5
THE U.N.'S OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM
We continue to support the international community’s efforts to
provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the
oil-for-food program. Transition from phase four to phase five (au-
thorized by UNSC Resolution 1210) was smooth. As in phase four,
Iraq is again authorized to sell up to $5.2 billion worth of oil every
180 days. However, because of a drop in world oil prices, Iraq was
only able to pump and sell approximately $3.1 billion worth of oil
in phase four; recent increases in world prices should provide in-
creased revenue for this phase of oil-for-food.
As of April 5, under hase five of the oil-for-food program, 340
contracts worth nearly f 1 billion have been approved. As of April
5, the United States had 145 phase four and 13 phase five con-
tracts on hold pending clarification of questions about the proposed
contracts.
Three assessment panels were formed in January to look at Iraqi
disarmament, the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and Iraq’s obli-
gations regarding Kuwait. The panels presented their reports to
the Security Council in April. The United States supported an ex-
amination of the current situation and exploration of ways to im-
prove humanitarian conditions, particularly with regard to vulner-
able groups such as children under age five and pregnant and
nursing women. The United States has expressed its support for
raising the cap on Iraqi oil exports under the oil-for-food program
in order to meet humanitarian needs, and for certain other pro-
posals made by the humanitarian assessment panel.
Resolution 1210 maintains a separate oil-for-food program for
northern Iraq, administered directly by the United Nations in con-
sultation with the local population. This program, which the
United States strongly supports, receives 13 to 15 percent of the
funds generated under the oil-for-food program. The separate
northern program was established because of the Baghdad regime's
proven disregard for the humanitarian needs of the Kurdish, Assyr-
ian, Yezedi and Turkoman minorities of northern Iraq, and its
readiness to apply the most brutal forms of repression against
them. In northern Iraq areas where Baghdad does not exercise con-
trol, the oil-for-food program has been able to operate relatively ef-
fectively, as documented by the humanitarian assessment panel.
The Kurdish factions have set aside their differences to work to-
gether so that Resolution 1210 is implemented as efficiently as pos-
sible.
Humanitarian programs such as oil-for-food have steadily im-
proved the life of the average Iraqi living under sanctions (who, for
example, now receives a ration basket providing over 2,000 calories
per day, a significant improvement in nutrition since the program
began) while denying Saddam Hussein control over oil revenues.
We will continue to work with the U.N. Secretariat, the Security
Council, and others in the international community to ensure that
the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people are met while denying
any political or economic benefits to the Baghdad regime.