to identify the needs of children and respond to them promptly. UNICEF workers reportedly have reduced their predictions of widespread infant deaths caused by post-war malnutrition and disease. They indicate that the situation has improved somewhat because of restoration of electrical power in many areas and because of international relief efforts. A recent study commissioned by UNICEF and carried out by two Tufts University nutrition experts found evidence that the malnutrition in southern Iraq predates the Gulf crisis and has been further exacerbated by the lack of equitable food distribution to that area. UNICEF is working to alleviate these conditions by implementing a supplementary feeding plan to supply children 294 -9- The U.S. effort to monitor and assess the effects of the oil fires was lI100?O!'3.lI¢d into a WMO Plan approved on April 30. 1991. NOAA is coor mating U.S. air monitoring activities with WMO, the designated lead UN agency for monitoring atmospheric pollution in the region. The assessment of the short and long term health and environmental effects of the oil fires is continuing. U.S. agencies are conducting assessment activities in consultation with UN counterparts, including WHO and WMO. To date no significant differences in the interpretation of data have surfaced between U.S. and UN agencies. QUESTION: 2. In late Atpril, WMO hosted an international conference to assess the atmospheric effects of the oil ires and to develop an international response plan. — Can you tell us something about this plan and what is the U.S. reaction to it? ANSWER: A group of U.S. experts met with counterparts from other countries under the auspices of WMO m Geneva A ril 27-30 and adopted a joint UN response lan to monitor and assess the healtg and other enviromnental effects of the oii) fires. In response to the WMO plan, the U.S. has made available several scientific teams, with special e rtise, to help local scientists and colleagues from other countries (notablygiz U.K. and Germany) collect and assess the data. QUESTION: 3. What is \WMO's role in the Gulf Regional Air Monitoring Plan? ANSWER: The World Meteorological Organization (WMO). in consultation with U.S. agency experts and governments in the Gulf. convoked a meeting in Geneva April 27-30 and produced the “Report of the WMO Meeting of ETIKS on the Atmospheric Part of the Joint UN Response to the Kuwait Oilfiel Fires.“ The recommendations contained in this report formed the basis of the VVMO-coordinated plan to which you refer. QUESTION: 4. NOAA (Noah) has established the Persian Gulf Program Office. How specifically does this office coordinate its efforts with WMO? ANSWER: The NOAA Program office deals with WMO directly in Geneva or through personnel of the two organizations located in the Gulf. Coordination also occurs through the EPA-chaired Gulf Task Force, which has overall responsibility for coordinating U.S. Government activities in monitoring and assessing the effects of the oil fires. QUESTION: 295 - - 5. The Kuwait Ministry of Public Health and the WHO, with the assistance of the U S Interagency Air Assessment Team, have developed a health action plan to address both acute and chronic health assessment projects. — Can you tell us something about this effort and the respective roles of WMO and the U.S.? ANSWER: Assistance to the Kuwait and other Gulf States in dealing with the enviromnental consequences of the Iraqi hostilities is being provided by an international effort in which the USG is participating. A broad range of programs is under the overall coordination of UNEP. The USG is working with governments of the region to charmel technical assistance through WMO, WHO and other UN agencies. EPA is the designated coordinator for the overall U.S. program, in consultation with the Department of State. The EPA task force, which has supplanted the U.S. Interagency Air Assessment Team, is keeping in close contact with WHO and working in coordination with the Kuwait government to assist in dealing with the problems of the area. WHO sent a mission to Kuwait from March 16 to April 6. Included were specialists in emergency relief, environmental health, community water supply and sanitation. an research and training in the control of tropical diseases. The mission collaborated with the Ministry of Health of Kuwait in preparing a tentative program budget for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the health care system covering a period of six to twelve months. Among the mission's findings were (1) that large numbers of health professionals had left Kuwait, possibly as many as 80 percent, and (2) that quality medical examination and care was almost impossible to provide because key elements of the electrico-medical equipment had been removed, damaged or rendered useless by the lack of maintenance or repair. The resulting health plan, developed in cooperation with the ministry, highlighted rehabilitation of the health care infrastructure, surveillance of environmental hazards and their impact on health, restoration of environmental control systems, provision of technical support, drugs, and other supplies, establishment of a program to deal with post-war psychological trauma, restoration of the pre-war informatics system, establishment of a mechanism for the repair of equipment required for operation of blood banks, and reequipment of emergency medical services. WHO also has proposed a Human Exposure Assessment Location (HEAL) project for Kuwait. This would be part of the WHO-UNEP Global Environment Monitoring System (GEMS). EPA is a major supporter of HEAL projects, and will be working with WHO to assist Kuwait in developing this activity, which uses new technology to assess total human exposure. In regard to air-pollution related health projects, WHO sees its role as coordinating and channeling Kuwaiti requests for consultants and funding, but not necessarily participating directly in each activity. QUESTION: 6. I understand that WHO plans to conduct an ecological assessment of environmental damage in Kuwait. — What is the status of this initiative? ANSWER: 296 H ii it ll l t -]_1-_ An officer of DHI-IS/CDC, acting as an advisor to WHO, visited Kuwait in May to design and undertake monitoring and research projects to assess ssible short-term and long-term effects of air pollution. Although WHO his been very active in working on health-related problems in Kuwait, in this and other ways, our Mission in Geneva was informed on August 6 that the conduct of a formal ecological assessment of environmental damage is not part of the WHO workplan. QUESTION: '~'=' . 7. Has Iraq's financial liability for environmental damage been established? ANSWER 1 The United Nations Security Council has condemned Iraq's actions in causing these discharges and fires, and is taking concrete steps to ensure that Iraq bears the burden o redressing this damage. In Resolution 674 (1990). para. 8, the United Nations Security Council states that Iraq "is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq.“ In Resolution 678 (1991), para. 16, the Security Council reaffirmed Iraq's liability under international law "for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources" as a result of Iraq’ s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Further, by Resolution 692 (199 ), para. 3, the Security Council decided to establish an effective compensation regime, drawn from Iraqi oil export revenues, that addresses these, as well as the many other aspects of the immense damage caused by Iraq. The United States has been the strongest proponent of compensation for this environmental damage. and we intend to continue to work to ensure that funds to redress this damage are provided by Iraq. QUESTION: 8. The FAO had intended to send its own f act-f inding mission to the Gulf region to identify specific activities within its mandate, in the area of fisheries and pollution. — Has such an effort been undertaken, and if so, what have been the results? ANSWER: Beginning September 1. 1991, FAO, in connection with_ the G_u_f Committee on Fisheries and Ecology, will conduct a 10-day fact-finding mission in the Gulf Region. FAO’s focus is to help with the rehabilitation of the fisheries industry in the Persian Gulf countries. QUESTION: 9. The IMO and the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation have been given high marks in dealing with the oil spills in the Persian Gulf. — Are there an areas where you feel the IMO. or the_Convention need to be strengthened or modified for future emergencies? .,_ ._,~ _ ANSWER: 298 . -13- Kuwait City in rnid-July for testing and review b ROPME and other institutions and agencies involved in the Plan of Action. The final version was expected to be ready by the end of Jigliy, including full facilities for data assessment and presentation. The fin version is to be transferred to ROPME in early August, accompanied by user manuals and system documentation. QUESTION: 13. UNESCO sent a special representative to Kuwait to assess needs within UNESCO's fields of competence. including environmental damage. A report was suppose to have been submitted in June. — Has this report been issued, and if so, what can you tell us about it? ANSWER.‘ Iba der Thiam, former Senegalese Minister of Education, served as Director General Mayor's special representative to Kuwait and submitted his report to the Director General who, in tum, made it available to the 136th session of the Executive Board (May-June, 1991). The report is a searing indictment of Iraqi vandalism and pillaging of Kuwait's educational, scientific, cultural, and communications infrastructures. It gives specific examples of studied and preplanned theft of specialized equipment and cultural objects. The 45 page written text is complemented by several video cassettes, available at UNESCO headquarters in Paris. The Executive Board instructed Director General Mayor to make proposals to its September session on ways of assisting Kuwait to restore its educational, scientific, cultural, and communications infrastructures. QUESTION: 14. Has the UN Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine _ Environment (ROPME), and its regional action plan, made sufficient progress in addressing the major environmental issues in the Persian Gulf? ANSWER: According to the report of the Third UN Inter-agency Consultation on the Plan of Action for the ROPME Region (UNIAC III). held in Geneva on July 3-4, 1991 ROPME had originally agreed to provide necessary office facilities, including pcs and 0 er logistics, to the Core Group and the UN Inter-agency Experts undertaking missions to the Region. It was also agreed by ROPME that the Core Group would have access to the baseline data available with ROPME. B the end of uly, however, ROPME expressed in a written report to the Ui,\lIAC III (no ROPME representative attended the meeting) that "in spite of its fullest cooperation, the components of the survey and assessment phases, to be carried out by the specialized agencies, cannot be completed within the three-month period...ROPME feels that, in general, progress in the activities taking place until now has not been satisfactory as was envisaged when the Plan of Action was developed jointly by ROPME and UNEP." ROPME further advised UNIAC III t it was planning to take the lead of the rehabilitation effort on September 1, 1991. QUESTION: 15. U.N. Guards for Kurds-mandate altercations with Iraqis, how many are there 300 -15- - initiated a UN guard pgogram to protect UN personnel and facilities and to monitor Iraqi havior with respect to its own citizens. — through its attempts to monitor the situation in southern Iraq, uncovered a major Iraqi government campaign to isolate members of the Shia population in the southern marshes. QUESTION: 2. Which U.N. agencies have been the most successful in responding to the crisis? — Which have been the least successful? ANSWER: It is impossible to characterize the performance of any UN agency as most or least successful. Each has experienced successes and failures during the last year. The nature of the tasks assigned to each agency has differed widely and, to a degree, determined the level of performance. Unfortunately, the UN performance has been marked by turf struggles, delays and staffing roblems Only after the appointment of Sadruddin Aga Khan as Executive Deibgate did the UN effort become more cohesive and effective. QUESTION: 3 How would U N activit in the Gulf be constrained were there not consensus amongthe Perm 5 members of the Security Council? ANSWER: The solidarity of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council in response to e Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and in the aftermath of the crisis has been historic. It enabled the Security Council to take a firm, united and unwavering stand against Iraq's aggression, including the authorization of the use of force to oust Iraq from Kuwait in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. In the aftermath of the crisis, Perm Five solidarity facilitated the adoption of Resolution 687, the "ceasefire" resolution which established the conditions for the restoration of peace and security in the area. Perm Five consensus also helped ensure the adoption of Resolution 688, a firm response to the threat to international peace an security posed by Iraq's repression of its citizens, the root cause of the massive flow of displaced persons in northern Iraq, Turkey and Iran. Res. 688 authorized the international community to provide humanitarian relief inside Iraq, and required Iraq to cooperate. This set the stage for the coalition's massive and successful Operation Provide Comfort, whose responsibilities the UN has now assumed, as well as for continued UN monitoring of Iraqi behavior. QUESTION: 4. What progress has been made in returning Kuwaiti property stolen by Iraq? — Has Iraq been forthcoming? ANSWER: Baghdad has publicly claimed that it is prepared to return stolen Kuwaiti 302 1. Bureau for Refugee Programs, DOS (cumulative through 8/31/91) Humanitarian Assistance Obligated/Committed for Emergency Relief in Iraq Since January 1991 (in US$ millions) “$58.24 million A. UN Appeals B C D E F 1. UNHCR 2. UNICEF 3. WHO 4. WFP 5. IOM 6. UN Guard Force 7. Office of Executive Delegate Subtotal UNWRA ICRC LICROSS Turkish RC Society and other Turkish Entities , RP Administrative Expenses 2. Department of Defense — over $337.89 million A. Operation Provide Comfort (figure to be revised) B. UN Guard Force (Excess property transferred to date) C. UNHCR (Excess property) 3. A.I.D. /Food For Peace l,‘. Food Commodities (rice, wheat flour, and vegetable oil contributed to WFP) 4. A I.D. / Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance — $15.26 A C. D. E F G TOTAL Grants to UNICEF and ICRC Grants to U.S. PVO‘s Local Procurement in Turkey Medical Supplies Tents & OFDA Stockpile Commodities OFDA & RP Staff TDY's and Expert Consultants Ambassador's Disaster Fund U.S.G. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE $ 24.50 3 00 0.50 2 oo 2 1s s 00 0.40 $ as 15 S s 00 $ 12 90 $ 0 25 $‘ i ss $ 0 oe $330 00 $ 93 $ 6 96 s as 92 million $ 1.00 $ 7 10 $ 5 31 $ 0 061 $ i 30 $ 0 46 § 0.025 $450.31 i/ 1/ 303 _2_ 1/ Incremental expenses for Operation Provide Comfort based on bills actually received through July 15 when U.S. forces withdrew from Northern Iraq. Estimated cost of Operation Provide Comfort may total $448 million when all bills are in. Both figures exclude costs financed originally from budget for Operation Desert Storm. 2/ Includes $8.98 million worth of food aid financed with FY 1990 funds which was diverted to Turkey for use in feeding Gulf crisis refugees. 304. ...‘'‘\ ' - _.~ _ . -t Appendix 10 lN’l'I;;HNl\‘l‘lONI\l. A.|'MlC ENERGY Au!-1NcY TIN; I\l|n'.1:'|'n|I umulrllthl. 25 Juty 4991 Dear Mr. secretary-General. Ptease ftnd attached the report of the ttirct IAEA Inspection tn Iraq under Security Council resolution (>87 (1991). You may deem It appropriate to transmit the report to the member: of the Security Council. I remain at course avoltablo wttn the Chtet Inspector. Mr. Demetrius Petrlcos tor any aonsuttattons you or the Council may wtsh to hove. lam planning to go to the Unttea States on 20 July. " Yours stncereti. Lac Q. ,. Hans Bttx cc: Action Team Mr. Javier Perez de Cuéttar °°° seqeuygenad Hr. Vllllros United Nations ""4"" New York. 10047 °"'*""-° USA DIR-ADP! _ PHD - one-so Special Catnmiss (Only IAY.It-Liaison Office NYC Pile 1 -\ |t-|s nu» w |\| \'n'\ Ill :'.u-n H" 309 .5. !-1f.Qfll!CiLEi1'l.CI!_"i9!JL mewmmmmb~&rwm 7. Research. development and testing oi EMIS components were carried out in the Nuclear Physics Building [80]. Reviews ot an lraqi provided video lope showing the EMIS facilities in the building. together with examinations ot components oi the t00CHnillimetre separators (this number refers to the radius oi the ton beam in the separator tank) and tho model 106 ion source test stand. are consistent with Iraq's declaration. in the opinion oi the inspection team, the tcciilty was not designed tor - nor was it capable at - producing enriched uranium in quantity. The Iraqi statement that the only real obstacle remaining in the development or an etficlent EMiS system was an improved ion source is consistent with experience elsewhere in the world. Work on graphite collectors and on the configuration at ion sources and collectors was also carried out in this building. Research on EMl$ chemistry was carried out in the nearby Chemical Research Building (85). A small pilot line tor the production ot UCI, was also contained in this building. Both buildings. 80 and 85. have been levelled and the rubble removed. Experiments with gas centrifuge enrichment were declared by Iraq to have occurred in the Cold Material Testing Building (63). ~ ‘a Iraq has accumulated. through imports and indigenous production. a large inventory ot natural uranium The indigenous material is largely tram an uranium extraction lacllity (producing yellow cake) associated with a superphcsphate plant at Al Qalrn. ‘ihe toxicity was extemtvety damaged during the bombing. There is no evidence that the totality servedonypurposebeyond thotdectared. Theoperator statedthata totalot 168 metric tonnes have been produced since the raciiity was commissioned in 4984. ‘this amount is \ considerably below the production capacity at 103 metric tonnes a year. The operator‘: explanation was that the uranium content at the phosphate are was tar lower than expected. Samples at the are were taken to investigate this issue. 310 9. -6. Akashat is an opencast mine which feeds At Qalm. no other activities were detected during the inspection. ito,_0<>evenn and UQh£'w~ 40. The team round that UCt4 production had been carried out at a l‘GCl|lly uuiside Mosul. A standard production process with U02 teed and CCI4 as the chlorination reagent was used. ‘the facility included ‘a U02 conversion capability. it was stated that the UCI4 plant went into production in August 1990 and operated tor about six months. The ptant manager indicated that production was limited tor most at that time because at corrosion problems. The inspection team found no evidence contradicting those statements. The UCJ4 production building had suffered substantial damage. and the U02 building had compielety collapsed and was covered with debris. There was also an traqi statement that the UCt4 used tor EMiS development and testing at Al Tuwaltha and Tarmtya had been produced in Building 85 at Al Tuwcthe. \ . m~ 11. The Tarmiya site has been described in previous inspection reports. The third inspection team visited the site again toliolng Iraqi contirrnattan that the site had been used tor EMi$ and further declarations regarding the extent of the EMi$ installations and operations. The team found evidence contacting statements about the number and type [1200 mm) oi EMS units installed in Building 33. The proces building contained two areas [A and B] tor EMIS imtcllaticns An eight-sepcn'Oloi' system (nine magnets) had been implied in area A during January and February 1990. A seventeen- separator system was In the process oi being installed (three magnets were in place) in area B at the time operations ceased. 311 12 13. 14. .7. in an ottcmpt to oonooal the GMIS oqt ilfvnant rrnm the Inspection teams. the return irons and rails tor the separators had been covered with concrete. This was removed at the team's request. The length of the installed retum iron in both area A and area 8 conformed to system specifications provided by iraq and to independent separator component measurements made by the inspection team. An Iraqi video film mode at the time when the installation of magnets. vacuum chambers and end pieces for the eight-separator system was completed (February 1990) and one made in February 1994, arier the bombing. were provided to the inspection team. The latter video tilm appeared to confirm that only three magnets had been installed. without VQ¢a_|l.It'n chambers. and that area B had thererore not yet been operational. A computer printout showing the performance of one at the separators during a run late in December 1990 was provided. The data have not been examined in detail. but It appears that the ion beam current was not up to the design value. the number oi separators ultimately intended for Building 33 has not been detemined. The facility design provides tar a maximum of 70 separators. but iroql authorities indicated that no decision had been taken beyond those conoeming the 25 separators installed or being installed. Facility specifications indicate that Building 245 was designed to accommodate 20 at the srnaiier (600 rnm) units. which have a higher separation tacior. Uranium recovery. the construction iana configuration of ion sources and collectors. and the construction at separator tank liners were all done at the Tarmiya site. A second tadivy. a repiica orTarmrya. was being constructed at Ash Sharqat. According tolniormatlon provldedduringthe inspection. construction atAshSharqatstartedshortiy after that at Tarrniya but none at the mater buildings had been commissioned. The overall state at compieteness was about 85% at the time when most oi the facility was destroyed. There was no sign that lnstalied equlpmenihad been removed. as had happened at other sites. The electric power supply to the site ls very substantial and. while installation was not complete. the substation serving the site would certainty provide power at a ievei equivalent to that at Tarrniya. At the time when this site was inspected. the Iraqi authorities 312 had not declared it as a nuclear taclllty; they stated the purposes of the installations at Ash Sharqat to be the protective coating at large pipes and containers and the production of machine tools. the Iraqi authorities have since stated that the Ash Sharqat tacticity was constructed from the plans used at Tarmtya. Further. they have indicated that the v¢r="~vtinn at important buildings had become a policy of the lraql Government. it ls not clear whether Iraqi intended to utilize the Ash Sharqat taclury tut utonium Ofllehrnont --< long as the Tarmlya facility continued to function. Mcteriel and EQulomem_Decl@1.Qtl0nsJAr90 ommimmm~ s_e§_rne:zl 15. Declarations oi material directly associated with the operation at EMIS development units in Building 80 at At Tuwaltha were provided to the team on the last day of the inspection pertod. Multigram quantities at uranium enriched up to a level of 40-45% and a tew ldlogrorns of uranium depleted down to a level at .0296 were included. Material in tlve enrichment ranges (up to 10 wt% U-235) resulting from the testing at EMt$ production units at Tarmlya was declared. and samples were taken. Again. only small amounts at material were involved. ‘this material was declared on 7 Juty as about 0.6 kg with an average "enrichment or 4%. 16. All tell-tale equipment at Al Tuwaitha. Tarmlya and the Mosul Production Facility had been removedandtumedoverbthekaqwrmytordestructtonandconcealmant. 'l'heArmy proceeded to transport the equipment to remote locations where much at It was destroyed and buried. Equipment tram At Tuwattha and Tarmtyo was distributed among locations to and 8. and equipment from the Mosul Production Facility was taken to locations 6 and 7 (near Mosul). Much at the equipment was destroyed to the point where it was no longer recognizable. The inspection team tried to concentrate on major EMIS components identified as end pieces. double-pole magnets with cots. vacuum chambers. liners. ion sources and collectors. The end pieces. magnets and vacuum chambers could not be 313 17. 18. .0. destroyed completely and. given the circumstances. the inventory was reasonabry consistent with Iraqi declarations. However. no collectors and only one ion source were found. Several pieces ol a collector were eventually provided. but the locating of ion sources and collectors will have to be a major ioiiowup activity. Iraq's clarification dated t8 July included components (but no ion sources or collectors) for six 600mm separators intended for installation at Tarmiya with the exception of one dipole and several coils. this equipment has not been found by the inspection team. The equipment inventories at locations e and 7 are consistent with the declared purpose of the Mosul Production Facility. Facilities where EMIS components were fabricated were identified by lraq. Some of these racilities had been inspected before the declaration. during the second iAEA on-site inspection. as a result of designation by the 50960! Commission. in the opinion of the inspection team. the broad goals cited by the Vice-Chairman at the lraqt Atomic Energy Commission neither require nor Justify the construction of a facility the size at Tamllya. much less two such facilities. Design drawings of building 33 and building 245 show a combination of high oopacitylmodest separation toctor units and low capacity-high separation factor units. This is the type of arrangement that would be 'Configured lr the goal was to produce highly enriched uranium. Design data provided by lraq indicate that it Tarrrlya had become fully operational. with 90 separators running at design capacity. up to 15 kilograms a year of highly enriched uranium or proportionally more uranium at lower enrtchments could have been produced using natural uranium as the feed. ~EMQmM In the 7 July declaration. Iraq listed certain gas centrifuge activities. equipment and components. Additional data were also made available. including information about a planned protect to build a 100-machine gas centrifuge cascade. iraq claimed that they 315 .11. Also. one drum of scrap material and two drums of U0‘ sample bottles which had not been included in he 7 Juty declaration were brought to the Tuwailha site and verified. The weights of this material were not provided and owing to its late arrival. it was not possible to determine thorn Furthermore, 235 kg of natural uranium in U30, lorm and tour natural uranium fuel elements. which had previously been under safeguards and which were recovered from the rubble otter the first inspection, were brought to the storage area at Al Tuwailha and verified. The irradiated HEU fuel elements in the mt‘ 5000 reactor were tuity verified during the inspection. 21. MIEl~ The hot cells md glove boxes present at At Tuwailha were all inspected. and al the manipulators of the hot ceib which had not been severely damaged were sealed for unique ldenlitioation purposes. 22- R2l1J9mU2Lis.l9Lli.m'§ ‘The conditions tor removal and transportation at both fresh and irradiated highly enriched fuel elements were examined and dsoussed with the troqi authorities in order to mlnllze the costs. the tad authorities expresed the wish to pertorm as many of the acfMiies cs possible involved in the removal at fresh fuel and the loading at irradiated fuel iflb transport containers. Further discussions on this matter will take place in the near tune. OTHER INSPECTIONS 23- Eadlmnsmfllmmmn The Illrd inspection team examined a facility which the Iraqi side had identified as the Engineering Research centre under the Ministry of Higher Education. The tacliity was surrounded by a low berm and a fence and had guard towers at each fence comet- 317 \J i . 50-323 O - 92 - 11 ~ 319 Appendix 11 Dear Congressman Bereuter: The testimony I prepared for.the hearing scheduled for Monday, October 21 on UN activities in the Gulf will be delivered by my principle Deputy, John S. Wolf. I regret not being able to meet with the two Subcommittees myself but, upon being told that the hearing had been postponed, I accepted the responsibility of heading the U.S. delegation to the Coordination Committee of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia. This meeting is intended to lay the groundwork for the signing of the Camdodia accords on October 23. Needless to say, this is a vitally important assignment and I know the Foreign Affairs Committee attaches the same importance to this Committee meeting as does the State Department. I've asked John W016 and Tom Pickering to give me a thorough briefing on the issues raised during Monday's hearing. Upon my return from Paris on October 24, I stand ready to brief you and other interested Members on the Cambodian negotiations or to follow-up on issues discussed during the hearing. Again, I regret not being able to attend Monday's hearing and I thank you for your cooperation and understanding of this unusual situation. . = Sincerely, John R. Bolton The Honorable Doug Bereuter U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 320 I. APPENDIX 12 SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RESPONSES THERETO GENERAL QUESTIONS QUESTION: 1. The Committee has had reports of extensive casualties from exploding land mines in the border areas in northern Iraq, with many of the mines having been laid since the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war. II. — How extensive is this humanitarian problem? - What is being done to deal with it? — Is the UN working with the Italian company that is meant to have laid many of these mines to locate the mines and deal with the problem? ANSWER: According to milita? officials with Operation Provide Comfort, the Iraqis have laid unto d thousan s of mines all over northern Iraq, not just in border areas. In most cases, they neither mapped nor marked the fields in any way. These officials estimate at least 300 civilians are being treated for mine-related injuries each month. Arrangements have been worked out under which three 10-man teams of Iraqi military specialists (unarmed), with cooperation from the Kurdish leadership, are removing mines in northern Iraq. Thousands of mines have been removed and destroyed. but the task remaining is still huge. We are not aware of any allegation that an Italian company helped Iraq lay many of the mines. Many Iraqi mines are of Italian manufacture. As part of Operation Provide Comfort. however, the Italians. the French. the U.S., and other coalition members have conducted extensive mine removal operations. U.N. HUMANITARIAN ROLE IN IRAQ QUESTION: 1. The September 4, 1991 report by the Secretary General required under section 5 of U.N.Res 706 estimates the overall humanitarian requirements for Iraq over a six-month period to be $1.8 billion. This includes: o $1.1 billion for food imports; o $250 million to re—establish minimum health services; o $27 million for an urgent supplementary feeding program for pregnant woman and infants; 0 $120 million for water and sanitation requirements; and, 323 _4- the two. Such outbreaks have disrupted winterization efforts and other UN aid programs. _ — cooperation by the Government of Iraq in allowing an estimated 200,000 Kurds, waiting to return to their homes in Kirkuk, to enter the city. To start this process. Iraq should allow the UN to have a full-time presence in Kirkuk so the returnees will feel safe. — agreement by the Government of Iraq to allow a continued UN humanitarian presence in Iraq after December 31; that is the expiration date of the Memorandum of Understanding, signed last April 18 between the UN and Iraq. The MOU covers UN humanitarian operations inside Iraq and the presence of the UN Guard Force. We do not believe an MOU is necessary for UN operations to continue, given the mandate provided by UN Security Council Resolution 688. —- agreement by the Government of Iraq to implement UN Security Council resolutions 706 and 712. This would make possible the import of food, medicines and critical humanitarian supplies. So far, violent clashes have been a recurring problem and Iraq's cooperation with the UN has been limited. The unstable atmosphere has made the winterizing program a bigger and more complicated job. Originally UNHCR calculated it would need to help 40,000 families to winterize their shelter. The figure is now up to 62,000 families - as many as 400,000 persons. There have been some reports that Iran is forcing Iraqi refugees back to Iraq; these reports have not been confirmed by either the UN or ICRC. Returnees continue to enter Iraq. The most recent figures from WFP indicate that 55,000 Iraqis are still in refugee camps in Iran and another 25,000 live outside camps. WFP estimates 70,000 Iraqi refugees in Iran will require food aid during September-December. The winterization program is one of the most ambitious operations UNHCR has ever undertaken. In northwestern Iran it involves setting up 3,300 prefabricated shelter units for houses, health posts and administrative centers able to withstand temperatures of minus 26 degrees centigrade. These units are for 40,000 Iraqi refugees in six camps. In Iraq, the program is bigger. UNHCR's shelter program will supplement efforts by returnees to insulate their makeshift or war-damaged dwellings. The UNHCR is providing roofing materials (5,400 MT of corrugated iron sheets and 22,000 cubic meters of timber), tools, blankets, kerosene stoves, heaters, kerosene. Jerry cans, mattresses and winter clothing to 62,000 families in Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Dohuk provinces. This effort involves 2500 trucks, 40 warehouses, 12 UNHCR field offices and 150 staff. About 15,000 winter tents are positioned as a "reserve" in case of need. Also, UNHCR is restoring 20 health centers, clinics and hospitals, and water supply systems in 50 valley towns and villages to benefit displaced persons who are expected to winter there. These efforts are underway 1n both Government-controlled and non—Government controlled areas. The total cost of the program: an estimated $35 million. According to recent UNHCR statements, all building materials and other supplies will be available for intended recipients by October 31; given a secure atmosphere which allows the displaced to receive these materials, no one should go without shelter this winter. It is somewhat unfair to blame UNHCR for falling to provide "promised" housing. 324 - 5 - The UN has made_ a tremendous effort to avert a crisis this winter. Unfortunately, Without some cooperation from the Government of Iraq and from the Kurds, the success of this effort will be in jeopardy. QUESTION: 4. We have heard that in many locations in southern Iraq whole villages are ].lV1Ilg "in lakes of raw sewerage". — Is this accurate? - What is being done to address this situation? — Has the UN been able to get emergency water purification equipment and generators into the south? ANSWER: The UN mission in Iraq and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) both report that there are problems with sewage treatment and water purification equipment in Iraq. Because of restrictions on their travel and operations in southern Iraq, it is not possible for them to determine the gravity of the situation in that area. The ICRC reports that it has water and sanitation teams providing both spare parts and technical assistanceto the Water Board. The ICRC has provided two trucks which, connected as a water link , produce 80,000 liters of potable water per day in one liter bags. An ICRC official ha_s said these machines played a large part m averting the outbreak of _a_ ma-or cholera epidemic in Iraq. UNICEF and OXFAM are also working ]Oll_[1y _on projects 111 various parts of Iraq to erect water storage tanks an to distribute chlorine gas for water treatment. QUESTION: 5. We have been informed that the ayegage calorie intake in Iraq today is 1000 calories per day. - Isn't this an average level below what is necessary to prevent malnutrition? - What is the problem? ANSWER It is difficult to estimate with precision the average total caloric intake in Iraq. The report prepared by the UN Secretary General on implementation of Security Council Resolution 706, issued in September 199 , estimates that consumption under the Government of Iraq's rationing system, established in September 1990. provides each beneficiary with about .600 calories per day. Naturally, those who can afford to purchase open market foodstuffs have a higher average while those who do not benefit from the rationing system may consume less. Recommended minimum daily intake levels vary, depending on location, age, sex and activity level of an individual. Under ideal circumstances, a healthy adult would consume around 2,300 calories per day. Yet in many countries of the world. the average intake is far below t is level. Where food supplies are 325 - 6 - scarce, relief experts try to ensure consumption of 1500-1800 calories a day. Unfortunately, the Government of Iraq has so far refused to accept implementation of SCR 706, under which food would be imported to allow for an average consumption rate of 1,900 calories per day. This calculation is based on needs assessments conducted by UN personnel. Food and medical supplies are exempt from approval procedures under UN economic sanctions against Iraq. The Iraqi food rationing system is judged by relief personnel to be reasonably efficient, but it does not cover areas outside the government's administration. Government-distributed food is therefore not directed to vulnerable groups such as the Kurds and Shia. To help fill these gaps, the UN's World Food Program continues to deliver food to Iraq's vulnerable populations. QUESTION: - Why isn't food getting to the people? — Is this a question of supply that should be addressed when and if Iraq begins to sell oil under U.N.Res. 706 and use a portion of the proceeds for food? — Or. do you continue to believe that distribution is a key problem and that this will only be resolved by instituting a more rigorous food monitoring program? ANSWER: Saddam Hussein is systematically using the distribution of food as a weapon against certain segments of the population. The Government of Iraq has illegally diverted at least one humanitarian food shipment. A rigorous monitoring program will be an essential element in ensuring that food purchased under the UN resolutions is distributed equitably. UN Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712 were passed to provide for proper supply and distribution of food inside Iraq. They provide a means both to supplement food distributed through normal Iraqi channels, and to provide direct assistance to vulnerable groups outside the government distribution system. We do not know how big the supply problem is. The UN Sanctions Committee has approved the shipment of 3.3 million tons of food to Iraq, and we estimate about half of that has been delivered. An upsurge in cargo traffic from Jordan and other neighboring countries suggests an mcrease in food supplies moving into Iraq. When Iraq agrees to implement the resolutions, a baseline assessment will be conducted which will help define this problem. QUESTION: 6. What progress has the Iraqi government made in repairing damaged electricity, telecommunications and sewerage facilities? — How high a priority does this appear to be for the government? ANSWER 327 -3- The International Organization for Migration (IOM) provides transport for those returning from the Turkish border and Iranian refugee camps to their homes inside Iraq. It also provides international transportation for persons displaced throughout the entire region during the Gulf War, including in Jordan, Syria and Kuwait, who need help to return (voluntarily) to their home countries. The World Food Program procures and distributes foods to refugee camps, returnees in the North, and vulnerable groups and displaced throughout the country, including 50,000 displaced in the South. WHO and UNICEF, working with UNHCR in areas where there are refugees and/or returnees, provide, respectively, health assistance and aid to restore water and sanitation systems. UNICEF. in addition to its assistance to refugees and returnees, is also providing emergency assistance to vulnerable groups throughout the country. UNICEF aid takes four forms -— improving water supply and sanitation; restoring basic health infrastructure and service delivery networks, conducting child immunization programs, and carrying out nutrition programs for children and pregnant mothers. WHO is also involved in these areas, but its work is more concentrated on surveillance and monitoring of conditions, mostly in the northern, eastern and southern provinces. WI-IO is also charged with health and environmental assistance in Kuwait in the after math of the War. FAOis responsible for emergency agriculture assistance in Iraq, mainly EZOYISIOII of seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, and land tilling machinery so as to gin to restore a minimum level of domestic agriculture production. The UN emergency assistance program has offices in Dohuk, Mosul, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah in the North and Basra in the South in addition to Baghdad. These "UN centers" are regional field operations and distribution centers as well as serving as tangible signs of the UN presence and concern for Iraqi citizens welfare. The UN Guards are to protect UN personnel, assets and operations. QUESTION: 8. How much of the total Iraqi humanitarian relief effort is provided by private voluntary organizations? - Do all of these organizations work through and with UN agencies? —- What organizations are we talking about? ANSWER: No data is available on spending by private voluntary organizations/nongovernmental organizations (PVO's/NGO's) in Iraq. However, according to the UN, there are 197 PVO-NGO emergency relief staff working in Iraq, Iran and Turkey under the overall UN humanitarian program. Total emergency relief staff in Iraq alone in September numbered 1,339, including staff of the UN (375). UN Guards (470), ICRC/LICROSS personnel (302) and PVO-NGO staff (192). We do not have a complete listing of all PVO's/NGO’s working in Iraq. A partial list, covering those active in northern Iraq, Iran and Turkey and 328 III. -9- collaborating with the UNHCR on Iraqi refugee relief is attached (Attachment A). Only six of the PVO's listed are American; however. we believe at least two more — the American Friends Service Committee (FSC) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) - are working in central Iraq. The FSC reportedly now figures on agriculture sector rehabilitation while CRS monitors food distribution and conducts supplemental feeding programs in collaboration with WFP and Iraqi Red Crescent Society. The great majority of PVO's/NGO's working in Iraq are Western European organizations. The forms of UN-PVO-NGO collaboration vary from formal operational agreements to letters of association through more informal cooperation. In Turkey these groups are involved in traditional assistance programs, in refugee camp clean up, and in supporting the Iraq program. In Iran PVO's/NGO’s operate with the UNHCR in the health, water, sanitation, food, and non-food relief sectors. The UNHCR's winterization program offers an example of UN-PVO-NGO collaboration in Iraq which invo ves: — joint needs assessment and project planning; — decentralization of operational decision making; and — secondment of NGO-PVO staff to the UN program. Specialized NGO-PVO personnel from FSC-USA and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), as well as government-funded staff from the Danish and Norwegian refugee councils have proved particularly useful. An LWF specialist seconded to UNHCR drafted a winter shelter program for north and northeastern Iraq. The plan was shared with other NGO's/PVO's who studied it, did their own assessments, and in consultation with UNHCR agreed on geographical and technical areas of operation. Eleven international NGO's/PVO's are now working with the UN to implement the winterization program in Dohuk, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil Governorates. IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 A-_Q§LQ121_ ~I QUESTION: 1. Are UN aircraft, including helicopters, now able to fly over Iraq unimpeded to conduct their inspection duties? — How do you respond to Iraqi threats to attack UN aircraft? — Do you take those threats seriously? ANSWER: UN aircraft, including helicopters, are able to fly unimpeded over Iraqi territory. We have stated on the record that the safety of the UN inspectors is the responsibility of the Iraqi authorities. If any harm comes to the inspectors the world community will hold Iraq completely responsible. We take Iraqi threats seriously and do everything possible to ensure the safety of the inspection teams. 329 - 19 - QUESTION: 2. What do you see as the shortcomings of UN inspections conducted to date? —- Is the chief problem that the UN just does not have the resources to carry out continuous monitoring of all Iraqi facilities? — A_re inspections too little too late, in the sense that Iraq has already dispersed and hidden key components of its weapons programs? ANSWER: We are extremely impressed with the work of the UN Special Commission and IAEA inspection teams. The intrusive nature of the inspections which is quite unprecedented in UN experience. has helped uncover in a significant marmer the nature and scope of raq's development efforts for missiles, nuclear and other, non-conventional weapons. In a such a complicated process there will of course be room for improvements and lessons learned from mistakes. Continued successful operations will require more resources from the international community. Ira i obstructionism makes the work of the inspectors particularly difficult. We believe the successful record of the inspection teams demonstrates clearly the inspectors’ hard work which will be built upon by the UN’s long term monitoring plan. B. Iraq ; Kuwait Border: QUESTION: 1. Is UNIKOM functioning smoothly? -— We've seen reports of Iraqi forces violating the demilitarized zone to recover military equipment from inside Kuwait. Have there been such incidents or other incidents in recent months? — Has UNIKOM now reduced the number of its personnel from 1440 to 950. including 300 observers? — Why the reduction in force? —- Are they sufficient to the task? — Was the six-month mandate of UNIKOM renewed on October 9, and were there any changes in UNIKOM's mandate? — Has the U.S. paid its assessed 30% share of UNIKOM's costs, $18.5 million, for the first six month period? — Is the U.S. also obligated to pay $18.5 million for the next 6-month period? — Why should the U.S. or any member of the UN pay these costs? Why isn't the UN assessing Iraq directly for these costs? ANSWER; We are very pleased with the performance of UNIKOM. There has been a 331 -12- began on October 1 with the assistance of UNIKOM). A specially outfitted aircraft for aerial photography has arrived in Kuwait from Sweden to aid in mapping. Two independent experts, who are members of the Commission, will visit the border area at the beginning of November to review the progress of the field work. The Commission expects maps for the actual demarcation of the boundary to be ready at the en of February 1992. We believe the work of the Commission may be completed by mid-1992. C. Other Eleainns Emgizains QUESTION: 1. We are also hearing reports that chemicals are leaking at some sites. - What can the UN do about this? —- When do you expect the destruction facility for chemical weapons to be built and operating? ANSWER The UN Special Commission has reported that chemical weapons stored in extremely unsafe conditions have been found at the Al—Muthana State Facility, sixty miles northwest of Baghdad. The UN is currently studying the most appropriate means to destroy the chemical weapons. Destruction may include building a special chemical weapons destruction facility. UNSCOM has said destruction may take one to two years. QUESTION: 2. Resolution 687 requires Iraq to agree to destruction or removal of all biological weapons and to identify their location within 15 days. After insisting for months that it did not possess "any biological weapons or related items," Iraq admitted on August 6 that it conducted biological warfare research at its Salman Park complex southeast of Baghdad. — Do you believe Iraq's biological weapons arsenal and production facility survived the war intact? — What have you been able to achieve during your inspections of the Salman Park site? — Does Iraq have other biological weapons research sites that you need to inspect, and have you had access to them? — How do you get control of the biological weapons problem in Iraq, when any biomedical research facility can produce biological weapons agents? ANSWER: . UN inspectors have not found stockpiles of biological warfare agents or weapons in Iraq. Iraq's biological warfare productiori capability was seriously damaged during operation Desert Storm. Any salvaged e uipment, research results, or technical expertise could form the foundation for a regenerated biological warfare program. The inspectors found no direct evidence of biological weapons at Salman Park 333 -14- These claims will be reviewed on an expedited basis by commissioners, who will make recommendations to the Governing Council on the total amount to be paid to each government. Each government will then allocate these sums to its claimants. Special fixed payments of $2500 r person will be allocated without the need to document the actual amount of igss, with respect to persons who departed the area or who suffered serious personal injury or the death of a close family member. Criteria for further categories of claims will be considered as soon as possible in future sessions of the Governing Council. QUESTION: 2. What progress has the UN made in securing the return of stolen Kuwaiti property from Iraq? — Do you now have a good estimate of what has been stolen? — How much of that has been returned? — What is your strategy for getting back the rest of the stolen property? — Where are you focussing your efforts? — What do you see as the next steps in returning property? —- When do you see this process being completed? ANSWER: The Government of Kuwait continues to compile lists of equipment and property removed by the Iraqis during their wholesale looting of Kuwait. We have seen no estimate of the total amount of stolen property. Iraq has returned approximately $700 million in gold bars and an undetermined amount of currency. 120,000 books, manuscripts and Islamic heritage museum antiquities have been returned and the contents of the national museum are in the process of being returned. Some equipment from the Kuwait press agency has also been returned. One of the Kuwaiti civil airliners seized by the Iraqis has been returned but the others were destroyed or are too seriously damaged to recover. The next phase will consist of return of equipment from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Health. Considerable Kuwaiti military equipment remains in Iraqi hands. The effort to return Kuwaiti property is being managed by UN Assistant Secretary General Richard Foran. He has worked with the two sides to arrange the transfers to date. The Government of Kuwait has set the priorities for Mr. Foran's efforts and has stated it is satisfied with the UN's handling of the process. Technical discussions between the Kuwaitis and Iraqis under the auspices of the UN have been held to arrange return of property. Kuwait has the option of appealing to the international commission in Geneva which has been established to process claims and seek compensation from Iraq for lost or damaged property. QUESTION: 3. What progress has the UN made in facilitating the work of the ICRC in the 336 International NGOs operating in Turkey, Iran and Iraq with formal or informal association with UNHCR Turkey Care lnlemalional USA Global Partners International Rescue Committee Médecins sans Frontieres Save the Children Federation USA League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies with the Turkish Red Crescent Iran Babhuzanrununce cleanup of border camps, suppon For Iraq operations support For Iraq operations support for Iraq operations support tor Iraq operations elementary education and health-social services tor women and children in Silopi Haj camp Follow -up assistance to Haj camp and other TRC projects Care International, Australia CICS-Italy Médecins sans Fronlieres, Belgium Hopitaux sans Frontiéres, France Pharmaciens sans Frontieres, France Architectes sans Frontiéres, France Islamic Sudanese Relief Agency . . Save the Children Fund, UK 1,, F .. Caritas Austria At tachinent (A) water and Food relief health health health central pharmacy rehabilitation/contruction programme health water, health, sanitation and supplementary Food winterization 337 Iraq mm~ Architectes lngénieurs du Monde, France Care lntemational, Australia ' Global Partners, United Kingdom ~ international Rescue Committee, USA Médecins sans Frontiéres, Belgium Oxlam, Belgium Shelter Now international, USA Caritas Switzerland, lnter Church Aid, Switzerland Northwest Medical Team, USA Ert2iLCio1einQraLe Action lntemationale contre la Faim (AIC F), France Action Nord-Sud, France Care International, Australia German Emergency Doctors , Germany Phamaciens sans Frontieres. France Save the Children Fund, UK Voluntary Reliel Doctors, Germany Danish Refugee Council ~m Care international, Australia Christian Outreach, UK Danish Church Aid, Denmark Equilibre, France lntemational Rescue Committee, USA Medair, Switzerland Medecins du Monde, France Oxlam, UK Pharmaciens sans Frontieres, France village construction lood and non-lood distribution health, water health, water, sanitation, shelter health, sanitation agricultural supplies tor Kurdish Reliel Organization shelter, water winter shelter logistics health, sanitation, lood health, shelter lood and non-lood distribution health health, pharmaceutical logistics health, shelter health water -.\ lood and non lood distribution health, shelter shelter, water health, lood distribution health health health water, sanitation health, pharmaceutical logistics 339 -2- market. In these inflationary times, one of the government's major tools for taking care of loyalists, such as the revolutionary guard or the police force, is to increase significantly their wages so that they can easily purchase food from the black market. Vast differences in nutritional circumstances among the regions result. In press interviews the Iraqi Minister of Health has acknowledged blocking UNICEF efforts to distribute infant formula and high-protein food packages designed for children under five years of age._ Because of this, about $4 million worth of food sits in warehouses ui Baghdad and Amman. The Iraqis insist that this aid must be passed out through the government's rationing system. The Government of Iraq's ration system already distributes some food provided by WFP as well as supp 'es it has itself procured. Ministry of Health personnel staffing hospitals and health clinics dispense drugs, medical supplies and supplementary foods used in nutrition programs for children and lactating mothers. UN agencies deliver food and medical supplies they import to UN distribution centers in Irbil, Dohuk, Mosul, Sulaymaniyah, Basra and Baghdad. They and PVO’s ensure it reaches the feeding programs, health clinics, hospitals, orphanages and the state food ration system network from there. They spot check these systems as well as monitoring drawdown rates, stocks on hand, etc. to ensure use is consistent with need. Also, NGOs-PVOs provide health personnel to some, but not all, health facilities, nutrition centers, and orphanages who also can "observe" usage. UNSCRs 706 and 712 provide for enhanced monitoring capacity for the much bigger program in the Office of the Executive Delegate. QUESTION: 3. How many U.N. humanitarian personnel are operating in Iraq and are there enough to sufficiently carry out their humanitarian mandate under the relevant U.N. resolutions? — How many more U.N. personnel would be needed on the ground to minimize the involvement of Iraqi officials in delivering humanitarian shipment? ANSWER: As of September 1991, there were in Iraq 188 UN international staff, 470 UN Guards, 192 NGO-PVO personnel, and 187 UN local staff, or a total of 1037. There were also 302 ICRC/LICROSS international staff in Iraq. UNSCR 712, the implementation plan for UNSCR 706, proposes adding UN staff and consultants to those already in country to carry out that program. QUESTION: 4. Is there any evidence to suggest that private voluntary organizations are having more success in delivering food and medical shipments to vulnerable population centers in Iraq than the United Nations? ANSWER: PVO-NGO staff by and large are working in collaboration with the UN in delivering aid to vulnerable populations. But all PVO-NGO staf in Iraq total 340 -3- only 192 persons compared to the 845 UN personnel and 302 ICRC/LICROSS staff. They cannot substitute for the UN presence. II. KURDISH REFUGEES QUESTION: 1. In a recent ~Qfl Lost article Kurdish leaders stated that many Kurdish refugees will die in the U.N.— administered camps even if the Security Council extends the mandate of the camps beyond the December 31 deadline and that Bagdhad is objecting to the extension. The article goes on to say that the survival of the Kurdish refugees is contingent on a continuation of the allied air umbrella over the camps. - Are the camps in the northern security zone sufficiently equipped to provide food, shelter and medicine for the refugees? - Is the Security Council actively seeking to extend the mandate of the U.N. with respect to administering the camps? — If Iraq refuses to allow the U.N. to extend its oversight of the refugee camps, will U.N. officials withdraw from the camps or will the Security Council mandate a continuation of the U.N.’s role over Baghdad's objections? — Does U.S. policy support extending the U.N.’s mandate regarding the refugee camps? ANSWER; The United States supports the continuation of current UN operations in northern Iraq beyond December 31, 1991. Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolution 688, provide the UN with a mandate to carry out umanitarian relief efforts in Iraq and require Iraq to cooperate with these efforts. There is no December 31, 1991 deadline in Resolution 688. We still expect Iraq to comply with its obligations under the UN resolutions. If Iraq chooses not to do so. we will consult with other members of the Security Council to determine appropriate action. UNHCR is carrying out a program to "winterize" its shelters in northern Iraq. Fighting in the region has somewhat frustrated their efforts, both by causing Kurds to flee from areas where UNHCR can help them and by hindering efforts to complete work. The level of this fightmg and Iraq’s willingness to cooperate beyond December 31 will determine if the program will be successful. QUESTION: 2. Has the United Nations concluded the process of repatriating refugees from Iraq’s borders with Turkey and Iran? — How many refugees remain in these camps? ANSWER: Of the nearly 1.8 million refugees who fled to Iraq's borders last March-April, only about 11,500, including Iraqi military deserters and some civilians wi 343 -6- affected by the environmental damage inflicted by the Iraqis. The most urgent action was to protect sensitive areas along the coast where industrial and desalination p ants were located. This was handled for the most part during the war and in its immediate aftermath. The UN played a role in mobilizing world resources. The next urgent matter was the oil fires. Kuwait entered into commercial contracts with the most respected fire-fighting companies in the world; the fires are being put out far more rapidly than many people had thought possible. The UN role was again to mobilize the resources available to study the smoke and to assess the impact of the f ires on public health. Now that this danger is passing, the real work can begin of assessing the damage and deciding what course of actions needs to be taken. We expect that the Gulf states themselves will bear an important responsibility for leading these efforts. QUESTION: 3. Will a specific percentage of the proceeds of the sale of Iraqi oil be allocated specifically for projects to address environmental damage? ANSWER: Para. 16 of UNSC 687 reaffirms that Iraq is liable under international law for direct loss, damage, including environmental damage, or injury to foreign governments, nationals, and corporations resulting from Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Iraq. Criteria and arrangements elaborated by the UN Compensation Commission to administer the claims program do not provide for a specific percentage of the proceeds of the sale of Iraqi oil to be allocated for any category of claim. QUESTION: 4. Do you believe a new international convention is needed to further clarify a country's responsibilities with respect to the environment during conflicts, and to expressly prohibit the use of the environment as a weapon? ANSWER: The U.S. believes that a new convention is totally unnecessary. It notes that the laws of war already address willful damage to the civilian population and the destruction or depletion of resources in occupied territory rom acts such as setting fire to the oil wells. The 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Enviromnental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) also imposes important limitations on environmental modification techniques. Those who wish to accept greater restrictions can adhere to Articles 35(3) and 55 of Addition Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which address damage to the environment during periods of armed conflict. The U.S. sees no need for additional legal instruments. We should instead emphasize that the Gulf War demonstrated the need for better implementation of existing treaties. International condemnation of clear violations of those conventions. such as Iraqi actions, is a necessary step to prevent recurrence. QUESTION: _ 5. Do you believe the U.N. system needs to establish some type of international emergency mechanism to enable a much more rapid and effective response to the 345 -3- the Iraqisby Iraqi troop emplacements and by the movement of heavy vehicles. en the fires are completely extinguished. the scientific community in the region and international experts will have to examine the situation and decide how best to handle it. The same careful analysis will have to be applied to the damaged coastal areas which include f ragile marshes and beaches. We are working with the regional governments an with the international community through the UN to address these issues. QUESTION: 7. Has UNEP or any other international organization been able to provide an estimate of the costs of environmental damage, as well as the costs of restoring the environment of the Persian Gulf? ANSWER: The Kuwaiti and Saudi governments have been working on assessments of the environmental damage. Putting a monetary value on the damage is very difficult at this time: estimating the cost of restoring the enviromnent cannot be done until decisions are made with regard to actions which should be taken and with regard to areas in which nature, and not human action, will do a more effective bioremediation. QUESTION: 8. A computerized data system that will contain information on pollution sources, distribution and impacts on the environment was supposed to be transferred to ROPME in August. Did this occur? ANSWER: The international effort to assess the impact on human health, ecology, and local and global climate took place in the framework of a plan developed at a meeting sponsored by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in April 1991. At that meeting, participants also agreed on the need for a method by which all the data sets could be archived in a centralized location for easy access and distribution. The Dutch promised, through UNEP, to develop a data management system for ROPME, which is the secretariat for UNEP's Gulf Regional Seas Program. We believe the Dutch (through Delft Hydraulic) have provided software and hardware to ROPME. The Dutch system, which is not yet operational, is designed to include a wide range of data collected in the ROPME region; material from air, water, and terrestrial studies will be in the system. The U.S. National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) took on the task of creating an archive of all the atmospheric related data sets at the request of the WMO and with the su port of the National Oceanic and Atmos heric Administration (NOAAK the Environmental Protection Agency i)EPA). the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), and the Department of Energy (DOE). This system is being developed. and NCAR is beginning the task of cataloging and archiving data sets which are complete and ready to be put into an archive. This system will include only air monitoring data and was never intended to be provided to ROPME. It has been given to the Kuwait Environmental Protection Department (KEPD), which will be the regional center for these data. NCAR expects the data archiving system to be operational around the end of November. 346 -9- The data in the NCAR system would be obtained through a commercial database that can be accessed either via the electronic network or over a telephone modem. This database will contain enough information about each of the data sets to allow the user to determine if the measurements in the archive would be of interest to his or her studies. Once a particular set of time periods, geographic locations, and parameters are selected, the data could be received on magnetic tape or compact disk or over the electronic network. The archived data will be accessible to any end user from both databases, the one in the United States and the one in Kuwait. QUESTION: 9. UNESCO's Executive Board instructed Director General Mayor to make proposals to its September session on ways of assisting Kuwait to restore its educational scientific, cultural, and communications infrastructures. - Can you tell us what the recommendations were? ANSWER; Yes. Director General Mayor informed the Executive Board October 1, in Board document 137 EX-28, of the following recommendations and actions taken to restore Kuwait's educational, scientific, cultural, and communications infrastructures. Two staff members went to Kuwait in June, 1991 to assist in formulating an assistance program in education from pre-school to university level. An agreement on a revolving fund to implement the program is awaiting the final approval of the Kuwaiti government. Negotiations are underway to renew for five years the agreement concerning the Kuwait-based Educational Innovation Program for Development in the Arab States. UNESCO has contributed $40,000 to help this office restore services. The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC). made two surveys of the oil spil1's impact on the coastal areas with special attention to subtidal seagrass beds and intertidal wetlands. The IOC produced an Integrated Project for the Coastal and Marine Environment in the Region. Funding is being sought to implement it. The Director General is exploring ways to respond to a Kuwaiti request to prevent illicit use of research documents stolen from the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research during the Iraqi invasion. A consultant was sent to Kuwait in July to prepare a master plan for rebuilding Kuwait's university library system. Another consultant was sent in mid-October to draft a master plan for the reconstruction of school and public libraries. In communications, UNESCO is helping to re-establish the Kuwaiti News Agency (KUNA). In the field of culture, a contract has been signed with the French Mission to Failaka which will make available to UNESCO a copy of their inventory of objects registered in the National Museum of Kuwait and in the Museum of Failaka. UNESCO is also working with the UN to identify a conservator to oversee the return of museum pieces from Iraq to Kuwait. Finally, UNESCO is considering requests from Kuwait for assistance in the 349 APPENDD( 14 SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY REP. IDUG BEREUTER (R—NE) TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RlEPONSl§ THERETO QUESTION: ' 1. Recently the House of Representatives passed a resolution that addressed the ability, or lack thereof , of the United Nations to effectively respond to disasters and humanitarian emergencies. — What is your assessment of the coordination and management of UN humanitarian relief efforts in the aftermath of the conflict with Iraq? - Has the United Nations undertaken efforts to more effectively coordinate its response to humanitarian emergencies? — To what extent is H.Con.Res. 197 consistent with the U.S. policy toward a unitary UN? ANSWER: Although initially slow in organizing a multi-agency response to the post-war situation, the UN’s subsequent coordinative efforts have been encouraging. The need for improved coordination led to the Secretary General's designation on April 9th of an Executive Delegate for Humanitarian Relief for the Gulf, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. The establishment of this focal point clarified agency responsibilities and facilitated operational arrangements. We were pleased to see implementation of coordinative measures such as inter-agency assessment missions, consolidated appeals and periodic situation reports that covered all agencies’ efforts. In response to international pressure for improved organization, the UN system is working on using these kinds of coordinative measures to create a more permanent and effective delivery mechanism for humanitarian aid, particularly for complex emergencies requiring a multi-agency response. For example, we can see the same types of measures being employed in the current UN relief effort in the Horn of Africa. At the same time, broader discussion among member states, fueled by a number of proposals for permanent reform measures, is taking place in UN fora. The discussion that began at the Summer ECOSOC session is being continued at the current UN General Assembly and will address the Secretary General's report on his perception of how the UN relief system can be improved. The issue of reform of UN relief delivery cannot be divorced from the need for overall UN administrative reform. Our vision of a "unitary UN" would foster coordination and discipline at all levels of the UN structure. H.Con.Res. 197 reflects the same concerns about the need for improvement in UN relief delivery that we. and others, have enunciated over the past several months. We are hopeful that the opportunity presented by election of a new Secretary General, together with the momentum created for instituting reform, will result in a more unified UN system, capable of dealing with numerous transnational problems, including humanitarian emergencies. 50-323 0 - 92 - 12 351 _ 2 - QUESTION: 3. The State Department claims that U.S. corporations have claims on the Iraqi assets. Iraqi — Would it not be possible to assure these corporations that they will be reimbursed With money from the future sale of Iraqi oil? This would allow the release of assets for humanitarian aid. ANSWER: U.S. individuals and corporations have two categories of claims against the Government of Iraq: those arising directly from Iraq's illegal invasion and occupgtion of Kuwait and those arising prior to the invasion. The first category will addressed by the UN Compensation Fund mechanism, which is to be financed from sales of Iraqi oil. The second category, pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 687, is to be addressed by "normal mechanisms." A census of blocked Iraqi government assets in the United States and claims of U.S. persons against Iraq conducted by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury Department has shown that the financial claims of U.S. individuals, corporations, and government entities against Iraq substantially exceed blocked Iraqi assets. The Department is actively evaluating a variety of claims sett ement options for the claims which are not settled by the UN process. Only when the contours of that process are better defined will it be possible to make final decisions on the approach the U.S. should take to the resolution of claims not covered by that process. In addition, mechanism to provide humanitarian supplies to the Iraqi population has already been established under Security Council resolutions 706 and 712. QUESTION: 4. Are any new steps being taken to find ways to help the millions of suffering civilians? ANSWER: ' The Government of Iraq is the biggest barrier blocking the Iraqi people from needed food and medicine. The Government of Iraq is cynically using its own citizens as a weapon to break UN sanctions. It has placed restrictions on the humanitarian efforts of the UN in Iraq. It has diverted food supplies sent to assist the Iraqi people. It refuses to accept UN resolutions which would ensure that proceeds from the sale of Iraqi oil provide needed food and medicine for the Iraqi people. The United States and the world community will continue their efforts to help end the suffering of Iraqi civilians. The United States so far spent over $582 million on Gulf-related refugees and displaced persons. This year, over $117 million of that has gone toward UN, ICRC, and League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies appeals for funds to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. These appeals have requested a total of $544 million. 353 s-ass-106 (1991) Page 2 Kggg111p_gnfi_;gg§§j;mjpg in this regard its resolution 688 (1991) and in particular the importance which the Council attaches to Iraq allowing unhindered access by international humanitarian organisations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and making available all necessary facilities for their operation, and in this connection stressing the important and continuing role played by the Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Government of Iraq of 18 April 1991 (S-22663), Recalling that, pursuant to resolutions 687 (1991), 692 (1991) and 699 (1991), Iraq is required to pay the full costs of the Special Commission and the IAEA in carrying out the tasks authorized by section C of resolution 687 (1991), and that the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council of 1S July 1991 (S-22792). submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 699 (1991), expressed the view that the most obvious way of obtaining financial resources from Iraq to meet the costs of the Special Commission and the IAEA would be to authorize the sale of some Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products: £§£illi£g_furthe; that Iraq is required to pay its contributions to the Compensation Fund and half the costs of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission, and ;gga11ing_fgr;hg; that in its resolutions 686 (1991) and 687 (1991) the Security Council demanded that Iraq return in the shortest possible time all Kuwaiti property seized by it and requested the Secretary-General to take steps to facilitate this, . Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 1. Agghggjggs all States, subject to the decision to be taken by the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 5 below and notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a), 3 (b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990), to permit the import, during a period of 6 months from the date of passage of the resolution pursuant to paragraph 5 below, of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq sufficient to produce a sum to be determined by the Council following receipt of the report of the Secretary-General requested in paragraph 5 of this resolution but not to exceed 1.6 billion United States dollars for the purposes set out in this resolution and subject to the following conditions: (a) Approval of each purchase of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) following notification to the Committee by the State concerned; (b) Payment of the full amount of each purchase of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products directly by the purchaser in the State concerned into an escrow account to be established by the United Nations and to be administered by the Secretary-General, exclusively to meet the purposes of this resolution; (c) Approval by the Council, following the report of the Secretary-General requested in paragraph 5 of this resolution, of a scheme for the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as referred to in paragraph 20 of resolution 681 (1991), in particular health related materials, all of which to be labelled to the extent 354 S-RES-706 (1991) Page 3 possible as being supplied under this scheme, and for all feasible and appropriate United Nations monitoring and supervision for the purpose of assuring their equitable distribution to meet humanitarian needs in all regions of Iraq and to all categories of the Iraqi civilian population, as well as all feasible and appropriate management relevant to this purpose. such a United Nations role to be available it desired for humanitarian assistance from other sources; (d) The sum authorised in this paragraph to be released by successive decisions of the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) in three equal portions after the Council has taken the decision provided for in paragraph 5 below on the implementation of this resolution, and notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the sum to be subject to review concurrently by the Council on the basis or its ongoing assessment of the needs and requirements) 2. Qggjdgg that a part of the sum in the account to be established by the Secretary-General shall be made available by him to finance the purchase of foodstuffs. medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs. as referred to in paragraph 20 of resolution 687, and the cost to the United Nations of its roles under this resolution and of other necessary humanitarian activities in Iraq: 3. Qggidgg_jg;;hg; that a part of the sum in the account to be established by the Secretary-General shall be used by him tor appropriate payments to the United Nations Compensation Fund. the full costs of carrying out the tasks authorised by Section C of resolution 687 (1991), the full costs incurred by the United Nations in tacilitatlng the return cl all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, and halt the costs of the Boundary Commission; 4. nggiflgl that the percentage of the value 0! exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq, authorized under this resolution to be paid to the United Nations Compensation Fund, as called tor in paragraph 19 oi resolution 687 (1991), and as defined in paragraph 6 or resolution 692 (1991), shall be the same as the percentage decided by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 705 (1991) for payments to the Compensation rund- until such time as the Governing Council 0! the Fund decides otherwise; 5. Bggggggg the Secretary-General to submit within 20 days of the date of adoption of this resolution a report to the Security Council tor decision on measures to be taken in order to implement paragraphs 1 (a), (b) and (c), estimates or the humanitarian requirements of Iraq set out in paragraph 2 above and or the amount of Iraq's financial obligations set out in paragraph 3 above up to the end of the period of the authorisation in paragraph 1 above. as well as the method for taking the necessary legal measures to ensure that the purposes of this resolution are carried out and the method for taking account of the costs of transportation of such Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products: /see 355 8-R28-106 (1991) Page 4 6. [ggther_rggue1t1 the Secretary-General in consultation with the International Committee of the Red Cross to submit within 20 days of the date of adoption of this resolution a report to the Security Council on activities undertaken in accordance with paragraph 31 of resolution 687 (1991) in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990: 7. lgggiggg the Government of Iraq to provide to the Secretary-General and appropriate international organizations on the first day of the month immediately following the adoption of the present resolution and on the first day of each month thereafter until further notice, a statement of the gold and foreign currency reserves it holds whether in Iraq or elsewhere; 8. §g11g_gggg all States to cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution: 9. Qggidgg to remain seized of the matter. . cmmmamms hm Introduction ................~....... f.......... .... . .... .. .. 3 1.. IQEIJIIIIIMRY QBSERWATIWIIS ....................... ...... .. .. ..... ..... . 4» III. 1IRAQ"S CURRENT QILEXEQKIFCAPAKZITY . . . . . . . ~ - . . . - . . . . t - . 5-.-.-...~-. -.-.-.-.-.-. 5 III. ESIHMTES ©F&I1ImNfll‘lI‘AR.1IAI1lI REQIBIREBQENIS ..t...~....................-.-....... 7 iv. uisic smwcnmn son nit nmnwsmmrionu or nit mmmr mowisioms 0F~€@lm@IL~I®UW% (N991) ..............-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.~-.-.-.-.-.-..... 8 A. Measures pertaining to the conclusion of contracts for the sale of petroleum and petroleum products and realization of the proceeds in an escrow account ...... . . . . ...~.......~...... 8 B Control of implementation of the contracts ....-.~-....-.-.-.-..-..-.-.-.-.-. IQ C Protection of petroleum and petroleum products and their soles proceeds against interference by third parties ............... ll D Disbursements from the escrow account and theirmonitoring ... 12 E Monitoring of purchases and deliveries to lraq H...-......~...... IS F Monitoring of imports and in-country distribution .. .. .....~ .. 16 V. ~TIME .............~..~... ~ . ~ . . . . ~ ~ . . . ...~-.-.-.~~.-..-.~-..~~~ -.~ I7 L& General recommendations ...................................... 17 Specific measures for the implementation of the relevant provision of Security Council resolution W06 (1991) .......... l7 91-28638 2554i (E) I... Appendlimll Qistr. S//QEIM6, 14‘ Septemlber l‘99ll ©RII@1lllll6\1l..:: EIll@l.llSl$l HQEEQKIT BY TIRE $E£&HARY~~ PURSUANT lI@ PARAQAHH S ©E-‘ S%M1I'lIY WHEEL ~lQN 77% ((l@9;>l) \ Q 861 difficulties would be overcome if the Comittee established by resolution 6€l‘(l990) was to decide immediately after the adoption of the resolution endorsing the present report that the first tranche of one‘third of the total could be released. 9. Mention of a United Nations role in dealing with huanitarian assistance that may be provided from funds from other sources (soc resolution 706‘(l99l), para.'l (c)) raises the possibility that funds from such other sources as accounts held in favour of Iraq or voluntary contributions may be deposited into the escrow account. Use of such funds. apart from the proceeds from authorised sales of Iraqi petroleu and petroleu products. would have to be confined exclusively to the procurement and distribution of items of a huanitarlan nature in accordance with the provisions of. and procedures established for. paragraph 20 of resolution 587 (1991) and would have to be free from the obligatory deductions and administrative costs specified in paragraphs‘2 and 3 of resolution 706 (l99l). l0. Resolution 70§_(l99l) contemplates the possibility of Iraq offering petroleu products for sale, in addition to crude petroleu. on the basis of all available information, it would appear that Iraq is most unlikely to be in a position to offer significant quantities of petrolcu products for sale at present. but if Iraq was able to do so, adequate measures could be devised promptly for verifying and monitoring such exports. ll. Finally, it is to be noted that the aetual sum from the sale of Iraqi petroleu and petroleu products will have to be determined by the Security Council after its consideration of the present report. Bearing in mind the reports of the Executive Delegate of the Secretary=General for the United Nations Inter=Agency Huanitarian Programs for Iraq, Kuwait and the _ Iraq-Turkey and Iraq-Iran border areas (sec 8/22799. annex. and annex‘I to the present report), the Secretary=Gcnral deems it necessary to underline that, even if the maximum amount of llié billion was to be the sum authorised by the Security Council under para raph l of resolution 70é‘(l99l), there would be a shortfall of approximately $800 million in the amount estimated by the Executive Delegate of the 8ecretary=Gcneral as necessary to meet the humanitarian and essential civilian requirements after deductions for the other purposes stipulated in the resolution. II. IRQ'8 CURENT OIL EXPORT CAPACITY ll. At present Iraq's crude oil production is between 300,000 and 500.000 barrels per day and maximum production capacity has been estimated at l.o55'million barrels per day. Only the production facilities in the Kirkuk area in the north and one of the pipelines to Yuurtalik in Turkey are operational. Under these conditions Iraq could export up to l million barrels a day, which is the current capacity of that pipeline. 862 11. Current productive capacity is well below the 3.lh million barrels per day that Iraq was producing before 2'August 1990. of which approximately 330.000 barrels per day were consumed domestically. Before 2'August'l990 Iraqi oil sold at a discount of between $1.50 and $2 below the price of the benchmark North Sea Brent crude. lb. At a possible price of $17.00 per barrel, Iraq would have to sell 96‘million barrels ($15,000 barrels per day for six months) to obtain the $l.6'bi11ion specified in Security Council resolution 706'(l99l). If Iraq was allowed to export at the current maximum capacity of l'million barrels per'day. it could generate revenue of $l.6'billion in three months or $3.2'billion during a six-month period. Ill. ESTIMATES OF HUMAITAIA REQUIREMENTS 15. As concluded by the recent humanitarian inter-agency mission of the Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General (hereafter referred to as "the mission“). the present food, health and nutrition situation in Iraq is critical. The problems of the severely debilitated population are aggravated by widespread shortages of essential medicines and medical supplies. Additionally. a generalized lack of safe water and unreconstructed or insufficient sanitation facilities maintain the incidence of water-borne and endemic diseases at a high level throughout the country. 16. Taking into account the above situation, the mission recommended that the maintenance of food supply and consumption as well as the close monitoring of the nutritional and health status of the Iraqi population over the next few months are absolutely necessary to prevent full-scale famine and major human disaster developing in the country. 17. The mission estimated that food import requirements for six months would amount to $l.l.'billion. It also estimatod_the cost of imports required to re-establish basic health services at $250 million. In addition. $27‘million is deemed necessary to initiate an urgent and critically needed supplementary feeding programme for mothers and children. Water and sanitation requirements covering both equipment and supplies were estimated at $l20‘million. To import the essential agricultural inputs recommended by the mission an additional $300 million is needed. 18. The report of the Executive Delegate on estimates of humanitarian requirements is reproduced in annex I to the present report. 854 balance is by assigning ultimate responsibility for monitoring and control to the Committee established by resolution 66l'(l990); this monitoring process should be assisted by independent inspection agents. The alternative of assigning ultimate monitoring responsibility to the States in which the purchasers operate would generate unacceptable and unnecessary time lags as each State would be required to set up monitoring and control mechanisms independently. Resolution 706 (1991) was adopted, in part. to meet pressing humanitarian needs in Iraq; the time required to take legislative and administrative measures in every State in which potential purchasers operate is simply not available. 23. Every contract between SOHO and the purchaser must include the following provisions: (a) The contract enters into force only after it has received the approval of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 66l'(l990), following notification to the Committee by the State in which the purchaser is based; (b) The proceeds from the sale are to be deposited by the purchaser into the escrow account established by the United Nations and administered by the Secretary-General; (c) The purchaser must open a letter of credit for each transaction providing for payment into the United Nations escrow account. 24. In order to facilitate the monitoring of the transaction, every contract must also stipulate that the oil be shipped via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, f.o.b. Ceyhan. 25. The letter of credit that must be opened for each contract should be issued by a reputable bank engaged in international banking and should be in s standard form. 26. As indicated in paragraph'22 above, the Committee should be assisted in monitoring by independent inspection agents. These agents should be appointed by the United Nations and have the status of experts on mission under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In addition, the Security Council should, in implementing the present report, provide for their freedom of movement. The inspection agents should be stationed at SOHO’s operations in whatever location allows for maximum access to the relevant information. The use of independent agents for inspection purposes is standard practice in the oil industry and several companies exist that could, by a competitive process, be chosen to provide experts to perform the task. At a minimum, the agents would verify that: (a) The price is reasonable in the light of prevailing market conditions; (b) The contract enters into force only after it has received the approval of the Committee established by resolution 66l'(l990); 366 with the contract terms and that no oil is delivered without the requisite approval of the Committee established by resolution 66l'(l990). This inspection, of necessity, must go further than what is normal in the oil trade. Inspection should be conducted at the Iraqi access points to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline in Kirkuk, at the border between lraq and Turkey to the extent possible, and at the loading terminal in Yumurtalik. The inspection agents should be requested to report to the Committee on compliance with the terms of each contract and verifying the terms of the letter of credit. Loading of the oil on ships will be permitted only once the inspection confirms that these matters are in order. The inspection agents should also be requested to report periodically on the total flow of oil through the pipeline and imediately if any irregularities are noticed, The United Nations will thus be made aware of any tampering with the flow of oil and any circumvention of resolution 706 (l99l). C.~ ~ 30. Government and private claims against Iraq arising from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait are certain to run into many billions of dollars. In this respect, it has particularly to be borne in mind that, as stated in paragraph22 of the Secretary-General’s report pursuant to paragraph9 of Security Council resolution 687'(l99l) (S-22559), the compensation mechanism decided upon in Security Council resolution 692 (1991) is not exclusive. Moreover, these enormous amounts are additional to the claims existing prior to 2'August'l990. The existence of these claims could render any Iraqi assets, including traded oil, exposed to sequestration, attachment or other forms or interference by third parties. Appropriate measures must therefore be instituted to ensure that the oil and its sales proceeds enjoy the necessary protection. This point is referred to particularly in paragraph5 of resolution 706'(199l), in which the Secretary-General is requested to report on "the method for taking the necessary legal measures to ensure that the purposes of this resolution are carried out'.,.'. 31, The first opportunity for Iraq's creditors or claim holders to institute legal proceedings would be when the oil arrives at the well-head in Iraq, Whatever the legal merits of such proceedings under Iraqi laws, the Security Council must take action to ensure that there would be no legal avenues in lraq for the oil to be diverted from the purposes authorized by Security Council resolution 706 (1991). Explicit language should be included in the Security Council resolution approving the present report setting forth immunity of the oil. Additionally, Iraq should specifically be required in the same resolution to take all steps necessary, including all legal and administrative steps, to accord immunity to the oil in order to prevent any delay or obstruction in the implementation of resolution 706'(l99l). 32. Iraqi oil exports during the six months envisaged by and for the purposes of Security Council resolution 706 (1991) will be shipped via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. While the oil passes through the pipeline in 368 __ (b) Costs of monitoring contracts of sale and of independent oil inspection agents; (c) Establishment and management of the escrow account; (d) Costs of in-country monitoring and distribution of emergency imports of basic humanitarian assistance; (e) Direct procurement of food and medicines by the United Nations. 36. The requirements for implementing Security Council resolution 687‘(199l) are estimated at $S76‘million. This amount includes the 30‘per 371 4.9.. lniliepemuient inspection agents will he appointed by lL"nii.ted! Ifiatiolms for the purpose of evaluating" verifying and monitoring the terms or offers hy- snppliers" the quuality” quantities amxdl labelling oif the items to he supplied and the means of transportation and delivery. Such inspection agents will he stationed at the relevant ports off uunloadimg and at the border entry points to lraq_ SQ. Part—paymmmt,, in accordance with commercial practices. may he made directly to the supply company at the time off sIl‘nipn'nent or ainfifreightz; ffnll payment may he completed after a report of satisfaction as to ag-mality,, quantity" etc... in conformity with the terms of the sunppl3r.. snch report to he prepared and submitted to the Committee established by resolution 6$>l"(l'b9©».. lllne Camumittce will signify to the Secretary~_____5Y_= 8“ PFEES8: 583 __ _ 393 Appendix 18 Testimony for Mideast Subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings of October 21. by Nancy Spannaus U.S. coordinator tor the Committee to Save the Children in Iraq The Committee to Save the Children in Iraq was founded in May of this year at the initiation of Helga Zepp-Lakouche of the Schiller Institute, His Excellency Patriarch Rafael I. Bidawid of the Chaldean Catholic Church of Baghdad, and Dr. Hans Koechler of the International Progress Organization of Vienna, Austria. Since that time we have delivered more than 30 tons of food and medicine to Iraq, and campaigned internationally for the lifting of what can only be called a barbaric policy of sanctions against that nation. Supporters of the Committee have submitted official documents to United Nations’ bodies demonstrating that the sanctions policy violates the guarantees of human rights protections and the protections against genocide which the United Nations itself claims to provide. These are available on request. In addition, the Committee has produced a 45 minutes film on its visit to Iraq, which took place between July 7 and July 30. This film presents a devastating picture of what the embargo has done to the ability of Iraq, once a 394 leading medical-scientific center for the Middle East region, to provide the most elementary medical care tor its citizens. It can be made available on request. In this testimony, however, 1 will concentrate on what kind of condition the more than year long embargo has created in Iraq, especially for its children. I will present the firsthand observations of a Committee member, medical doctor Margit Fakhoury, who travelled to Iraq in July. Dr. Fakhoury was personally involved in examining many children, as part of our Committee's program of transporting 22 kids to Germany for medical treatment which they could not get in Iraq. She also visited numerous hospitals in Baghdad and the south of the country, as part of the Committee's mission of delivering medicated milk and medical supplies. — Testimony - _ I quote from testimony Dr. Fakhoury prepared for submission to parliaments and human rights groups around the world. I begin with her description of the situation surrounding the children the Committee brought to Germany. -i'I§'h- Most of the patients who were brought to Germany for further treatment had severe osteomyeletis: 1) Sabreen, a 3-year-old girl, fell from a height of about two meters. She broke her right underleg [fibula] and got severe infection of the bone. Antibiotics were --' _. -;.u'.'-.. 395 given for some time. When we saw her in July, tour months after the accident, aha still had pus discharge from the wound. The doctors told us they couldn't do anything more for her. _ Now she is in one of the hospitals receiving antibiotic treatment and an operation to remove the dead and infected bone. In a few months, we hope she'll walk normally. 2) Alah, an 8-year-old girl, was hit by a bomb explosion of a small bus. She lost her mother during this accident. She also has a severe infection of bone and knee joint. She was brought to us by her father. In the hospital there was no efficient treatment anymore. Here she has received antibiotics, blood transfusions, and operations for removal of the dead bone. But she will not be as fortunate as Sabreen, her roommate in the hospital: her leg will remain stiff, the infection will affect the growth of her leg--resulting in a short leg with later orthopedic problems and most probably further surgical intervention. 3) Ijad, a 19-year-old youth. He lost both legs through a hit on a shelter in Baghdad. As he tells it, one leg was blown away directly, the other leg half cut below the knee. He also was sent home from the hospital with pus discharge from the infected bone, because of lack of available treatment. Here in Germany they performed an operation which i 396 lasted many hours in hopes of getting rid of the inflection. If not, he'll have an amputation of the left upper leg too, with the problem to fix prostheses for him. 4) Amira, a 21-year-old girl, who stayed in the hospital for four months. When we saw her there she was severely depressed. The doctors told us they couldn't do anything more for her. They couldn't treat the infection of the bone anymore. Most probably she would have lost her leg. Here they are trying operations and antibiotics to help her. 5) And here [referring to a photo unfortunately not available to us at press time], you see Ali, a 17-year-old youth, who was hit by a bomb in the kitchen at home. During the same accident he lost one sister with her two children and a brother. Another sister lost her ear. After the accident he was brought to Yarmouk teaching hospital where he remained the entire time before coming to Germany. In Baghdad he had had several operations; he lost his broken leg completely because of gangrene; he has osteomyelitis in the broken arm, and had severe septicemia and malnutrition. He was in such a miserable state that you could hardly look at him. Row his general condition is improving slowly, and when we saw him last week he already could joke with us. Other children lost parts of their extremities during the war, like Syed, Afaq, and Alah. we hope we can help them here with prostheses and _ - -.__in|'.Q:i'iI-1. ._ 399 the anger of poor mothers who were depending on this supply for their children. This health center is responsible for 86,000 citizens; of them, 50-60% are children under 5, and up to 20% are children under 2. How many tons of milk powder do you need to provide them with the necessary daily calories? One ton of milk from the factory costs about 6,000 deutschemarks. How many tons of milk can Non-Governmental Organizations send to Iraq? One thousand, 2,000 tons or even more, but for how long? If the embargo is not lifted soon, thousands of innocent children will die of hunger. Is this necessary? and if so, why? The effect on health of low caloric intake is that a simple flu can quickly lead to death. The low caloric intake does not only include the children, but adults as well, and an intake of 1,000 calories a day, half the normal amount you need, will not pass by without having dangerous side effects. ... - Operations - Operations are normally done in sterile surroundings. Is this possible when the windows are broken, air conditioning is not working, sterilizers are out of order for different reasons? The first rule before you start an operation is not fulfilled, because you should work in a sterile environment. The result is wound infection, gangrene, osteomyelitis, sepsis, all of which could be prevented.