
THE WHITE House,
Washington, April 3, 1998.
Hon. NEWT GINGRICH,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Consistent with the Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as
part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I am report-
ing on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq’s compliance with the res-
olutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
This report covers the period from February 3, 1998, to the present.
Introduction
For much of the period covered by this report, Iraq was engaged
in a serious challenge to the authority of the UNSC and the will
of the international community. As documented in my last report,
Iraq refused to allow U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspec-
tors to carry out their work at a number of sites last December;
Iraq’s refusal to cooperate in spite of repeated warnings continued
until the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) be-
tween U.N. Secretary General Koﬁ Annan and Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister Tariq Aziz on February 23, and the endorsement of this
agreement by the UNSC on March 2 when it adopted UNSCR
1154. Both the MOU and UNSCR 1154 reiterate Iraq’s commit-
ment to provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access
to UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
UNSCR 1154 also stresses that any further Iraqi violation of the
relevant UNSC resolutions would result in t e severest con-
sequences for Iraq. Iraq’s commitment is now in the process of
being tested. A series of UNSCOM inspections of so-called “sen-
sitive” sites in early March proceeded without Iraqi interference.
On March 26, UNSCOM inspections of the so-called “presidential
sites” began under the arrangements agreed to by UNSCOM Chair-
man Richard Butler and Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.
The team of 60 UNSCOM inspectors, accompanied by 20 diplomatic
observers, is conducting inspections of the so-called “presidential
sites” through April 5. Chairman Butler traveled to Baghdad in
mid-March for discussions with Iraqi officials concerning Iraq’s
missile and chemical weapons programs.
Throughout the crisis created by Iraq’s refusal to cooperate with
U.N. weapons inspectors, the objective of my Administration was to
achieve effective ins ctions, preferably through a diplomatic solu-
tion. Our vigorous dlialomatic efforts were backed by the credible
threat to use force, if necessary. I consulted with our allies in the
region as well as with the other members of the U.N. Security
Council. Secretary of State Albright, Secretary of Defense Cohen,
U.N. Ambassador Richardson, and other Administration officials
(1)


2
also pursued our objectives vigorously with foreign governments,
including several trips to the region and to relevant capitals and
at the United Nations. Our military forces responded quickly and
effectively to support our diplomatic efforts by providing a credible
military option, which we were prepared to use if Iraq had not ulti-
mately agreed to meet its obligation to provide full access to
USCOM and the IAEA.
U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region
As a demonstration of U.S. resolve during the recent crisis with
Iraq, the aircraft U.S.S. Independence, U.S.S. George Washington,
their accompanying battle group combatant ships, and additional
combat aircraft have remained in the region. United States force
levels in the region now include land- and carrier-based aircraft,
surface warships, a Marine amphibious task force, Patriot missile
battalions, a mechanized battalion task force, and a mix of special
operations forces deployed in support of USCINCCENT operations.
To enhance force protection throughout the region, additional mili-
tary security personnel are also deployed. These U.S. forces were
augmented by the H.M.S. Illustrious and accompanying ships from
the United Kingdom.
In addition to the United Kingdom, a number of other nations
have pledged forces to our efforts to compel Iraq’s compliance with
its commitments. Although all of the members of this international
effort seek a peaceful diplomatic resolution of the crisis in Iraq, all
have shown their resolve to achieve our common objective by mili-
tary force if that becomes necessary. Without this demonstration of
resolve to both use military force and impose the severest con-
sequences on Iraq for any further Iraqi transgressions, it is un-
likely that the MOU and UNSCR 1154 (see below) would have been
achieved.
Twenty nations have deployed forces to the region or have read-
ied their forces for contingency deployment. Those countries cur-
rently represented in the Gulf include Australia, Argentina, Can-
ada, the Czech Republic, Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Ro-
mania, and the United Kingdom. Another 12 nations have offered
important access, basing, overﬂight, and other assistance essential
for the multi-national effort. Still others have identified force con-
tributions that are being held in reserve for deployment should the
need arise. United States and Allied forces in the region are pre-
pared to deal with numerous contingencies, either conventional or
weapons of mass destruction-related. UNSCR 949, adopted in Octo-
ber 1994, demands that Iraq not use its military forces to threaten
its neighbors or U.N. operations in Iraq and that it not redeploy
troops nor enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq. In view
of Saddam’s record of brutality and unreliability, it is prudent to
retain a signiﬁcant force presence in the region to deter Iraq. This
gives us the capability to respond rapidly to possible Iraqi aggres-
sion or threats against its neighbors.
Until Iraqi intent to comply with the MOU is veriﬁed, it will be
necessary to maintain our current augmented force posture in the
region. The ongoing inspections of the so-called “presidential sites”
mark the next critical phase in the UNSCOM inspections process.