5
used during the Iran-Iraq war. This document would be of great
value in helping UNSCOM establish a true material balance for
Iraqi chemical munitions—-a mandatory task for UNSCOM. During
Butler’s aborted visit to Iraq August 3-4, the Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister told Ambassador Butler that Iraq would never give it to
the Commission. This evidence directly contradicts the Iraqi claim
that it has given UNSCOM all the information it has.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
In July 1998, UNSCOM assembled yet another group of inter-
national experts to meet with Iraqi counterparts for review of Iraqi
declarations on the biological weapons program. And again, the
Iraqis presented no new material. The experts thus found, again,
that Iraq’s declarations are not adequate for credible verification.
This conclusion covered weapons (SCUD missile BW warheads, R-
400 BW bombs, drop-tanks to be filled with BW, and spray devices
for BW), production of BW agents (botulinum toxin, anthrax,
aflatoxin, and wheat cover smut), and BW agent growth media.
The report of this UNSCOM—250 mission of international experts
recommended to the UNSCOM Executive Chairman that no further
verification of Iraq’s declarations be conducted until Iraq commits
itself to provide new and substantive information, stating that any
other approach would be counter-productive.
LONG-RANGE MISSILES
UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler reported to the
Security Council on August 5 that UNSCOM and Iraq had made
significant progress in the accounting of both CBW and conven-
tional SCUD warheads, as well as the material balance of major
components for SCUD engine production. However, no progress
was reported in accounting for the unique SCUD propellant pos-
sessed by Iraq, and the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister refuses to
allow further discussion of Iraq’s concealment program, including
the hiding of SCUD warheads.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In an interim report to the UNSC July 29, the IAEA said that
Iraq had provided no new information regarding outstanding issues
and concerns. The IAEA said while it has a “technically coherent
picture” of Iraq’s nuclear program, Iraq has never been fully trans-
parent and its lack of transparency compounds remaining uncer-
tainties. The IAEA noted Iraq claims to have no further docu-
mentation on such issues as weapons design engineering drawings,
experimental data, and drawings received from foreign sources in
connection with Iraq’s centrifuge enrichment program. The IAEA
also reported that Iraq said it was “unsuccessful” in its efforts to
locate verifiable documentation of the abandonment of the nuclear
program. Iraq has failed to pass the measures required under
UNSC Resolution 715 to implement UNSC Resolutions 687, 707
and other relevant resolutions, including the penal laws required
to enforce them.


7
and reiterated that “the decision by Iraq to suspend cooperation
with UNSCOM and the IAEA is totally unacceptable.” Further,
“they view with extreme concern the continuing refusal by the Gov-
ernment of Iraq to rescind its decision.”
We continue to work with the Council in its effort to bring about
full Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. We are now
seeking a Council resolution that would suspend further periodic
reviews until Iraq reverses course and resumes cooperation with
UNSCOM and the IAEA. Iraq’s refusal to cooperate is a challenge
to the authority of the Security Council and to the credibility of all
international weapons nonproliferation efforts, since UNSCOM and
the IAEA are responsible to the Security Council for the most thor-
ough arms contro regime on earth.
THE U.N.’S “OIL-FOR-FOOD” PROGRAM
We continue to support the international community’s efforts to
provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the
‘oil-for-food” program and other humanitarian efforts. Under the
last phase of the “oil-for-food” program, which ran from December
3, 1997, through June 2, 1998, $1.1 billion worth of humanitarian
goods were approved for export to Iraqi. United States companies
can participate in “oil-for-food” and over $165 million worth of con-
tracts for U.S. firms have been approved.
Under the current phase of “oil-for-food” Iraq is authorized to sell
up to $5.2 billion worth of oil every 180 days, up from $2.0 billion
in previous phases. Although the UNSC resolution outlining this
program, Resolution 1153, was adopted on February 20, Iraq did
not present an acceptable distribution plan for the implementation
of Resolution 1153 until May 27, 1998; it was accepted by the U.N.
Secretary General on May 29.
Under the current phase of the “oil-for-food” program, 235 con-
tracts for the purchase of humanitarian goods for the Iraqi people
have been presented for approval; of these, 162 contracts worth
over $562 million have been approved and 13 are on hold pending
clarification of questions about the proposed contracts. With regard
to oil sales, 50 contracts with a total value of $955 million have
been approved so far during this phase.
The United States has supported the repair of the Iraqi oil infra-
structure in order to allow sufficient oil to be exported to fund the
level of humanitarian purchases the Security Council approved in
UNSC Resolution 1153. Treasury is in the process of amending its
regulations to allow U.S. companies to bid on oil infrastructure re-
pair contracts just as they are permitted both to purchase Iraqi oil
and sell humanitarian goods under the U.N. “oil-for-food” program.
Resolution 1153 maintains the separate program for northern
Iraq, administered directly by the U.N. in consultation with the
local population. This program, which the United States strongly
supports, receives 13 to 15 percent of the funds generated under
the “oil-for-food” program. The separate northern program was es-
tablished because of the Baghdad regime’s proven disregard for the
humanitarian condition of the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen
minorities of northern Iraq and its readiness to apply the most bru-
tal forms of repression against them. The well-documented series
of chemical weapons attacks a decade ago by the government