S. HRG. 107-658
BE
F76/2:S. HRG -107-658
HEARINGS TO EXAMINE THREATS, RESPONSES
AND REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
SURROUNDING IRAQ
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JULY 31 AND AUGUST 1, 2002
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
URDUE UNIVERSITY
OCT 17 2002
U.S. DEPOSITORY
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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81-697 PDF
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2003-


san-13.139.1.2:5017
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director
PATRICIA A. McNERNEY, Republican Staff Director
(II)
800


IV
Page
Feil, Col. Scott R., U.S. Army (Ret.), executive director, Role of American
Military Power, Association of the U.S. Army, Arlington, VA
196
Prepared statement
199
Francke, Rend Rahim, executive director, Iraq Foundation, Washington, DC .. 177
Prepared statement
183
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, prepared statement ...... 161
Marr, Dr. Phebe, former professor, National Defense University, Washington,
165
Prepared statement
170
Weinberger, Hon. Caspar, former Secretary of Defense; chairman, Forbes
Magazine, Washington, DC ....
231
Prepared statement
235
DC .....
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
265
Bennis, Phyllis, Institute for Policy Studies
Byler, J. Ďaryl, director, Mennonite Central Committee U.S. Washington,
DC
Pellot, Dr. Peter L., emeritus professor of Nutrition, University of Massachu-
setts in Amherst and Dr. Colin Rowat, lecturer in Economics, University
of Birmingham
269
271


HEARINGS TO EXAMINE THREATS, RE-
SPONSES, AND REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
SURROUNDING IRAQ
WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 2002
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Feingold, Wellstone, Bill Nelson,
Lugar, Hagel, Chafee and Brownback.
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.
Welcome, everyone, here this morning to what is the beginning
of, I hope, for lack of a better phrase, a national dialog on a very
important question. There are some very difficult decisions for the
President and for the Congress, and we think it's important, the
members of this committee, that we begin to discuss what is being
discussed all over, but not here in the Congress so far.
The attacks of 9/11 have forever transformed how Americans see
the world. Through tragedy and pain, we have learned that we can-
not be complacent about events abroad. We cannot be complacent
about those who espouse hatred for us. We must confront clear
danger with a new sense of urgency and resolve.
Saddam Hussein's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, in my
view, is one of those clear dangers. Even if the right response to
his pursuit is not so crystal clear, one thing is clear. These weapons
must be dislodged from Saddam Hussein, or Saddam Hussein must
be dislodged from power. President Bush has stated his determina-
tion to remove Saddam from power, a view many in Congress
share. If that course is pursued, in my view, it matters profoundly
how we do it and what we do after we succeed.
The decision to go to war can never be taken lightly. I believe
that a foreign policy, especially one that involves the use of force,
cannot be sustained in America without the informed consent of
the American people. And so just as we have done in other impor-
tant junctures in our history, the Foreign Relations Committee
today begins what I hope will be a national dialog on Iraq that
sheds more light than heat and helps inform the American people
so that we can have a more informed basis upon which they can
draw their own conclusions.
I'm very pleased and grateful for the close cooperation of my
Re-
publican colleagues, Senator Helms, in absentia, and his staff, in
(1)


2
particular Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel, in putting these hear-
ings together. This is a bipartisan effort. It reminds me of the way
that things used to work in this committee when I joined it in
1973.
I want to say a word now about what the hearings are not about,
from my perspective. They are not designed to prejudice any par-
ticular course of action. They are not intended to short-circuit the
debate taking place within the administration. I know I speak for
all members of the committee in saying at the outset that we recog-
nize our responsibility as we conduct these hearings to do so in a
way that reflects the magnitude of the decisions the administration
is wrestling with and the Congress will have to deal with.
We've coordinated these hearings closely with the White House.
We're honoring the administration's desire not to testify at this
time. We expect, at some later date, to convene hearings at which
the administration would send representatives to explain their
thinking once it has been clarified and determined. We do not ex-
pect this week's hearings to exhaust all aspects of this issue. They
are a beginning. But over the next 2 days, we hope to address sev-
eral fundamental questions.
First, what is the threat from Iraq? Obviously, to fully answer
this question will require us to have additional and closed hearings
on top of hearings in S-407 and discussions we've already had with
the intelligence community. Second, depending on our assessment
of the threat-or depending on one's assessment of the threat, what
is the appropriate response? And, third, how do Iraq's neighbors,
other countries in the region, and our allies see the, “Iraqi prob-
lem”? And, fourth, and maybe most important, if we participate in
Saddam's departure, what are our responsibilities the day after?
In my judgment, President Bush is right to be concerned about
Saddam Hussein's relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruc-
tion and the possibility that he may use them or share them with
terrorists. Other regimes hostile to the United States and our allies
already have or seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. What
distinguishes Saddam is that he has used them against his own
people and against Iran. And for nearly 4 years now Iraq has
blocked the return of U.N. weapons inspectors.
We want to explore Saddam's track record in acquiring, making,
and using weapons of mass destruction and the likelihood, in the
opinion of the experts that will come before us in the next 2 days,
the likelihood that he would share them with terrorists.
We want to know what capabilities Saddam has been able to re-
build since the inspectors were forced out of Iraq and what he now
has or might soon acquire. We want to understand his conventional
military strength and what dangers he poses to his neighbors as
well as to our forces, should they intervene.
Once we have established a better understanding of the threat,
we want to look at the possible responses. The containment strat-
egy pursued since the end of the gulf war and apparently sup-
ported by some in our military has kept Saddam boxed in. Some
advocates for continuing this strategy believe it's exceeded their ex-
pectations. And some others advocate the continuation coupled
with tough, unfettered weapons inspection. How practical is that?
Others believe that containment raises the risks Saddam will con-


3
tinue to play cat and mouse with the inspectors, build more weap-
ons of mass destruction and share them with those who wouldn't
hesitate to use them against us. In this view, if we wait for the
danger to become clear and present, it could become too late. It
could be too late. Acting to change the regime, in this view, may
be a better course.
But a military response also raises questions. Some fear that at-
tacking Saddam Hussein would precipitate the very thing we're
trying to prevent, his last resort to weapons of mass destruction.
We also have to ask whether resources can be shifted to a major
military enterprise in Iraq without compromising the war on terror
in other parts of the world.
My father has an expression, God love him. He says, “If every-
thing's equally important to you, Joe, nothing is important.” How
do we prioritize? What is the relative value? What are the costs?
We have to inquire about the cost of a major military campaign
and the impact on our economy. As pointed out yesterday in one
of the major newspapers in America, in today's dollars, the cost of
the gulf war was about $75 billion. Our allies paid 80 percent of
that, including the Japanese. If we go it alone, does it matter? Will
we encompass and take on the whole responsibility? What impact
will that have on American security and the economy? We have to
consider what support we're likely to get from our key allies in the
Middle East and Europe, and we must examine whether there are
any consequences if we move for regional stability.
Finally, the least explored, in my view, but in many ways the
most critical question relates to our responsibilities, if any, for the
day after Saddam is taken down, if taken down by the use of the
U.S. military. This is not a theoretical exercise. In Afghanistan, the
war was prosecuted exceptionally well, in my view, but the follow-
through commitment to Afghanistan security and reconstruction
has, in my judgment, fallen short.
It would be a tragedy if we removed a tyrant in Iraq, only to
leave chaos in its wake. The long suffering Iraqi people need to
know a regime change would benefit them. So do Iraq's neighbors.
We need a better understanding of what it would take to secure
Iraq and rebuild it economically and politically. Answering these
questions could improve the prospects for military success by dem-
onstrating to Iraqis that we are committed to staying for the long
haul.
These are just some of the questions we hope to address today
and tomorrow and in future hearings and, no doubt, in the fall. In
short, we need to weigh the risks of action versus the risks of inac-
tion.
To reiterate my key point, if we expect the American people to
support their government over the long haul when it makes a dif-
ficult decision, if the possibility exists that we may ask hundreds
of thousands of our young men and women in uniform to put them-
selves in harm's way, if it is the consensus or a decision reached
by the administration that thousands or tens of thousands of troops
would be required to remain behind for an extended period of time,
if those measures are required, then we must gain, in my view, the
informed consent of the American people.


4
I welcome our witnesses today. We have a group of extremely
competent people, one of whom got on a plane in Sydney and trav-
eled 24 hours straight to be here for this hearing, and others who
have come from long distances, as well. These are men and women
of stature, background knowledge, academic and practical under-
standing of the region and the country, and we're anxious to hear
from them.
I would now ask Senator Lugar if he would like to make an open-
ing statement. And although we usually reserve opening state-
ments just to the ranking member and the chairman, I would,
since we only have a few members here at the moment, invite my
other three colleagues if they would like to make a, “short”—not as
long as the chairman's—short statement.
When you get to be chairman, you can make long statements.
Senator Lugar.
Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
your leadership in organizing these hearings and for a comprehen-
sive statement that really does set forward the major issues we
must discuss.
I was an outspoken advocate for United States military action
against Iraq that culminated in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
I urged President Bush at a very early date to seek congressional
authorization for deployment of troops and the use of force in the
Persian Gulf. At the time, many in and out of the administration
feared the possibility of losing that vote. I believed all along the
votes would be there, but had the votes for authorization not been
there, it would have been far better to have known this at the be-
ginning rather than to be surprised down the road that the Nation
was not behind the President. A few weeks later, the House and
Senate did vote to authorize President Bush to use military force
against Iraq, and the administration benefited immensely from this
overt decision of the American people.
If President Bush determines that large-scale offensive military
action is necessary against Iraq, I hope that he will follow the lead
established by the previous Bush administration and seek congres-
sional authorization. The administration must be assured of the
commitment of the American people in pursuing policies and ac-
tions in Iraq after focused and vigorous discussion and debate. It
is unfortunate that today, some 10 years after the gulf war, we still
face threats posed by Saddam Hussein. This did not necessarily
have to be the case.
On April 18, 1991, I wrote to President Bush urging him to send
our forces to Baghdad and to complete the job. He was gracious
enough to receive me in the White House to discuss that letter. I
believe that while we had the forces present, we should end the re-
gime of Saddam Hussein and build a democratic Iraq. And, for a
number of reasons, our President chose instead to pursue a policy
of containment. Those important reasons for that decision, then
and now, include our plans for the future of a post-Saddam Hus-
sein Iraq and future stability of Iraq's neighbors.
We must estimate soberly the human and economic costs of war
plans and postwar plans. I am under no illusion that this will be
an easy task. The President and the administration will have to
make the case to the American people regarding the threat posed


5
to the United States security by Saddam Hussein and the weapons
of mass destruction he appears intent on producing and potentially
utilizing against Americans and other targets.
But the President will also have to make a persuasive case to our
friends and allies, particularly those in the region. Simply put, Şad-
dam Hussein remains a threat to the United States, allied, and re-
gional security. However, the situation on the ground in the region
has changed since 1991, and it is not at all clear that the tactics
of that campaign should be re-employed today.
Ten years ago, the United States had done the military and dip-
lomatic spade work in the region. We had developed a war plan.
Allies in the region permitted the United States forces to launch
attacks from their territory. We had collected a coalition of willing
and able allies. Our allies were willing to pay for $48 billion of the
$61 billion cost. We were prepared to utilize the force necessary to
defeat Iraqi forces. And, most importantly, we had the support of
the American people. We have not yet determined if these same
conditions are present today. They might be, but we have not yet
engaged all the parties necessary to ensure a successful outcome.
At the end of the Persian Gulf war, the agreements surrounding
the cease-fire included an Iraqi commitment to destroy a stockpile
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the ability to
produce them in the future. I fully supported this endeavor. Iraq's
possession of weapons of mass destruction represents a potential
threat the world cannot ignore. On several occasions since the end
of the war, the United States and our allies have resorted to the
use of military force to counter the threat Iraq poses to its neigh-
bors and to the United States' vital national-security interests.
Saddam Hussein has demonstrated his ability and willingness to
use weapons of mass destruction and spread instability through
military force against his own people and neighbors.
Unfortunately, the overriding priority of his regime has been the
maintenance of his own power. These hearings seek to shed light
on our policy alternatives. The administration understands that ul-
timately it will have to make a case for its policy decisions. This
is not an action that can be sprung on the American people. Leaks
of military plans are dangerous to our security. But public debate
over policy is important to the construction of strong public support
for actions that will require great sacrifices from the American peo-
ple.
I look forward to working closely with the chairman to lead this
debate and to lay some of the foundation of the coalescing of ad-
ministration and congressional thinking and support that will be
essential for a campaign against Saddam Hussein.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Gentlemen, I've just been informed that there are going to be
four rollcall votes in a row starting at 11 o'clock, so I am going to
rescind my offer. And if you want to put your statements in the
record or make a 1-minute statement, literally, do that, but we'll
never get to our witnesses.
Would anybody like to make a very brief opening comment?
Senator WELLSTONE. Mr. Chairman, I'd just ask unanimous con-
sent that my statement be included in the record. I was a teacher,


6
and I'm used to 70-minute classes. I don't know how to do it in 1
minute.
[The prepared statement of Senator Wellstone follows:) ]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL WELLSTONE
For months now, high-ranking administration officials have openly discussed
launching a military attack on Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Until very re-
cently, however, serious public discussion on the nature and urgency of Iraq's
threat, the range of possible U.S. policy responses, and the consequences of a pos-
sible U.S. or allied military attack has been in short supply. I believe a free-ranging
and open discussion of the policy options facing us on Iraq is long overdue, and wish
to thank Senator Biden for scheduling this hearing today, and those which are to
follow. By initiating these hearings, the committee is taking an important and his-
toric first step in meeting its constitutional obligations to ensure that the represent-
atives of the people have a chance to thoroughly assess these profoundly important
questions before any action is taken.
From all that I have seen, I do not believe the administration has yet made a
case for taking military action against Iraq. Before any decisions about major
changes in U.S. policy in the region are made_including possible military or other
action-our country and our people need to learn as much as we can about the
available choices on Iraq and their likely consequences.
Among other things, we must know the impact of a U.S. pre-emptive attack on
the international coalition effort to combat terrorism, our nation's number one na-
tional security priority. With few exceptions, our coalition partners and regional
friends oppose military action. We need to take a hard look at whether taking mili-
tary action against Iraq would be worth jeopardizing the steady progress we are
now making with scores of other nations in actually preventing terrorists from ac-
quiring the resources to attack us again as they did on September 11.
We also must know the nature and urgency of the threat from Iraq, the range
of possible American policy responses beyond the use of force, the legal authority
for U.S. or concerted international action there, the impact on our economy and on
the world economy, and the human toll of any such conflict.
We must also have some clearer idea of our policy goals. Should the goal of U.S.
policy be to overthrow the regime and install a regime less hostile to U.S. interests,
to compel Iraq finally to agree with unfettered UN-sponsored weapons inspections,
to destroy suspected weapons of mass destruction production facilities, or some com-
bination of these? What is the precedent for the U.S. to launch a major military op-
eration in the absence of direct provocation by the target country? Should U.S. ac-
tion be targeted and covert, or overwhelming and overt? What would we expect the
casualties among U.S. service personnel to be in a potential war on Iraq, and would
it be higher, as most experts agree, than in the current war in Afghanistan? Are
Americans ready to shoulder that burden now? What would the death toll be among
ordinary, innocent Iraqi civilians? Why is the UN-sponsored sanctions process, re-
cently overhauled and more narrowly targeted, continuing to erode, and what can
be done about that? All of these questions and more must be answered in this proc-
ess.
The most recent leaked military plan for invading Iraq calls for a heavy reliance
on air strikes, focusing first and primarily on Baghdad. What is never mentioned
in this report is the fact that Baghdad is also a crowded city of four to five million
people, and it would be virtually impossible to take measures sufficient to prevent
innocent non-combatants from being harmed.
We must also consider the major responsibilities likely to flow from any military
victory. What would it take to secure Iraq and to rebuild it economically and politi-
cally? How many U.S. forces would be required to go in, to secure the country and
restore some semblance of democratic rule, and for how long would they stay?
Would the American people be willing to shoulder the cost of billions of dollars need
ed for this effort, billions of dollars also urgently needed back here at home? In
short, after a military victory has been declared, will the U.S. stay committed for
the long haul? In Afghanistan, we won the war, but the follow-through commitment
to secure Afghanistan's peace through security and reconstruction has fallen short.
That fact, probably as much an any other, has had a chilling effect on regional sup-
port for U.S. action on Iraq.
No one here disagrees that the world would be a much better place without the
brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. He has preyed on his neighbors, has used
chemical weapons on his own people, and continues to be one of the world's worst
violators of human rights. However, if a decision to take military action is made,


7
it should only be made after the administration has engaged in a serious and
thoughtful sustained public discussion on Iraq with the American people, and only
after all diplomatic and other peaceful options have been exhausted. Further, if the
administration decides to move, it must come back to Congress and seek war powers
authorization before engaging in a large scale escalation of hostilities.
I believe these hearings are an important first step in beginning a serious and
thoughtful discussion of U.S. policy toward Iraq, one which has been sorely needed,
and I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses before us.
Senator WELLSTONE. I'd like to thank the panelists for being
here today, and I would like to ask unanimous consent that a
statement by Phyllis Bennis at the Institute for Policy Studies be
included in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be.
[The statement referred to can be found on page 265.]
The CHAIRMAN. And every Senator's statement will be placed in
the record if they have one. I sincerely apologize for that.
Senator Dodd.
Senator DODD. I think this is tremendously important, what
you're doing. I think this is tremendously valuable. I know there
are those who question the motivations behind all of this, but I
can't think of any more valuable function that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee can perform than do exactly what we're doing
here. I think it not only educates our colleagues, educates ourselves
and the American public, it gives the administration an oppor-
tunity to focus its ideas and policies. I think one of the best debates
that ever occurred in my 20 years in the Senate was the debate
surrounding the issue of the gulf war back in 1989.
And so I thank you for doing this. This is a very, very valuable
service, and I hope our colleagues pay good attention to what we
hear.
Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Senator BROWNBACK. If I could for just a quick moment, I want
to thank you for holding the hearings and second what Senator
Dodd has said as to their importance. And I know the administra-
tion looks with importance on these hearings as engaging the coun-
try.
I would just note, I think, to our panelists and to other, I don't
think there's a question but that we've got to, at some point in
time, deal with Saddam Hussein. Many would have argued we
should have done it 11 years ago. Some would have argued we
should have done it 5 years ago. I think the question now becomes,
should we do it now? And if so, how? And what does it impact
throughout the region?
So I hope our panelists can really address that issue, because I
think there's pretty strong unanimity in the Congress that at some
point in time we're going to have to deal with this guy. Is now the
time? And what's the way? And I hope we can get at that through
these hearings.
Senator WELLSTONE. Mr. Chairman, I know everybody's being
very brief, but just given the comments of a colleague that I work
with, could I just say something in 30 seconds? I used 30 seconds
before
The CHAIRMAN. Sure.


9
we're going to have to break about probably ten after 11 and be
gone for 40 minutes. With a little bit of luck, we will be able to get
this panel finished, or if we're still engaged, we'll ask you to hang
around, if you can.
But, with that, why don't I know yield the floor to you, Mr. Am-
bassador. And, again, thank you for the effort and your service.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BUTLER, FORMER EXECUTIVE
CHAIRMAN, UNSCOM, DIPLOMAT IN RESIDENCE, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY
Ambassador BUTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of this
committee, I'm greatly honored to have been invited to be here.
This is an important debate, and I hope I can make a useful con-
tribution to it.
Mr. Chairman, having worked within the Australian Parliament,
I'm well aware of the division bells and rollcall votes and so on,
and I appreciate your duties in the Chamber. I will, therefore, come
straight to the point and try and speak with dispatch.
My subject, as allocated to me by you and your staff, is Iraq and
weapons of mass destruction. I'll make these opening remarks and
be happy—then the paper has been circulated, and I'll be happy to
take part of whatever discussion-
The CHAIRMAN. Your entire statement will be placed in the
record for our colleagues.
Ambassador BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, members of this committee,
Iraq's stated position is that it has no weapons of mass destruction.
As recently as last week, two senior Iraqi officials, the Deputy
Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, reiterated this claim. It's
more than interesting that in his public statement, Saddam Hus-
sein never claims to be disarmed. On the contrary, he threatens a
degree of destruction of his enemies, which implies his position of
mighty weapons.
It is essential to recognize that the claim made by Saddam's rep-
resentatives that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction is false.
Everyone concerned, from Iraq's neighbors to the U.N. Security
Council to the Secretary General of the United Nations, with whom
Iraq is currently negotiating on the issue, everyone, simply, Mr.
Chairman, is being lied to.
It is now over 10 years since Iraq was instructed by the U.N. Se-
curity Council to cooperate with action to, and I quote, “destroy, re-
move, and render harmless,” its weapons of mass destruction.
Those weapons were specified by the Council as these—all nuclear,
chemical, biological weapons, and the means to make them, and
missiles with a range exceeding 160 kilometers. The Security Coun-
cil's instruction to Iraq was binding under international law. And
all other states were equally bound by law not to give Iraq any as-
sistance in WMD, weapons of mass destruction.
From the beginning, Mr. Chairman, Iraq refused to obey the law.
Instead, it actively sought to defeat the application of the law in
order to preserve its weapons of mass destruction capability. The
work of UNSCOM, the body created by the Security Council to take
away Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, had varying degrees of
success. But, above all-above all—it was not permitted to finish


10
the job, and almost 4 years have now passed since Iraq terminated
UNSCOM's work. And in that period, Iraq has been free of any in-
spection and monitoring of its WMD programs.
Now, I've given this briefest of recollection of that history be-
cause, Mr. Chairman, I put to you and your colleagues it shows two
key things. One, Iraq remains in breach of international law. Two,
it has been determined to maintain a weapons-of-mass-destruction
capability at all costs. Now, we need to know, as far as we can,
what the capability it today.
First of all
, nuclear weapons, although, sitting on my left here,
Dr. Hamza is far more expert than I am in that field, but I'll say
quickly what I believe is the case. Saddam has sought nuclear
weapons for two decades. Ten years ago, he intensified his efforts
in a so-called crash program. The gulf war put an end to this. Sub-
sequent inspection and analysis by the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA) and UNSCOM showed that in spite of rel-
atively deficient indigenous sources of uranium, Saddam's program
was, in fact, when stopped, as close as 6 months away from making
a crude nuclear explosive device. Of the three components nec-
essary for a nuclear weapon-materials, equipment, and knowl-
edge—Iraq has the latter two. On the relevant equipment and com-
ponents, Iraq actually refused to yield them to the IAEA and
UNSCOM inspectors.
The key question now is, has Iraq acquired the essential fission-
able material, either by enriching indigenous sources or by obtain-
ing it from external sources? And I don't know the answer. And I
will say, throughout my remarks, Mr. Chairman, what I don't know
as well as what I think is the case. I don't know the answer to that.
It is possible that intelligence authorities in the West and Russia-
and you all know why I mention Russia, in particular-may know
the answer to that question.
But what there is now is evidence that Saddam has reinvigorated
his nuclear weapons program in the inspection-free years. And over
2 years ago, the IAEA estimate was that if he started work again
on a nuclear weapon, he could build one in about 2 years.
Now I turn to chemical weapons. Saddam's involvement with
chemical weapons also spans some 20 years. He used them in the
Iran Iraq war in the mid 1980s and on Iraqis in the north who
challenged his rule in 1998. UNSCOM identified an array of chem-
ical-weapons agents manufactured by Iraq. This included the most
toxic of them, VX. Iraq's chemical weapons program was extensive,
and UNSCOM was able to destroy or otherwise account for a sub-
stantial portion of it, of its holdings of weapons and its manufac-
turing capability. But, Mr. Chairman, not all of it.
It was particularly significant that following UNSCOM's dis-
covery of Iraq's VX program and the fact that Iraq had loaded it
into missile warheads together with other chemical and biological
agents, it was particularly significant that Iraq then strengthened,
in 1998, its determination to bring UNSCOM's work to an end.
Now I turn to biological weapons. Iraq also maintained an exten-
sive biological weapons program with an array of BW agents. Its
attempts to conceal this program were most elaborate, implying
that BW, biological weapons, are, in fact, particularly important to
Saddam. I often thought that there was a relationship here. The


11
extent of their attempts to prevent us from finding something dem-
onstrated the degree of importance of it. And if that rule applies,
BW is very important to Saddam.
Iraq weaponized BW-for example, it loaded anthrax into missile
warheads and continually researched new means of delivery-
spraying devices, pilotless aircraft. UNSCOM's absolutely refusal to
accept the transparently false Iraq claims about its—what it called
its “primitive, failed, unimportant BW program—and UNSCOM's
examination of the possibility that Iraq had tested BW on humans.
These also contributed to Iraq's resolve in 1998 to terminate
UNSCOM's work.
Finally, missiles. Iraq's main prescribed ballistic missile was the
Scuds it had imported from the USSR. It also sought to clone those
indigenously and continuously sought to develop, other medium-
and long-range missiles. UNSCOM's accounting of Iraq's Scuds was
reasonably complete. A good portion of them had been fired or de-
stroyed during the gulf war. But the disposition of a number of
them, possibly as many as 20, was never unambiguously estab-
lished.
In addition, Iraq was working, while UNSCOM was still in Iraq,
on the further development of a missile capability which would
breach the 160-kilometer range limit. I asked them to stop that
work, but the general in charge of it categorically refused.
And there was another issue in the missile field which also con-
tributed to Iraq shutting us down in 1998. I had asked Iraq to yield
to us 500 tons of fuel that would only fire a SCUD engine, and they
refused.
Now, what do I derive from this SITREP, Mr. Chairman? Quick-
ly, six main points. We do not know, and never have known fully,
the quantity and quality of Iraq's WMD. Its policies of concealment
ensured that this was the case. Two, we do know that it has had
such weapons, has used them, and remains at work on them.
Three, what it has been able to further achieve in the 4-years with-
out inspection is not clear, in precise terms. That is the inner logic
of inspections. You cannot see what you are not permitted to look
at. Fourth, Saddam Hussein knows what he is working on, he al-
ways had, and the assets he holds in the WMD field. His refusal
to allow inspections to resume has nothing to do with notions of
Iraqi sovereignty. It is designed to prevent the discovery of and to
protect his weapons-of-mass-destruction program. Next, intelligence
agencies might know more than they are able to say in public. Cer-
tainly what has been published of defector and intelligence reports
confirms that during the past 4 years Iraq has been hard at work
across the board to increase its WMD capability.
And, finally, there are a number of deeply disturbing possibilities
within Saddam's WMD program, which need urgent attention, but
especially these. Has he acquired a nuclear weapons capability by
purchasing it from Soviet stock? I think that's an important ques-
tion. And, second, is he working in the BW field on smallpox, ebola,
and plague?
Now, there is a question as to why does Saddam want these dia-
bolical weapons? Why has he defended them at such great cost to
the Iraqi people? In many respects, Mr. Chairman, he's told us
himself in his various outbursts. They make him strong. They help


12
him stay in power at home. They help him fight what he thinks-
his enemies outside Iraq.
But, even more disturbing than those so-called goals and his
view of the world is his apparently cataclysmic mentality. He sure-
ly must know that, especially following September 11, any use by
him, and, indeed, any threat of use of WMD against the United
States or possibly its allies, would bring a terrible response. It
would be intelligent for him to now recognize that his WMD capa-
bility is an insupportable liability for him and his regime. Yet, Mr.
Chairman, he shows no sign of such intelligent judgment. And this
is perhaps the ultimate pathology of the man.
Will he make his WMD available to terrorist groups? Again, I
don't know. We do know that Iraq has trained terrorists from
around the region and has mounted terrorist actions of its own as
far afield as in Southeast Asia. I have a personal experience of
that. But I have seen no evidence of Iraq providing WMD, as such,
to non-Iraqi terrorist groups. I suspect that, especially given his
psychology and aspirations, Saddam would be reluctant to share
with others what he believes to be an indelible source of his own
power.
On the elemental question, therefore, the one put to me, Saddam
and weapons of mass destruction—that is, does he have them, et
cetera—what's the state of affairs contrary to his assertions that he
has none? In addition to what I've put to you, I would refer this
committee to the traditional test of whether or not a person can be
judged to have committed a crime, and this is, did the accused have
the motive, the means, and the opportunity? And, Mr. Chairman,
Saddam plainly has all three and has demonstrated this fact.
What should be done? I was told that's not my issue for this
morning.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, we would welcome your input.
Ambassador BUTLER. Well, clearly an ideal situation would be
the resumption of arms control in Iraq-inspections and serious
arms control—but, Mr. Chairman, not if that means the shell
game-phony inspections, more deceit, more concealment. That
would, in fact, I suggest, be deeply dangerous, providing an illusion
of security.
So if the decision has to be taken to remove Saddam, then I'd
just say this. Do it for the right reasons. As you have pointed out,
Mr. Chairman, have this debate and make clear to the world what
this is about. It is about weapons of mass destruction, but please
do not leave out Saddam's hideous record, in terms of human-rights
violations—he should be on trial in The Hague alongside
Milosevic—and, second, the fundamental violation by his regime of
international law, something which trashes the system of inter-
national law and harms us all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Butler follows:]


13
PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD BUTLER, FORMER EXECUTIVE
CHAIRMAN OF UNSCOM, DIPLOMAT IN RESIDENCE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
IRAQ AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Iraq's stated position is that it has no weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As
recently as last week, two senior Iraqi officials—the Deputy Prime Minister and the
Foreign Minister-reiterated this claim.
It is more than interesting that in his public statements, Saddam Hussein never
claims to be disarmed. On the contrary, he threatens a degree of destruction of his
enemies which implies his possession of mighty weapons.
It is essential to recognize that the claim made by Saddam's representatives, that
Iraq has no WMD, is false. Everyone concerned, from Iraq's neighbors to the UN
Security Council and the Secretary-General of the UN, with whom Iraq is currently
negotiating on the issue, is being lied to.
It is now over ten years since Iraq was instructed by the UN Security Council
to cooperate with action to “destroy, remove, or render harmless” its weapons of
mass destruction. Those weapons were specified by the Council as: all nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons; the means to make them; and missiles with a
range exceeding a hundred and sixty kilometers.
The Security Council's instruction to Iraq was binding under international law.
All other states were, equally, bound by that law to deny Iraq any assistance or co-
operation in the field of WMD.
From the beginning, Iraq refused to obey the law. Instead, it actively sought to
defeat its application in order to preserve its WMD capability.
The work of UNSCOM, the body created by the Security Council to implement
its decisions on Iraq's WMD, had varying degrees of success. But, above all, it was
not permitted to finish the job. Almost four years ago the Iraqi's terminated its
work. Iraq has been free of inspection or monitoring since then.
This briefest of recollections of relevant background history reveals two salient
facts: Iraq remains in breach of the law; it has been determined to maintain a WMD
capability.
We need to know as far as is possible, Iraq's current WMD status.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Saddam has sought nuclear weapons for some two decades. Ten years ago he in-
tensified his efforts, instituting a "crash program.” The Gulf War put an end to this.
Subsequent inspection and analysis by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and UNSCOM, showed that in spite of relatively deficient indigenous
sources of the fissionable material needed to make a nuclear weapon, Saddam's pro-
gram was as close as six months from yielding a bomb.
Of the three components necessary for the fabrication of a nuclear explosive de-
vice: materials, equipment, knowledge; Iraq has the latter two. On the relevant
equipment/components, Iraq refused to yield them to the inspectors.
The key question now is has Iraq acquired the essential fissionable material ei-
ther by enriching indigenous sources or by obtaining it from external sources?
I don't know the answer. It is possible that intelligence authorities, in the West
and/or Russia do. But, there is evidence that Saddam has reinvigorated his nuclear
weapons program in the inspection-free years.
Over two years ago, the IAEA estimate was that if he started work again, Saddam
could build a nuclear weapon in about two years.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)
Saddam's involvement with chemical weapons also spans some twenty years. He
used them in the Iran-Iraq war in the mid-eighties and on Iraqi's who challenged
his rule, in 1988.
UNSCOM identified an array of CW agents manufactured by Iraq. This included
the most toxic of them-VX. Iraq's CW program was extensive. UNSCOM was able
to destroy or otherwise account for a substantial portion of Iraq's CW holdings and
manufacturing capability. But, not all of it.
It was particularly significant that following UNSCOM's discovery of Iraq's VX
program and the fact that Iraq had loaded it and other CW and BW agents into
missile warheads, Iraq strengthened its determination to remove UNSCOM from
Iraq.


14
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (BW)
Iraq also maintained an extensive BW program with an array of BW agents. Its
attempts to conceal this program were the most elaborate, implying that BW were
particularly important to Saddam.
Iraq weaponized BW. For example, it loaded anthrax into missile warheads and
continually researched new means of delivery: spraying devices; pilotless aircraft.
UNSCOM's absolute refusal to accept the transparently false Iraqi claims about
its “primitive, failed and unimportant” BW program and its examination of the pos-
sibility that Iraq had tested BW on humans also contributed to Iraq's resolve, in
1998, to terminate UNSCOM's work.
MISSILES
Iraq's main proscribed ballistic missile was the Scuds it had imported from the
USSR. It also sought to clone those indigenously and continually sought to develop
other medium- and long-range missiles.
UNSCOM's accounting of Iraq's Scuds was reasonably complete: a good portion of
them had been fired or destroyed during the Gulf War. But the disposition of a
number of them, possibly as many as 20, was never unambiguously established.
In addition, Iraq was working, while UNSCOM was still in Iraq, on the further
development of a missile capability which would breach the 160 kilometer range
limit. I asked them to stop that work. They refused.
There was another issue in the missile field which also contributed to Iraq shut-
ting down UNSCOM in 1998. I asked Iraq to yield some 500 tonnes of fuel which
would only drive SCUD engines. It refused.
It is very important to make the following points:
• We do not know and never have known fully the quantity and quality of Iraq's
WMD. Its policies of concealment ensured this.
• We do know that it has had such weapons, has used them, remains at work
on them.
• What it has been able to further achieve in the four years without inspection
is not clear, in precise terms. That is the inner logic of inspections—you cannot
see what you are not permitted to look at.
• Saddam Hussein knows what he is working on and the assets he holds in the
WMD field. His refusal to allow inspections to resume has nothing to do with
notions of Iraqi sovereignty. It is designed to prevent the discovery of and to
protect, his WMD program.
• Intelligence agencies might know more than they are able to say in public. Cer-
tainly what has been published of defector and intelligence reports confirms
that, during the past four years, Iraq has been hard at work, across the board,
to increase its WMD capability.
• There are a number of deeply disturbing possibilities within Saddam's WMD
program which need urgent attention, but especially these: has he acquired a
nuclear weapons capability by purchasing it from former Soviet stock; is he
working, in the BW field, on smallpox, plague, ebola?
Why is Saddam so deeply attached to these diabolical weapons and defended this
attachment at massive cost to Iraq and its people?
In many respects he has told us himself, in his various public outbursts. They
make him strong against enemies within and without Iraq. They support his pos-
turing to lead the Arab world against its enemies.
Even more disturbing than Saddam's goals and view of the world, is his appar-
ently cataclysmic mentality. He surely must know that, especially following Sep-
tember 11, any use by him and indeed any threat of use of WMD against the United
States, or possibly its allies, would bring a terrible response.
It would be intelligent for him to now recognize that his WMD capability is an
insupportable liability for him and his regime. Yet, he shows no sign of doing so.
This is perhaps the ultimate pathology of the man.
Will he make his WMD available to terrorist groups?
I don't know. We do know that Iraq has trained terrorists from around the region
and has mounted terrorist actions of its own, as far afield as in South East Asia.
But I have seen no evidence of Iraq providing WMD to non-Iraqi terrorist groups.
I suspect that, especially given his psychology and aspirations, Saddam would be
reluctant to share what he believes to be an indelible source of his power.
On the elemental question of whether, contrary to assertions authorized by him,
Saddam possesses WMD, I would refer to the traditional test of whether or not a


15
person can be judged to have committed a crime: did the accused have the motive,
means, and opportunity? Saddam plainly has had and continues to have, all three.
What should be concluded from these facts?
The resumption of arms control in Iraq is urgently required. But, it would have
to be serious. If Iraq again refused to cooperate, then to pursue compromised inspec-
tions would be dangerous. If it is decided to take military action against Saddam
it will be crucial for it to be for the right reasons. There are, in fact, three: Saddam's
flagrant violation of human rights; his continuing refusal to comply with inter-
national law as expressed in binding decisions of the Security Council; and, his vio-
lation of arms control obligations and treaties.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I particularly agree with your last
point. I have been pushing for 8 months that he should be indicted
as a war criminal. Even if we cannot get him, he should be indicted
as a war criminal so the world understands.
Doctor, welcome.
Dr. HAMZA. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. KHIDHIR HAMZA, FORMER IRAQI NU-
CLEAR PHYSICIST; PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON MIDDLE EAST-
ERN AFFAIRS, NEW YORK, NY
Dr. HAMZA. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, yesterday
Saddam met members of the Atomic Energy Organization address-
ing then as what he calls mujaheddin. That is people who exert ex-
treme effort and may sacrifice themselves for their work. And this
is what he had to say yesterday. “The Americans and British say
that if Iraq is left to its own means, it might make such and such
weapons.” He didn't name them, but it's clear what he meant.
“They mean to harm us.” “It is to prevent any Arab or Muslim from
progress.” He calls it progress. “This is the evil program of the
West, and especially the Americans assisted by Zionism and their
supporters.” It is clear now, at this critical juncture, that at his
meeting with Atomic Energy exhorting them to do their “national
duty”—we see Saddam back at his own old games of trying to cre-
ate at least the impression that he is a dangerous man and a men-
ace and should not be trifled with.
The last meetings of the Iraqi delegation with the U.N.-relevant
personnel on resuming inspections in Iraq, the Iraqi Government
decided, after they failed to make the U.N. agree to their terms of
getting the inspectors back, they wanted some concessions. They
declared that the inspector's job is to disarm Iraq and leave it de-
fenseless against American strikes since the Americans will never
remove sanctions. So the whole game they thought the inspectors
are charged with is to disarm Iraq. Since the inspectors are
charged only with dismantling weapons of mass destruction and
their facilities, this was an admission that Iraq may possess these
weapons and also an implied threat that, facing an invasion, it
might use them.
If we go back to the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Iraq built
its own weapons of mass destruction in technologies indigenously
with some foreign help. It understood that its main assets were not
the equipment but the scientists and engineers that makes these
weapons. Thus Saddam's government kept a tight lid on its science
and engineering military teams at the same time it allowed


16
UNSCOM and IAEA to demolish some of its weapon production
sites.
That these science and engineering teams were capable of re-
building the program was made manifestly clear in the aftermath
of the gulf war. Within less than a year, these teams rebuilt suc-
cessfully most of Iraq's services infrastructure. This included re-
building power stations, major telephone exchanges, and oil refin-
eries.
Elated by their success, Saddam kept these teams as contracting
entities to the government for the civilian sector with a much-re-
duced load and assigned them the rebuilding of the needed facili-
ties for the nuclear and other weapons-of-mass-destruction pro-
grams. This provided them with a cover as civilian contractors with
the actual work to prove it. But, at the same time, their weapons-
of-mass-destruction work continued unhindered.
Thus, the computer we used for the nuclear-weapon design is
now located in a hospital in Saddam City at the outskirts of Bagh-
dad. If an inspector should arrive at the site, he or she will be
shown contracts for the civilian sector. The only indication that
things are not what they seem is that it is headed by a man who
worked extensively on the Iraqi nuclear-weapon design and that
most of his staff are former workers in the nuclear weapon pro-
gram.
Legally, and according to the current mandate of UNMOVIC, the
U.N. inspection body, the burden is on the inspectors to prove oth-
erwise. Thus, Saddam has managed, from the experience of the last
11 years, to create the perfect cover. In effect, it turned the whole
Iraq science and engineering enterprise into a giant weapon-mak-
ing body. And since they do actually accomplish civilian tasks, the
economic burden on the government is also reduced.
Saddam valued his people more than equipment. And while he
initially allowed the U.N. teams to destroy some of his equipment
and facilities, Saddam kept tight control over his scientists and en-
gineers. Thus defections were kept to a minimum. This was helped
by well-publicized cases of defectors seeking help and were turned
down. One of them got killed in Jordan by Iraqi agents while wait-
ing for the U.S. Embassy to grant him an entry visa. Not a single
high-level defector left the regime since the botched defection of
Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law, to Jordan in 1995. This kept
the information flow out of Iraq to a minimum, increasing the opac-
ity of the WMD programs.
Iraq is well into CW production and may well be in the process
of BW production. With more than 10 tons of uranium and 1 ton
of slightly enriched uranium, according to German intelligence, it
has in its possession, Iraq has enough to generate the needed
bomb-grade uranium for three nuclear weapons by 2005.
Iraq has corporations in India and other countries to import the
needed equipment for its programs, then channel them through
countries like Malaysia for shipment to Iraq. Germany already
blacklisted some of these companies for violating sanctions imposed
on Iraq.
Iraq is importing directional-control instruments for its missiles
of much higher precision than those needed for the allowed 160 kil-


17
ometer missiles under U.N. sanctions. Thus, Iraq is gearing to ex-
tend the range of its missiles to easily reach Israel.
The type of equipment imported indicate that Iraq is in the proc-
ess of creating its own foundation for the production of needed ma-
terials, thus avoiding detection if these materials are on the watch
list of exporting countries. Following this logic, Iraq is or will be
able to produce its own growth media for the biological weapons
program and many of the precursors for chemical weapon program.
The same can be said for local uranium production from
phosphates. This removes many limitations on production and al-
Iows Iraq to accelerate its own weapons programs.
The inspection regime in Iraq had a mixed history. The Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, the body charged with ensuring
that nuclear facilities are not used for nuclear-weapons purposes,
failed in its task with regards to Iraq before the gulf war. The
International Atomic Energy Agency remains basically a weak or-
ganization beset by its international composition and multiple loy-
alties of its workers though within its sphere it has been quite suc-
cessful in accounting for and keeping a tab on essential components
of the nuclear fuel cycle, but it has limited leverage with the states
and works best in a cooperative and amiable environment.
Against determined states such as Iraq, it is at a great disadvan-
tage, thus it failed again after the gulf war when it declared early
that it took care of basically all of Iraq's nuclear program. It took
the defection of Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law, to force the Iraqi Gov-
ernment to declare the actual scope of its nuclear weapons program
and forced the inspectors to start all over again in revealing what
has not been declared before.
We are talking about a two-stage process—dismantling what is
there and monitoring after-so that it does not get rebuilt. With
Iraq's aggressive behavior toward inspectors and the cat-and-mouse
game it continuously plays with them, monitoring becomes prob-
lematic at best in the later stage of keeping Iraq disarmed. So even
if some equipment are dismantled, getting them not to be rebuilt
again will be problematic in any future program. Iraq could just at
any time stop cooperating and it might be just too late to stop it
from continuing its weapons program.
If the inspectors go back now, there is very little human intel-
ligence that will help them locate the new weaponsites. Spread
widely among the government infrastructure in smaller hard-to-de-
tect units, the inspectors will have a hard time locating all the pro-
gram's components. A recent defector with credible information as-
serted that all units are built with a backup. If one is detected or
is in danger of discovery, all activity is immediately transferred to
the backup facility.
The new UNMOVIC inspection body do not have the support and
free hand UNSCOM enjoyed. With Russia and other states that
favor removing sanctions, keeping the pressure, the onus now is on
the inspectors to prove that Iraq is in violation. Not finding a
smoking gun after a series of inspections is all that the Russians
and the French need to declare that the United States has no case
and sanctions must be lifted. The U.S. case will be considerably
weakened, and more voices will rise against U.S.-Iraqi policy as
baseless if the inspectors go in and find no smoking gun that Iraq


18
is making weapons of mass destruction. This is a danger that must
be carefully examined before inspection teams are allowed back in
Iraq possibly to divert an invasion.
Many voices declared that Iraq was not pursuing nuclear weap-
ons before the gulf war. This included the IAEA, International
Atomic Energy Agency, that declared Iraq clean in many state-
ments. This happened even after the German publication, Der
Spiegel, reported Iraq's successful attempt to acquire classified ura-
nium centrifuge enrichment technology from Germany.
However, the United States knew better and used the gulf war
setting as a way to dismantle Iraq's nuclear weapons program. But
its dismantling process ignored the knowledge base acquired over
the years that can be used easily to rebuild what was destroyed.
A similar insistence on proof before taking serious action will be al-
lowing Saddam to achieve his goals and challenge the U.S. inter-
ests again.
With no large, easily distinguishable nuclear sites, and little or
no human intelligence, it is difficult to see how any measure, short
of a regime change, will be effective. Saddam is totally indifferent
to the human suffering of his people. And with his threats of re-
prisals against the families of weapons-of-mass-destruction workers
has managed to stop defections among his personnel despite the
fact that a large number of Iraqis from other walks of life managed
to escape. With a Soviet-style economy that's basically geared to
war and its requirements, Iraq is currently the only Arab state
that all Arab extremists look at as the future challenger to Israel
and U.S. interests in the region. Thus, if Saddam makes it in the
nuclear arena, he will be the region's undisputed leader in Arab
eyes. It will then be much harder to agree on the needed conces-
sions for a peace process, and a viable peace will be impossible to
achieve under any terms.
Saddam has used and will continue to use the Palestine issue to
rally the Arabs around him as he did when he used the Arab lead-
ers meeting in Baghdad to challenge the peace treaty of Egypt with
Israel that President Sadat agreed to.
Saddam and terrorism: Saddam Hussein has a long history of in-
volvement in international terrorism, from assassinations of Iraqis
abroad in the 1970s and 1980s to support for radical anti-Western
groups in the 1980s and 1990s to links with Islamic fundamental-
ists today. His track record speaks for itself.
Always the opportunist, he has used the biannual Islamic con-
ferences held in Baghdad since the 1980s as a recruiting ground for
Islamic radicals from around the Muslim world. A former Iraqi in-
telligence officer now in Europe has described how he would dress
as a cleric and approach Islamists from key countries to put on the
Iraqi payroll for special operations. He was tasked—that is, the in-
telligence officer—to recruit Pakistanis, Indonesians, and Malay-
sians, while other officers concentrated on Palestinians and Arabs.
We know from credible sources that Osama bin Laden was a fre-
quent visitor to the Iraqi Embassy in Khartoum when bin Laden
was a resident of the Sudanese capital until 1996. It is no coinci-
dence that Khartoum is one of Iraq intelligence service's largest
foreign station.


19
It has also been confirmed that the Iraqi Ambassador in Turkey,
Farouk Hijazi, traveled to Afghanistan and met bin Laden in De-
cember 1998. It is revealing to note that prior to being appointed
Ambassador to Ankara, Hijazi was head of foreign operations for
Iraqi Intelligence Service. Incidentally, the same Hijazi who was
hurriedly pulled out of Ankara on September 29, 2001, has recently
resurfaced as Iraq's Ambassador to Tunisia.
There have been several confirmed sightings of Islamic fun-
damentalists from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Gulf states being
trained in terror tactics at the Iraq intelligence camp at Salman
Park, 20 miles south of Baghdad on the Tigris River. Three intel-
ligence officers have reported that they were surprised to find non-
Iraqi fundamentalists undergoing training at the facility. The
training involved assassination, explosions, and hijacking. All three
reported that there is a fuselage of an old Tupolev 154 airliner
used for hijack training. This was later confirmed by satellite pho-
tographs.
Iraq military capability has been considerably depleted since the
gulf war. Part of the drive to rebuild larger weapon-of-mass-de-
struction stockpiles is to make up for this depletion in military ca-
pability. Iraq, now, has practically no air force, a much degraded
air-defense system, and practically no new tanks, heavy artillery,
or armored vehicle. What is left functioning from the gulf war arse-
nal is basically in the hands of the Special Republican Guard, and
the rest of the Armed Forces are basically armed with light weap-
onry.
With a highly corrupt officer corps, the Iraq Army suffers from
a large number of absenteeism, poor or nonexistent medical care,
pilfered rations and little or no pay.
It is estimated that Iraq has no more than a quarter of the fire
power it possessed at the onset of the gulf war. With the original
Ba'ath Party members mostly murdered or jailed, Saddam's gov-
ernment now is purely a personal dictatorship of Saddam and his
clans. The original rhetoric of the Ba'ath party no longer carry any
weight with the population.
Iraqi WMD are under the control of the special security organiza-
tion. This is the same group that is charged with Saddam's secu-
rity. This feared and ruthless organization is mainly composed of
conscripts from Saddam's hometown and very loyal tribes in the
adjacent areas. They have an observer in all major military meet-
ings, and they are present at the headquarters of all the division
commanders, and they report directly to Saddam's younger son,
Qussey.
Any operation to disrupt the authority of the central government
of Iraq or the Iraqi command structure and especially the handling
of deployment of weapons of mass destruction must target this or-
ganization. Precision bombing and strict enforcement of no-drive
zones should eliminate most, if not all, of the dangers of Saddam
possibly using his CBW against U.S. forces. Past defections from
this pampered group indicate that it is not as tightly controlled as
was earlier thought, and defection rate may increase considerably
when faced with an imminent invasions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hamza follows:]


20
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. KHIDHIR HAMZA, FORMER IRAQI NUCLEAR PHYSICIST;
PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS
THE IRAQI THREAT
Failing to obtain concessions in return for allowing the inspectors back, the Iraqi
government turned the argument around by claiming that the inspectors' job is to
disarm Iraq and leave it defenseless against an American strike. Since the inspec-
tors are charged only with dismantling weapons of mass destruction and their facili-
ties, this was an admission that Iraq may possess these weapons and also an im-
plied threat that facing an invasion it might use them.
Iraq is currently the country with the most extensive experience in the use of
chemical weapons (CW). Its extensive use of these weapons and biological toxins
during the war with Iran and against its own Kurdish population provided the Iraqi
government with a huge database of information about the effectiveness and strat-
egy of use of each of these agents. The two tests of dirty bombs carried in
Mohammediyat in 1988, though were inconclusive as to their effectiveness in a war
setting, provided Iraq with extensive design and testing experience in this area,
probably the only Middle East country to do so in the last two decades. This pro-
vides Iraq with another tool for possible use in a terrorism setting. The recent defec-
tor reports of purchases of Russian radioactive materials through an African country
re-enforces Iraq's intents in this direction.
It is understood that CBW use is mainly intended to create a terror situation in
the targeted area. Any lethality that can be achieved using CBW can be surpassed
by conventional means. But the effects are not the same. The Iranian attackers who
showed no hesitancy in facing all the fire Iraq can muster were terrified of the lim-
ited CBW Iraq used at the time. The Iraqi port of al-Fao was occupied by Iranian
forces that repelled many conventional attacks, but collapsed easily under the con-
tinuous flow of CW that was thrown at them in the closing days of the war with
Iran. The same goes for the Kurds who fought with incredible bravery against the
Iraqi armed forces but ran away in terror to Turkey and Iran when the Iraqi armed
forces approached after the Gulf war fearing the use of CW after the Halbja mas-
sacre.
Iraq's use of these weapons included also the threat of use to prevent an attack.
Thus Saddam's government firmly believes that it thwarted a second Israeli strike
against its nuclear installations in 1990 when Saddam threatened to "burn half of
Israel using the binary” (chemical weapon.) Thus a firm belief in the utility and ef-
fectiveness of these weapons by Saddam's government emerged to present an option
that the regime believe that it cannot survive without. The WMD option is firmly
believed to be the reason behind not losing the war with Iran and preventing fur-
ther strikes by Israel, and if the Americans have not interfered would have helped
in quelling the Kurdish uprising.
Iraq built its own WMD technologies indigenously with some foreign help. Sad-
dam understood that his main assets were not the equipment but his scientists and
engineers. Thus Saddam's government kept a tight lid on its science and engineer-
ing military teams at the same time it allowed UNSCOM and the IAEA to demolish
most of its weapons production sites. That these science and engineering teams were
capable was made manifestly clear in the aftermath of the Gulf war. Within less
than a year these teams rebuilt successfully most of Iraq's services infrastructure.
These included rebuilding the destroyed control rooms of the power stations, the
major telephone exchanges and oil refineries. Elated by their success Saddam kept
these teams as contracting entities to the government for the civilian sector with
a much reduced load and assigned them the rebuilding of the needed facilities for
the WMD program. This provided them with a cover of civilian contractors with ac-
tual work to prove it but at the same time their WMD work continued unhindered.
Thus the computer we used for the nuclear weapon design is now located in a hos-
pital in Saddam city at the outskirts of Baghdad. If an inspector should arrive at
the site he or she will be shown contracts for the civilian sector. The only indication
that things are not what they seem is that it is headed by a man who worked exten-
sively on the Iraqi NW design and that most of his staff are former workers in
Group Four the Iraqi nuclear weapon team. Legally and according to the current
mandate of UNMOVIC, the new UN inspection body, the burden is on the inspectors
to prove otherwise. Thus Saddam has managed from the experience of the last elev-
en years to create the perfect cover. In effect it turns the whole Iraqi science and
engineering enterprise into a giant weapon making body. And since they do actually
accomplish civilian tasks, the economic burden on the government is minimized.
Thus Saddam not only used the international markets to import dual use items


21
under false pretenses, he created for the first time in the third world dual use engi-
neering teams.
Unlike the UN, Saddam valued his people more than the equipment. And while
initially the UN teams concentrated on destroying equipment and facilities Saddam
kept tight control over his scientists and engineers. Thus defections were kept to
a minimum. This was helped by well publicized cases of defectors seeking help and
were turned down. One of them got killed in Jordan by Iraqi agents while waiting
for the U.S. Embassy to grant him an entry visa. Not a single high level defector
left the regime since the botched defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son in law,
to Jordan in 1995. This kept the information flow out of Iraq to a minimum increas-
ing the opacity of the WMD programs.
German Intelligence (the BND) has been the only major Western intelligence
service to provide assessments of the Iraqi WMD programs openly. Though flowed
in some minor details it provides a broad outline of the clandestine Iraqi activities
in the WMD and missiles areas. As a minimum it generated a large database on
Iraqi purchases from Germany and other countries that when put together with de-
fector and other information can present a credible assessment of the current and
future threats of the Iraqi programs. These may be summarized as follows:
(a) Iraq is well into CW production and may well be in the process of BW
production.
(b) With the more than 10 tons of uranium and more than one ton of slightly
enriched uranium in its possession Iraq has enough to generate the needed
bomb grade uranium for three nuclear weapons by 2005.
(c) Iraq is using corporations in India and other countries to import the need-
ed equipment for its programs, then channel them through countries like Ma-
laysia for shipment to Iraq. Germany already blacklisted some of these corpora-
tions for violating the sanctions imposed on Iraq.
(d) Iraq is importing directional control instruments for its missiles of much
higher precision than those needed for the allowed 150km missiles under UN
sanctions. Thus Iraq is gearing to extend the range of its missiles to easily
reach Israel.
(e) The type of equipment imported indicate that Iraq is in the process of cr
ating its own foundation for the production of needed materials thus avoiding
detection if these materials are on the watch list of the exporting countries. Fol-
lowing this logic Iraq is or will be able to produce its own growth media for the
biological weapons program and many of precursors for its CW program. The
same can be said for local uranium production from phosphates. This removes
many limitations on production and allows Iraq to accelerate its output.
Iraq realized that CBWs are more instruments of terror than they are of war. A
real deterrence is the nuclear weapon option. Realising that a few nuclear weapons
are not a serious deterrence because of the need for testing, it configured its pro-
gram to generate its own materials for the nuclear core. Thus the plan that was
set in 1982 targeted a 100 kg (220 lb) of bomb grade uranium a year. This is equiva-
lent to 6 implosion or two gun type bombs a year. With a worked out design for
the implosion option Iraq planned on being a major power in the region through its
nuclear arsenal. Thus under this program Iraq was not much interested in pur-
chasing the materials needed for the nuclear core through its extensive black mar-
ket network. However under threat the situation did change. After the invasion of
Kuwait Iraq embarked on a crash program to make one nuclear bomb using the
French supplied fuel at its disposal. This option, now declared by the Iraqi govern-
ment was dropped only after it was made clear that the uranium extraction capa-
bilities were not good enough to achieve enough materials for one bomb. Recent de-
fections indicate that Iraq is seeking actively all kinds of nuclear materials. It is
also active in seeking the needed components to accelerate its uranium enrichment
program.
With the a workable design and most of the needed components for a nuclear
weapon already tested and in working order, Iraq is in the final stages of putting
together its enrichment program to enrich enough uranium for the final component
needed in the nuclear core. Thus Iraq's nuclear achievement when it happens, to-
gether with its history of use of its available WMD will turn it into a serious threat
to U.S. interests in the region. Serious punishment (regime change) will be largely
discounted. Iraq's posturing, aggressiveness and harassment of unfriendly regimes
will increase considerably. The window of opportunity to abort this option before it
happen is closing down possibly within the next two to three years, after that a
change of regime will be a much costlier prospect.
The inspection regime in Iraq had a mixed history. The International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA), the UN body charged with ensuring that nuclear facilities are


22
not used for nuclear weapons production failed completely in its task with regards
to Iraq before the Gulf war. The IAEA remains basically a weak organization beset
by its international composition and the multiple loyalties of its workers. Within its
sphere it is quite successful in accounting for and keeping tab on the essential com-
ponents of the nuclear fuel cycle and its utilization over the globe. But it has limited
latitude with the states and works best in a cooperative and amiable environment.
Against determined states such as Iraq it is at a great disadvantage. Thus it failed
again after the Gulf war when it declared early that it took care of basically all of
Iraq's nuclear program. It took the defection of Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law to force
the Iraqi government to declare the actual scope of its nuclear weapons program
and forced the inspectors to start all over again in unraveling what has not been
declared before. Thus while it managed to dismantle a large part of the Iraqi nu-
clear program it was at a loss by the time the inspectors left in 1998 as to the
whereabouts of many of the important figures in the program. The new Iraqi policy
of giving up some of the equipment but keeping the working teams intact was be-
yond the inspectors mandate. There was nothing they could do to prevent the Iraqi
teams from rebuilding what was destroyed.
Iraq is actually quite open about its intents and goals. It refused to promulgate
laws that make it illegal for its citizens to work in the area of WMD as was required
by UN resolutions. It also refuses to accept the limitations imposed by sanctions de-
claring them to be illegal. Thus as stated by the former Iraqi ambassador to the
UN, Nizar Hamdoun, Iraq is not going to impose sanctions on itself. This is forced
on Iraq and as such the Iraqi government is not bound by its terms. Policing what
Iraq imports is a problem for the UN and not the Iraqi government.
If the inspectors go back now there is very little human intelligence that will help
them locate the new weapons sites. Spread widely among the government infra-
structure in smaller hard to detect units, the inspectors will have a hard time locat-
ing all the programs components. A recent defector with credible information as-
serted that all units are built with a backup. If one is detected or is in danger of
discovery all activity is immediately transferred to the back-up facility.
The new UNMOVIC inspection body does not have the support and free hand
UNSCOM enjoyed. With Russia and other states that favor removing sanctions
keeping the pressure, the onus is now on the inspectors to prove that Iraq is in vio-
lation. Not finding a smoking gun after a series of inspections is all that the Rus-
sians and the French need to declare—that the U.S. has no case and sanctions must
be lifted. The U.S. case will be considerably weakened and more voices will rise
against the U.S. Iraqi policy as baseless. This is a danger that must be carefully
examined before inspection terms are allowed back in possibly to divert an invasion.
The claim that the U.S. needs a smoking gun to prove that Iraq is in violation
of its commitments regarding WMD discounts all the past experience in dealing
with Iraq.
Many voices declared that Iraq was not pursuing nuclear weapons before the Gulf
war. This included the IAEA that declared Iraq clean in many statements. This hap-
pened even after the German publication Der Spiegel reported Iraq's successful at-
tempts to acquire classified uranium centrifuge enrichment technology from Ger-
many. However the U.S. knew better and used the Gulf war setting as a way to
dismantle Iraq's nuclear weapons program. But the dismantling process ignored the
knowledge base acquired over the years that can be used easily to rebuild what was
destroyed. A similar insistence on proof before taking serious action will be allowing
Saddam to achieve his goals unchallenged.
With no large easily distinguishable nuclear sites and little or no human intel-
ligence it is difficult to see how any measure short of a regime change will be effec-
tive. Saddam is totally indifferent to the human suffering of his people, and with
his threats of reprisals against the families of WMD workers has managed to stop
defections among its personnel despite the fact that a large number of Iraqis from
other walks of life managed to escape. With a Soviet style economy that is basically
geared toward war and its requirements, Iraq is currently the only Arab state that
all the Arab extremists look at as the future challenger to Israel and U.S. interests
in the region. Thus if Saddam makes it in the nuclear arena he will be the region's
undisputed leader in Arab eyes. It will then be much harder to agree on the needed
concessions for a peace process and a viable peace will be impossible to achieve
under any terms. Saddam has used and will continue to use the Palestinian issue
to rally the Arabs around him as he did when he used the Arab leaders meeting
in Baghdad to challenge the peace treaty of Egypt with Israel that President Sadat
agreed to.
Limiting Iraq's access to technology is bound to fail in the end. The U.S. cannot
police the transfer of technology in the age of the Internet and the widening of the
science base all over the globe. Perversely, limiting sales of high technology equip-


23
ment created financial difficulties for many high tech companies and scientists and
made them an easy target for countries like Iraq. Lawyer Michael Rietz who rep-
resented three of the main German exporters of technology and know-how to Iraq
tells a sobering tale. One of his clients, Karl Schaab sold the blue prints for the ura-
nium enrichment centrifuge to Iraq for a mere forty thousand dollars. He also pro-
vided more than a hundred classified reports in the deal. He provided 36 high tech
carbon fiber rotors for the centrifuges for a million dollars. Iraq's investment to buy
technology this way was much cheaper than developing it themselves. Dietrich
Hinze provided flow forming machinery to make missile shells and gave away half
ownership of his company to Iraq all for less than 20 million dollars. He also taught
the Iraqis how to use the equipment. Locally he was so much admired for bringing
business to his small town in Germany that he was honored with a statue in a main
location in town. All those represented by Rietz were more or less sentenced for time
served and released though they all pleaded guilty. Actually according to Rietz, one
of the men working for the German Federal Export Agency, Dr. Welzien, opened a
consulting business charging very high rates to German companies for advising
them on how to use loopholes in the German export laws to expedite making some
questionable exports, and it is legal. With Europe no longer in an accommodating
mood Iraq shifted its purchasing bases to India and Malaysia among others. Thus
technology transfer restrictions, which failed in the past to limit advances in the So-
viet Union's weapons programs are failing again in limiting access to weapons tech-
nology as was demonstrated by India, Pakistan and now Iraq and possibly Iran. An-
other failure for the policy of containment.
Iraq and terrorism
Saddam Hussein has a long history of involvement in international terrorism.
From assassinations of Iraqis abroad in the seventies and eighties, to support for
radical anti-western groups in the eighties and nineties, to links with Islamic fun-
damentalists today, his track record speaks for itself.
Always the opportunist, he has used the biannual Islamic Conferences held in
Baghdad since the 1980s as a recruiting ground for Islamic radicals from around
the Muslim world. A former Iraqi intelligence officer now in Europe has described
how he would dress as a cleric and approach Islamists from key countries to put
on the Iraqi payroll for “special operations.” He was tasked to recruit Pakistanis,
Indonesians and Malaysians while other officers concentrated on Palestinians and
Arabs.
We know from credible sources that Osama Bin Laden was a frequent visitor to
the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum when Bin Laden was a resident of the Sudanese
capital until 1996. It is no coincidence that Khartoum is one of the Iraqi Intelligence
Service's largest foreign stations.
It has also been confirmed that the Iraqi ambassador in Turkey, Farouk Hijazi,
traveled to Afghanistan and met Bin Laden in December 1998. It is revealing to
note that prior to being appointed ambassador in Ankara, Hijazi was head of foreign
operations for the Iraqi Intelligence Service. Incidentally, this same Hijazi, who was
hurriedly pulled out of Ankara on September 29, 2001, has recently resurfaced as
Iraq's ambassador in Tunisia.
There have been several confirmed sightings of Islamic fundamentalists from
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states being trained in terror tactics at the Iraqi
intelligence camp at Salman Pak, 20 miles south of Baghdad on the Tigris River,
Three former intelligence officers have reported that they were surprised to find
non-Iraqi fundamentalists undergoing training at the facility. The training involved
assassination, explosions, and hijacking. All three reported that there is a fuselage
of an old Tupolev 154 airliner used for hijack training. This was later confirmed by
satellite photographs.
Iraq's conventional military capability has been considerably degraded since the
Gulf war. Part of the drive to build larger WMD stockpiles is to make up for this
depletion in military capability. Iraq now has practically no airforce, a much de-
graded air defense system and practically no new tanks, heavy artillery or armored
vehicles. What is left functioning from the Gulf war arsenal is basically in the hands
of the Special Republican Guard and the rest of armed forces are basically armed
with light weaponry. With a highly corrupt officers corps the Iraqi army suffers
from a large number of absenteeism, poor or nonexistent medical care, pilfered ra-
tions and little or no pay to the conscripts. Pay and rations are usually split among
the officers and party members. It is estimated that Iraq has no more than a quar-
ter of the firepower it possessed at the onset of the Gulf war. With the original
Baath party members mostly murdered or in jail, Saddam's government now is
purely a personal dictatorship of Saddam and his clan. The original rhetoric of the
Baath party no longer carry any weight with the population. Thus the army that


24
surrendered to the American forces in droves in Gulf war is now in an even worse
shape and would regard an American invasion as a welcome liberation army. Amer-
ican inspectors and media personnel who visited Iraq were surprised by the friendli-
ness and lack of rancor of the population toward Americans. This is in contrast to
the image of the Americans as evildoers that Saddam was trying to project in all
his speeches.
Iraq's WMD are under the control of the Special Security Organization (SSO).
This is the same group that is charged with Saddam's security. This feared and
ruthless organization is mainly composed of conscripts from Saddam's hometown
and very loyal tribes in adjacent areas. They have an observer in all major military
meetings and they are present at the headquarters of all division commanders and
they report directly to Saddam's younger son Qussey. Any operation to disrupt the
central authority of the Iraqi command structure and especially the handling and
deployment of weapons of mass destruction must target this organization. Precision
bombing and strict enforcement of a no drive zones should eliminate most of if not
all the dangers of Saddam possibly using his CBW. Past defections from this pam-
pered group indicate that it is not as tightly controlled as was earlier thought and
defection rate may increase considerably when faced with an imminent invasion.
Iraq is now at one of the lowest points in its history. Saddam managed to destroy
its middle class and its hope in a viable future. Millions of Iraqis are believed to
have left the country since the Gulf war taking with them most of its professional
class. With no future to look forward to Iraqis will welcome an American invasion
with open arms. With a long history in government and a large bureaucracy it will
not revert to the situation in Afghanistan now. The Kurds promised to rejoin the
rest of Iraq under a coalition government. And above all if a democracy is estab-
lished and nurtured in Iraq it will be a turning point in the region's history.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, doctor.
Professor Cordesman.
STATEMENT OF PROF. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, SENIOR FEL-
LOW AND ARLEIGH A. BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASH-
INGTON, DC
Professor CORDESMAN. Thank you, Senator.
Let me begin with a caveat. It is very easy to be arrogant about
trying to predict a war that no one has ever fought in the face of
the kind of information you can obtain from unclassified sources.
And I think it is very dangerous to make quick sweeping gen-
eralizations about the military capabilities of Iraq. As a result, I
would like to enter into the record a net assessment of Iraq's capa-
bilities—those of the United States and the other forces in the re-
gion—and call the committee's attention to that statement as some-
thing to look at as a reference as your hearings proceed. 1
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your statement will be placed
in the record.
Professor CORDESMAN. I would like to begin with one point that
I think needs to be made very clearly. Iraq might be a far easier
opponent than its force strengths indicate, but it also is potentially
a very serious military opponent, indeed. And, to be perfectly blunt,
I think only fools would bet the lives of other men's sons and
daughters on their own arrogance and call this force a “cakewalk”
or a “speed bump” or a war whose risks you can easily dismiss.
I see every reason for the reservation of the American military
and the Joint Chiefs, and I think efforts to dismiss the military ca-
pabilities of Iraq are dangerous and irresponsible. These forces do
have serious defects, but Iraq is still the most effective military
1 The report can be accessed at the Web site of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies: http://www.csis.org


25
power in the gulf. It still has active forces of over 400,000 men. It
still has an inventory of over 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other
armored vehicles, 2,400 major artillery weapons. It still has over
300 combat aircraft in its inventory, although perhaps less than
half of these are truly operational. And it certainly still has some
chemical and biological weapons.
This is not a force that can be dismissed. It has, out of its 23 di-
visions, a core of perhaps six Revolutionary Guard divisions and six
regular-army heavy divisions, plus some significant special forces
which have a long record of combat capability and which I believe
U.S. experts indicate have reasonable levels of manning and readi-
ness.
Having said that, I should note that while Iraq has a total of at
least 23 division equivalents, probably half of these have only lim-
ited effectiveness manning levels as divisions of under 8,000 men.
In the regular army, most of its units probably have manning lev-
els of 70 percent or less. And, we saw during the gulf war that in-
fantry units and other elements that were dependent on Shi'ite,
Kurdish, and Turkoman conscripts or low-quality reservists did not
fight well or with great competence.
It is a fact that Iraq has had no major new arms deliveries in
a decade. It does, however, still have 700 relatively modern T-72
tanks, 900 BMP series armored infantry fighting vehicles, and sig-
nificant numbers of self-propelled artillery weapons and multiple
rocket launchers. It has a significant number of modern anti-tank
guided weapons, and it can still operate a significant number of at-
tack helicopters and a large number of utility helicopters.
At least in urban warfare, the fact that there are nearly 120,000
other men in the security, border, and other paramilitary forces
has to be taken into careful account. And the Special Republican
Guard units and some Republican Guard units themselves, plus
Saddam's bodyguards, are trained for urban warfare.
The Iraqi air force is certainly a weak link. Out of the 300-odd
combat aircraft, they can often fly very intensive sortie raids, but
there are no signs of meaningful training for air combat or air-to-
ground combat of or organized use of air forces in effective ways.
The air force performed badly during the Iran Iraq war. It per-
formed only minimally during the gulf war.
It is also an air force without modern intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance assets without modern electronic warfare capa-
bilities as airborne assets. It is not an air force which perhaps can
do more than fly limited penetration raids, and those would only
be meaningful if it used weapons of mass destruction.
I would be more careful about Iraq's surface-based air defenses.
It has no modern surface-to-air missiles, nothing like the S-300 or
S-400 series. Its basic force structure is dependent on SA-2s, SA-
3s, and SA-6s, which date back in design to the 1960's. But it has
one of the most dense air-defense networks around its urban areas
and populated areas in the world, much more dense than any
around Hanoi at the time of the Vietnam war.
Iraq has made real progress in many areas of its command and
control. It has deep buried shelters, an excellent survivable commu-
nication system. It has learned to adapt to things like anti-radi-
ation missiles. It uses tactics like pop-up and remotely linked radar


26
activity, decoys, ambushes, deployments in civilian areas, and it
was sufficiently effective to have advised Serbia at length during
the fighting in Kosovo. And I think anyone in the U.Š. military
would say it had considerable success. It is a reality that this sys-
tem can probably be suppressed, but will survive, and we have
learned that to our cost since Desert Storm.
While sanctions have cutoff arms imports, Iraq maintains a very
significant import network which it uses for the weapons of mass
destruction, as has been described by Ambassador Butler and Dr.
Hamza. The only really disturbing aspect of this that has been
made public is an increasing flow of weapons out of Eastern and
Central Europe through Syria. This flow is known to have included
engines for MiG aircraft, new tank engines, and equipment for the
land-based air defenses, plus spare parts. At this time, however, I
suspect that it has had only limited impact on the overall readiness
of Iraqi forces.
The thing that would bother me most is not whether we can win,
but whether we are honest about the intangibles in this war in
Iraqis' military capabilities. And let me just mention a few of those
very quickly. It is easy to talk about the unpopularity of the regime
and to assert that units are not reliable. People did that through-
out the Iran-Iraq war, and they were wrong virtually every time.
We did not see mass defections in the gulf war until Iraq forces
came, under intense pressure. The Republican Guard units and the
heavy divisions retreated in good order.
We talk about tyranny and repression, violence is part of this re-
gime, but so are incentives and bribery. It is impossible to know
who will take these bribes and incentives seriously. Saddam has
been in power during the entire life of some 80 percent of the Iraqi
people. To say that he has had no impact, that he does not have
loyalty, that there are factions that will not follow him, is reckless
and dangerous. Uprisings can be meaningful in some areas. But
uprisings are very unlikely in the
in the core
areas of Saddam's
strengths—Baghdad, Tikrit, and the cities in the center—and
urban warfare is a dangerous and uncertain structure.
We do not know whether he has reduced the rigidities of his com-
mand. It seems very doubtful, and that does mean that the possi-
bility of striking at the core of his power and ignoring the flanks
is a possibility.
I should also note, when I talk about urban warfare, that it is
one thing to train for urban warfare with the kind of training the
Iraqis get, and quite another to actually fight it. They did not do
well during the Iran-Iraq war in this area. At the same time, their
ability to use decoys, human shields, to use civilian buildings as
cover, is a well-proven capability. And our precision air power did
not, even in Afghanistan, demonstrate the ability to strike with
such precision that you will not inflict significant civilian casualties
and collateral damage.
Iraq's combat engineering is good. I leave it to other witnesses
to comment on the quality of our bridging and water-barrier cross-
ing capabilities. But one uncertainty here is whether it could use
its helicopter mobility at all, and we have great helicopter mobility.
The problem is not whether we can suppress their air defenses, but


27
how long it will take and what cost. And certainly over Baghdad,
without stealth, we could face serious limits.
We do not really know how cohesive their maneuver capability
can be in the face of our air power. And the ability to bring units
together and concentrate in one area to deal with limited U.S. at-
tacks could be critical.
People talk about their capability to execute asymmetric warfare
and their support of terrorism. I think this is an area where the
committee should pay very careful attention to the American intel-
ligence community and put little faith in outside reports.
Other witnesses have commented on weapons of mass destruc-
tion. I want to make a caveat here, and I want to go back to my
own experience as the one-time manager of DARPA's program on
chemical, biological, and theater nuclear weapons. Very often, we
confuse the ability to proliferate with war-fighting effects. In the
case of the nuclear weapons, those effects are fairly well known. In
the case of chemical and biological weapons, this is not known.
Very minor issues in engineering and in the method of delivery can
affect the lethality of chemical and biological weapons by two or-
ders of magnitude or more. That is a hundred times. And you can
go, as was the case from anthrax with zero effect, to anthrax at-
tacks with near nuclear effects, depending on how the agent is pre-
sented, deployed, the quality of the manufacture. It is very unlikely
that we will know the answer to those issues until a war takes
place. It is a certainty that Iraq lacks the sophistication to conduct
training and testing and know the lethality of its own weapons in
these areas before it uses them, an uncertainty we need to remem-
ber very carefully.
Let me just say, in conclusion, that I do not regard Iraq's mili-
tary strength as a massive force that can make use of most of its
assets, but I think it is incredibly dangerous to be dismissive. It is
very easy to send people home unused and alive. It is costly to send
them home in body bags because we did not have sufficient force
when we engaged. And to be careless about this war, to me, would
be a disaster.
I am reminded of a quote about 2,000 years old by Pliny the
Elder, “Small boys throw stones at frogs in jest, but the frogs do
not die in jest; the frogs die in earnest.” This is not a game, and
it is not something to be decided from an armchair.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Professor Cordesman follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, SENIOR FELLOW AND
ARLEIGH A. BURKE CHAIR FOR STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTER-
NATIONAL STUDIES
Any effort to provide an assessment of Iraq's military capabilities involves a wide
range of challenges. The uncertainties and “intangibles” affecting any assessment of
Iraq's military capabilities—and any war that has not yet been fought-are at least
as important as the hard data on its force strength and order of battle.
There is reason for modesty in any form of military analysis, and above all in
speculating about future wars. The proper rules for such analysis were laid out over
two millennia ago by Thucydides in writing his “History of the Peloponnesian War,”
(c. 420 BC): “...I did not even trust my own impressions, but it rests partly on
what I saw myself, partly on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the report
being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible.” These are tests
no one can meet in talking about Iraqi ability to fight a war that has not happened.


28
I have been asked today to talk about Iraq military capabilities, but this is in
some ways of very limited value unless the discussion focuses on capabilities in a
given contingency. As a result, I would like to submit a detailed report for the
record that provides a fully net assessment of the possible wars that can take place,
and how Iraq might fare against given threats and opposition forces.
I would also note that in some ways we are already at war. Iraq has been involved
in a political struggle against the U.S. and its neighbors ever since the ceasefire in
the Gulf War that is an extension of war by other means. The course of this “war
of sanctions” can sharply alter its military capabilities over time. While current at-
tention focuses on U.S. military efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime, Iraq
may become involved in a wide range of conflicts, many of which may take on a
number of different forms and become asymmetric in character. Iraq's continuing ef-
forts to develop weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery systems com-
pound both the uncertainties in assessing its military capabilities, and the uncer-
tainties as to how it would behave in given contingencies.
Nevertheless, a great deal is known about Iraq military capabilities and probable
behavior, as well as about the military capabilities and behavior of its potential en-
emies. The list of potential contingencies is limited and there are often severe con-
straints on the options available to Iraq and its opponents. As a result, it is possible
to make educated “guesstimates” as to Iraq's capabilities relative to most key sce-
narios, and about the strengths and weaknesses of its position in most contin-
gencies.
IRAQ’S CURRENT MILITARY FORCES
It is relatively easy to estimate the total size of Iraqi military forces, and to com-
ment in broad terms on their capabilities. Although Iraq's forces have many serious
defects, Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf, despite the Gulf
War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle. Iraq still
has armed forces with around 424,000 men, and an inventory of some 2,200 main
battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons. It
also has over 300 combat aircraft with potential operational status.1 As weak as
many aspects of Iraq's forces may be it is a major military power by regional stand-
ards and has at least some chemical and biological weapons. Iraq must be taken
seriously both in regional terms and in any military effort to overthrow the regime
of Saddam Hussein.
The International Institute of Stategic Studies estimates that the Iraqi army still
can deploy some 375,000 men, organized into seven corps, with two Republican
Guard corps and five regular army corps. These forces include six Republican Guard
divisions (3 armored, 1 mechanized, and 2 infantry) plus four Special Republican
Guard brigades. The regular army has some 16 divisions, and while 11 are rel-
atively low-grade infantry divisions, 3 are armored divisions and 3 are mechanized
divisions. The regular army also has five commando and two special forces brigades.
While these units lack modern training and the regular army units are heavily
dependent on conscripts, over one third are full time regulars or long-service reserv-
ists, U.S. experts estimate that Iraqi divisions differ significantly by unit, but have
an average authorized strength of about 10,000 men, and that about half of the 23
Iraqi divisions have manning levels of around 8,000 men, and “a fair state of readi-
ness,” Although at least half of the regular army has manning levels of about 70%
of authorized strength or lower, and some infantry units have very poor manning
levels, and are heavily dependant on Shi’ite, Kurdish and Turkoman conscripts.
Republican Guard Divisions have an average authorized strength of around 8,000
to 10,000 men, and seem to average at least 80% of authorized strength. Brigades
average around 2,500 men—the size of a large U.S. battalion.2 Both sets of esti-
mates give Iraq a total force, today, of approximately 20-23 division-equivalents,
versus 35-40 division-equivalents in the summer of 1990, and 67-70 division-equiva-
lents in January 1991-just before the Coalition offensives began in the Gulf War.3
Iraqi manning levels are, however, uncertain. There are many reports of badly
undermanned units, but Iraq has also carried out a number of reserve call ups in
2002.4
The Iraqi Army relies on large numbers of combat-worn and obsolescent weapons,
but it does have some 700 relatively modem T-72 tanks, 900 BMP-series armored
infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs), 150 self-propelled artillery weapons, and 200
multiple rocket launchers. It has extensive stocks of AT-3, AT-4, Milan, and High-
subsonic Optically Teleguided (HOT) antitank guided weapons, and roughly 100 at-
tack and 275 utility/transport helicopters. The mobile elements of Iraq's 17,000 man
Air Defense Command can deploy large numbers of manportable surface-to-air mis-
siles, plus SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, and Roland vehicle mounted surface-to-air missiles.


29
Iraqi logistics are weak, subjecgt to political controls to prevent coup attempts, and
limited by sanctions that have prevented most arms imports for over a decade. Iraqi
combat engineering and bridging however, is good.
Iraq also has extensive internal security and paramilitary forces. The entire police
and law enforcement system performs internal security functions, and there are par-
allel internal security services with units in virtually every town and city. The Re-
publican Guard and Special Republican Guard units are specially trained for urban
warfare and security operations, as well as conventional military operations, and
there are three paramilitary forces. The security troops have some 15,000 men, the
border guards around 9,000, and Saddam's Fedayeen consist of 18,000 to 20,000
men.
The Iraqi Air Force has around 30,000 men. It still has some 316 combat aircraft,
although only about 50-60% are servicable. Senior pilots still fly 60-120 hours a year
depending on the aircraft, but junior pilots fly as few as 20.
The IIŠS estimates that the air force has 6 obsolete H-6D and Tu-22 bombers,
and 130 attack aircraft. These include Mirage F-1EQs, Su-20s, 40 Su-22s, 2 Su-24s,
and 2 Su-25s. Iraq still has extensive stocks of short-range air-to-ground missiles
and cluster bombs. It also has 180 air defense fighters, including 12 MiG-25s, 50
Mirage F-1EQs, and 10 MiG-29s, plus 5 MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft. Addition-
ally, the air force has extensive stocks of MiG-21s, training aircraft, and drones, and
has experimented with using them as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and un-
manned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). It stlll has 2 IL-76 tankers and large num-
bers of transport aircraft.
Jane's provides a different estimate with the following key combat types; the num-
ber estimated to be in service are shown in parenthesis: 40(0) F-7, 30 (13) Mirage
F-1EQ, 36 (15-25) MiG-21, 35 (15-20) MiG23, 6 (3-6) MiG-25, 17 (1) MiG-29, 33 (15-
18) Su-20/22, 21 (6-11) Su-25, 2 T-22, and 3 Tu-16.5
Air Force air-to-air and air-to-ground training is limited and unrealistic. In the
past, command and control has been over-centralized and mission planning has
often set impossible goals. The two No Fly zones have further limited air training
and comat experience. There are no modern airborne sensor, command and control,
or intelligence capabilities, other than a small number of UAVs. Air control and
warning is still heavily dependent on outdated ground-based intercept capabilities.
The Air Force has, however, practiced penetration raids by single low-flying aircraft,
and has shown that it can conduct independent offensive operations at the small
formation level.
The heavy surface-to-air missile forces of the Air Defense Command are still orga-
nized into one of the most dense defensive networks in the world. There are four
regional air defense centers at Kirkuk (north), Kut al Hayy (east), Al Basra (south),
and Ramadia (west). Major command facilities are underground and hardened. Ad-
ditionally, there is a network of redundant radars and optical fibre command links.
Reports differ over the extent to which China has helped Iraq create a modern and
highly survivable optical fibre command net. There are unconfirmed reports of more
modern radars being smuggled in from the Ukraine.
The system is backed by extensive low-altitude anti-aircraft (AA) guns, and SA-
8b, SA-11, and SA-13 short and medium range missiles. The Sterla 2 and 10 (SA-
7 and SA-10) are used for terminal defense of key buildings. Iraq has learned to
rapidly move its fire units and sensors, use urban cover and decoys, use “pop-on
radar guidance techniques, and optical tracking. Its mix of SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-
6s is badly outdated, but some modifications have been made.
Iraq has learned a great deal about land-based air defense operations from the
Gulf War and more than ten years of operations against the U.S. and British air-
craft enforcing the “No Fly Zones.” Iraq provided significant aid to Serbia in air de-
fense tactics during the fighting in Kosovo, and helped Serbia make effective use
of decoys, “pop-on” and remotely linked radar activity, various ambush tactics, and
the use of deployments in civilian areas to limit NATO will ingross.
Iraq is certain to have developed contingency plans to move and disperse its land-
based air defenses in the event of a major
U.S.-led attempt to overthrow the regime,
and to try to concentrate such defenses to protect the regime and try to use them
to partially compensate for the lack of an effective Iraqi Air Force.
To strike, Iraq has developed some countermeasures to U.S. anti-radiation mis-
siles since the Gulf War, and has recently begun to get significant equipment
through Syria.
The 2,000 man Iraqi Navy has never been an effective force and was devastated
during the Gulf War. It now has only 6 obsolete Osa and Bogomol guided missile
patrol craft, and three obsolete Soviet inshore minesweepers. Iraq does, however, re-
tain all of the shore-based Silkworm and other anti-ship missiles it had at the time
of the Gulf War, and extensive stocks of mines—some of them relatively modern and
81-697 D-2


30
sophisticated. (The U.S. never succeeded in targeting land-based Iraqi anti-ship mis-
siles during the Gulf War, and the U.S. and British Navies entered Iraqi mine fields
without detecting their presence.)
It is difficult to generalize about Iraqi forces where each land and air unit has
such different levels of effectiveness and where political and internal security con-
siderations are so important however, Iraq has demonstrated that it can still carry
out significant ground force exercises and fly relatively high sortie rates. It has not,
however, demonstrated training patterns that show its army has consistent levels
of training, can make effective use of combined arms above the level of some indi-
vidual brigades, or has much capability for joint land-air operations. It also has not
demonstrated that it can use surface-to-air missiles in a well-organized way as a
maneuvering force to cover its deployed land forces.
Sanctions and the impact of the Gulf War have also had a major impact on Iraqi
war fighting capabilities. Iraq has not been able to fund and/or import any major
new conventional warfare technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War, or to
produce any major equipment—with the possible exception of limited numbers of
Magic "dogfight air-to-air missiles. Iraq's inability to recapitalize and modernize its
forces means that much of its large order of battle is now obsolescent or obsolete,
has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat. It also
raises serious questions about the ability of its forces to conduct long-range move-
ments or maneuvers, and then sustain coherent operations.
Iraq has, however, maintained much of the clandestine arms purchasing network
that it set up during the time of the Iran Iraq War. It has prior experience in buy-
ing from some 500 companies in 43 countries, and has set up approximately 150
small purchasing companies or agents. Intelligence experts feel that Iraq also has
an extensive network of intelligence agents and middlemen involved in arms pur-
chases. Iraq has probably obtained some air defense equipment from countries like
the Ukraine and China, and may have been able to smuggle in some spare parts
through Syria, Turkey, and Jordan.
Deliveries through Syria have become significant since mid-2001, and include
parts and weapons assemblies for MiG and Shukoi aircraft, armor, and land-based
air defenses. Nevertheless, Iraq has not been able to restructure its overall force re-
structure to compensate for its prior dependence on an average of $3 billion a year
in arms deliveries. It has not visibly deployed any major new weapon system since
1991, or been able to recapitalize any aspect of its force structure.
KEY PROBLEMS IN ASSESSMENT
Wars and battles are rarely decided by "tangible” factors, like manpower and
equipment numbers, quantifiable aspects of sustainability, or other measures of ef-
fectiveness. One historical case after another, shows the real world outcome of war
has been determined by “intangibles," where various experts differ sharply over the
relative capability of each side. Today some experts find it very easy to assert that
Iraq's major combat units will fight with loyalty and determination because of their
privileges, dependence on the regime, and nationalism. Others find it equally easy
to assert that Iraqi forces they will rapidly collapse or defect because the regime
is an unpopular tyranny.
In practice, Iraq's performance in past wars has shown that many aspects of its
military behavior cannot be predicted until a war starts, and that these uncertain-
ties interact with the uncertainties affecting any predictions about the military per-
formance of Iraq's opponents. The following “intangibles” and uncertainties regard-
ing Iraqi warfighting capability affect any dynamic net assessment of Iraq:
• Real world popularity and unpopularity of the regime among the various ele-
ments of the armed forces and in areas of military operations. Loyalty may vary
across different force elements, such as Republican Guard, Special Republican
Guard, regular army with regular manning, and regular army with largely con-
script manning.
• Real-world impact of repression and tyranny versus incentives, nationalism,
and propaganda in determining popular support for the regime or active opposi-
tion. The impact of issues like ethnic divisions, UN sanctions and the oil for
food program, and backlash from the Second Intifada.
Willingness of various Kurdish factions to participate in a conflict or ride one
out; loyalty of various Shi’ite elements versus uprisings and resistance.
• Efficacy of the regime's bribes and incentives in buying loyalty.
• Impact by combat element of more than 10 years without open access to world
arms market, along with limited discretionary funding for force maintenance
and modernization; and limited ability to smuggle in parts, weapons, and muni-
tions.


31
• Uncertain sustainability of current stock of munitions and spare parts.
• Quality of training, and leadership experience by unit and force element.
• Reliance on a rigid logistic system, emphasizing “flood forward” techniques to
make up for a lack of response to the needs of commanders and the tactical sit-
uation, by moving supplies forward in large amounts, regardless of the imme-
diate need.
• Progress in reducing the past rigidities and over-centralization of the command
system, and its failure to allow for independence of action.
• Real-world ability to execute urban warfare and military operations in built up
areas; also, the ability to shelter in populated areas, and use human shields,
without popular uprisings or action. Impact of ethnic divisions, tribal loyalties,
etc. in given areas.
• Level of improvement in air operations and in ability to conduct effective air-
to-air and air-to-ground combat using dispersed forces capable of independent
operations.
• Efficiency of dispersal techniques and human shields, plus decoys and decep-
tion, in limiting the efficacy of U.S. intelligence and strategic reconnaissance
(ISR), targeting, and air strike capabilities.
• Ability to make effective use of water barriers and earth barriers; ability to tie
combat engineering to real world military tactics in the face of U.S. airpower
and helicopter mobility.
• Ability to effectively deploy and concentrate air defense assets for tactical pur-
poses, versus exploit largely fixed SA-2/ SA-3, and SA-6 system.
• Short and medium-term wartime survivability of heavy surface-to-air missile
defenses.
• Current status of joint warfare and combined arms expertise, and improvement
in such expertise, if any.
• Cohesive maneuvering capability and ability to use helicopters to overcome
water barriers and to reinforce.
• Since 1991, improvements in artillery tactics and methods to acquire long-range
targeting capabilities and manage and switch fires.
• Planning and real-world capability to execute asymmetric warfare, covert war-
fare, and use terrorist proxies.
• Effectiveness of the security and paramilitary forces in the face of any serious
popular opposition.
• Size and effectiveness of Iraqi opposition forces, if any.
• Size and effectiveness of current holdings of chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and missiles, and other delivery systems. Possible
possession of a biological or nuclear weapon so lethal that it could inflict mas-
sive damage or casualties and make a major change in the level of deterrence
or war fighting capability.
• Existence of preplanned launch on warning (LOW), launch under attack (LUA),
and retaliatory strike capability to deliver CBRN forces; deployment of covert
and terrorist proxy capabilities.
It is easy to guess at-or to assert—some judgment about Iraqi capability in any
of the above areas. It is certainly true that little about Iraqi military behavior since
1991 implies that Iraq will suddenly achieve dramatic degrees of surprise and inno-
vation in military operations, however this can scarcely be ruled out, and the key
issue in war fighting is often one of marginal or relative efficiency.
In a contingency, like a U.S.-led invasion to overthrow Saddam, Iraq may have
enough war fighting capability to require a very significant U.S. and allied response.
In many other contingencies, the weaknesses in Iraqi forces may not be critical rel-
ative to similar or different weaknesses in Iranian and other Gulf forces.
IRAQ AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Iraq has a much more serious history of exploiting proliferation than Iran. It has
seen proliferation as a counter to conventional superiority since the late 1960s. It
sought weapons of mass destruction long before the Gulf War showed it what the
"revolution in military affairs” and U.S. conventional superiority could accomplish.
Since 1991, Iraq has been unable to obtain significant imports of conventional weap-
ons, and it is incapable of producing its own. As a result, it is scarcely surprising
that Iraq sees proliferation as its key potential method of countering the U.S. ad-
vantage in conventional forces and has been willing to pursue such options in the
face of massive economic costs, UNSCOM and IAEA efforts to destroy its remaining
capabilities, and the extension of UN sanctions.


32
Iraq continues to work on its Samoud ballistic missile system and other similar
systems that supposedly have a range of less than 150 kilometers—although none
of these systems are believed to be deployed, and lack the range for effective strikes
on most foreign cities and facilities. Iraq likely has at least 12-25 surviving Scud
missile assemblies, however, and could have in excess of 40.
UNSCOM inspectors note that UNSCOM's claims to have identified 817 out of
819 Scud imports are extremely soft and may well have an error of 60 weapons,
and that no accurate count exists of Iraqi produced components. This could give Iraq
a range of 20-80 operational Scuds and Iraq has shown in the past that it can
produce its own TEL launchers. Iraq also continues development work on shorter
range missiles since missiles with ranges of 150-kilometers or less are permitted
under the terms of the ceasefire.6 UNSCOM made it clear in all of its reports, up
through the final expulsion of its inspectors from Iraq, that Iraq was concealing the
nature of its chemical and biological weapons effort and had systematically lied in
every major disclosure report it had submitted to UNSCOM from the start to the
end of the inspection effort.
In spite of the Gulf War, and nearly eight years of UNSCOM efforts before Iraq
forced an end to the UN inspection effort, Iraq still presents a major threat in terms
of proliferation. It is all too clear that Iraq may have increased this threat since ac-
tive UNSCOM and IAEA efforts ended in December 1998. It is known to have con-
tinued to import precursors for chemical weapons and may have increased its hold-
ings of biological growth agents. No one can dismiss the risk that Iraq does have
weapons with very high real-world lethalities.
Much depends on how well Iraq has organized its CBRN forces and weaponized
its chemical and biological agents. Virtually nothing is known in the unclassified lit-
erature about the Iraqi process since 1991 in this latter area, which can affect the
real-world lethality of chemical and biological warheads, bombs, munitions, and
sprayers by up to two orders of magnitude.
Iraq developed effective 155-mm artillery and 122-mm multiple rocket rounds for
the delivery of chemical weapons during the Iran Iraq War and could probably mod-
ify such technology to deliver biological weapons. The effective use of chemical weap-
ons armed with artillery and multiple rocket rounds against large enemy ground
forces does, however, require an extensive inventory of munitions, however, even in
using VX-gas. It is unclear that Iraq could conceal the production, deployment, and
training for an operation of this scale. The delivery of biological agents using such
weapons would present two critical problems: The effects would probably only de-
velop after the battle was over and there would be a serious risk of secondary effects
if the agent blew back over Iraqi troops and civilian areas. The use of such attacks
cannot be ruled out, however, particularly as a last extreme, and the troops firing
such weapons would not have to be informed of such risks.
Iraq has had cluster bomb technology since the Iran Iraq War, and has long had
the theoretical engineering capability to use non-explosive release mechanisms like
air bags to release chemical and biological munitions. Before the Gulf War, Iraq de-
veloped crude parachute release designs for its missile warheads, systems which
would be substantially more effective than the primitive contact fuse warheads and
bombs it had at the time of the war, and which might well have produced negligible
weapons effects if they had ever been used.
Iraq must realize that the crude contact fusing, and chemical/biological warhead/
bomb designs, it had at the time of the Gulf War drastically limited the effective-
ness of its CBRN weapons. Iraq has had strong incentives to correct these problems
for over a decade, and the development of parachute release weapons is only mod-
erately challenging. Iraq has also had a decade to adapt non-destructive dissemina-
tion technology like airbags. Nevertheless, experts are deeply divided over Iraq's
systems integration and engineering skill and the probability that Iraq has devel-
oped lethal missile warheads.
There is broad agreement among experts that Iraq has probably developed effec-
tive sprayer and line source-delivery technology since the Gulf War. This is the most
lethal way to deliver chemical and biological weapons, and is far more effective than
using even advanced missile warheads. Iraq also experimented at the time of the
Gulf War with using aircraft like the Czech L-29 trainer as a remotely piloted drone
to carry out such deliveries at long ranges, and U.S. forces were deeply concerned
that Iraq might be using its UAVs for such missions early in the Gulf War. The
use of fighters, helicopters, and drones for such missions requires relatively large
aircraft, and they would be vulnerable to air defenses. It is at least possible, how-
ever, that Iraq could use its best strike aircraft to fly a one-way mission and succeed
in penetrating deep into Southern Gulf, Turkish, and Kurdish territory or the rear
area of U.S.-led coalition ground forces. It is also possible that Iraq might be able
to use a drone, UAV, or modified fighter, GPS, and earth-hugging flight profiles to


33
create the equivalent of cruise missiles for such missions with sufficient accuracy
and reliability to attack city sized targets at long ranges.
Similar critical uncertainties exist in other areas of Iraqi CBRN warfighting. Sev-
eral UNSCOM inspectors believe that Iraq lied about its ability to produce a stable
form of persistent VX nerve gas during the time Iraq was still under inspection, just
as it had lied earlier about weaponizing of VX. Iraq's mustard gas inventory proved
to be highly stable during the period of inspection, and it seems likely that Iraq now
has both stable non-persistent and persistent nerve gas. Iraq is known to have con-
tinued
to smuggle in precursor chemicals during the inspection period and since
1998. Persistent VX would probably be at least 10 times more lethal than anything
Iraq used in the Iran Iraq War or against its Kurds.
Iraq has experimented with the conversion of biological agents into dry, coated
micropowders that can be lethal to two orders of magnitude or more versus slurries
of wet agents. At least in the case of the most lethal, advanced weaponized forms
of dry-storable Anthrax-such biological weapons can achieve the lethality of simple
nuclear fission weapons. They can have far more immunity to heat and sunlight,
disseminate without clumping, and are extremely lethal when inhaled. They can be
non-explosively disseminated with air bag technology, and are far better suited to
use in bombs, missile warheads, and covert attacks.
Similarly, little is known about
any Iraqi advances in sprayer and line-source delivery technology, and in tailoring
CB agents to make them more effective in such delivery profiles. Contrary to some
literature, truly effective line source and sprayer delivery is a complex engineering
problem involving both the agent and delivery system.
The greatest single unknown, in terms of Iraqi capability to use biological agents,
consists of infectious agents like Smallpox and Plague. Iraq was one of the last
countries to have a natural outbreak of smallpox and may well have the culture.
Smallpox is easy to reproduce in a small facility and is infectious enough so agents
willing to commit suicide or individuals who are unwittingly exposed could create
serious corridors of infection. The long period between exposure and symptoms de-
prives such agents of immediate impact in war fighting scenarios, but they could
be used in port, airbase, or rear areas during the staging of enemy forces with lim-
ited risk because Iraq's borders would be sealed. Infiltrating the agent into Turkey,
Southern Gulf states, Israel, or the U.S. and U.K. would be an option; as is sending
in exposed unwitting or deliberately infected individuals. No meaningful capability
now exists to screen for the agent or exposed individuals, and agents carrying
Smallpox agent could be immunized, as could those infecting unwitting subjects.
IAEA and U.S. intelligence experts privately put little or no faith in the claims
of various Iraqi defectors that Iraq retains the ability to make fissile material, has
extensive covert fissile material production facilities, and has workable bomb de-
signs small enough to be used in missile warheads. IAEA experts note that the Iraqi
diffusion effort was never effective, that the Calutron designs fell far short of meet-
ing specification, and that Iraq's centrifuge designs proved to be far less effective
during laboratory review than they initially estimated, and that Iraq does not seem
to have understood the technical problems in using centrifuges to enrich fissile ma-
terial beyond 90%. They note that cascades of centrifuges are relatively easy to con-
ceal in multistory buildings, but that Iraq is extremely dependent on imports to cre-
ate such a facility and would probably need outside technical support.
Iraq did, however, have at least two workable fissile weapon implosion designs
that could be used in large bombs at the time of the Gulf War, had solved the tech-
nical problems in making and triggering high explosive lenses for nuclear weapons,
and had workable neutron initiators. If it could obtain fissile material, it could prob-
ably make a large explosive device relatively quickly, but not fit one to a missile
warhead or build a bomb that any of its aircraft other than its bombers and MiG-
24s could deliver at long distances, particularly in low-altitude penetration missions.
Iraq might be much more successful in arming any actual nuclear weapon it could
obtain, particularly because of the relatively crude PAL systems fitted to many FSU
weapons, and the duplicative code sequences used to arm them.
Iraq has shown both that it can disperse and conceal and that it is willing to take
serious risks in doing so in spite of the centralized nature of the regime. During
the Gulf War, Iraq was willing to place large numbers of chemical weapons under
the control of its regular Army forces, although biological weapons and missiles
were placed under the control of special units of the Republican Guard which seem
to have had a significant element of Iraqi security forces. Iraq also showed during
the Gulf War that it could disseminate chemical weapons (and possibly biological
weapons) over a wide area without detection by Coalition forces. Coalition intel-
ligence and targeting of such weapons stocks was a near total failure through the
end of the war, and advancing forces sometimes had to be warned of the existence
of stockpiles of chemical weapons by surrendering Iraqi officers. Iraq mixed chem-


34
ical and conventional munitions stockpiles without special security precautions and
even dispersed unguarded weapons at unused airstrips for possible arming in a last-
ditch emergency.
A number of experts believe Iraq could disperse most of its covert biological pro-
duction on warning or under attack. Iraq is known to have mobile laboratories and
storage equipment and to have developed advanced techniques for rapid equipment
and material movement during the time of UN inspection. It is not known whether
Iraq has developed special survivable communications for such dispersal efforts, or
exactly who would control such units and how loyal they would be under extreme
conditions particularly knowing the probable level of reprisals both in terms of the
level of attacks on Iraq and future treatment of war criminals. Regimes like Iraq's
do, however, have a long history of successfully indoctrinating and lying to carefully
selected “loyalist” units. Such units can now also make use of GPS rather than
presurveyed sites, and may well be able to make use of GPS for preplanned tar-
geting or to change targeting in the field. This could increase the dispersal area and
the effectiveness with which an Iraqi force would be able to target cities and fixed
facilities at long ranges.
Cumulatively, these uncertainties make it impossible to do more than guess at
Iraq's warfighting capabilities. As such a guesstimate, Iraq's present holdings of de-
livery systems, and chemical and biological weapons, seem most likely to be so lim-
ited in technology and operational lethality that they do not severely constrain U.S.
freedom of action, or seriously intimidate Iraq's neighbors.
Barring classified intelligence to the contrary, Iraqi CBRN capabilities must be
taken seriously, but do not seem great enough to change U.S., British, Iranian,
Israeli, Saudi and/or Southern Gulf perceptions of risk to the point where they
would limit or paralyze military action against Iraq by a U.S.-led coalition or pre-
vent large-scale Israeli strikes on Iraq.
Iraq has not fired any Scud variants in nearly twelve years. There are no public
reports that it has tested dry-storable biological weapons, or has made major ad-
vances in its weaponization of nerve gas. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that Iraq
can openly build up major production and deployment capabilities without them
being detected and targeted, and without provoking strong U.S. counter-prolifera-
tion programs, including preemptive or retaliatory strike capabilities.
Nevertheless, Iraq's possession of even moderately effective CBRN weapons must
affect other aspects of U.S., British, Southern Gulf, and Israeli perceptions of the
risks inherent in attacking Iraq. President Bush has already made it clear that the
U.S. might well make maximum use of its advanced intelligence, strike, and recon-
naissance (ISR) capabilities, and air and missile power to carry out a massive pre-
emptive strike on Iraq's CBRN and delivery capabilities at the first sign of any
major crisis or as a prelude to an invasion to overthrow Saddam.? Such weapons
create a strong incentive for preemption even in “peacetime conditions” if (a) they
can be targeted with sufficient reliability and depth of coverage, (b) the U.S. and
its allies are confident the resulting strikes would do sufficient damage to offset the
risk of Iraq lashing out with its surviving weapons, (c) the U.S. is confident any sec-
ondary effects in terms of Iraqi civilian casualties would be limited, and (d) the U.S.
is convinced it can show the world that Iraq was in violation of the UN ceasefire.
Preemption might also take place regardless of these risks if the U.S. was convinced
Iraq was prepared for the use of such weapons or was dispersed a major force for
the possible delivery of such forces.
It should be noted in this regard that the physical destruction of stored or dis-
persed chemical and biological facilities and munitions stored on the ground pre-
sents only a limited risk of major collateral damage and secondary civilian casual-
ties unless the weapons are in densely populated areas. No one can disprove the
idea of trace effects from such explosions, such as those associated with Gulf War
syndrome, but the probabilities are limited.
FACTORS SHAPING IRAQI OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR U.S.-LED COALITION MILITARY EFFORT
Iraq cannot hope to win a conventional war in the face of decisive U.S. force, but
it does have a wide range of options, and some might be effective in the face of inad-
equate U.S. and coalition force levels:
• The key battle is already underway and is largely political. Iraq's best strategy
is to defuse the political momentum for a major U.S. attack on Iraq, and to win
as much Arab support as it can. This means strengthening the political accom-
modation it has already reach with other Arab states—including Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia—and attempting to win broad Arab political support through its
support for the Palestinian cause in the Second Intifada. Some form of Iraqi ac-
commodation in terms of resuming UN inspections is another potential option,


35
although one that Saddam and other hard-liners in the regime is certain to be
reluctant to take. Using oil wealth and control over much of the media to mobi-
lizing popular support is another approach the regime is taking and one that
both deters U.S. military action and strengths Iraqi operational capabilities. In
contrast, the U.S. faces the backlash from the Second Intifada, has been unable
to mobilize Arab or European support for a war tied largely to the threat of pro-
liferation, and has no smoking gun in terms of Iraqi support for terrorism.
• The worst Iraqi option is to repeat the mistakes of the Gulf War and send its
best forces out into the desert where they are most exposed and have the least
air defense. Some counterattacks and raids may be needed, but a forward de-
fense strategy is the one most vulnerable to U.S. military action. Similarly,
digging in forward areas, and the extensive use of static forces and earth bar-
riers, could be useful in defending Basra and a few critical lines of communica-
tion, but makes Iraqi forces easy to bypass and outmaneuver.
• A city-populated area based strategy presents the most problems for the U.S.
in using air power effectively, and provides the most political advantages in ex-
ploiting collateral damage and civilian casualties. It also is unlikely to lead to
uprisings or opposition action as long as loyal forces are in place and willing
to fight.
Iraq may be able to exploit water barriers against heavy U.S. forces, but is more
likely to lose bridges and road mobility to U.S. airpower. Pre-positioning forces
and supplies to defend a limited part of the country with the most loyal popu-
lation and most critical cities—an urban redoubt strategy-offers more surviv-
able flexibility than either a forward deployed or central reserve strategy. Iraq's
surface to air missile system also supports such a strategy.
• Some form of Iraqi redoubt and scorched earth strategy is also an option. Iraq
set Kuwait's oil fields on fire during the Gulf War, and might well try to use
the oil weapon in such a contingency. It has already talked about oil embargoes
in the context of the Second Intifada, and Saddam Hussein might well see burn-
ing Iraq's oil fields and CBRN attacks on major Gulf oil fields as both a defense
and form of revenge. Iraq could also combine such a strategy with falling back
on a largely Shi'ite dominated “redoubt” by using the cities and towns in North
Central Iraq for its defense while leaving as much of a scorched earth as pos-
sible in the areas of a U.S.-led coalition advance.
• Fighting delaying actions inside urban areas offers Iraq a way of using human
shields, limiting U.S. air strike capability, and forcing U.S.-led coalition forces
to fight on the most restricted terms. It cannot win against mobility and deci-
sive force, but it is certain to be more effective than putting infantry in earth
barriers—the “speed bump” strategy that Iraq used in the Gulf War.
• Iraq is virtually certain to try to exploit civilian casualties and collateral dam-
age as a political and media weapon, and mix this with the use of deception
and decoys. Saddam Hussein's regime will attempt to fight a political battle to
the last.
• Iraq might try to use CBRN weapons to preempt a U.S. build-up, launch on
warning (LOW), or launch under attack (LUA) against key U.S. and coalition
bases. He might try to use selective escalation to using remaining missiles and/
or CBRN weapons to try to involve Israel in the war risks escalating the phys-
ical damage to Iraq, and make maximum use of the backlash from the Second
Intifada. Saddam Hussein seems to have put his missiles and CBRN forces in
the hands of loyalists who might well execute a LOW, LUA, and/or desperate
retaliatory option. The problem with a desperate retaliatory option is that Sad-
dam must realize that waiting until the regime is collapsing, and then con-
ducting CBRN operations against Arab states, or conducting covert CBRN
strikes against the U.S. when the regime is already in extremis, is far more
likely to increase the severity of coalition action. He must also realize that
major, highly lethal, Iraqi CBŘN strikes on Israeli population centers are likely
to trigger a major nuclear war.
Anyone who looks seriously at this list of variables will quickly see that it is im-
possible to predict whether and how the U.S. will use decisive force, the Iraqi re-
sponse to a U.S.-led coalition, the nature of a U.S.-led coalition, how long Iraq can
endure, and what strategy Iraq will actually pursue if it does use its CBRN weap-
ons.
What does seem likely, however, is that it would take a major U.S. miscalculation
about the size of the forces needed to defeat Iraq and/or a poorly structured and
over-constrained U.S. operation, to allow Iraq to ride out the U.S.-led attack through
even the best combination of urban and redoubt warfare. Furthermore, most forms


37
armor, the amount of air power, the attack helicopters, the force
mix and the basing. And when we talk about this kind of option,
we're talking about access to major bases. And while we might not
need 2,800 sorties a day, as we flew in the gulf war, being able to
mount less than 1,000 to 1,500 would be reckless.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, doctor, let me ask you. In your book, you
discuss the merits of helping scientists working on the regime's
weapons of mass destruction to escape Iraq. Based on your experi-
ence, what was the missing ingredient, if there was one, in Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction program, its human expertise for re-
search, its design and production, or raw ingredients—for example
highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons? What was the weak-
est link?
Dr. HAMZA. Senator, the weakest link was research—that is, re-
search that could resolve the bottlenecks in the program. For exam-
ple, with uranium enrichment which one needs at the bomb core
you need some bomb-grade uranium, so you need to enrich natural
uranium using enrichment processes—we were held for 5 years be-
cause we could not develop an enrichment barrier that will sepa-
rate the heavy from the light uranium. So the bottlenecks in tech-
nology were the hold up.
The same goes for the calutron process to enrich uranium using
the electromagnetic method. We were held up by simple tech-
nologies here, but these were insurmountable problems to us over
there.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any reason to believe they have sur-
mounted those bottlenecks?
Dr. HAMZA. They declared they did. In 1993, Iraq surmounted
the bottleneck in the diffusion barrier technology and declared it in
its full, final, and complete declaration. So Iraq did declare that
some of these bottlenecks—for example, in the diffusion process-
were resolved. But still it leaves a very small core of researchers
to be the really critical part of the program. And if these small
cores of researchers—that's what I mention in the book—were
taken care of, the program will be probably hindered.
The CHAIRMAN. How much does Saddam rely upon the expertise
of scientists—foreign scientists for such as unemployed Russian sci-
entists and others? How much of the scientific research and devel-
opment is done by non-Iraqis?
Dr. HAMZA. We had two experiences—when I was transferred to
the military industry to start the nuclear weapon program, the en-
richment group was ordered by Kamel to use the Germans. Our
original intent was that using foreigners is a leaky process. We al-
ways—information leaks out by foreigners. Using the Germans, for
example, in 1989, Der Spiegel published a detailed report on what
the Germans gave us and what kind of expertise we got. So that
was a sobering experience. And I believe after that Iraq will use
scientists in a very limited way.
I believe some scientists were used in rejuvenating the chemical
weapon program, but not many in the nuclear. I believe Iraq still
relies on its own scientists to develop its own weapons program.
The CHAIRMAN. In conclusion, how confident are you about your
assertion that you used in your statement saying that by 2005 you


38
believe the Iraqi Government will have enough fissile material to
build three nuclear weapons?
Dr. HAMZA. This is the German assessment I mentioned. As I
mention in the report, I took parts of these statements to save
time, but this is the German BND assessment based on what it ob-
served from Iraqi defectors and Iraqi capabilities.
The CHAIRMAN. When was that assessment made?
Dr. HAMZA. It was made last year, and there are reports that
they repeated it this year again. It was February of 2001.
The ĈHAIRMAN. My time is up.
Senator Lugar.
Senator LUGAR. Dr. Cordesman, much of the argument about the
need to attack Iraq now is really based upon the thought that Dr.
Hamza suggested, that they could develop a nuclear capability by
2005, or even Ambassador Butler's comment that at the end of the
gulf war or thereabouts, Iraq may have been within 6 months of
developing a nuclear weapon. If that is so, and given the point
you've made about the efficacy of biological and chemical weapons
being very difficult to estimate, the case for continuing the so-
called containment strategy is that Iraq has not been able to de-
velop weapons capable of providing a massive first strike capa-
bility. And, as a matter of fact, the strategy apparently, as we see
it, is that Saddam would use these weapons defensively and simply
threaten the rest of the world with retaliation if an event occurred
that threatened him.
However, what is your judgment, leaving aside intelligence re-
ports that may help the committee or, more importantly, the Presi-
dent and others, to determine the imminence of Iraq's capability?
What is the case against simply continuing as we are now? If evi-
dence appeared that he had developed a nuclear weapon outside of
a covert situation, couldn't we just reserve the right for preemptive
strikes or take action to try to eliminate that. Is there a big enough
threat that cannot be contained?
And then, second, if we adopt that strategy, is it possible we
could wind up with a policy with our allies and neighboring states
that in the event that Saddam did develop and did strike somebody
that we all attack together, as opposed to the current situation in
which almost all the neighbors, plus our NATO allies, are highly
skeptical of the efficacy of our initiating a strike at this point. They
suggest they are uncertain that Saddam has the weapons, and
likelihhod of development, and worry that in the process of attack-
ing we might trigger the use of whatever Saddam does possess
much to the detriment of his own people and those he would strike.
I'm asking you for a general summation on the efficacy of con-
tainment as we know it.
Professor CORDESMAN. Senator, the first assignment I had when
I came out of graduate school, in the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense, was to work on a study of proliferation. That was back in
the 1960s, and I have been working on such studies ever since. The
ability of experts to predict who would really develop a nuclear
weapon at a given time over a period, has been so poor that I think
what we really have to say to ourselves is we can't make such pre-
dictions.


40
questions make the case of the value of having these hearings. And
we appreciate immensely your participation.
Let me pick up again, just on a followup point that Senator
Lugar was making, Professor Cordesman, that I would like you to
address, if you could, and that is the importance and the prosecu-
tion of a military option of international support or regional sup-
port. You mentioned in your statement the necessity of having
bases of operation, being able to place supplies in forward positions
and the like would be very important. We at least hear today of
the criticism that is coming from allies as well as regional powers
in the region who at least call themselves allies. Could you please
give us some sort of an assessment of how important that factor
is in the successful prosecution of the military option?
Professor CORDESMAN. I think we have to be prepared for the
fact that if we do this, it will, in many ways, be our first preemp-
tive war. We will not have a clear smoking gun. There will not be
a simple cause to rally around. I think we will have the support
of the British Government. Most of our NATO allies will, at best,
be reluctant and seek, if anything, to delay it to use the U.N. But
we had some of those problems during the gulf war. Remember, the
French Defense Minister resigned to protest just before the fighting
began. We didn't get our aircraft into Turkey until 48 hours be-
cause the authorization was only given by the Turkish Government
48 hours before the air war began. Coalitions take on a cachet in
retrospect that they never had at the time. But there are some re-
alities here. You're going to need Turkish air basing far more, be-
cause the center of Iraq's power is a lot further north. Saudi air-
space will be critical. So would Saudi bases, if possible.
There were 23 airfields and air bases at the time of the gulf war.
We used every single one of them to capacity, put Marine Corps
aircraft into unimproved strips because there were no areas left.
And 11 of those bases were in Saudi Arabia.
If we are going to fight this war we, at a minimum, are going
to need all of the capacity of Qatar, of Bahrain, and Kuwait. We
are going to need to be able to stage through Oman. We probably
are going to have to use most of our carrier assets, at least ini-
tially, because of the lack of basing, unless you can get Saudi Ara-
bia. And so any assessment of relative capability and scenarios is
determined, not so much by what our European allies do, but what
we can actually get by way of support in the region.
Senator DODD. Do I have time for one more question?
The CHAIRMAN. You sure do.
Senator DODD. Let me jump back, if I can, doctor-Ambassador
Butler, to the efforts of compliance. Is there any sense or any sce-
nario which you could conjure up which would cause Saddam Hus-
sein to—and his government–to take a different view toward in-
spections? Or is that, in your view, an option that has been ex-
hausted and the past events have proved the futility of trying to
have the kind of cooperation necessary to pursue that avenue of
dealing with this issue?
Ambassador BUTLER. Well, Senator Dodd, my answer, I'm afraid,
will be a pessimistic one. In the concluding part of my remarks, I
said that I believed it was essential-if one asked the gut question
of what is needed here, my answer is arms control and disar-


41
mament. What that implies is—and others tended to agree-was
that it is, in theory, essential that we have Iraq brought into con-
formity with the law, which is that it must cooperate with a full-
scale international effort to, (a) take away the weapons that it
made in the past and which already exist, and, (b) institute a sys-
tem of long-term monitoring that Dr. Hamza referred to, for exam-
ple, to ensure that those weapons are not reconstituted in the fu-
ture.
Now, central to such a structure is the cooperation of the Govern-
ment of Iraq, and it never gave it. Remember, at the beginning of
my statement, I concluded from the brief history of UNSCOM, in-
credibly brief, that there were two points. One, the first point, was
that Iraq never obeyed the law. And the other was that it had al-
ways been utterly committed to having weapons of mass destruc-
tion.
Now, I must, I'm afraid, give a pessimistic answer to your very
pertinent question. Are they likely to do it? No, they're not. Does
it mean that we should, therefore, now stop trying to get that re-
stored? No. I think we have got to go a little further way—if for
no other reason than to make clear to the world that we went the
full distance to get the law obeyed and arms control restored before
taking other measures.
Senator DODD. May I ask you quickly what specific avenues
would you pursue to take this the final yard or two, as you describe
it?
Ambassador BUTLER. I've said many time before, Senator, and
I'll repeat it here, the pathway lies in cooperation with Russia. It
is Russia and, to some extent, France in the Security Council in
1998 and 1999 which brought our efforts—and I don't mean the
United States' efforts; I mean UNSCOM and the civilized and in-
terested community that wanted to see this horrible problem of
weapons of mass destruction in Saddam's mind and behavior
brought under control. It was Russia's split with the United States,
Russia's decision that it had greater interest in sticking with Sad-
dam that brought our effort down.
Now, it follows logically from that, and indeed there's a lot of
practical evidence for it as well as mere logic, that the way ahead
would be through and with Russia. If we could get Russia and then
France—the U.K., of course, is a given. I don't mean that dis-
respectfully to them. They've been staunch on this. If we could get
Russia to work seriously with us in Baghdad to make very clear
to the Iraqis that, “This is it. This is it. You will do serious arms
control, or you're toast,” to put it simply, we might have a chance.
But absent that, we won't.
Senator DODD. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Can I ask for a point of clarification, professor? Without Qatar,
without Bahrain, without Kuwait, is it possible to launch success-
fully a military action that has a high probability of success and
a relatively low probability of high casualties for American forces?
Professor CORDESMAN. You could conduct a very destructive
bombing and air campaign, but short of having access to both Jor-
dan or Turkey, the answer would be, “I think not.” And, I think


43
Now, in addition to those measures of containment, we need very
specific things directed at the specifics that Iraq and Saddam pre-
sents to us, and that is that it has been in the form of inspections.
The regime of inspections was unique in history. We've never seen
such a thing before.
Why was that done? Because he's unique. This is something-
this is a point that I would like to particularly put to this com-
mittee. This man is different. If you look around the world—and
I was deeply impressed by the approach that Professor Cordesman,
yet again, took this morning. I think it was hardheaded and right.
He's worked all his life in nonproliferation.
If you look around the world of 180 countries, you see 160 who
basically behave properly, and there's about 20 who don't. Three of
them, extra-systemic to the nonproliferation treaty, have nuclear
weapons—India, Pakistan, and Israel. That's not good. But in nu-
merical terms, the world in that sense is basically, for 40-odd
years, the period since the Second World War, has behaved more
or less well. When you get down into analyzing those
who haven't,
one sticks out beyond and above all others, and it's Saddam Hus-
sein and what he has done to his country and to those around him.
Now, that means, in my view, we need to continue fundamental
elements of containment. Should we—this is your question, I
think-should we rely on it as the answer? No, because, in and of
itself, it doesn't work. Do we discard it altogether? No. We need
some elements of containment. But we also need a specific solution
to the specific problems posed by this particular—and I suggest
unique_outlaw.
Now, maybe resumed inspections would never be successful, as
Dr. Hamza has said. I don't think we'll actually get to there, be-
cause, as I've already said, I suspect the Iraqis might even let them
begin. But then if that is the case, we have to consider something
else, and that's what I think these hearings are about. What is that
other thing to deal with this unique problem? I don't yet know the
answer.
Senator Biden has started a process with Senator Lugar of find-
ing that answer, and I just think we've got to press on and find
it.
Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I beg the indulgence
of the committee to ask the other two witnesses for a short answer
to the question?
The CHAIRMAN. Sure.
Senator HAGEL. Thank you very much.
Dr. Hamza.
Dr. HAMZA. I agree with Ambassador Butler. Containment did
keep Iraq from accelerating its production, limited what is avail-
able to it, destroyed most of its weapon repository. But in the end,
it's not the answer for the simple reason Iraq restructured its
science and technology base around the containment policy, so it
created a new international network for purchasing, redistributed
its scientists and engineers so that they will not be very visible to
air strikes and to possible inspectors if they go in. So, in the end,
Iraq is working to defeat containment. And, in the end, it will
achieve its purpose.


44
So containment did delay-yes, I agree with the Ambassador-
considerably Iraq's—Iraq would have been now in possession of nu-
clear weapons without containment and a much larger stockpile of
chemical and possibly much more biological weapons. But in the
end, we need something else with containment. My suggestion, as
I stated earlier, is that regime change as the stated U.S. policy
would be the correct way to deal with this problem.
Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Professor Cordesman.
Professor CORDESMAN. I would have to agree largely with the
previous witnesses. I think we should remember, however, what
containment means. It isn't just sitting there. Are we really aggres-
sively going to try to stop arms transfers? In which case I have
heard no one in this country point out the fact that Syria's become
a serious conduit.
What happens if we detect proliferation? Remember that we
could go to war tomorrow if we had a U.S. or British aircraft shot
down, and have to repeat another Desert Fox. Are we really willing
to go to war immediately if there's a violation on missile testing,
if we detect a biological facility, if we have the confidence? Contain-
ment is not pacifism. It is not simply reliance on arms control. But
to say containment is exhausted, you can only say that when you
are really ready, Senator, to do something else. That means we
need a critical minimum of allies and bases, a national commit-
ment to using decisive force, and a willingness to win the peace as
well as the war.
And, I think that until nation-building becomes a bipartisan
term and one where there is a serious commitment to what could
be years of peacekeeping, economic help, and help in building a de-
mocracy, we aren't ready to say containment is exhausted.
Senator HAGEL. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL
I would like to congratulate the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding
these timely hearings on Iraq. I agree with my colleagues that we need a national
dialogue on what steps we should take to deal with the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein's Iraq.
Americans need to be informed about the complexities and consequences of our
policies in Iraq.
I look forward to listening to and learning from the distinguished witnesses before
us today about the nature and urgency of the threat we face from Iraq, including
their evaluations of what the best policy options may be for meeting this threat; the
prospects for a democratic transition after Saddam Hussein; and what the implica-
tions of our policies in Iraq may be for the stability of the Middle East and our secu-
rity interests there.
Much of the debate by those advocating regime change through military means
have so far focused on the easy questions. Is Saddam Hussein a ruthless tyrant who
brutally oppresses his own people, and who possesses weapons of mass destruction
that have the potential to threaten us, his neighbors and our allies, including and
especially Israel? Yes. Do most Iraqis yearn for democratic change in Iraq? Yes, they
do. Can Saddam be rehabilitated? No, he cannot.
In my opinion, complicated and relevant questions remain to be answered before
making a case for war, and here is where these hearings will play an important
role. What is the nature, and urgency, of the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to
the United States and Iraq's neighbors? What do we know about Iraq's programs
of weapons of mass destruction? There have been no weapons inspectors in Iraq
since December 1998. Is Iraq involved in terrorist planning and activities against
the United States and U.S. allies in the Middle East and elsewhere?


45
What can we expect after Saddam Hussein in Iraq? What do we know about the
capabilities of the opposition to Saddam inside Iraq? While we support a unified and
democratic opposition to Saddam Hussein, the arbiters of power in a post-Saddam
Iraq will likely be those who reside inside, not outside, the country. And these indi-
viduals and groups we do not know. Who are they? And where are they? These are
the Iraqis we need to understand, engage, and eventually do business with.
What will be the future of Iraqi Kurdistan in a post-Saddam Iraq?
How do we accomplish regime change in Iraq given the complexities and chal-
lenges of the current regional environment? The deep Israeli-Palestinian conflict
continues; our relations with Syria are proper though strained; we have no relation-
ship with Iran; Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan have warned us about
dangerous unintended consequences if we take unilateral military action against
Iraq; and Afghanistan remains a piece of very difficult unfinished business, an un-
predictable but critical investment for the United States and our allies.
I can think of no historical case where the United States succeeded in an enter-
prise of such gravity and complexity as regime change in Iraq without the support
of a regional and international coalition. We have a lot of work to do on the diplo-
matic track. Not just for military operations against Iraq, should that day come, but
for the day after, when the interests and intrigues of outside powers could under-
mine the fragility of an Iraqi government in transition, whoever governs in Iraq
after Saddam Hussein.
An American military operation in Iraq could require a commitment in Iraq that
could last for years and extend well beyond the day of Saddam's departure. The
American people need to understand the political, economic, and military magnitude
and risks that would be inevitable if we invaded Iraq.
There was no such national dialogue or undertaking before we went into Vietnam.
There were many very smart, well intentioned professionals, intellectuals, and strat-
egists who assured us of a U.S. victory in Vietnam at an acceptable cost. Well, elev-
en years, 58,000 dead, and the most humiliating defeat in our nation's history later
we abandoned South Vietnam to the Communists.
Let me conclude by saying that I support regime change and a democratic transi-
tion in Iraq. That's easy. The Iraqi people have suffered too long, and our security
and interests will never be assured with Saddam Hussein in power. The tough ques-
tions are when, how, with whom, and at what cost. I look forward to the testimony
of our witnesses over the next two days on these critical questions.
The CHAIRMAN. We're going to come back. One of the things I'm
sure we're going to be asking you about is the extent that Saddam
Hussein is the unique element in this picture. What is Iraq without
Saddam Hussein? How dangerous is it, even if he dropped dead to-
morrow, how would that—all by itself, nothing else, just Saddam
Hussein-how would that alter the situation, if at all?
[Recess.]
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. I thank our wit-
nesses for your indulgence. Of all days to have four votes back to
back, it was today. I apologize for that.
Let me now yield to Senator Feingold. I think he's next in line.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for
holding these hearings. And I want to offer my gratitude to all the
witnesses and particularly this panel. We had a long time voting
there, but I can tell you, a lot of people commented on how excel-
lent this panel has already been. So I appreciate what you've done.
In April, I chaired the related hearing of the Constitution Sub-
committee of the Judiciary Committee, and much of that earlier
hearing focused in detailed legal terms on the authority of the
President to launch a military operation against Iraq. And after lis-
tening to many constitutional experts, I certainly concluded that
the Constitution requires the President to seek additional author-
ization from Congress before he can embark on a major new mili-
tary undertaking in Iraq.


46
Today, these hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee
begin the important work of considering the complicated policy
issues that are at stake, gathering information, and coming to some
informed conclusions about what we will and will not authorize
with regard to U.S. intervention in Iraq.
I want the committee to know a number of my constituents have
contacted me prior to today's hearing, and they have delivered one
very clear message. They want to be certain that this committee
carefully considers a range of views and informed perspectives on
Iraq, and they want to be certain that we do not accept as fact any
one set of subjective assumptions about Iraq. They are right to in-
sist on a sober and honest effort. And given how much of the rhet-
oric surrounding U.S. policy toward Iraq in recent months has sug-
gested that American families should be prepared to send their
sons and daughter to war, we do owe the American people nothing
less than a thorough examination of the situation before us and a
careful consideration of our policy options. And I again thank the
Chair for the role these hearings will play in that process.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD
I want to start by thanking Senator Biden for holding these important hearings.
They come at an important time in our struggle to respond to worldwide terrorist
threats, and they offer a critically important opportunity for the Congress to begin
to gather information and come to some informed conclusions about what we will
and will not authorize with regard to U.S. intervention in Iraq.
I also want to offer my gratitude to all of the witnesses who will help us think
through the difficult issues and options that confront us today. A number of my con-
stituents have contacted me prior to today's hearing, and they have delivered one
very clear message they want to be certain that this committee carefully considers
a range of views and informed perspectives on Iraq, and they want to be certain
that we do not accept as fact any one set of subjective assumptions about Iraq. They
are right to insist on a sober and honest effort. Given that much of the rhetoric sur-
rounding U.S. policy toward Iraq in recent months has suggested that American
families should be prepared to send their sons and daughters to war, we owe the
American people nothing less that a thorough examination of the situation before
us.
As we begin these hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, I would note
that I chaired a related hearing in April of the Constitution Subcommittee of the
Judiciary Committee. Much of that earlier hearing focused, in detailed legal terms,
on the authority of the President to launch a military operation against Iraq. The
Judiciary Committee hearings in April followed an important precedent that was
first established in January 1991, as the former President Bush was threatening to
launch a similar military operation against Iraq, again without seeking congres-
sional authorization. At that time, Senator Biden chaired a hearing before the Judi-
ciary Committee in which prominent scholars questioned the authority of the Presi-
dent to authorize the use of force in Iraq without congressional approval. Based in
part on the 1991 Judiciary hearings, former President Bush ultimately sought and
received congressional authorization for operation Dessert Storm. That was an im-
portant victory for the Constitution and for our constitutional structure.
It was based on that 1991 precedent, then, that I organized a similar hearing on
war powers and the case of Iraq in the Judiciary Committee in April. At that hear-
ing, after listening to many constitutional experts, I concluded that the Constitution
requires the President to seek additional authorization before he can embark on a
major new military undertaking in Iraq. I also concluded that this may well be one
of our last opportunities to preserve the constitutionally mandated role of Congress
in making decisions about war and peace.
The April hearing focused on important constitutional questions. These two addi-
tional days of hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee will provide us with
an equally important opportunity to consider the complicated policy issues that are
at stake in any decision on Iraq. Through these hearings, it will be important to
assess the level of the threat that exists, along with the relative costs and dangers


47
that would be posed by a massive assault on Iraq. We must give careful attention
to the risks to American soldiers, and to our relations with some of our strongest
allies in our current anti-terror campaign.
Regardless of which policy path we choose, our goal is presumably to make Amer-
ica more secure in the long-term. That means that it will be crucially important to
think through the aftermath of any proposed military strike. That means thinking
about whether or not there will be a context of order in which controls can be im-
posed and maintained on weapons of mass destruction and the means to fashion
them, and that means thinking about the conditions and the will of the long-suf-
fering Iraqi people. We have to be honest with ourselves and with the American peo-
ple—these are big issues, and addressing them may require very serious commit-
ments.
I don't think we need access to classified information to begin today to weigh the
risks and opportunities that confront us. But I also look forward, in both secure and
open settings, to hearing the administration make its case for a given policy re-
sponse. Certainly the perspective of the Administration is one that we must hear
before coming to any ultimate conclusions. Today, however, I think we have an op-
portunity to explore the general nature of the threats, dangers and policy options
that exist. As a starting point, these considerations are crucial.
Following these hearings, and subsequent consultations with the Administration,
Congress may ultimately conclude that America's interests require a direct military
response to threats emanating from Iraq. If we do come to that grave conclusion,
I would urge my colleagues to honor the Constitution by providing congressional ap-
proval for military action. And I would counsel the President that by following in
his father's footsteps and seeking congressional authorization, the President would
ensure that any military response against Iraq would be taken from a constitu-
tionally unified, and inherently stronger, position.
I look forward to these initial discussions.
Senator FEINGOLD. Let me ask all of you this. All of us here
would agree that the President has the constitutional authority to
launch a preemptive strike in self defense in advance of an immi-
nent attack by Iraq on the United States. And this is especially
true in the face of an imminent attack on the United States with
a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon, but the key here is to as-
sess the level of the threat and the imminence of the attack.
The War Powers Resolution creates a high threshold for unilat-
eral Presidential action, action which must be authorized in any
event within 60 days of any preemptive strike. So I would like to
ask you, do any of you believe that we have already reached that
level of threat, that we now face an imminent attack on the United
States? Mr. Butler.
Ambassador BUTLER. An imminent attack upon the United
States by Iraq? And you're talking about 60-day notice. Look, Sen-
ator, my simple answer is no, we do not.
Senator FEINGOLD. Doctor.
Dr. HAMZA. Surely what we are talking about here really is a
preemptive strike for a possible future danger which is much larger
than what we have right now. And it would be much costlier in the
future, or not? Yes. If we do it much later, it will be a much costlier
strike than what we do now.
Senator FEINGOLD. I understand that, but you don't believe there
is an imminent threat of an attack on the United States.
Dr. HAMZA. What I believe is it is much easier now at much less
cost and less danger to the United States to do it right than to do
it after the window closes.
Senator FEINGOLD. That's not the question I'm asking, but I ap-
preciate the comment.
rofessor Cordesman.


48
to you,
Professor CORDESMAN. Senator, I do not believe, in any classic
sense, it is imminent, but I have to issue a very strong caution. I
don't think you will ever get that kind of warning. As we learned
at the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon, the
idea that you have enough warning to tell you an attack is immi-
nent on the United States or our allies, particularly from a man
like this when he has biological weapons or nuclear weapons, this
is not the world we are going to live in. And I have to say that if
that is the interpretation of the War Powers Act, it is so fundamen-
tally obsolete that it has become irrelevant to asymmetric warfare.
Senator FEINGOLD. It is simply a threshold question. I think we
need to determine—to figure out what procedure we should follow
in terms of dealing with this issue.
Ambassador Butler.
Ambassador BUTLER. Thank you. Could I just say I agree with
what my two colleagues have said? Dr. Hamza, of course, answered
a different question. But I want to take this opportunity, Mr.
Chairman, to make this point. This was a very specific question
from Senator Feingold. I gave the only answer I could give. I also
agree, in particular, with Professor Cordesman that that is not to
say that we don't face a danger.
I want to say this. I've searched my mind thoroughly about my
Iraq experience and the inner meaning of what the last 10 years
have been since the end of the gulf war until now. And I'll put this
Mr. Chairman, and to your colleagues. If there is an inner
meaning to what we now face it is this. And it's one of life's great
principles, I submit. That is that if you defer, put off to another
day, the solution to a serious problem, it will only be harder and
costlier in the end.
Senator FEINGOLD. I think there's a lot of force to all those com-
ments, and I don't necessarily disagree with them. What I'm trying
to do here is determine the basic assumptions that we can share
with our colleagues and the American people. What is the threat?
And I think the first thing to ask is, is there an imminent threat
to the United States being attacked directly? The answer is no, but
that doesn't necessarily lead to any other conclusion about whether
it's advisable to move forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator Lugar.
Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I don't have further questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nelson.
Senator NELSON. Give me your opinion. What would be the possi-
bility of an uprising from within if we were to have some kind of
external attack with some internal clandestine operations? Is Sad-
dam Hussein's control on the leadership of that country so tight
that it's very difficult to have that uprising from within?
Dr. HAMZA. Is that to me?
Senator NELSON. To all of you, please. Doctor, go ahead.
Dr. HAMZA. I believe the experience of an attack from outside
that caused an uprising was there in the gulf war, and it gave us
an example of what could happen. I believe the circumstances are
even better right now for an uprising than was the gulf war. I
mean, we had sanctions then of less than a year. And we had a


49
very strong uprising that took off Saddam government in more
than two-thirds of the country. What we have now is a country
that's under sanctions for 11 years and under Saddam oppression
for all this period. The Iraqis are, by now, giving up hope of any
possible change unless they get rid of that man. And so I believe
if there is a serious U.S. intent to remove him, and there is an at-
tack, the Iraqis will join the U.S. forces, like what happened in Af-
ghanistan. And there will be an uprising, and there will be a great
support for any invasion from inside Iraq.
Professor CORDESMAN. If I may, Senator, I would be very cau-
tious, because one thing is what kind of uprising and for what? I
don't believe you're going to see the Kurds rush out to take adven-
tures and risks at this point in time, and that has been fairly clear
from a great deal of discussion. There are problems, certainly, for
the Shi'ites. They have many reasons to rise up, but if they rise
up in the south, they also are now dealing with a much better-
structured security force.
Saddam has adapted, as well. And I am struck by the fact that
while there are many different opposition capabilities, to the extent
I've seen any really organized efforts, they have come from SAIRI.
Yet, they have had more and more operational problems. I've seen
fewer and fewer indications that claims of operations actually have
reality.
And if this uprising happens in the south and we have not the
strength to get rid of the regime in Baghdad and its core, then we
may see again that we expose people, frankly, to becoming martyrs
or victims.
At best, you're not going to see a united Iraq. But, if we don't
have the proper military strength, you might well see something
happen that could be just as bad as what happened in 1991.
Senator NELSON. I want to come back to a followup, but I would
like to get Mr. Butler's opinion, as well.
Ambassador BUTLER. Senator, just very quickly, I think the Iraqi
are a thoroughly decent people. I think they have been the first vic-
tims, the most evident victims of a brutal homicidal dictatorship,
and I think if they saw the possibility that that would be taken
away, they would welcome it.
How that would occur, a spontaneous democratic uprising, is
something that—I agree with Professor Cordesman-you would
have to be very careful about. Whether instead the coming demise
of Saddam would be seen by various factions in the country as pro-
viding them with an opportunity to take power for their own ends
is something that could be a source of difficulty.
The question really is about who would replace him, and I think
that is a very important question. But as far as the Iraqi people
are concerned, yes, they know what they've suffered under for a
very long time. And in that elemental sense, I believe, in the end,
they would feel good about being relieved of the burden of Saddam
Hussein.
Senator NELSON. May I followup?
The CHAIRMAN. Please.
Senator NELSON. To the professor, the fact that we have, basi-
cally, air cover over two-thirds of the country in the north and the
south, how do you utilize that to your advantage to provoke the


51
I repeat, it can be done. No arms-control inspection or
verification is perfect. Anyone who's been in that business will tell
you that. I've been in it for a quarter of a century, and I'll tell you
straight up, there can be errors and mistakes. But, Senator, there
is an enormous gap between an inspection regime that is given full
access, and one that is cheated upon.
Now, given full access, our technologies and intelligence are such
that we can do a very, very good job. I don't think it serves our pur-
pose well—that is, the purpose of getting to the clear truth of
things—to say this work is inherently flawed. It isn't. What is its
big problem is refusal to allow it to be done.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, that's why I asked the question.
Ambassador BUTLER. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. I want to get-yes, Professor.
Professor CORDESMAN. Senator, I agree, in broad terms, with
what Ambassador Butler has said. But going anywhere at any time
means having all the manpower, the mobility, the resources, the
monitoring you need. The more you have to do, the more of these
resources you need. And, you have to have a base point to begin
with, which means at some point you would have to survey and in-
spect Iraq again, knowing that you will no longer have audit trails
to the time of the gulf war.
But beyond that, I don't know of anyone at CDC and
USAMERİD—and I would suggest you ask them—who believe that
if a country is willing to use infectious agents or genetic engineer-
ing you can be certain they will be found through inspection. The
facilities involved are so small, so easy to scatter, the amount of
agent that is needed is so limited, ways you can deliver them can
be covert or use human agents. So, you may end up, if you try to
inspect without putting the resources in, by pushing people into bi-
ological options and into the worst-possible attack scenarios. That
risk should be kept firmly in mind.
The CHAIRMAN. I acknowledge that, understand that. That is
able to be done by Iraq, even if Saddam is gone.
Professor CORDESMAN. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And so I think we should be looking for here-
at least I'm looking for the broadest, most rational understanding
of what our options are and what we can and cannot be certain of.
And the truth is there's a lot of things we can't be certain of, but
everything is probabilities as we move down this road.
I realize my time is up. I'm going to followup, though, with the
permission of my colleagues, on one question, and that relates to
nuclear capability able to be married to a missile, a medium-range
or longer-range missile. Both of you who have been involved in the
inspection side of this in the past, and you, doctor, who were in-
volved in the production side, if you will, to use the phrase loosely,
would be as qualified as any witnesses we're going to have to an-
swer the following question, and that is that if Saddam were suc-
cessful in building an intermediate-range missile or a missile that
is—much further than 160 kilometers, and if he were able to pro-
vide a nuclear warhead on that missile—as we all know, it's a heck
of a lot easier to put a chemical or biological warhead, for no other
reason, for the layman out there, other than the pure weight of the
object—would we be able to have enough notice of that, not in


52
terms of whether they developed the capacity on the nuclear side,
but on this missile side, and would we be able to preemptively
move against that system, that nuclear delivery system, as others
have on other occasions? Do you understand my question?
Doctor Hamza.
Dr. HAMZA. There are two stages, Senator, for the delivery sys-
tem to be successful. One is that the nuclear weapon itself has to
be hardened to withstand the missile trip itself, which can-
The CHAIRMAN. What you mean by that is, it has to be hardened
enough so the vibration and the thrust and the force and the war-
head can sustain that and stay intact, correct?
Dr. HAMZA. Exactly.
The CHAIRMAN. OŃ.
Dr. HAMZA. Iraq has not done that, until I left. Now I'm talking
about 8 years ago since I left. We had no, as I said, high-level de-
fector to tell us what is going on down there in any case. I expect
that's a defined project and this work must be done. So Iraq needed
to do that at the time. I don't know if it has been done. I don't
think the inspectors found anything in that direction up to 1998.
They are in a better position to answer that. My impression, they
did not find any trace of serious Iraqi work in that direction.
Whether it happened since 1998 until now, my guess it would.
The second stage is mating that to a missile. The Iraqi missile
has a problem, that's the payload gets much smaller with the in-
creased range, because what they are doing is not-
The CHAIRMAN. By “payload,” you mean-
Dr. HAMZA. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. It's important, I think, if this is being listened
to by the American people. The payload means the actual weapon
that sits on top of that missile
Dr. HAMZA. Exactly.
The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And the heavier that payload the
less distance that same missile could travel.
Dr. HAMZA. Exactly.
The CHAIRMAN. If you had a light payload, it can travel further.
If a heavier payload, it travels less far. Correct?
Dr. HAMZA. Exactly correct.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
Dr. HAMZA. And the problem with the Iraq missile system is that
Iraq did not develop a medium-range missile. It took short-range
missiles and extended the range, and that meant the payload will
be smaller eventually. So we had that problem. We faced it when
I was there. And that was one of the things that was under consid-
eration. I don't know if Iraq resolved that either.
So the problem of delivery of a nuclear warhead by a missile re-
mains to be questionable by Iraq, so one has to look at other op-
tions that Iraq could use to deliver its nuclear weapons. But my be-
lief right now, Iraq does not have this capability yet.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador BUTLER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I'll try and keep this
short because of the time factor. What Iraq was doing in my time
there was trying to increase-
The CHAIRMAN. For the record, your time ended when?


53
Ambassador BUTLER. The last time I was in the country was
1998. My job ended in 1999.
They were attempting to increase the fuel loading on a given
missile to make it go longer. That is, another way to make a mis-
sile fly longer is to increase the amount of fuel. But if you do that,
you reduce the amount of space left for the size of the warhead.
In our experience then, Iraq had loaded chemical and biological
agent into warheads, and it seemed to be more interested in that.
I think the ultimate goal of Saddam is to have a nuclear weapon
deliverable by missile. That's a very effective way to deliver a nu-
clear warhead. It's by long distance. You're well away from where
the explosion will take place. And it's very dangerous, very effec-
tive. But that requires a certain kind of missile, one that will fly
a good distance, carry a nuclear weight at the top, and have a good
guidance system. I don't believe that Iraq is near that yet. Does he
want it? Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, my question is where do you think they
are?
Ambassador BUTLER. I think what they were contemplating what
they were contemplating was delivery of a nuclear weapon by other
means.
The CHAIRMAN. In the past, and, Professor, I'd like you to re-
spond, as well. In the past—I've been doing this strategic doctrine
issue for 30 years—when we were talking about Russia, we used
to always say Russia would never deploy what they haven't flight
tested. Russian would never rest—no nation would rest its security
based upon a missile—or a system that hadn't been tested.
I assume we're operating on a different premise relative to this
fellow, but would there not-add to your answer, if you would,
whether or not there would be a requirement for some, or is there
a requirement for any flight testing in any way for this guy to en-
gage in the contemplated use of that combination of a missile and
a warhead that's nuclear?
Professor CORDESMAN. Senator, all I can do is give you another
worst-case scenario, because I think Dr. Hamza and Ambassador
Butler are completely correct. If you could obtain small Russian nu-
clear weapons, if you could get these in ways which allowed you to
bypass the Russian security systems on the weapons—and it is a
matter of public record that some of these systems are relatively
primitive and non-destructive
The CHAIRMAN. Again, for our listeners, we're talking about a
whole system. We're talking about an intermediate or a short-range
nuclear missile. We're not talking-
Professor CORDESMAN. No, I'm talking only about something like
a nuclear device, whether it is a small tactical nuclear weapon or
the kind of thing that might be used in a MIRVed missile. It would
be a nuclear device, however, that had sufficiently low weight so
it could still meet the very real constraints that Dr. Hamza raised,
and some of these Russian weapons were not designed to be pro-
tected against intrusive arming.
Now, if you used a similar payload, got the weight and size ex-
actly right, and then you started firing what they can logically fire,
which are missiles with the range of 150 kilometers or less, you
might be able to conduct the test of such a warhead without it


54
being detected. And, if you then put that warhead on a longer-
range missile, and were willing to strike at a city-sized target, it
is just possible that you might be able to create a missile launch
capability without extensive testing or with that kind of testing al-
though that would be at the absolute margin of risk.
However, Saddam did use chemical weapons that were manufac-
tured in laboratories early in the Iran Iraq war with no prior test-
ing whatsoever. He went directly from the lab to the battlefield.
The CHAIRMAN. Isn't that a difference, though, between testing
a chemical agent and relying upon testing-I mean, using, without
having tested at all, a nuclear warhead on a missile?
Professor CORDESMAN. As Ambassador Butler pointed out, what
makes this man different from all other proliferators is his proven
history of risk-taking. And the fact that the nuclear weapon might
never get near its intended target-
The CHAIRMAN. Would be irrelevant to him?
Professor CORDESMAN [continuing]. Would not always be reas-
suring.
Let me just add one other point about biological and chemical
weapons. It is extremely difficult to put useful biological and chem-
ical weapons on a missile warhead. It requires exact fusing and a
nondestructive mechanism to spread the agent. Nothing Iraq had-
and I will defer to Ambassador Butler and Dr. Hamza-in 1998
that was discovered by UNSCOM came close to that. They were
crude unitary warheads with contact fuses.
One caution. A lot of the necessary fusing is becoming commer-
cially available, and the best nonexplosive dissemination device,
unfortunately, is the air bag used in cars, so you can't rule that
possibility out.
The CHAIRMAN. If I can translate what you just said, it's difficult,
and it's important.
I have one concluding question, and I'll yield a longer round to
each of my colleagues, as I have had.
If we operate on the premise—and I have been corralling men
and women like you for the past year, who are experts in your
field, and boring them to death with questions for hours on end in
my office trying to gain as much knowledge and background as I
can. And one of the things, whether people are, quote, “for moving
or not moving,” one consensus I seem to get from whomever I
speak with wherever they are in the equation of moving sooner
than later or not moving at all or containing or whatever is that
this is a different-breed-of-cat, this fellow, and that if, in fact, he
is cornered, if, in fact, his regime is about to come to an end, that's
the place at which he is the most dangerous, that's the place he's
most likely to use whatever it is that he has that can be the most
destructive. And the thing that I hear most often stated is that the
issue is whether or not he will preemptively use any weapon of
mass destruction, whether he will use it only in response to an in-
vasion, or whether he will use it as a last-ditch effort to save him-
self by either broadening this to a regional war or whatever.
What evidence do we have that contained and beyond we've pro-
voked so far, unprovoked beyond this point, is that he would offen-
sively, without further provocation, use a weapon of mass destruc-
tion, when, in fact, the rationale offered by all of you is that this


55
is a guy whose first and foremost desire is to stay in power? Ex-
plain that—what seems to me to be a bit of a conundrum here.
Why would he offensively-for example, the discussion now is
we'd better move now, not because he'll have weapons to blackmail
us as they get more sophisticated, but that he may very well de-
liver these weapons into the hands of terrorists to go do his dirty
work, or he would preemptively strike Israel, strike American
forces in the region, strike neighbors, et cetera. Why would he do
that? What in his past would indicate he would do that knowing
that, as one of you said, he would invite an incredible response?
That seems certain to me he would invite an overwhelming re-
sponse. A lot of innocent people would die in the interim, but-any
comment on that? And then I'll yield.
Professor CORDESMAN. Let me, if I may, Senator—I felt exactly
the same way after the Iran Iraq war, which was the first time he
showed he was willing to take incredible risks. But, he did invade
Kuwait. He used chemical weapons against his own Kurds, admit-
tedly not in the face of the absolute guarantee
of retaliation or the
risk of it that he would face in attacking us. But, the problem we
all have is we're trying to read the mind of one person or those of
a very narrow group of Iraqis and figure out how they might be-
have under stress or over time.
I would add that wars of intimidation in the gulf can be very,
very important if he can use such intimidation to really lever the
behavior of Saudi Arabia and other countries. We do have to re-
member that 60 percent of the world's oil reserves here and our
own forecasts are that the world's economy will be dependent on
the gulf for twice as many oil exports by 2020 as it is now.
Dr. HAMZA. The whole idea that Saddam will use a nuclear
weapon and just attack I don't think comes into play here. What
happens here is that nuclear weapons at least will be the deter-
rence he needs to have a free hand in the region. That's the fear,
not the fear that he will put nuclear weapons on a missile and
shoot it at Israel or the United States. We know what kind of re-
sponse he will get, and he knows it as well.
What will happen next is that if he gets the deterrence he needs
to have a free hand in the region, what shape of action do we need
to take against him, and what kind of situation would we be in in
the future? That's the danger.
The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the answer, because I am not try-
ing to make a case. I'm trying to understand a point, because my
instinct, talking to so many people, is that the real concern is being
able to leverage that capability, as opposed to him preemptively
waking up one morning saying, “You know, I'm going to take out
Riyadh,” or “I'm going to take out Tel Aviv," or "I'm going to take
out Ankara,” assuming he had the range to do that, which he
doesn't, not at this point. But, at any rate, do you want to con-
clude? I've really gone beyond my time.
Ambassador BUTLER. Just very quickly, Senator. I think one
must acknowledge that it's extremely uncomfortable for us to know
that he's there with these weapons. But one has to draw a distinc-
tion, I think, between that discomfort and a rational calculation of
what he might do. And if you accept that one of his fundamental
imperatives is to stay in power, then it's hard to think that he


56
would wake up one morning and decide this is the day that I'm
going to go and attack the United States, because he knows that
that would be suicide. So I think that's a very important distinction
to draw. No one is comfortable with his weapons status. And why
should we be? But one has to keep clear eyes about what he might
calculate to serve his interest.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you.
And I thank Senator Chafee for his indulgence. Fire away, Sen-
ator.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This
panel is, the topic is “The Threat,” and I guess that's probably the
most important place to start, is the threat, and then in subse-
quent panels, we'll talk about possible responses, regional consider-
ations, the day after, and national security perspectives. But, of
course, I do think the threat is the most important one, of course.
And there was a recent story in the Washington Post, a Sunday
story, in which it says that, “Many senior U.S. military officers con-
tend that Saddam Hussein poses no immediate threat, and that the
United States should continue its policy of containment.” I know
Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel have talked about containment.
But some of the other quotes from the article are that, “This ap-
proach is held by some top generals and admirals in the military
establishment, including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” And
some of the quotes are, “In my assessment, the whole containment
and sanctions policy has worked better than it's given credit for.”
And another quote is, “We've bottled them up for 11 years, so we're
doing OK.”
I do think that it would have been good to have that perspective
on this panel, for better balance. I think we've got, from this panel,
a perspective that the threat is very real, very immediate. And I
maybe would ask you to comment on some of these senior military
officials, including, according to the article, members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and their
The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator will yield just for a moment. I
apologize, but
Senator CHAFEE. Excuse me.
The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. The Senator from Florida is going to
chair the hearing. I have to leave for a few minutes. And after this
panel is over, we'll recess for 45 minutes for lunch. I'm not sug-
gesting you finish now. When the panel is finished, we'll recess for
45 minutes.
I assure you, Senator, there are other witnesses coming along
who think the policy containment is just fine. So I hope you'll find
this is extremely balanced when we finish the whole 2 days of
hearings.
But I thank you for your letting me interrupt, and I turn the
gavel over to the Senator from Florida.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess I'll put my question specifically to Ambassador Butler,
because one of the quotes from this article was that senior officers
believe the policy has been more effective than is generally recog-
nized. And as evidence, the top brass said the approach has de-
terred Hussein from threatening his neighbors and from backing
terrorist organizations.


57
And in your testimony, you said the opposite. You said, “We do
know that Iraq has trained terrorists from around the region and
has mounted terrorist actions of its own as far afield as Southeast
Asia.” And I think you mentioned that you had some personal ex-
perience in that. So I'd maybe ask you to expound on that experi-
ence you have with Hussein training terrorists.
Ambassador BUTLER. Dr. Hamza gave more detail of that, and
there was no prior consultation between him and me before we
started work today. He referred to the terrorist training center at
a place called Salman Park, outside Baghdad. There are detailed
accounts available now of the throughput through that center of a
variety of nationalities, most of them from countries in the Middle
East. But the point is not just Iraqis, but a multiplicity of nationals
have been that school trained by Iraq in techniques of terrorism.
The incident that I referred to in Southeast Asia, when I said I
had one personal experience of the reach of Saddam, was that dur-
ing the gulf war, Saddam sent a terrorist hit group to Bangkok,
Thailand, when, at that time, I happened to be an Australian Am-
bassador to Thailand. The existence of that group was identified by
intelligence authorities, and their plan was to make an attack upon
the embassies of the United States, Australia, and Israel in Bang-
kok. Australia got this happy mention because we were a partici-
pant on the coalition of 29 countries that then sought to expel Iraq
from Kuwait.
There was a bit of a crisis in Bangkok. I had to ask assistance
of the Thai Army. They lived in our embassy compound for a
month, some several hundred soldiers and so on, until the threat
abated. The end of the story is that the cell involved was found,
it was heavily armed, and did, indeed, have detailed plans for a
military attack upon those three embassies. Dr. Hamza referred to
other instances where Iraq has conducted assassinations and so on
well away from Iraq. Those were the sorts of activities to which I
was referring.
Is there another part of your question that I've left out?
Senator CHAFEE. No, that was it. Your testimony was about that
experience in Southeast Asia and
Ambassador BUTLER. But I do, I just want to say I do-
Senator CHAFEE. It sounds like you're taking great exception to
the Washington Post article and some of the quotes in there.
Ambassador BUTLER. Sorry?
Senator CHAFEE. It sounds as though you're taking exception to
some of the quotes in that article that—the one I just read, “Senior
officers believe the policy of containment has been effective—more
effective than is generally recognized. And as evidence, the top
brass said that the approach has deterred Hussein from threat-
ening its neighbors and from backing terrorist organizations.'
Ambassador BUTLER. Yeah. No, I would like to address that.
Saddam Hussein has backed terrorism in a general way. What we
don't know is the nature of his involvement, if any, in September
11. There is some circumstantial evidence that suggests there has
been some involvement.
I don't agree with what you've quoted. I think that—I already
said this morning that a policy of containment was an essential
weapon. It's been well used. But by itself, it's not enough. We had


58
other weapons, as well: arms control, inspections, and so on. And
I think it's not appropriate or complete to say that that will serve
us well into the future. The continuing existence of Saddam Hus-
sein with his weapons of mass destruction activities and his contin-
ually throwing petrol on the fire of political problems in the Middle
East is something that I think is very dangerous in world politics,
and that is not addressed simply by a policy of narrow containment
of him.
Senator CHAFEE. Yes. I know my time is expired, but I want to
say that I think that's the key here, is the existence of the threat.
And there's some dispute. And yourself recognize, since we haven't
been able to inspect, we just don't know. And I think that's really
the key. It would be great to hear from some of those officers or
anybody else that has a different point of view on this what is the
threat. I think the three of you have been very strong that the
threat is immediate, and it's real. I think, for the benefit of our
study, it would have been good to hear an opposing point of view.
Senator NELSON (presiding). Professor.
Professor CORDESMAN. I don't believe you were here when the
question was asked whether containment was exhausted, and I
think the answer that both Ambassador Butler gave and I gave
was no.
Now, I do have to say, Senator, that I get very disturbed when
people quote the Joint Chiefs by anything other than name. And
it is always easy to find somebody in the joint staff who will say
virtually anything if you keep calling. So I do not deny that con-
tainment can go on. But, at least from my own view, one thing we
have to understand is there will never be a point certain at which
this risk reaches unacceptable levels, unless Saddam attacks or
threatens somebody else very visibly.
The other thing to remember is what containment really means.
It means a ruthless effort to stop arms imports, transfers of tech-
nology, the willingness to be in place and strike if he openly vio-
lates, in terms of weapons of mass destruction, as we have done in
the past, and to go on with a low-level war with his air defenses.
If that is sustaining containment, then we are doing a great deal.
But there is not a neat dividing line between resting in place and
throwing Saddam out of power.
Senator CHAFEE. Well, yes, I couldn't agree more. And, in fact,
you were the one that quoted Pliny and talked about body bags,
and that's why I think the key is the threat, and that's what we've
got to really get to the bottom of. And I believe I was here on the
question about containment and that we haven't exhausted it. But
exactly what's taking place in Iraq is, I guess, a mystery.
Senator NELSON. Senator Feingold.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As one of you referenced, on Monday Secretary of Defense Rums-
feld said that, “The Iraqis have a great deal of what they do deeply
buried,” suggesting that air power alone might not be enough to de-
stroy Íraq's non-conventional weapons facilities. We hear a lot
about these bunkers, and I want to just focus for a minute on the
issue of the underground sites themselves.
Writing 4 years ago in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dr.
Hamza suggested that the Iraqis, aware of the success of satellite


59
remote sensing in uncovering underground facilities, decided not to
build underground facilities. Do we have reason to believe that the
Iraqis altered their policy on this issue? And if so, why? And we'll
start with you, doctor.
Dr. HAMZA. Yes. Apparently, the nuclear facilities themselves are
above ground mostly. But what happened is that now Iraq shift-
ed—according to one civil engineer who defected recently, shifted
into building smaller underground facilities. And to cover that,
they understood the satellite angle quite well, that if you dig un-
derground, this is a red flag and everybody will be watching. Every
satellite passing by will be making tapes of what they are doing.
So what happened is they started doing that under existing
bunkers and under bungalows, so they had a surface cover to do
it, according to that engineer. And they do it also in duplicate, so
that if one site is compromised, they can go back to the backup
site.
So the policy has been changed, according to the defector, and
this is very credible report he is giving us, and it's been verified
here.
Senator FEINGOLD. Either of you have a comment on that?
Professor CORDESMAN. I think, Senator one comment, first. I
don't think the Secretary of Defense would say this carelessly, but
it is a mixture of what you harden and how many things you
harden, how many dispersed soft targets you have, how quickly you
can move your assets when you feel you are about to be seriously
under attack, and how well you can use decoys and deceive.
Now, we know the Iraqis use all four of those techniques. We
know they have refined them steadily since the attack on Osirak.
It is simply a reality that you are not going to be able to target
a lot of their assets.
We flew, as I said earlier, some 2,400 sorties against Iraq's Scuds
the last time. Suppressed them? Probably, at least in part. Killed
any? No. The idea of having the perfect target mix to strike at just
the right times seems to me to be simply impossible.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Let me ask a different question.
Some of the rhetoric about Iraq suggests that the primary concern
is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the notion that
the Government of Iraq is willing to provide such weapons or the
means to make them either to the highest bidder or to groups that
share some element of the Government of Iraq's world view. And,
of course, the precise nature of the proliferation to a non-state
actor scenario is not entirely clear. But if this is the case, then it
seems to me that countering that threat means securing materials
in widely dispersed sites, some of which we may know about, and
some of which we may not. If an invasion were to begin, if the gov-
ernment were to be toppled, wouldn't there be some degree of chaos
for some period of time, along with “use it or lose it” pressures?
Can't we expect, perhaps, self-interested individuals to start selling
off whatever they can to the highest bidder or taking materials of
concern out of the country for purposes of such sales? In other
words, isn't less control arguably even more dangerous than the
current situation?


60
I'd also like you to address whether or not this scenario would
argue against the so-called inside-out approach that was detailed
in Monday's New York Times?
Professor
Professor CORDESMAN. I think you hit on a very real risk, just
that striking some of these weapons might cause collateral damage.
But several points to bear in mind: it's going to get steadily worse,
not better. And if it gets bad enough, then the ability to use these
systems to intimidate or to be able to sort of sell or proliferate
them, without credible retaliation, will grow with time, not again
with any clear point at which this occurs.
My guess, and it's only a guess, would be that this risk at this
point in time is limited. Perhaps, in part, because those countries
that wish to disseminate chemical and biological weapons, or wish
to have them, are already doing pretty well on their own, and the
incremental effect here might be limited.
But your last question, to me, is one of the most important. I
think that you may be able to defeat the core of Saddam's oper-
ation by focusing on the core of his power. But certainly you have
to be ready simultaneously to go into other parts of the country
and do what UNSCOM couldn't finish. You can't simply rely on the
opposition to turn it over to you.
Senator FEINGOLD. Other responses, if I could, Mr. Chairman?
Senator NELSON. Yes. Ambassador.
Ambassador BUTLER. Yes, just very quickly, Senator, on your last
question about things underground. When I heard the recent focus
on that issue, I was utterly unsurprised, because our experience in
UNSCOM was of, you know, elaborate use of underground facili-
ties.
I just would add this additional concept, which is underground,
but under buildings, because that prevents you from seeing the
tunneling from the air if the tunneling is under buildings, includ-
ing Presidential palaces. And that's a concept that you will remem-
ber from a few years ago.
Now, I agree with what Professor Cordesman has said to you
with respect to your last question. It is a very bad situation in Iraq.
And were he to be removed, it's possible, of course, that there could
be a period of relative chaos or even a spot of anarchy and people
getting stuff and selling it off and so on. It's not necessarily a good
situation. What that means is that we must know who would re-
place him, and hopefully a bunch of people who are free of the
weapons of mass destruction mindset.
Before we stopped for the votes, the chairman put the question
to us about the removal of Saddam, “Is it just about this person?”
And remember, I'm one who argued that this country is unique in
its present circumstances, and that uniqueness is indivisible from
the fact that the President is Saddam Hussein. I think, in some
measure, it is him. But it's also a mindset, and we would need to
be sure that the group that replaced him was not in possession of
the same mindset.
Now, I would caution against the reasoning that says this is a
very bad situation, and were we to try to deal with it, it's going
to create some bad circumstances, like hitting weapons which
would then disperse them, chemical or biological, or a situation


61
where people are selling on the black market bad stuff that's been
made by Saddam and so on, and therefore we shouldn't do it, be-
cause that just puts off the evil day.
I
agree with Professor Cordesman. If we don't find the solution
to this soon, which ultimately must mean a group of people in con-
trol in Iraq who do not have his mindset with respect to these
weapons, it's going to be harder in the future.
Senator FEINGOLD. Well, those are very helpful answers. I thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator NELSON. Senator Lugar.
Senator LUGAR. I have nothing further.
Senator NELSON. Give us your opinion about the complicity of
Syria in avoiding the U.N. sanctions. Who would like to start? Pro-
fessor.
Professor CORDESMAN. Senator, I think that we have perhaps
found ourselves in a position where, because Syria has cooperated
in some aspects of dealing with al-Qaeda and certain types of
Islamist extremists, we've been a little reluctant to point out the
fact that there is an increasing flow, not so much of major arms,
but critical parts. We know things like jet engines, tank engines,
some aspects of armored spare parts are beginning to move
through Syria in very significant deliveries. I think, however, to get
down to the details is something that really only people in the in-
telligence community can tell you.
Senator NELSON. Any other comments?
Ambassador BUTLER. Not much to add to that except that Syria
has increasingly been a willing participant in Saddam's breaking of
the sanctions and running a black market in oil and so on. So
they've given comfort to him in financial terms. And a good deal
of the money that he raises that way, outside of the U.N. escrow
account and oil for food and so on, of course, fuels his military and
other activities.
Senator NELSON. The first downed pilot, through a series of mis-
takes, we left down, Commander Scott Speicher. Since then, we
have credible evidence of a live sighting of Commander Speicher
being taken to a hospital. Do any of you have any information with
regard to the whereabouts or the condition of Commander
Speicher?
Professor CORDESMAN. No, sir.
Senator NELSON. Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador BUTLER. It would be pretentious of me to say that
I do, in any positive way that would help those concerned about
him. But let me say, Senator, that I am aware of his case and have
formed the view, on the basis of information put to me and there
are no secrets there; it's not complete information—but I've formed
the view, and it's only a personal opinion, that the possibility that
he is alive is not small. And I, therefore, do not believe that we
should give up on him.
Senator NELSON. And why do you come to that conclusion, that
he might be alive?
Ambassador BUTLER. Well, I'm not referring to the idea of a live
sighting. What was found and not found in the investigations of the
crash site in the desert is one important series of factors, and that
there wasn't a body, that there's not been any mortal remains of
81-697 D-3


62
us
le
the man and some other anecdotal evidence of the kind that
you've just added to by saying now there's apparently a live sight-
ing.
I've got no possible way of assessing that. But there are individ-
uals who are interested in his welfare and who keep a dossier on
all of this, and I've seen some of those materials, and I think :- be-
hooves us not to give up on the possibility that he is alive.
Senator NELSON. Well, I take every opportunity to ask that c es-
tion, whether I'm meeting with the King of Jordan or the Presint
of Syria or the Prime Minister of Lebanon, meeting with var
government officials here, because there's a family that's gi ng
through agony in Jacksonville, Florida, on not knowing what is
status of their family member. So thank you for your comments.
Are there further questions? Senator Lugar.
Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I'd just ask this of this panel. s
there any evidence that Saddam Hussein is giving weapons of me 3
destruction information, parts, weapons themselves, to terroris
broadly defined, whichever group? And if he was doing so, wou
there be any fingerprints of this? How would we know? Does an
one have a comment on that?
Professor CORDESMAN. I would just say, Senator, that you cei
tainly hear other views, but all of my experience tells me this i
one of the areas where you are coming to the absolute core of the
intelligence community. One of the great problems you have is thai
when you have an extraordinarily unpopular man, you will have
report after report of internal division, support of terrorism, what-
ever contributes to taking military action against him. Sometimes
these will be real, and sometimes they need careful verification.
And one of the most disturbing things, not of what Dr. Hamza
has said, but what I have heard from others, is the tendency to as-
sert a conspiracy theory without citing the fact that there are many
other equally valuable ways of doing it.
Finally, if you have a really good intelligence service, it doesn't
take much to conceal something as small as, say, smallpox in a
transfer to a potential agent, and you probably will never know
until it happens.
Dr. HAMZA. According to Richard Sperzel, who is the chief inspec-
tor of the Iraq biological weapon program–I talked to him several
times—he is of the opinion that the type of anthrax, especially the
one that appeared in Senator Daschle's letter addressed to him, is
a type that would have an Iraqi fingerprint on it and that the type
of powder used and the technology used in loading the anthrax
spores on the powder would indicate that Iraq is a possible source
of this type of anthrax. He was not convinced that it is a single in-
dividual that did it, a loner somewhere. He thinks it is a joint ef-
fort, a large effort, of an expert team with a lot of technology under
his disposal.
So that would be just about the only indication so far that there
is a possible terrorism source from Iraq using its weapons of mass
destruction under its disposal.
Senator LUGAR. Ambassador Butler.
Ambassador BUTLER. Senator, I've already said this morning
that I think it would defy rationality for Saddam to supply WMD
technology to terrorists or other groups. Those weapons are identi-


63
Thank you.
fied by him as his indelible source of power and authority, and I
find it hard to think that he would behave in that way.
But on your direct question, is there evidence? No. What do I
think? I think there will have been conversations between Iraqis
and their various friends about the exquisite business of how to
make certain biological and chemical weapons and so on, conversa-
tions of a technical character. But there is no evidence, that I know
of, that they have actually transferred such weapons or technology.
Senator LUGAR. As Professor Cordesman has said, in ascribing
these theories of conspiracy, we need to find evidence. I don't think
yo can base whatever action our government wants to take upon
si position, however well founded, as some have argued in the
I
ss, and this is why I raised the question with each of you, and
ppreciate your responses.
Senator NELSON. Any further questions of the committee?
[No response.]
Senator NELSON. On instructions from the chairman, who will re-
irn at 2 o'clock, we will have a short recess, and the committee
ill resume with panel two at 2 o'clock.
Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, the chairman suggested, I think,
dispensation of 45 minutes?
Senator NELSON. Yes, but since then he has sent new instruc-
tions.
Senator LUGAR. Oh. all right.
Senator NELSON. And he will return at 2.
Senator LUGAR. Very well.
Senato; NELSON. The committee stands in recess.
[Whereipon, at 1:45 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p.m., the same day.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
The conmittee resumed, pursuant to recess, at 2:20 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Hiden, Jr. chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Sarbanes, Kerry, Feingold, Wellstone,
Bill Nelson Rockefeller, Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, and Brownback.
The CHAPMAN. The hearing will please come to order. I want to
thank all of our witnesses for putting up with this unusual sched-
ule. Most of you who have been around here understand it, and I
know, Mr. Anbassador, you have. It is always dangerous to sched-
ule serious hearings the last week the Senate is going to be in ses-
sion for a while, but I felt these were so important, as did Senator
Hagel, that we should move forward, so again I apologize for the
interruptions.
Our second panel is an equally significant panel, and will shed
a good deal of light on the issues we are discussing here. Our first
panelist is Arbassador Robert Gallucci. He is currently dean of
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. I want you to
know, dean, that I almost made a mistake when I spoke over at
Georgetown. I vas presented with a Georgetown chair that is sit-
ting in my offie, with a Georgetown seal on it, and as we were
about to file my financial disclosure I was sitting on the chair and
my secretary sad, are you sure you filed everything, and I said, ev-
.


64
erything I know. She said, how about what you are sitting on, and
it had not been, and so I might have been before the Ethics Com-
mittee had I not been sitting in that chair.
At any rate, he served as Ambassador at Large from 1994 to
1996, Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs
from 1992 to 1994, and Deputy Executive Chairman of the U.N.
Special Commission from 1991 to 1992 overseeing the disarmament
of Iraq, better known as UNSCOM.
We also have Mr. Charles Duelfer, who has briefed me in the
past, and I have been ungracious enough to mispronounce his
name, but he is currently visiting resident scholar at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, he served as Deputy Executive
Chairman of the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq from 1993 until
its termination in 2000, and for the last several months of
UNSCOM's existence he served as acting chairman.
General Joseph Hoar, U.S. Marine Corps, retired. General Hoar
served as commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command from
1991 to 1994. He was Deputy for Operations for the Marine Corps
during Desert Storm, retired in 1994 after a 37-year career in the
Marine Corps, and we appreciate you being here, general.
Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney retired from the Air Force in 1994.
Prior to his retirement, Lieutenant General McInerney served as
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. He is currently
a consultant.
And Dr. Morton Halperin. Mort is currently a senior fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations and the Washington director of Open
Society Institute. He was Director of the Policy Planning Staff for
the Department of State from 1998 to 2001. He served as Special
Assistant to the President, and Senior Director for Denocracy at
the National Security Council from 1994 to 1996, and was the Con-
sultant to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of De-
fense for Policy. He also, in an earlier incarnation, was the man
who I went to most for advice relating to civil liberties issues.
Welcome to you all, and I would invite you in the order you have
been called to give your statements, if you would. Welome again,
Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, DEAN, EDMUND
A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador GALLUCCI. Mr. Chairman, Senator Hagel, I am
pleased, really, to have the opportunity to appear before you today
and address the critical issue of American policy toward Iraq. I
would request, please, permission to provide a writter. statement
for the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.
Ambassador GALLUCCI. I would begin with the premise that the
only way Iraq poses a critical threat to the United States or our
allies is through the use of weapons of mass destruction in one of
two scenarios. First, if Iraq were to transfer chemica, biological, or
nuclear weapons to a terrorist group, or second, if Iaq were to use
these weapons against American or allied forces o homelands in
order to impede an American-led invasion aimed at verturning the
Iraqi regime.


65
Let me put this another way. If Iraq can be prevented from ac-
quiring weapons of mass destruction, and I say particularly viral,
biological weapons or nuclear weapons, then Iraq poses no special
threat to America or her allies. If Iraq does acquire WMD, the
threat still does not rise to a critical level because our deterrent,
our threat to retaliate in the event of Iraqi use of WMD is both
credible and effective.
However, if Iraq acquires and clandestinely transfers WMD to a
terrorist group, or if the United States should move to overthrow
Saddam Hussein, then we should not expect our deterrent to be ef-
fective either in preventing terrorist use of WMD against us or
Iraqi use against us in an effort to prevent regime change.
This line of reasoning leads us to ask about Iraqi WMD capabili-
ties that were addressed this morning. I would submit that no one
outside of Iraq knows with high confidence what those capabilities
are today. However, based on 7 years of inspections and 4 years
without inspections, the only prudent assumption is that Iraq has
or will have chemical and biological weapons at some point rel-
atively soon.
The nuclear weapons issue I think is more complicated, but since
Iraq has already done the signature work to design and develop the
triggering package for a weapon, and the acquisition of HEU or
plutonium from the states of the former Soviet Union cannot be
ruled out, we cannot have any real confidence that Iraq is not now
or will not become soon a nuclear weapons state.
In light of the threat posed by Iraqi acquisition of these weapons,
the unfulfilled requirements of the 1991 Ü.N. Security Council Res-
olution 687, the likelihood that Iraq will continue efforts to acquire
such weapons, and the character of the Iraqi regime, I do not think
it would be prudent for the United States to leave Iraq free to pur-
sue WMD acquisition indefinitely.
This assessment stands even if we lack any intelligence that Iraq
would, in fact, transfer WMD to a terrorist group. It is also an as-
sessment that leads some analysts to favor military action against
Iraq aimed at overturning the regime, which is one of the two cir-
cumstances in which deterrence could be expected to fail and Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction used against America or her allies.
It seems to me, therefore, that if the United States is to block
Iraqi acquisition of WMD, it should look for ways to do so short of
such a war for this, if for no other reason, and the other reasons,
loss of life, severe budgetary consequences, alienating friends and
allies around the region and around the world, and avoiding the
challenge of post conflict regime reconstruction and maintenance,
are important as well.
The question is, then, can a politically plausible inspection re-
gime be designed and put in place that would offer sufficient assur-
ance of preventing Iraq from acquiring WMD over the long term,
and could such a regime be forced upon the current Iraqi govern-
ment in the near term without first going to war against that gov-
ernment? Fortunately, 7 years or so of UNSCOM inspections give
us some insight into what a desirable regime would look like, and
what pitfalls need to be avoided in designing one.
First, we can assume that any regime that appeared as though
it would be effective in blocking Iraqi's WMD acquisition would


66
also be resisted by Iraq. Therefore, the only way to impose such a
regime, short of war, would be to pose to Iraq the credible alter-
native of a prompt invasion and regime change if the inspection re-
gime is resisted. Just as clearly, Iraq must be convinced that ac-
cepting such an inevitably intrusive inspection regime permanently
would, indeed, protect it from invasion, at least by the inspection
regime's sponsors.
Second, it should be clear to all by now that an inspection regime
that fails to give us high confidence that it is successfully uncover-
ing and blocking any serious WMD development is worse than no
regime at all. Such a regime gives Iraq cover and gives it the initia-
tive, protects it from invasion, and in some circumstances would
supply it with hostages.
Third, it is probably true that an inspection regime that is too
robust, that is, one accompanied by substantial supporting military
units deployed to the region, would inevitably be taken by friends
and allies, as well as Iraq, as a step to invasion, Desert Shield
masquerading as UNMOVIC plus.
Fourth, we are, therefore, in search of the Goldilocks inspection
regime, one that is balanced just right to be effective, acceptable,
and sustainable. Some obvious elements of such a regime are the
following:
Inspectors who have unrestricted, unlimited, and immediate ac-
cess to any site in Iraq. There can be no sanctuaries or exceptions.
Inspectors must be chosen for their experience and expertise,
without regard for geographic balance.
Inspectors must be free to receive, exchange, and discuss intel-
ligence with governments as necessary to conduct their missions.
Inspectors must be able to take whatever steps are necessary to
maintain the security of their communications and their oper-
ational plans.
Inspections must be undertaken in an environment free of Iraqi
movements of any kind, air or ground, in the area of the inspection.
And here is a key element: Inspectors should have the option of
conducting inspections supported by a specifically configured and
prepositioned military unit to assist it in entry, prevent loss of con-
tainment at an inspectionsite, and to manage any spontaneous ci-
vilian opposition.
On the last point, the inspection regime thus must be capable of
inspecting any designated site and overcoming any Iraqi non-
cooperation or resistance, except that mounted by a significant
military unit. In short, if an inspection fails, it must do so in a way
that creates a clear casus belli.
There will be many with international inspection experience who
would only participate in an inspection regime that presumed host
government cooperation, and who would oppose a regime that had
a military force organic to it, as I propose here. There are good rea-
sons for adopting such a position as a rule, but our past experience
with UNSCOM provides ample reason to treat Iraq as an exception
to that rule.
This inspection regime would be designed to prevent Iraq from
manipulating the inspection process. It would aim to strike the
right balance, linking the inspection regime to an invasion if Iraq


67
fails to cooperate, without being so robust as to appear an inevi-
table move to overthrow the Iraqi Government.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Gallucci follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMB. ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, DEAN, EDMUND A. WALSH
SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, I am pleased to have the oppor-
tunity to appear before you today to address the critical issue of American policy
toward Iraq.
I would begin with the premise that the only way Iraq poses a critical threat to
the United States or our allies is through the use of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), in one of two scenarios:
if Iraq were to transfer chemical, biological or nuclear weapons to a terrorist
group; or
if Iraq were to use these weapons against American or Allied forces, or our
homeland's, in order to prevent or impede an American led invasion aimed at
overturning the Iraqi regime.
Let me put this another way. If Iraq can be prevented from acquiring WMD—par-
ticularly viral biological weapons or nuclear weapons—then Iraq poses no special
threat to America or her allies. If Iraq does acquire WMD, the threat still does not
rise to a critical level because our deterrent, our threat to retaliate in the event of
Iraqi use of WMD, is credible and effective.
However, if Iraq acquires and clandestinely transfers WMD to a terrorist group,
or if the United States should move to overthrow Saddam Hussein, then we should
not expect our deterrent to be effective, either in preventing terrorist use of WMD
against us, or Iraqi use against us in an effort to prevent regime change.
This line of reasoning leads us to ask about Iraqi WMD capabilities. I submit that
no one outside of Iraq knows with high confidence what those capabilities are today.
However, we do know that Iraq had programs that successfully produced chemical
weapons (CW), including VX, biological weapons (BW), including anthrax, and an
implosion type nuclear weapons triggering package with some, but not enough,
fissile material for a weapon. We also know what was destroyed over seven years
of UINSCOM inspections, suspect some material that had been produced was not
found, and that more has been produced during the last four years of no inspections.
Furthermore, since clandestine manufacture of BW and CW agents could be accom-
plished by Iraq without high confidence of detection by allied intelligence agencies,
and Iraq's intention to acquire those weapons cannot be assumed to have dimin-
ished, the only prudent assumption is that Iraq has or will have chemical and bio-
logical weapons at some point.
The nuclear weapons issue is more complicated. Although the wish to acquire nu-
clear weapons must be assumed to continue in the Iraqi leadership, the facilities
required to produce the necessary fissile material probably would be detected, even
if Iraq attempted to clandestinely construct them, especially if plutonium was
sought. That said, a clandestine centrifuge program, producing highly enriched ura-
nium (HEU) could not be ruled out. What makes matters worse, however, is that
the acquisition of HEU or plutonium from the states of the former Soviet Union can-
not be ruled our either, in light of the well known inadequacies that persist in mate-
rial accountancy and control in those countries. Since Iraq has already done the
"signature” work to design and develop the triggering package for a weapon, we can-
not have any real confidence that Iraq is now, or will remain, a non-nuclear weap-
ons state.
In light of the threat posed by Iraqi acquisition of WMD, the unfulfilled require-
ments of the 1991 UN Security Council Resolution 687, the likelihood that Iraq will
continue efforts to acquire such weapons, and the character of the Iraqi regime, I
do not think it would be prudent for the United States to leave Iraq free to pursue
WMD acquisition indefinitely. This assessment stands even if we lack any intel-
ligence that Iraq would, in fact, transfer WMD to a terrorist group. It is also an
assessment that leads some analysts to favor military action against Iraq aimed at
overturning the regime—which is one of the two circumstances
in which deterrence
could be expected to fail and Iraqi weapons of mass destruction used against Amer-
ica or her allies. It seems to me, therefore, that if the United States is to block Iraqi
acquisition of WMD, it should look for ways to do so short of such a war for this,
if for no other reason. And the other reasons—loss of life, severe budgetary con-
sequences, alienating friends and allies in the region and around the world, and


68
avoiding the challenge of post-conflict regime reconstruction and maintenance—are
important as well.
The question is, then, can a politically plausible inspection regime be designed
and put in place that would offer sufficient assurance of preventing Iraq from ac-
quiring WMD over the long term? And could such a regime be forced upon the cur-
rent Iraqi government in the near term without first going to war against that gov-
ernment? Fortunately, the seven years or so of UNSCOM inspections give us some
insight into what a desirable regime would look like, and what pitfalls need to be
avoided in designing one.
First, we can assume that any regime that appeared as though it would be effec-
tive in blocking Iraqi WMD acquisition would also be resisted by Iraq. Therefore the
only way to impose such a regime short of war would be to pose to Iraq the credible
alternative of a prompt invasion and regime change, if the inspection regime is re-
sisted. Just as clearly, Iraq must be convinced that accepting such an inevitably in-
trusive regime-permanently-would indeed protect it from invasion, at least by the
regime sponsors.
Second, it should be clear to all by now that an inspection regime that fails to
give us high confidence that it is successfully uncovering and blocking any serious
WMD development is worse than no regime at all. Such a regime gives Iraq cover
and the initiative, protects it from invasion, and in some circumstances would sup-
ply it with hostages.
Third, it is probably true that an inspection regime that is too robust, that is, one
accompanied by substantial supporting military units deployed to the region, would
inevitably be taken by friends and allies, as well as Iraq, as a step to invasion:
Desert Shield masquerading as UNMOVIC PLUS.
Fourth, we are, therefore, in search of the “Goldilocks Inspection Regime,” one
that is balanced just right to be effective, acceptable and sustainable. Some obvious
elements of such a regime are the following:
• inspectors who have unrestricted, unlimited, and immediate access to any site
in Iraq; there can be no sanctuaries or exceptions;
• inspectors must be chosen for their experience and expertise without regard for
geographic balance;
• inspectors must be free to receive, exchange, and discuss intelligence with gov-
ernments as necessary to conduct their missions;
• inspectors must be able to take whatever steps are necessary to maintain the
security of their communications and their operational plans;
• inspections must be undertaken in an environment free of Iraqi movements of
any kind, air or ground, in the area of the inspection; and
inspectors should have the option of conducting inspections supported by a spe-
cially configured and prepositional military unit to assist it in entry, prevent
loss of containment at an inspection sight, and to manage any “spontaneous”
civilian opposition.
On the last point, the inspection regime must be capable of inspecting any des-
ignated sight and overcoming any Iraqi non-cooperation or resistance, except that
mounted by a significant military unit. In short, if an inspection fails, it must do
so in a way that creates a clear casus belli.
There will be many with international inspection experience who would only par-
ticipate in an inspection regime that presumed host government cooperation, and
who would oppose a regime that had a military force organic to it, as is proposed
here. There are good reasons for adopting such a position as a rule, but our past
experience with UNSCOM provides ample reason to treat Iraq as an exception to
that rule. This inspection regime would be designed to prevent Iraq from manipu-
lating the inspection process. It would aim to strike the right balance, linking the
inspection regime to an invasion if Iraq fails to cooperate, without being so robust
as to appear to inevitably presage a move to overthrow the Iraqi government.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, dean.
Mr. Duelfer.


69
STATEMENT OF CHARLES DUELFER, RESIDENT VISITING
SCHOLAR, MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC; FORMER
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, UNSCOM
Mr. DUELFER. Again, thank you for asking me to be here today,
and I would like to have my statement entered into the record as
well.
The CHAIRMAN. It will be.
Mr. DUELFER. My comments will draw upon my experience as
Deputy at UNSCOM from 1993 until 2000. I came to know many
Iraqis and their organizations quite well. They saw me both as a
U.N. official and also as an American with whom they could talk,
and sometimes quite candidly.
Let me state from the outset that I support the objective of cre-
ating the conditions where the Iraqi people can establish a new
leadership in Baghdad. There is a strong case for this, when you
consider the growing risks posed by the current regime, in contrast
with what Iraq could be under normal leadership.
The talent and resources that can design and build nuclear
weapons under Saddam can help Iraq be the leading economy and
culture of the Middle East under new government. Until that hap-
pens, the Iraqi people will never achieve their enormous potential.
Of course, getting there is the issue.
I have a differing opinion from Dr. Gallucci. In my opinion, weap-
ons inspections are not the answer to the real problem, which is
the regime, nor can they even fully eliminate in perpetuity Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction so long as this regime is in power,
and I would make another comment here in terms of terminology.
Earlier this morning, there was a lot of talk about arms control,
but what we are discussing with respect to Iraq is coercive disar-
mament. Iraq initiated a war, they lost, and part of the terms of
the cease-fire agreement were that it was supposed to get rid of a
large part of its arsenal, and that was to be verified by UNSCOM.
That is not really arms control in the classical sense, where two
parties enter into an agreement because they think it is in their
common interest. Iraq steadfastly does not believe that it is in its
interest to get rid of these weapons.
Here I come to a key problem that I see in this whole dynamic,
and that is that the forces are all wrong. The Security Council
writes resolutions demanding Iraq give up weapons of mass de-
struction capabilities which the regime believes are essential to its
survival. UNSCOM was created to attempt to implement this objec-
tive. We did a lot. Bob Gallucci did a lot. Richard Butler did a lot.
All of our experts on the ground, they did the most, but ultimately
Baghdad had vastly more resources than we did, and much more
endurance than the Security Council.
Ultimately, the Security Council was not willing to commit the
resources to enforce compliance. Saddam very cleverly divided the
Council with threats, rewards, and ultimately by holding his own
people hostage. He created a situation where Council members did
not want to see more pain fall on innocent Iraqis as a consequence
of support to inspectors.
This will no doubt happen again, and here again I would point
out the same dynamic occurred after World War I. The Versailles


70
Treaty obligated the Germans to disarm. The international commu-
nity created a bunch of inspection teams. They had the same prob-
lems, they lasted about the same length of time, and it ultimately
failed.
But even if you can imagine a radically different approach to in-
spections with a sizable military force, I do not see how that would
work over the long term. Can we keep forces deployed to support
inspections forever? Are we really prepared to give back to this re-
gime control of the oil revenues? And pursuing this approach does
nothing for the innocent Iraqis trapped under this government.
In essence, inspections in my opinion are only a short term pal-
liative, and do not address the fundamental problem. Saddam
knows this, and if he concludes we are really preparing for regime
change, he will offer the concession of allowing inspectors in under
some conditions. This will only be a tactical retreat on his part.
I want to make a second point now before I conclude. Finally-
and this has to do with regime change—there is a central point
that is simple, but it is a central point on regime change, and that
is that it is fundamentally a political objective, not a military one.
Military commitment will be essential to convince various audi-
ences we are serious this time and Saddam's days are numbered.
However, creating the conditions for new leadership in Baghdad
demands a political strategy to guide potential military action.
Moreover, what we do in a nonmilitary realm before potential con-
flict will directly affect the extent of possible military conflict and
the amount of damage to Iraq and ourselves.
In this light, it is essential that Iraqis in Iraq know that their
lot will only improve when the current regime is gone. Iraqis and
key institutions in Iraq should understand that their interests are
not served by defending Saddam and his clique. We can make a
good case that intervention is justified, given the unique and dan-
gerous characteristics of this regime.
My guess is that with sufficient work and consultations we can
build international support to create conditions for regime change,
and a consensus on characteristics we expect a new government to
achieve. Moreover, we can make decisions about such matters as
relieving sanctions, establishing security relations, and debt relief,
based upon how the new government progresses toward higher
standards, but I reiterate, our highest priority should be convincing
Iraqis in Iraq that they will be better off when Saddam has gone,
and that he will be gone.
Iraqis and their institutions will be making vital decisions about
their future without Saddam. The Iraqi people are the greatest
threat to Saddam's regime. If they are convinced Saddam and his
clique are doomed, they will make decisions that are in their inter-
est and our interest, and any ultimate use of force can be mini-
mized.
Finally, let me just make a comment, a personal comment. I re-
member asking a senior Iraqi once whether he served his country
or Saddam. It was not possible for him to answer, but he definitely
understood the difference. In essence, we need to make it possible
for the Iraqi people to act in the interests of their country and not
Saddam Hussein.
Thank you.


71
[The prepared statement of Mr. Duelfer follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES DUELFER, RESIDENT VISITING SCHOLAR, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; FORMER DEPUTY EXECUTIVE CHAIR-
MAN, UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ (UNSCOM)
Thank you for the opportunity to testify at such a critical moment with respect
to relations and actions toward Iraq. My remarks will reflect my years investigating
Iraq's weapons programs as the Deputy Executive Chairman of UNSCOM. This
gave me the opportunity to know Iraqi institutions and individual Iraqis high and
low. I dealt with diplomats, technocrats, military, intelligence and regime officials
as well as many Iraqis who have departed Iraq. While I was a UN official, my Iraqi
interlocutors were always aware that I was an American familiar with Washington
and its policies on Iraq.
As other witnesses have made clear, a key feature of the present regime is its
dedication to all types of weapons of mass destruction. I can only underline the view
that, all other things being equal, the current leadership in Baghdad will eventually
achieve a nuclear weapon in addition to their current inventories of other weapons
of mass destruction. For more than a decade the regime allocated billions of dollars
and the efforts of thousands of individuals toward this end. That they were near
success in 1991 is a tribute to the vast talent of the Iraqi people, the great resources
of the country, and their misdirection by reckless, oppressive leadership. To me this
highlights the enormous difference between what Iraq could be under different lead-
ership and what it will be if the present regime continues.
Looking forward, the risk posed by the present regime will entail leverage of
growing oil production (perhaps to 4-5 million barrels a day in a few years), the di-
minished effectiveness of sanctions as a restraining force, and the ultimate risk of
a belligerent state in the region with nuclear weapons. The leadership in Baghdad
knows that it was a serious blunder to invade Kuwait before they had a nuclear
weapon. Regional states know this as well and recognize they will have to accommo-
date Saddam once a nuclear weapon is achieved. Even now they are very cautious
not to antagonize the regime. So far, Saddam has proven to be a survivor and quite
willing to exercise whatever leverage available to him.
In opposition to the accumulating dangers of the present regime, it is worth con-
sidering the opportunity cost to the world, and especially to the Iraqi people of the
persistence of this regime.
In my experience, most Iraqis would like nothing more than to be reconnected to
the rest of the world and indeed, the United States. Through the accident of birth,
individuals with talent in the sciences, engineering and even military serve in a
country under a miserable leadership. Exercising the option of not serving at the
direction of the regime is to put themselves and families at great risk.
During my years at UNSCOM, working toward the elimination of Iraqi WMD ca-
pabilities, I often commented to colleagues in Washington that if I had 100 green
cards to pass out, we could have the Iraqi program dissected and eliminated. This
was meant to illustrate that the programs depend critically on a relatively limited
number of people--people, who, given a choice, would rather be someplace else. Of
course no one provided them such a choice. Nevertheless many Iraqis leave if they
can. The constant drain of Iraqis illustrates the hopelessness in Iraq. A country with
all the ingredients to be a growing regional economic power is, instead, a waste of
great talent and squandered resources.
The long-term threat posed by this regime cannot, in my opinion, be addressed
with weapons inspections. The experience of UNSCOŃ from 1991 to 1998 bears this
out. While UNSCOM accomplished significant disarmament, it was not complete
and it certainly wasn't permanent. At best the inspections provided a temporary im-
provement to regional stability. However, the goal in UN resolutions is not tem-
porary WMD disarmament but permanent coercive disarmament. This means the
inspectors were ultimately supposed to monitor extensively and intrusively forever.
Iraq was supposed to comply fully and verifiably. If they did so, sanctions were to
be lifted.
Iraq offered tactical cooperation and worked to divide the Security Council and
erode sanctions. The international community could not sustain its commitment to
its own resolutions—especially when confronted with the impact on Iraqi civilians
that were ultimately held hostage by the leadership in Baghdad. From the regime's
perspective, inspections were a temporary setback. They were correct. It is highly
probable that if Baghdad becomes convinced that significant action to depose the re-
gime is likely, they will offer the concession of accepting inspectors once again with
the aim of buying time and dividing the international community.


72
A critical point we learned in the mid-nineties was just how important weapons
of mass destruction were held by the regime. Senior Iraqi officials stated convinc-
ingly that the use of chemical weapons saved them in the war against Iran. It was
their counter to Iranian human wave attacks. The use of long range missiles was
also seen as vital to attack cities deep in Iran behind the forward battle lines.
Moreover, the regime believes that the possession of chemical and biological weap-
ons contributed strongly to deterring the United States from going to Baghdad in
1991. They first described their pre-war actions to disperse weapons and pre-dele-
gate authority to use them if the United States went to Baghdad in a long meeting
with Iraqi ministers in September 1995. This discussion took place only after a sur-
prising event during the history of UNSCOM's work in Iraq.
Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, defected to Jordan in August 1995. He had
been the lead member in the ruling family directing much of the WMD effort. Fol-
lowing his defection, UNSCOM learned the WMD program was more extensive than
had been declared and efforts were still underway-even as UNSCOM was oper-
ating its monitoring system. Moreover, we learned that a system for the conceal-
ment of these activities was run out of the Presidency. UNSCOM came close to hav-
ing an inspection and monitoring system in Iraq where we would report Iraqi co-
operation, but they would not be complying.
Prior to the defection, many members of the Security Council had been pressing
UNSCOM to report favorably on its disarmament and monitoring work. They had
tired of the long dispute that consumed long debates in the Security Council. More-
over, Iraq had been threatening to end its work with the UN unless UNSCOM re-
ported favorably and the Security Council acted to end sanctions. Saddam Hussein
himself declared such a threat in his National Day speech of July 17, 1995. The
Iraqi Foreign Minister, in Cairo a few days later, set a deadline of August 31, 1995.
Finding Iraq intractable, many began, implicitly, to question UNSCOM. Maybe
UNSCOM was simply too fastidious or worse, too much under the influence of the
United States. Maybe Iraq would never be able to satisfy the technocrats in
UNSCOM and then the Security Council would be stuck. These arguments and this
predicament are not new.
The last time the international community attempted this sort of political solution
to a military threat was following World War I when Germany was subject to strict
disarmament limits set in the Versailles Treaty. An international body analogous
to UNSCOM was created (called the Inter-Allied Control Commission) with virtually
identical tasks as given UNSCOM and similar limitations. The dynamic was the
same. An international body was directed by a victorious coalition to verify the coer-
cive disarmament of a country that had not been occupied.
These earlier inspectors encountered all the same problems and deceptions as
UNSCOM. I have looked up their reports in the British archives. Change some of
the nouns and you would think you were reading UNSCOM reports. They were har-
assed, given wrong and misleading declarations, blocked from sites, accused of being
spies, and pressured to give false positive reports, etc. Germany (particularly the
Reichswehr under the direct guidance of General Hans Von Seeckt) worked to sus-
tain capabilities and development work with the same strategies and techniques
that UNSCOM found in Iraq. Development work was concealed in a variety of ways,
including in civilian areas (e.g. hidden Krupp arms development, secret naval design
efforts, like the pocket battleship, and civil aviation masking military training). Pro-
grams were located overseas (e.g. expertise in submarine work was offered overseas,
tank and aircraft training took place in Russia as well as the sale of a chemical
weapons production plant). Only when France reoccupied the Ruhr did Germany be-
come, albeit temporarily, forthcoming with proper weapons declarations.
At the same time, Germany under Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann worked
diplomatically to escape the constraints. The Allied coalition of 1918 eventually
melted down in its purpose. Ultimately after six years of inspections, the Inter-Al-
lied Control Commission was removed from Germany—its work incomplete, but po-
litical momentum swept over its reports. The international community in 1926-27
halted the inspections with the artifice that Germany would join the League of Na-
tions and be subject to the global disarmament actions under that body.
Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz was well aware of this disconnect between the
inspectors categorical goals and the murky commitment of force behind them. He
said on more than one occasion that we were not General MacArthur. We did not
occupy Iraq. Therefore there were limits to what we could do.
Tariq Aziz was absolutely correct, although we did our best to escape this reality.
UNSCOM tried very intrusive and imaginative methods to penetrate the security
of Iraqi weapons programs (including techniques not usually associated with an
international body accustomed to the virtues of transparency and diversity of mem-
bership). However, against the full resources of a nation-state, with thousands of


74
touched upon a very sensitive issue for an assembly of sovereign states. If nothing
else, he highlighted the possibility that under certain circumstances external inter-
vention may be justified.
Such a case could be made with respect to Iraq under the current regime. It is
a growing risk to all concerned, not least of which are the Iraqi people themselves.
One certainty is that the situation is not static. Iraq is going to evolve one way
or the other. Limited actions by the international community will have limited ef-
fects. The threat will continue to grow and in the meantime the opportunity for a
positive Iraq continue to slide into the future. This is clearly an issue where the
United States must lead one way or another. Mr. Chairman, you and your com-
mittee are raising an important subject that needs to be examined from many as-
pects. I hope my comments have helped illuminate some facets of this difficult issue.
I attach copies of two recent and relevant op-ed articles for the record.
[From the Washington Times, Sunday, July 14, 2002]
PRELUDE TO A REPLAY OVER INSPECTIONS
(By Charles Duelfer)
Earlier this month U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Iraqi Foreign Minister
Naji Sabri falled to agree on the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq.
This was not surprising. Baghdad agreed to begin such discussions in March
when U.S. military action against Saddam Hussein's regime looked imminent from
its standpoint. Accepting inspectors in some fashion is a tactic Iraq will employ to
derail international support for an American military buildup against the regime.
When the U.S. actually deploys forces, international pressure for a peaceful “solu-
tion” will rise and the leverage of an Iraqi “concession" on accepting inspectors will
be far greater. Baghdad now judges Washington will not begin such actions before
the end of the year at the earliest. Hence, the inspection card will not be played
until later. In this context, even if inspectors get into Iraq, their prospects are dim.
The UN inspectors have been and will be caught between the conflicting go of
Baghdad, Washington, and other Security Council members. Their ability to succeed
is limited by Iraq's lack of cooperation and the council's inability to force compilance.
Baghdad views weapons of mass destruction as vital to the survival of the regime.
Chemical weapons were instrumnental in the war against Iran. Iraq believes its ar-
senal in 1991 helped deter the United States from proceeding to Baghdad.
The regime has every reason to associate these weapons with its own survival.
Consider whether Washington would even be contemplating military action to de-
pose the regime if Saddam had the capacity to detonate a nuclear explosive on U.S.
forces or Tel Aviv.
U.N. inspections, at best, may delay or complicate Iraq's weapons program. The
former weapons-inspection team, UNSCOM, endeavored for seven years to account
for all Iraqi programs. That tortured experience yielded partial compliance by Bagh-
dad. Iraq gave up what it was forced to expose, and retained the rest.
The continuous cat-and-mouse game along with episodic U.S. and British bombing
has given Baghdad excellent practice in concealing its weapons. The U.N. inspectors
have, on paper, the right to immediate, unconditional, unrestricted access-words
that sound good in New York but are difficult to implement in Iraq.
Practicalities intrude. For example, is it reasonable todemand that Iraq turn off
its entire air defense system so the inspectors may fly into Iraq anytime, and any-
where? Baghdad will reasonably point out that it has a legitimate air defense sys-
tem and some accommodation must be made to provide information about U.N.
flights. From this, the Iraqi government can derive warning information on inspec-
tions. Similar accommodations will sprout in vittually all inspection activities.
Iraq's close monitoring of all inspection activities meant “no-notice” inspections
rarely equated to surprise inspections. UNSCOM conducted hundreds of no-notice
inspections. However, only a few were truly suprise inspections, and they developed
into confrontations, delays and blockages.
Further, as the U.N. resolutions are now written, it is up to the inspectors how
extensive they wish to make their system. Whatever is deployed will be worked out
between the inspectors and Iraq. The Security Council has not stated any perform-
ance criteria for the system. The absence of concrete directives puts U.N. inspectors
in a weak position to demand a system elaborate and intrusive enough to make
credible judgements about Iraqi disarmament.
If the U.N.-Iraqi process proceeds, how will we know if a serious inspection re-
gime is planned? One test will be whether there is serious investigation of Iraq's


75
activities since UNSCOM left in December 1998. Credible defectors have reported
that Iraq has expanded its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs during
this period. The U.N. database includes the 200-300 key engineers, scientists and
technicians from Iraq's prior WMD programs. If the programs have continued, many
of these individuals will be involved. Inspectors, must interview these people with-
out Iraqi government presence to verify their activities since 1998.
UNSCOM had agreed (mistakenly, in retrospect) to allow Iraqi government ob-
servers to be present at all interviews. Iraq was able to keep a complete record of
all information transmitted to the inspectors, and this facilitated its control of the
incomplete picture presented. It also allowed the intimidation of the interviewees
(who were often terrified of saying something contrary to the established line.)
Ultimately, pursuit of more intrusive, credible, inspections will lead to conflict be-
tween inspectors and the Iraqis. This will land in the Security Council sooner or
later, and the same messy debates from 1997-8 will recur. Does non-cooperation by
Iraq mean they are not complying? Is war justifed simply because some stubborn
inspector was blocked from a sensitive security warehouse?
If the United States is serious about solving the Iraq problem, it should not center
its argument for changing the management in Baghdad on the inspection issue.
Washington needs to make a broader case. It needs to show that the threat is
broad and growing. Moreover, given the authoritarian nature of the regime, it is dis-
ingenuous to say the Iraqis should change their own government. Outside interven-
tion is needed to create conditions under which Iraqis can change their government.
The tremendous potential of the Iraqi people combined with Iraq's resources will
never be realized under this regime. A country that should have a vibrant society
and be the engine of development in the Middle East will remain a contorted and
dangerous mutant threatening the region and beyond. And the people will continue
to suffer.
[From the Baltimore Sun, June 3, 2002]
PRO-ARAB POLICY IS TO GIVE IRAQIS A NEW REGIME
(By Charles Duelfer)
WASHINGTON.—The explosion between Israel and the Paiestinians has not
changed the underlying logic for regime change in Baghdad. But it has greatly af-
fected the regional political context, making it essential that a compelling positive
case be made in the Arab world for such a pursuit.
So far, a strong, coherent public message has not come out of Washington. Cer-
tainly one can be made. Washington can make the point that there are two possible
futures for Iraq.
One is a continuation of the present regime led by Saddam Hussein, with its
growing threat to the region and repression of its own people.
The growth of Iraq's weapons capabilities (eventually including nuclear), the le-
verage of growing oil production and the wasted potential of a vibrant population
all point to an inevitable future problem. This is unacceptable over the long term-
especially for the United States, whose military will ultimately be called upon.
A second possible future for Iraq is a more positive one in which its leaders sub-
scribe to international norms and its people can achieve their enormous potential.
Iraqis are energetic, assign great prestige to education, engineering and the arts
and, in my experience, would like nothing
better than to be reconnected to the rest
of the world, including the United States. The combination of the Iraqi people and
their huge oil and agricultural resources should be the engine of development in the
Middle East.
The difference between these two possible futures is Mr. Hussein. Given the
unique authoritarian nature of his regime, it is disingenuous to say that the Iraqi
people on their own should change their leadership. Therefore, outside intervention
is needed to create the conditions under which the Iraqi people can change their
own government. They will never be able to achieve their potential under Mr. Hus-
sein.
Therefore, action against the regime is not an attack against Arabs, as Mr. Hus-
sein would say, but for Arabs. In fact, leaving Mr. Hussein in power is an anti-Arab
position.
Creating the conditions to permit a change of government in Baghdad requires
that the United States take the lead with an unquestionable commitment to bring-
ing about that change. This will force Iraqis and leaders in the Middle East and
Europe to evaluate what relationship they will have with the next Iraqi government.


76
Once this mindset is established, it will become apparent that a new Iraqi govern-
ment is in their interest and that it would be shortsighted to act to preserve the
current regime, despite Mr. Hussein's attempts to buy support through oil contracts.
To this end, the message must be that the United States seeks both the greatest
and the least change in Iraq—the greatest being the removal of Mr. Hussein, the
least being retention of established institutions such as the civil service, the various
civilian ministries and even the regular army. These national institutions will be
essential in a post-Hussein government.
Success will depend entirely on making it clear that the United States is abso-
lutely committed to following through on a regime change. This will mean preparing
and being willing to deploy as many military forces as necessary.
Only this level of commitment can provide the incentive for the necessary switch
in mindset among Iraqis (and the rest of the region). Once Iraqis become convinced
that Mr. Hussein's fall is inevitable, he will find himself very lonely in Baghdad.
A special element in this strategy is Russia. Washington must convince Moscow
that it will benefit by a new government. For example, only if there is a new govern-
ment in Iraq will Russia be able to exercise its contracts to develop Iraqi oil fields
and receive repayment of $8 billion of debt.
The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians provides a political smokescreen
for Mr. Hussein. Washington needs to reverse this by demonstrating that a new re-
gime in Iraq is a pro-Arab policy. This diplomatic and political work needs to hap-
pen now, even if potential military options are delayed.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
General Hoar.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH P. HOAR, U.S. MARINE CORPS
(RET.), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND (1991-1994), DEL MAR, CA
General HOAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to
address the committee. I am in favor of a regime change in Iraq.
What is at issue is the means and the timing. The issue has four
key components, all of which deserve our discussion and, indeed,
a national debate because of their implications.
First is a change of policy, after a period of over 50 years, in
which we depart from the principle of deterrence to one of preemp-
tion.
The second is the need for support from countries in the Middle
East, Asia, as well as our traditional allies in NATO, Japan, Aus-
tralia, and elsewhere, as we contemplate combat operations against
Iraq.
The third is the problems associated with mounting a military
campaign against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and then fi-
nally, assuming success of this military campaign, the implications
for war termination, most especially the requirements for nation-
building.
First, the issue of deterrence and preemption. For more than 50
years, deterrence has served us well, up to and including Secretary
of State Jim Baker's warning just before Desert Storm in Geneva
to the Iraqi regime about the use of weapons of mass destruction.
Deterrence is still the best option until operations against al-Qaeda
have turned the corner and major progress, with Ŭ.S. leadership,
has been made on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
Let me now frame some questions about a preemption strike.
How will we know that Iraq is planning to pass weapons to ter-
rorist organizations? Poor intelligence remains a problem. In 1990,
there were 1,800 technical and professional people working in the
nuclear program in Iraq, and we did not know it.


77
Or is simply possession of weapons of mass destruction among
the nations of the "axis of evil” sufficient? Will Iranian nuclear
power plants be next? Does it apply just to nuclear weapons, or do
chemical and biological weapons deserve the same treatment, be-
cause a number of Islamic and Arab countries possess chemical and
biological capabilities.
What are the red lines? What will we need, and what process
shall we use before a preemptive strike? I would hope that it would
be based on more than the circumstantial evidence that we have
available at this time.
May the President declare an intent to strike without a declara-
tion of war from the Congress of the United States? What effect
does this policy have on other countries with whom we might have
disagreements in the future, for example, China?
Second, if you believe, as I do, that the United States has a
moral responsibility, as the world's only superpower, to provide
leadership to at least assure stability, if not peace, why are we con-
vincing virtually none of the European countries, let alone the Arab
countries, of the need for an attack on Iraq? My sense is the Arab
countries will not support a campaign of this type without signifi-
cant movement toward peace between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority.
On a more practical level, we need bases, overflight, intelligence,
search and rescue, support from Arab neighbors in the vicinity of
Iraq, and from our allies, financial and troop support for nation-
building that would follow a successful military campaign.
With respect to the military campaign, war in the Middle East,
now as before, depends on logistics. Even with the astonishing
technical gains exhibited in Afghanistan, logistics is still the most
challenging aspect of this campaign. Strategic lift, both sea and air,
was my No. 1 priority on the Integrated Priority List when I was
the commander in chief at CENTCOM. It was at the top of Norm
Schwartzkopf's list before me, and I expect it is still high for his
successors today.
Getting to the region with troops, equipment, and supplies, and
most important, maintaining them through an operation of any size
will be key. There is no doubt we would prevail, but at what risk?
Risk in the military is simply the cost of American men and women
serving in the military who would be killed or injured in an oper-
ation like this.
The Iraqi campaign is a risky endeavor. To think that you can
support an operation of this type without control of ground lines of
communications and support from the sea seems to me to be re-
mote. For example, any logistics_buildup would require an anti-
missile defense for our troops. A Patriot missile battalion requires
over 250 CE-141 sorties from the United States or from the Euro-
pean theater. The size of the force, how it will be deployed, where
will the logistics buildup be located, and the timeframe needed are
all critical to success.
Finally, assuming a successful military campaign, we need at the
policy level in government a war termination plan. This is some-
thing that we did not have in Desert Storm. In short, how do we
achieve a political status acceptable to our government. After the
expulsion of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the requirement of war


78
termination will include the establishment of a new government,
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, a newly reorga-
nized armed force, and a police force, what has been basically de-
scribed as nation-building.
Who will do this? Will there be a Marshall Plan for Iraq, a nation
of 25 million people? Where is the analysis of that cost, the people
and the funds and the equipment who will bear that cost?
All of these components need to be discussed both in open and
closed hearing to be sure that a preemptive strike on Iraq is the
correct course of action.
I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, general.
Lieutenant General McInerney.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. THOMAS G. McINERNEY, U.S. AIR
FORCE (RET.), FORMER ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. AIR FORCE, WASHINGTON, DC
General MCINERNEY. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
thank you for this special opportunity to discuss the war of libera-
tion to remove Saddam's regime from Iraq. I will not dwell on the
merits of why he should be removed. Suffice it to say, we must pre-
empt threats such as those posed by Saddam Hussein. We face an
enemy that makes its principal strategy the targeting of civilians
and nonmilitary assets. We should not wait to be attacked by ter-
rorists and rogue states with weapons of mass destruction. We
have not only the right but the obligation to defend ourselves by
preempting these threats.
I will now focus on the way to do it very expeditiously and with
minimum loss of life on both the coalition forces, the Iraqi military,
and the people themselves, and at the same time maintain a rel-
atively small footprint in the region.
Access is an important issue, and we want to minimize the polit-
ical impact on our allies adjacent to Iraq that are supporting the
coalition forces. Our immediate objectives will be the following:
Help Iraqi people liberate Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein and
his regime; eliminate weapons of mass destruction and production
facilities; complete military operations as soon as possible; protect
economic infrastructure targets; identify and terminate terrorism
connections; and establish an interim government as soon as pos-
sible.
Our longer term objectives will be to bring a democratic govern-
ment to Iraq using our post World War II experiences with Ger-
many, Japan, and Italy, that will influence the region significantly.
Now, I would like to broadly discuss the combined campaign to
achieve these objectives, using what I will call blitz warfare to sim-
plify the discussion.
Blitz warfare is an intensive, 24-hour, 7 days a week precision
aircentric campaign supported by fast-moving ground forces com-
posed of a mixture of heavy, light, airborne, amphibious, special,
covert operations working with opposition forces that all use ef-
fects-based operations for their target set and correlate their timing
of forces for a devastating, violent impact.
This precision air campaign is characterized by many precision
weapons, upwards of 90 percent using our latest C2ISR command


79
and control intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets
such as Jstars, Global Hawk, Predator, human intelligence, signals
intelligence, et cetera, in a networkcentric configuration to achieve
less than 10 minutes for time-critical targeting.
Using the Global Strike Task Force, the naval strike forces com-
posed of over 1,000 land and sea-based aircraft, plus a wide array
of air and sea-launched cruise missiles, this will be the most mas-
sive precision air campaign in history, achieving rapid dominance
in the first 72 hours of combat, focused on regime-changed targets.
These are defined as targets critical to Saddam's control. For exam-
ple, his command and control and intelligence assets, his inte-
grated air defense, his weapons of mass destruction, palaces and lo-
cations that harbor his leadership, plus those military units that
resist or fight our coalition forces.
All the Iraqi military forces will be told through the opposition
forces in our information operations campaign that they have two
choices, either help us change regime leadership and build a de-
mocracy, or be destroyed. In addition, commanders and men and
weapons of mass destruction forces will be told that they will be
tried as war criminals if they use their weapons against coalition
forces or other nations.
In a multidirectional campaign, coalition forces will seize Basra,
Mosul, and most of the oil fields, neutralize selected corps of the
Iraqi Army, and destroy the integrated air defense zone, command
and control, weapons of mass destruction locations, and Iraqi air,
using our stealth, SAM suppression, and air superiority assets.
This will enable coalition forces to achieve 24/7 air dominance
quickly, which is critical to our success.
The expansion of our beachheads in the north, south, east, and
west regions, and the airheads, seized with alarming speed, will
allow the opposition forces to play a very significant and decisively
important role with our special covert operations and the Iraqi
army and air force, to determine their status, i.e., are they friend,
foe, or just disarmed.
The political arm of the opposition will communicate intensively
with the Iraqi people, letting them know they are liberating them
from 22 years of oppression, and that they are now controlling
large amounts of territory. Humanitarian missions will be accom-
plished simultaneously with leaflet drops, et cetera.
U.S. and other coalition forces are helping us to liberate and
change the regime, is the mantra. You, the Iraqi people, must help
us to do this quickly, and with minimum loss of life. This IO cam-
paign must be well-planned and executed, working closely with the
opposition forces. This means that the administration must move
very quickly now to solidify the opposition forces, to include the op-
position military forces, and set up a shadow government with ag-
gressive assistance and leadership from the United States.
In summary, the Iraqi forces we are facing are about 30 percent
equivalent since Desert Storm, with no modernization. Most of the
army does not want to fight for Saddam, and the people want a re-
gime change. Let us help them to make that change, and liberate
Iraq from this oppressor. President Bush has accurately said, inac-
tion is not an option, and I am in support of his position.
I await your questions, Mr. Chairman.


80
[The prepared statement of General McInerney follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS G. MCINERNEY, LT. GEN. USAF (RET.)
A WAR OF LIBERATION
Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Thank
you for this special opportunity to discuss a war of liberation to remove Saddam's
regime from Iraq. I will not discuss the merits of why he should be removed but
will focus on the way to do it very expeditiously and with minimum loss of life on
both the coalition forces, the Iraqi military and people themselves; and, at the same
time maintain a relatively small foot print in the region.
Access is an important issue and we want to minimize the political impact on our
allies adjacent to Iraq that are supporting the coalition forces. Our immediate objec-
tives will be the following:
(1) Help Iraqi people liberate Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein and his re-
gime.
(2) Eliminate WMD and production facilities.
(3) Complete military operations ASAP.
(4) Protect economic infrastructure targets.
(5) ID and terminate terrorism connections.
(6) Establish an interim government ASAP.
Our longer term objectives will be to bring a democratic government to Iraq using
our post WW II experiences with Germany, Japan and Italy that will influence the
region significantly.
Now I would like to broadly discuss the combined campaign to achieve these ob-
jectives using what I will call “blitz warfare” to simplify the discusssion. Blitz war-
fare is an intensive (24-7) precision air centric campaign supported by fast moving
ground forces composed of a mixture of heavy, light, airborne, amphibous and spe-
cial/covert operations working with opposition forces that all use effects based oper-
ations (EBO) for their target set and correlate their timing of forces for a
devestating violent impact.
This precision air campaign is characterized by many precision weapons (90%)
using our latest C2ISR assets, Jstars, Global Hawk, Predator, Humint, Sigint etc.
in a network centric configeration to achieve less than 10 minutes for time critical
targeting. Using the Global Strike Task Force and Naval Strike Forces composed
of over 1,000 land and sea based aircraft plus a wide array of air and sea launched
cruise missiles, this will be the most masive precision air campaign in history
achieving rapid dominance in the first 72 hours of combat focused on regime change
targets. These are defined as targets critical to Saddam's control i.e., C4I, IAD,
WMD, palaces and locations that harbor his leadership plus those military units
that resist or fight our coalition forces.
All the military forces will be told through the opposition forces and our informa-
tion operations (10) campaign that they have two choices either help us change re-
gime leadership and build a democracy or be destroyed. In addition, commanders
and men in WMD forces will be told that they will be tried as war crimnals if they
use their weapons against coalition forces or other nations.
In a multi-directional campaign, coalition forces will seize Basra, Mosul and most
of the oil fields, neutralize selected corps of Iraqi army and destroy the integrated
air defense zone, C4I, WMD locations and Iraqi air using stealth, SAM suppression
and air superiority assets. This will enable coalition forces to achieve 24-7 air domi-
nance quickly which is critical to our success. The expansion of our beachheads in
the north, south, east and west regions and the airheads seized with alarming speed
will allow the opposition forces to play a very significant and decisively important
role with our special/covert ops and the Iraqi army/air force to determine their sta-
tus i.e., friend, foe or just disarm. The political arm of the opposition will commu-
nicate intensively with the Iraqi people letting them know they are liberating them
from 22 years of oppression and that they are now controling large amounts of terri-
tory. Humanitarian missions will be accomplished simultaneously with leaflet drops
etc. United States and other coalition forces are helping us to liberate and change
the regime. You the Iraqi people must help us to do this quickly with minimum loss
of life. This 10 campaign must be well planned and executed working closely with
the opposition forces. This means that the administration must move very quickly
now to solidfy the opposition forces and set up a shadow governnment with aggres-
sive assistance and leadership from the United States.
In summary the Iraqi forces we are facing are about 30% equilavent since Desert
Storm with no modernization. Most of the army does not want to fight for Saddam


83
gations under the U.N. charter, or whether the President is saying
that we can no longer be bound by the restrictions that the U.N.
charter puts on the use of force by all states.
If he is arguing the first, then I think the case needs to be made
of how one squares the language of the charter, the interpretation
that all of our Presidents have put on the charter, with the notion
that we now can initiate the use of military force. If the President
is saying that we no longer should be bound by the charter, then
that is a profound change in American policy which I think needs
a full debate.
I think all these costs and risks need to be put on the table. They
may be worth taking, but certainly not before a full public debate,
and certainly not, in my view, before Congress authorizes the use
of military force.
Now, finally, I want to reiterate again my view that it is not at
all clear that this option will accomplish the most important pur-
pose of preventing terrorist attacks, both conventional and with
weapons of mass destruction, against Americans. I think there is
certainly a very grave risk, certainly if we move before there is a
Palestinian settlement, that the very opposite will occur, that what
we will stimulate is a large number of people in the Arab world
who will be willing to take up a terrorist attack on the United
States and on Americans around the world if they see us launching
a military attack against Iraq.
Finally, I would ask that we consider the opportunity costs of
this policy. This policy of military action against Iraq has already
come to take a very substantial amount of the attention and energy
of senior officials of this government. There is only so many things
that the administration can do at one time. The attention of top
leaders is a very scarce resource, but so is what we can ask our
allies to do, and other countries, and the Congress, and the Amer-
ican public, and there are limits to how much money we should
spend.
In my view, we should be devoting these scarce resources to nur-
turing the worldwide coalition against terrorism, to helping to set-
tle disputes between Israel and Palestine, between India and Paki-
stan over Kashmir, and to help countries like Indonesia and Nige-
ria cope with ethnic conflict. .
We also should be staying the course in Afghanistan, and that
means nation-building, and helping the security of that country,
and we should be working to reduce poverty in developing coun-
tries in the world, and getting our own procedures at home right
for how to deal with terrorism and how to improve our intelligence
to deal with terrorism threats.
These are all daunting tasks, but I would argue that in terms of
preventing terrorist attacks on Americans they are much more cen-
tral, much more urgent, and much more important than launching
military operations against Saddam Hussein. In my view, we
should allow containment plus to keep Saddam in the box, while
we pursue these more urgent tasks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Halperin follows:]


85
long as the embargo is made to work and the alliance against Saddam is being
strengthened we can and should be patient.
MILITARY ACTION
It appears that each day we are treated to another leak of a proposed military
strategy to bring down the Iraqi regime. I do not claim the expertise to evaluate
the alternative military proposals. I would argue, however, that in evaluating this
option we must be ready to face the most serious consequences. We can all hope
for a very short and immaculate war with very few casualties and an orderly trans-
fer to an interim regime which runs the country with ease. However, it would be
the height of irresponsibility to count on that and to choose this option with con-
fidence that this scenario will come to pass.
If we choose this course we must deploy to the regime sufficient military forces
to defeat the Iraqi army on the battlefield and in combat in Baghdad. We must be
ready to accept substantial casualties on our own military forces and those of any
allies that join in the attack and also on the civilian population of Iraq and of neigh-
boring countries including Israel. We must acknowledge the risk that weapons of
mass destruction and chemical weapons will be used against our troops and against
civilians.
We must also be ready to occupy the country and to stay for a significant period
of time coping at great cost with a range of security and economic problems.
There can be no question that the financial cost of this option would be enormous.
We are entitled to know what the budget costs are and whether we will pay for
them with larger deficits, new taxes, or drastic cuts in domestic spending. We also
must accept the risk that oil prices will escalate and that there could well be a
sharp decline in the value of the dollar.
Finally, we need to debate the costs of actually implementing the new policy of
pre-emption that the President has announced. It is not clear to me if the adminis-
tration is arguing that the policy is consistent with our obligations under the UN
Charter or if he is saying that we cannot be bound by that commitment. Either ap-
proach has very profound implications and moves us away from what has been the
effort of every American president since Truman to explain how our use of force is
consistent with the Charter and reinforces our efforts to prevent other nations from
using force.
All of these costs and risks may be worth taking but I do not see that the case
has yet been made. As we begin the public debate about this option we are entitled
to insist that the administration calculate these costs and make those calculations
public and that it explain why this price is worth paying.
In considering the pros and cons of the two options we must ask first and fore-
most about its impact on the likelihood of terrorist attacks on Americans (and other
innocent civilians) in the United States and around the world. I think a very com-
pelling case can be made that even the successful implementation of this option
with relatively small direct costs would increase the risk of terrorist attacks directed
at the United States. I think this is so for two reasons.
First, especially if there is no progress on the Palestinian issue, it is likely that
an American military conquest of Iraq will lead many more people in the Arab and
Muslim world to choose the path of terror and to be willing to take part in terrorist
activity. Given that we do not have evidence of significant support by Iraq for ter-
rorist plotting to kill Americans and given the likely reaction to an American attack
we must insist on the administration explaining the rationale and the evidence for
the belief that taking out Saddam reduces the risk of terrorist attacks.
Second, and in my view, even more important, is the opportunity cost of this
focus-only with great effort do I resist saying obsession-on military action against
Iraq. This administration, any administration, can only do so many things at one
time. The attention of top leaders is the most scarce resource but there are also lim-
its on what can be asked of allies and other countries and of the Congress and the
American public. And there are limits on how much we can spend. In my view we
should be devoting these scarce resources to nurturing the world-wide coalition
against terrorism, to settling disputes between Israel and the Palestinians and be-
tween India and Kashmir, in helping Indonesia, Nigeria and other countries cope
with ethnic and religious conflict, in staying the course in Afghanistan, in helping
to reduce poverty in the developing world, and in altering our own procedures at
home for dealing with terrorist threats.
These are daunting but urgent tasks much more central to reducing the risk of
terrorist attacks than the early removal of Saddam. We should, in my view, allow
containment plus to keep him in his box while we work creatively on these more
urgent tasks.


86
Mr. Chairman, in a way these very hearings are a reflection of the way the ad-
ministration's determination to go to war against Iraq has forced a distortion in the
issues that we should be debating. However, given the administration's focus there
was no choice. If we are to go to war we must first have the public debate and the
congressional authorization which our constitution legally requires and which the
health of our democracy demands.
I commend the committee for holding these hearings, I thank you for the honor
of being invited to participate, and I await your questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We have good attendance.
We will try to keep this to 5-minute rounds the first time around.
Let me begin by asking you, Dr. Halperin, if you were still in the
government and you had clear and convincing proof that Saddam
had a nuclear capacity that was capable of being launched on a
missile platform, would that change your view? In other words, the
containment plus, I assume the containment plus is designed to di-
minish the prospect that he gains that ultimate capability. I think
we would both say that was the worst capability. Assume that you
were convinced that existed. Would that change your priorities?
Dr. HALPERIN. Yes, at least to the extent that I would think we
should undertake military action to destroy those capabilities and
the delivery systems.
The CHAIRMAN. Which leads me to the next question. Do you
think that, were he able to build, buy, steal, possess that nuclear
capability able to be delivered by a missile, do you have any degree
of confidence that that could be destroyed, absent a military inva-
sion of feet on the ground, troops on the ground?
Dr. HALPERIN. I think certainly the missile delivery system, cer-
tainly if it was long range missiles, could be destroyed without
troops on the ground, but if troops on the ground were necessary
to destroy an active nuclear capability, I would think we could get
the support of the countries in the region and of the U.N. Security
Council for action of that kind in the way that we were moving to
get it against the North Koreans when they were moving in that
direction. I think that is a different scenario than I think we are
confronting now.
The CHAIRMAN. How would a successful containment plus policy
solve or deal with the potential of Saddam giving weapons of mass
destruction to terrorists?
Dr. HALPERIN. Well, I think it deals with it only by making it ab-
solutely clear to him that if that line is crossed we will, of course,
launch operations. I think if the President has evidence that he is
linked to and supported al-Qaeda, then he has the authority to use
military force both from the Security Council and from the Con-
gress of the United States, and I think he should act on that. You
cannot always be sure you will get the evidence of that, but my
view is that he in fact is extremely unlikely to do that unless he
concludes that we are going to try to take him out of power any-
way.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask any of you who wish to respond to
this question. All of this discussion we are having today, we will
have in the future, and we have had in the past comes down to rel-
ative risks and tradeoffs.
You all have said to one degree or another that it matters where
we have a place from which to stage our invasion, if there is an


87
invasion, whether it is a relatively small number of forces or it is
a 1/4 million forces, whatever it is.
You have all indicated that if, in fact, Saddam possess more ca-
pability relative to the weapons of mass destruction we know he
has, and we are not exactly sure what he has, that presents a seri-
ous threat to us.
You have also indicated that it would be better if we had others
with us than go it alone, either before, during, or after, and so it
all comes down, it seems to me, to vastly oversimplify it, to trade-
offs here. If we go alone now, no one knows the cost, but we would
succeed, we would ostensibly change the regime, we would hope-
fully be able to destroy the weapons of mass destruction that exist
over a period of time in the country, but we may very well
radicalize the rest of the world.
We may pick up a bill that is $70, $80 billion. We may have to
have extensive commitment of U.S. forces for an extended period
of time in Iraq, and if we do not do that, we find ourselves in the
position where we increase the possibility he could destabilize the
region preemptively himself, he could move and use the weapons
of mass destruction as leverage for blackmailing actions in the re-
gion, and so on.
So in weighing the risks and the tradeoffs here, how important
is it and to what degree do each of you feel you have to be certain
he possesses the weapons of mass destruction that can be effec-
tively delivered, whether it is a chemical weapon, whether it is a
biological weapon, or whether it is a nuclear weapon? How impor-
tant in each of your calculus is that question that he has, or is
close to having, or it is not worth the risk of determining any
longer, or waiting any longer, whether he has weapons of mass de-
struction that are deliverable and efficacious?
Because you heard the testimony earlier, and I know you all are
very sophisticated. So, the mere fact you have the ability to
produce a chemical weapon and/or a biological agent does not mean
you can effectively disperse it, does not mean it can have the effi-
cacy that it would in our hands, for example, so how much of your
calculus is dependent upon your sense of his capacity to possess
and deliver these weapons?
General HOAR. Mr. Chairman, during the gulf war we believed
that he had the capability to deliver chemical weapons against us,
and in fact in the run-up, General Al Gray and I went down to
Quantico one Saturday to look at a simulation that had been done
regarding the two marine divisions that were going to be in the at-
tack into Kuwait, and there were some estimates of casualties that
ran in the order of magnitude of 10,000 if artillery rounds with
chemical weapons were used.
So the issue is, are these strategic weapons, or are they tactical
weapons? Could they be used on troops in relatively short distances
of, say, 30 kilometers, or are we talking the cities of Israel and the
major cities in the Arabian area? I think there is a big distinction
there.
I would also say that while in my mind it will always be murky,
the degree to which the regime has acquired these kinds of weap-
ons, particularly at the strategic level, that thus far we have not
seen him use this. The current regime has boxed him in. I think


88
the possibility of him using it goes up considerably if, in fact, the
regime is about to fall, and I think certainly that is a grave risk
to take in the event of an invasion.
The CHAIRMAN. Anybody else? Yes.
Mr. DUELFER. I would just briefly add that not all weapons of
mass destruction are created equal. Chemical and biological agents
present one level of concern, but when Saddam gets a nuclear
weapon, and he has had this intent, he has devoted enormous re-
sources over two decades to do that, then everything will change.
We would not be sitting here talking about the potential of a mili-
tary action against Iraq if we suspected he had a nuclear weapon.
He knows that. I have had this discussion with very senior
Iraqis. They know that had they invaded Kuwait after they pos-
sessed a nuclear weapon, it might be a very different outcome. So,
I think that it is a key inflection point when they get a nuclear
weapon.
The other thing is, picking up a bit on your analysis of the dy-
namic of the issue, what we are seeing here is, it is very easy to
quantify, identify near-term costs. It is very difficult to firmly iden-
tify long term benefits and long term risks. Budget analysts, politi-
cians, go through this problem all the time, and the fact that we
are here and my colleagues are here saying there is a lot of near-
term risks, that is true, we can see those, but ultimately there is
a very long-term concern which is very, very big and that is, I
think, what characterizes much of the debate.
The CHAIRMAN. Dean.
Ambassador GALLUCCI. For me, there is a huge difference be-
tween, on the one hand, chemical weapons and bacteriological or
biological weapons that are toxins, and on the other hand, viral bio-
logical weapons and nuclear weapons. That is where the break
comes in terms of casualties and death and destruction, though you
can have these overlap, depending upon a lot of manipulating as-
sumptions.
I assume, not withstanding the careful statements I tried to
make here in writing, I assume that Iraq has—not will have, might
have, has VX, a very serious nerve agent, certainly sarin, in a de-
liverable form. I assume it has both anthrax and botulinum toxin,
as it did before. It had 4 years to regenerate, and I do not believe
UNSCOM could be confident it destroyed it all, so I believe that
is the extant right now. I do not know about the smallpox, and that
to me is a huge, huge concern, and I think the nuclear weapons fall
into that same category.
The problem is, of course, I think getting evidence of this is going
to be very hard. We have to ask ourselves the question of whether
we want to wait for that evidence, do we want to get on that slope
that Charlie was just talking about, trying to figure out what this
looks like in terms of long-term costs, when the near-term costs are
so easy, or force themselves upon us.
When I try to net this out, I think I come down and conclude
that we do not have, right now, an urgent need to act, as we might
if we saw a facility under construction, or that missile you talked
about with Mort before. That is not in front of us right now, nor
do we have the evidence that they are complicit in 9/11. If we had
such evidece, I do not believe this Government would have any


89
choice whatever but to act, so we do not have that kind of pressure
on us. At the same time, we have no confidence that we will see
anything like that before we are confronted with something we
wish not to see.
So I end up thinking that this is not something we should try
to live with for a long period of time. We need to get ourselves in
the position to cut this off. That means we have got more time than
just the next 6 months, year or 2 years that we might be thinking
about with an invasion.
That is why I am looking for some option other than an invasion
like this very aggressive inspection regime, which can only work if
invasion is a viable option, to force Saddam to accept it. But I think
you are right to try to push at the edges here to make us think
through what would cause us to find it prudent to pay the cost and
run the risk of action sooner rather than later.
The CHAIRMAN. The question for me is, do we have the time to
do this right? Doing it right means we could, in my view, work out
arrangements with Russia. We could, in my view, deal with the sit-
uation in the Middle East much better than we have now. We
could, in fact, be much better situated if we did some very impor-
tant things over the next 6 to 8 months that we do not have time
to do now, and the question is, how much time do we have?
But at any rate, I have trespassed upon your time. I will move
to the Senator Lugar.
Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
struck, listening to the testimony this afternoon, by some parallels
with our thinking after September 11. Many of us went into a
crash course on Islam, and events in several countries of the world
where not enough attention had been paid for a long time as to his-
tory and development. We sought to gain some idea of why people
do the things they did, what the motivation was.
Beyond that, we have been involved in an effort, and the distin-
guished Senator from West Virginia is taking leadership in this, to
determine what deficiencies we have in our intelligence systems.
Why we do not know more, and why we were not better informed?
Here we have a situation which clearly we need to know much
more.
We are all saying today we have not found the evidence, but
somebody will ask why not; given the resources of this country, ex-
traordinary abilities that we have, and the imperative need. The
same question, as Dr. Gallucci knows, from North Korea has been
asked for a long time. The usual comment was that people did not
understand the language. They could not insinuate themselves in
the country. There were all sorts of dodges and weaves.
But here the life of the country is at stake. We are about to take
very grave, important actions, and it just appears to me that-it
is not entirely the role of this committee, but each one of us had
best become much better informed about Iraq. I am struck by your
comments, Mr. Duelfer, that it makes a big difference who suc-
ceeds, but I am even querying the question, what are the alter-
natives? Who knows that much about the internal politics of Iraq
these days?
Now, there are Iraqi exiles who meet frequently in this town and
elsewhere, and maybe among them are leaders that will have the


90
backing of the Iraqi people. In other words, to come to the conclu-
sion that somehow or another, the Iraqi people are going to con-
demn Saddam and fight to re-take their country. But as we heard
this morning from Dr. Cordesman, this was not always the case in
the past. We were surprised by nationalism, feelings of patriotism,
however despicable the leaders, because they did not trust us, ei-
ther.
In other words on what basis do we believe, or what must we do
to have a constituency in Iraq that really wants democracy in any
remote form like the kind that we try to produce in this country,
or in Western Europe? Who might have at least the backing in a
way that Mr. Karzai, apparently through the loya jirga in Afghani-
stan has some consent? But even then he must contend with the
war lords around him, and other people that seek to stop progress.
Now, absent some analysis of what the politics are, and who is
there, then we really do have a rather long occupation. The thought
of a parallel between Japan or Germany is a real leap in terms of
the institutions that are available that might bring about some
semblance of Western democracy, so I raise the question, how do
we get up to speed? What are the resources academically and gov-
ernmentally in this country that are likely to identify for an in-
formed argument the post Saddam situation? How do we even gain
a sense in terms of public diplomacy, of enlisting the Iraqi people
to understand life will be better if, in fact, we intervene, or if we
stay, or if we try to produce capitalism, democracy, or whatever we
want to do there?
Mr. Duelfer, I will start with you. Would you respond to that?
Mr. DUELFER. Thank you very much. I think these are funda-
mental issues. In essence what needs to happen is, Iraqis and Iraq
need to conclude that it is in their interest and it is patriotic for
them as proud Iraqis to change their leadership.
Senator LUGAR. How do we do that? What brings that about?
Mr. DUELFER. Well, I think the international community can
make a case that this regime is a danger to the external world, it
is also a danger to the internal world in Iraq. We should not be
prescriptive as to whom should lead Iraq, but I think we can say
that there are certain standards, ideals that we would expect a fol-
low-on government to embody to a greater or lesser degree.
This also has the important advantage of avoiding identifying
groups of people within Iraq who would very shortly fall into the
list of Saddam's most wanted people, but if we identify characteris-
tics and ideals which no one can dispute, pluralism, elections, fix-
ing the financial system, getting rid of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, these are ideals which the external community would support
and patriot Iraqis could also support.
Senator LUGAR. Why do we think they would? Why would Iraqis
say, we need a strong government, Saddam is a bad leader, but on
the other hand we need somebody who knows where to go? This de-
gree of participation and vigorous debate is a large part of the proc-
Mr. DUELFER. In my experience in talking with lots of Iraqis is
that they recognize Saddam as their leader, but they also recognize
his shortcomings. They would like nothing better than to be recon-
nected to the rest of the world. They see enormous benefit in that,
ess.


91
but I do not think they are going to be wanting to see someone im-
pose a leader on them.
There are very delicate balances which you will hear from in the
next panel within Iraq, the north, middle, south, clans, military,
various institutions, but I think there is a solution set there. I
think we should make it clear that we want to change as much in
Iraq as possible, meaning the top leadership, and as little as pos-
sible at least from the outside. In other words, cause as little dam-
age to the infrastructure as possible.
We ought to make it clear that most Iraqis have everything to
gain and little to lose by a change in management.
Senator LUGAR. Does anyone else have a comment on the intel-
ligence, or how we gain people in Iraq?
General MCINERNEY. I think clearly, Senator, there are 2 million
Iraqis in the United States that have fled Iraq. They are a valuable
source of understanding the people and the communications back
there. The opposition forces are in daily and weekly contact with
the military and other people in Iraq today. That is certainly a
good starting point, and that is why I think we need to organize
this opposition to understand the problem.
The forces I am talking about are enabling forces. Now, you can
debate whether it is 50,000 or 250,000 or a million. We are talking
about an enabling force to help the Iraqi people take their country
back and understanding these people, who I think are probably one
of the most sophisticated, if not the most sophisticated in the Mid-
dle East in education and understanding, and they had a middle
class, and still do, it will be a lot easier than people realize.
I used the model of Japan and Germany after World War II. I
was a boy there. We had in 1948, we had one division, one division
in all of Germany, or at least in the U.S. sector, and the others had
more. There was not a large predominance once you got rid of the
Nazi leadership and Hitler, then the people wanted to take this
path. I think the people in Iraq will want to take a path. I think
their neighbors will not want them to take a path toward democ-
racy,
and that will be one of our biggest challenges. Democracy
does not flourish in the Middle East, and we must be sensitive to
that.
Senator LUGAR. And the neighbors are a real problem, as you
point out.
General MCINERNEY. That is correct, who are allies and who are
vital to this construct.
Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry.
Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Let me just, in the chairman's absence, thank him for these hear-
ings. I was not able to be here this morning, but I do think that
these are obviously very important hearings, and I think this is
what this committee is supposed to do, and it is good, as a member
of this committee for 18 years now, to see it in advance of decisions
doing its work this way, and I think probably every committee
member probably feels affirmative about that.
I think the way the chairman has constructed it is good. I think
it is right not to have the administration here at this point, and
that we sort of lay some groundwork here.


92
I was in the region earlier in the year and met at some length
with Saudis, with the Crown Prince Abdullah, the Foreign Minister
and others, with King Abdullah, with their intelligence agencies,
President Mubarak, his intelligence people, and came away with a
sense that most of them believe—at least they express this—that
we are sort of overexaggerating and overly worried about some as-
pects of Saddam Hussein, though they do not like him. They ac-
knowledge that, but they certainly interpret some of the threat dif-
ferently, President Mubarak, I might add, quite dismissively believ-
ing that we sort of build him up in some ways.
I am not sure I agree with them. I mean, they live there, but if
you assess what we believe he may or may not have, I do not think
anybody believes he has a nuclear program today that I have heard
with any great conviction. We know he had about 7,000 people that
were working on the program once upon a time, but our estimates
are today that he may have at least a couple of dozen top-flight nu-
clear scientists and engineers, but there is probably no doubt he is
working on it, and I think most of us have to make the assumption
that he is.
Second, he has got some continued shorter range missile develop-
ment that he has been doing. That could help with a longer range
missile, but it is not a direct, longer range missile program, and we
estimate that he has somewhere up to two dozen Scuds or so, and
obviously that has some potential for menace with respect to Israel,
particularly if we were starting to engage in some way, but I un-
derstand from Israeli authorities not so much that they do not be-
lieve the overall value of changing the equation in the region is not
worthwhile.
So there is a lot to sort of balance here. I am of the opinion that,
under the right circumstances, it is not that difficult. I think I tend
to agree with General McInerney, I think there are, according to
the intelligence sources that I have listened to, without revealing
any of it, capacities for significantly more internal activity than
maybe some people anticipate, so I think it is achievable.
I think the question that we need to think about is sort of when
and how, what is the process, what brings you to the point of pull-
ing the trigger, what sort of makes you reach that point where you
have made the decision that you have exhausted the doctrine of
remedies, if you will, in the context of international law and of
going to war?
Certainly one of the lessons of prior conflicts is that it helps to
have the American people fully supportive, fully educated, fully in-
volved, and clear about the objectives, and prepared to stay the
course. There is nothing in what we have done to date that pre-
pares the American people for that, or that even lays out on the
international stage a sufficient level of rationale, evidence, public
diplomacy that might bring you, I think to that legitimate trigger-
pulling stage.
It seems to me that we are sitting—and I want to ask you par-
ticularly, dean, about this, but I would like others to comment
about it. I mean, there is a process here that it seems to me has
been avoided to date. The rhetoric seems to be far ahead of our ca-
pacity, and we seem to be ignoring and dismissive of the need for


93
friends and allies and understanding on a global basis of why we
might ultimately choose to do this.
Now, there is in place a very forceful cease-fire agreement which
Saddam Hussein signed and agreed to, and it includes the full de-
struction of these weapons and the full inspection. Does it not
make more sense, in terms of all of these sensitivities that I have
jut laid out, gentlemen, in terms of gaining the legitimacy of the
American people, the assent, the consent of the American people
and the assent, gaining the support and understanding of the
world as to why we would be doing this, to go back to that process,
even though we know he will refuse to live up to it?
Certainly, if he has the things that he does not want us to find,
he will not live up to it, so those who want the justification to go
in will get the justification, but in the absence of that, we do not
have a chance of having exhausted that doctrine of remedies in a
way that I think answers the question to mom and pop in America
as to why their young child may come home in a body bag.
Now, is there a process here that has been avoided, dean, begin-
ning with you, that we should go through that would better posi-
tion us with respect to the potentials of this, and the opposite side
of that question is, we lived with Russia for almost 50 years with
the capacity to destroy us many times over, and a policy of contain-
ment worked there. Why could not a policy of containment also
work here, at least while you buildup to that point of legitimacy?
Ambassador GALLUCCI. Thank you, Senator. I would like to take
a shot at a few of those questions, or observations that were in
your statement.
First, I cannot help going back to the nuclear weapons observa-
tion, because it troubled me. I do not know that Iraq has nuclear
weapons, but I do know for a fact that there was a workable design
in Iraq in the days of UNSCOM, which we picked up, and it was
an implosion system, a relatively sophisticated design, that they
did more work on after that. I also know that we have a real prob-
lem with accounting for material, fissile material coming out of the
former Soviet Union.
I think I also know that we should have no confidence, we should
have no confidence that we will know if fissile material finds its
way into Iraq from one of those countries. We might know, but we
might not.
What I am getting to here is a very troubling sentence, and that
is that I do not understand how someone fully familiar with all of
our intelligence capabilities and our knowledge could say with high
confidence that Iraq does not have a nuclear weapon now, or will
not have one for 6 months or 6 years, not when they have done the
work on an implosion system and there is fissile material to be
had. I do not understand how one could say that, so that is point
one.
Second, when we come to the question of time, do we have time,
and would we want time to use it for something useful, for exam-
ple, to build a necessary consensus domestically and internation-
ally to make this a more politically plausible and successful oper-
ation. I think there is a risk there, because of what I just said
about the nuclear issue, because for me the key issue here is, is
Iraq plausibly capable of transferring a viral biological weapon or
81-697 D-4


94
a nuclear weapons capability to a terrorist entity that could not be
deterred?
I do not know the answer to that, but I do not like sitting around
a long time hoping it does not happen, so I think that is what
makes me uncomfortable with simple containment, just wait and
see. What we may next see is some devastating event in the United
States that is traced back to Iraq, and I would then say, well, I
guess that calculation was wrong, waiting and seeing, so I am un-
comfortable with indefinite postponement.
However, if you were to say, but do we have time, I guess I think
it is important enough to get this right, that we take some time,
and for me, again, I think there may be an inspection option. It is
not UNSCOM. It sure is not UNMOVIC. It is another kind of in-
spection that is much more aggressive, that could not be put in
place unless the Iraqi regime saw an invasion as the alternative.
So I like the idea of trying to find another way to grapple with this,
and even, if you must do an invasion, to take the time to get it
right.
The chairman referred to doing some missionary work, I think
with other countries, particularly Russia, and we have had a con-
cern for a period of time with the position of France within the Se-
curity Council. There is much to be done in the region, and you
will
hear more about that.
So yes, I think we can take the time, but I do not think indefi-
nitely. I am troubled by the simple containment option in which
you wait for something that would be a trigger. What the adminis-
tration is talking about is not preemption, as I understand it. It is
a preventive war. Preemption is the anticipation of an act by the
other side. We do not see that. This would be looking way down
the road and saying, we are not going to allow that situation to
emerge. That is a very forward-leaning posture, and I think we
have the time to get ourselves ready.
Senator KERRY. But there is a certain visible logistical period of
time under any circumstances here, during which time you could
certainly provide a sufficiently more powerful ultimatum than ex-
isted previously with respect to inspections.
Ambassador GALLUCCI. I think not only could you, but you have
no hope of getting successful inspections unless you took the ante-
cedent steps. The Desert Shield, if I can be allowed, a period of
time in which we took some of those steps, and began to put forces
in place, and began to take the political steps that made the inva-
sion a very credible option that is something we intended to do,
and I think we would be believed this time, where we were not be-
lieved 11 years ago.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hagel.
Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and to our panelists,
thank you. We appreciate your contributions today, and the con-
tributions you made, each of you, to our country.
Senator Lugar focused on somethin, and that is, after we have
heard your testimony and you have heard our speeches, and you
might even hear an interview or two after this, we are all for vir-
tue, democracy, good government, and all things right, but how do
we get there, and that, I think, was Senator Lugar's point, and I


95
would ask each of you to focus on a couple of areas and if you
would not mind responding to this question.
General Hoar and Dr. Halperin in their testimony asked a lot of
questions back, and they each laid out a number of dynamics and
factors that we should pay a lot of attention to if, in fact, the mili-
tary option is the option, and as we drift along and containment
is not particularly attractive, and we have gone through that for
11 years, and we still have Saddam, and we still have uncertainty,
and we still have problems.
So therefore, what is the option, what should we do, and there
are various versions put forward, and I would hope that General
McInerney, when you respond, if you will deal a little bit with the
opposition groups and forces that you keep talking about, which I
am not aware of, but they may be there.
But what I would ask the five of you to focus on is the economic
dynamics of this, the opposition dynamics, the allies, how all that
integrates into something, or maybe it is not important, maybe a
unilateral strike along the lines of what General McInerney is talk-
ing about, clean, crisp, sophisticated, go in and get it done, and
maybe that works.
Then what happens afterwards? Who governs? Do any of you
have any idea of an exiled government, of any individual, any
groups that you could put forward to us today as to what happens
after we take this bold strike in the interest of virtue and all man-
kind? Now, what follows on? I think General Hoar got into some
of those points in his testimony.
So with that, each of you, thank you, and we are always grateful
for your consultation and input, and we would start with you, dean.
Ambassador GALLUCCI. I think I have to go. I do not know, Sen-
ator, that I can add on the three points you made, economics, the
opposition, and the allies, to what has been said. I liked General
Hoar's list of things we ought to think about, and particularly those
things we ought to think about being able to do the day after, as
well as the things we ought to put in place so that we do this in
the most politically plausible way. That was, I thought, a very nice
list, and I would associate myself with that.
I guess for my moment here I would say that I worry about the
"lite" option, and I will be listening to General McInerney as well
to learn more about that option. I have in my ears ringing the
words of Tony Cordesman this morning about assuming too much
about what the opposition might accomplish, about going in to a
light, taking that risks. I do not know that he was speaking specifi-
cally about the blitzkrieg type operation, but it seemed that he was
speaking to that, and worried about that being the concept of oper-
ations, rather than a heavier up, more traditional approach, and
that troubles me.
So I guess I still remain to be persuaded that that option really
is viable, and that you have got that kind of support, and that the
regime is that fragile and can be overturned. It may well be true,
but I think the point this morning was that is a hell of an assump-
tion to make, or a risk to take, and right now I would not-based
upon what I know, I would not be there myself in making that cal-
culation.


96
Of all the things that I think in this list that I would worry
about most at this point, if we were doing this mostly because we
want to avoid the transfer of this capability to terrorist groups, we
want to reduce, the vulnerability of the United States of America
today to suffering a 9/11 event with a weapon of mass destruction,
then I want to ask myself, if we do this unilaterally, and we have
not taken care with allies in the region, are we going to create a
situation which worsens the situation? That for me that is the key
question. Mort Halperin's comments went to this, and that to me
is very, very important.
Unfortunately, it is a soft point, if I can put it that way. It is
a hard one to assess, but if we do this the wrong way and we cre-
ate, Senator Lugar, what you were talking about before, that situa-
tion in which we can ask ourselves, gee, I wonder why we are not
appreciated the way we think we ought to be, then we will have
really made a tragic error, so I think that is the kind of calculation,
very hard to make, and we look to regional experts to help us.
Senator HAGEL. Mr. Duelfer.
Mr. DUELFER. I tried to get a little bit at the point you were rais-
ing when I said what we need to do ahead of time is do our polit-
ical groundwork, both with respect to Iraqis in Iraq, Iraqis outside
of Iraq, the opposition, but also with some key capitals on this, and
I think a discussion about the characteristics of a follow-on govern-
ment that we would expect to see is one mechanism for involving
a lot of important voices, some overtly, some perhaps not overtly,
into putting forward a picture of what we expect Iraq will be on
the other side, but without being prescriptive, in other words, not
being in a position where we are trying to impose something on the
Iraqi people.
But I think there is a delicate balance and delicate work that has
to be done politically which includes people in Iraq, and that obvi-
ously is something that is not necessarily what we can be dis-
cussing in an open session, but none of this is guaranteed. There
are enormous risks, economic risks, loyal interests, all of that sort
of thing. There is a big risk that Saddam will be able to charac-
terize what we are doing as trying to put in place a puppet, and
nothing will solidify the Iraqi people to oppose us, nothing will
cause more bodies to come back in bags, ultimately, than if the
Iraqi people are put in a position where they see supporting Sad-
dam as being the patriotic act.
What we need to do is carefully separate Saddam from patriotic
acts for regular Iraqis, Iraqis in the army, Iraqis in the Republican
Guard, even the Special Republican Guard, even the security serv-
ices. We need to make Saddam feel very lonely. I think there is a
strategy out there which can do this, both with our allies, with cap-
itals. I think it rests on causing audiences in various locations,
most especially in Iraq, though, to think about their relationship
with the next government in Baghdad, and when they start doing
that, Saddam will be very lonely.
Senator HAGEL. General.
General HOAR. Senator, I think you touched on some very com-
plex issues. First of all, I do not believe that the Iraqi opposition
can be depended upon. I think from my own experience in the re-
gion, that they were not worth anything during that time. Tony


97
Zinni, who followed me twice removed, felt the same way up to 2
years ago, and what the Iraqi opposition needs is a charismatic
person that is doing something to make the case for a regime
change, and that certainly is not Mr. Chalabi in Mayfair sending
faxes to Iraq. That is the first thing.
Second, those people that have chosen to stand up and fight on
two occasions, the Shia in the south and the Kurds in the north,
have both been left in the lurch by the U.S. Government, so until
we are on the ground and winning, do not expect any help from
them, if that is what we are going to do.
How do we get allies into this game? I would say that pan
Arabism as a political movement and as an economic movement is
dead, but not as a cultural movement. From Morocco all the way
across the Arab world there is still a good deal of sympathy for the
Iraqi people, not the regime, but the people. We have to make the
case as a government, through public diplomacy and otherwise, and
we have not made that case to the Arab people, the Arab street,
as it is frequently called, why the change has to be made and why
it would be useful, and clearly, as Mort suggested, if there were
some movement on the Israeli-Palestinian side we would move a
long way, because most Arabs feel that is a far more pressing issue
than the Iraqi issue.
With respect to cost, the sort of thing that is contemplated up to
and including large numbers of people on the ground, assuming a
military victory, would be very costly. Desert Storm, the Saudis
paid $17 billion as their share of that bill. Prince Abdullah told me
that he had been deceived, his word, by a senior administration of-
ficial on how the bills would be split up. There is very bad feeling
there. I am sure that the Kuwaitis, because of their special cir-
cumstance, would help any way they can if we put pressure on
them, but it will not be easy.
I think that all of the things that we have talked about here
need doing, but it requires a concerted effort on the Government's
part, and I do not see that that work is being done at this time.
I would finally add that bringing the Russians into the equation,
and perhaps the Chinese, because that is the source of some of this
weapons transfer of materials, would help indeed, and shutting
down the oil that goes from Iraq through Turkey, $2 billion a year,
and providing another source for the fuel that goes to Jordan at a
reduced cost would also put greater pressure on the Iraqi Govern-
ment.
Senator HAGEL. General McInerney.
General MCINERNEY. Senator, I think the important thing is, the
opposition group must be developed. The fundamental tenet that
we have got to operate from, and I will not personalize this, but
there are people out there that our Government can actively work
with. They will not meet the Boy Scout sniff test. They will not do
certain things, but they will be part of a group that will have credi-
bility within Iraq, and it has the right objectives and the right mo-
tives.
Nobody loves Saddam in Iraq. Every family, I have been told by
Iraqis, every family has been hurt by this man, either in the Ira-
nian war, the gulf war, or personal prosecution that he has made


98
against them, and so we need to capitalize on that, and there is
a sweet spot.
I cannot give you that answer now, but I do know that thought-
ful people can resolve that issue, and once you have that and have
a credible one, then everything else starts to roll with it, and so
that is to me extremely important, and I would just agree with the
comments that General Hoar made on the allies.
Senator HAGEL. Thank you.
Dr. HALPERIN. Senator, I think that is the critical question. I am
extraordinarily skeptical that we have a clue of how to bring into
existence a combined Iraqi opposition that could take over the
country. We have been trying for a very long time under three
American administrations now, and I do not believe that there is
a solution to that problem.
Moreover, I would say that while many, and maybe most Iraqis,
hate Saddam, I would say that it is extraordinarily unlikely that
a group that came to power which was patriotic Iraqis would give
up the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. They live in a world sur-
rounded by nuclear states—Pakistan, Iran, Israel. That is not a
Saddam policy. That is a policy, I believe, that most Iraqi leaders
would follow.
Moreover, I think it is extraordinarily unlikely that the group
that came into power in Baghdad would be for the kind of auton-
omy that the Kurds tell us is the precondition for their cooperating
with us. I think we have failed to honor our commitments to them
twice now, and to promise them that in the face of what is likely
to be a government in Baghdad that has no interest in it is, I
think, an extraordinary commitment to make. I would think what-
ever government comes to power, unless it is following a long
American occupation, is not going to be anything like a democratic
government. There are no others in the area. It is hard to imagine
why this would happen overnight in Iraq.
I think we also have to be enormously humble about our ability
to help friendly governments in the region do the right thing. It is
not an accident that most of the terrorists came from countries
deeply friendly to the United States that we have worked with for
a very long time. I think the danger that if we have a friendly Iraqi
regime it will become for the first time a breeding ground of people
who go elsewhere and plot to kill innocent Americans is not only
a risk, but in my view is extraordinarily likely.
A democratic Iraq of the kind that we talk about after Saddam
will come about only if we are prepared to stay there for a very
long time, accepting, in my view, very great risk of casualties, and
a threat to the territorial integrity of Iraq. A democratic regime is
not going to have the capacity to keep that country together unless
there is an American military force in the country that insists that
it stay together, and we have to think about whether we really
want to be the instrument.
The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone disagree with that point? Does any-
one disagree with the point just made? Repeat the last point,
please.
Dr. HALPERIN. Keeping Iraq together, and democratic, will re-
quire American military forces dedicated and committed to that, in-


99
cluding denying the Kurds the kind of autonomy that they will de-
mand and assert.
The CHAIRMAN. Stop right there, please. Does anyone disagree
with that specific point, and if so, how?
General MCINERNEY. Well, I think that the opposition groups
clearly want to keep, except maybe the Kurds, keep Iraq as Iraq.
I mean, the Shias in the south, they do not want-
The CHAIRMAN. Except the Kurds. That is like saying keep the
United States together, except the Southwest.
General MCINERNEY. And that will be one of the entry points,
that because it is in our interests to have the Iraq that we have
there today and not a fragmented society, and that is, I think, how
we entered this argument and get our support, and that is ex-
tremely important.
Again, the size of the military, it is more the influence of the
United States to keep that than a large occupation force. I do not
see that as the requirement. It is the influence and the staying
power of our influence there helping to shape that democracy. Sir,
I believe that in one sense the two principal leaders of the Kurds
have made a deal with Saddam Hussein already. Both of them
have gone on record recently as saying that they are fairly com-
fortable with the relationship.
I think that that could be done again, but Mort's point is well
taken. There is no tradition of democracy in that area. Iraq is the
instrument of post colonialism cut up by the British, cutting across
ethnic lines.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me make it clear, I am not trying to start
an argument. I am trying to determine throughout these hearings
where there are points of consensus on major, major questions, and
a major question is, to me at least, what after? That is why I asked
the question.
I would yield to Senator Feingold.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask one of
Mr. Duelfer and Dr. Halperin.
There are obviously a number of diverse points of view in the for-
eign policy community about the right course of action in Iraq. No
one disagrees with the basic premise, though, that the Iraqi people
have suffered terribly from years of deprivation, and that they have
been consistently told that it is United States support for U.N.
sanctions that is responsible for their plight. I think, Mr. Duelfer,
you were already getting into some of this a moment ago, but I
would like to hear a little bit more from you and then from Dr.
Halperin about what kind of reaction can we expect from the Iraqi
people if the United States moves to invade their country?
If widespread civil conflict threatens to break out in the wake of
regime change, staving off chaos in Iraq may require, as we just
talked about, a very significant American presence over a signifi-
cant period of time. Aside from the obvious resentment this will
provoke in other parts of the Middle East, is there any reason to
believe that the Iraqi people themselves would tolerate such a pres-
ence?
Mr. DUELFER. Senator, it is for exactly those points that you are
raising that I emphasize that we need a very well thought out set
of political organizing principles. In a sense, there are national in-


100
mess.
stitutions in Iraq that hold the country together, the regular army,
there are departments of agriculture, irrigation, there is a civil
service, there are clans which span the length and breadth of the
country, and they need to feel that their interests will be preserved
in what comes next, but it is very important that whatever we do
not be seen as imposing something upon them, but simply allowing
them to replace their own leadership.
If they wind up in a position where Saddam is saying, here
comes the Americans, they want to destroy the great nation of Iraq
and put in place a puppet, then I think we are headed for a big
Senator FEINGOLD. Are you suggesting these institutions will be
able to overcome the connection that people may feel between the
humanitarian crisis and what has happened in the past?
Mr. DUELFER. I think if we posit that we will judge the next gov-
ernment in Iraq based on how it proceeds toward behaving more
normally, toward pluralism, and say we are going to make our deci-
sions about security relations, about debt relief, about adjusting the
sanctions—we need to get out of this box that we are in, and I have
no idea how we got in it, where the notion of changing the manage-
ment in Baghdad is seen as something anti-Arab.
I mean, Saddam has done a great job in speaking to the Arabs
in the street, as they are called, via al Jazeera and other mecha-
nisms, saying the United States is against the Arabs because the
United States wants me out of power. I mean, logically there is
nothing better I can imagine for the Arab people that if Saddam
left and the Iraqi people were able to achieve their enormous po-
tential, and there is enormous agreement that they have enormous
potential.
Senator FEINGOLD. Again, Dr. Halperin, what I am getting at is
the relationship between the humanitarian crisis and the reaction
of the Iraqi people.
Dr. HALPERIN. Well, I think part of that, Senator, goes back to
the spectacular failure of the United States so that we got to this
point where the world believed that somehow we were responsible
for the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, rather than Saddam Hussein.
Secretary Powell came in, I thought, committed to changing that,
both by more effective public diplomacy, but even more important,
by changing the nature of the embargo. That is, by allowing Iraqis
to import many more kinds of things than we had permitted in the
past, by allowing them to rebuild their oil industry and export as
much oil as they could, consistent with the economic situation, and
focusing the embargo only on things which contribute directly to
their weapons of mass destruction or conventional military capa-
bility.
We now have that resolution from the U.N. Security Council. As
far as I can tell, having worked very hard to get it, we have done
nothing to implement it. I think we need to implement that in a
way that turns that tide so that we begin to demonstrate to the
world that if there is a humanitarian crisis in Iraq, it is Saddam
Hussein's fault, and not the fault of the U.N. embargo, and that is
my proposed containment plus strategy.
If you talk about a regime that comes in afterwards, the natural
course of events in Iraq in my view would be to a regime which
part of


102
To me,
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, gentlemen.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen. Do you want to take a 5-
minute break? Your constitutions are admirable.
The Senator from Florida.
Senator NELSON. I would yield to the Senator from West Vir-
ginia.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from West Virginia. He was here be-
fore everybody, and I was getting to him last, for which I apologize.
The Senator from West Virginia.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am struck, I guess, by listening to this conversation this after-
noon, about the enormous variety and range of uncertainty which
is expressed by all of you, and it is not that people are keeping all
options open, because you are all experienced professionals, and
that is not your purpose, but the effect of what you are saying gives
that impression, that we need to keep all options open, so the con-
cept of uncertainty interests me.
For example, people talk about galvanizing the people in some
way. Well, I mean, you know, they talked about that in Indonesia
when Sukarno was in charge, and nothing happened, until some-
thing eventually did after decades, and Assad the same thing—was
he a 7-year term, something of that sort—and now we have Hus-
sein, and people are talking about, well, if we could only figure out
a way to get the people going.
the pan Arabism argument followed, as Senator Lugar in-
dicated, our total inability to understand what Islam is, and getting
off all the signals that we do not, and then even in conversations
like this, where there is this sort of—where the sense of uncer-
tainty about the development of American foreign policy, or poten-
tial American foreign policy, military or diplomatic, is just wrapped
in uncertainty.
I mean, I think that one can speculate that it is a lot easier to
use intelligence to find out, for example, what is going on in the
chemical world with emissions and effluents than it is in the bio-
logical world, which is much more discrete. You say that the nu-
clear thing, if we were really sure about the nuclear thing I cannot
imagine that we would not go in, and yet my understanding this
morning was that there was a feeling that each day that goes by
the threat gets greater, and then we get back to the threats, which
are the subject of all of this.
The question I would ask you is that there is an extraordinary
polemic involved in this, because the stakes are so high, the con-
sequences Senator Kerry mentioned, are we preparing the Amer-
ican people, and that is as if Iraq existed by itself in the world, and
of course it does not. They have their own nations, we have our
own problems, and there are uncertainties everywhere now which
encourage each other and compound, therefore, so I am just inter-
ested in what is a resolution process? I mean, if we are stuck with
uncertainties, and then we can go from here to here, and we are
rational here and we are rational here, we make sense here and
we make sense here, and we are right here and we are right here,
so we describe all the options, but time closes in, the dean said so,
and every day that passes gets more dangerous.


103
And then this not insignificant point that if, perchance, we wait
3 days too late, and either from that country, through others—and
some people say no, they will not do it through others, because
they want to keep it for themselves because it gives them power,
but who knows about that, too, and then some day all of a sudden
some series of terrible things happens in this country, and then the
whole concept of body bags takes on a very different concept.
So I guess the only question, certainly the only question I have
time for, is that we can deal with uncertainties because we are an
honest Nation and we tend to be very open in expressing our views
and our concerns and our worries, and that is fair to the American
people, part of the democratic process, unique in the world, I might
say, we are that way.
But at some point there comes the point of a resolution of what
you are going to do, and you cannot talk about uncertainties be-
cause you do not have all the answers, and you never will have all
the answers, and we all know that we will never have all the an-
swers, and so sort of a collective sense from you gentlemen of how
one deals with the process of going from continuing uncertainties
on very, very large issues to the point of decision. Obviously, it
rests in the hands of the President of the United States.
Ambassador GALLUCCI. I would like to take a brief shot at that
and go back to a point that was made earlier that the coalition
fought a war against Iraq and won, and there was a resolution to
the war, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. It is still out-
standing and is not being implemented, and so as an opening prop-
osition, Senator, your statement that we have this uncertainty, let
us remember that there was a resolution that really deserves to be
implemented. So we are dedicated to getting from here to there,
which is to say, to an Iraq that does not have weapons of mass de-
struction.
So the question is, how do we get there? Well, do we have to in-
vade immediately? I would say no. Is that something we want to
leave alone for a long period of time? I would say no, too risky, for
the reasons we have all talked about.
So in the near term it would seem to me one of the things we
ought to do is build a consensus around the need for action. We
should have hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on this, and we should address all this, and the American people
should be listening, and then we should start to do those things,
some of which have been laid out by some of my colleagues at the
table, that would build a consensus domestically and internation-
ally, in order that we be in a position to take military action when
either we are forced to because of some bit of information that is
delivered to us by George Tenet, or some other way, or because we
have come to the point where we think we now are in a better posi-
tion in terms of our status with allies and friends and domestically.
Fially, if you took the advice I was offering, you would also want
to check the box of really trying to see whether an aggressive in-
spection regime could be put in place.
But there is a deliberate process, I think, that we can move and
implement, but starting with the proposition that that U.N. Secu-
rity Council resolution deserves to be implemented and has not


105
and whether or not you feel like that is a meritorious type of policy
trend to support.
General HOAR. Senator, I do not think Tom and I are going to
agree with this, but I think Tony Cordesman's thoughts this morn-
ing about encouraging resistance without direct affirmative assist-
ance on the ground is at best an unethical and perhaps an amoral
approach. Given what has happened in the south to the Shia be-
fore, I do not think that you can build that kind of support in the
south without a firm commitment on the part of the Government
to come to their aid.
Senator BROWNBACK. On the ground?
General HOAR. On the ground.
General MCINERNEY. I would agree with General Hoar. The op-
position must be developed outside the country, and it must be
credible, and then working covert operations back in, but only
when you put U.S. and coalition forces in harm's way in that coun-
try in such an enabling force size that you can enable them to sur-
vive, because in the final analysis, the coalition forces will be the
ones that make this successful. It is not the opposition forces. The
opposition forces bring political to it, Iraqis retaking Iraq. You are
helping them do that.
Number 2, they also bring a dialog with the Iraqi people in the
Iraqi Army, and that is where we need to focus, but I would agree
100 percent with General Hoar and Tony Cordesman that, do not
let anything try to do it, them start by themselves.
Senator BROWNBACK. Just with air superiority, using air superi-
ority?
General McINERNEY. I do not think air alone can do that.
Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you for directly responding. The sec-
ond is a broader question. It may be a bit of a wild card, but it
struck me as an interesting point. A gentleman far more knowl-
edgeable than I am on these issues in the region was assessing the
war on terrorism and I think to date the Bush administration has
done a marvelous job in the war on terrorism.
I think they have been so very focused, very intense, and going
sequentially, focused on Afghanistan. Next, they have been in-
volved in the Philippines where the troops are coming out, Georgia,
troops in Uzbekistan, building alliances up in Central Asia. I think
this has been to me a very good, solid, sequential strategy.
My question is now that in the war on terrorism, what is the ap-
propriate next target to go at? If you just back up and you ask
yourself
, what is the best place to go at, and this person was as-
serting that if you look at it that way, and you are trying to get
your biggest, most problematic targets first, an analogy to dealing
with cancer, where you go and you dig the big nodes out before
they metastasize, you go at Afghanistan, you have got to dig and
pull this one out, that your next big country that is supporting and
sponsoring terrorism, that is putting money into it, that is putting
troops into it, that is training, is Iran, that that is the country that
is supporting, that is sponsoring more terrorism, supporting Islam
Jihad, Hezbollah, Hamas, shipping weapons, providing training to
a number of countries in that region. Is that the more likely in-
tense focus that one should go at in a sequential battle in the war
on terrorism?


106
General MCINERNEY. My feeling is, is that Iran will take care of
itself once Iraq goes. Iraq has violated the U.N. accords. It has vio-
lated everything. It attempts to shoot down every day airplanes in
the northern fly zone and the southern fly zone. If they hit one of
them, that is an act of war, is it not? That does not seem to bother
him, because I think he flat says, they just do not have it. They
just do not have the guts to come after me, and every day, they
fire at our planes, and every day we put them in harm's way. Now,
that is why I think Iraq should come before Iran.
What you said about Iran is exactly correct, although I think
once Iraq goes, that Iran will self-correct.
Dr. HALPERIN. Senator, let me comment on that. Two points. I
think the only way to stop Iran from supporting those terrorist
groups is to settle the Palestinian-Israeli problem. I cannot imagine
even a different regime in Iran which would not provide support
to those groups as long as the Middle East problem is the way it
is, so the solution to the Iranian terrorism, which as you say is fo-
cused on the Middle East and on Israel, is to settle the Middle East
problem. You cannot settle it by regime change in Iran.
Second, I agree with you, we need to go through a sequence, but
I think we have skipped the first step too fast. Afghanistan is not
over. Afghanistan is still going to require for a very long time a
very substantial American military presence, and I think before we
look for another place to use American military force we had better
make sure that we do not leave behind an Afghanistan which 2
years from now is supporting terrorist groups again, not from the
central government, but from pockets around the country.
General MCINERNEY. The only thing I would say to that, Afghan-
istan is not developing weapons of mass destruction, and that is
why the priority must shift. We clearly must stay and work the Af-
ghanistan problem, Mort. I agree with you 100 percent.
Ambassador GALLUCCI. Senator, I think Iran is a serious problem
for us, but I hope it is not on our list of countries which we would
plan to invade any time soon in a preemptive act.
Senator BROWNBACK. I have not heard anybody suggest that.
Ambassador GALLUCCI. That is good. I think there is a question
about how best to deal with Iran. I guess I would disagree with
General McInerney. I do not think that addressing the Iraqi prob-
lem is necessarily going to help us with Iran. I think certainly, if
the Palestinian-Israeli issue were resolved, that would go a long
way in taking away one of the issues that causes difficulty.
Iran's drive to weapons of mass destruction independent of its
support for terrorism is, I think, a much more deeper rooted desire
in Iran, and I do not think it is connected particularly to this re-
gime. I think it is traceable to the Shah, and I think this is a stra-
tegic issue that only when we get a dialog with Iran will we be able
to address successfully. Right now, I think the key to dealing with
Iran is dealing with Russia rather than Iran, because we do not
have much going on with Tehran.
To go back to your first question about where do we go next, I
would be putting energy working on the Mort Halperin theory of
governance, that governments of the United States only have so
much energy. I would be putting energy on working on South Asia
and Pakistan in particular, and I worry greatly about the stability


109
that we need to do better on, and I will leave it at that, and I know
we can.
Do we have it right now? I would agree with General Hoar, we
do not have it right now, but all that rolled up in was a very impor-
tant campaign which speed and the simultaneous—remember, we
had 38 days, or whatever it was. Many would still like to have
that. There is a powerful synergy between simultaneous land and
air, because when you put ground in, he has to mass his forces,
and if anything we have invested in, it was taking tanks out on the
Central Plains of Europe, and that has got to be his main force.
And again you play back to the 10 campaign, to the Iraqi people.
We are not after you nor your military. That is an extremely pow-
erful tool that we need to work on.
Senator NELSON. Clearly, we have the new systems. By the way,
Joint Stars, Mr. Chairman, is built in my home town of Melbourne,
Florida.
Mr. Chairman, I want to ask one more question, and this is a
very delicate question. You were not here before, when you had
given me the opportunity to chair the hearing, and I raised the
issue of the downed pilot from Jacksonville, Florida, from the gulf
war, and all of these folks were sitting in the audience and heard
my questions to the previous panel, and my question to you all
would be, if Commander Scott Speicher is alive, they are obviously
going to use him in some way as a shield, as some kind of wedge
to try to get us not to do certain things or go certain places.
That, of course, from a human standpoint, with a family that has
gone through what they have gone through in Jacksonville, if he
is alive, is just an awful contemplation. Can you all give to us, to
me any insight into how we would have to go about that? Do we
just have to be coldhearted and put the national interest first?
What would you recommend?
General HOAR. Senator, there are several hundred Kuwaitis that
were captured, and there is no trace of them as well. This is clearly
a national policy. There have been just Iranians that have been re-
patriated recently from the Iraq-Iran war. I think we need to con-
tinue to press in every possible way, but it would seem to me that
again, using the good offices of other countries, specifically the Rus-
sians, and maybe others could help as well.
In the long run, I do not think any of us could speculate about
what role this particular tragedy would have in terms of national
policy.
Senator NELSON. I could not expect you to answer any other way.
Mr. DUELFER. You raise a very important point, both with re-
spect to an individual, but with respect to a general problem, and
I have had over the years some serious conversations with Iraqis
about how Americans target, and what they do, and so on and so
forth, and it might be useful to just say what their impression is.
Their impression, their thing is, Americans cannot take casual-
ties. This is part of the motivation for weapons of mass destruction.
I had a discussion on September 18, 1995, late at night, with
Iraqis, where Iraqis first discussed with us their concept of the use
of weapons of mass destruction, and what they did prior to the
commencement of the conflict in 1991, and it has been said before,
but I think it bears on this.


110
They deployed weapons, they filled them, they predelegated the
authority to use them if the United States went to Baghdad, and
they believe that that contributed to the decision not to go to Bagh-
dad. Again, the notion is, the United States cannot take casualties,
but more than that, they also saw what happened at the end of the
gulf war, when we ended the fighting after 100 hours. Why? Well,
one of the factors which they saw was, here is television pictures
of the Road of Death, so not only can Washington not stand to take
casualties itself, they do not even like it when Iraqis are casualties.
And if you add to that the experience of the last decade, where
as I mentioned in my testimony Saddam has taken his own popu-
lation hostage, the international community cannot sustain its will
because Saddam is causing his own people to pay an enormous
price.
Now, all of this philosophy is going to weave itself into how they
defend themselves against perceived attack, including collocating
civilian and military targets, such that no weapon, no matter how
smart, is going to be able to distinguish between the two, and we
just have to be able to take that into course.
Senator NELSON. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. You are an extremely valuable panel, and we
have one more panel, but I cannot resist, I have two more ques-
tions, and I would ask my colleagues if they have one or two more.
This is too important to let you go.
Each of you have a slightly different prescription as to how to
proceed. To speak to the point made by Senator Rockefeller, there
is necessarily uncertainty in all of the prescriptions. What I have
gleaned from you all, that you all seem to have in common, al-
though slightly different ways of approaching what
pro-
pose to a President, for example, at this moment, is that none of
you seem to think that the groundwork that is needed to be done
has been done thus far for your individual approaches, each one of
you. They are all different, slightly different. They are different in
degree.
But what I have gotten so far this morning and this afternoon
is that whether it is containment plus, whether it is a robust re-
gime with a ready force demonstrating that we need it, or what is
in between, is that the spadework necessary to be able to success-
fully bring to fruition each of your suggested courses of action has
not been done yet. Is that correct?
Any of you, for example, were Senator Lugar President, and to-
morrow he turned to you and said, OK, I am about to implement
full blown your proposal, any one of you, would all of you say, I
am ready to go, we are ready to go right now, or would you say,
by the way, we have got to do a lot more work, we have not done
this with the Russians, we have not done this with the Kuwaitis,
we have not moved this with the Europeans, we have not done this
with the—I mean, am I right, or am I getting this wrong here?
There is more that has to be done for every one of the prescrip-
tions, right, in terms of spadework?
Ambassador GALLUCCI. It is a leading question, Mr. Chairman,
but I think you lead us in the right direction.
The CHAIRMAN. It is intended to be, because I do not want to
make any mistake here, not because I want you to reach the same
you would


111
conclusion. I just want to make sure that I understand it, because
look, gentlemen, I want to make it clear this is maybe the best way
in simple terms that folks in my home town of Claymont will un-
derstand, I think, our obligation at the end of the day whenever
that is—I do not mean today—is to say to the American people,
here are the choices. You pay your money, and this is the chance
you take. The upside or the downside is clear.
If he has to take the one side, nuclear weapons. Today, tomor-
row, 6 months or 6 years from now, that is a very bad thing. If he
has the ability to deliver that over a range that is longer than a
couple of miles, that is even a worse thing, and because of his pre-
vious mode of action, because of what the perception on the part
of Iraqi military and civilian leaders around him is about, our abil-
ity to absorb pain and suffering, the consensus seems to be he
would likely at some point use either preemptively or in response
these weapons, and therefore we should do something about this,
and if we did something about it and were able to wipe him out,
in the sense of take him out and get rid of those weapons, it would
be a very good thing, because the potential for things in the region
to get better would be there. That is the upside, the danger and
the upside.
But don't we have to say to the American people, and it may be
I am truly—I have not reached a conclusion about this, but if, for
example, we were struck with a weapon preemptively, we would re-
spond, and would we not have to say to the American people, these
are the likely consequences of our responding, or preemptively
moving. One would be, there would be loss of life, loss of American
life. It is not likely that we are going to be able to do this without
something between a couple and maybe 10,000 lives lost, depend-
ing upon the ability and the efficacy of the chemical or biological
weapons he may have.
The second thing we are going to have to say to them is, we are
going to have to mobilize on a grand scale, say goodbye to daddy
for Labor Day and mommy for Halloween, because the Reserves
and the National Guard are going to have to be mobilized. Does
anybody think we can do any of what we are talking about without
mobilizing the Guard and the Reserves to a degree beyond which
they are now? So we have to tell people that, so they are not sur-
prised about it. It seems to me we have to tell them that.
We spent months, and I spent hours with the President, literally
on one occasion 2 hours with the President in the Oval Office, and
the only discussion was, in Afghanistan about the Arab street, and
our concern about—we went through this tortuous process in Af-
ghanistan, which was cake compared to this, worrying about what
this means from Djakarta to Tunisia. What about our interest in
the rest of the world? We have to tell people we do not know, right?
We do not know what the response would be.
We would also have to tell them that there is going to be a spike
in oil prices. The idea that this could occur without a spike—maybe
we should pay all these prices, but we have to tell them that there
is going to be a spike in oil prices. It may be temporary, it may
be long lasting, but there is going to be a spike. It is going to have
economic consequences.


112
And third, if we do it by ourselves, we cannot expect the rest of
the world to pick up 80 percent of the tab, whether it is $40 billion,
$80 billion, $100 billion, whatever it is, right?
And we are going to have to say that it could impact upon, it will
impact on, and we know, you may not, on the deficit. There will
be a deficit, or some of my friends will have to give up a tax cut,
right? I mean, those are the choices we have to make.
Senator BROWNBACK. Or spending increases.
The CHAIRMAN. And last, that there is at least a serious prospect
that we are going to have to keep a lot of Americans in place for
a long time in an area of the world that may mean they are not
going to come home for Christmas, this Christmas anyway, and
probably for a while. Is that a fair statement?
So I am not suggesting that we should not act at this point. I
do not know enough to know yet, but I am suggesting one of the
objectives, and the reason I am so thankful for you all giving us
your time and the panels that will come, is I think we have an obli-
gation to say to the American people—I for one, for example, if I
knew he had these weapons, and the Lord came down and sat up
here and said, Joe boy, he has them and he is going to move, I
would say we have got to pay all of these prices, we have got to
pay them all, but I have an obligation to tell the American people
that this is going to be the cost, the parameters of the cost.
And so I hope that we can—and you will continue to be available
to us, because I am convinced the President is taking this very se-
riously. I realize he talks a lot about regime change, and some peo-
ple think he talks about it very blithely. I do not think he is un-
aware, the deeper he gets into this, that this is very consequential,
and so I think that if we continue this, and I hate the word, par-
ticularly in the foreign policy context, dialog—that usually means
saying nothing, but if we continue this discussion as a Nation, we
will arrive at the right answer. We will arrive at the right answer,
and we will have the consensus of the American people.
But the puzzle for me is, among other things, it sure would be
nice if we got more people in on the deal. It sure would be bene-
ficial if we had more cooperation. It sure would be useful if we
could cut some of the risk, which I think if we have enough time
and enough ingenuity we could, and so one of the things we are
going to be exploring with the next panel, who are experts on the
region and on the culture, and for example, and I will end with
this, in Iraq, I mean, there are three centers of power.
There historically have been three centers of power in Iraq. They
are based on tribal and ethnic differences. They have significant
ramifications. It matters whether or not, how they react, and how
neighboring countries react to them, and so we are going to get an
opportunity to get into some of what Senator Lugar raised today
about how much do we know, how much do we know about the cul-
ture? How much do we know about the consequences? How much
do we know abut the responses that are likely to come based upon
certain actions?
But the reason I bothered to say that before you leave, and I will
yield to my colleagues for questions for you, is, I just want you to
know, which I hope is obvious to you, I think you are making a sig-
nificant contribution here.


114
argument that if you take care of Iraq the rest will fall in place,
including Israel and the Palestinian issue.
General HOAR. I disagree with that violently, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone agree with that proposition?
General MCINERNEY. I think it will have a lot more significance
if we take care of Iraq first. Saddam gives about $950 million this
year to the PLO. He has bonded himself with that issue, where be-
fore he was not, but I also think, General Hoar, it has gotten to
such a point over there that it is obscuring a lot of the other things
Afghanistan and Iraq.
The only thing I would say about Europe,
would say about Europe, they had the same
problem in 1939, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. That is a good point.
Dr. HALPERIN. Senator, can I just make one comment? I
go
back
to Senator Rockefeller's point about uncertainty. Remember, it was
not too many years ago when we were the leading exponents of the
notion that one could get along with Saddam Hussein. He was still
developing nuclear weapons, he was still doing terrible things to
his people, and we were arguing with our allies we can come to
terms with him.
There are very great uncertainties, I think, that affect all of
these decisions, but I just wanted to comment on the part that you
started with. It seems to me it is very uncertain what we should
do. There are no clear answers, there are no easy answers, and
therefore it seems to me that I come back to what you were em-
phasizing, is that the process is key to this. I would hope that we
would not have from the administration what we had on the reor-
ganization of the government, which is opposition, silence, and then
a proposal and a demand that we do it in 2 weeks or 2 months.
If we are going to do this, we need a long period of debate after
the President lays out the case. I think Congress not only has to
insist it has a role to play, but it has a role to play that cannot
be stampeded by a sudden announcement.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.
Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me try to offer
a road map. What if we took the position that the panel this morn-
ing mentioned, especially Ambassador Butler, and many of you
mentioned today, that essentially we fought a war militarily, the
U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution, but unfortunately for
a variety of reasons Iraq did not comply. In due course Iraq antici-
pated we would not enforce compliance, which we have not, but
leaving aside whether Saddam is close to developing a nuclear
weapon we go back to the U.N. Security Council friends and say
we must take this threat seriously.
So whether it is containment light or containment heavy, we
must try to enforce what Secretary Powell has negotiated. We must
be pretty hardnosed about it and say, we are going to stop any-
thing restricted from coming in and out of Iraq as far as we can.
We are going to enforce the no-fly zones almost to the point that
we occupy in the air those two zones, so you are squeezed.
In other words, leaving aside all of the speculation over intel-
ligence we do not have, we do those things which are ordained now
by the United Nations, by all of our friends.


116
what do we have left, we still have not heard what will happen.
Some express hopefulness that there is a charismatic figure some-
where in Iraq today, or outside of Iraq, that might come in, or sev-
eral of these people who somehow might bring about a different
style of life for people.
Now, we are experimenting with this in Afghanistan. There are
big changes there. Women are going to school and having basic
rights. This changes the whole concept that half the population of
most Muslim states are disenfranchised and out of the picture.
As you pointed out, if all this began to occur in Iraq, what would
the neighbors think? How about the Saudis? How about anybody
in the neighborhood? Do they accept this? How many years, and
how many people do we have to have there to make certain those
who are doing these incipient democratic things have time to do it?
And so that is a part of the situation I think we need to sketch in
some more, Mr. Chairman.
The military side of it is not complex. Most Americans are not
prepared to spend $80 billion and several hundred thousand people
in readiness and deployment, but that we can do. We have been
through that before, and we still have not come to a successful con-
clusion in Iraq, or at this point certainly even in Afghanistan, and
that seems to me to be critically important.
The CHAIRMAN. That is why I almost switched my registration
and voted for you in the primary.
Senator LUGAR. I do not really ask for anybody to comment. This
is sort of my own editorial, unless somebody has a thought about
it.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to comment?
Dr. HALPERIN. Let me say, Senator, I am ready to sign up to the
first part of your policy, which is a vigorous enforcement of what
the international community already supports, with the notion that
if Saddam resists that, we then push further with the use of mili-
tary force.
Senator LUGAR. That is our entré back into the international
community.
Dr. HALPERIN. The only thing I would add is, let us take a little
bit of that money you set aside and spend it to make the embargo
work. If we are prepared to compensate the Syrians, the Turks,
and the Jordanians for the consequences of honoring the embargo,
and if we insist that they honor the embargo, I think we can make
that happen, and I think that would have a very
Senator LUGAR. That is interesting, compensating these people.
Dr. HALPERIN. The U.N. Charter entitles countries which enforce
embargoes mandated by the Security Council to be compensated by
the international community. We did it to some degree with the
countries around Serbia, not fully, but to a significant degree, and
we have not done that in this area, and that is a lot cheaper than
a military operation.
Senator LUGAR. Good idea. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Gentlemen, do either of you have any
more questions?
Gentlemen, I cannot thank you enough. This has been very help-
ful, the start of this undertaking, and I warn you, we are like poor
relatives, when we are invited, we show up. You have invited us


117
to ask you again. I am warning you we may ask you back. I thank
you very, very much. You have been very helpful.
We have one more panel, a very important panel, and what I
would like to suggest is that I realize it is 5 o'clock, but it is going
to take a little more time. Professor Telhami, Professor Ajami, Dr.
Kemp, and Ambassador Parris are our next panel, and we appre-
ciate their waiting so long. Please, gentlemen-I do not know
where they put your name tags, but if you would pick a seat, and
the tag will find you.
Professor Telhami is Anwar Sadat professor of peace and devel-
opment at the University of Maryland, and is a nonresident senior
fellow at the Brookings Institution, and has made himself available
to this committee, to me and many members of the committee, and
we truly appreciate his making himself available.
Professor Ajami is professor and director of Middle East studies
at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International
Studies, and he has recently been elected to the board of the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations, again has been incredibly generous with
his time and advice.
Dr. Kemp is director of strategic programs of the Nixon Center.
From 1983 to 1985 he served as both Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for
Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Coun-
cil.
And last but not least, Ambassador Mark Parris served as U.S.
Ambassador to Turkey from 1997 to 2000. He served as Special As-
sistant to the President and Senior Director for the Near East and
South Asia at the National Security Council from 1995 to 1997.
Again, I thank you all for being here, and I thank you for your
patience. Maybe if you could proceed in the order you have been
introduced, and then we can get to questions. You see we have an
interested panel on this side, so I appreciate your time and hope
we do not ruin your dinner.
STATEMENT OF DR. SHIBLEY TELHAMI, ANWAR SADAT PRO-
FESSOR FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT, UNIVERSITY OF
MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK, MD, AND NONRESIDENT SEN-
IOR FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. TELHAMI. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for inviting me. I
would like to make some very brief opening remarks, and I would
submit my written statement for the record.
The CHAIRMAN. All of your statements will be placed in the
record to the extent that you do not do the whole statement.
Dr. TELHAMI. What I would like to do is instead just highlight
a few points, and I would like to address more specifically the issue
of regional impact on a possible war, and how the region broadly
looks at policy toward Iraq.
I think it is clear from what you heard already that there is per-
vasive opposition to a military campaign toward Iraq in any fore-
seeable future, and it is very important to understand what the cal-
culations are in the region that lead to this kind of opposition.
I would like to begin by saying that while a lot of that has to
do with an assessment of public opinion in the region and the pres-
sures they face from their own public, much of that calculation is


119
says, who cares about public opinion in the region, or who cares
even about the positions of these governments who are opposing
the United States? The assessment is that we are powerful enough
to do it on our own, and when they see that we are going to do
it anyway, they are going to jump on the American bandwagon,
and they are mostly authoritarian governments. They are going to
find a way to bring the public along, and therefore, why should we
care? Why should we pay attention to that? Let us do what we
need to do, and they are just going to jump on a winning American
bandwagon.
I am not going to address the military side of that. You have
heard a lot about it. But the political side of it, I think it is a mis-
take to make that argument. I have no doubt that some govern-
ments will jump on a winning American bandwagon, no question
about it. I think people do not like to be on the sides of losers, and
they do not want to be on the wrong side of the United States, es-
pecially if they are sure that the United States is going to win, and
I think militarily there will be no doubt.
The real question is at what cost and what are the consequences,
but I think if the United States is willing to put a lot of resources
into it, that there is no doubt about the military equation of it, and
so there is no doubt that some will do it, but I will submit to you
that the calculations have changed since 1991, and clearly we can-
not be assured that all of them or even most of them, those that
joined the coalition in 1991 are going to have the jump-on-the-
bandwagon attitude.
Let me tell you why, and I will give you a couple of reasons. One
is, the situation has changed not only in terms of the perception
of Iraqi threat. In 1991, clearly they saw Iraq as a threatening
state with military capabilities. Today, nobody really believes that
Iraq is a serious threat, and they see it mostly as a victim, so the
logic of the Iraq issue is different.
While in 1991 there may have been doubts, particularly by radi-
cals in the region, about the U.S. military capability and staying
power, that was made a reality after the 1991 victory. It is clear
that today no one has doubts about the United States. Most Amer-
ican attitudes are really derived by a perception that America is ac-
tually very powerful, that America is perhaps too powerful for
them, too domineering in regional politics, so the perception is not
exactly the same perception that preceded 1991, and that therefore
the logic of the psychology is very different.
From the government's point of view, most of them probably will
do what they have to do to resist public opinion if public opinion
tries to disrupt a policy of supporting an American campaign in
Iraq, or at least sitting on the sidelines of an American campaign
toward Iraq. Many of them will probably succeed. Most of them do
not have as much certainty as they did back in 1991 that they
could succeed.
The absence of certainty is in part a function of a new reality,
which is that they no longer control the flow of information. They
no longer control perception, at least in that dimension.
There is a sense that the public will get information that is going
to be disruptive to governmental agenda in a way that govern-
ments cannot control. That is new to them. They do not know


120
whether it means a lot, and they do not know whether it means
a little, but they know that it presents some uncertainty about
their ability to control, and second, there is a sense of empower-
ment in the region.
That is, I would say, a public disgust with states in general, with
their own states, with the international system, with international
organizations, and certainly with the United States, and in that
sense to the extent that there is a public that is willing to be mobi-
lized, it is not mobilizing behind a possibility that Iraq might have
victory, or behind a government who is going to advocate their
causes. It is the extent to which they are going to be able to do
something on their own, or rally behind militants.
The source of inspiration today is not states, it is militants, anti-
state, and the extent to which therefore they succeed is not a func-
tion of the strength of any particular state, including Iraq, and in
that regard I think what we will have even in a successful cam-
paign, and even if the governments do succeed in repressing the
public, you are going to have two clear outcomes.
One is, they are only going to succeed if they are more repres-
sive, and I am talking about governments outside of Iraq. They will
succeed only through repression, and they have probably the capac-
ity to do so. They will stretch themselves to the limit, but if we
have any illusions about this then transforming the Middle East
into a democratic place I think, let us think about that a little bit
more.
And second, it is undoubtedly, in my judgment, going to increase
the motivation for terrorism in the region. Maybe we can reduce
some aspects, but clearly there will be more motivation. We have
to understand that there are dynamics that will be out there re-
gardless of what the outcome will be actually in Iraq itself, but let
me end with a question pertaining to the nuclear threat.
I think it is interesting, we had the discussion before about
whether or not the region sees Iraq's nuclear potential, or potential
in weapons of mass destruction as threatening to them. They are
the ones who have to fear Iraq most, its neighbors. Why aren't they
worried about Iraq so much, and I think ultimately it is really a
different interpretation of the threat.
Most of them first do not think Iraq is close to having a nuclear
capability. They think we are exaggerating, but more importantly
I think they have a different assessment of Saddam Hussein. They
think he is a ruthless dictator, but not suicidal. They think he is
sensitive to deterrence, and they think that he goes against weaker
but not stronger opponents, and therefore, regardless of what he
does, they think he is containable. They have a different idea about
the sort of threat that he poses, and in that regard they see the
choice as being a choice between our being willing to live with him
and not being willing to live with him.
I think ultimately in our debate we have confused the two issues,
frankly. If the issue is about terrorism, then we have to remind
ourselves that this is not likely 6o eliminate the motivation for ter-
rorism in the Middle East. It may even increase it.
If our aim is to limit Iraq's nuclear capabilities, weapons of mass
destruction capabilities, we may succeed in Iraq in particular. We
will succeed militarily, but we might have a political option if our


121
1
aim is not also to overthrow the regime, and I think what we have
done is in essence linked the regime change option with the elimi-
nation of the weapons of mass destruction option.
That is, the political attempt to try to put controls in place that
would get Iraqi cooperation on weapons of mass destruction has al-
ways been linked to the idea that we also want regime change, and
so the Iraqi reluctance in part, at least—at least they have not
been tested enough-has been the assumption that we are after the
regime as well as minimizing their capabilities, and therefore I
think we have not tested the political option that splits the two,
that says, let us test the choice for the regime between survival
and having nuclear weapons, let us test them politically, and I
think it is very clear that for his survival Saddam Hussein is will-
ing to give up almost anything.
At the same time, if his survival is at stake, there is no doubt
that he is willing to do almost anything, and I think that is very
important to remember in thinking about how we might design a
policy that would be effective toward Iraq.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Telhami follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. SHIBLEY TELHAMI, ANWAR SADAT PROFESSOR FOR
PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND; NONRESIDENT SENIOR FEL-
LOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
THE REGIONAL SETTING OF POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
Dear Mr. Chairman, let me begin by addressing the regional calculations about
American policy toward Iraq. Even aside from public sentiments, one should not un-
derestimate the strategic reluctance of states in the Gulf to support an American-
led war on Iraq for two reasons: They fear above all the possible disintegration of
Iraq, or continued instability emanating from Iraq, and they do not believe that
American assurances to the contrary are credible; they see the task of maintaining
Iraq's territorial integrity and preventing meddling by other states to be potentially
overwhelming. On the other hand, even if the United States commits to a sustained
presence in Iraq and to the deployment of the necessary military, political, and eco-
nomic resources to assure Iraq's stability, many of Iraq's neighbors, and others in
the region, fear a possible American military/political dominance that would then
include Iraq in a way that alters the strategic picture to their disadvantage.
Governments in the region generally favor preventing Iraq from becoming a nu-
clear power, especially under Saddam Hussein. Even Gulf states such as the United
Arab Emirates, who fear Iran more than they fear Iraq and who worry about weak-
ening Iraq too much, support measures to limit Iraq's nuclear capabilities, including
reinstating international monitors. But some states also worry about overwhelming
American power in the region. Their calculations are thus more complex: They don't
want to see Iraq armed with nuclear weapons, but they also fear American domi-
nance, (and in Syria's case, Israeli strategic dominance), especially a scenario of a
sustained American military presence in Iraq.
Ultimately, however, most states in the region do not see Iraq as now posing a
serious threat to them that warrants a war that could significantly alter the re-
gional environment and presents them with hard choices internally and externally.
They don't see the status quo as being especially dangerous, and they don't see hard
new evidence to convince them otherwise. Certainly not all of Iraq's neighbors have
the same calculations, and the interests of the members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council are different from those of Jordan, Turkey, Syria and Iran, and there are
differences even within the GCC. Most, however, see American policy on this issue
as being driven by either domestic politics, or by strategic designs to consolidate
American dominance, and thus do not see an intended good for them. The real issue
is whether they have to accommodate the U.S., because otherwise they will be in
even worse shape if they don't, and therefore whether or not they should find some
way to benefit if the American decision to go to war with Iraq became unavoidable.
One of the biggest reasons for regional reluctance to support an American military
effort to topple Iraq's government is concern for public opinion. Although states in
the region remain very powerful in their domestic control, no state can fully ignore
the public sentiment in the era of the information revolution. Certainly one of the


122
major barriers to getting the support of Arab governments for a war option is public
pressure. But much of the public in the Arab world is sympathetic to Iraq's efforts
in general; today, they see Iraq as victim, not as aggressor. It is important thus to
understand how the public in the region, including the elites, views this issue. First,
most don't understand that the basis of the policy to prevent Iraq from acquiring
WMD is UN resolutions, so they see the policy as a strategy intended to prevent
only Arab states from acquiring such weapons. Second, those who understand the
role of UN resolutions raise the question about “double standards” in applying UN
resolutions, always with examples from the Arab-Israeli conflict, and they ask in
any case, why it is that the U.S., not the UN, should make the ultimate decision
authorizing a war. Third, while some almost wish for an Arab deterrent, even if pos-
sessed by Saddam Hussein, most don't believe that it is likely in any case, see Iraq
to be helpless, and see the entire focus on this issue as tactical, intended to justify
keeping fraq in a box, or intended to justify a possible war on it. This has become
even more so in recent months, with the public in the region increasingly resentful
of American policy, and seeing the U.S. as dominating the decisions at the UN.
Fourth, there is continued empathy with the suffering of Iraq's population and a
prevailing assumption that the sanctions, not the Iraqi regime, are ultimately to
blame for this suffering.
In our limited public debate about Iraq policy, one prevailing view is that we
needn't trouble ourselves much with public opinion in the region, or even with the
current opposition to war by the region's governments. The logic of this argument
is that in non-democratic systems of government, public sentiment is unlikely to
alter the ultimate calculations of governments, and that these governments will
have no choice but to jump on the American bandwagon because they can't afford
to be on the losing side. It is true that the record of governments in the region justi-
fies the belief in their ability to contain public discontent. Certainly in 1991 these
governments were very effective in limiting the impact of public resentment, but it
is important to note that both the resentment of the U.S. and the sympathy with
Iraq at the public level are greater today than they were in 1991. And it is also
the case that government control is more limited at least in the area of information
flow, and thus governments are less able to shape public perceptions.
This is not to say that states do not remain capable of containing public anger;
they remain central players in Middle East politics, as is the case globally. What
it means is that they are less certain today about their capabilities, that they face
more anger than before, and that we should have no illusions about how they will
ultimately contain anger: only through more repression. So aside from the con-
sequence for Iraq itself, it is likely that one outcome of war with Iraq and possible
Arab governments' cooperation in that war is that there will be more repression, de-
spite the best of our intentions. As in our policy toward Pakistan today, we will be
more willing to overlook measures of repression if governments will lend their sup-
port for what will be our urgent strategic priorities in bringing about a favorable
outcome in Iraq.
We should also not take it for granted that all governments will swallow hard and
jump on our bandwagon once a decision is made. This will be true for some, but
not for all those who joined the coalition in 1991, in part because some fear both
the failure of the war and also its success. The trade-off for them between facing
the anger of their publics on the one hand, and facing the anger of the U.S. on the
other, have also changed since 1991. Ultimately, governments will make their deci-
sions on realpolitik calculations, but many of them are uncertain today where these
calculations will lead them.
In the end, it is clear that if the U.S. puts enough resources into play, it will suc-
ceed in overthrowing the government of Saddam Hussein. But we have to remember
that that specific objective is an instrument for the broader American objective of
reducing the danger of terrorism and protecting American interests in the Middle
East. An American military success could in fact have a short-term strategic benefit,
assuming that the U.S. is willing to sustain the effort for an extended period beyond
government change. But the consequence on regional psychology is likely to be dif-
ferent from the one that prevailed in 1991. Radicals in the region who wanted to
see a change in the Middle East after the end of the Cold War pinned their hope
on the prospect that Iraq would be a powerful state and that Saddam Hussein
would be a new Bismarck who would overcome the pervasive sense of Arab weak-
ness—in the same way that even more people pinned their hope on Gamal abd al-
Nasser of Egypt in the 1950s and 60s. And moderates in the region envisioned that
an inevitable Pax Americana could possibly help them transform the regional envi-
ronment, especially in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, improve prospects of eco-
nomic prosperity, and begin a process of political liberalization. At the end of the
1991 war, the defeat of Saddam Hussein certainly led to a sense of resignation by


123
radicals pinning their hopes on Arab leaders and states. And moderates gathered
momentum in support of an American-backed process that was centered on peaceful
efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and constructing a moderate coalition in
the region. That coalition crashed with the collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli nego-
tiations in July 2000, and the realization that neither economic prosperity nor polit-
ical liberalization materialized. Today, there is a sense of utter mistrust, not only
of the U.S., but of states and international organizations. And there is a sense of
pervasive humiliation in the region at the public's inability to affect any change,
both internally and externally. This, unfortunately, has led many to find inspiration
in non-state militant groups, perfect recruits for terrorism. The source of inspiration
for them is no longer states like Iraq, as most people see it today as a helpless vic-
tim. Unlike the radicals in 1991, who had some doubt about America's ability to de-
feat Iraq, today a motivating factor for the radicals is that the U.S. is too powerful
and dominating in the region-not that it is weak, or that it lacks the will to exer-
cise power. The net outcome of a successful scenario, of overthrowing the Iraqi re-
gime and securing an American-backed new Iraqi government, will be to increase
the anger, and thus the motivation, that terrorists readily exploit. It is good to re-
mind ourselves that most of the terrorists coming from the region in the 1990s, in-
cluding those who committed the horror of 9/11, did not come from Iraq, even
though Iraq may have been a factor in their motivation.
As such, it is not clear that even a success of a military campaign in Iraq will
reduce the terrorist threat, and it may even have the consequence of increasing it.
Thus, we must ask the question about the ultimate strategic aim of a campaign,
beyond the overthrow of Iraq's government. Certainly, the central argument in the
public debate has been about Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction,
especially nuclear weapons. A war option would eliminate Iraq's nuclear potential,
although one wonders whether other states may not conclude that they should accel-
erate their own efforts to develop nuclear weapons as a way to deter perceived
American unilateralism. Although some aspiring nuclear states may be deterred ini-
tially by the Iraqi example, the likelihood that American resources will be thinly
stretched in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in the global war on terrorism, will make
it less likely that the U.S. will contemplate other major wars barring an urgent
threat to American interests.
It is also important to consider why states who should fear Iraq most, its neigh-
bors, are less troubled in the short term by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
There are two areas of difference: most of them do not believe that Iraq has serious
nuclear potential, and therefore would need to see significant evidence to accept the
proposition. Second, most believe that Saddam Hussein is a ruthless risk-taker, but
not suicidal, and see him as being sensitive to deterrence. The latter point is espe-
cially important, because of the psychology in the region which goes like this: In the
unlikely event that Iraq should develop nuclear weapons under the sanctions re-
gime, it will refrain from using them because the consequences will be self-destruc-
tion; While Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons before, he has done so
against weaker parties who could not seriously threaten him.
These differing views of Saddam Hussein also explain some of our own policy am-
bivalence. If we consider that our aim is not merely to prevent Iraq from developing
weapons of mass destruction, but also an active campaign to change the regime in
Baghdad, then it is hard to see how we put ourselves on any course but one that
which preempts Iraq's nuclear potential, since it will be more difficult to overthrow
the government once Iraq is a nuclear state. But it should be clear to us that what
would be driving such a course is not weapons of mass destruction as such, but over-
throwing the regime.
To the extent that weapons of mass destruction remain an important issue, the
pursuit of this objective could lead us to contemplate a number of other possible
tracks that should become part of our national debate. One such track is the contin-
ued containment policy coupled with the reintroduction of a more vigorous inter-
national inspection regime in Iraq. It is clear that Saddam Hussein has put many
obstacles before the international inspectors in the past and he refuses to allow
them back. This may indicate that the same tactics will be pursued by him in the
future. But it is also clear that he has been operating under the assumption that
our objective is ultimately to topple him, in addition to limiting his capabilities in
the meanwhile. The only way a strategy to get his full cooperation could have a
chance of success is if his overthrow no longer becomes the objective; He will always
choose his survival over all else. As such, our debate should consider how important
regime change is as an objective to us, and whether it is worth the risks of a mili-
tary option even if there is a chance that a non-military solution could be found.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, professor.


125
People say Americans are arrogant, but it is not true. Americans
enjoy life, and they are proud of their lives, and they are boastful
of the wonderful inventions that have made life so much easier. It
is very difficult to understand the machinery of hatred, because
you wind up resorting to logic, but trying to understand this with
logic is like measuring distance in kilograms. Measuring distance
in kilograms.
These are people who are afraid of America, afraid of life itself.
These are people who are envious. To them, life is an unbearable
burden. Modernism is the only way out, but modernism is fright-
ening. It means we have to compete. It means we cannot explain
everything away with conspiracy theories.
Bernard Shaw said it best, you know, in the preface to St. Joan.
He said that Joan of Arc was burned for no other reason except
that she was talented. Talent gives rise to jealousy in the hearts
of the untalented.
So we shall go into the Arab world, into the Muslim world. We
should launch this campaign in the face of this kind of sentiment
about America. Now, this will not be Desert Storm, I think we
must understand that, because in Desert Storm there were even
Muslim jurists, Muslim jurists in Saudi Arabia and Egypt who ar-
gued that Saddam was a menace to his world and a tyrant, and
resistance to him is legitimate.
They issued a ruling opinion in that direction, so we went with
that, and at the time there were jurists who even ruled that you
could have Arab and Islamic, quote-unquote, other friendly forces.
We got in under that loophole, 1/2 million men under the other
friendly forces. It will not be this way this time around. We under-
stand that.
So ideally for the regimes in the region what they want for the
Desert Storm of a decade ago, I have written in the statement I
have submitted to you, Mr. Chairman, is they now want the perfect
storm, and this is really what they want. A swift war, few casual-
ties, as little exposure by themselves as possible, the opportunity
to be rid of Saddam without riding in broad daylight with the
Americans, and without being brought to account by their people.
It would be great if they could get that, but the political world
never grants these kinds of favors. The fog of war is what it is, and
there will be risks run by these regimes, and there will be risks
run by ourselves.
I agree partly with my colleague, Shibley, on one point that I
think, and I would elaborate by saying this would be a war in the
time of the satellite channels, and so a lot of this will be in the
open, and I think this is the nightmare of these regimes, that we
would call upon them to make commitments in the open.
So my feeling is that we would end up not with a very brilliant
position, but not with a bad one if we choose to draw the sword,
if
you want your metaphor, to pull the trigger, that there would be
people who would associate with us quietly in Kuwait, in Qatar,
and there would be people who would associate with us even in
Jordan, though the case of Jordan requires, I think, focus and dis-
cussion, but they will dread having to be brought out into the open.
Will the Arab street greet us warmly? It will not, but I tell you
one thing, the one street that will trump all streets, and this, I
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127
dam Hussein and his regime, and on some of the truths of Iraq itself and answer
some questions the members of this committee might have.
There are rumors of war all around, and the rumors have, of course, been most
widely circulated in the Arab world itself. That world has a fixation on America:
Truth and legend about America are jumbled in that region. Our thoughts and sec-
ond thoughts, the disagreements of our officials, the things we supposedly hatch for
them over there, are the staple of the region's politics.
By the appearance of things, Saddam Hussein must be convinced that war is on
the horizon. His regime now promises to return Kuwait's national archives; It prom-
ises to “discuss” the 600 Kuwaiti war prisoners—who in Iraq's previous utterances,
had never existed. In recent months the Iraqis have alternated threats and induce-
ments. The newspaper of First Son Udday Hussein, the dictator's oldest, has issued
a warning that even the “spectators” to the war will not be spared; There have been
the familiar warnings that the ground under pro-American Arab rulers would be set
ablaze, that the political culture of the place would punish those who would cast
their fate with the foreign power. Conversely, the Iraqis are now offering oil dis-
counts, free trade zones, promises of commerce to practically all their neighbors.
They have held out to the Syrians the promise of turning over Syrian members of
the Muslim Brotherhood who had been granted asylum by Iraq,
The Iraqi despot is on the ground, he is of the place. It is a time of acute impasse
between the Arab world and the United States. This would be a war in the age of
the satellite channels and the news media. The Iraqis aim to scare us away, to sug-
gest that we would be venturing into a region that bears us nothing but ill will.
It should be conceded right away that this is not Desert Storm, that we shall have
to bring with the gear our own ideological and moral arguments. Eleven years or
so ago, it was different during Desert Storm: That was a solar/lunar eclipse. The
Iraqi ruler had run afoul of the rules of his neighborhood. His neighbors were men-
aced, and they were eager for protection. There were Muslim jurists, in Saudi Ara-
bia and Egypt, who issued fatwas, ruling opinions, against Saddam, sanctioned the
presence of Arab and Islamic and “other friendly forces.” In the intervening decade,
the man worked his way into the order of things. He knew the rules. He insinuated
himself into the prevailing status quo.
This time around, the region shall be divided between those crying out against
the Great foreign power's war, and relatively silent subdued partners. A silent mi-
nority of liberal secularists will see the justice of this campaign and the need to rid
the Arab world of Saddam's power and Saddam's example: We shall be hailed in
Kuwait, for the Kuwaitis bear Saddam ajustifiable animus and know him for what
he is. But it will be tougher going in other Arab lands. There shall be no demonstra-
tions in Arab cities in favor of a strike against Iraq, it is safe to assume. If the mood
of the region could be divined, it is as sure as anything that there will be dem-
onstrations in Nablus and Casablanca, in Ramallah and Cairo, against America and
its war. The campaign shall be seen as an Anglo-American war. Both Egypt and
Saudi Arabia are on record against this resort to arms. It is safe to assume that
they can not turn on a dime, and join us in full daylight. Most likely, they will seek
cover: They will get out of the way, offer what cooperation can be provided-passage
through the Suez Canal, the use of command and control facilities, the combined
Air Operations Center at Prince Sultan Air Base—while in public maintaining their
distance. The crucial help that would be needed from Saudi Arabia is its excess ca-
pacity of 3 million barrels of oil a day to replace Iraq's production in case of a long
interruption of Iraqi oil production. That sort of help can be relied upon.
Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia would risk its American connection in favor of
Saddam. The truth must be known that there is no constituency for Iraq and for
Saddam Hussein in Saudi Arabia. The kind of religious fervor that has moved opin-
ion in Saudi Arabia on Islamic issues (Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan where every
extended family had a son in that land, practically, and the issue of the Palestin-
ians) is not there for the secular regime of Saddam Hussein. The dynasty in Saudi
Arabia and the regime in Egypt can thus have a reasonable amount of prerogative
and stay on the sidelines. The body politic in Bahrain and Qatar and Kuwait (let
alone in Turkey, a case apart, and a country that can be fully relied upon for the
prosecution of this war) will permit these lands enough latitude to support an Amer-
ican campaign. The country that will bear watching will be Jordan. Whether the
young monarch, Abdullah ibn Hussein, decides to roll the dice and associate his
country with an American campaign. If he does, there would be an irony here: Last
time around when the two fathers, George Herbert Walker Bush and King Hussein,
were there for the first campaign against Saddam, King Hussein opted for the street
in his country, and reasoned that Pax Americana will forgive him his tilt toward
Iraq, while the Iraqis and the pro-Iraqi sentiment in Jordan would be less forgiving.
It was a variant of the choice that the late King Hussein had made in 1967, in the


128
Six Day War, when he rode with Nasser in the full knowledge that the Egyptians
were doomed nonetheless. For King Abdullah this will be a big call, for his country's
temper
and opinion run in the other direction. He has just strongly criticized his
uncle, Prince Hassan bin Talal, for attending a meeting with Iraqi oppositionists
and anti-Saddam military officers in London. This is the stuff of which reigns are
made and broken: The young King's burden-a large Palestinian population, a coun-
try of considerable poverty—is well known. But the weakness of the Jordanian state
should not be overblown. The state could ride out the storm, and it could present
what cooperation it offered the Americans as the price Jordan had to pay for its
place in the American and Western order of things. In other words, it will have to
be shades of Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan: staring down the street and the
Islamists, insisting on the need to be with the winners, and with the forces of order
and modernity:
The street that will matter of course, the street that will silence and trump all
other Arab streets, will be the street in Basra and Baghdad. After liberation, Iraq
is sure to erupt in joy. It is destined to embarrass the pro-Saddam demonstrators
in other Arab and Muslim lands in precisely the same way the throngs in Kabul
who greeted the Americans with kites and boom boxes embarrassed Al Jazeera tele-
vision, and the pro-Taliban demonstrators in Karachi and Jakarta and Cairo. It will
be hard for the street in Nabhis to make its fury felt when the Iraqis come out of
their long captivity to tell the world of the nightmare they have endured in
Saddam's great, big prison. It will be, if only for a moment, a bad day for anti-Amer-
icanism.
Ideally, for Desert Storm a decade ago, the regimes in the region would now want
the Perfect Storm: a swift war, few casualties, as little political exposure by them-
selves as possible, the opportunity to be rid of Saddam without riding in broad day-
light with the Americans, and without being brought to account by their people. But
the political world will never grant this kind of good fortune. The fog of war is what
it is: There will be risks run by these regimes, and there will be risks run by our-
selves.
But those risks of war should be measured against the risks of the status quo.
It is in the nature of human affairs that inertia often wins by default, that the costs
of a particular status quo are hidden, while the costs of change are so readily appar-
ent. Who for instance is to say that we would have endured the terrors of September
11 had we seen Desert Storm to its rightful conclusion back in 1991? Though no
smoking gun has linked Saddam Hussein to September 11, the great simple truth
must be known that the culture of Arab radicalism, which begot the furies of that
day, was nurtured by his survival in power. After America spared him, a monitoring
force was dispatched to Saudi Arabia to enforce southern Iraq's no fly zone, and it
was precisely that American military presence in the Arabian Peninsula which be-
came the rallying cry of Bin Laden and his soldiers of terror.
In the tug of war between containment and rollback-to use the Cold War im-
agery—the advocates of containment tell us that we can live with Saddam as we
have lived with him for a long time now. But containment's advocates offer no as-
surance that the ruler in Baghdad will always play the containment game, and with
weapons of mass destruction at his disposal, not strike at a moment of his own
choice.
As I said before, along with the military gear we will have to take our own case
for the war. Saddam's neighborhood will not supply the outrage and the concern
with him. To read the region, the man is no serious menace, and few in his world
are convinced that he has weapons of mass destruction at his disposal. A substantial
body of opinion maintains that he is there at America's convenience—kept in place,
his forces degraded, but used as a scarecrow to justify America's presence in the
Gulf, its weapons sales programs and joint militaiy exercises. We will have to cut
through all that: the expedition will have to be justified by September 11 rules.
America will have to insist on its right to retribution, on the generalized case that
terror is indivisible and that a regime of this kind of malignancy in so vital and
explosive a region will have to be changed. We will have to live with the doubts and
the naysayers: After all this is a region where substantial majorities are yet to ac-
cept that it was young Arabs who flew into those towers, and into the Pentagon.
The second pillar of a strike against the Iraqi regime has to do with the vision
we have for Iraq itself. We will have to be willing to stick around to help rehabili-
tate that polity. The real work will have to be done by Iraqis themselves, but we
should not shy away from the task—even if it goes by the name of nation-building.
We should read Iraq intelligently and sympathetically. This is a country with sub-
stantial social capital and the region's second largest reserves of oil after Saudi Ara-
bia. It has tradition of literacy and learning and technical competence. It has a large
diaspora of means and sophistication, waves of people driven out by the country's


129
turbulent politics and by the heavy hand of the rulers. We should be done with the
bogeyman of a Shia state in Iran's image emerging in Iraq, as a satrapy of the Ira-
nian clerical regime. Such thoughts and ideas paralyzed American power in 1991,
when the Iranian revolution was still in full swing. We should not fall for this.
Iraq's Shia community is a community of Iraq. They are Iraqis and Arabs through
and through. Shi'ism was a phenomenon of Iraq centuries before Shi’ism crossed to
Iran, brought there as a state religion-8 centuries to be exact. The great sem-
inaries and the sacred places of Shi'ism are in Iraq-Najaf and Karbala. A healthy
measure of competition was always the norm between the Shia seminaries of Iraq
and those of Iran. It was only official terror in Iraq, and a crude theory of the folk
and of race, of who is an Arab and who is not, that Iraq's rulers unleashed on their
country, that helped disinherit the Shia of Iraq. They are the country's largest com-
munity, a majority of it, and we should understand this. They have endured the re-
gime's brutality yet fought its war against Iran. Precious few among them, I hazard
to guess, dream of a Shia state. The great majority are secularists who know that
the country will have to accommodate its largest three communities: The Shia
Arabs, the Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds. (Part of the great silence in the Arab world
is the discomfort of Arabs with the issue of Kurdish rights and Shia grievances; this
has been the Ba'ath party's and Saddam Hussein's advantage all along.)
For American policy, this should be a straightforward call. We don't do ethnic/sec-
tarian imperiums. We can't defend the right of 20% of the population, the Sunni
Arabs, to maintain primacy over the land. In the decade behind us, the Kurds have
come into a measure of autonomy in their ancestral land-10% of the country's area
now makes up the protected Kurdish zone in northern Iraq. The Kurds have ideas
of federalism and decentralization-mixing both elements of geography and eth-
nicity. They are not eager to give all that up and return to the ways of the past.
The best should not be the enemy of the good. We should not engage in a false
specificity of what a future Iraq would look like after a military campaign. We
should trust in the pluralism of the opposition—it has Shia and Sunni, constitu-
tional monarchists, Kurds, people who have spent their adult lives in exile in West-
ern democracies and know the terrible wages of political radicalism and are eager
to give Iraq a new chance. Above all, we should trust in the innate wisdom of the
Iraqis themselves who have lived on their nerves for decades now, and have seen
the squandering of their country's wealth and potential in pursuit of deadly foreign
wars and weapons of destruction.
Of all the regimes in the region, this is the most malignant, its ideological roots
go back to National Socialism that infected Germany in the 1930's. This would be
the place where American power can really function for the good. It has a secular
culture—the religious prohibitions that limit and trouble the American presence in
Saudi Arabia do not obtain in Iraq. It may, as well, have a greater readiness for
democracy than Egypt-because it is wealthier, because it lacks the burden of
Egypt's poverty and numbers, and the steady presence of an Islamist current.
To govern is to choose. The resort to arms is never frivolous. To own up to one's
politics, we have a leadership and a national security team for whose judgment and
skill I have tremendous regard. Before they pull the trigger, if they pull the trigger,
they will have come to it after all other alternatives are exhausted. They will have
done an enormous amount of quiet work, reached with the states in the region sub-
tle accommodations that these states will abide by while maintaining official dis-
tance and reserve. We can't win hearts and minds in the Arab world today. This
is the sad fact of the Arab condition today. American power was used three times
in favor of Muslims in the 1990's—in favor of Kuwait in 1990-91, of Bosnia in 1995,
of the Kosovars in 1999. We received no open gratitude for these deeds and accom-
plishments. It is often the fate of Great Powers to provide order against a back-
ground of those who take the protection and bemoan the heavy hand of the pro-
tector. This campaign, if and when it comes, would be no exception.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, professor.
Dr. Kemp, welcome.
STATEMENT OF DR. GEOFFREY KEMP, DIRECTOR, REGIONAL
STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, THE NIXON CENTER, WASHINGTON,
DC
Dr. KEMP. I would like to add my appreciation, Mr. Chairman,
to you and your colleagues for hosting this extremely important set
of hearings. I have been asked to talk about the likely response of


130
Iran to a war against Iraq, and I will try to do it in about 9 min-
utes.
Iran has a long agenda of unresolved problems with Iraq, includ-
ing border disputes, the Kurdish question, religious quarrels, ter-
rorist and liberation activity, Iraqi Shia refugees in Iran—there are
hundreds of thousands of them and, of course, the continuing
aftermath of the brutal Iran-Iraq war.
Iran has a huge stake in the future of Iraq, and therefore is
going to be watching very carefully what we do and what happens.
Iran remains extremely suspicious of Saddam Hussein, and most
Iranians hate his regime, I am certain, as much, as my colleague
says, the Iraqis do.
However, and this is the point I want to stress, at this time the
Iranian regime is more worried about a U.S. war that calls for a
regime change and regards this to be inimical to its own interests.
From an Iranian perspective the status quo, that is to say, a con-
tained Iraq, suits their interests much better.
They acknowledge Iraq's potential to reemerge as a regional
threat, but the United States is seen as the greater threat, espe-
cially since the President's State of the Union speech designating
Iran as part of the “axis of evil.” Iran's hardliners have taken this
very seriously, including the frequent calls from the administration
for regime change in the region, and they wonder at what point
their Islamic republic, which is in trouble, will be a candidate for
American action.
All Iranians, irrespective of whether they are hardliners,
softliners, moderates, or conservatives, worry about a failed or
messy U.S. operation that would leave the region in chaos. They
would then be on the receiving end for possibly millions of new
Iraqi Shia refugees, and they worry about the enormous disrup-
tions a messy war would have on world oil markets and their very
fragile economy.
The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, can you tell us how large the Shia popu-
lation is in Iraq?
Dr. KEMP. It is about 60 percent of the population.
The CHAIRMAN. About 14 million, 15 million?
Dr. KEMP. About that.
Now, Iranian fears, which I have just articulated, are one thing,
but what, in reality, is the Iranian Government likely to do in the
event that there is a war? Some analysts, and very good analysts,
I would add, believe that Iran has already embarked on a proactive
policy to delay any U.S. attack on Iraq by stepping up support for
terrorism against Israel, and stirring up trouble in Afghanistan.
The greater the violence in either area, the more difficult it will be
for the President to take on Iraq.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that the Iranian-based
Shiite opposition group—this is the one that Dr. Cordesman was
talking about this morning, the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, may be open to support from the United States,
particularly air power to topple Saddam, provided we do not send
in ground forces.
This would suggest the Iranian Government is at least prepared
to blink or wink in the event of a limited U.S. operation that does
not involve ground troops. In my judgment, Mr. Chairman, if the


131
United States has serious support for military action, including the
U.N. backing, E.U. backing, some moderate Arabs on board, Tur-
key on board, and the Russians on board—this is very important;
the Russians are moving in our favor—Iran is likely to keep its
head down and not take a strong position against the United
States during the war.
However, if international support is weak, Iranian protests will
be loud. Much will depend upon how this administration ap-
proaches Iran in diplomatic channels. In my judgment, its current
policies toward Iran suggest that the leaders of Iran are likely to
be warned rather than wooed in the event that we decide to go
after Iraq.
The problem here, I think, is that the Iranians could react unpre-
dictably to what they would regard as a belligerent U.S. posture.
The regime, for instance, might decide to place Iranian military
forces on high alert. Under these circumstances, there is a danger
that there could be military incidents between United States and
Iranian maritime forces in the Persian Gulf, and that could lead to
miscalculation and escalation.
Now, in thinking about Iranian behavior the day after the war,
much will depend upon the nature of the new regime in Baghdad.
It is not inconceivable that Iran might be willing to work closely
with the new regime and reach an agreement to resolve out-
standing issues relating to the Iran-Iraq war—the POW's, for in-
stance, and the longstanding dispute they have had over the de-
marcation of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. But if U.S. forces have
to invade and occupy Baghdad, this will mean trouble for the
hardliners and they will clearly be eager to exploit regional
resentments if a new Pax Americana, of the kind that my two pre-
vious colleagues suggested, emerges.
Assuming no radical shift in the political balance in Tehran, it
could be expected, that Iran will make greater efforts to develop a
nuclear weapons capability. It is possible that a quick U.S. victory
over Iraq could result in a new bout of pragmatism in Tehran,
leading to a deal with Washington, but this outcome is by no
means certain.
On the other hand, an arrogant, victorius America could well
find itself disliked by Iranians who regard themselves as reformers
and pro-West. Iranians are very proud of their independence, as
well as their desire to have a more democratic system, and we
should not be unaware of the fact that while a lot of them may
hate their own regime and like us at this point in time, this atti-
tude can change.
The fact of the matter is, Mr. Chairman, a number of geopolitical
realities are going to face any new regime in Baghdad and ulti-
mately better relations between Iran and Iraq will be very, very
important. Iran will be Iraq's neighbor long after U.S. troops have
left.
Now, just 2 or 3 minutes on Europe. Direct European support for
initial U.S. military action against Iraq is highly desirable, but not
essential. However, cooperation with the United States would be
essential if this war was protracted. We would conceivably have a
major energy supply problem and working with the Europeans to
resolve that is essential. Europeans support, in my judgment, is


133
!
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. GEOFFREY KEMP, DIRECTOR, REGIONAL STRATEGIC
PROGRAMS, THE NIXON CENTER
WAR WITH IRAQ: RESPONSES FROM IRAN AND EUROPE
Introduction
Iraq borders on six countries—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and
Iran. All have a huge stake in what happens to Iraq. Their response to a U.S. led
war against the regime of Saddam Hussein will depend upon several factors. First,
the level of international cooperation promised to the U.S. prior to the war. Second,
the duration, conduct, and effectiveness of the military campaign. Third, U.S. pro-
posals and plans for the days after” regime change in Iraq.
At one extreme it is possible to envisage a broad based, U.S. led and UN sup-
ported, alliance including key Arab countries, Europe, including Turkey, and sup-
port from Russia. This would be followed by a quick decisive victory with few cas-
ualties and the emergence of a stable, humane, pro-Western democratic regime in
Baghdad. Only token U.S. forces would be required to occupy Iraq: UN arms inspec-
tors would return and remove all WMD capabilities. A new era of reform would be
unleashed throughout the Muslim Middle East and it will be easier to resolve the
Arab-Israeli conflict. This very optimistic outlook can be termed, “the best case.”
At the other extreme one must consider the “worst case.” One can imagine a U.S.
decision to remove Saddam with minimal international or regional support, a pro-
tracted war that goes badly with many casualties, including Iraqi civilians. One can
also postulate Saddam's use of WMD against Israel and the Kurds, massive Israeli
retaliation and mayhem and chaos in Iraq with no one in control. At that point, the
U.S. would either have to occupy most of the country or witness Iraq's descent into
bloody civil war and a surge of refugees fleeing to the north, south, and east causing
"regime change" in moderate Arab states such as Jordan.
In between these two extremes there are many other possible outcomes. Unilat-
eral action could be very successful; alternatively, an alliance could flounder. The
point is that both regional and European responses will clearly be linked to how the
war goes.
Iranian Responses
Iran has a long agenda of unresolved problems with Iraq including border dis-
putes, the Kurdish question, religious quarrels, terrorist/liberation activity, Iraqi
Shia refugees in Iran, and the continuing aftermath of the brutal Iran Iraq War
(1980-88). For these reasons, Iran's position on a U.S. war with Iraq is complex and
its policy unpredictable. It has huge stakes in the future of its neighbor. We have
two recent precedents to draw upon: Iran's behavior during the 1991 Gulf War and
its behavior during the Afghan war in the fall of 2001. In both cases, Iran had a
strong interest in the outcome; it feared and hated both Saddam Hussein and the
Taliban. For this reason, Iran did not play a spoiler role during these wars. It was
quite cooperative on Afghanistan both during the war and in the immediate after-
math of the U.S. victory. Iran remains highly suspicious of Saddam Hussein; most
Iranians hate his regime. They remember, with great bitterness, Saddam's frequent
use of chemical weapons during the Iran Iraq War and Iraq's deliberate targeting
of Iranian cities with surface to surface missiles. Iran continues to worry about
Iraq's WMD and is as eager as the U.S. to see them removed.
Yet at this time, Iran is worried about a U.S. led war and regards the call for
"regime change” to be inimical to its own interests. From an Iranian perspective,
the status quo, i.e. “a contained Iraq” suits their interests much better. They believe
that so long as Saddam is a pariah there are limits as to how far he can reconstitute
his weapons programs. They are quite happy that American military power and
international arms embargoes have kept Saddam in his box. They have benefited
from economic sanctions on Iraq. Iraq's oil production and exports have been limited
and some Iranian groups, notably the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
have made a great deal of money smuggling Iraq's oil to the black market. So long
as Saddam remains in power Iraq will be unable to reopen the contentious border
dispute with Iran over the demarcation of the Shatt al Arab waterway.
Thus while Iran acknowledges Iraq's potential to reemerge as a regional threat,
now the United States is seen as the greater threat. President Bush's State of the
Union speech on January 29, 2002 designated Iran as part of the “axis of evil.”
Iran's hardliners have taken very seriously Bush's frequent calls for “regime
change” in the region and wonder at what point the Islamic Republic will be a can-
didate for American action. They notice that American military forces are now de-
ployed in Turkey, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bahrain,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman. The U.S. Fifth Fleet patrols the Persian Gulf, the


134
Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Land based U.S. long range bombers can reach
the Gulf from Europe, Diego Garcia, and even the continental U.S. They point out
that Israel, their bitter enemy, has a military alliance with Turkey and that Jordan
and Egypt have extremely close ties with the U.S. defense establishment. Hence an
American invasion of Iraq would bring U.S. troops to their Western border and they
will literally be encircled by American military forces.
Quite aside from concerns that they will be the next victim after Iraq, Iranian
hardliners are fearful that a pro-Western regime in Baghdad will invariably in-
crease pressure on them to relinquish power to Iranian reformers. All Iranians
worry that a failed or messy U.S. operation would leave the region in chaos and
they would be on the receiving end for possibly millions of new Iraqi Shia refugees
and the economic disruption of world oil markets.
Iranian fears may be one thing but what, in reality, are they likely to do in event
of war? Some analysts believe Iran has already embarked on a proactive policy to
delay any U.S. attack on Iraq by stepping up support for terrorism against Israel
and stirring up trouble in Afghanistan. The greater the violence in either area, the
more difficult it will be for Bush to take on Iraq. On the other hand recent activity
of the Iranian based Shiite opposition group based in Tehran (the Supreme Assem-
bly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI)) may be open to U.S. help in toppling
Saddam Hussein provided it is limited to air power and not invasion. This suggests
that the Iranian government is prepared to be passive in event of a limited U.S.
military operation. The assumption is that SAIRI's policy would not be articulated
if the Iranian government was adamantly opposed to it.
If the U.S. has serious support for military action including UN, EU, moderate
Arab, Turkish, and Russian backing, Iran will likely keep its head down and not
take a strong position against the U.S. during the war. However if international
support is weak, Iranian protests will be loud. Much will depend upon how the Bush
Administration approaches Iran in diplomatic channels. Given the current nuances
of the Bush policy towards Iran, Tehran is likely to be warned rather than wooed
by this administration. The problem for the U.S. is that Iranians could react unpre-
dictably to a belligerent U.S. posture. The regime may decide to place Iranian mili-
tary forces on high alert. Under these circumstances, there is a danger that military
“incidents” between U.S. and Iranian maritime forces could take place in the Per-
sian Gulf with the danger of miscalculation and escalation.
Clearly this possibility would be greatest if the war itself went badly and either
became bogged down or spread to a wider Middle East confrontation. The latter case
could happen if Israel is forced into the war because Saddam, presumably with
nothing to lose, launches terror attacks against Israel and creates havoc in Jordan.
In thinking about Iranian behavior “the day after”, much will depend upon the
nature of the new regime in Baghdad (assuming there is not anarchy) and the de-
gree to which the regime takes its instructions from Washington. A number of possi-
bilities could emerge. An Iraqi military coup by anti-Saddam factions within the Re-
publican Guard could happen soon after the U.S. begins to attack. Under these cir-
cumstances, no invasion would be necessary but the U.S. might have little say in
the governance of the country. The new leadership could offer favorable deals to its
neighbors and to the Kurdish and Shia communities in Iraq. It is not inconceivable
that Iran might be willing to work closely with the new regime and reach an agree-
ment to resolve outstanding issues relating to the Iran Iraq War (POWs, etc.) and
the demarcation of the Shatt al-Arab.
On the other hand, if U.S. forces have to invade and occupy Baghdad, the new
regime will clearly be under the control of Washington. This will mean trouble for
Tehran's hardliners and they will be eager to exploit regional resentment of the new
Pax Americana if a formidable U.S. presence generates a major backlash. They will
regard a pro-Western leadership as an American puppet and will be convinced that,
sooner or later, they will come into the cross hairs of American military might. As-
suming no radical shift in the political balance between reformers and hardliners
in Tehran, it can be expected that Iran will make even greater efforts to develop
a nuclear weapons capability, even though they will assume the U.S. will success-
fully destroy all Iraq's WMD capabilities.
Their reasons for concern go beyond the putative threat of American military
power. They will know that one of the priorities of the new regime will be to rein-
vest in Iraqi oil production to generate hard currency to pay for a huge reconstruc-
tion effort. This will mean that Iraq will be interested in maximizing its oil revenue
and unlikely to conform to OPEC production quotas, thereby possibly lowering oil
prices and reducing Iran's hard currency earnings.
A pro-Western Iraq could reopen the Shatt al-Arab dispute or could even proceed
with a previous Iraqi proposal to build a canal from Basra to Umm Qasar thereby


136
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, one way or another, would be drawn into a cauldron of
instability in Iraq. On the other hand, when presented with the more optimistic sce-
nario, namely that American forces could quickly defeat Iraq and that the remnants
of Saddam's support could collapse, Europeans are nervous about what then hap-
pens after the fall of the regime. Will the United States have to occupy Iraq, and
if so for how long? When pressed, the European officials are not prepared to say
that they would contribute forces to a post-Saddam Iraqi occupation, unlike the situ-
ation in Afghanistan when they volunteered more forces than the U.S. thought nec-
essary. And on Afghanistan the Europeans worry that the U.S. has no "staying
power” and that, absent a causus belli, it would be unwise to take on Iraq while
the Afghan and Pakistani regimes remain precarious.
Conclusion
Iran will not be able to prevent a U.S. attack on Iraq. It will likely remain neutral
during the war while intensifying its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Its greatest
leverage will be during the post war period. Its population and geography assures
its interests must be taken into account, irrespective of its leadership. In the last
resort the European governments will support the United States if it uses force.
Whether this support will include troop contributions is highly unlikely except in
the case of the Blair government, which, at least at the highest levels shares U.S.
concerns with the exception of regime change as a stated war objective.
In considering the pros and cons of a military campaign against Iraq, the U.S.
must take into account the stability of both the Middle East and South Asia. No
one doubts the ability of the United States to prevail in any military campaign
against Iraq, but the cost may be high and may require a formidable commitment
of manpower if the job is to be done properly. The Bush Administration openly talks
about its wishes for regime change in Palestine and Iraq and hints that Iran and
Syria could be next. What is less discussed is the problem of regime survival. At
this point in time pro-American regimes in Afghanistan and Pakistan are in danger
and our friendliest leader in the Arab world, King Abdullah of Jordan, warns that
his regime may be threatened if events get out of hand. He may be exaggerating
the danger, but he is clearly very worried. We would be foolish to ignore his con-
cerns.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank
you,
doctor.
Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. PARRIS, SENIOR POLICY ADVI-
SOR, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, & CALDWELL, WASH-
INGTON, DC
Ambassador PARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join my
colleagues in expressing my appreciation for the opportunity to ap-
pear before you on this
very timely and important subject. The last
time I sat in this chair was during my confirmation hearings, when
you grilled me on Turkish policy toward Cyprus. All things consid-
ered, I think I would just as soon talk about Turkish policy toward
Iraq.
I do not think that there is any question that Turkey's attitude
will be critical in the event the United States seeks to remove Sad-
dam Hussein through the use of force. In the interest of time, I am
not going to recite the many reasons why that is so. All one has
to do is look at a map and consider the options to realize that you
really cannot exercise any of them without Turkey.
What do the Turks think about the prospect of direct U.S. mili-
tary action to topple Saddam Hussein? The short answer is, they
hate the idea. The Turks' dread of a new war against Iraq stems
from their negative experiences of the last one. In security, eco-
nomic, and strategic terms, Turkey emerged a loser from the last
gulf war and its aftermath.
From a security standpoint, Saddam's oppression of the Iraqi
Kurds' short-lived uprising in 1991 and the coalition's subsequent


137
expulsion of Iraqi central authorities from the north had a pro-
foundly negative impact across the border in southeast Turkey.
PKK terrorists exploited the situation to expand their operations
exponentially. It took most of the nineties, thousands of lives, lots
of money, and frequent interventions into northern Iraq itself for
the Turkish military to get the situation back under reliable con-
trol.
From an economic standpoint, U.N. sanctions against Iraq cutoff
Turkey's access to what had been its largest trading partner. The
impact was on the order of what would happen here if the U.S.-
Canada border were sealed from one day to the next. Turks esti-
mate the cost over the last decade at between $40 and $80 billion,
and that may be low.
From a strategic standpoint, Ankara saw the emergence in
northern Iraq of local administrative organs to fill the gap left by
the withdrawal of Iraqi central authorities as a step toward the es-
tablishment of a de facto Kurdish state. Preventing such a develop-
ment had long been and remains a cornerstone of Turkish regional
policy, reflecting concern for its impact not just on Kurdish popu-
lations, but on the interests of up to 2 million Turcomen of north-
ern Iraq, a people ethnically and culturally very close to the Turks.
Over the past decade, Turkey has found ways to cope with most
of the consequences of the gulf war. It is not now uncomfortable
with the status quo that has emerged in the area in and around
northern Iraq.
Would it not be better for Turkey if Saddam were gone? No ques-
tion about that. Turks are not insensitive to the potential advan-
tages, especially from an economic standpoint, of Saddam's re-
moval, and of Iraq becoming a more normal neighbor, but for most
of them the appeal of such gains is outweighed by misgivings over
what could go wrong this time around.
Based on their experiences since 1990, the Turks lack confidence
that the United States understands Iraq's internal dynamics well
enough to give meaning to our repeated commitments to maintain
its territorial integrity. They worry that even if we do understand
the situation better than they suspect, the process of replacing Sad-
dam could at some point lead the United States to make tradeoffs
at Turkey's expense, and they remain concerned that if things do
not go according to plan, the United States will not see the project
through, leaving Turkey again to face a neighbor that is either hos-
tile or in chaos.
Now, seen from this perspective, we should probably not be sur-
prised that Turkey's highest leaders, including its President, Prime
Minister, Defense Minister, and senior military have publicly and
repeatedly expressed deep reservations about the wisdom of seek-
ing forcibly to remove Saddam Hussein, but Turks are realists, and
in virtually all conversations I have had with the Turks on this
subject, their bottom line is a realistic one.
Iť boils down to this. If the United States does go after Saddam,
Ankara will not have the luxury of sitting this one out. There
would simply be too much at stake in terms of Turkey's interests.
Turkey would want to be in on the planning and execution of any
operation to ensure that those interests were factored in and that
there was no deviation from an originally agreed concept once


138
things got started, and Turks who think about these things under-
stand that the price of this kind of access and this kind of trans-
parency is some degree of cooperation.
It is clearly in the interests of the United States, if we move
against Saddam militarily, to maximize the extent of Turkish co-
operation and to minimize the possibility of surprises once the op-
eration begins. The key to making Ankara part of the solution
rather than a potential problem is early and honest and detailed
consultations.
What will the Turks be looking for in those consultations? At the
most general level, they will want to see that whatever we have in
mind is serious. Given the history, they will need to be convinced
that we will finish the job this time around, that we can do it with
dispatch, and that we will do whatever it takes to get their neigh-
bor back on its feet in one piece and as a member in good standing
of the family of nations.
But the Turks will also have more specific things they will want
to see addressed. They will first of all want to be sure that they
do not again pay an economic price for being on the right side in
this war. I would therefore not be surprised to see Turkey seek to
lock in before hostilities start concrete, specific commitments from
the administration in terms of debt forgiveness or additional eco-
nomic or military assistance.
I would also expect Ankara to seek assurance of continued U.S.
support in the IMF and other international financial institutions to
the extent action in Iraq adversely affects Turkey's economic recov-
ery program, but it is on issues relating to northern Iraq that U.S.-
Turkey consultations will be most important, because what hap-
pens there very simply may well define Turkey's role in the broad-
er conflict.
There have been some provocative but I think ultimately fanciful
things written in the U.S. press about what that role will be. I
think you can forget about Turkish tanks rolling to Baghdad. It is
simply not going to happen, nor is anyone in Ankara sitting around
counting the revenue that Turkey might gain by seizing the oil-
fields around Mosul and Kirkuk.
My impression is the Turks are deadly serious about maintaining
Iraq's unity and territorial integrity. Indeed, I believe that serious-
ness underlies what will be Turkey's primary goal in the event the
United States moves against Iraq. That is, denying the Iraqi Kurds
any gain that might enhance their ability in a post Saddam envi-
ronment to press for independence or its functional equivalent.
Now, that imperative has certain practical implications that U.S.
planners will ignore at their peril. One hears a lot around this
town, for example, about how the United States will, quote, im-
prove the military capability of the Peshmerga, the Kurdish militia,
as part of an effort to topple Saddam. I suspect that a more capable
Peshmerga force is not something most Turks will be wildly enthu-
siastic about, either now or on the day after.
Another area of potential tension has to do with the nature and
mission of U.S. military and other personnel who may be deployed
in the north. The Turks have spent a decade developing an ability
to monitor and, to an important extent, to control developments
there. They are likely to be suspicious of and may resist any pres-


140
• From a strategic standpoint, Ankara saw the emergence in northern Iraq of
local administrative organs to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of Iraqi central
authorities as a step toward establishment of a de facto Kurdish state. Pre-
venting such a development had long been—and remains a cornerstone of
Turkish regional policy, reflecting concern for its impact not just on_Turkey's
own Kurdish population, but on the interests of the up to 2 million Turcomen
of northern Iraq-a people ethnically and culturally very close to Turks.
Over the past decade, Turkey found ways to cope with most of the consequences
of the Gulf War. It is not now uncomfortable with the status quo that has emerged
in and around northern Iraq.
Would it not be better for Turkey if Saddam were gone? Without question. Turks
are not insensitive to the potential advantages-especially from an economic stand-
point-of Saddam's removal and of Iraq becoming a more normal neighbor. But for
most of them, the appeal of such gains is outweighed by misgivings over what could
go wrong this time around.
Based on the their experiences since 1990, Turks:
• Lack confidence that the United States understands Iraq's internal dynamics
well enough to give meaning to our repeated commitments to maintain its terri-
torial integrity;
• Worry that, even if we do understand the situation better than they suspect,
the process of replacing Saddam could at some point lead the U.S. to make
tradeoffs at Turkey's expense;
• Remain concerned that, if things don't go according to plan, the U.S. will not
see the project through, leaving Turkey, again, to face a neighbor that is either
hostile or in chaos.
Seen from this perspective, we should not be surprised that Turkey's highest lead-
ers, including its President, Prime Minister, Defense Minister and senior military,
have publicly and repeatedly expressed deep reservations about the wisdom of seek-
ing forcibly to remove Saddam.
TURKEY'S BOTTOM LINE
But Turks are realists. And in virtually all conversations that I have had with
Turks on this subject, their bottom line is a realistic one. It boils down to this: if
the U.S. does go after Saddam, Ankara will not have the luxury of sitting it out.
There would be simply too much at stake in terms of Turkish interests. Turkey
would need to be in on the planning and execution of any operation to ensure that
those interests were factored in and that there was no deviation from an original,
agreed concept once things got started. Turks who think about these things under-
stand that the price of access and transparency is some degree of cooperation.
It is clearly in the interests of the U.S., if we move against Saddam militarily,
to maximize the extent of Turkish cooperation, and to minimize the possibility of
surprises, once an operation begins. The key to making Ankara part of the solution,
rather than a potential problem, is early, honest, detailed consultations.
INCENTIVES AND RED LINES
What will the Turks be looking for in such consultations?
At the most general level, they will want to see that whatever we have in mind
is serious. Given the history, they will need to be convinced that we will finish the
job this time around, that we can do it with dispatch, and that we will do what it
takes to get their neighbor back on its feet in one piece and as a member in good
standing of the family of nations.
But the Turks will have more specific things they want addressed as well.
They will first of all want to be sure that they do not again pay an economic price
for being on the right side. Some have even suggested that this may be an oppor-
tunity to make good some of Turkey's losses from the last war. I would therefore
not be surprised to see Turkey seek to lock in, before hostilities start, concrete, spe-
cific commitments from the Administration in terms of debt forgiveness or addi-
tional economic or military assistance. I would also expect Ankara to seek assurance
of continued U.S. support in the IMF and other international financial institutions,
to the extent action against Iraq adversely affects Turkey's economic recovery pro-
gram.
But it is on issues relating to northern Iraq that U.S.-Turkish consultations will
be most important, because what happens there may well define Turkey's role in
the broader conflict.
There have been some provocative but fanciful things written in the U.S. press
about what that role might be. Forget about Turkish tanks rolling to Baghdad. It


141
is not going to happen. Nor is anyone in Ankara counting the revenue Turkey might
gain by seizing the oil fields around Mosul and Kirkuk. Turkey is serious about
maintaining Iraq's unity and territorial integrity.
Indeed, that seriousness underlies what I believe will be Turkey's primary goal
in the event the U.S. moves against Iraq: denying the Iraqi Kurds any gains that
might enhance their ability in a post-Saddam environment to press for independ-
ence or its functional equivalent.
That imperative has certain practical implications that U.S. planners will ignore
at their peril:
• One hears a lot around this town, for example, about how the U.S. will “im-
prove the military capability of the peshmerga” as part of an effort to topple
Saddam. Now, I suspect that a more capable peshmerga force is not something
most Turks will be widely enthusiastic about, now or on the Day After.
• Another area of potential tension has to do with the nature and mission of U.S.
military or other personnel who may be deployed in the north. The Turks have
spent a decade developing an impressive ability to monitor and, to an important
extent, control developments there. They are likely to be suspicious of, and may
resist, any presence that dilutes that ability by establishing direct links to local
Kurdish leaders.
• And what about the Iraqi opposition? Turkey has traditionally been skeptical
of Iraqi exile organizations, and has notably had a rocky relationship with the
Iraqi National Congress. To the extent the U.S. intends to rely on such groups,
particularly in the north, Ankara might have other ideas.
• Finally, what would the Turks really do if Iraqi Kurds attempt to seize Mosul
and Kirkuk? Ankara clearly fears that possession of these politically important
cities and their associated oil wealth would put the Kurds in a powerful negoti-
ating position on the Day After. Turkey's press in recent months has been full
of credible reports that Turkey would itself seize those cities, rather than allow
that to happen.
Mr. Chairman, I raise these examples not to suggest that they reveal irreconcil-
able differences between the U.S. and Turkey that would keep us from cooperating
in an effort to change Iraq's leadership. I don't believe that to be the case. But I
think they do underscore the importance of honest, detailed discussions before any
balloons go up.
Judging from press reports, that process seems to have started in earnest during
Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz's visit to Turkey last month. Even though we are
repeatedly told that “there is no plan on the President's desk," and even though
most people in Turkey wish the issue would just go away, it is not too soon.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
Let me ask you, Mr. Telhami, how would you test the choice be-
tween regime change and nuclear weapons? You drew what I think
most Americans would think is a false distinction here that in fact
everyone we have heard from so far, almost everyone you hear is
reputed to be informed, says that there is no way of separating
Saddam from his nuclear, or weapons of mass destruction, and it
is a foolhardy exercise to attempt to do it, and therefore regime
change is the only alternative.
What you are suggesting is the possibility that Saddam stay in
power but not have his weapons of mass destruction, a deal that
I think you would find an awful lot of people ready to accept, prob-
ably, but I mean, I do not quite understand.
Dr. TELHAMI. Let me just put it this way. There is clearly a dif-
ference in terms of how people in the world in Europe and the Mid-
dle East see the priorities in Iraq. To the extent that the priority
is eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, they
see that as being more important than the issue of regime change.
I think in our debate it is clear that we have articulated a policy
of regime change from the very beginning, even when it was not
an explicit policy, it was an implicit policy. The real question is, if,
in fact, our priority is eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruc-


143
State Department people who were in Bonn acknowledged that the
Iranians were useful in putting together the Karzai interim govern-
ment.
Then things went downhill very badly, climaxing with the smug-
gled ship that was caught moving arms to the Palestinians and the
President's State of the Union speech, and so now the problem is
we do not have the sort of relationship with the Iranians we had
last fall.
My own personal view is that if we contemplate a major war
against Iraq, we at least have to make an effort to resume some
dialog with the Iranian Government, however unpleasant its activi-
ties are in other theaters.
I happen to believe that what the Iranians are doing in the occu-
pied territories, their support for Hamas and Hezbollah, is linked
to their fear that we are going to go after Saddam Hussein and
that they have got to know that if we are truly determined to get
rid of him they are going to have to make a calculation that they
can either cooperate with us in a passive way during that cam-
paign, or they can be against us, and if they are against us, then
they are likely to be very much in our cross-fire.
So my advice, if I had my old job, and assuming I survived for
more than a week down there in this climate, I would essentially
suggest we rethink our Iranian strategy as we get closer toward a
war with Iraq.
The CHAIRMAN. A last point. Professor Ajami, you indicated that
if we move against Iraq, the people in the region, who are looking
for this perfect storm, but the people in the region, heads of state
in the region will associate with us but not want to be seen with
us, not want us to kiss them in public.
What does that mean as that relates to the use of what you
heard in the last panel the two military guys saying, without
Qatar, without Bahrain, without Kuwait there is no reasonable
way in which we could sustain a massive U.S. military engage-
ment? Does your note about, will associate with us but very quiet-
ly, does that mean they will not be able to give us access?
Dr. AJAMI. They can give us access. I think sometimes people un-
derestimate the power, the coercive power of these governments
and their power, I think, to live with a certain cognitive dis-
sonance, shall we say. They will have to, some of these states,
maybe even Jordan, it may have to have shades of the Musharraf
situation.
President Musharraf, give him credit, he stared down the
Islamists, he stared down the street, he associated himself with
American power in the face of all kinds of arguments that this re-
gime was destined to fall if it were actually to associate itself with
us, and if it were to be a base for the war against Afghanistan. He
did it, and the way he did it was to say, look, this is the choice
for Pakistan's majority, that either we are a pariah among nations,
or we actually join this coalition, and he sustained his case.
I think it will come to this, for example, for the King of Jordan.
Imagine now the nightmare of this young King of Jordan, Abdullah
II. Now, it is kind of interesting, if you will, if you like historical
ironies, last time around it was the two fathers, Bush Senior and,


145
very clear and defined link between the Arab Palestinian issue and
Iraq. Is that true or not? If it is, how deep is it part of the dynamic
if we would go into Iraq, and I heard some of you mention it, but
I would very much like each of you to give me your thoughts on
that.
Ambassador Parris.
Ambassador PARRIS. Well, I think there is no question that it
complicates any assessment by the administration of how you
would implement a policy of regime change, which they have de-
clared to be the policy. There is a question in my mind whether it
is a showstopper, as some of the other witnesses have suggested.
I think we sometimes underestimate the ability of some of our
friends in the Arab world to deal with issues arising from dis-
content in their streets. These have proved to be pretty robust re-
gimes when they need to be, regimes who understand the dynamics
and have been able to dominate them over the years.
My guess is that if the administration were to do this in a way
which provided adequate consultation which satisfied many of the
concerns that have been expressed here and in previous panels
that those governments have shared with us, and are likely to
share with us in the consultative process, that it would be possible
to carry out the kind of operation that we are talking about with-
out resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute first, which after all is going
to take a long time. There is a real question whether or not, based
on some of the earlier testimony today, we have that kind of time.
Senator HAGEL. So you do not see it as a serious impediment?
Ambassador PARRIS. I think it is certainly serious, and it is cer-
tainly an impediment, but I am not convinced that it would stop
this effort in its tracks if it were done properly and intelligently,
and with full concern for the sensitivities that our potential part-
ners have expressed.
Dr. TELHAMI. I think it clearly is, Senator, a complicating factor
in some places. I mean, I think that Mr. Ajami's point was right
about 1991, 1990 and 1991, when the King of Jordan decided es-
sentially that the pressure from his public was too much to bear,
that he had to stay it out, even though he was one of the friendliest
leaders toward the United States of America. He made that choice,
and obviously he made it because he felt the heat from his public.
I think that the link is not direct. I think that what is at issue
is the resentment toward the United States, which is broad-based
and is linked to a lot of issues, but it is highly focused on this issue
because of the escalation that we see, and therefore there will be
an automatic link about an American design for Iraq.
I agree with the idea that these states are robust. I think they
have proven to be robust before. They calculate on a realpolitik
basis. They have to do what they have to do to survive, and if that
means they have to go with America, they ultimately do. Even if
they do not like it, they ultimately do, but I think we should have
no illusions about the points that I tried to make earlier, one of
which is that now they have more uncertainty about their ability.
They have been stretched to the limit in the last few months be-
cause of this pressure, and because they do not have control over
this information, that they are scared of it. It does not mean they
cannot do it, but they have more uncertainty.


146
But the more important point is, they can only succeed in con-
taining the public discontent through repression, and the net out-
come will be that we are going to end up with a Middle East that
is more repressive, and we cannot, and we should not have any il-
lusions about it, and I would argue—and here Mr. Ajami may have
a disagreement. He has not addressed it, but it is about the extent
to which this would be a factor in additional motivation for ter-
rorism.
I happen to think that that is an issue. I happen to think it is
very important. Even aside from whether the public has the capac-
ity to overthrow regimes, I think revolutions are scarce in history,
and they clearly have been scarce in the Middle East. It is still a
state system. We often forget that.
But even authoritarian governments have to be sensitive and re-
sponsive to their publics, and there are new channels and avenues
available to the public to express the discontent in ways that-un-
fortunately through militancy, and I think it would be very easy to
conceive an argument that the militants would exploit and would
be able to do more of it than before a war with Iraq.
Senator HAGEL. Dr. Ajami.
Dr. AJAMI. On the issue of terrorism and the connection be-
tween—and I will get to your point, Senator Hagel, but on the
issue of terrorism and the connection with the Palestinian ques-
tion, it is interesting to note that the trail of terror, the trail of ter-
ror that dogged America throughout the nineties, that is the World
Trade Center truck bombing in 1993, the bombing in Riyadh in
1995, the Khobbar Towers in 1996, the attacks on the U.S. Embas-
sies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in the summer of 1998, and the
attack on the USS Cole in October of 2000, they all happened dur-
ing one of the most accommodating American diplomacy toward the
Palestinian question under the Presidency of Bill Clinton, where
Bill Clinton was quoting Yassar Arafat and the terror paid the Pal-
estine question no heed. Indeed, the master minds of al-Qaeda paid
the Palestinian question in every statement they made no heed.
Two men came together in 1998, Osama bin Laden and a physi-
cian much more interesting for the purposes of terrorism, Ayman
Zawahiri, who is an Egyptian and a foe of the regime of Mubarak,
that came together and gave us this trail of terror. The Palestine
question was the issue de jour just recently for the bin Ladens in
the region, and so that is the connection to terrorism. Terrorism
paid no attention to what we were doing on the Palestinian ques-
tion.
Terrorism had no regard for the peace of Oslo, and when Yassar
Arafat had more visits to the White House than any head of state
in the world during the Clinton years the al-Qaeda people thought
he was of no relevance to the kind of grievances that they had.
So we come now to Iraq, and it is still a question of linkage, can
we do Iraq without doing Palestine. There is a kind of view of the
Arab world I do not share that all issues that Palestine is the end
all, be all of Arab politics. I do not agree with this. I think the gulf
is very important. I think Iraq is very important. I think the fate
of 22 million Iraqis is extremely important, and I think the idea
that we cannot do anything in the region short of solving, quote-


148
are having another full day tomorrow, as I understand it, and that
you are also contemplating resuming the hearing process when we
come back in September.
I think it is imperative that we have launched on this enterprise.
Every day we get a new report in the national press about U.S. pol-
icy toward Iraq and its implications. We had a headline in the
Washington Post, "Some Top Military Brass Favor Status Quo in
Iraq, Containment is Seen Less Risky Than Attack.”
Another in the New York Times just yesterday, “Profound Effect
on Economy Seen in a War on Iraq, U.S. May Bear Most Costs, Ex-
perts Weigh Likelihood of an Oil Price Shock, Another Disruption
of Markets,” and then even today the Times had its lead story, “Air
Power Alone Cannot Defeat Iraq, Rumsfeld Asserts, Secretary Side-
Steps Question of Sending in U.S. Ground Forces to Oust Hussein,”
which then, of course, draws you into the debate, can you do it with
air power alone, or can you not do it with air power alone, et
cetera.
Now, it seems to me imperative that there be a broader examina-
tion of all of these questions, and you know, this term, brutal re-
gime in Iraq, raises major and complex questions for U.S. policy,
and how they are answered will have consequences for the region,
for our own country, and more broadly around the world for a long
time to come, and obviously we need to embark on the process you
have launched sooner, I think, rather than later. We have to have
well-considered, well-informed policies, and we have to take into
account the full measure of potential benefits and risks, and it has
to be fully explicable to our people.
In that regard, I was very much taken by the op ed piece that
you and Senator Lugar have in today's New York Times, and I am
very strongly supportive of the approach contained therein, includ-
ing your statement, “without prejudging any particular course of
action we hope to start a national discussion of some critical ques-
tions.” I think that is extremely important, and I therefore again
commend you for undertaking this careful examination of the situa-
tion.
You and Senator Lugar set out there some questions which I
think form the framework for these hearings. What threat does
Iraq pose to our security? How immediate is the danger? What are
the possible responses to the Iraqi threat? Third, what are our re-
sponsibilities if Saddam is removed? Fourthly, what would it take
to rebuild Iraq economically and politically?
I know you are trying to do these panels I think focused on par-
ticular aspects of that question, but if I could go outside of that
The CHAIRMAN. Believe me, these guys can go anywhere you
want them to go.
Senator SARBANES. Let me close by putting a question or two
down: What would we have to undertake afterwards with respect
to Iraq; and how long are we talking about being present; and what
kind of resources would we have to commit?
And as you answer that question, could you put it in the context
of our staying power; what we have reflected on that question in
Afghanistan. Now, you know, we went into Afghanistan, and we
did an important military operation with considerable success, but
we're left with problems afterwards.


149
Now, how adequately are we addressing that, and how commen-
surate has our commitment been? And as you look at the Afghani-
stan situation, what questions may that raise about the Iraqi situa-
tion, post Saddam Hussein? That's the question I would like to
leave at this time.
The CHAIRMAN. That's a very good question. I'm anxious to know
that.
Dr. KEMP. Can I start?
The CHAIRMAN. In any order you'd like.
Dr. KEMP. As I understand it, the U.S. Army began preparations
for the occupation of Germany in 1942. Currency was being printed
for the occupation.
I think we've got a long way to go in thinking about this problem
of occupying Iraq. I gather tomorrow morning, you're going to have
some very good people who have looked at this in great detail. So
I wouldn't want to preempt anything that they say.
But if you're talking about the occupation of Iraq, you are talking
about tens of thousands of U.S. troops for a long period of time.
Kabul is, you know, the only area that we're protecting in Afghani-
stan and that is a relatively small city. It is not Bagdad. It is not
a city of six million.
The idea that we can just win the war and go away would be ex-
traordinarily irresponsible. The idea that there will be a govern-
ment in waiting ready to take over the administrative tasks of Iraq
is wishful thinking.
And, furthermore, there may be people cheering us on, and I'm
certain there will be, but there are also going to be a lot of recrimi-
nation, and a lot of violent acts will be committed in revenge. The
southern Bagdad suburbs is predominantly Shia. They have been
suppressed for years and years by this regime. They are not going
to kiss and make up the day after. This is going to be worse than
Paris in 1944 where, as you know, more people were killed in the
3-weeks after the liberation than there had been killed for many
years before.
So I think it is a very serious problem, and I am delighted that
you are going to have a special panel on this, because it is the least
thought through element of this extremely political debate that we
see in the press that has been so oversimplified and has so under-
estimated the complexities of the problem.
The CHAIRMAN. With the permission of my colleague, if I can add
a complicating factor, to the extent that you spoke about Iran, the
degree to which we settle the matter and keep peace in Bagdad
and other places by being in place and occupied does not that raise
the ante in Tehran that we, in fact, are seeking a permanent-bas-
ing a permanent station there.
Dr. KEMP. Yes, it does. And some people, of course, would argue
that's all to the good, because that will put the fear of God into the
bad mullahs and the good mullahs will take over, but I'm not quite
so confident that that's what will happen.
The CHAIRMAN. Please, doctor, if you would follow through with
your
Dr. AJAMI. Well, first of all, let me just take this opportunity to
thank Senator Sarbanes, because he's been looking after my pen-
sion. And for his great work on corporate reform, we really com-


150
mend you. You're a great figure, and I think that if you can handle
corporate reform, you can handle Iraq very easily.
Now, I agree with everything that Jeff Kemp said. And I teach
a class with Jeff Kemp, and I have been doing it for many years,
and this is probably one of our first agreements in a long time.
I think that we are going to be there in Iraq, but I don't think
we should be frightened necessarily or we should think that it will
be drawn out or that it will be extensive or that we're going to take
the plunge into imperialism in a very deep way.
There are several things, just in echoing some of what Jeff said,
we want to know about Iraq. This is a country that has the second
largest reserves of oil after Saudi Arabia. It has enormous social
capital; it's not Afghanistan. It has an educated and technically
competent middle class. So making a stand there will not nec-
essarily be bad for us.
I think Jeff is right; there are these grievances and historical ac-
counts to be settled in Iraq. There will be things that we should
be good at. There will be truth and justice commissions. There will
be war criminals. There will be people we can't protect, and maybe
even we shouldn't protect.
So it won't be easy, but I think we operated on the assumption,
I think, again, the chairman has given us good marching orders.
And I think Senator Luger was very clear on that, as well. We have
to take this and say, is this worth doing? Is this worth doing?
And that's what every one of us, I think, really has to make
that's the decision that has to be made, whether it's in Wisconsin
or Maryland or Connecticut or anywhere. You have to really argue
the case and sustain the case if it's really worth it, that this is a
very volatile part of the world. It is the oil supplies of the world.
It is a very notoriously bad man, and that even though we're a re-
luctant empire-you know, we are reluctant about imperial burden.
We don't undertake imperial burden willingly, and that's good. And
when sometimes people say that they heard from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and they're against this military intervention or that mili-
tary intervention, one is reassured that we don't have a military
ready and eager to go everywhere and pull the trigger.
So it's really all—that's what the national discussion is all about.
That's what you're hearing, and that's what this debate is all
about.
The CHAIRMAN. Are you talking about the same numbers Dr.
Kemp is? Are you talking about tens of thousands? And if you are,
we're obviously talking about billions of dollars. Tens of thousands
of troops translates, over a short period of time, as billions of dol-
lars.
Dr. KEMP. Right, but as my colleague Fouad said,
there are ways
for the Iraqi Government to pay for these troops. They have a lot
of oil.
The CHAIRMAN. What period of time do you envision?
Dr. KEMP. I would think years.
The CHAIRMAN. Five years, 10 years?
Dr. KEMP. A minimum of 5 years, I would think.
Dr. TELHAMI. Senator, first of all, let me thank you for looking
after my interest too, as one of the constituents.
The ČHAIRMAN. Well, you guys didn't thank us for anything-


151
Dr. TELHAMI. Well, you've got a problem, if you've got a dis-
advantage.
So I'm one of the constituents-
The CHAIRMAN. Nobody pays attention to the chairman of the
Banking Committee, you know-
Dr. TELHAMI. No, no, banking is not my-
The CHAIRMAN. I'm joking. It's a bad joke. I'm sorry.
Dr. TELHAMI. Maryland is in this case.
I do worry about the consequences. I think it's a major issue to
be concerned about. I don't think that any of us knows how the
public is going to react. There is no question that the regime is de-
spised; that we have no doubt about. But we should have no illu-
sion that it's going to translate into a love for America; we should
have no illusion about that. In some instances it may, and others
it may not.
We should also be very careful not to miscalculate in the early
days when people do face liberation from repression and when they
do celebrate their liberation, we may translate as a welcoming mat
for us, and that could become a real problem. The Israelis made
that mistake in South Lebanon, when they thought early on that
the fact that they undermined the PLO influence in south Lebanon
translated into a welcoming mat. And, clearly, that turned out that
some of the same people who were happy to see the PLO go were
then among their fiercest enemies.
So I don't think, first of all, we know exactly how the public is
going to react. And clearly, we could find ourselves in a situation
where we overstay our welcome.
Second, I think it is clear that everyone in the region is going
to have a stake in what happens in Iraq. And those are people who
live right next door and have resources and conflicts far better than
we do. Be it the Turks, as Mark pointed out, if we don't coordinate
with them, they can make our lives miserable. And that is true
about the Iranians, and it is certainly true about others in the re-
gion.
And, so, it is clear that they have resources. They have the inter-
est and obviously the abilities. And therefore, depending on wheth-
er we coordinate, we cooperate, whether it works with the rest of
the region in terms of coincidence of interest, it matters a lot.
And finally I want to say that I do think that no matter what
happens, even if we do have a relatively successful outcome in Iraq,
which we all pray for, and if even—and I agree, by the way, with
Fouad about Iraq's potential. I mean, clearly Iraq has tremendous
potential. It is a country with an infrastructure, industrial history,
a secularized country, oil resources. Clearly in 1980, actually, when
it started the war with Iran, it stood on the verge of greatness in
the region. And unfortunately it has been taken on a disastrous
route that lasted for two decades and killed hundreds of thousands
of its own people. So it has suffered a lot, but it certainly has po-
tential.
At the same time, even if the Iraqi people have a happy outcome,
I believe that most people in the region will see this as American
imperialism. Most people in the region will see it as imperialism.
And whether we can live with that is a question.


152
I mean, it may be true that the sentiment is we're powerful; we
can do it; they're going to have to do what we want regardless. I
think most will, undoubtedly, but think if you apply that same
strategy and principle to your own lives in your social relations or
domestic relations or relations with other people or business rela-
tions, how long that can serve you, if you take that attitude as a
strategy of winning, that—where you don't take the people's wishes
and considerations and calculations into account, where you do
things unilaterally because you're powerful enough to think that
they're just going to have to see it your way and they will, and how
much resentment builds up awaiting the right moment. And unfor-
tunately there will be a right moment. I am not so optimistic about
the Musharraf model in Pakistan, as some people have suggested
earlier.
I think I applaud Mr. Musharraf for taking the position he took.
It was tough to do, to stand out and tell people that they have a
choice. I agree with that. That was the right thing for him to do.
I am not sure he will succeed. I am less confident he will prevail.
And I am worried about what is going to happen 5 years down the
road in Pakistan in relation to us and in relation to militancy per-
taining to us. And I'm worried about Afghanistan.
And, so, looking at that, I say to myself, do I want more of that
in the region or should I follow a different route? That affects the
motivation of people, that affects the interest people, that makes
sure that my policy coincides with the interests of others not goes
against them because they have to follow my lead.
And they're a different approach, different philosophical ap-
proach, and I am less certain about the unilateralistic approach
that relies on a group force as a way of getting through in the Mid-
dle East.
Ambassador PARRIS. My colleagues have made excellent points,
and I'm not going to try to belabor them by repeating them, other
than to underscore what Jeff said, which is that this is the part
of the problem that deserves the most attention, and you'll being
doing that in detail tomorrow.
So much of it is scenario dependent, and I think you'll find there
is enormous opinion as to what we can expect when and if we fi-
nally get in there.
But I would like to make one point and to play off something
that Mort Halperin said.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank him for your pension.
Ambassador PARRIS. No, I'm a Virginia resident.
The CHAIRMAN. OK, good.
Ambassador PARRIS. It is to play off something that Mort
Halperin said in the previous panel which is, to be sure that there
will be a democratic regime in Iraq over the long term, we'll have
to stay there for 20 years.
And, you, Senator, asked, I think, the panel if there was anybody
that disagreed with that statement. It's a profound question, and
basically nobody was prepared to take it on.
I think it merits parsing because what Mort said was to ensure
a democratic regime over the long term. And that suggests that,
you know, there is one quality of democracy.


153
If our objective is to create the Federal Republic of Germany in
Iraq, we may very well have to stay there as long as we did in Ğer-
many. But there are shades of democracy around the world, many
of which represent close friendships and allies of the United States,
and would be remarkable improvements over the status quo in
Iraq. And I think it would be presumptuous of us to sit here and
suggest that, you know, unless they meet the standard that we do
in this country, we shouldn't—the game is not worth the candle.
It seems to me that if you take a different approach, if you accept
the proposition that there may be a different standard than ours,
you may take less time. It may be less resource intensive. Some of
the down sides that have been discussed here might be less acute.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Chafee.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman very much.
Mr. Kemp, you mentioned that there is a worst-case and a best-
case scenario, and your worst-case scenario, I'm wondering if there
is something even worse than what you might have suggested.
Dr. KEMP. Oh, probably.
Senator CHAFEE. I think Dr. Telhami was 'kind of going down
that road in talking about the power of the public, and if there is,
you know, public resentment then comes repression, and there is
a spiral that leads to something that did happen in 1979 in Iran.
The Shah was toppled so quickly that we didn't even get our em-
bassy people out and took over our embassy and kept them hos-
tage. It can happen so fast.
And is it possible that this conflagration, this spontaneous com-
bustion, can take place where these regimes are toppled and the
neighboring countries, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, of course,
you've mentioned, and even those that aren't neighbors—I mean
Turkey is a neighbor-or even those that aren't neighbors, we
talked about Pakistan a little bit, is that possible just a sponta-
neous combustion of anti-Americanism and a toppling of regimes,
which ultimately—if you want to talk about a worst-case scenario,
is the entire oil-or the majority of the oil production for the world.
Dr. TELHAMI. Well, there are a lot of worst-case scenarios but
even beyond that, obviously, even in the conduct of war-I mean,
if we're right, that if some of the panelists that you've heard before
were right about the fact that there is uncertainty about the degree
to which Iraq may even have nuclear weapons, and if we are right
about the ruthlessness of the leader if he knows he's going to go
down the drain in an American attack, if he knows that this is
going to be a war against him, it's certainly the case that he's going
to use whatever is at his disposal, because there is not going to be
a deterrence issue anymore. He knows he's going down, and he's
going to use everything at his disposal.
I have no doubt that in a war, in a full war, where our aim is
to bring down the government—and, obviously, that's going to be
the aim of the war—that he will use everything at his disposal. I
don't know what that is, but I have no doubt. And one can paint
scenarios as to what these are. Maybe he doesn't have much, but
the issue is if we think that there is uncertainty—there are sce-
narios of this sort, there are scenarios of preemption of attacks
even prior to the American attacks if war is imminent. That could
be done.


155
The Sabas in Kuwait have been around for approximately the
same time. The Hashamites in Jordan, in a very, very truncated
volatile realm, have been around since 1921. And even Khaddafi
has been around since 1969.
And the Egyptian revolution of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak has
been in the saddle for now half a century, and there is no evidence
that anyone could overthrow these governments. They know. That's
the one thing they know is how to stay in power.
The combined GDP, we are now told, of the Arab world is $60
billion less than Spain, less than Spain, twenty-two Arab govern-
ments.
So they don't know how to develop their population. We know
they don't like to give them maturity, but they know how to stay
in power. We should trust them. You know, that's what the game
is all about.
Dr. KEMP. Just on this, Senator Chafee, an even more worse
case, we were worried about Soviet Union nuclear threat in both
the 1967 war, that's gone. So to me the worst case would be a nu-
clear war in the Middle East, which is possible under certain cir-
cumstances. That, I think, would have a devastating impact on the
oil markets, and then I think these regimes that up to now have
been extraordinarily resilient would be facing a day of reckoning,
because what we have not really discussed, because it wasn't their
mission, but there is a demographic bulge moving through this re-
gion of young people who cannot be employed because they do not
have jobs, and it's getting worse by the year.
The Arab world, Iran, Pakistan, are entering into this window of
where they have to create more jobs a year than they possibly have
the resources to. And that's where I think you could get an explo-
sion. I don't think it will be a single explosion. It won't be like 1848
in Europe when all the rotten monarchies collapsed, but sooner or
later some of these regimes have to crack, whether it's Iran first
or Egypt, I don't know, but they cannot keep going at this rate of
degregation.
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I hate to do this to you, but just a
couple of more quick questions.
Do you have another question?
Senator CHAFEE. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
panel.
The CHAIRMAN. The premise that the question—the question as
to if Saddam is taken down, how long do we have to stay. The way
you answered was premised upon the notion that we had no co-
operation from anywhere else in the world, we didn't have the Eu-
ropeans in the game, no one else got in the deal here.
Can you give me your best educated guess, as quickly as you can,
as to whether or not given that circumstance, that is, Saddam has
been removed, American forces are in the region in large numbers
where it may be part of the calculous of our European friends in
the EU that they be part of the process. And would it make a dif-
ference if they not—it would, obviously, make an economic dif-
ference to us, but would it make a difference if they were part of
the process in terms of the reaction in Iran, the reaction in Turkey,
the reaction in other parts of the world, of that part of the world?


156
I mean,
As quickly as can you, it's an awful long—I mean, a profound
question
Dr. KEMP. It would make a very important difference if part of
the occupation force also includes bringing in UNMOVIC, the U.N.
inspectors that you had discussed this morning, that would also
give more legitimacy to it.
The more this is seen as an international operation with coopera-
tion from the U.N. and the Europeans, the less the chance that we
will be pigeonholed as merely imperialists, but we've got a lot of
work to do.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, the second, I think more difficult question
that, at least, I haven't resolved, is what do you believe would be
the calculous that our European friends would engage in to deter-
mine whether or not it was in their interest to participate?
Dr. AJAMI. I think, you know, their logic would be if we succeed,
we succeed together; if we fail, we fail alone. I mean, I'm reminded
of, like, soon after September 11, Le Monde had this famous head-
line, "Tous Americains”; we're all Americans. And a few weeks
later, it became Tous Americains with a question mark. All Ameri-
cans, not quite, that they believe that we were using September 11
as a way of expanding our authority in the world and in the region.
I think Iraq is rich; we go back to that. Iraq is a good market.
And I think when we go in, a lot of these countries will come with
us, because they'll want to be part of the reconstruction of Iraq.
this will be fundamentally important for the French. It
would be important for the Russians. It would be important for the
Brits, and for others, and for the Germans, so I don't think we will
necessarily be alone.
It's just the fate of a great power sometimes to be alone when
the hard work has to be done.
The CHAIRMAN. Quite frankly, if I had a choice of being alone
after the hard work was done, the way you phrase it-
Dr. AJAMI. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN [continuing). Or being alone, getting the hard
work done, I would rather be alone getting the hard work done, be-
cause I think the really hard work is done after.
Dr. TELHAMI. But let's have a little word of warning, though,
Senator, which is that these are democratic countries we're talking,
about
The CHAIRMAN. Right.
Dr. TELHAMI [continuing). We're not talking about the Middle
Eastern countries.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree.
Dr. TELHAMI. We're talking about countries that are differen-
tiated, that have their own domestic considerations, and in that re-
gard, if you look at public opinion so far, only in Britain is the pub-
lic about evenly divided on Iraq. There is not a single country in
which there is a majority support for entering Iraq. Most
countries
The CHAIRMAN. I would suggest that was the case in Bosnia and
they all came along after the fact. I remember pushing President
Clinton very hard, as hard as I politely—well, as hard as I could,
politely or otherwise, about moving to bomb in Kosovo. And he said


157
what about the French? I said, I promise you if you go, they'll
come.
Quite frankly, I'm more uncertain about it as it relates to Iraq.
My instinct is that—and, again, I'm not the expert, that's why we
have you here—but my instinct Professor Ajami, is that if we suc-
ceed, they will be willing to take a piece of this.
Dr. AJAMI. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. I would—let me ask you if there is any parallel
here.
I was very disappointed, and I have been public about this, in
the failure of this administration to expand ISAF in Afghanistan,
especially on what I believe are not completely accurate grounds
that the Europeans weren't ready to.
The Europeans—and I spent time there. I spent time with the
Europeans. They were totally prepared to, until we said we
wouldn't be part of it. And as one European said, “if the big dog's
not there, the little dogs don't want to play.”
And, so, I was under the distinct impression in everything, and
I have followed this very closely, that had we been willing to lead,
to expand ISAF, not even with numbers, just lead with commit-
ment, that ISAF—we would have gotten significant support from
Europe to expand ISAF in raw numbers.
Is that able to be can you extrapolate from that that a similar,
assuming a military success in Iraq, is there any relevance to the
willingness in Iraq-I mean, in Afghanistan and what they may be
able to do in Iraq?
Dr. KEMP. Well, I would just say that if we're not prepared to
go much further in Iraq than we have gone in Afghanistan, we're
doomed from the start.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree.
Dr. KEMP. So that I think the Europeans would argue you're
going to have to get in in a big way, and we ultimately are going
to have to help you. And one important reason is they would see
this as a way to help diffuse then the Arab/Israeli conflict, which
in the last resort, the Europeans worry about primarily because of
migration and the whole string of European issues which we
haven't gotten into today. So if we don't lead in Iraq, then it's all
over. It's a hopeless case.
Ambassador PARRIS. Unfortunately many of them will be worried
about the splitting of the spoils of war. I have no doubt about it.
I think that the issue of the oil contracts is going to become an
issue in the thinking of a lot of them, and I think, you know, that
is going to be part of the calculous.
The CHAIRMAN. I argue that's the way—I don't know why this
isn't a win/win situation with the Russians. I mean, I actually had
a conversation that he has not dissuaded me from mentioning with
President Putin. You know, they think they've got tens of billions
of dollars waiting in the bank in terms of developing those oil
fields, which they can't develop. They're also owed about $11 bil-
lion. I thought it was nine. When I said nine, he looked at me and
he said 11.
It's a little bit like having a very rich aunt that you don't like,
and you know she has $40 million in the bank. You may not have
81-697 D-6


158
a relationship with her, but you're not going to give up on her
knowing she has it in the bank.
These folks have it in the bank. And there was even a feeler put
out by Gazprom and—what's the other oil company,
Dr. KEMP. Lukoil.
The CHAIRMAN [continuing). Lukoil that they would be interested
in a consortia with U.S. companies.
One of the things I found the Russians were worried about is we
go in, take out Iraq, they lose their contracts. I can't imagine why
this isn't a win/win situation if we were smart about this. But I
don't get any sense that there is any movement on this by anyone
in the administration.
Ambassador PARRIS. I think one of the problems is a structural
one. And it's certainly the case with Turkey up until very recently,
which is that if you're talking point is there is no plan on the Presi-
dent's desk, and you're not prepared to go beyond that, you can't
get very deeply into conversations with people who would just as
soon, frankly, not accept the premise in the first place. I mean, the
Turks and others, I'm sure, are not standing in line to talk about
the day after.
And you'll only get their attention when you're prepared to de-
scribe, in some detail, what you're going to do, in what timeframe,
and what your vision of the day after is.
The CHAIRMAN. I kidded the President when he asked what I
would do. I said Mr. President, part of this is the vision thing, and
I'm not sure what the vision should be.
Gentlemen, with your permission, I have, rather than take more
of your time, it's almost 7 o'clock, you've been so patient and help-
ful, I have about two or three questions I would like to submit to
each of you in writing. There is no urgency in terms of getting
them back, and I would ask you publicly, to embarrass you into
having to say yes, would you be willing to come back if we continue
this process?
Dr. KEMP. Yes.
Ambassador PARRIS. Be glad to.
Dr. AJAMI. It would be a great honor, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you all very, very much, and we are ad-
journed.
[Whereupon, at 6:50 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 10 a.m., August 1, 2002.]


HEARINGS TO EXAMINE THREATS, RE-
SPONSES, AND REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
SURROUNDING IRAQ
THURSDAY, AUGUST 1, 2002
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:25 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Feingold, Wellstone,
Boxer, Bill Nelson, Rockefeller, Lugar, Hagel, Frist, and
Brownback.
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.
Yesterday, the Foreign Relations Committee began what I hope
will be a national discussion on Iraq. Let me say, again, how
pleased and grateful I am for the cooperation of my Republican col-
leagues, starting with Senator Helms, in absentia, and his staff,
and Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel, for putting these hearings
together. This has been a team effort. This is not me sitting down
with a witness list and saying here we go.
As with yesterday we have coordinated these hearings with the
White House. Let me explain what I mean by coordination. We're
a separate and equal branch of the government. We are not asking
permission of anybody to have any hearing, but we did ask them
for their input. We asked them for their input as we debate and
discuss this very difficult question the President has to resolve, and
they have been very cooperative.
We are honoring their desire not to testify at this time, but I do
not want to put the President in the position of having to make any
of these critical decisions prematurely. I take him at his word, their
word, the administration, that this is a process that's entrained
and hopefully our hearings can help them elucidate their discus-
sions and their decision process, as well.
Yesterday, we addressed three critical questions, among others.
First, what is the threat from Iraq? Second, depending on the as-
sessment of that threat, what is viewed as the appropriate re-
sponse to the threat? And, third, how do Iraq's neighbors and our
allies see the problem in Iraq?
We had excellent, excellent testimony from our panels yesterday,
but the one area in which I think we need considerably more dis-
cussion, as well, is how Iraqi's neighbors and our allies view the
problem of Iraq. We heard a wide range of views from an excep-
(159)


160
tionally thoughtful group of witnesses spanning the spectrum of
points of view. I'm not sure we reached many definitive conclu-
sions, but I am convinced we're asking the right questions. And to
get the answer, you have to ask the right question first.
We are, I hope, shedding some light on an important and com-
plex problem that the President faces, as well as the Congress and
the American people. Again, I'll reiterate, I truly believe, and I
think all of my colleagues do, that a foreign policy will not be sus-
tained, particularly if it calls for the expenditure of American treas-
ure and blood, potentially, without the informed consent of the
American people.
Today, we'll address a fourth question, and that's not to suggest
that our incredibly qualified panel of witnesses is not free to speak
to any other issue, as well. We've attempted to ask the panels to
come to address a specific question, not because we think that's the
only question they're competent to respond to, but because we want
to order this some way at the outset.
And one question that I think is the least explored—and, as a
matter of fact, spontaneously to it, and this is yesterday, said they
thought it was the least explored, as well, and perhaps the most
important. If we participate or if we are the only participant in the
departure of Saddam, what are our responsibilities, if any, the day
after? This is an issue we've already been grappling with, and you
heard discussion in the Executive Committee meeting, on Afghani-
stan. We are openly discussing it after a successful military action
in Afghanistan.
As I've said many times before, our military did a remarkable job
in prosecuting the war in Afghanistan. But, as you could hear from
the discussion here today and the vote here today, there is at least
a consensus that, in some part, we may be falling short-may be
falling short of the mark in winning the peace. The peace is a lot
harder to win than the war.
We're not doing nearly enough, in my view, to secure Afghani-
stan so that it can be rebuilt and so that it does not again become
a haven for terrorists. I'm pleased to announce, however, that what
you've just noticed just a few minutes ago, that I think we've got
a pretty strong consensus here to encourage the President, knowing
that he has our support, to go beyond Kabul with an international
security force.
In Iraq, we can't afford to replace one despot with chaos. The
long suffering Iraqi people need to know the regime change will
benefit them. We heard that from every witness yesterday. So do
Iraqi's neighbors. And the American people will want that assur-
ance, as well.
Already yesterday many of our witnesses talked about the crit-
ical importance of thinking through the day after well in advance
of the day of, and even the day before we act in Iraq. Today we'll
look at this issue in greater detail. We want a better understanding
of what it would take to secure Iraq and rebuild it economically
and politically. I don't mean all by ourselves, but that may be the
position we put ourselves in.
So what does it mean if it's all by ourselves? We need to know
how many U.S. forces will be required to stay, how long, and for
what purpose. We should consider the prospects of establishing a


161
stable and democratic state, but maybe a stable and not-so-demo-
cratic state, and a democratic political order in Iraq, and what role
the Iraqi opposition might play in that, and what role might, as
I've had the great pleasure of having some of the witnesses here
today brief me privately over the last month, as I did the several
panels before, and I know there's some discussion among them and
among experts in the region as to the prospect of participation with
the civil servants that exist within Iraq, the military that exists
within Iraq, how willing they'd be willing to—some argue that this
could be done very readily, because we'd have overwhelming help.
Others suggest that it would not be done very readily at all. Others
suggest that it didn't have to be paid for by us. Iraq's a wealthy
country; they could fund this themselves our presence, they could
fund there, and so on.
So these are all questions that are vitally important to our inter-
ests, and we have, I think, put together, with the help of Senator
Helms, his staff, and the White House, requests from them, as well
as our staff, some very, very significant witnesses today.
So I welcome them, and I would now ask Senator Hagel if he
would like to make any opening statement. And after that, I would
move to introduce the witnesses and begin discussion.
Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I do have a state-
ment, which I will ask to be included in the record. And since we
are on a limited track here with votes coming, I would suggest we
go right to the witnesses.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL
I would like to congratulate the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding
these timely hearings on Iraq. I agree with my colleagues that we need a national
dialogue on what steps we should take to deal with the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein's Iraq. Americans need to be informed about the complexities and con-
sequences of our policies in Iraq.
I look forward to listening to and learning from the distinguished witnesses before
us today about the nature and urgency of the threat we face from Iraq, including
their evaluations of what the best policy options may be for meeting this threat; the
prospects for a democratic transition after Saddam Hussein; and what the implica-
tions of our policies in Iraq may be for the stability of the Middle East and our secu-
rity interests there.
Much of the debate by those advocating regime change through military means
have so far focused on the easy questions. Is Saddam Hussein a ruthless tyrant who
brutally oppresses his own people, and who possesses weapons of mass destruction
that have the potential to threaten us, his neighbors and our allies, including and
especially Israel? Yes. Do most Iraqis yearn for democratic change in Iraq? Yes, they
do. Can Saddam be rehabilitated? No, he cannot.
In my opinion, complicated and relevant questions remain to be answered before
making a case for war, and here is where these hearings will play an important
role. What is the nature, and urgency, of the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to
the United States and Iraq's neighbors? What do we know about Iraq's programs
of weapons of mass destruction? There have been no weapons inspectors in Iraq
since December 1998. Is Iraq involved in terrorist planning and activities against
the United States and U.S. allies in the Middle East and elsewhere?
What can we expect after Saddam Hussein in Iraq? What do we know about the
capabilities of the opposition to Saddam inside Iraq? While we support a unified and
democratic opposition to Saddam Hussein, the arbiters of power in a post-Saddam
Iraq will likely be those who reside inside, not outside, the country. And these indi-
viduals and groups we do not know. Who are they? And where are they? These are
the Iraqis we need to understand, engage, and eventually do business with.
What will be the future of Iraqi Kurdistan in a post-Saddam Iraq?


163
And these hearings which you've launched are obviously in-
tended to do that. In fact, you and Senator Lugar had an article
in the New York Times yesterday—just yesterday and, in the
course of which, you said, “Without prejudging any particular
course of action, we hope to start a national discussion of some crit-
ical questions,” and I think it's very important to have that na-
tional discussion. I think the way you've structured it, in terms of
the questions that have been outlined to be addressed, provide a
structure and a format for this discussion. I'm very happy to par-
ticipate in it, but I'm particularly pleased to acknowledge, the very
significant leadership you're exercising on this very important
issue.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, Senator.
Senator Dodd.
Senator DODD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I just want to make sort of
the same comments. I've been on this committee 21 years, and this
is what this committee was designed to do. And, unfortunately, we
haven't done it enough over the years. And the fact that we're
doing it here is tremendously worthwhile and valuable. It's the rea-
son why there is a committee process. It's the way that foreign pol-
icy ought to be conducted, in a partnership with the Congress. And
so I want to add my voice to that of Senator Sarbanes in thanking
you and Senator Lugar and others, the administration, for allowing
this to go forward and doing it in such a cooperative fashion.
And it was tremendously instructive yesterday. I found the hear-
ings—I couldn't attend, unfortunately, some of the afternoon, but
the ones that I watched on television or the ones I participated in
I just think were tremendously worthwhile and already is having,
I think, a very worthwhile and beneficial impact on the decision-
making process.
But just—while some of the conclusions-obviously we haven't
formed any firm ones, but I thought some conclusions about how
we ought to approach this were tremendously worthwhile. And,
just very briefly, I wrote down some of them.
First, that we shouldn't underestimate the capability of the Iraqi
military. I think we all agree with that today. Then, second, we
should understand that the undertaking of any effort to oust Hus-
sein will be extremely difficult without the support of the inter-
national community. I think, again, we all sort of agreed, that's a
given. Third, that the U.N. inspections, when it was functioning,
was successful and having some effect on the quality and quantity
of weapons of mass destruction that are accumulated. That efforts
to contain Hussein through the reintroduction of U.N. weapons in-
spectors is still worth trying, particularly of Russia and the French,
but particularly if Russia would be involved. That seriously explor-
ing the reinstatement of the inspection option may build in na-
tional support. We shouldn't abandon that idea. Don't necessarily
have to jump to it, but I thought that was very worthwhile and tre-
mendously helpful. And, finally, once the inspections option is no
longer perceived by our allies to be a viable response to Saddam
Hussein, then the international community would be more ame-
nable to come together and support the use of force if that's the de-
cision.


165
So we will recess for 10 minutes, be back, and we'll start with
you, Dr. Marr, when we come back.
The committee is in recess.
[Recess.]
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.
Thank you for your indulgence. Hopefully we won't have many
interruptions, as we did yesterday.
Dr. Marr, again, welcome, and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. PHEBE MARR, FORMER PROFESSOR,
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. MARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the committee, for the
invitation to testify. I would like to add my voice to others in
thanking you for this wonderful opportunity to generate a public
discussion on the issues involved in this critical foreign-policy deci-
sion.
Our panel has been asked to examine what we can expect in Iraq
after Saddam if the United States should be successful in achieving
his fall. I would like to focus on two key issues that will be critical
for U.S. planning in post-Saddam Iraq. The first is the potential for
fragmentation or fracturing once Saddam's regime is decapitated
and, along with it, the potential for outside interference from Iraq's
neighbors. The second is the issue of providing alternative leader-
ship for Iraq.
Let me say at the outset that I regard the replacement of Iraq's
leadership as a serious and very ambitious project. The decision to
do so is difficult because the potential benefits to Iraq, to the
United States and to the region are substantial. But so, too, are the
possible costs and unintended consequences. If the United States
embarks on this project, it needs to be prepared to see it through
to an acceptable outcome, including, if necessary, a long-term mili-
tary and political commitment to assure a stable and more demo-
cratic government. If it is not prepared to do so, the intended bene-
fits could vanish.
Let me turn to the issue of fragmentation. Incidentally, in my
prepared remarks, I have included a map of Iraq which might be
helpful, together with a great deal more information than I'm going
to give you here. As we know, Iraq is a multi-ethnic, multi-sec-
tarian country with boundaries that were imposed by foreign pow-
ers at the time of its formation in 1921. It has three main demo-
graphic components consisting of the Kurdish-speaking population
in the north, about 17 percent, the Arab Shia in the south, about
60 percent, and the Arab Sunnis in the center, somewhere between
15 and 20 percent. These are sketched on the map.
For over 80 years, these communities have coexisted and, to
varying degrees, have participated in the process of building a state
and a nation. That process, while well underway, is still incom-
plete. Under the current regime, a narrowly based Arab Sunni
community uses repression to enforce its rule over all communities;
hence, the fear that if the regime is removed, the country will frag-
ment into its ethnic and sectarian components.
How accurate is that assessment? First, in my view, it is very
unlikely—indeed, inconceivable—that Iraq will break up into three
relatively cohesive components, a Kurdish north, a Shia south, and


166
an Arab Sunni center. None of these communities is homogenous
or shows any ability to unite. Moreover, in many cities-Baghdad,
Mosul, Basra—the communities are thoroughly mixed. Most impor-
tant of all, the overwhelming majority of the population, except
possibly for a few Kurds, has consistently shown a strong desire to
keep the state together and profit from its ample resources.
However, the removal of the regime, under certain cir-
cumstances, could result in a breakdown of the central government
and its ability to exercise control over the country. There are two
dangers here. The first is short-term. If firm leadership is not in
place in Baghdad on the day after, retribution, score-settling, and
bloodletting, especially in urban areas, could take place.
On a broader scale, without a firm government, parochial inter-
ests could take over both in the north and the south and the cen-
ter. The Kurds, for instance, could seize Kirkuk with its oil fields,
establishing a new reality in the north. The Arab Sunni clans, who
control military units, might struggle for power in Baghdad. The
Shia party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,
SCIRĪ, located in Tehran, could send units of its militia across the
frontier and attempt to gain control of areas in the south.
Such a collapse of authority could trigger interference from
neighbors. Turkey could interfere in the north, as it's done before.
Iran, through its proxies, could follow suit. There could even be a
reverse flow of refugees, as many Iraqi Shia exiles in Iran return
home, possibly in the thousands, destabilizing areas of the south.
And, over the long term, if a new government in Baghdad fails
to take hold, if it is not more inclusive of Iraq's communities and
acceptable to the population, Iraq could gradually slip into the cat-
egory of a failed state unable to maintain control over its territories
and borders. This is not the most likely scenario, but it is a little
more likely than a decade ago. While most Iraqis do want the unity
and territorial sovereignty of their state, their sense of identity as
a nation has eroded under the Ba'th, and, in my view, is weaker
than at any time since 1945.
In some respects, the state is already in the process of failure
and needs revival. The Kurds have been governing themselves for
over a decade, for example. While the Kurdish leadership is real-
istic about its prospects for independence—they are nil—and will-
ing to live in Iraq under some federal identity, their Kurdish iden-
tity and aspirations for self government have increased.
In a post-Saddam Iraq, it's going to be more difficult to integrate
the Kurds into Iraq proper. The Shia population has been in a con-
stant state of decline for over the past two decades from wars, revo-
lution, and government repression. The 1991 rebellion, which was
widespread in the south, showed the extent of Shia alienation. And
since that time, a sense of Shia identity has increased.
However, despite considerable alienation from the government,
the Shia have no discernible leadership or organization inside Iraq,
unlike the Kurds. Moreover, there's no real Shia desire for separa-
tion. Rather, the Shia want a greater—indeed, a dominant-share
of power in Baghdad commensurate with their numbers.
While the Shia are not likely to break away, holding Iraq to-
gether will require new leadership in Baghdad capable of incor-


169
are ready-indeed, eager—for change. They seek the preservation
of their state and its future development as a nation, but they have
had no experience of democracy, only of a police state, hence the
building blocks of democracy will have to be created, including a
reorientation of attitudes and practices. This will take time.
I suggest that there are three potential options_open to the
United States in bringing about leadership change. The first is to
pressure those inside to change the regime themselves. The most
likely source of change, if Iraqis are left to accomplish the deed
themselves will be the center—from kin and clan groups, from the
military, or, less likely, the party. This will be the least expensive
option for the United States in terms of troops and political invest-
ment, but it will probably bring the least change. It is also likely
to be the most destabilizing. It could lead to a struggle for power
in Baghdad, the erosion of central control, and a gradual break-
down of national unity.
Inside leadership is most likely to move against Saddam if it de-
cides the United States is serious about occupation, but the United
States will need to support this new leadership to prevent frac-
turing. If the United States is unsure of the new leadership, if it
cannot give it immediate support, the United States could lose con-
trol of the situation. Identifying potential inside leaders now and
making U.S. requirements clear and public beforehand would help
avoid this slippery slope.
The second option, is to introduce the outside opposition as alter-
native leadership. This would produce the most change inside Iraq
in the directions desired by the United States. But this is the most
difficult and costly option. The United States would have to install
and support this opposition with troops over some considerable pe-
riod of time.
There is a third option. If the United States occupies Iraq, it will
have the best opportunity, in the short-term, to provide law and
order, prevent retribution, and begin the processes by which Iraqis
inside and outside can refashion their political system and move to-
ward democratic reforms. Most Iraqis would welcome that prospect,
but it represents a considerable commitment by the United States
over several years and some troops on the ground, preferably in
conjunction with allies. And before too long, the United States will
be viewed as a foreign occupier. Thus, the institution of new leader-
ship and the procedures for establishing a new government need to
be fairly expeditious—say, within 6 months—and the U.S. military
greatly reduced thereafter.
Nevertheless, if the United States is determined to replace the
regime, it's better to take a firm hand in the beginning to help in
providing the building blocks for a new and more democratic re-
gime. In this case, the United States will have to keep some forces
on the ground and strong advisory teams in place to assure that
the new regime gets a solid footing.
Iraq has a military and a bureaucracy which can be used to de-
fend and administer the country, but it will require effort to reor-
ganize and reshape these institutions in the desired direction. This
is no small task.
If the United States is going to take the responsibility for remov-
ing the current leadership, it should assume that it cannot get the


170
results it wants “on the cheap.” It must be prepared to put some
troops on the ground, provide advisors to help create new institu-
tions, and, above all, spend time and effort in the future to see the
project through to a satisfactory end. If the United States is not
willing to do so, it had best rethink the project.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Marr follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PHEBE MARR, FORMER PROFESSOR, NATIONAL
DEFENSE UNIVERSITY; AUTHOR, SPECIALIST ON IRAQ
IRAQ AFTER SADDAM
The purpose of my testimony is to provide a snapshot of what we can expect in
Iraq after Saddam, should the US be successful in achieving his fall. Obviously, the
means and manner of removing the regime will affect the aftermath: a relatively
quick transition with a minimum of bloodshed and destruction will provide one set
of circumstances; a more prolonged and destructive military operation will produce
a less favorable outcome. It also matters whether the change is accomplished from
within, by Iraqis, or requires a direct US military effort. Rather than dealing with
the means, however, which is not my area of expertise, I would like to focus on a
general political and social picture of Iraq; what we should be prepared to find in
Iraq the day after, and, in particular, two key issues that will be critical for US pol-
icy and planning in post-Saddam Iraq. The first is the potential for fragmentation
or fracturing, once Saddam's regime is decapitated, and, along with it, the potential
for outside interference from Iraq's neighbors. The second is the issue of providing
alternative political leadership for Iraq, the nature of that leadership, and the impli-
cations of the choice for Iraq's future and US policy aims.
Replacement of Iraq's leadership is a serious and ambitious project. It is a difficult
foreign policy decision for the US, in part, because its potential benefits, both to
Iraqis at home and to the security of the region, are high. But so, too, are the pos-
sible costs as well as unintended consequences which cannot be calculated. If the
US embarks on this project, it needs to be prepared to fulfill its responsibilities, and
see it through to an acceptable outcome, including a potential long-term military
and political commitment to assure a stable and more democratic government. If it
is not prepared to do so, the intended benefits could vanish.
Fragmentation
Iraq is a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian country, with boundaries imposed by for-
eign powers at the time of its formation in 1920. Its three main demographic compo-
nents, the Kurdish speaking population in the north (c. 17 percent); the Arab shi'ah
population in the south (c. 60%) and the Arab sunnis in the center (c. 15-20%) have
coexisted over the past 80 years, and, to varying degrees, have participated in the
process of building both a state and a nation. As with most such states, that proc-
ess, while well underway, is still incomplete. Under the current regime, the state
is controlled by a narrowly based Arab sunni minority, using the mechanism of re-
pression to enforce its rule over all communities, except for a portion of the Kurdish
population in the north, where its rule does not run. Hence the fear that if the re-
gime is removed, the country will fragment into its ethnic and sectarian compo-
nents. How accurate is that assessment?
First, it is very unlikely, indeed inconceivable, that Iraq will “break up” into three
relatively cohesive components: a Kurdish north; a shi’i south; and an Arab sunni
center. None of these three communities is homogenous or shows any ability to
unite under any leadership. Second, there is substantial mixture of these commu-
nities in many cities-especially in Baghdad and the center—but also in other cities
in the north and south, making separation difficult. In some areas, other minorities
such as Turcomen and Christian communities form substantial components of the
population. Third, while some Kurds may have aspirations for independence, they
are unlikely to achieve it, and many others would be comfortable in a more demo-
cratic Iraqi state. The shi'ah have never expressed separatist aspirations. Indeed,
both Arab shi'ah and Arab sunnis, as well as some Kurds, have a strong desire the
keep the state together and to profit from its ample resources.
1 In the mid-1990s, for example, the Regional Command of the Ba'th Party, consisted of 17
members; 12 were Arab sunnis; 4 Arab shi'ah, and one a Christian. Of this group, 3 were from
the Begat clan; 5 were from allied clans, and two were from Mosul. (Faleh A. Jabbar, From
Storm to Thunder (Tokyo, Institute of Developing Economes, 1998). p.17.


171
However, the removal of the current regime in Baghdad, under certain cir-
cumstances, could result in a “break-down” of the central government, and its in-
ability to exercise control over the country: to maintain law and order; and to move
the country and its institutions in the direction desired by the US. There are two
dangers here. The first is short term. If firm leadership is not in place in Baghdad
“the day after” Saddam is removed, retribution, score settling, and bloodletting, es-
pecially in urban areas, could take place. For example, the shi'ah in the poor Bagh-
dad townships of al-Thawrah and al-Shu'alah, recent migrants from the south and
over a million strong, could cross the Tigris and attack the more affluent sunni dis-
tricts, such as al-'Adhamiyyah, a fear often expressed by the sunni residents of
Baghdad. One a broader scale, without firm government, parochial interests could
take over, both in the north and south and in the center. The Kurds, for instance,
could seize Kirkuk, with its oil fields, establishing a new reality in the north. Arab
sunni clans, who control military units, might struggle for power in Baghdad. The
shi'ah party, SCIRI (The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), lo-
cated in Tehran, could send units of its Iraqi Badr brigade across the border and
attempt to seize the initiative in southern shi'i towns, repeating the mistakes made
in the 1991 rebellion. Such a collapse of authority could trigger interference from
neighbors. Turkey could intervene in the north to prevent refugee flows and to exert
control over events in Kurdistan. Iran, through proxies, could follow suit. There
could be a reverse flow of refugees, as Iraqi shi'ah exiles from Iran return home in
the tens of thousands, destabilizing areas of the south.
Over the longer term, if a new government in Baghdad fails to take hold, if it
is not more inclusive of Iraq's communities, and more acceptable to its population;
if a uniform rule of law cannot be established, Iraq could slip into the category of
a failed state, unable to maintain control over its territory and its borders. The situ-
ation in the north of Iraq is an example. The Kurdish area is not unified; it is di-
vided between the two major Kurdish parties. Neither has real control over its bor-
ders, and in the northeast, one party has lost control of an enclave along the Iranian
border, dominated by Islamist parties and penetrated by Iran and other influences,
possibly including terrorists. While the situation is not yet a serious problem, it
serves as a metaphor for what could happen to Iraq as a whole, in the absence, over
the long term, of a stable, legitimate government in Baghdad.
Iraq has been a state for over 80 years and for most of that time has had a tradi-
tion of strong, central government. The chief thrust of every government since its
founding has
been state formation and the creation of a nation from the diverse ele-
ments within its boundaries. In the process, a sense of Iraqi identity has developed
among the majority of its population, particularly in relationship to their neighbors;
most Iraqis, with the possible exception of some of the Kurdish population, want the
unity and territorial sovereignty of their state maintained. At various times within
Iraqi history, the central government has been more inclusive of its various commu-
nities, with a better balance among ethnic and sectarian components. But that sense
of identity has eroded under the Ba'th, particularly since the rebellion of 1991,
which was a defining moment for Iraq's ethnic and sectarian communities. The
sense of Iraqi identity is still there today, but it is weaker than at any time since
1945.
The Kurds:
The Kurdish community in the north has been governing itself for a decade, in
an arc of territory which runs from Zakhu in the north to Hajj'Umran in the east
to Sulaymaniyyah in the south. Much, but not all, of this territory is protected by
US and UK overflights in the No Fly Zone north of the 36th parallel. (Kurdish self-
rule is also due to the withdrawal of Iraqi government troops and administration
from the zone.) While the Kurdish leadership is realistic about its prospects for
independence (they are nil) and willing to live within Iraq under a federal arrange-
ment which gives them a large measure of autonomy, their aspirations for self-gov-
ernment and their Kurdish identity have increased over this period. In the post Sad-
dam period, it will be more difficult to integrate the Kurdish community into Iraq.
For example, Kurdish, naturally enough, is now the language used in administra-
tion and taught in schools in the north. As a result, the Kurdish facility in Arabic,
taught as a second language in the schools, has weakened among the younger gen-
eration and may make it more difficult for them to participate in national life. De-
spite numerous trials and tribulations, the Kurds have managed to establish a fairly
respectable level of government in the north, far freer than that which exists in the
south. But they have not done so without consistent support, intervention. and prod-
ding from the West, and Western military protection.
Moreover, the problems of the Kurds may provide a metaphor for Iraq as a whole
after Saddam. After Saddam's withdrawal from the north in 1992, the Kurds held


174
and demographic sense to refer to the “Arab sunni triangle” which stretches from
Baghdad to Mosul and to the borders of Syria and Jordan in the West. This region
includes the small, but growing, cities and towns of the Tigris and Euphrates valley
north and west of Baghdad, dominated by Arab sunnis (often with strong tribal and
clan ties) from which the regime recruits its leadership. (Baghdad, with a population
of over 4 million, has an Arab shi'ah majority and substantial numbers of Kurds.
Turcoman, and Christian communities, as well as Arab sunnis.)
The issue of alternative political leadership is critical, indeed, probably “the” crit-
ical issue in the post-Saddam period, and needs to be addressed. If new leadership
is to come from "inside” Iraq, it is fair to say that there at present there is no visible
alternative leadership. There may be a number of potential leaders—from within
the military, the clan structure, the educated elite—but they cannot emerge and
demonstrate their leadership under this regime. Numerous coup attempts have been
made but all have been cut down. Hence we can speculate on sources of leadership,
but it is not clear what capacity putative leaders would have or what constituencies
they could mobilize. One conclusion may be drawn, however. If leadership emerges
from inside the regime or its support system—the change this leadership will
bring-in orientation, political culture and even foreign policy-may be too little to
be supported by the bulk of the population or to meet US demands and expecta-
tions. For example, will a sunni general, raised and trained under the Ba'th, be will-
ing to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction? Will he and the centrist coalition
he may assemble be friendly to the US government? Above all, will such leadership
be acceptable to Kurds, shi'ah, and even educated sunni civilians who are hoping
for real change and more inclusiveness? Will he be able to mobilize sufficient sup-
port to keep law and order, or will a struggle for power erode his control at the cen-
ter?
The outside opposition, on the other hand, has a multitude of leaders who have
been vying with one another for years. The key figures and groups are fairly well
known in Washington. These include Ahmad Chalabi, leader of the Iran National
Congress, originally an umbrella group that included a number of opposition organi-
zations, but is now mainly a vehicle for his leadership; Sharif Ali, a member of the
Hashimite family, advocating a constitutional monarch; the Iraq National Accord,
led by Ayad Allawi, and composed of many ex-Ba'thists claiming to have ties and
contacts with army officers and Ba'thists inside; SCIRI, the main shi'ah component,
already mentioned; various individual generals who have defected over the years,
and the two Kurdish parties who are already in control of their own real estate in
the north. The main problems with the outside opposition are clear. They have been
competing and squabbling for years, and have been unable to coalesce, even around
a mainstream candidate such as Ahmed Chalabi. Most have narrow constituencies,
and little or no organization inside. The Kurds, the strongest component, do have
organization, some military force, and a strong constituency in the north of Iraq.
But the Kurds are unable, and unwilling, to take on a leadership role in Baghdad.
To the contrary. The two Kurdish parties, and in particular the KDP, have illus-
trated time and again that their main aim is self-government in the north; not
greater control or even change in Baghdad. The weaknesses and political liabilities
of SCIRI have already been dealt with. As for the other groups, their main difficulty
is that they are outside Iraq, and it is not clear what, if any, constituencies they
have inside. Their main constituency is, in fact, in Washington.
This raises a policy paradox. Many of the outside opposition leaders have dem-
onstrated leadership skills (Ahmed Chalabi, for example). They are westernized, and
generally support US aims, including the elimination of WMD. They are more famil-
iar with western democratic processes and are most likely to bring change in Iraq.
But they will have to be put in by the US, and will likely have to be supported by
us over some considerable period, if the changes they—and we envisage are to be
maintained. And as western supported elements, their legitimacy will soon be ques-
tioned.
The outside leadership—its benefits and pitfalls—are accessible and well known
to us. It is the potential “inside” leadership that is most uncertain. To understand
where this leadership may emerge, it is worth taking a look at what we will find,
once Saddam and his inner circle are removed.
The Iraqi regime today is supported by three pillars: a kin and clan network that
dominates security, the military and the decision-making apparatus; broader based
institutions (the Ba'th Party, military organizations, the bureaucracy): an economic
“mafia", backed by state controlled resources.
The kin and clan network
Saddam has maintained power largely by placing his own tribe and clan (the Albu
Nasr/Begat) in key decision making, security and military positions. (For all intents


175
and purposes these two groups are synonymous). The Albu Nasr, hailing from the
area around Tikrit, probably number only about 25,000, with several thousand ac-
tive members available for political recruitment, but they have gradually come to
occupy the strategic heights of the political system. Allied with them are a numer-
ous, neighboring clan and tribal groupings—the Duris, the Tikritis, the Juburis, the
Ubaidis, and the larger tribal confederation of the Dulaim. Almost all are Arab
sunni and overwhelmingly come from the cities and towns of the Arab sunni tri-
angle. Numerous studies have focused on this phenomenon, charting the numbers
and kinds of positions occupied by these clan groups; intermarraige between and
among key political families; and the relationship of various members to Saddam's
own extended family. All point to one overwhelming trend. Beneath a facade of mod-
ern institutions—a political part, a military and a bureaucracy-an ever thickening
network of kin and clan relations has governed the country. deeply penetrating lead-
ing institutions, especially the military. One author has posed a hierarchy of clans,
led by the Begat, and followed by the Tikritis, the Duris, and the Dulaimis, and
shown how they dominate the military.2 As kin and clan relations have grown, these
primordial ties have come to replace ideology and party organization as the glue
that holds the regime—and the government together. In the countryside as well,
tribal leadership and organization has come to play an increasing role in providing
local government services. This network has been referred to as ahl al-thiqah (the
people you can trust).
Even when Saddam's immediate family and the core of his supporters are re-
moved, these clan groups will remain, and so too will the kinship ties that bind
them. Alternative leadership may, indeed, rise from related clans—some of whom
have already attempted coups-imbedded in the military or even the security sys-
tem. In this case, the leadership is bound to be Arab sunni, and a key issue is
whether such a leader will be willing or able to go beyond clan politics; whether we
will simply get another clan in power; and above all, whether such a change will
be acceptable to the non-sunni population and the urban, educated middle class that
functions outside the clan system.
The Institutions of State
The second pillar of the regime rests on the institutions of state: the Ba'th Party,
the various components of the military, the bureaucracy and the educational estab-
lishment. These are recruited from a broader base and include both shi'ah and
Kurds as well as other communities. At secondary levels, these institutions are peo-
pled by educated professionals; they constitute the ahl al-khibrah (the people with
expertise) or the technocrats. Some are potential pools of future leadership.
The Economic Elite
The third pillar of the regime is the economic elite, often referred to as an eco-
nomic “mafia”. It is a product of the state's control over oil and other resources,
which it distributes through a patronage system, controlled by Saddam's family and
clan. But the largesse is spread into all communities, tying important Kurdish,
shi'ah, and sunni elements to the regime. Most are contractors who owed their
wealth to government patronage; a smaller number are industrialists. While this
group can provide the support, the contacts and some of the know-how to revive the
economy, it cannot be expected to provide alternative political leadership. In fact,
it is not a true private sector independent of the state. Indeed, one of the best
changes that could be introduced would be to separate this economic class from the
state, and to move toward the creation of a true, and more independent, private sec-
tor.
This brief survey on what we can expect in Iraq the day after, leads to the fol-
lowing conclusions, albeit tentative:
• In the past decade, Iraq's sense of national identity has eroded, but it has not
disappeared. Kurdish aspirations for self government, shi'ah self-awareness and
even Arab sunni identity have increased. In any new political order, few Iraqis
will be willing to tolerate a continuance of rule by a narrowly based Arab sunni
minority, like the present regime. The good news is that after years of repres-
sion, Iraqis are ready for change; they seek preservation of their state and its
future development as a nation. However, they have had no experience of de-
mocracy; only of a mukhabarat (secret police) state, which has created distrust,
corruption and bitterness among communities. The building blocks of democracy
will have to be created, including a reorientation of attitudes and practices, and
this will take time.
2 Jabbar. Op. cit., p.6.


176
• Without firm authority at helm the “day after", and a clear enunciation of fu-
ture constitutional procedures pointing to new directions, retribution and a
struggle for power are likely in the short term. Erosion of the central authority
could, in a worst case scenario, allow parochial interests to emerge in the north
and the south. This will induce meddling and interference from neighbors, most
likely Iran and Turkey.
• Providing alternative political leadership, and the process by which it is in-
stalled, is the most critical and difficult problem faced by the US as an outside
power.
• A "coup” or change of government from within-absent US forces on the
ground-is the scenario most likely to be destabilizing. While this is the least
expensive option for the US in terms of troops and political investment, it could
lead to a struggle for power in Baghdad and the erosion of central control, and
a gradual “break down” of national unity. Inside leadership is most likely to
move against Saddam if it decides the US is serious about occupation but it will
need US support to prevent fracturing.
• If the US is unsure of the new leadership or unsatisfied because it appears too
close to the previous regime, a period of probing and exploration could ensue,
during which the US will have to make demands before providing support and
recognition. In the interim the US could lose control of the situation. Identifying
potential inside leaders and making US requirements clear and public, before
hand, would help avoid this slippery slope.
Introducing the outside opposition as alternative leadership would produce the
most change inside Iraq in the direction the US desires. But this is the most
difficult and most costly option. This opposition lacks clear indigenous support;
the US would have to be prepared to install and support this opposition with
troops, over a considerable period of time.
• If the US finds itself in occupation of Iraq, it will have the best opportunity,
in the short term, to provide law and order, prevent retribution; and begin the
processes by which Iraqis (both those outside and those inside) can refashion
their political system and move toward democratic reforms. Most Iraqis would
welcome that prospect, but it represents an expensive, long term commitment
by the US over several years, and some troops on the ground, preferable in con-
junction with allies. And before too long, if the US is not careful, it will be
viewed as a foreign occupier by those inside and outside. Thus, the institution
of new leadership and the procedures for establishing a new government, need
to be fairly expeditious. After a short period (six months) a US-even and inter-
national presence—could be greatly reduced. Nonetheless, if the US is deter-
mined to replace the regime, it is better that it take a firm hand in the begin-
ning to help in providing the building blocs for a new, more democratic regime;
support its efforts; and plan to keep some forces and a strong advisory team
in place to assure the new regime gets a solid footing.
• Among the steps needed will be:
Removal of the security system and the training of a new police force.
Establishing a new system ofjustice.
Re-education and redirection of the bureaucracy.
Assembly of a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution.
Developing the building blocks of civil society (a free press, civic Institu-
tions, reform of education).
• Iraq has a military and a bureaucracy on which the US can rely to provide de-
fense and help develop the country, but as this list of tasks indicates, it will
require considerable effort to reorganize and reshape Iraq's institutions in the
desired direction. This is no small, or short term task. If the US is going to take
the responsibility for removing the current leadership, it should assume that it
cannot get the results it wants “on the cheap". It must be prepared to devote
some troops on the ground, advisors to help create new institutions, and above
all time and effort in the future to see the project through to a satisfactory end.


178
staff is actually the last to leave. And, second, you have to be the
one at the hearing.
Ms. FRANCKE. Well, it's very good of you.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I enjoyed it.
Ms. FRANCKE. Thank you for this particular panel, because, very
sadly, my impression is that not enough thinking has been going
on in Washington, to date, about the issue of the day after. It ap-
pears, from the press, that there's a great deal of thinking going
on about military operations, but what to do after is not thought
about much. And whether it is a question of lack of interest or lack
of people, I don't quite know, but I think this situation has to be
remedied, and remedied quickly.
I'm an Iraqi-American, and my ambition is to see my native Iraq
free and that there are good relations between Iraq and the United
States. This is what I fervently hope for.
In the event of a military campaign to remove the regime of Sad-
dam Hussein, the United States will have a unique opportunity to
influence the political outcome in Iraq in a way that is good for
Iraq, good for the region, and good for the United States. I might
say that the United States will not have had such an opportunity
since the end of World War II. This will be probably the first time
that the United States will really be able to have leverage. I would
like this leverage to be for the good.
I have spoken to Iraqis over the past 10 years. It is my business
to speak to Iraqis every day. And there is a unanimous desire for
pluralism, representation, participation, accountability in govern-
ment-in short, all the things that we call democracy. The United
States should seize this opportunity in the event of the removal of
the regime to press for sweeping change of the political system and
a new foundation for democracy in Iraq.
I would like to say, at this point, that the subject of Afghanistan
was mentioned earlier today, and I would not like to see Afghani-
stan as a model, by which I mean—and to put it crudely, and you'll
excuse me I do not think we should have a hit-and-run operation
in Iraq.
Historically, Iraq has set the tone for the Middle East, and Iraq's
future political shape will affect the region either in a positive or
a negative direction. Intervention and regime change should not be
the beginning of U.S. commitment to assist and support Iraqis, but
should be the beginning of a commitment toward nation building
in Iraq. And U.S. involvement should be sustained. I do not mean,
necessarily, just a military involvement, but at all levels. The U.S.
commitment to see Iraq through this difficult period should be
made up front and should be held to.
The day following a regime change in Iraq will be largely deter-
mined by the message the United States sends to the Iraqis now,
before military action, about U.S. intentions and about U.S. vision
for Iraq. I have to tell you, Iraqis desperately want to be free of
Saddam Hussein, and they also know that the only country that
can help them with this is the United States. And they are ready
to welcome the United States as liberators.
But equally because of the history of the gulf war and because
of its aftermath and because Iraqis believe that the United States


179
abandoned them, in 1991 and later, there is, unfortunately, a def-
icit of trust among Iraqis of U.S. intentions.
I have spoken to Iraqis who were in Iraq only in the past few
months. They are apprehensive. First of all, they understand that
there is a real likelihood of the United States conducting a military
campaign in Iraq with the purpose of changing the regime. And I
can tell you many Iraqis that I've spoken to have said that regime
change is often discussed in Baghdad as a likely possibility. But
they're apprehensive about the destructiveness of the war that will
come, and they are apprehensive about what the United States will
do after the regime is gone.
We must make clear that the United States comes to Iraq as a
friend and not as an occupier, and that the United States will help
Iraqis rebuild the country from the devastation of 20 years of war.
Mr. Chairman, what is likely to happen on the day after, specifi-
cally? First, we will not have a civil war in Iraq. This is contrary
to Iraqi history, and Iraq has not had history of communal conflict
as there has been in the Balkans or in Afghanistan. Second, I
would agree with Dr. Marr, Iraq will not fall apart and will not be
dismembered. The Kurds have spared no words or effort in explain-
ing and stressing that they want to remain part of Iraq. The Shia,
far from wishing to secede, see themselves as quintessential Iraqi
patriots. But what both of these groups want is a bigger role in
Iraq, a bigger role in Baghdad and in the center of government, not
separation from Iraq.
Third, provided the United States has put forth a reassuring
message, Iraqis will join U.S. forces in dismantling the regime, and
Iraqi military forces, in particular, will defect and cooperate with
U.S. troops. There will be a measure of confusion, but I do not be-
lieve that there will be chaos. And particularly, there will not be
chaos in those parts of Iraq where there are American troops.
I do believe, by the way, that there is a very likely chance of an
11th-hour military coup. Once military officers and army generals
are aware that the U.S. troops are, in fact, in Iraq and they are
advancing on Baghdad and that the intention is, in fact, to remove
the regime, there is a very strong likelihood that some group of
army officers will stage a coup.
Fourth, the humanitarian situation will deteriorate badly be-
cause of war casualties, population displacement, the disruption of
systems of distribution of food and medical resources.
Fifth, the system of public security will break down because
there will be no functioning police force, no civil service, and no jus-
tice system.
Sixth, there will be a vacuum of political authority and adminis-
trative authority. Surviving senior officials from the old regime will
have fled or will remain in hiding. Meanwhile, military officers who
have cooperated with U.S. forces will be vying for recognition and
privilege from the United States. The United States must be very
cautious about who it gives authority to in this situation of a vacu-
um.
This is on the very first day after the regime change. But within
a few weeks, there will be other problems that will emerge. One,
there will be a need to eradicate the remnants of the old regime.
There will be a need to develop the administrative structure and


180
institutions of Iraq. The infrastructure of vital sectors will have to
be restored. An adequate police force must be trained and equipped
as quickly as possible. And the economy will have to be jump-start-
ed from, not only stagnation, but devastation.
In other words, a very large number of U.S. and international ci-
vilian groups will be needed alongside any military troops that are
in Iraq—not only from the United States, but from the European
Union, from the United Nations, from the NGO community. There
will be a great need for expertise and resources to build Iraq, and
this has to happen quickly, not on day one, but perhaps on week
five or week six or week seven. But, no matter how many troops
and civilians there are, there will be a dire need for Iraqi participa-
tion in this effort. I believe an Iraqi partnership is indispensable,
both for political and for practical reasons.
Therefore, who are the likely candidates for an Iraqi partnership
with the United States? And, for a further question, who are the
successors to Saddam's regime who might emerge from this part-
nership?
Again, I agree with Dr. Marr, that after 30 years of repression,
there is no political life in Iraq outside Saddam's leadership and
Saddam's family. The urban middle class's professionals and Intel-
ligentsia have been crushed, and it is unlikely that on day one or
week one a new leadership will emerge from outside this tight cir-
cle of existing power now.
I believe that, in the aftermath, there will be, in fact, two circles
that might emerge as possible—or who will certainly clamor for
partnership with the United States. The first circle, of course, is
the military officers, the defected military officers who will have co-
operated with the United States. And the second circle will be the
Sunni provincial clans of central Iraq.
But, as I explain in my written statement more thoroughly, there
is almost a total overlap between these two circles. The Sunni clans
of central Iraq were the power base that Saddam used. And, in
fact, they supplied the manpower to, not only the military, but the
military and the security apparatus of the states. And so to talk
about a separation between this clan system and the military secu-
rity complex is, in a way, a false differentiation.
The military security complex identification with the clan system
of central Iraq was precisely the model that Saddam Hussein used
for his regime. And the question is, if we actually choose our part-
ners from these two circles, we will be replicating the model that
was used by Saddam Hussein.
I should also mention the Ba'th party, because there is a notion
that perhaps the Ba'th party could come up with potential leader-
ship. I do not believe there is such a thing as a functioning Ba'th
party in Iraq. It's been eviscerated. It was never a good institution,
in any case, and it was a chauvinistic ultra-nationalist institution.
But, even so, the regional commander of the Ba'th party really is
a tool and instrument for Saddam Hussein. And without Saddam,
there is no such thing. We are not likely to see a leadership emerge
from that.
In the confusion of the first few weeks, there will be a great deal
of temptation for the United States to rely on military army gen-
erals and perhaps this clan system. And I want to suggest why this


182
I am not, by any means, suggesting that this opposition can be
the whole story of Iraq's-
The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, would you say that again, please,
about taking administrative —I didn't catch the first part of
your-
Ms. FRANCKE. I'm saying that this nuclear political structure
should be prepared and enabled to take charge of immediate ad-
ministrative and management needs of the country.
The CHAIRMAN. Can you explain what you mean by prepared and
enabled?
Ms. FRANCKE. Would you like me to explain now or when I'm
done?
The CHAIRMAN. Whenever it's convenient for you. Whenever you
think it fits best in your statement.
Ms. FRANCKE. If I may at least finish this paragraph?
The CHAIRMAN. Please.
Ms. FRANCKE. I am not suggesting, by any means, that this oppo-
sition can be the whole of Iraq's political structure. Quite the con-
trary, it should form no more than an open circle to be augmented
and completed as leaders emerge within Iraq in the months after
regime change. Without such a partnership, and without such a
partnership being built right now or beginning right now, the
United States is likely to find itself with no civilian framework to
rely on in Iraq for a long period of time.
Mr. Chairman, my idea for an administrative and management
structure is that the Iraqi groups in the opposition have to be able
to come into Iraq with U.S. troops and at least put together the
remnants of the civil service in Iraq, come in with perhaps a core
group of people who are trained in policing by the United States
so that this core group can go into Iraq and work with the rem-
nants of the police force. In other words—and also, by the way, be
in charge, or at least create a sort of an overall structure for man-
aging humanitarian services, because
The CHAIRMAN. Can I say it another way to make sure that I un-
derstand it? Because the Iraqi National Congress coming to see me
not long ago—and I apologize to my colleagues for the interruption,
but I hope this is clarifying, not disruptive—made the same state-
ment to me that you've just made.
If I can give an example so that I—to see if I understand it, as-
sume American forces went in. You are suggesting that the U.S.
Government work with members of the Iraqi National Congress
here in the United States or-
Ms. FRANCKE. The Iraqi opposition.
The CHAIRMAN. The Iraqi—well, OK, there are several different
opposition groups. They don't fit into your little scheme, all of
them, but let's assume, whatever it is, that we essentially come in
with a police commissioner who is an Iraqi from abroad in the Di-
aspora. We essentially come in with a water commissioner. We es-
sentially come in with a commissioner—think about running the
city of Chicago—you know, we come in with someone to run the
Department of Public Works, someone to come in—so we have in
a sense, what you're suggesting is as we come in, instead of hav-
ing—in addition to NGOs, in addition to American civilians who
are helping set up the infrastructure or maintain it, you're sug-


184
3. To the extent that the United States declares itself for democracy, and not
merely change, in Iraq, it will gain the trust and cooperation of the Iraqi people.
Once the regime of Saddam Hussein is removed from power, there will be a his-
toric opportunity to remake Iraq out of the ashes of 30 years of brutality, domestic
and foreign wars, nightmare weapons, and economic collapse. But this requires a
commitment from the United States and the international community to a process
of nation-building in Iraq. The commitment should not be of a purely military na-
ture—it is just as important civilian, institutional, and economic, but it must be sus-
tained.
The situation on the day after
It is impossible to predict with precision what will happen on the day after the
overthrow of the Iraqi regime, what some are calling D-Day-plus-one. Nevertheless,
certain factors will derive the situation in the country:
First, Iraqis will welcome the United States as the liberator, and many will join
U.S. forces in dismantling the regime's edifice. Iraqi military officers, once they are
certain of the regime's demise, will want to show that they too are on board, and
will defect with their troops. But the welcome will be coupled with a sense of appre-
hension and expectation: What will the Americans do, and what do they intend for
Iraq? It is essential to assure Iraqis that the United States come to Iraq as a lib-
erator and friend, and not as occupying force, and that the United States bears the
message of freedom and democracy.
Second, the humanitarian crisis will become acute, as the disruption of distribu-
tion systems, population displacements and destroyed infrastructure leave people
without access to food, water, and medical resources. There will be civilian casual-
ties to take care of at a time when hospitals, roads and electricity are unavailable.
Oil production may be interrupted for weeks, causing shortages inside Iraq and af-
fecting the international energy markets.
Third, the system of law and order will break down, endangering public safety
and putting people at risk of personal reprisals. There will be no police force, no
justice system, no civil service and no accountability. In this confusion, people will
be inclined to take justice into their own hands.
Fourth, there will be a vacuum of authority and an intense jockeying for power.
Senior officials who fear retribution will take flight or remain in hiding. Others, in-
cluding military officers, clan leaders, mid-level civilian officials, and scattered rem-
nants of the old regime will vie for positions, and will want to ingratiate themselves
with the U.S. forces to obtain political recognition and secure a role in the after-
math.
Fifth, several of Iraq's neighbors may attempt to influence the process of change
and to pre-position themselves to take advantage of the outcome.
It is equally important to know what will not happen, and to dispel some common
myths about Iraq. One myth is that Iraq will break apart into mini-states, that the
Kurds and the Shi'a will secede, and that parts of Iraq will be taken over by, or
join, Turkey and Iran. This myth was spun in 1991 principally to keep Saddam
Hussein in power and indeed Saddam may be the biggest perpetrator of this false-
hood. Iraq will not split apart. Iraqi Kurds have spared no effort or words to reas-
sure the world that they see themselves as part of Iraq and have no intention of
seeking independence. The Shi’a identify themselves as quintessentially Iraqi, as
Iraqis first and everything else second. All Iraqi groups have publicly committed
themselves to the territorial unity and integrity of a future democratic Iraq.
A second myth that needs debunking is that Iraq will irrupt in civil war. Iraq has
never had a civil war on the Balkan or Afghan model. With the exception of sporadic
Kurdish conflict in the mid 1990s, inter-communal fighting among Iraqis is virtually
non-existent in Iraqi history. The established pattern in Iraq is for the government
to oppress communities and individuals, and for communities to retaliate against
the government, and not against each other. Furthermore, there is no tradition of
warlords and armed private militias in Iraq's history, as there was in Afghanistan
or in Lebanon. To anticipate civil war in Iraq is to ignore or misrepresent modern
Iraqi history.
For 30 years, Saddam Hussein's regime has inflicted wounds on the Iraqi people.
Saddam has been liberal and equitable in his oppression. It is not only the Kurds
and the Shi'a who have been persecuted; Iraqis from all social and political groups
have suffered injustice and disenfranchisement. Iraq's urban middle classes, its pro-
fessionals and intelligentsia, have been crushed, and no forms of civil society exist
in Iraq. All these groups, and every individual Iraqi, seek restitution, recognition
and participation in a new political order after the fall of Saddam Hussein. There
is an overwhelming desire for freedom among Iraqis. They want justice, representa-
tion, accountable government, freedom from fear, freedom to speak out, and security


185
for themselves and their families from the thugs of a lawless state. Iraqis want ev-
erything that is summed up in the single word democracy.
First priorities
Iraq will need everything in a post-Saddam period, and the United States must
be willing to accept a nation-building role, assisted by other countries and national
and international organizations. In some respects, Afghanistan is a case study in
what not to do. The United States cannot take the path of least resistance and re-
gard Iraq exclusively as a military campaign, to be quickly wrapped up. For both
Iraqis and the United States, this must be a fight not just against Iraq's past, but
also for its future.
The immediate, day one, priorities in Iraq will be:
(a) restoring law and order and preventing vigilantism,
(b) addressing humanitarian needs, and
(c) dismantling the old regime's weapons of mass destruction.
In a slightly longer time-frame of no more than a few weeks, there will be addi-
tional priorities:
(a) eradicating the remnants of old regime institutions, including the several
security and paramilitaly organizations created to safeguard the regime,
(b) ensuring the capture of leaders of the old regime, with the expectation of
indictment and prosecution,
(c) restoring the infrastructure of vital economic sectors,
(d) training an Iraqi police force,
(e) restructuring the civil service, and
(f) kick-starting the economy.
These tasks will present formidable challenges of manpower, organization and
command responsibility. With the collapse of the institutions of the old regime, the
civil service and the police force necessary for dealing with emerging crises will be
dysfunctional. For a country of 22 million, tens of thousands of people have to be
mobilized to carry out the functions of distribution, communication, management
and law enforcement. The old security apparatus of Saddam's regime must be neu-
tralized and put out of commission. In its place, an adequate police force will have
to be trained or re-trained. The old power structure that ran the country can no
longer be allowed to continue, and the civil service will have to be reconstituted
under new authority. There should be preparations of the prosecution of leaders of
the old regime.
The Iraqi economy has been devastated, and Iraqis have lived in deprivation for
the past 12 years. Per capita gross domestic product in Iraq is estimated between
$1,500-2,500 per year, having dropped from over $15,000 in 1990. In moderately de-
veloped countries, this figure is $25,000. An important task for the U.S. from the
start is to regenerate the Iraqi economy, create employment opportunities and pro-
vide a visible improvement in the standard of living as quickly as possible. To this
end, the United States should announce a Marshall Plan for Iraq even before the
fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, and proceed to put it in place once there is a
change of regime as an inseparable part of the reconstruction of Iraq. This is the
single most important gesture of good will that the United States can offer, and will
win the trust of Iraqis desperate for economic relief.
The United States must take a major role in addressing these immediate and me-
dium-term needs. The United States will have troops at hand, but will also need
a large contingent of civilians both from the United States and other countries who
are experienced in crisis situations and institution-building. With the passage of
time it will be vitally important for Iraqis to perceive the United States as a benign
presence, a problem-solver and guardian of their interests, rather than merely as
a military police.
Still, no matter how many American and foreign troops and civilians enter Iraq,
Iraqi participation will be indispensable and decisive. For political and practical con-
siderations, the United States will need to work with an Iraqi structure of authority
to meet public security and humanitarian emergencies effectively. Therefore, the US
should not allow an Iraqi vacuum of authority to endure, but must ensure that an
Iraqi governing structure emerges rapidly. By necessity, the US will have to identify
and deal with Iraqis who can step in to manage the country in partnership with
the United States, its allies and international organizations. The sooner the United
States identifies its Iraqi partners, the easier it will be to deal with the challenges
of the day after. Who can the Unites States turn to in Iraq?


186
Traditional options for succession
The United States will have the responsibility of determining which Iraqi part-
ners it can work with, and who can best govern and administer the country through
a transition period. The choices that the US makes will reflect several factors: how
well the US understands Iraqi political society; what the US thinks about Iraq's fu-
ture and the future of the Middle East; how the US calculates its long term inter-
ests in the region; and how strong a commitment the US is prepared to make to-
wards helping Iraqis build their future.
In the months following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, the options
for leadership within Iraq will be limited. After 30 years of repression, execution or
flight of political figures, indeed the cessation of all political life in the country,
there will be no political parties or prominent leaders outside the perimeter of the
old regime. Inside Iraq today there are only two circles of power which see them-
selves as candidates for succession: the military/security complex and the provincial
clans of central Iraq who supply manpower to this military/security complex and
have been co-opted and exploited by Saddam Hussein for his own ends. The fact is
that the extensive overlap between the two circles makes them almost identical. The
Ba'th party is a hollow and compromised institution reviled by Iraqis. Without Sad-
dam Hussein, it has no authority and no credible candidates can step forward from
its ranks. As a result, in the immediate period after regime change, and for many
months after, few visible and credible candidates for political leadership will emerge
from within Iraq.
Once US forces enter Iraq with the explicit aim of removing the regime of Saddam
Hussein, Iraqi troops will defect and cooperate with the United States. In the ensu-
ing confusion, it is probable that a general or group of generals will stage an 11th
hour coup against Saddam Hussein, giving them an immediate claim to political
leadership. At this point, the US can choose the easy and quick way out of Iraq by
installing in power the group of generals, and consider its task done, more or less.
The United States must resist falling into this trap. Replacing the regime of Sad-
dam Hussein with a military regime means a continuation of exclusionary politics
and repression, a return to zero-sum game politics practiced by Saddam Hussein.
A military government will be divisive for the country and lead to conflict, even to
raising the specter of Iraq's dismemberment. For a start, most of the Iraqi generals
who have achieved a degree of seniority will be vulnerable to charges of committing
war crimes and crimes against humanity, whether against the Kurds in the 80s, in
Kuwait in 1990-91, or against the uprising in 1991. Moreover, the military is heav-
ily dependent on the clans of central Iraq, and, absent Saddam Hussein and his
family, these clans have no acknowledged hierarchy. Each believes it is the rightful
heir to power in Iraq, and none is ready to grant loyalty to any other. Competition
for supremacy will be fierce. With access to weaponry and a kinship network
through Iraq's armed forces, these clans may well become the future warlords of
Iraq, setting in motion a string of successive military coups as they fight for political
control.
Long disenfranchised Iraqis, hoping for representation and inclusion, will simply
rebel against a military government, discontent will gather momentum and invite
foreign intervention. To maintain control, a military government in Iraq will have
to resort to the tactics of Saddam Hussein, using military means and repression to
quell opposition and challenges. The inexorable logic of militarism and violence as
a tool to gain and stay in power will take hold of Iraq yet again. This will not serve
Iraq or the United States well, and the negative repercussions will resonate
throughout the region.
Founding a new order in Iraq
The view, unfortunately popular in the West, that Iraq should be governed by
military and tribal strongmen, is a regressive (not to say racist) view that takes us
back to the 1920s and ignores political and social developments in Iraq over the past
80 years. It condemns Iraq to live under an authoritarian, militarist system that
has brought Iraqis nothing but disaster. By extension it also condemns the whole
Arab world to archaic political autocracies that have turned the Middle East into
an economically and socially stagnant swamp. At a time when the U.S. is calling
for accountable government and representation in other parts of the Middle East,
there is no better place to start than in Iraq, where the US will have the best oppor-
tunity of showing that it will practice what it preaches.
Another common error is to look at Iraq solely through the prism of ethnicities
and religion. From this perspective, Iraq is divided into Kurds, Sunnis, Shi'a,
Turkomans and Assyrians, as if these groups were static, homogeneous and uni-di-
mensional. This is only half true. For within these broad and simplified categories
is a richer reality of multiple constituencies within each of these groups, often deter-


189
the growth. And, of course, the political situation is a constraint-
is a general constraint on all these things.
So what is actually needed to be done? In order to grow, you
need to do certain things immediately and, as you say, the day
after, but immediately and in the very short term. And in order,
actually, for Iraq—and I'm going to read part of things which i
have done before. For Iraq to resume growth, it must first restore
economic stability and create the conditions to sustain this sta-
bility.
Restoring economic stability. Top priority must be given to rais-
ing the external value of the dinar-of the Iraqi dinar, the national
currency—and controlling high inflation because of the adverse ef-
fects, social and political, consequences of this. In other words, the
immediate priority is to restore microeconomic stability.
If inflation is not reduced, it is likely that political protest will
take place. Repressive measures must not be used to quell those
protests in a new setup. A resolute effort to address that question
of inflation as explained below should help stabilize the situation.
So what is needed in this regard? Basically, what is needed, mo-
bilization of substantial volume of financial resources. This mobili-
zation has two dimensions, international and regional and domes-
tic.
What is needed on the international and the regional level? After
the lifting of the sanctions, Iraq should be allowed to reach or ap-
proach its maximum oil export capacity. Its reentry into the oil
market should be accommodated without adversely affecting the oil
price level. This will require maximum cooperation by OPEC mem-
bers, even though many of them are suffering from budget deficits.
These countries are certainly aware of the suffering Iraqis have
gone through and should also be aware that the economic and po-
litical stability of Iraq will have favorable repercussions on regional
security. Agreement on a new oil production level in Iraq should be
a process of dialog and negotiation with other OPEC members, a
process by which Iraq can reintegrate into the region and the inter-
national community.
Second, a standing should be granted to Iraq on the payment of
debt reparation. Actually, Iraq is not paying its debt now, but, if
conditions arise, probably there will be some questions in order to
pay that debt.
The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, can you tell us if you know what the
total amount of reparations owed is, roughly, by Iraq? In other
words, what is the nature of the debt and reparations you're refer-
ring to, the magnitude, roughly?
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Well, the debt actually is divided in two parts.
I mean, there is actually a debt owed to gulf countries, which is
interest free, and there is also a debt which is to non-gulf creditors.
And, I mean, estimates vary. All the official estimates about this
is actually—an Iraqi statement in 1991 submitted to the United
Nations, which says it's about $42 billion.
The CHAIRMAN. Forty-two billion.
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. But, of course, I mean, because if it is not paid,
it is accumulated.
81-697 D-7


190
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. So reparation, of course, is a different thing. I
mean, they are—the statistics are there, and there is a Web site,
a very good Web site, in—that claims there is about $300 billion.
But, of course, these are verified, and what is paid is very much
less. But the claims are still there.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. So there should be a standstill on these things.
If this is not done, then Iraq may remain in deficit.
While sanctions are currently causing their resource deficit, pay-
ment of debt reparation may later become its principal cause. The
question is, of course, is that even when you lift sanctions and you
get all oil exports back to the country, but there is a payment of
debt reparation, then, of course, there is another leakage in the
economy. Therefore, actually, you might go back to a deficit situa-
tion, and it is the deficit that is causing inflation and causing the
lower value of the dinar. So it's actually a package.
What Iraqis need is lifting of the sanctions coupled with relief
from debt and reparation. Experience shows that high debt-service
payment engender economic instability and fuels inflationary pres-
sure.
Third, the regional and international community should extend
substantial financial assistance to Iraq. This assistance should be
on concessional terms or preferably in the form of grants, would as-
sume particular importance in the event that the reentry of Iraq
into the oil market was only partially accommodated or if there
was actually–no standstill agreement arrived at in terms of debt
reparation.
Those three measures actually are related to the fact that they
are part of financing. They do not relate—they are measures by the
international community. They do not relate to production—to ac-
tual production or trade. A lot of countries, I mean, go to financing
before they start their growth policies and investment policies. And
the situation is no different in Iraq.
So these measures will actually indicate that there is a commit-
ment, and there should be a commitment on serving all these—the
debt problem and the reparation problem. And, of course, the finan-
cial assistance will depend—volume of financial assistance will de-
pend on the extent to which these problems are solved.
I have an estimate here—I mean, the question of financial assist-
ance depends on the deficit of resources. I have, actually, an esti-
mate which—in the next 5 years, the annual deficit could be about
$7 billion-depending on the payment of debt, depending on how
much the country will get in terms of exports.
And, as you know, all these variables are subject to many as-
sumptions. Therefore, this is one of the estimates, and this will in-
dicate how much the international community should actually
make available to Iraq.
But if there is a solution to the other problems, like debt repara-
tion and the reentry of Iraq into the oil market is guaranteed, the
picture would be changed. Therefore, the question of actually nego-
tiation of a question, studying the figures very well—but this is ac-
hrally something of the order of magnitude.


192
The CHAIRMAN. I said good luck.
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Yes, well, I mean, this is actually-it needs to
be—well, that's why I'm mentioning about the reintegration of Iraq
into the oil market and the cooperation from other oil-exporting
countries. Then, of course, the non-oil sector, which is almost the
same level, because it represented about 50 percent of output in
Iraq.
We are talking about a reconstruction bill estimated in a meth-
odological way, not actually the actual way, about $300 billion. But,
of course, this needs actually to be verified on these things.
So the other outlet for the spending of the resources, for a new
program of human development and technological rehabilitation so
that Iraq can abridge the technological gap as far as access to in-
formation technology in concerned. This gap has been caused by
sanctions and government policies which prevents access to infor-
mation, in general. Information technology will be an essential req-
uisite for growth in the next decade.
Of course, when you restore—this, we hope—these measures
should restore economic stability. Then we will have actually-
when we restore the economic stability, we will have to maintain
that stability, and this will depend actually on actions basically by
Iraqis. The first phase action by the international and the regional
community is a phased approach, is a sequenced approach. Is it a
cooperation by the regional and the international community. Now
actually it is basically a proactive policy by Iraqis.
Here in this phase, which is a phase to maintain the economic
stability, is—Iraq should cooperate with OPEC—should initiate co-
operation with OPEC to maintain a stable price level that guaran-
tees good level of revenues but yet doesn't hurt actually the con-
sumers of oil.
In the first phase, we agreed on a standstill, then Iraq should
propose negotiation of the claims, whether it is debt or reparation,
which means actually negotiation with the creditors and negotia-
tion with the U.N. And this, of course, you need a very well-inte-
grated government in order to discuss all these issues.
Then, of course, after you maintain stability, economic stability,
you have the preconditions now and the conditions to resume an
orderly growth. And this, of course, not related to the short term.
And in this case, you have to—in Iraq before—because of the
availability of oil revenues, the government and the authorities
were not actually using and relying on economic policies to mobilize
resources. We are suggesting here the policies first to create sta-
bility, but we are suggesting policies, macroeconomic, like mone-
tary, fiscal, and these things, to mobilize resources for growth.
And in this way the government should rely on macroeconomic
policies, because—in the past, because of the fact that oil revenues
are available if you—the thinking that if there is oil—if there is re-
sources, why should you need policies to mobilize resources? And
this is wrong, because mobilization of resources through policies is
a capacity-building process in Iraq.
And then, on redefining the priorities both in terms of production
structure and ownership. And, of course, here we are suggesting
that Iraq use its agricultural potential. It should concentrate on
human development, it should concentrate on telecommunication


196
many of the state enterprises were sold at book value to the government-linked pri-
vate sector. The strategy governing the reliance on the private sector will have to
be reconsidered and reevaluated with a view to putting efficiency considerations
first.
With respect to the productive structure, the priority should be on human devel-
opment and agriculture. Iraq, at present, is not well placed to reap the benefits of
globalization and meet its challenges without serious efforts to enhance its techno-
logical base in these areas. Development of the agricultural sector should save the
country substantial amounts of foreign exchange, a precious resource in a future
Iraq. In the industrial sector, light industry, especially food processing, should re-
ceive priority because of existing domestic demand and its export potential. Develop-
ment of other sectors should be based on careful market studies that take into ac-
count domestic and foreign demand conditions and existing supply capacities in the
region. The development of these sectors and any other sectors, which can generate
in a short time the required foreign exchange, can also be financed by foreign direct
investment (FDI) by Arab and multinational corporations because domestic re-
sources may not be sufficient for consumption and development purposes. FDI,
which can be undertaken within the development strategy of the country, is a
source of finance and technology. Another source of finance is Iraqis resident
abroad.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, doctor.
Colonel.
STATEMENT OF COL. SCOTT R. FEIL, USA (RET.), EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, ROLE OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER, ASSOCIA-
TION OF THE U.S. ARMY, ARLINGTON, VA
Colonel FEIL. Mr. Chairman, thank you and members of the com-
mittee for providing the opportunity to comment on potential post-
conflict reconstruction efforts in the wake of a U.S.-Iraqi conflict.
While I'm co-directing a project concerned with this issue, jointly
conducted by the Association of the U.S. Army and the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, the views expressed here are
my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the parent orga-
nizations or my colleagues or our commission, which has several
Members of Congress on it.
I have a statement for the record, sir, and I'd like to make a few
brief comments.
The CHAIRMAN. Your statement will be placed in the record.
Colonel FEIL. Thank you, sir.
Any post-conflict reconstruction effort taken in the wake of an
American-led conflict with Iraq will require broad international
support, significant human and material resources, and an unwav-
ering political commitment over time. As you've heard, the United
States has a number of national interests at stake in Iraq that
would require significant and sustained involvement.
First and foremost, the United States must make certain that
Iraq no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or the world. We can-
not tolerate weapons of mass destruction possessed by a regime
that operates outside the bounds of civilized behavior.
Second, the United States must prove its commitment to secur-
ing peace in the region. Iran's perceptions of U.S. objectives and
the reactions to having U.S. forces engaged within both Iran's east-
ern and western neighbors must be seriously considered.
And, third, the Iraq that follows a conflict must be both viable
and capable of self-determined behavior in consonance with gen-
erally accepted norms of international and domestic order. It must
neither be a basket case nor a bully.


197
I think the international community will hold the United States
primarily responsible for the outcome in the post-conflict recon-
struction effort, but we can expect significant international involve-
ment in any post-conflict situation in Iraq. Due to the vacuum ex-
pected to exist at the end of an Iraqi war, the notable centrifugal
tendencies in several regions of the country and the significant eco-
nomic potential which may be realized in the successful reconstruc-
tion of the country, the coordination of international actors is ex-
traordinarily important. The international community should begin
now to implement planning mechanisms and align tasks, actors,
and resources to accomplish this effort. The key tasks should be
clearly delegated to various actors based on their relative compara-
tive advantages. I note that we began to discuss the situation in
Germany and what it would like after the end of World War II be-
ginning as early as 1942.
The United States needs a strategy for Iraq that integrates post-
conflict reconstruction efforts with the political and military cam-
paign to accomplish regime change. U.S. planning efforts should
avoid the false dichotomy of conflict and post-conflict operations,
and our strategy and operational plans must define a seamless pro-
gression of tasks, responsible actors, and the resources applied to
those tasks that accomplish the national objective. The planning for
post-conflict reconstruction must commence now rather than after
hostilities have commenced or, worse, ended.
I think Iraq will need international support in four major areas,
security, governance and participation, justice and reconciliation,
and social and economic well-being. I'd like to provide a little bit
more detail on the security requirements.
First, there are indications, which are arguable, that removal of
the current security forces and apparatus without significant capa-
bilities to immediately replace them may result in reprisal and ret-
ribution killings in Baghdad and other large cities. Public order
and the protection of the populace and the humanitarian relief ef-
fort is paramount in this regard.
A second important aspect of security will be obtaining guaran-
tees from the neighboring states to refrain from trying to control
or unduly influence events in Iraq. This leads to a requirement
that the Shatt al-Arab and the Iraqi oil fields must be protected.
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts will de-
mand special attention. With the Iraqi forces, including their re-
serves, equaling about 700,000 personnel and another 60,000 in the
various security services, disarmament, demobilization, and re-
integration efforts will dwarf anything that we have previously at-
tempted. Iraqi's large and organizationally diverse security forces
will require integration into organizations that are visible, trans-
parent, and responsive to a legitimate government.
And, finally, and one of the most important tasks, control of the
weapons of mass destruction and their facilities associated with
production and storage must be a top priority.
I would propose the following security force, and I posit this in,
U.S. force equivalents, because I think that we will be the “lead
dog in this pen,” Mr. Chairman, and I think that if we get coalition
partners to add to this effort, that is additional capacity that may
allow us to leave or reduce our presence at an earlier rate, but I


198
don't know that it's a substitute for a core American presence in
the country.
The requirements are: providing the core security for the largest
cities, about 10 million in population in the largest eight, which is
about 40 percent of the total population, and the humanitarian ef-
fort; securing the WMD and their associated facilities; patrolling
the Iranian border areas and the Kurdish areas; protecting the
Shatt al-Arab and the oil fields; monitoring the regions of the Ti-
gris, the Euphrates, and the Syrian border; the Tigris and Euphra-
tes contain the bulk of the population; and then conducting an inte-
grated disarmament and demobilization process that is coordinated
with the reintegration efforts.
You've heard my colleague, just previously, talk about the econ-
omy; releasing some several hundred thousand people back into the
economy as a result of a demobilization effort it has to be inte-
grated well with efforts to provide employment and useful things
for idle hands to do; and, last, a reform of the security sector.
These missions place a premium on intelligence, mobility, ma-
neuverability, and boots on the ground, quite honestly. And, there-
fore, I would propose a post-conflict security force of about 75,000
personnel. This does not, as I said, count coalition contributions,
and I would also point out that for many of the things that are
called for in this type of a situation, the United States may be the
only provider of that capability.
I would organize this, and this is a notional sort of force list,
with a corps headquarters—and I think that the entire force has
to have a significant aviation capability so that you can retain your
mobility and with a small number of soldiers—make your presence
felt around the country using a mobility advantage—a corps head-
quarters, two U.S. divisions, one of which I think should be the
101st Airborne Division because of its aviation capability.
The second division is situation-dependent as to whether the
neighbors, especially Iran, are—how their behavior is evaluated. If
the evaluation of their behavior and their attitude toward what
we're doing is relatively complacent, then I think a light division
with more infantry to use within Iraq is probably appropriate. If,
on the other hand, the Iranians are threatening or there is a prob-
lem with the brigade of the Iraqi Diaspora that's coming back into
the country, then perhaps an armor division or a mechanized divi-
sion would be more appropriate to help secure Iraq's eastern bor-
der.
Two U.S. calvary regiments. They have a significant aviation ca-
pability, and they’re organized, trained, and equipped specifically
for a role that would allow them to do border surveillance and pa-
trolling in certain areas.
A corps aviation brigade—once again, to plus-up the aviation. I
think a special operations forces group, an SF group, would be re-
quired initially for securing their weapons of mass destruction, and
then they could transition into what they're also very, very good at,
which is security sector reform and training of a new Iraqi mili-
tary.
A corps Support Command for logistical support, an additional
engineer brigade to help work on the infrastructure, and then 4,000
police monitors. The standard that has been used ever since the


199
end of World War II and is adopted by the UNDP is about one po-
liceman for every 450 to 500 citizens. And then the standard that
we've arrived at in the Balkans is that you have about one monitor
for every ten policemen in order to achieve round-the-clock moni-
toring capability. And so that winds up being about 4,000 inter-
national police monitors, and I would strongly recommend that
those come from the moderate Arab states and those along the
North African littoral that we might be able to encourage to par-
ticipate in this.
There will be a requirement for some limited U.S. Air Force tac-
tical air lift, but I think that that can—a lot of that can be based
in Turkey, Kuwait, and perhaps some of our other partners as time
goes on and we reduce our presence within Iraq.
The total cost of this force once again, based in U.S. equiva-
lents, and there's wide variation in counting-could range up to
about $16 billion for that first year for a force of 75,000 to operate
within Iraq.
And, last, the duration of that force. I think that in the past, we
have probably been a little bit overly optimistic. I think that force
would have to stay within Iraq performing its functions for approxi-
mately a year. As Professor Marr pointed out, a national consti-
tuting process that could take place within 6 months and that was
legitimate might reduce some of that requirement, and we might
be able to begin drawing that force down a little bit earlier. But
I would see a significant force, one above the level of 5,000 people,
with some sort of reduction in that force going on, but I would see
a significant force of about 5,000 people remaining in Iraq for a
good 5 to 6 years.
We would try to reduce that presence consonant with the
progress in developing Iraq's legitimate security sector and also
with progress in the other four areas of reconstruction
or the
other three areas of reconstruction, which are economic and social
well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and partici-
pation.
I have included in my statement, for the record, some policy rec-
ommendations that we've made for those three areas, but I've made
it to the bell, and so, sir, I will now be happy to answer any ques-
tions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Feil follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF COL. SCOTT R. FEIL, CO-DIRECTOR, AUSA/CSIS POST-
CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN IRAQ: STRATEGY AND RESOURCE
CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Any post-conflict reconstruction effort taken in the wake of an American led con-
flict with Iraq will require broad international support, significant human and mate-
rial resources, and an unwavering political commitment over time. The size of the
country, the “tough neighborhood”, the scope of the human needs, and the potential
additional damage to infrastructure combine to make rebuilding Iraq an immense
challenge. The ongoing war against terror inside and outside Afghanistan also com-
plicates the task for the United States, as does Iraq's proximity to the Arab-Israeli
situation, both geographically and conceptually. While the United States may prefer
to de-link actions in these three areas, strategic outcomes result from interaction,


200
and our adversaries and allies have a view which must be considered in planning
and execution.
Past post-conflict reconstruction efforts around the globe can illuminate poten-
tially effective and efficient mechanisms to undertake this challenge. As part of a
larger inquiry into the capacities and gaps that exist in the U.S. ability to respond
to complex emergencies, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction project has developed a
framework to help understand the key challenges to rebuilding a country following
conflict. This paper seeks to distill some of the lessons from previous efforts and
apply them to the case of Iraq, with an emphasis on the security requirements that
must be established as a foundation for integrated efforts to reconstruct capacities
in economic and social well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and
participation. Our goal must be a minimally capable state that can order its internal
and external affairs according to generally accepted norms of behavior.
The United States has a number of national interests at stake in Iraq that would
require significant and sustained involvement over time. First and foremost, the
United States must make certain that Iraq no longer poses a threat to its neighbors
or to the world, either through its military capacity, or through its political and ide-
ological make-up. Weapons of mass destruction coupled with a regime that supports
terrorism cannot be tolerated. Second, having gone to war in Afghanistan, then fol-
lowing with an effort in Iraq, the United States must prove its commitment to se-
curing the peace, not only in those states, but also in the region. In this situation,
Iran's perceptions of U.S. objectives and reactions to having U.S. forces engaged
within Iran's eastern and western neighbors must be considered. Third, the Iraq
that emerges from the conflict must be both viable and capable of self-determined
behavior in consonance with generally accepted norms of international and domestic
order. It must be neither a basket case nor a bully. If the United States and the
international community fail to improve the situation of people living in the region,
many will believe that the United States' war is indeed against Muslims—a conclu-
sion that would have chilling consequences for U.S. interests.
The United States must evaluate its own comparative advantages and allocate
significant resources accordingly. It is absolutely essential that the United States
play a constructive role in a number of areas, not just in the military arena. If the
United States does not definitively debunk the myth that it “destroys but does not
build,” pursuing national interests and maintaining a global system to the benefit
of all will prove progressively more difficult.
STRATEGY
The key to bringing transformative change to Iraq is to establish a sustainable
political process by which various factions develop and continuously refine a com-
mon national agenda. This political constituting process must offer opportunities for
broad and widespread participation of various Iraqi groups at all levels, and must
realistically account for current power realities in the country. The introduction of
the exiled military and political leaders poses significant challenges in the absence
of any viable presence within the country of organized opposition to the current re-
gime. “Vacuum filling” must not be a random process.
The centerpiece of the international strategy to assist in these constituting proc-
esses will be striking the right balance between establishing responsive and effective
central governing institutions and enhancing citizen participation. For the inter-
national community to focus exclusively on one at the expense of the other would
be shortsighted. Whereas international support will pay greatest dividends in the
security and justice sectors when applied to create national institutions, support for
governance and social/economic needs will be required at both the local and national
levels. Decades of war, economic diversion, deprivation and misrule have weakened
the ability of the society to mobilize and develop legitimate political voice. The as-
sisting international community must encourage and develop the capacities for
grass roots political action while supporting and guiding the establishment of a
strong government that can deliver needed goods and services.
REGIONAL STRATEGY
Any strategy for Iraq must be integrated into a broader approach to the Central
Asian and Middle East regions. Iraq's neighbors have their own vital national inter-
ests to pursue—the pursuit of those interests can either contribute to a successful
outcome or provide the centrifugal forces that result in disintegration, additional
conflict, and escalation to a set of regional wars. International attention to Iraq and
its neighbors should be calibrated to maintain strategic balance in the region and
to minimize threats to stability and security emanating from the territory of any
state. Diplomatic initiatives must establish the conditions in on-going regional con-


201
flicts, (Afghanistan and the Arab-Israeli situation) which will not exacerbate the
challenges arising from a conflict and post-conflict reconstruction effort in Iraq. On
the security front, the United States and its friends must support a regional strat-
egy to address the arms flows and political meddling that have undermined social
well-being, good governance, and stability in the region.
Regional planning and cooperation for mutually supportive development has an
important role. Iraq's economic potential, consisting almost exclusively at present of
oil revenues, when properly developed and channeled to investment in productive
sectors, can become an engine of diversification and growth for the region. Given
high debt burdens and severe governance challenges throughout the region, address-
ing economic and political development in both a regional and bilateral context is
imperative.
INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR
Leading an effort to remove the current regime in Iraq will confer special respon-
sibilities upon the United States. In many post-conflict situations arising from eth-
nic/tribal situations or failed state capacity, developing indigenous ownership of the
process and sensitivities to American presence often mitigate against a large U.S.
footprint. The United States thus properly assumes a low profile and limitations on
presence, preferring to support the effort with more indirect methods of financial
and advisory resources. However, the U.S. can expect to be held by the inter-
national, Arab, and Muslim community to persevere in a public way in Iraq. In
some ways reminiscent of post-WWII in Germany and Japan, the U.S. will be ex-
pected to be the lead, visible, and very responsible agent in Iraq.
However, while the international community will hold the U.S. primarily respon-
sible for the outcome, we can expect significant international involvement in any
post-conflict situation in Iraq. Due to the vacuum expected to exist at the end of
an Iraqi war, the notable centrifugal tendencies in several regions of the country,
and the significant economic potential which may be realized in the successful re-
construction of the country, the coordination of international actors is extraor-
dinarily important. Indeed, the dangers and needs will be so great that the inter-
national community should begin now to implement planning mechanisms and align
tasks, actors and resources. Key tasks should be clearly delegated to various actors
based on their comparative advantages, keeping competition among donors to an ab-
solute minimum. We began to discuss the missions, roles and composition of a secu-
rity force for post-war Germany as early as 1942.
A key step to effective coordination will be ensuring a comprehensive, joint assess-
ment of Iraq's needs. This would not only help create a common understanding of
the challenges ahead among donors and potential Iraqi leaders, it would also spare
a traumatized society from a succession of many repetitive and competing assess-
ments. Although a joint assessment would help establish a division of labor with
respect to specific responsibilities, some of the general comparative advantages of
the various donors are already quite evident.
The UN should play a leadership role in three areas in particular: managing sup-
port for the political process in Iraq; overseeing donor coordination efforts; and man-
aging humanitarian assistance programs. On the humanitarian side, UN agencies
such as the World Food Program (WFP), UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), and UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) are already administering and dis-
bursing humanitarian aid flows to vulnerable populations. In addition, UN agencies
such as UNHCR, the World Health Organization (WHO), UNDP, and the Inter-
national Organization for Migration (IOM) have comparative advantages in every-
thing from refugee repatriation, provision of key health services, community based
social and economic development, and integration of the Iraqi diaspora.
Similarly, the World Bank, UNDP, and ADB should provide leadership in the eco-
nomic rejuvenation of Iraq. They are sufficiently resourced and experienced to pro-
vide assistance in the areas of employment generation, infrastructure, and agri-
culture reform that will lay the foundation for trade, investment, and sustainable
economic activity. The World Bank's economic recovery programs should stress good
governance practices in order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally,
the World Bank, in cooperation with the UN special representative of the secretary
general and UNDP, should administer and coordinate reconstruction funds through
the establishment of a multidonor "trust fund,” and should take the lead in ensuring
that oil revenues are managed in such a way as to support reconstruction and legiti-
mate government activities.
In addition to refraining from meddling in internal Iraqi affairs, regional actors
should also be prepared to play a helpful and supportive role by offering diplomatic
and financial assistance for Iraq's emerging political reorientation. On the diplo-


202
matic side, a group, consisting at a minimum of its neighbors (Iran, Turkey, Syria,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait), plus the United States, Russia, the EU, and
Japan, should be assembled to provide political stability in the region, guarantee
Iraq's borders, and prevent spoilers from jeopardizing success. Assistance to regional
actors in dealing with their own internal development needs should be considered
part of the larger vision of post-conflict reconstruction in the region.
Recommendation: The United States must develop and implement a strategy for
Iraq that integrates post-conflict reconstruction efforts with the politico-military
campaign to accomplish regime change. The U.S. must avoid succumbing to the
false dichotomy of conflict and post-conflict operations and the strategy and oper-
ational plans must define a seamless progression of tasks, actors, and resources that
accomplish the national objective. The planning for post-conflict reconstruction must
commence now, rather than after hostilities have commenced, or worse, ended.
SUBSTANTIVE PILLARS OF RECONSTRUCTION
Iraq will need international support in four major areas: (1) security; (2) govern-
ance and participation; (3) justice and reconciliation; and (4) social and economic
well-being. Each need will be analyzed below, with special attention to what the
U.S. role could and should be.
SECURITY
While permanent security institutions are reconstructed, transitional security ar-
rangements will be necessary. The U.S. can expect requirements for a significant
security force to remain in Iraq to continue for some time. Cessation of hostilities
may come at a distinct point in time, or conflict may simply decline in intensity and
geographic scope. In either event, the provision of security by the U.S. and the inter-
national community will be a continuing requirement if the reconstruction effort is
to succeed. Internally, there are indications that removal of the current security
forces, without significant capabilities to immediately replace them, may result in
reprisal and retribution killings in Baghdad and other large cities. The largest cities
of Iraq (Baghdad, Al Basrah, Mosul, Kirkuk, Irbil, As Sulaymaniyah, An Naj if, and
Al Hillah) contain about 40% of the population, with most of the rest also con-
centrated in the Tigris-Euphrates river valley system. This is a population that has
both labored under a repressive regime for decades, but also contains a significant
youth population that has only known one form of government and one leader.
A second important aspect of security will be obtaining guarantees from all neigh-
boring states to refrain from trying to control or unduly influence events in Iraq.
Many of the population centers are close to the Iran-İraq border, scene of dev-
astating war in the 1980s, and Syria and Iraq have had significant security and re-
source differences exacerbated by feuding over the Ba'th Party, whose ideology they
both claim. The Shaat al Arab region and Iraqi oilfields must be protected. Past
Post-Conflict Reconstruction efforts in other countries with regional rivals suggest
that a “lead country” with significant resources, prestige, and acceptable impar-
tiality and objectivity is required to provide “space,” and general direction and co-
ordination for a successful effort.
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts will demand special atten-
tion. The structure of the Iraqi Armed Forces, with units such as the Republican
Guard having political, as well as military functions, requires a plan that can ac-
commodate different types of “soldier," based on security needs at the time. As in
Kosovo, it may be a priority to keep the most potentially active military leadership
in some form of visible unit control, rather than dispersing them back into the popu-
lation. With the Iraqi forces estimated at 400,000+, reserves bringing the total to
700,000, and another 60,000 in various security_services, DDR requirements will
dwarf previous efforts. Many of the regular (non-Republican Guard) forces may cre-
ate minimal demand for disarmament and demobilization-as in the Gulf War they
may simply be “paroled.” However, they will create significant strains on a fragile
economy if transition and reintegration programs are not in place immediately to
process them. The need to create opportunities for learning a new trade, schooling,
and farming will be huge. Ultimately, the success of these efforts will depend on
reestablishing an economy capable of providing a significant number of jobs.
Iraq's large and organizationally diverse security forces will require integration
into organizations that are visible, transparent, and responsible to a legitimate gov-
ernment. Building a national army and responsible internal security forces/police
must be a top priority for the new government during the medium- to long-term.
The control of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the facilities associated
with their production and storage must be a top priority.


203
Recommendations for U.S. Involvement
1. Post-Conflict Security Force:
• Requirements:
• Providing the core security for the largest eight cities, (10 million + popu-
lation) and the humanitarian effort.
• Securing WMD and associated facilities.
• Patrolling the Iranian border areas and the Kurdish areas.
• Securing the Shaat al Arab and major oil fields.
• Monitoring the region of the Tigris and Euphrates and Syrian border.
• Conducting integrated disarmament and demobilization; coordinating with
the reintegration efforts.
• Security Sector Reform.
These missions place a premium on intelligence mobility/maneuverability, and
"on-the-ground" capability.
• Force size: 75,000 personnel (based on missions, terrain, and capabilities and
calculated in U.S. forces. This does not count coalition contributions, some of
which may be used in later phases as off-sets. For many of these capabilities
the U.S. is the sole provider).
• One Corps Headquarters.
• Two U.S. divisions, one of which should be the 101st Airborne Division (Air
Assault). (With a stable Iranian border, the other division could be a light di-
vision. If Iran were to adopt a more threatening posture during the conflict
or after, then a heavy (armored or mechanized infantry division would be the
second). The 101st Division has a significant aviation component.
• Two U.S. Cavalry Regiments, one of which is heavy. These ground units have
large aviation capability and are organized, equipped and trained for recon-
naissance and combat operations that are suited for border operations.
• One Corps Aviation Brigade in addition to the one normally part of the Corps,
Special Operations Forces Group (initially for WMD security, then for DDR/
SSR).
Corps Support Command for logistic support.
• Engineer Brigade.
• 4000 international police monitors. (Predicated on historically proven ratios
of one policeman for every 450 to 500 citizens and one monitor for every 10
policemen).
• Limited USAF tactical airlift.
• Cost: The total cost of such a force is based on a per soldier cost estimate of
$215,000 per year, yielding an annual security cost for the force in country of
approximately $16.2 billion per year. (While there is wide variation in esti-
mating the costs/soldier, Western European nations cost factors are about
$120,000 per soldier per year, and UN forces cost about $103,000 per year).
• Duration: The force would stay in place as described for at least one year. Based
on progress in reconstructing and reforming the security sector and in the other
issue areas of well-being, justice and governance, the force could begin to turn
over functions to either
replacement units from other nations or the UN, or to
the indigenous security force. The duration for a significant, (above 5,000) U.S.
presence in Iraq would be for 5-10 years, based on an estimate of how long it
would take to achieve sustainable reform in the security sector.
2. Reinforcement Capacity: This capacity should be constituted primarily from al-
ready existing forces in the theater, (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and at
sea), and from allies.
3. Iraqi National Army: Among the key challenges for the new government will
be building a well-trained army under unified, civilian control. Although leadership
of the force will have to be carefully balanced along tribal, regional, and religious
lines, the force will also need to recruit a number of young Iraqis who have not par-
ticipated in prior conflicts. The United States and its NATO allies are well posi-
tioned to respond to requests to design, train, and develop this army. Even limited
military assistance programs, such as recently provided in East Timor and Central
European countries (Poland and the Czech Republic) have tremendously shaped the
foundations for legitimate security institutions. Cultural issues will require joint
training with other regional forces, perhaps from Egypt or other North African Mus-
lim nations.
4. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): DDR will stand a
much better chance of success if one single strategy integrates the efforts of the Se-
curity Force, the civilian UN agencies (especially UNDP), the World Bank, IOM, and


204
bilateral donors. A clear division of labor should be agreed on at the earliest possible
opportunity. The United States can and should take a lead in pressing for an inte-
grated DDR strategy. U.S. technical expertise in this area is well developed, and
should be applied in the context of the integrated strategy. The United States
should also be prepared to provide substantial support through financial contribu-
tions in the reintegration phase, a key part of the process that is often insufficiently
supported.
5. Regional Security: Given the volatility of the region and competing agendas of
Iraq's neighbors, the United States should provide leadership and support for re-
gional security measures. A multilateral cooperation council organized by the Orga-
nization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the UN could improve regional
security.
GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION
Given the ethnic and religious cleavages and the historic development of the coun-
try, finding the right balance between centralized authority and local control will
pose an enormous challenge. The ultimate goal will be creating a national Iraqi
identity and a capable, viable state. The international community should work
through local structures, wherever possible to stimulate regional and local participa-
tion in the formation of the future government, as well as to assist in providing
services to the population.
In order to help Iraq move toward a system of good governance and widespread
citizen participation, fundamental questions of the state's relationship to the indi-
vidual, ethnicity, religion, and other states, must be addressed up front. Inter-
national donors must let Iraqis set the agenda and pace for their own future. Espe-
cially during the initial stages, in the absence of indigenous capacity, the inter-
national community must guide the integration and rationalization of interests of
the returning diaspora and the locals who emerge as potential leaders. To foster in-
clusiveness and compromise, however, it must be vigilant about providing support
to constituting processes and rights-based rules.
Recommendations for U.S. Involvement
1. National Constituting Process: The United States should provide political and
financial support to a national constituting process, at both the national and local
levels. Determining the participants and the nature of this effort and how to inte-
grate those who may only be able to join after the current regime is changed, must
be determined now. The United States should also support the work of other bilat-
eral and multilateral organizations in working to revitalize political participation by
all Iraqis.
2. Transitional Administration: In the short run, the interim government will re-
quire immediate support from the international community. The United States
should contribute money on an urgent basis to a UNDP Interim Authority Trust
Fund, and be further prepared to respond to post-conflict Iraqi requests for financial
and technical assistance.
3. Civil Service: Iraq's civil service system must be completely overhauled. This
initiative should start in Iraq's five largest cities and in those offices that deal with
the oil industry. If control is to be wrested from the bureaucracy that has operated
at the behest of and behind the shield of the current regime, the new central gov-
ernment will need support from the international community to begin paying a rea-
sonable number of civil servants. The United States should contribute money to a
trust fund set up by the special representative of the secretary general for this pur-
pose, and should leverage this money to attract other donors as well on a priority
basis. Over 2-4 years the financing of this civil service structure must ultimately
be transferred to the Iraqi government. Revenues will be generated through sale of
oil and the establishment of a transparent trading and customs system.
4. Civil Society: The development of civic associations, independent nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), free media, and religious institutions is absolutely es-
sential. A key part of this will be establishing a "civil society forum," as has been
done in Guatemala and other post-conflict situations. The United States should sup-
port other bi-lateral donor nations' leadership in this process, and should provide
some funding to help seed the initiative. Equally important will be the support
needed to restore technical capacity for national and regional communication.
5. Political Participation: The United States should support citizen participation
through programs that reinforce national values and human rights. Although large-
scale U.S. democracy promotion programs are not feasible, targeted technical sup-
port for legislative strengthening, transparency and other participatory activities


206
terim Iraqi administration to staff judicial and other important rule of law positions
in major cities.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
In addition to the need for immediate humanitarian assistance in the wake of a
conflict, numerous essential issues of economic and social well-being deserve the at-
tention of the international community and the U.S. govermnent, including the
transparency of oil revenues, improvement of the agricultural sector and transpor-
tation networks, education, the role of the diaspora, and human rights.
Oil is the keystone of the Iraqi economy. The PCR effort must re-establish the
oil industry in a manner that contributes to immediate needs and is structured to
provide the revenues and hard currency necessary to sustain long term develop-
ment. Monitoring of production and revenue generation and disbursement will be
required until a legitimate government, acting through a transparent budgetary
process, can execute those tasks. Iraq will need foreign investments to redirect its
trading role in the region and the world, which has been skewed by the effect of
sanctions. Current estimates are that oil exports, under the sanctions regimes re-
duced in 1996 and 1999, have reached about 75 percent of their pre-Gulf War level.
Agricultural markets must be reestablished. Iraq is still a net food importer, and
although per capita food imports have increased with the relaxation of sanctions,
the agricultural sector is still hampered by the sanctions. The establishment of local
food and commodity markets will require the repair and construction of transpor-
tation networks. Significant damage can be expected to the transportation and com-
munications infrastructure and the United States should work with the multilateral
development banks to accelerate and establish now the process to rebuild both sys-
tems. The U.S. may be able to defeat the Iraqi Air Force without doing wholesale
damage to runways at the 100 airfields around the country. This will provide some
capacity to support mobility not only for the security force, but also for humani-
tarian and economic aid.
Education must be a top priority, with focus on several key areas. First, edu-
cational opportunities must be provided as an option to help demobilize and re-
integrate soldiers and security personnel who are released. Second, about half of the
women in Iraq are illiterate and the education system must be expanded to meet
their needs. The United States can help provide means for the large and highly
trained Iraqi diaspora to have access and immigration rights to return to support
reconstruction.
The potential of Iraq's professional diaspora living all over the world must be
tapped to contribute to a strengthening of the socioeconomic sector. The positive ef-
fects of the return of a committed educated and skilled diaspora, such as increased
investment and the opening of trade channels, are needed to reverse the effects of
decades of violent conflict and sanctions. Expecting negative consequences of dias-
pora returns, including reprisals and loss of remittances, is reasonable. These prob-
lems must be taken seriously and mitigated through integration of returnees into
the local communities.
Recommendations for U.S. Involvement
1. Humanitarian Assistance and Repatriation: The United States should continue
to respond in a generous and timely manner to appeals from UN humanitarian
agencies, such as WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP, IOM, and FAO. The U.S. military should help to se-
cure key routes to enable a rapid expansion of emergency aid to the most needy
parts of the country.
2. Employment Generation and Absorptive Capacity: USAID, through the Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Office of Transition Initiatives, should develop
and fund high-impact and visible employment generation projects to jumpstart the
economy, restore social tranquility, and build political momentum. Drawing on re-
cent experience in East Timor and elsewhere, a similarly structured program in Iraq
should utilize U.S. resource capacity and UN managerial oversight while encour-
aging strong local participation in the decision making process.
3. Agriculture and Food Security: The United States should provide significant
support for multilateral initiatives that address both short-term and long-term food
production and rural development needs of Iraq and its neighbors. This support
should be both financial and technical. The activities of international organizations,
NGOs, regional actors, private donors, and indigenous entities should be coordinated
to ensure that local needs are met.
4. Diaspora Engagement: The U.S. government should facilitate investment from,
and the possible return of, the Iraqi diaspora living in the United States. This can


207
be accomplished through supporting existing programs such as UNDP's Transfer of
Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals initiative, and IOM programs, as well as
through offering a variety of protections and guarantees for would-be returnees. Key
among these would be offering visa guarantees for those who may go to Iraq, but
who may wish to return to the United States. Opening a coordination office to le-
gally channel diaspora funds and investments would also facilitate diaspora involve-
ment in the rebuilding process.
5. Social Development: The United States should be prepared to provide assist-
ance to foster long-term social development in areas including health, food security,
social safety nets, HIV/AIDS, gender equity, and the environment, through various
international organizations (e.g., the World Bank, WHO, UNDP, the UN Develop-
ment Fund for Women, the UN Environmental Program).
6. Economic Development: Similarly, the United States should be prepared to pro-
vide technical and expert assistance in economic development areas such as infra-
structure, micro-enterprise loan programs, narcotics control, investment, trade,
banking, regulatory reform, and finance through the World Bank's Economic Recov-
ery Strategy.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND CRITICAL RECOMMENDATIONS
To maximize the effectiveness of U.S. intervention, the above recommendations
must be consistent with the following guiding principles: (1) Iraq's long term needs
and preferences should drive the provision of international resources; (2) whenever
possible, indigenous capacity should be reconstituted; (3) long-term sustainability
must be fostered; (4) U.S. actions should reflect and emphasize U.S. interests; (5)
because reconstruction and development is a long-term and uncertain process, Iraqi
and international expectations must be realistic. In addition to these guiding prin-
ciples, four basic functional recommendations could help frame U.S. government in-
volvement.
• Planning: The United States and the international community should build a
unified, integrated planning process based on an ongoing integrated joint as-
sessment of all post-conflict reconstruction sectors. The findings of the assess-
ment will serve as an essential common analytical baseline for setting priorities
and promoting cooperation between often disparate and disconnected inter-
national and Ŭ.S. actors. This should build on, but not be limited to, an initial
joint assessment done by the U.S. the World Bank, UNDP, and ADB.
• Coordination: New staff structures being implemented in the U.S. Department
of Defense at the regional combat commander level (the Joint Interagency Co-
ordinating Group, JIACG) and for field deployment (the Joint Interagency Task
Force, JIXTF), should be activated as soon as possible within U.S. Central Com-
mand to begin the process of integrating the military plans for the conduct of
the conflict with plans for post-conflict reconstruction. These structures, guided
by the appropriate national level counterparts in the Departments of State and
Defense, and the National Security Council, must work now to integrate the
other agencies of government in that planning process (Department of the
Treasury, Department of Justice, USAID, etc.).
• Predeployment training: The opportunity to conduct training at several levels
should be seized immediately. The SENSE simulation at the Institute for De-
fense Analysis should be scheduled for training and mission rehearsal exercises
in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq. Additionally, the Combat Training
Centers at Fort Irwin, Fort Polk, and in Germany should begin the process of
conducting integrated mission rehearsals that not only replicate combat in like-
ly situations in Iraq, but move units directly from conflict to post-conflict train-
ing, and integrate the range of expected IGOs, NGOs, local people, and other
actors who will influence the accomplishment of the overall mission.
• Funding: The U.S. government should be prepared to provide at least $1 billion
annually to satisfy the reconstruction needs outlined in this paper. Estimates
of the non-security related costs in reconstruction in Afghanistan range from
$15 to $25 billion over the next decade. Iraq, even after a large scale conven-
tional conflict against the United States, would start from a better baseline and
have, in oil reserves, a better resource base to assist in financing reconstruction.
Given U.S. interests and the amount of activity and resources invested in the
war against terrorism, the United States must be willing to provide ongoing as-
sistance to meet both expected and unforeseen needs. The administration
should actively engage the Congress to design a coherent, strategically sound
package of U.S. support for post-conflict reconstruction as part of the larger pol-
icy approach to the region, and this package must be integrated with the plan


208
to prosecute any campaign in Iraq. With an explicit, bipartisan, executive-legis-
lative compact in hand, the United States will be able to more effectively lever-
age an expenditure of blood and treasure and secure its national interests.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me say, colonel, I think it's a very thoughtful
and
very detailed statement.
And my first question to you, as a professional-now obviously
you are not speaking for CSIS, you're not speaking for the military,
but you have had considerable experience in the military in these
planning processes. Do you have any reason to believe that this
kind of detailed planning that you have submitted to us as your-
I'll oversimplify it—your ballpark estimate—it's more than a ball-
park estimate of what would be needed—do you have a sense that,
as we speak right now, in the Pentagon there's someone crunching
similar numbers? Do you think that, at the Pentagon, at this mo-
ment, there is a team—and we have incredibly qualified people
there is a team over there saying to the Secretary, “Look, this is
what we think the bottom-line number is for you, for us, when you
make your recommendation to the President.” Do you think the
planning has gone that far? Do you have any reason to believe
that?
I'm not asking for any access, because you don't have any, to
classified information. I'm just trying to get a sense of where you
think it is.
Colonel FEIL. From my knowledge of the planning processes-
and, sir, I've got to say, you know, once you retire, your access
seems to go up, but your credibility may be suspect, because you
get farther and farther away from things and get staff. I would
have to believe, knowing my colleagues in the military, that people
are taking a look at this effort. I cannot say, with any reason to
be confident at all, that they would necessarily come up with the
same number that I did.
The CHAIRMAN. No, I'm not suggesting that. I'm trying to get a
sense that—one of the things here is—that I discussed privately
with Dr. Marr in my office, was—and others—is us trying to get
a handle on how far along the process is and the detail is in the
administration for—before the President is presented however
many options there are. Were any of us sitting there as President,
we would want to know the answer to these questions.
Colonel FEIL. The formal planning process does call for an annex
to a contingency plan to have a post-conflict sequence of events and
resources and tasks, et cetera. So I would have to assume that in
the generation of the plan for whatever options are out there, that
each one of those options would contain an annex that would have
this type of analysis in it.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, you all approached this from a slightly dif-
ferent perspective, but you all approached it thoughtfully from your
area of expertise and interest as to what would be needed the day
after and in subsequent days. And I would like you, any one of you,
to correct me if I misrepresent what seems to be a consensus that
has emerged on this panel—and others, I might add-and that is
that there—in order for any of the scenarios you all—you individ-
ually suggested are preferable or possible, international support for
the effort is important. And some of you, I think, would argue it's
critical


210
it's on the record—that we're talking about Kurds who are Sunni.
We're talking about Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds are not Arabs.
And we're talking about Shia Arabs. So two out of three of these
regions are Arab. Two out of three are Sunni. But they are not the
same. All Arabs aren't Sunnis.
And the question is, is the religious tie tighter than the ethnic
tie? In other words, in terms of putting together a government that
encompasses, necessarily, all three sectors participating, at least to
the degree that they think their share of participation is commen-
surate with their impact on the country, is there a closer tie be-
tween the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs, because they're both Sunni?
Or is there a more ethnic and cultural tie between the Sunni and
Shia Arabs? And does it—or does it matter? Is it at all relevant?
Dr. MARR. Personally, I think the religious element may be in-
creasing a little bit. But, my own sense is that the ethnic tie, the
Arab and the Kurdish feeling is stronger than the religious ties be-
tween the Sunni Kurds and Sunni Arabs.
But I wish we could get away from regarding the map as control-
ling, because
The CHAIRMAN. I'm not suggesting it is.
Dr. MARR. No. Yes, I realize that. The identity that must be en-
couraged is Iraqi.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand.
Dr. MARR. There is an Iraqi identity. And, to a very large degree,
if it is encouraged by new leadership, these ethnic and sectarian
divisions as ways in which people identify themselves—Arab versus
Kurd, Shia versus Sunni-will be reduced. There will be a better
chance of getting a viable state.
The Kurds are a problem, in a sense, because they do speak a
different language. And the language distinction, I think is, of
course, a very important one.
The CHAIRMAN. I will end with this, because I've gone over my
time, and because I want to get back to the larger question I asked
in the second round or if others don't cover it.
The reason I asked is that the Kurds have another unifying fac-
tor, that they're Kurds. That's also a factor of division. There has
not been a willingness—or the kind of unity one might expect. And
you cannot see this map, but this map is colored. The border of
Iraq ends here as you all know better than I do. This pink color
is where Kurds live people who call themselves Kurds. A whole
bunch of that pink is in Turkey. A significant part of it is in Iran.
Every Kurdish group that has come to see me over the 30 years
I've been a Senator has not talked about Iraq-has talked to me
and others about Kurdistan, about the Kurds. And so can we—and
I'm not being facetious now—can we easily dismiss the notion that
we are seeing, right now, and hearing explained from northern Iraq
as we speak—the newspaper articles, the television programs, and
American television, and American news—where the Kurds are ba-
sically saying—so it's being portrayed—“Whoa, hold up a minute.
This is as good as it's ever gotten for us right now. We essentially
have our autonomous region here in the north, which is doing just
fine. The economy's starting to boom, we're starting to move, no-
body's being shot or killed, things are working out pretty well. So,


211
United States, what do you have in mind here? Explain to us be-
fore you come what our rights are going to be before we get here.”
Now, that's what's being projected. It's really a question rather
than a statement. As an expert in the area, do you believe and
I think I've accurately characterized the essence of the newspaper
and television articles and programs Americans have seen over the
last two, three, 4 weeks as discussion of Iraq has sort of ratcheted
up-does that play any factor that the Kurds, at the moment, think
things are better than they've been at least in the last 20 years,
and maybe are OK? I mean, could you all speak to that for a sec-
ond?
Dr. MARR. I know Rend will want to say something about this.
Yes, it is a factor. I think there's no doubt about it. This is an ongo-
ing factor, which is why I said it's going to be more difficult to inte-
grate the Kurds into a post-Saddam Iraq than it would be other-
wise.
The situation is not bad up there, but without being Cassandra,
I'd like to point out that it's not quite as good as the Kurds may
say. For one thing, they're not unified. The area is split in two, di-
vided between the two main Kurdish parties because they couldn't
agree on a unified government. They cannot maintain their posi-
tion without American support and protection and U.S. mediation
of their disputes. They are not in control of their borders. And,
hence, as I've indicated, the Turks have to keep coming across.
Although I'm not totally informed on the situation, I understand
that on the eastern border with Iran, there's a no-man's land which
the PUK does not control and, from our perspective, is open not
only to Iranian influence, but other outside influences, even ter-
rorist influences. That is precisely the kind of situation that we
don't want.
And even though they like what they have, the Kurds don't have
a future in northern Iraq, and they know it. They have difficulty
in getting the middle class to come back. So the Kurds understand
that, within some framework, they have to stay within Iraq, and
they've said they'd do so.
And, Senator, I would like at some point to send you and your
staffers, a couple of Kurds who may have a little different perspec-
tive.
The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to overstate what I've been told for
the last 30 years.
Dr. MARR. No, I understand. I understand.
The CHAIRMAN. I'm trying to get a sense that basically what
some have suggested to us—not Kurds—some have suggested to us
that in order to make this all work, we're going to have to make
some commitments to the Kurds, but make some commitments to
the Turks, as well.
I'm way over my time. I'll come back to that. Let me yield to Sen-
ator Lugar.
Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Francke, you point out that the Iraqis would welcome the
United States as liberators initially. But then, ominously, in your
second paragraph, the humanitarian crisis will become acute and
the system of law and order will break down, there will be a vacu-
um of authority, intense jockeying for power, and several of the


212
neighbors may attempt to influence the process and preposition
themselves to affect the outcome. That's sort of a logical sequence,
but all pretty dismal.
Both you and Professor Marr have suggested that the identifica-
tion of leadership will be extremely difficult. If it's imposed by the
United States without roots in Iraq it will present a set of difficult
problems. But there's not much experience—in fact, very little ex-
perience with democracy or liberal institutions, and it would be a
difficult time for institution building and all of this.
And all of you, including—Colonel Feil, go into this in much more
detail trying to outline exactly how many American troops and/or
civilian personnel are likely to be required to meet the problems of
law and order, humanitarian distress, general disestablishment in
all of this.
The importance of this hearing is really for this testimony to
begin to sink in. Whether you are accurate to the last paragraph
or not, the fact is that our experience in American foreign policy
in Somalia after Americans were attacked and dragged through the
streets was to get out. That was a debate on the Senate floor-im-
mediate withdrawal, no sense of nation building. In fact, “nation
building,” in quotes, became something we definitely, as a policy,
were not going to be engaged in.
Tremendous debate then when we tried to intervene in Bosnia
with our NATO allies, because this was perceived, once again, as
sort of the thing end of the wedge of nation building. Likewise, the
debate on this in Kosovo.
And, finally, of course, we have some experience in Afghanistan.
It's instructive that, at the time of our military operations in Af-
ghanistan, we simultaneously began preparing an plan what was
going to happen in the future. After, we had a national emergency,
and we moved rapidly. Fortunately, Chairman Karzai was avail-
able, the king was available, a good number of able people used a
lot of agility in trying to think through how the loya jirga could be
supported, and we're still at that point.
But just before the testimony today, as you perceived, we had a
business meeting in which we adopted a very significant resolution
with regard to assistance to Afghanistan-$3.5 billion over 3 years.
Now, that's a fairly modest sum, given what we're talking about
today on Iraq any way you parse the figures. And this is just a bill
coming through the Foreign Relations Committee. It has not
passed the Senate as a whole. The administration may or may not
support such an idea. And, in fact, this appears to be a debate as
to really how extensive American forces, either military or others,
ought to be in Afghanistan. And this is a war in which we have
been engaged, as opposed to one in which we might be engaged.
So I mention all of that to say that as the public focuses on your
testimony through this hearing they will discover this is a very
daunting process. Any way you look at what is being suggested
today, there is enormous expense and commitment of people as
well as treasure for a number of years. And it's one country in the
middle, as we heard yesterday, of a neighborhood of countries that
may, in fact, feel very threatened by democracy if it did evolve in
Iraq, and that democracy won't necessarily prevail all around this


213
new Iraq. And it's not clear to me where the leadership is going
to come from.
Now, some of you have suggested a coalition of forces, and that
makes sense. And, in a way, the Afghan government is based upon
that idea. But it's not clear to most of us who are not scholars in
the politics of Iraq, as you are, as to who conceivably might be in
that coalition.
Now, you can think of various factions and parties and elements.
But physically, do any of you have any idea about personalities-
people, individual leaders—in Iraq now or outside of Iraq that
might, in fact, be a part of a coalition? If you were asked, in the
midst of hostilities with Iraq, who should the United States back
in terms of trying to put together a coalition that might work, that
might be this transition, do any of you know who it is and who has
experience at doing this sort of thing?
And if not, what do we do? In other words, do we try to identify
persons in advance? Do we sort of hope that someone from the mili-
tary or from the Ba'th party or from the opposition to the Ba'th
party or from anybody, people may emerge, identify themselves,
coalesce?
In other words, I don't see how this happens, even though I see
the daunting circumstances that you describe. Can any of you give
an idea as to who physically might offer leadership? Or if you don't
want to name somebody for fear that person would be jeopardized,
can you give some sense of confidence that there are such persons
who might understand democracy, some semblance, finally, of our
foreign-policy objectives, which-after all, we got into this war to
get rid of weapons of mass destruction. Who is going to lead us to
the caves or the laboratories or whatever it is so we can destroy
it, as opposed to somebody in Iraq who says, “Now, I have a second
thought about this. As a matter of fact, Iraq may need some of
those weapons to deal with Iran or to be a great power or what
We will have fought a war to get to these weapons of mass de-
struction, and while we're trying to rehabilitate Iraq, we suddenly
have a government that says, “Iraq first. We're nationalists. And,
as a matter of fact, we want to progress with weapons of mass de-
struction.”
Now, is there anybody in this picture that can give us some hope
that a war is worthwhile if, in fact, our objective is to get rid of
the weapons of mass destruction, in that a government would be
consistent with our policies sufficient to at least achieve that one
basic item of foreign policy. Does anyone want to respond to that?
Dr. Marr.
Dr. MARR. I think Rend has addressed it, and I've tried to ad-
dress that in my written paper. I have to say that I think this is
the most critical unknown in the whole issue. And if we don't have
some good answers to that, we should go back and rethink.
We do know who's available outside. The outside opposition is
clear. They will go all the way in fulfilling our objectives, weapons
of mass destruction and so on. But as has been made perfectly
clear, we have to bring them in militarily. Others may disagree,
but I also believe we have to support them militarily.
have you.


216
circle”—to be augmented, to be added to—as leadership comes from
within Iraq. And I don't want to suggest that we do not—we should
not include in that leadership elements from the army, the mili-
tary, the Sunni clans. Indeed, we should. All I want to guard
against is that all authority and all the power be given to that old
model.
Also in my written paper, I have talked about the responsibilities
of this transition unity government. And certainly—and we have to
have markers, milestones for this transition government. It must
do the following—this, that, and the other. One of the things that
I mention is that it must prepare the ground for a constituent as-
sembly. In fact, it should prepare the ground for its own dissolution
by organizing elections for a constituent assembly, by having a ref-
erendum, by, in fact, then overseeing free and fair elections, and
then getting out and allowing a permanent constitution and a per-
manent government to take place. All of this needs to happen, and
I would like to see this engagement by the United States and by
the international community throughout this process.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by
joining in the high praise for you and, of course, Senator Lugar, not
only for your stamina, which was praised, but for these very
thoughtful hearings. I've been here for all, or at least the majority
of each panel. These are very thoughtfully, well-planned, very im-
portant hearings.
I do want to say on the record that I don't believe these hearings
can replace subsequent hearings when we hear from the adminis-
tration, nor do I think anyone can argue that this can be sufficient
to make it unnecessary to have a full debate on the Senate floor
and a vote on whether to authorize any such action.
I take strong issue with the statements of the minority leader of
the Senate yesterday, who indicated that he thought that the con-
gressional debate apparently would not be necessary, citing, appar-
ently, his belief that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq. Now, that may
well be true, but I have not seen that evidence.
And I believe that Senate Joint Resolution 23, which authorized
the approriate actions we've taken with regard to Afghanistan and
al-Qaeda does not permit an invasion of Iraq without that kind of
evidence.
But having said that, Mr. Chairman, I sincerely believe that
these hearings are an exceptional basis for what Congress should
do, and you've really produced a very fine moment in the history
of this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you, Senator. And I can assure
my—I think my colleague agrees with me these aren't the only
hearings we're going to have.
Senator LUGAR. No.
The CHAIRMAN. This is the beginning of the process. It's not in-
tended to be the end of the process.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd ask the panelists, could you estimate the scope of the humani-
tarian crisis within Iraq that would have to be addressed in the


218
in some of the former Soviet republics to bring people back and
show them how market economy with all its ramifications, works,
so that if you do something to try to reduce unemployment, it
causes a repercussion in another area that you have to balance out.
Linking all the disparate parts and all the capacity that we have
in our government together is really the key to getting a handle on
the cost and bringing together people who can integrate those ef-
forts so that those unforseen circumstances are acknowledged and
accounted for in the plan.
I noticed that the amendment that was proposed today about
doing an assessment in Afghanistan-looking at the transportation
system clearly a combination of what damage existed before, what
damage we did during the campaign. Our assessment could have
been done earlier. We would have a better handle on what the cost
of that is. The idea of bringing together all the disparate players
to address this—the entire issue of a conflict and what comes after
in an integrated, coherent fashion, I think would yield some an-
swers.
And the day after, as opposed to 6 weeks—or 6 months for a con-
stituent assembly and some of the security force implementation
that would take place in weeks, I think that a lot of those things
could begin on the ground immediately if civilian agencies, both
from the U.S. Government and our NGO and international part-
ners, had planning development capacity similar to the military.
My experience in the military—there are 23,000 people in the
Pentagon. That's what those guys do all day. They plan. There are
no parallel organizations-only small little sections that are way
overburdened-in many of the other significant Cabinet agencies
that have a responsibility to bring the resources to bear and inte-
grate their stuff with the military. And so, therefore, the military,
which has standing capacity and a great ability to plan, moves in,
attempts to do the right thing, often does very well, fills the vacu-
um, and then has to be, you know, massaged and part of that fill-
ing of the vacuum is why there's a perception that the military
doesn't like to do these things, because they feel they get sucked
into those sorts of things.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, they do.
Colonel FEIL. And, once again, the costs that I listed, and the
number of troops, clearly with the ability to deploy police monitors,
et cetera, et cetera, you could change the slope of your withdrawal
if civilian agencies were prepared to pick up the execution of those
tasks.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Let me ask—just because my
time's running out, I want to ask you a different type of question.
How realistic is it to believe that Iraq's weapons of mass destruc-
tion and the means to make such weapons can be secured by either
an occupying force or post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi government be-
fore those weapons are moved out of the country?
And part of the question involves thinking about what kinds of
reprisals people close to the Iraqi regime or people close to the
WMD program might expect from a successor government. Are
these people likely to flee out of their own interests? Isn't it likely
that those people will take valuable and dangerous materials as
well as knowledge with them?


219
Colonel FEIL. I hesitate to the committee heard from other wit-
nesses that are probably better qualified than I am to speak to that
specific eventuality, Senator. I would say that you've got a range.
And so I think part—of possible outcomes—part of the initial cam-
paign, and probably—and I have no prior knowledge of this, but
thinking logically, as you point out-clearly, one of our first efforts
has got to be to get a handle on all that stuff and all those people,
and then that cannot be allowed to sort of slip away into the gen-
eral population of Iraq.
It is-in microcosm, much more important task—it has to be a
very tightly focused effort to do that, the same as we would not
allow some of the general officers and some of the other leaders
from some of the clans and the military to just sort of-go through
the demobilization line and then be released into the general popu-
lace. But I think that's got to be a top priority in our plan.
Senator FEINGOLD. Yes. Doctor, if you—if it's all right to have
the doctor answer the question. Do you want to make a comment?
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Well, I would like to come back about to the
question of governing Iraq on these things. And, of course, I mean,
we are Iraqi-we Iraqis, we speak always about the future, about
Iraq and the government and these things. But the question here
is Iraqis are very much aware and cognizant about the fact that
they have really lost a lot of opportunities in terms of simple eco-
nomic development and growth. This is since the beginning of the
1980s and even before. And if they compare this with their poten-
tial, I mean, they realize how much loss they have incurred.
The question here I wanted to allude to is, I don't think, apart
from, actually, the defense—legitimate defensive means, that Iraq
would like to concentrate on the future on things which are a part
from its economic development aspirations. Basically, I mean, they
would like probably to look at a smaller scale, the example of Ger-
many and Japan after the Second World War. And they have the
potential to do that.
This brings me to the question, is—I know that politicians actu-
ally are very much concerned about the government of Iraq, and
the fact that we have to find people that govern Iraq from the
groups that exist. But the question here is actually that Iraq
should give unfortunately to the people, specialists in various
fields, actually, to give higher say to the future development in
Iraq-technocrats in the field of legal system, constitution, health.
I know the I mean, of course, they're one can say that these are,
of course, management, but they have to actually have a stronger
say, and their opinions should be heeded by the politicians in fu-
ture Iraq. This is the only way where all the resources that may
emanate or will emanate to Iraq will be put into economic develop-
ment, which actually we lost in terms of decades the case of this
development and we will have to recoup all these things.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank
you.
Let me followup with a few things, if I may. No. 1, I don't think
any of us should lose sight-even though we didn't ask you to do
this—any of us should lose sight of what the rationale for going
into Iraq is in the first place.


221
because that's—we're costing—we're talking about just the oper-
ation would cost roughly, if we did it alone, $75 billion, if it rep-
licated Desert Storm.
Colonel FEIL Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It doesn't take us quick to get to $100 billion
here, and it doesn't take much, if we do all—doctor, you want us
to do to get us up to a couple of hundred billion dollars.
And so one of the things that brings me—the reason I bother to
say all that is that I think we have to be able to explain what we're
going to do to the American people here. Not what we're to do to
them; what we're going to do and how it will impact on them.
And it may be, in the minds of some, what we're going do “to.”
So that leads me, believe it or not, to this point. I think Senator
Lugar is correct. We need to find a McArthur that's on the outside,
a Thomas Jefferson that's hiding somewhere inside, a new bank ac-
count that we don't have yet, and a degree of tolerance on the part
of the American people that exceeds what we've ever asked any
other people to have. That's kind of the worst-case combination.
But let's set out what, as these hearings go on, are beginning to
emerge in my mind—and as my young daughter would say, we get
a get-out-of-jail-free card in this one, because I'm not sure yet of
this—but why does it not make sense for us to—as much as you
don't like the comparison to—or any references to Afghanistan-
and it is a fundamentally different circumstance, I acknowledge-
why don't we have a Bonn meeting now, essentially, where, pro-
fessor, we get all of the disparate groups outside and smuggle some
of those who are inside out to have the Bonn meeting before the
first American bomb or military person is launched?
Why should we not, or should we, be insisting or asking, cajoling
our allies to be part of that process, as well, now, where we begin
in a much more earnest fashion to identify who we will turn to?
Does that make sense now, if you were—if Senator Lugar were
President and you were his National Security Advisor, would you
be suggesting that to him now, or what would you—what about
that idea—those two ideas, a Bonn now—the equivalent of a
Bonn-you all know what I mean—you all know, but for the public.
After we went into Afghanistan, what we did is, we and our al-
lies gathered together the various warlords, representatives, et
cetera, in Bonn. We kept them there until they hammered out an
interim government. Fortunately, I think, we got a guy named
Karzai, who was able to traverse the differences. He was acceptable
to all, at least in the near term, and we set up a process—they set
up a process for a constituent assembly being elected within a
timeframe, benchmarks, which you're talking about, Ms. Francke
benchmarks that had to occur within a time certain with an inter-
national commitment of dollars, which hasn't been kept, but an
international commitment of dollars to accommodate this interim
government's capacity to move to the next step.
Should we be doing something that detailed now, before we move
on Iraq, assuming the military situation doesn't change drastically
and we don't find tomorrow that he's hoisted a—you know, a
longer-range version of a Scud with a nuclear weapon on tops of
it? I mean, should we be doing that kind of thing now?
81-697 D-8


223
it was left open. It was left open so the loya jirga, in effect, filled
in the pieces here.
But let me just—there's two more questions I wanted to—well,
there's many more, but I have gone beyond what should be your
patience.
Oil. Yesterday, we heard significant testimony—a significant
amount of testimony that if, in the process of dealing-quote/un-
quote, “dealing with Saddam,” we had the acquiescence or coopera-
tion of the Russians, the acquiescence and the cooperation of the
French, that are the two mentioned, that a whole lot of other
things that created problems and dilemma would be marginally or
significantly easier to deal with down the road as we went through
this whole process.
And I raised yesterday, as some of you may have heard, the
question—and it related to reparations, and it related to debt, as
Dr. Al-Shabibi has mentioned—that the Russians believe they are
owed somewhere around $11 billion by the Iraqis, and they assume
that had contracts—they had contracts that they assume are
worth—I've heard various number put on it, but that are in the
range of $30 billion, in terms of contracts to develop and—do you
know where the oil fields are in-mainly in the south, in the Shia
region, I'm told. There's one or some in the north, but the bulk of
it is in the south—and that they believe that this is a contractual
obligation that they have. And they believe—it is a contractual ob-
ligation they have with Saddam—and that they are owed money
from the past.
Now, if, in fact, we were to work out, with the Russians, deal
that said basically—the development of those oil fields, that the
new government—we will insist the new government, whatever it
is, honors those contractual commitments with you and that it be
done in some consortia where you play a significant part or not the
only part. Would that be viewed by the Iraqi people, who are ini-
tially going to embrace us, as a matter of grand larceny, whereby
we, the United States had orchestrated an agreement whereby the
Russians are able to, along with us, I suspect, in consortia, develop
those oil fields?
I realize I'm being very precise. I realize I'm being almost
pendantic about how I'm approaching some of these things. But, at
the end of the day, I've found, whether I'm standing in a Pristina
or Sarajevo or wherever I am, or in Kabul, it gets down to a mili-
tary guy standing with a gun on a corner, a diplomat sitting in a
office, an indigenous person making a demand, and someone hav-
ing to make a decision on things like this.
So what happens? What happens in that—would you think that
a fair thing, doctor, or do you believe that the contractual obliga-
tions of the Russians, for example, is, in fact, null and void, be-
cause made by Saddam, who is already ravaged and raped that
country economically?
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Well, Senator, this is, indeed, a very specific
question. The question, of course, will have to be studied to see
whether it will have to be compared with the Iraqi oil capacity or
whether the two countries should be involved in the development
of the oil sector. And, of course, in my presentation, I put, as one
of my points whereby the resources to be mobilized is that Iraq will


224
have to reach its maximum capacity of oil. Because, you know, Iraq
is one of the countries which actually did not produce a lot of oil,
because a lot of past conflicts and these things. And I think, I
mean, these things will have to be looked at where different coun-
tries, of course, can be evaluated in order to raise the capacity of
Iraq on these things.
I don't know, of course, politically what will be the situation. I
mean, this, of course, will have to be decided. But I think that the
Russian are—if they want—I mean, probably—they want to trade
their debt with their investment, this is another question. I mean,
the question is, of course, there will be a situation where Iraq can
win, if, for example, Iraq can get foreign investments, which actu-
ally brings technology and, at the same time, I mean, the debt is
relieved because the country is allowed to
The CHAIRMAN. I'm not talking about the debt being relieved.
The debt being paid. That's the point they would want. It won't be
relieving the debt. That's the very point I'm making. The Russians
have
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Well, then this-
The CHAIRMAN [continuing). Made it clear they want the debt
paid.
Dr. AL-SHABIBI. Yes. This is a matter of, of course, for negotia-
tion. This is what we call-
The CHAIRMAN. No, see, that's my point, and I'm going to end
with this. It is not a matter of negotiation. It is not a matter of
negotiation. No President of the United States can sit and say, “By
the way, we're going to figure this out after the fact. We're going
to negotiate this after the fact.” If a deal had to be made to get
Russia in, then a deal is a deal, and no one is negotiating it. It's
being imposed. It's being imposed.
My point I'm trying to raise here is that there's a lot of things
that cannot be negotiated. If we wait to negotiate all of these
things, then we find ourselves in a situation where we are impos-
ing upon the parties involved at least a temporary chaos, and little
likelihood of anything happening.
One of the things we found from Bosnia to Kosovo to Afghanistan
is the greater degree you allow the warring factions you were try-
ing to liberate to have a say in the outcome, the less successful it
was, that the closer you came to imposing at the front end, “This
is how it's going to be. We're going to do this if we go the following
way,” we've had the greatest success. To the degree to which we
internationalize and say, “We'll talk about it afterwards,” like we
did in Bosnia, the degree to which they still are not together in
Bosnia-Kosovo is actually further along than Bosnia is, in my
opinion.
But, at any rate, and so I just want—again, this is about going
in with our eyes wide open. I'm not proposing this. I'm trying to
make sure that we understand that there are certain things—the
idea that the United States is going to march into Iraq, save itself
by doing away with the nuclear and chemical and biological weap-
ons, liberate the Iraqi people in the process, stay, to the tune of
tens of billions of dollars a year, until the Iraqi people sort it out
for themselves as to how they want to get things going, and do it
all without having to have-make agreements with the inter-


225
national community before we went in, I think, is not likely to hap-
pen.
It would be nice if it would, but I've gone way over my time.
And—but I can't resist one last question.
What about Iran, what about Turkey, and what about Saudi Ara-
bia, in terms of their reaction to overwhelmingly and primarily
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq? And, at a minimum, a requirement that
a significant—you've all agreed that there's going to be required an
American presence-military presence required, minimum of a
year, for 75,000 to a maximum of 20 years for a whole lot of people.
By the way—that was the argument—yesterday, the argument
was 20 years. I believe that was Mort Halperin who made that ar-
gument, 20 years, and he just happened to be sitting where you're
sitting. I pointed to something in between. And what we're also
told is that the one thing the Iranians are most concerned about
is a permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq. And we're told that
the likelihood that Tehran will make a distinction between whether
we think it's temporary and they think it's permanent is not likely,
that they will presume, if there are large-
And, by the way, as Scott—as the colonel can tell you, if we move
in temporarily with 75,000 people, meaning a year or more, we're
building Bondsteels—we're building—we're building major, major
U.S. military installations in the context of that region of the world
even if we only intend to stay there a year or 18 months or there-
abouts.
And so how is that going to be viewed? You all are familiar with
Bosnia and Kosovo. We have this place called Bondsteel. It's a fort.
It is a base. It is significant. And it sits there. And we invested-
I imagine it's a couple of billion dollars for the whole process. And
this administration, and the last one, has no intention of staying
there permanently, doesn't want to stay there permanently, has no
vital interest to stay there permanently, and yet we still did that.
What happens when you put up a Bondsteel? Do you think the
footprint-we keep talking about the footprint-I mean, that's a
pretty big footprint if we're going to have to have 75,000 people,
even for a year or two in there. There's going to be a footprint. And
if we do what I think Scott is saying-excuse me—the colonel is
saying—and I haven't heard anybody say something fundamentally
different—and that is, what is the mission of those people?
The mission is providing core security for the largest eight cities.
The mission is securing WMD and the facilities. We're going to be
going around looking for them. The mission is patrolling the Ira-
nian border and the Kurdish areas, securing the oil fields, moni-
toring the region of the Tigris and Euphrates along the Syrian bor-
der–because there's a lot of smuggling and a lot of things going
on there—conducting integrated disarmament and demobilization-
which I've never heard anyone suggest we can fail to do—and secu-
rity sector reform. Forget that. It's not like we're going to have a
force sitting outside of Baghdad in one fort. We're going to have
people on the Iranian border, down in the oil fields, up in the Ti-
gris and Euphrates, on the—you know, on the—well, maybe not the
Turkish border.st
We're going to be all over the place. That's a pretty big footprint,
even if it's only for a year. How does that get-and that's my last


226
question-how is that viewed, if it is predominantly American and
even though we announce ahead of time all things working—we're
only going to be there with this kind of footprint for a year or so.
What reaction—what happens in Syria? What happens in Iran? I
mean, what is the—is there any predictable response from those
countries?
Dr. MARR. I would like to take a crack at the gulf. I've been out
in the gulf for the last 5 or 6 months and listening to their views.
And what I'm hearing is that people would like to see a change of
regime if it could be done quickly and easily. Their greatest fear
is that we're going to go in and change the regime and then get
out. They'll be stuck with the follow-on-a mess.
But the kind of presence and bases, that we've heard about today
will certainly arouse anti-American feeling in the area. This feeling
is about the worst I've heard in 40 years, I think it has definite
repercussions on the potential for terrorism.
I assume this presence will be viewed with suspicion by Iran, but
I don't know what Iran can do about that. Frankly, I don't see Iran
playing a major role. Iran might interfere and try to destabilize
Iraq and to do some of the things I suggested with the Shia, and
the Kurds if the presence looks permanent. Instead we should rely
on a reshaped Iraqi military, which would be my way to go. It has
to be retrained; its officer corps has to be somewhat different, but
Iraq does have a military. Its job is to guard the border with Iran
and the border with Syria.
So I would prefer that our presence be pretty substantial initially
because they need to keep things together. How long this visible
presence would have to be there is a question. And any visible
presence of the U.S. military in the region bothers me, because I
think inevitably it does encourage terrorism.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, that's the conundrum the President is
going to have here. All the folks in the region say, “Don't come and
go. Don't come and get out.” And they say, “And by the way, don't
stay.” “Don't come and leave it a mess, but don't come and stay."
And then we leave guys and women wearing uniform sitting there
and saying, "Whoa, what's my job here?”
Anybody think we can come put Humpty Dumpty back together
and get out of there in months? Anybody? Anybody think we can
do it in 1 to 2 years? Anybody think we're in the 3-to-5 year range?
Colonel Feil. Sir, I guess, speaking—as I think I said at the be-
ginning-sort of the benchmark—first of all, referring to the nation
building, as my colleagues have pointed out, Iraq is a nation, so it
is a qualitatively different problem than Afghanistan or putting to-
gether a Bosnia, that sort of thing. The
The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider Germany nation building after
World War II? Or Japan-
Colonel FEIL. There was a German nation there. It-
The CHAIRMAN. I'm not being argumentative.
Colonel FEIL. No, sir. I-
The CHAIRMAN. I want to make sure
Colonel FEIL [continuing). I would not consider that nation build-
ing. I considered that
The CHAIRMAN. Good.


227
Colonel FEIL [continuing). A defeat in a conventional war and a
reconstruction of the civil administration, the governing processes,
and the security sector and the economy, clearly through the Mar-
shall Plan.
The CHAIRMAN. I'm just trying to define the terms.
Colonel FEIL. Absolutely, because there is wide variation. And
each-although we try to draw some generalizations, each case has
its own very significant sort of gradations.
I think that, unfortunately, what we've done in the decade of the
1990s a lot of times is try to look for the 50th percentile, plus one,
and just nudge a process over the edge. And what we've wound up
doing—I hate to say it is, I think, in some instances, is low-ball-
ing that effort. And then you're in the problem of we can't put more
in, because we had a bad experience with that in the 1960s in Viet-
nam.
And so, therefore, we hope and we try to cobble together and
patch something that will get us farther on down the road where
we know, I think—at least I feel—in the depths of our gut, if we
had gone in there hard-or large, I guess-Secretary Perry's state-
ment when we went into Bosnia, “We're going in as the lead dog.
We're the toughest guys on the block. Don't mess around with us.”
We got a response—the response that we wanted at that time.
I think that applying that kind of logic in post-conflict recon-
struction, has some compelling aspects to it—it looks bad at the
outset, but if you can demonstrate—if you went in with—if you
took my figures and went in with 75,000 and you had a Bonn-like
process and a Tokyo-like process and got the national constituting
process together and got the donors together and figured out who's
going to do what to whom, and are we all at the start line appro-
priately, based on our comparative advantage, when the thing tum-
bles, then that slope would be very steep-you know, if you're there
for 6 months, and then all of a sudden you say, “Look, I came in
with 75,000 guys—or I came in with whatever the campaign called
for, and because the civilian agencies were with them, I withdrew
down to 75,000, and then 3 months later I'm pulling out 10,000
guys, and 3 months after that I'm pulling out 10,000 guys.” If you
can demonstrate progress, I think that may allay some of the fears
my colleagues have stated and the concerns that the regional na-
tions might have.
The CHAIRMAN. In direct proportion to how well you plan going
in and who you've got on the
Colonel FEIL. I think absolutely.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.
Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that the testi-
mony has led me to believe, first of all, that the need for planning
in other parts of our government, in addition to the Defense De-
partment, is extremely important. I say that because I suspect,
from the testimony we heard yesterday, we identify Saddam Hus-
sein as a unique menace. There are bad leaders all over the world,
but this is really, by far, the worst. He has successfully brutalized
the country, created enormous problems in terms of nutritional de-
ficiency for the children, lack of income for most of the population.
In essence, by trying to maintain power, he has created a lot of


228
problems for the Iraqi people, quite apart from the menace that he
presents to the neighborhood.
So having established this as an extraordinary circumstance that
might justify authorizing the President of the United States to go
to war, it seems to me we must try to identify the fact that it would
be best if we went to war with a lot of other countries, including
the neighbors, including NATO allies, and including the Russians,
as a matter of fact.
Now as I have heard the testimony today—we've identified the
fact that Iraq has great resources—among them, oil. What if, in our
planning, the United States Department of Commerce or the Treas-
ury Department has thought through why some of our allies have
been lukewarm about our military planning. Namely, that they
have either debts that Iraq owes or oil concessions. In other words,
even while we're doing the difficult work, business as usual might
be created, not only for the Iraqis, but for them.
We would say that's not really the way that it's going to work.
This is not economic imperialism, but, in fact, as a part of our plan
for Iraq, in addition to identify the political leadership and the coa-
lition and building democracy, we're going to run the oil business,
for example. We're going to run it well. We're going to make
money. And it's going to back to help pay for the rehabilitation of
Iraq, because there is money there.
Now, furthermore, if you want to be involved in that business,
whether you're Russians or French or whoever, you must be with
us in the beginning of this business. We're going to set up the busi-
ness together. We're going in together. Because once we get there,
we're going to control the oil business.
I take that as a good point of departure, because that gets peo-
ple's attention.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
Senator LUGAR. But there is no point whatsoever in our going to
rescue all the people of Iraq, the Russian debt, the French oil con-
cessions, if our efforts are met with opposition and criticism. As the
chairman has identified, our efforts in Iraq cannot stop after the
threat has been removed. It is in our national interests that a sta-
ble, peaceful Iraq emerges.
I'm suggesting, to be provocative today, that we do have a plan.
It must be more than a military plan, and it must result in attract-
ing a broad coalition. If our statesmanship is adept, we will have
the Russians aboard, the French will be with us, so will a lot of
other people, and we will deal with the Iraq problem together. This
will ensure a much greater chance of success, rather than being
identified as the unique invaders, the unique enemy.
Now, it may be that Arab sentiment will end up disliking the
Russians, disliking the French, disliking the Germans, the English,
all of us. But it could be, as a matter of fact, that if the oil business
makes money, and we pump 5 million barrels a day, as opposed to
two, and the Iraqi people begin to thrive. Some people might like
this idea, in fact, this new incipient democracy will have something
to work with, as opposed to poverty and destruction and rehabilita-
tion that may or may not occur.
Now, given that provocative idea, does anyone have a comment?


229
Ms. FRANCKE. Senator, yes. I would suggest that a lot of hard
horse trading go on prior to any military action. And it has sur-
prised me, actually, that none has been going on. And the advan-
tages of it can be seen in the smart sanctions issue where, in fact,
we did do some hard bargaining and some horse trading, and we
got the thing through the U.N. Security Council.
And I think your suggestion is perfect, that one should encourage
the administration to go and bargain hard and say, “We'll give you
this if you'll give us that,” and so on and so forth.
Now, the other issue is that lifting sanctions on Iraq and getting
oil flowing and getting business in Iraq is actually going to have
an enormously beneficial economic impact in the region, not just
Turkey. We hear about Turkey only. But there are many, many
companies in Jordan, in Syria, in the gulf that can benefit from
this economic opening up in Iraq.
It's actually going to be a bonanza in the region, to be honest,
and there is plenty of room for everyone to benefit, not just from
developing the infrastructure of the oil industry, but from building
roads and hospitals and so on and so forth. There's everything to
be done, and Iraqis can't do it all on their own. So there is that
economic benefit.
But I want to address another issue that the chairman also
raised, and that is the perception of the United States in the re-
gion. And to this extent, I think the colonel was absolutely right.
If we can show that we are diminishing gradually, there will be a
great sense of relief.
However, I don't want to open a new subject, but we have to be
honest. There are many other reasons—other problems in the Mid-
dle East that we need to be addressing. It is not just U.S. policy
toward Iraq that makes Middle Easterners angry. In fact, this is
very much of a secondary issue, and it's byproduct of other issues.
And so we should not simply look at U.S. presence in Iraq as
being the one that inflames Arabs and so on. There are many
issues that are older, broader, and more entrenched in the Middle
East that we need to look at.
So after the first gulf war, there was an opportunity to particu-
larly, the Madrid Conference on the Middle East, and I wonder
whether, in fact, Iraq will present such another opportunity for a
global look at the Middle East and its problems.
Senator LUGAR. It might, and you make a very good point. My
only thought would be that it is conceivable that there are issues
in the Middle East, including Israel and Palestine, that might take
many, many years. One reason we're having these hearings is that
we may be on the threshold of a war now. So ideally, it would have
been desirable to have cleared everything up before military
action
Ms. FRANCKE. Yes.
Senator LUGAR [continuing). But that, I suspect, is not really in
the cards.
The CHAIRMAN. In our generation, there was a guy, who was a
rock singer-I think his name was Clyde McPhatter-and he sang
a song called, “Timing,” “Ticky-ticky-tock, timing is the thing.”
This is all timing. We don't control this timing. We don't control
the timing. We're talking about, as the Senator said, we're here be-


230
cause the administration and others are saying “in the very near
term.” I don't know anybody who thinks in the very near term we
are going to find a solution that will satisfy the region relative to
Israel and the Palestinian question.
But you've been very, very kind with your time. We'd like to,
with your permission-some of our colleagues may have some ques-
tions to submit to you in writing. We'll not overburden you. We're
not going to make this a summer project for you—an August
project, but—and we'd also like to know—I would like to know if
you would be available to the committee in the future, as well.
As I said, this is not the end of this process. This is the begin-
ning, and you've helped us get off to, I hope, an auspicious start.
I hope people view it-I think it is in beginning to delve into, for
the first time, at least, in the fora like this on some of the really
difficult questions. But because they're difficult does not mean that
they are not answerable. Because they're difficult and because this
presents us with great problems—we've faced more difficult prob-
lems before, and we've overcome them.
And so I'm optimistic. I have a view that if we, in fact, discuss
it and debate it and reach a consensus, that there isn't anything
we can't do, including dealing with Saddam Hussein.
I thank you all very, very much for your indulgence, and we are
recessed until 2 o'clock, when we have a second panel. As a matter
of fact—well, 2 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p.m., the same day.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Boxer, Bill Nelson, Rockefeller, Lugar,
and Hagel.
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.
I'm told that we are going to have one vote around 2:30.
Senator BOXER. I think it's been pushed back to 3.
The CHAIRMAN. Good, I hope that's true.
This will be the last panel we have today, and the most distin-
guished panel that we've had, two men with a considerable amount
of service to the country. The first is former Secretary of Defense,
among other things. I served here when you were running the Of-
fice of Management and Budget. I've wanted to always ask you
which was more difficult.
But, at any rate, Caspar Weinberger was Secretary of Defense
from 1981 to 1987. Secretary Weinberger has served a number of
public positions, including Chairman of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion in 1970, Deputy Director and then Director of the Office of
Management and Budget from 1970 to 1973, and Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, which is what it was called then,
from 1973 to 1975, and since 1993, has been chairman of Forbes
Magazine. It's an honor to have you back here, Mr. Chairman,
thank you for taking the time to be with us.
And we also have with us Mr. Samuel Berger. Mr. Berger served
as the National Security Advisor to President Clinton, from 1997


235
it need not be so in Iraq. We changed several regimes after World
War II. And in each case, the result was a vast and a major im-
provement.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding these hearings. I think
this debate is a vital part of our democracy. I just hope that in dis-
cussing how to remove Saddam Hussein, we will recognize and re-
alize that the boundary between the people's right to know and the
enemy's right to know is a very thin one and we would ignore it
at the peril of our troops.
Thank you very much, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinberger follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR WEINBERGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE; CHAIRMAN, FORBES MAGAZINE
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your inviting me to be here today. The question before
us is should the United States depose Saddam Hussein. The answer is clear: yes.
We must do it quickly, decisively, and with a firm commitment to a just and demo-
cratic future for Iraq.
I have heard several reasons articulated as to why we should not remove Saddam
from power.
1. There is no proof he continues to develop weapons of mass destruction
I should begin by noting that the Rumsfeld Report submitted in July 1998 made
clear that the ability of U.S. intelligence agencies to predict timelines for weapons
development in rogue states is eroding, both because of defects within those agen-
cies and the nature of the security environment in the world today. In other words,
Mr. Chairman, we should not assume we are sitting pretty simply because someone
in Virginia tells us we have ten years to do so.
On the question of whether Saddam Hussein is developing weapons of mass de-
struction-from open sources alone, I can tell you that Saddam has been diverting
trucks from the United Nations Oil for Food program to use as missile launchers.
He has acquired new surface to air batteries and is using them to target allied
flights. Just last week, it was reported that Saddam is attempting to import stain-
less steel tubing used uniquely in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear
weapons.
According to the Times of London, Iraq used the cover of a recent disaster in Syria
to ferry so-called flow-forming machines into the country. Similar machines were
used by Iraq in the past to produce components for uranium enrichment.
Other reports indicate that Saddam is reconstituting his chemical weapons pro-
grams, and has been working steadily since 1998 (when the last UN inspectors were
kicked out) to rebuild chemical weapons plants.
Finally, I should cite to you the words of Rolf Ekeus, the first director of the
United Nations weapons inspections team in Iraq: “The systematic pursuit of the
proscribed weapons and the funds thrown into their development points to a sin-
gular mind and extraordinary insistence. The present leader of Iraq has dem-
onstrated that he has ambitions for his country reaching far outside the borders of
Iraq. These grand designs of extended influence presuppose access to weapons of
mass destruction and the means for their delivery.'
2. Saddam Hussein has given the United States no reason to depose him
Saddam is in violation of several United Nations Security Council resolutions, and
has been for almost four years. There must come a point in cases such as this when
the international community recognizes a rogue who will not comply with the de-
mands of the civilized world. More importantly, perhaps, we must recognize that if
unchecked, there is every possibility that Saddam will use those weapons on his
own people, his neighbors or provide them to the terrorist organizations with which
he has ever deepening ties. Which brings me to excuse number 3:
3. Unless Saddam can be tied to September 11, the United States has no reason to
depose him
The idea that Saddam must be tied to the attacks on the United States is a straw
man constructed solely in order to be torn down. The United States does not need
to sacrifice 3,000 of its innocent citizens in order to justify defending our national
security and that of our allies.


236
Saddam Hussein is developing a significant relationship with terrorist groups
such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command),
Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Abu Nidal. I have been told he is cultivating
operational ties with each of these groups, doing much more than simply providing
cash to the families of so-called “martyrs”.
In addition, there have been persistent reports of a growing al Qaeda presence
inside Iraq. Again, I understand this is more than the initial tales of small cells at-
tacking Kurdish groups, operating in the mountainous border area near Iran. Ap-
parently, al Qaeda members are moving freely around Baghdad, using their Sad-
dam-granted liberty to coordinate operations worldwide.
Surely no one would assert this situation poses acceptable risks. We cannot risk
the possibility that Saddam will share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists.
Finally, there is an assertion that I read regularly in the pages of the newspaper
from leakers at the Pentagon.
4. Saddam is contained now; containment works and he will die of old age eventu-
ally
This is the kind of vision-less foreign policy that makes me thank our Founding
Fathers for civilian control of the military. First, I must note that these leaks of
war games, war plans and the likes are a disgrace to the United States Armed
Forces. I commend Don Rumsfeld for going after them. It also strikes me as the
height of irresponsibility for the New York Times and others to publish these ru-
mors. Anyone who has been charged with the care and safety of U.S. troops as I
was for seven years would, I am sure, feel this way.
Second, this assertion is palpably untrue. Containment is not working. Saddam
Hussein is exporting upwards of $3 billion in illegal oil and using the profits for
who-knows-what. He has a reason to keep out arms inspectors. What is it?
In this day and age, containment means more than pre-empting the expansionism
of loony dictators. It means containing the dangers they pose, and limiting their ac-
cess to instruments and persons who can assist them in carrying out their threats.
Mr. Chairman, Saddam is not contained, and he cannot be contained. He has vio-
lated all of the promises which we accepted when we crushed his military in the
Gulf war. He cannot be believed and he is an implacable foe of the United States.
That is why he must be removed.
I would like to quickly address two other important issues. The first is the role
of the United Nations. It seems odd to me, as it must to many around the world,
that the United States persists in supporting renewed negotiations for weapons in-
spections inside Iraq. Kofi Annan has come to the end of his rope after three failed
rounds of negotiations with Baghdad. The President of the United States has said
that he will see Saddam Hussein removed, and notwithstanding, we continue this
odd charade in New York.
The terms of weapons inspections have become looser and looser over the years.
There is no point in sending in some team to rubber stamp Saddam's "cooperation”.
Those who advocate that we persist in seeking a solution to the problem of Iraq
through the United Nations are advocates of inaction. They're just afraid to say so.
Finally, and to my mind, most importantly, I have heard it said by influential peo-
ple in this town that an a priori commitment of tens of thousands of troops for many
years is the required prerequisite for removing Saddam Hussein from power.
This seems to me to be political in the extreme—an attempt to set the bar so high
that any operation in Iraq will be deemed the President's failure. We must remove
Saddam, yes. We must also have in place a democratic transition committed to a
united future for Iraq.
The Iraqi people are perfectly capable of governing themselves if allowed the
chance. Representative leadership in Iraq must have the full faith and credit of the
United States, and our commitment to enforce unity and democracy. But we don't
need a GI on every street corner for the foreseeable future. After all, if what we
wanted was a strong leader in Iraq, we shouldn't have bothered to box him in dur-
ing the Gulf war. People say there will be chaos. I disagree, but I must confess
frankly that even chaos would be better than Saddam.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding these hearings. This debate is a vital part
of our democracy, and I know our Commander in Chief is grateful for the Congress'
support as he works to defend our national security.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank
you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Berger.


237
STATEMENT OF SAMUEL R. BERGER, FORMER NATIONAL SE-
CURITY ADVISOR; PRESIDENT AND CEO, STONEBRIDGE
INTERNATIONAL LLC, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. BERGER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, I welcome this opportunity to
participate in the beginning of an important national discussion on
how we deal with a threat to peace posed by the regime of Saddam
Hussein.
That it is a threat is the essential starting point. Saddam Hus-
sein is a menace to his own people, to the stability of a combustible
and critical region, and a potential threat to the United States. He
has demonstrated his intent to seek hegemony in the gulf. He has
demonstrated his intent to develop weapons of mass destruction
and his willingness to use them. He has demonstrated his con-
tempt for the international community and his implacable hostility
to the United States. A nuclear-armed Saddam sometime in this
decade is a risk we cannot choose to ignore.
But let's be clear. All these things were true before September
11. While the President is right to underscore the potential nexus
between hostile regimes, weapons of mass destruction, and terror-
ists, viewing the Iraqi threat primarily through the prism of the
war on terrorism distorts both.
Is it conceivable that Saddam will link up with extremist Islamic
terrorists? Yes, but that has not been his history. And removing
Saddam Hussen does not eliminate the danger that terrorists will
obtain chemical or biological weapons from any of the more than
dozen states that have the capacity to produce them or acquire
dangerous nuclear material from inadequately safeguarded storage
facilities in the former Soviet Union.
This is not to minimize, Mr. Chairman, but to clarify it. Saddam
Hussein and the fight against terrorism may one day intersect, but
we lose our focus and our credibility on both fronts if we reflexively
lump them together.
What, then, is the right policy? Containment, in fact, has stopped
Saddam from attacking his neighbors since 1991. But when he ex-
pelled U.N. inspectors in 1998, he substantially undermined the
ability of the international community to track his weapons-of-
mass-destruction programs. Simply keeping him in the box carries
higher risks when his WMD programs are unchecked and he can
break out with such lethality.
But concluding, that regime change is the necessary goal is to
begin the discussion, not to end it. It is just as foolhardy to under-
estimate the challenges involved in ousting Saddam Hussein as it
is to underestimate the threat he poses.
There are different approaches to a regime change. One is to pro-
vide tangible support to those around Saddam who can take mat-
ters into their own hands. We have learned that achieving success
in this manner is easier said than done, but it now an avenue we
should abandon. We can enhance those possibilities to some degree
by increasing international efforts that de-legitimize Saddam and
defining more clearly what a new Iraqi government can expect
from the international community if it accepts international norms.
Another option is the so-called Afghan model, arming the Iraqi
opposition to march on Baghdad, supported by U.S. air power, but


238
limited manpower. Clearly there is an important role for the oppo-
sition, both internal and external, but I am deeply skeptical of a
surrogate strategy in Iraq. The Iraqi opposition is weaker than the
Northern Alliance and fractured by internal rivalry. At the same
time, the Iraqi Armed Forces are signficantly stronger than the
Taliban, and Saddam Hussein's grip is tighter. We should be very
wary of turning the U.S. military into an emergency rescue squad
if Saddam Hussein loses tanks against insurgents we are backing.
America does not need a Bay of Pigs in the Persian Gulf.
That leaves a U.S.-led military invasion, which ultimately may
become our only option. But we must define the necessary objective
more broadly than simply eliminating Saddam's regime. Our objec-
tive must be removing that regime in a way that enhances, not di-
minishes, our overall security. Our strategy should bring greater
stability to the region, not less. It should contribute to ending
Israel's isolation, not compounding it. It should not come at the ex-
pense of the support we need in the fight against al-Qaeda or the
stability of friends in the region. It would be a pyrrhic victory, for
example, if we get rid of Saddam Hussein only to face a radial Pak-
istani government with a ready-made nuclear arsenal.
We must approach this challenge with sharp focus, but also with
peripheral vision. That is why we need to do more than simply
plan a military invasion. We need to put in place the building
blocks that can make long-term success possible, and we need to
proceed on a timetable dictated not by elections or emotions, but
by a hard-nosed intelligence assessment of the trajectory of Iraq's
capabilities, especially its nuclear program.
What are those building blocks? First, the United States must be
engaged consistently in trying to reduce the violence and tension
in the Middle East. If there is not progress on the ground in ending
the violence and improving people's lives or we are not seen at
least working energetically to change the dynamic, I believe sup-
port from the region for action in Iraq will be scarce, and an inva-
sion very well break along an already precarious Arab-Israeli fault
line.
Second, we need a sustained strategy to make evident to others
the legitimacy of our actions. Today even many of our closest allies
do not share our sense of the threat. Some in the United States say
that doesn't matter in the end, that our allies are weak militarily
and soft strategically. As for those in the region, others say, in ef-
fect, if we do it, they will come.
But the fact that America can do it alone does not mean it is
wise to do it alone. We don't need to recreate the gulf war coalition.
We acted essentially unilaterally in Afghanistan. But the world
saw our actions as a legitimate response to a terrible provacation.
Power by itself does not confer legitimacy. It is the widely per-
ceived purpose to which that power is applied and the manner in
which it is used. If we are right about the threat Iraq poses, we
ought to be able to build a solid case for the world and take the
time we have to do it.
Third, and crucially, we need to have an honest discussion with
the American people about what's involved, consistent with the
Secretary's very important admonition about operational surprise
and secrecy. From the gulf war to Kosovo and Afghanistan, our


239
men and women in uniform have performed superbly, securing im-
pressive victories at impressively low costs.
But our pride in them should not blind us to the very real chal-
lenges of war in Iraq. Our objective here is not to drive Saddam
Hussein back to his own country. It is to drive him out of power.
The American people must be prepared for a more challenging mis-
sion-urban combat, chemical weapons attacks, Saddam's use of
human and civilian shields, an American presence in Iraq meas-
ured in years when we succeed.
It is time to start asking and answering, as you have been doing
in this committee for the past 2 days, tough questions before we
launch our country down the path to war. What impact will our ac-
tions have on key governments in the region, such as Jordan, Paki-
stan, and Turkey? What allies do we need, from both a military
and political standpoint? What kind of successor do we see for Sad-
dam Hussen? How do we keep the country together and avoid a
Balkanized outcome? What kind of assistance economic, political,
and military—can a new Iraqi government expect from the United
States? Do we see this as Korea, where we helped build a thriving
democracy from the debris of war but maintained a military pres-
ence there a generation later, or Bosnia, where we seem impatient
to leave even before the conditions warrant? And who will pay for
Iraq's recovery, with current estimates of the cost of rebuilding its
economy ranging from $50 to $150 billion?
Mr. Chairman, there is no question that the world will be a bet-
ter place without Saddam Hussein's regime. As you've stated in the
past, if he is around 5 years from now, it means we haven't done
something right. But if we don't do this operation right, we could
end up with something worse. We need to be clear and open about
the stakes, the risks, and the costs that genuine success—meaning
a more secure America and a more secure world—will require.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berger follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SAMUEL R. BERGER, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR; PRESIDENT AND CEO, STONEBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL LLC
SADDAM IS A THREAT
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I welcome
this opportunity to help open an important national discussion on how we deal with
the threat to peace posed by the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
That it is a threat is the essential starting point. Saddam Hussein is a menace
to his own people—to the stability of a combustible and critical region and a poten-
tial threat to the United States. He has demonstrated his intent to seek hegemony
in the Gulf. He has demonstrated his intent to develop weapons of mass destruction
and his willingness to use them. He has demonstrated his contempt for the inter-
national community and his implacable hostility to the United States. A nuclear-
armed Saddam sometime in this decade is a risk we cannot choose to ignore.
But let's be clear: All these things were true before September 11. While the Presi-
dent is right to underscore the potential nexus between hostile regimes, weapons
of mass destruction and terrorists, viewing the Iraqi threat primarily through the
prism of the war on terrorism distorts both.
Is it conceivable that Saddam will link up with extremist Islamic terrorists? Yes,
but that has not been his history. And removing Saddam Hussein does not eliminate
the danger that terrorists will obtain chemical or biological weapons from any of the
more than a dozen states that have the capacity to produce them, or acquire dan-
gerous nuclear material from inadequately safeguarded storage facilities in the
former Soviet Union.


241
Third, and crucially, we need to have an honest discussion with the American peo-
ple about what's involved. From the Gulf War to Kosovo and Afghanistan, our men
and women in uniform have performed superbly-securing impressive victories at
impressively low costs. But our pride in them should not blind us to the very real
challenges of war in Iraq. Our objective here is not to drive Saddam Hussein back
into his own country; it is to drive him out of power. The American people must
be prepared for a far more challenging mission: urban combat, chemical weapons
attacks, Saddam's use of human and civilian shields, and an American military
presence in Iraq-measured in years—when we succeed.
TOUGH QUESTIONS
It's time to start asking and answering tough questions, before we launch our
country down the path to war.
• What impact will our action have on key governments in the region-such as
Jordan, Pakistan and Turkey?
• What kind of successor do we see for Saddam Hussein? How do we keep the
country together and avoid a Balkanized outcome?
• What kind of assistance
economic, political and military—can a new Iraqi gov-
ernment expect from the United States? Do we see this as Korea—where we
helped build a thriving democracy from the debris of war but maintain a mili-
tary presence there a generation later? Or Bosnia, where we seem impatient to
leave even before conditions warrant?
• And who will pay for Iraq's recovery-with current estimates of the cost of re-
building its economy ranging from $50-150 billion?
Mr. Chairman, there's no question that the world will be a better place without
Saddam Hussein's regime. As you've said in the past,“if he is around five years
from now, it means we haven't done something right.” But if we don't do this oper-
ation right, we could end up with something worse. We need to be clear and open
about the stakes, the risks and the costs that genuine success—meaning a more se-
cure America and a more secure world—will require.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much.
Before we begin, or as we begin, one of the statements that you
made, Mr. Secretary, maybe in a different context or in a closed
hearing or a closed circumstance, you can tell us, but the line that
says, “I understand there is more than initial tales of small cells
acting-Kurdish groups operating in the mountain borders of Iran.
Apparently, al-Qaeda members are moving freely around Baghdad
using their Saddam-granted liberty to coordinate operations world-
wide.” I have not heard that from any source in the U.S. Govern-
ment that I've kept close tabs on, but maybe at some point in an-
other context you can share with us the source of that.
But in the interest of just general fairness, Senator Rockefeller
has been patient and at the end of the line here. I get to stay
throughout the whole hearing. I can ask my questions at the end.
Why don't we begin with you, Senator Rockefeller, we'll go in order,
and I'll question last.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. I have a Confucian temperament, Mr.
Chairman.
A couple of things come to mind. In the days of these hearings,
there's been just an enormous array of thoughts and suggestions.
And yesterday I sort of concentrated on the uncertainty factor.
And, you know, you—Mr. Berger, you talked about removing Sad-
dam does not do it all. And that brings up a question which I've
actually sort of wanted to ask. We've been talking a lot about na-
tion building here. And you say, well, that could be $100 to $150
billion for Iraq alone.
Americans tend to be kind of episodic, you know, crisis oriented
when we obviously, 9/11 is a little bit more than episodic, but-


242
and what we're in is profoundly dangerous, but we jump from sort
of country to country, and then we will take Iraq and we'll sort of
isolate Iraq and say, well, what are going to be the repercussions
of this?
Are we talking about, in fact, removing Saddam Hussein because
he is Saddam Hussein, alone, or because of the weapons of mass
destruction? And is it not really what we're talking about, the re-
moving the threat to this country of—weapons of mass destruc-
tion-of which he is the dictatorial keeper and decisionmaker?
So if it's the removal of weapons of mass destruction, and if you
accept that al-Qaeda is in 60 other countries, that South America
has not yet bubbled up, Africa, in many ways, hasn't bubbled up,
well, Southeast Asia is all yet before us, perhaps, or probably, and
many other places in the Middle East-Iran-who knows? You
can't do it all. You can't go in and say, well, here's Afghanistan-
and that's kind of more of a futile warlord thing and that history,
but Baghdad is much more of a stabilized middle class. Perhaps we
can make a democracy out of that, and so let's nation build. And,
oh, by the way, that may cost $100 to $150 billion. Then you go
down to the Indonesian archipelago and you're talking about thou-
sands of islands—and, who knows, the largest Muslim country in
the world, which is not to tie Islam into this in any greater than
is appropriate. But you start stockpiling an inventory which be-
comes absolutely out of the question for this country.
You talk about educating—I'm not questioning you, Mr. Berger,
I'm just questioning the proposition—we talk about educating the
American people to what we're doing, leveling with the American
people. Well, if we're going to level with the American people, we'd
better tell them that this—that we're talking about, you know, and
$8 or $10 trillion project here worldwide, in all probability, unless
we think that 9/11 was isolated, and it surely was not, and nobody
even pretends to think that.
Isn't it really our security that we're talking about? And if it's
really our security, isn't it keeping ourselves safe from weapons of
mass destruction from wherever they might come? And, you see,
that doesn't have to just be a nuclear bomb. That can be a suicide
bomber. That can be a plane into the World Trade Tower. That can
be, you know, something else into a chemical plant, a power grid,
whatever it is, but it's the combination of the intelligence, the pre-
emptive intelligence, as opposed to the—as well as the tactical, but
particularly the preemptive—and keeping ourselves safe—and,
therefore, as much as possible, the world, because we're the largest
target, and if we're keeping ourselves safe—but we've gotten into
this enormous discussion on nation building.
And I would just like to, sort of, get both of your thoughts on
that. If you're suggesting--and I don't disagree that—to stay the
course and that—we had some witnesses this morning that said,
no, you only have to have about 5,000 troops in Iraq for 3 or 4 or
5 years or less—a couple of years, I think one of them suggested.
That doesn't seem very probable to me if they're talking about na-
tion building.
And what it seems to me that you started off with is making
America secure, removing the means of destruction of us and other


249
know, helicopter heading to someplace, that, in light of that, most
of the people—well, I won't say what they said—I've asked the
question, is Saddam more likely to use chemical or biological weap-
ons—and I limit it to that, because I've not heard a single voice
suggest that, at this moment, they believe he has nuclear-is it
more or less likely he would use chemical or biological weapons in
one of three circumstances—one, against the invading U.S. forces
moving on Baghdad of wherever; two, against the Israelis to widen
the war into a regional war as one of his hopes for salvation; or,
three, against his own people in a scorch-the-earth policy not un-
like he did with, not chemical or biological weapons, but with con-
ventional weapons, setting the oil fields of Kuwait on fire as he
left?
So what probably do each of you assign to the likelihood of him
using whatever weapons of mass destruction he has available to
him this time? And if so, when and how do you think that would
most likely occur? Either one of you and in whatever order.
Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, it's pure guesswork, of course,
as you know. Not only that, but I'm long out of office, and so I
would be guessing.
First of all, you ask if conditions are different. One thing is dif-
ferent, and that is he has a lot fewer troops. He has a lot fewer
tanks and a lot fewer infantry and a lot fewer artillery pieces than
he had at that time. Sadly, we didn't destroy the whole thing, but
he's left with a fair amount, but it's a very much smaller amount.
Roughly, I'd say 30 percent now of what he had at the start of the
gulf war. So that's one significant difference.
I don't think there's any predicting what a person like Saddam
Hussein would do. I think we have to assume he's not going to en-
gage in useless acts. I think he would undoubtedly perhaps feel
that if he's being invaded and that there's any kind of realistic
sense of what's going to happen, he would know that he probably
couldn't win. Whether or not he would use chemical or biological
weapons, I, frankly, don't know.
I think we have to assume that he's not going to be held back
by any of the normal restraints that a civilized person would be
under. He's used a gas against his own people up in the Kurdish
north about 4 or 5 years ago didn't hesitate for a moment, be-
cause he felt they were in revolt against him, and they can't tol-
erate any kind of revolt.
Whether or not he would try to do what he did in Kuwait is hard
to say. On his way out of Kuwait, he set fire to all the remaining
oil wells. I happened to be over there. I did go over there some-
where within about 5, 6 days after that war ended, and it was a-
it just looked like every picture of purgatory you've ever seen paint-
ed, and it was all completely useless as far as the military was con-
cerned, and he's never made any effective compensation for it. So
we're dealing with a person who's not bound by any normal re-
straints, and that's why it's hard to estimate what he would do.
He has far fewer resources, and it is at least possible that a
campaign against him would go well enough so that he would not
have very much time to engage in any nastiness. He's got a lot of
very, very unpleasant weapons. The VX explosives and chemical
and various other things are very nasty pieces of equipment.


250
I don't think I can help you by guessing, but I would guess that
if we are successful, he wouldn't have time to do very much dam-
age. I doubt if he would use these weapons to widen the war, be-
cause I think he knows he would find very little support for that.
I think the support that he thinks he's amassing now is very chi-
merical and is based upon simply a feeling that if his neighbors,
who uniformly hate him, speak loudly enough against our doing
any invasion, that we may be discouraged from doing it. But
whether he would try to widen the war or not, I don't know. There
would be no particular gain to him for doing it, but that might not
necessarily stop him.
I think you're dealing with a very unpredictable person who has
no civilized restraints, and that argues even more strongly for get-
ting rid of him as quickly as possible. Frankly, I wish we had done
it at the end of the gulf war.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Berger.
Mr. BERGER. Mr. Chairman, I agree with Secretary Weinberger
that Saddam is not likely to be bound by normal restraints in cir-
cumstances such as this, which he would see as essentially existen-
tial to his regime. So I think in devising a war plan—and I also
agree with Secretary Weinberger, there's been entirely too much
babble in the press about various war scenarios—I think we would
certainly have to anticipate this potential. It would, obviously, take
you in the direction of trying to disrupt command and control as
quickly as possible, as swiftly as possible.
The dilemma here, of course, is how do you maintain even tac-
tical surprise if you have to have a substantial buildup in order to
accomplish your mission. But I think any war planning here would
have to anticipate the potential or the possibility that he would use
or threaten to use biological or chemical weapons against American
forces, potentially against Israel in order to turn this into an
Israeli-Arab war, and perhaps against his own people. I think that
would have to be very much a part of our calculation in developing
a war plan here.
The CHAIRMAN. One of the things that the first President Bush
did that we've learned after the fact, is spent a lot of time with his
top people talking with the Israelis and getting a commitment that
if they were attacked, they would not respond—they, the Israelis,
would not respond. And I assume the reason for that was their con-
cern that even though we had even stronger case in the region that
he had invaded a country, occupied a country, violated every norm
of international law, that if, in fact, Israel did respond in its own
self interest, that there was a risk that it would turn from Saddam
versus the coalition forces liberating an innocent country to the
Israelis and the Arabs—or at least complicating matters.
And so I hope—as a matter of fact, I'm sure, we must be consid-
ering that possibility. I can tell you without revealing any war
plans or anything—I don't have any—is that the Israelis have spo-
ken to me about that. The former Prime Minister spent 342 hours
with me talking about that. And that is, what happens if Israeli
is attacked with chemical or biological weapons.
So I guess my question is this. Is it an important part of the
planning process for a National Security Advisor or a Secretary of
Defense to be recommending to the President, if he's going to move,


251
what the President should or should not be saying to the Israelis
or should or should not be planning relative to the use of these
weapons—the potential use of these weapons?
Mr. WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, ordinarily, I don't think the
Secretary of Defense would get into that field. I was always ac-
cused of practicing foreign policy when I was Secretary of Defense,
but we didn't get to the
The CHAIRMAN. I remember that.
Mr. WEINBERGER [continuing]. Basic point of telling theor sug-
gesting to the President that-
The CHAIRMAN. That's a legacy I don't think you've left.
Mr. WEINBERGER [continuing). How he would respond to things
of that kind.
The military's job would be—and I assume that's what's going on
now, but I don't know-it would be to plan for an operation with
a number of different contingencies. And they would plan to do es-
sentially what would be quite normal, and that would be to assume
that all kinds of options would be chosen against us, and that to
make sure we had the material and the troops and the plans ready
to deal with that, as well as the intelligence.
But whether or not that would include a guess as to what Sad-
dam Hussein would do with whatever weapons he's got, as far as
recommendations to the President is concerned, I would think that
would not be done. I think that what would be done would be that
any war plans that might be developed would certainly include the
ways to respond to whatever it was Saddam Hussein might decide
to do. That would be part of the normal planning. I don't think it
would go beyond that. But in the course of doing that, if the Presi-
dent wanted to know what would happen if they used certain
weapons of if they threatened to use certain weapons, I assume the
military would tell him the basis on which they were planning to
deal with a contingency like that, but I doubt if they would advo-
cate a course of action.
Mr. BERGER. Mr. Chairman, any war carries with it the potential
of unexpected contingencies. You're talking about an expected con-
tingency, one that we can foresee, not as a certainty, but certainly
as a possibility. And it would seem to me that it would be incum-
bent upon us to engage in very serious discussions with the Gov-
ernment of Israel quietly in advance of any such action.
I know there is a debate in Israel that took place after 1991
about whether Israel made the right decision in not retaliating
against Scud attacks which were not associated with chemical
weapons. And I can imagine it would be a very difficult decision
for any elected Prime Minister of any country to not respond to a
So it is certainly not—if that were to happen—not out of the
,
realm of possibility that Israel would respond. And I think that,
again, this suggests the complexity of this operation. It doesn't nec-
essarily dictate whether we should or shouldn't do it, but I think
it would be surprising if we did not have a serious discussion with
the Israelis about how that contingency would unfold.
The CHAIRMAN. I think one of the responsibilities I have as chair-
man of this committee is—and the reason why the administration
is not here now—not demand they be here now—is that we not dis-


252
cuss operational plans here. And that has not occurred, and as long
as I'm chairman, will not occur, although I don't think I'm going
to admonish any member of this committee. They all agree, both
sides of the aisle on that.
But one of the things it seems to me is our responsibility, be-
cause it is my sense—I could be wrong, but it's my sense that this
President and his administration understand—whether or not they
understand the constitutional responsibility, they understand the
political value of having a Congress “with them” as they take off
on an effort.
And from my discussions, although I want to make it clear I've
got no firm commitment from anybody in this administration, but
I have, at the White House, discussed the issue of whether or not
authorization would be required in the absence of an al-Qaeda con-
nection related to 9/11, in the absence of evidence of an imminent
attack by Iraq, and the need for our participation, the Congress'
participation and authorization. And so it's my distinct sense—I
could be making a fool of myself here if it turns out wrong-my dis-
tinct sense that there will be no signficant movement against Iraq,
absent consultation with the Congress, and, like his father, a re-
quest for authorization.
I might note, parenthetically, if the right case is made, I think
he'd get an overwhelming response, positive, to it if he dem-
onstrated that there were certain things put in motion that would
answer some questions for members.
The reason I bother to say that is this. It seems to me that part
of our function as a committee, and the reason why we're seeking
your advice and help, is that we should be laying out the nature
of the threat and a range of opinions relative to the nature of the
threat, and not only the nature of the threat, the timing of the
threat, the timeframe in which we have to respond to the worst
case, and then lay out for the American people what—not the cer-
tain costs are, but what the probable costs are in terms of every-
thing from our treasure as it relates to life as well as it does to
property and cost.
And so that's why I'm about to pursue a couple more questions
with you—again, not-understanding that none of us know for cer-
tain what will happen once this is undertaken or even prior to it
being undertaken, if it is undertaken.
The last gulf war, as a coalition, which went extremely well—a
significant coalition, significant participation in the military under-
taking as well as the aftermath-cost, in today's dollars, about $76
billion, I'm told. Is that about right? I think it was $60-some billion
in Desert Storm. And, in today's dollars, I'm told it's in the $75 to
$80 billion range. And of that, 80 percent of it was paid by the Jap-
anese, the Europeans, and others.
Now, I want to make it clear, for me at least, that if I am con-
vinced that Saddam has and is likely to use weapons of mass de-
struction, including the nuclear capability, I think we have to be
prepared to pay any price-$70 billion, $100 billion, $150 billion,
whatever it would take—to protect our interests. But if we have to
go this alone, do either of you think—that is—when I say “go it
alone,” the military action-do any of you think there is a likeli-


254
ican, pre-positioning them over a long period of time, and then con-
ducting what was a very successful hundred-hour war, and then,
in relatively short order, beginning to draw down those forces, this
is premised upon, in the best-case scenario—I would call the best-
case scenario-articulated by Secretary Weinberger that it would
be better to go with others and not alone, but if we go alone, we
go alone.
And if we do it as successfully as we did Desert Storm—that is,
we meet the objective—the objective, a different objective this time,
not just merely pushing Iraq out of Kuwait, but taking down a re-
gime, which means somebody's got to go to Baghdad, in all prob-
ability, another 400 miles and a few other small problems—that
then, if we did this successfully, we would find willing allies and
assistance in helping us maintain the cost after the fact. After the
fact, which could be we've heard testimony today from serious
people—and yesterday—that the costs could—and I'm not sug-
gesting either of you agree, but the testimony we've heard from se-
rious people, including—Colonel Feil, but that was yesterday—the
military guy—my mind's blank here.
Thank you very much. I can rely upon the reporter. The Senate
reporter points out Cordesman was the one who was a very serious
guy, as well as today—Colonel Feil, with less experience, but still
very, very knowledgeable.
They're talking about 75,000 troops staying and so on and so
forth. Even if you don't get into those numbers, if you expect other
forces—everybody-does anybody believe that it's possible to go in,
take down Saddam and not have some foreign military presence,
whether it's ours or not, in Iraq for at least the near term, meaning
months, not a hundred hours, not a hundred days, but—well, that's
a hundred days, in months, but months? I mean, aren't we at least
signed onto that, just to literally physically assemble and order the
forces from our allies who might, after the fact, be willing to come
in-I mean, is that not-well, just logistically?
Mr. WEINBERGER. Again, it's a guess, Senator, but certainly some
time would be required of us to demonstrate our consistency and
our resolve.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. WEINBERGER. I don't know how long that would be, and I
don't know how many people would be involved. It would depend
entirely on how well the military-
The CHAIRMAN. The reason-look, I'm not trying to
Mr. BERGER. Mr. Chairman, maybe I could add-
The CHAIRMAN [continuing). Pin you guys down. I'm just trying
Mr. BERGER. Right, if I can just add one dimension to that. The
task of forging some sort of government going forward, which has
the support of Iraqis, strikes me as doable, but difficult. You have
a wide variety of external opposition groups, a wide variety of in-
ternal opposition groups, all of whom I would think you'd want to
draw upon in an exercise as part of at least the Iraqi piece of the
coalition. They have not had a great record of staying together,
even the two Kurdish groups, let alone all the others.
So there's going to be a period, it seems to me, when there is a
vacuum of power, even though we may have installed some other
to get


255
general, in the absence of some stabilizing presence. And that, it
seems to me, has to come from
The CHAIRMAN. The only reason I pursue this, again, in terms of
sort of a full disclosure to the American people here, we are talking
about more than several billion dollars, in terms of the cost of such
an operation, and we are talking about tens of billions of dollars-
I mean, granted, there's probably less of a—assuming chemical and
biological weapons aren't used, which could greatly escalate the
cost, in terms of human life and other ways, but there is also the
requirement this time to stay longer, whatever that means. It could
be weeks, it could be months, it could be, in some people's minds,
years, but it's longer.
Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. WEINBERGER. I think a great deal depends on our intentions.
And I want to call your attention to a much smaller scale-not a
replica of this operation, but Grenada. We went into Grenada with
more troops than everybody thought we needed, and we had a very
successful operation and prevented the kidnaping and detention of
American students, and we got out, and we got out in something
under a month. And a couple of months after that, there was a free
election, and we have not been back.
Now, that is obviously a much smaller scale and it had different
kinds of aspects to it, but the intention was very important, be-
cause the intention was to do just that
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. WEINBERGER [continuing]. To get in and get out.
And I think that given that kind of same sort of intention, we
could—depending on how success the military aspects are, we could
not have to remain as long as some people are talking about.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, that may be a good jump-off point. If Gre-
nada had sunk into the bottom of the Caribbean, the events of the
world would not have changed, God love the Grenadians, if that's
the correct way to pronounce it. If Grenada had signed a security
pact with the Soviet Union, it would not have made a whole lot of
difference. Iraq is so fundamentally different in terms of this re-
gard. You said, Mr. Secretary, I thought, that we have to dem-
onstrate we have the staying power, that—not only to take Saddam
down, I assume you meant, but to not walk away with the region
more destabilized than when we arrived.
Mr. WEINBERGER. Now, that certainly is true, and I don't know
how long that would take, but a lot would depend on how many
allies we had and how successful the military operation had been
and what kind of conditions were left. And if you start from-if you
have a complete military victory, then I would suggest that the re-
building phase and the length of time for us to stay would be less-
ened.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I—by the way, I'm not disagreeing—that if
we did it right, we could—I'm just trying to get broad parameters
here. I would I mean, look how long-I mean, some have com-
pared the need here to be the kind of commitment after the fact
we made to Japan and Germany. That's one extreme. The other ex-
treme is Grenada. And in between are experiences we had, like
Kosovo and Bosnia, where we had broad coalition support, where


256
we had a signficant success, where we routed the opposition, and
where we still have 7,000 forces. But-
Mr. BERGER. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. BERGER. We learned the hard way in Bosnia that artificial
deadlines are a mistake in a situation like that. We said we would
be out in a year. I think that was an honest judgment at the time.
It was wrong.
And basically, we have to be prepared to stay as long as it takes
until the conditions are such that a stable Iraq that is not threat-
ening to its neighbors can exist. And I don't think we're ever going
to be able to put a finer point on it than that, except “as long as
it takes.”
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, again, I'm not looking for a very fine
point. But we do know, in just broad macro terms, to have even the
minimum number of forces that anyone has suggested in anything
that's been leaked or discussed that I've heard, we're talking about
tens of thousands of forces going in. We may not be talking about
a quarter of a million. We may be talking about 75,000, but we're
talking a lot of forces. We're talking about it taking more than a
hundred hours—not the victory, but before we can leave.
And so, again, to give some sense of proportion to the American
people when we ask them for their permission, through their Con-
gress, to go in, if we ask them that
Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator.
The CHAIRMAN [continuing). I think we have an obligation to tell
them this is going to cost a lot of money. I'm not suggesting we
shouldn't pay it, but it may cost a lot of money.
Mr. WEINBERGER. I think that's true, but I also think we should
be pointing out the benefits
The CHAIRMAN. Oh, by the way, I agree.
Mr. WEINBERGER (continuing). Of a Saddam-free world.And I
think that they have to be ground into the equation, and I think
that's a very major factor.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree. I'm sorry, I thought I said at the out-
set-as I said at the outset, if we can make the case, which I
think-well, I won't say what I think yet; the hearings aren't fin-
ished—but if we can make the case that the threat is real and dire,
that a free and democratic Iraq, if it could be accomplished, could
have a cleansing impact on that part of the world and make our
life easier significantly down the road, which I think could be made
in an ideal circumstance—not even an ideal, in a—if we do things
right—that it is worth the price.
So I'm assuming we wouldn't vote to give the President the au-
thority to do this unless we thought that the price—or the potential
damage to us was so significant, and the price of victory was worth
it. But we then ultimately have to tell them what the price is. And
I don't mean in literal dollar terms; I mean in terms of reasonable
things we could anticipate.
But I can anticipate, since my staff just said there's 1 minute left
in the vote, that my colleagues were more correct than I was about
how certain the next vote was going to be. They're probably lit-
erally on their way back. The first one in, please authorize them
to begin the hearing. We're not going to trespass on your time


257
much longer, but I am going to have to go vote. So we'll recess until
the first Senator, Democrat or Republican, returns, and we'll begin
the questioning with them.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Senator NELSON (presiding]. The committee will resume. Chair-
man Biden is just finishing up voting on the floor and will be here
momentarily and asked me to go on. And we apologize to our wit-
nesses, but when they call the votes—when the roll is called up
yonder, one has to respond.
I wanted to ask both of you about your opinion with regard to
the influence of radical fundamentalist groups operating in north-
ern Iraq. Mr. Secretary?
Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, without certain knowledge, Senator—and
I would disclaim that at the beginning-I think it is common
knowledge that there are a great many of these groups in Iraq. I
don't know if that's especially limited to the north—but the climate
that is encouraged by Saddam Hussein is one that encourages
them to gather.
Many of the Arab countries, particularly the moderate Arab
countries, like Egypt, for example, are very worried about these
people, and they take every step they can to make sure that they
don't have undue influence on either policy or presence in the coun-
try.
I think Iraq is quite the contrary. I think they welcome them, be-
cause I think they do—as far as I know—they used to do a sub-
stantial amount of training of these people and preparing to un-
leash them on the world. So I would think that there is a substan-
tial infestation of radical Muslim groups and know that the country
is hospitable to them and that they can operating with more free-
dom they can in countries that are opposed to them.
Mr. BERGER. Senator, I obviously don't have access to the same
the same degree of access to the intelligence as I had a little more
than a year ago. So ultimately this obviously was a question that
has to be posed to the intelligence community.
Iraq, historically, has supported terrorist organizations, primarily
PKK, directed toward Turkey, the MEK, directed toward Iran. I
know that there is some evidence of support of late for groups in-
volved in support of the Palestinians against Israel.
Historically there has not been a close relationship between Sad-
dam Hussein and his regime and Islamic Jihaddist fundamental-
ists. They see Saddam-have seen Saddam as a secularist. He's
killed more Islamic clerics than he's killed Americans. They have,
of course, at this point, a common enemy, and that's why this is
something we have to be very attentive to and certainly be very
vigilant about.
But historically there has not been close relationship the Saddam
Hussein regime and the al-Qaeda, bin Laden, Islamic Jihaddist
movement.
Senator NELSON. Mr. Secretary, you had stated, I think, in your
actual remarks that you thought that there was a connection with
al-Qaeda. Would you elucidate and expand on that?
Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes; well, the initial reports were that there
were some small groups of al-Qaeda wandering around up in the


258
northern area, in the mountain area, working across the border
with Iran and so on. There is a lot more than that now. They have
been welcomed to the country, officially. Some of them are being
paid as martyrs by Saddam Hussein. And the information about al-
Qaeda in Baghdad that I've been told when I inquired is from sen-
ior intelligence officials who did not wish to be otherwise identified
but, of course, would testified at a closed hearing. I am told it's re-
liable by people with whom I have great confidence. And I think
that it might well be a good idea to have a closed hearing on the
subject. I would not be able to contribute more than I already have,
but I am told that that is the case, that the al-Qaeda groups are
welcome and that they are being supported, their families are
being supported, on the theory that they—some of them are mar-
tyrs from Palestine and Afghanistan and that they will continue to
be found useful by Saddam Hussein for the people with whom he
deals.
Senator NELSON. Do you think that Saddam Hussein would
share weapons of mass destruction with such groups?
Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I don't know if he'd share them or not.
I think he would—he would not be above allowing them to help in
the delivery of them or in the construction of them or as part of
his general plan. I know there's a theory around that he wouldn't
share them because he wants to have them all to himself, but my
belief is that he would utilize anybody that he could find, and he
doesn't have very many outside allies, and he has quite a few in-
side enemies. But I think he'd share the use of them and allow
them to participate in his—whatever plans he has. I don't think he
would hand them the weapons and turn away, no. But I don't think
that that's—I think that's a technical distinction that isn't very rel-
evant.
Senator NELSON. I'm quite interested in exploring this question
of connection with al-Qaeda, because we haven't seen a lot of com-
mentary about that.
Mr. Berger.
Mr. BERGER. Senator, first of all, in terms of connection to al-
Qaeda, I can't speak to that directly. I know that the intelligence
community has been looking rigorously at the issue of whether
there is a connection, over the last 10 months. And obviously it
would be important to hear from them as to what they've estab-
lished.
With respect—to me, the greatest threat Saddam poses—and you
can't rule out, obviously, the possibility of his sharing weapons of
mass destruction with terrorist organizations. He has had chemical
weapons for over a decade and has not taken that course. To me,
the greater threat is his own use of weapons of mass destruction
as a deterrent or directly. And specifically what I worry about most
is his obtaining a nuclear capability and believing that the posses-
sion of that capability would dissuade the United States, therefore,
from responding to an aggression by Saddam Hussein in the gulf
to seek to extend his influence, his hegemony, in the gulf. So there,
obviously, is the potential of his sharing weapons of mass destruc-
tion with terrorist groups. It has not been his pattern to date. I
think we should I suspect the intelligence community is looking


259
under every rock for a connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam
Hussein, and I encourage that. But I can't speak to it directly.
Senator NELSON. Is it your understanding that his threat of
chemical and biological warfare was one of the reasons that we did
not move on Baghdad 11 years ago in the gulf war?
Mr. BERGER. Well, I—Secretary Weinberger could speak to this
you know, I accept President Bush-first President Bush's expla-
nation at face value on that, whether, in hindsight, we agree or
not, which is that he had a coalition-he had constructed a coali-
tion around a purpose, which was to expel—to defeat the aggres-
sion of Iraq into Kuwait. Having accomplished that, President
Bush has said he felt that, in a sense, the mandate of that coalition
no longer existed.
I think, obviously, with hindsight, had we continued on for sev-
eral more days and at least eliminated the Republican Guard units,
we might not be facing this problem at this point. But I don't know
that I've ever heard this articulated in terms of fear of use of chem-
ical weapons. In fact, as you know, of course, there was a very ex-
plicit warning issued to Saddam Hussein with respect to use of
chemical weapons against third countries—Israel, Saudi Arabia-
which obviously had a deterrent effect in that context.
The CHAIRMAN (presiding]. Will the Senator yield on that point
for a just a moment?
Senator NELSON. I would yield to the chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. We heard testimony yesterday from one of the
witnesses saying that they thought that the reason—they thought,
in their discussions with Iraqis, that Iraqis believe and Saddam's
cadre believed that the reason we stopped is because they had
chemical and biological weapons. I have not heard anyone assert
that the reason President Bush decided to stop was his fear of con-
cern about or thought that chemical weapons would be used
against American forces. And so—but I've not heard anybody make
the assertion that President Bush, one, stopped because of concern
about chemical or biological weapons.
Mr. WEINBERGER. I was not in office at that time, Senator, but
I agree with you, I have not heard that, and I think if you look at
the timeframe, it's not at all credible, because the war was over in
such a short time, and there were a number of people who felt that
the televised pictures of the road into the southern part of Iraq had
been littered with all of the equipment and tanks and everything
that we destroyed and that this might look a little too bloodthirsty
and we would have a chance to get an acceptable peace.
I think the fatal error was in believing you could trust Saddam
Hussein. And you can't, you couldn't, and you never can in the fu-
ture. But I don't think that it had any connection between the
chemical warfare capability, whatever it was at that time.
The CHAIRMAN. To beg the indulgence of my colleagues just a
minute more, the context in which this discussion took place yes-
terday was whether or not deterrence worked. And it was argued
by one of the witnesses that deterrence worked, the threat of
annihalation essentially issued by Bush, one, to Saddam was the
reason why Saddam did not use his chemical or biological weapons.
Another witness responded and said, “Well, in Iraq they say the
reason we didn't keep going was a threat that Saddam would use


261
it, unfettered, that would alleviate our concerns about Saddam
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.
However, I do think that the process of seeking that kind of ro-
bust, unfettered regime is a useful device in focusing the world
back on Saddam Hussein and away from us. He would have to ex-
plain why he doesn't want the world in, why he won't accept this.
And the moral balance here shifts from whether we're acting uni-
laterally, whether we're acting legitimately, to what does he have
to hide? Why won't he let the world in? So as a tactical matter, I
do believe that we can use an absolutist position in the United Na-
tions, an uncompromising, absolutist position, to serve our purpose
of gaining some greater support in the world for an action we may
have to take.
Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I would have to disagree, Mr. Chairman.
You're never going to get an absolutist position out of the United
Nations.
Mr. BERGER. No, I'm talking about an absolutist position by the
United States.
Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes, I know, and-
Mr. BERGER. I believe-
Mr. WEINBERGER [continuing). We can be very insistent, and
they will do what they've always done. If Saddam knows that that's
what we want, he'll say yes, and then when we go in, he'll say,
“Oh, yes, but," and you haven't focused world opinion any more
than you have now. He's had 4 years in which he has succeeded
in throwing out an absolute U.N. resolution. And asking for it
again is asking for more useless promises from him.
Mr. BERGER. Well-
Mr. WEINBERGER. And that's essentially what you're doing, that
he may give a useless promise, and then all you've done is given
him more time to develop these weapons.
Mr. BERGER. Well, I assume that we have the control of our own
vote, and I assume that if we have the tenacity to go to war in
Iraq, we have the tenacity to stand out ground in New York.
And, therefore, if we say we will only accept a regime which we
define as being an absolutist regime, one of two things will happen.
He will say no, in which case I believe we're in a stronger position
internationally, or he will say yes, in which case the inspectors will
go in, and he will play games with them, and a very clear causus
belli will have been established.
So I don't see inspections as a very probable way of solving the
WMD problem. I do see it as a useful mechanism for focusing the
world back on Saddam Hussein, weapons of mass destruction, and
the threat that he poses.
Mr. WEINBERGER. If I disagreed again, I'd simply be repeating
myself, so I won't take your time for that.
Senator NELSON. Well, I'll ask you this final question. Then I'm
going to turn it over to Senator Feingold.
Give us your opinion if the President should consult with Con-
gress before taking military action in Iraq.
Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I think it's always desirable to have con-
gressional support, and I think there certainly would be and should
be consultation. I think that we have to have in mind the Execu-
tive capabilities, the Executive prerogatives under the Constitution.


263
tification for the kind of operation that Mr. Berger was just refer-
ring to.
But I do appreciate your being here, and let me just ask a couple
of questions. What would be the cost to the multilateral coalition
against terrorism if the United States were to begin a major mili-
tary operation in Iraq tomorrow, sort of in concrete terms? What
diplomatic work would need to be done to reduce the costs? Would
our allies, or even states that are not allies, need certain commit-
ments from us? And is it possible to significantly reduce those
costs? For either one of you.
Mr. WEINBERGER. Well
, Senator, I would say that you certainly
should expend a great deal of time and effort in trying to rebuild
a major coalition. I think that this involves a considerable degree
of consultation ahead of time. I think that it's important for those
nations to be with us, and I think those consultations can continue
what has actually been started, as I understand it—that is, the
persuasion that we are serious, that we do make—plan to make a
major commitment, and we plan to win. And I think that that
needs to be done and emphasized in whatever way it can be done
consistent with security of the operation, with all of our potential
allies, including the existing ones.
And obviously some of the moderate Arab nations should be
brought in, as they were last time. We had—I think we had 31 na-
tions in the gulf war coalition, and I think that it worked extremely
well, and I think we should certainly try to reconstitute as much
of that as we can.
Senator FEINGOLD. How much success do you think we will have?
How many of those countries do you think we can get?
Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I think, as I said earlier, I think before
you were here, that success has many allies. And I think that if
it's quite clear we're going in with the resources that we have and
the resources necessary to win, that we'll pick up quite a few.
And I think we have to realize the hatred that is felt for Saddam
Hussein in the region. And his neighbors know him. And what
they're afraid of is being caught out on a limb in which we've start-
ed down a road and turned back. They live there. They're there all
the time. We're not.
So I think that's a real fear that they have, and I think that has
to be overcome, and I think it can be done best by consultation, by
discussions ahead and by major efforts made to reconstitute as
much of the coalition as we can.
I don't have any idea how many we would get. Probably not 31
at the beginning. But as things went on, and if the military oper-
ation showed signs of success, I would dare to venture that we'd
pick up quite a few.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Weinberger.
Mr. Berger.
Mr. BERGER. Senator, let me first make a distinction I made in
my earlier remarks. I think the fight against terrorists and the
threat of Saddam Hussein, while they are related, are not identical.
We had a-Saddam was a threat before 9/11, and he's a threat
whether or not he links up with terrorists. Therefore, it seems to
me, one way to look at your question is what is—what is the cost,


265
a soluble problem, that it is not a problem—that is, Saddam Hus-
sein—that we can succeed in our objective, which I said at the out-
set, either we separate him from his weapons, or him from Iraq.
And I think the latter is the more likely thing to happen, but I
think it does matter how we do it, when we do it, and that the
American people are fully informed and we have their fully in-
formed consent.
So you've been, as usual, both very good, and I cannot promise
you I will not ask you back again. My expectation is I will be ask-
ing you again. I hope you will be as accommodating with your time
as you have been in the past when we resume these hearings.
I want to congratulate the staff—Tony Blinken, the new staff di-
rector, as well as the Republican staff director, and all the staffs
for putting together what I hope everyone understands was a truly
bipartisan and thoroughly balanced discussion of the problems that
we face and the opportunities we have.
And so we will-I leaned back to you a moment ago and indi-
cated that I hope they will—not hope—I have asked them, so I do
hope, since I've asked them, that they will summarize what we
have learned here for us and put together a proposal for Senator
Lugar and me—and hopefully, by then, Senator Helms and me
to consider as we proceed in the fall with further discussion of the
issues relating to Iraq.
With that, gentlemen, unless you have a closing comment-
Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, I would like to thank you and thank
the committee and thank you, first of all for having the debate and
thank you for the very fair and decent manner in which it's been
conducted and in which we all had, not only an opportunity, but
a very ample opportunity, to explain all of our views. So I congratu-
late you. I'm glad you had the hearings, and I will look forward to
whatever comes out of it.
Mr. BERGER. And I certainly share that view, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you all very much. We are ad-
journed.
[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHYLLIS BENNIS, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES
Nelson Mandela was right when he said that attacking Iraq would be "a disaster.”
A U.S. invasion of Iraq would risk the lives of U.S. military personnel and inevitably
kill thousands of Iraqi civilians; it is not surprising that many U.S. military officers,
including some within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are publicly opposed to a new war
against Iraq. Such an attack would violate international law and the UN Charter,
and isolate us from our friends and allies around the world. An invasion would pre-
vent the future return of UN arms inspectors, and will cost billions of dollars ur-
gently needed at home. And at the end of the day, an invasion will not insure sta-
bility, let alone democracy, in Iraq or the rest of the volatile Middle East region,
and will put American civilians at greater risk of hatred and perhaps terrorist at-
tacks than they are today.
PURPORTED LINKS TO TERRORISM
It is now clear that (despite intensive investigative efforts) there is simply no evi-
dence of any Iraqi involvement in the terror attacks of September 11. The most pop-
ular theory, of a Prague-based collaboration between one of the 9/11 terrorists and


266
an Iraqi official, has now collapsed. Just two weeks ago, the Prague Post quoted the
director general of the Czech foreign intelligence service UZSI (Office of Foreign Re-
lations and Information), Frantisek Bublan, denying the much-touted meeting be-
tween Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers, and an Iraqi agent.
More significantly, the Iraqi regime's brutal treatment of its own population has
generally not extended to international terrorist attacks. The State Department's
own compilation of terrorist activity in its 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism, re-
leased May 2002, does not document a single serious act of international terrorism
by Iraq. Almost all references are either to political statements made or not made
or hosting virtually defunct militant organizations.
We are told that we must go to war preemptively against Iraq because Baghdad
might, some time in the future, succeed in crafting a dangerous weapon and might,
some time in the future, give that weapon to some unknown terrorist group—maybe
Osama bin Laden—who might, some time in the future, use that weapon against
the U.S. The problem with this analysis, aside from the fact that preemptive strikes
are simply illegal under international law, is that it ignores the widely known his-
toric antagonism between Iraq and bin Laden. According to the New York Times,
"shortly after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, Osama bin Laden approached
Prince Sultan bin Abdelaziz al-Saud, the Saudi defense minister, with an unusual
proposition. ... Arriving with maps and many diagrams, Mr. Bin Laden told Prince
Sultan that the kingdom could avoid the indignity of allowing an army of American
unbelievers to enter the kingdom to repel Iraq from Kuwait. He could lead the fight
himself, he said, at the head of a group of former mujahideen that he said could
number 100,000 men.” 1 Even if bin Laden's claim to be able to provide those troops
was clearly false, bin Laden's hostility towards the ruthlessly secular Iraq remained
evident. There is simply no evidence that that has changed.
Ironically, an attack on Iraq would increase the threat to U.S. citizens throughout
the Middle East and perhaps beyond, as another generation of young Iraqis come
to identify Americans only as the pilots of high-flying jet bombers and as troops oc-
cupying their country. While today American citizens face no problems from ordi-
nary people in the streets of Baghdad or elsewhere in Iraq, as I documented during
my visit to Iraq with five Congressional staffers in August 1999, that situation
would likely change in the wake of a U.S. attack on Iraq. In other countries
throughout the Middle East, already palpable anger directed at U.S. threats would
dramatically escalate and would provide a new recruiting tool for extremist ele-
ments bent on harm to U.S. interests or U.S. citizens. It would become far more
risky for U.S. citizens to travel abroad.
THE HUMAN TOLL
While estimates of casualties among U.S. servicepersonnel are not public, we can
be certain they will be much higher than in the current war in Afghanistan. We
do know, from Pentagon estimates of two years ago, the likely death toll among
Iraqi civilians: about 10,000 Iraqi civilians would be killed. And the destruction of
civiſian infrastructure such as water, electrical and communications equipment,
would lead to tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of more civilian deaths, particu-
larly among children, the aged and others of the most vulnerable sectors. We can
anticipate that such targeted attacks would be justified by claims of “dual use." But
if we look back to the last U.S. war with Iraq, we know that the Pentagon planned
and carried out knowing and documenting the likely impact on civilians. In one
case, Pentagon planners anticipated that striking Iraq's civilian infrastructure
would cause “Increased incidence of diseases [that] will be attributable to degrada-
tion of normal preventive medicine, waste disposal, water purification/distribution,
electricity, and decreased ability to control disease outbreaks. . . ." The Defense In-
telligence Agency document (from the Pentagon's Gulflink Web site), “Disease Infor-
mation-Subject: Effects of Bombing on Disease Occurrence in Baghdad” is dated
22 January 1991, just six days after the war began. It itemized the likely outbreaks
to include: “acute diarrhea” brought on by bacteria such as E. coli, shigella, and sal-
monella, or by protozoa such as giardia, which will affect “particularly children," or
by rotavirus, which will also affect “particularly children.” And yet the bombing of
the water treatment systems proceeded, and indeed, according to UNICEF figures,
hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, “particularly children,” died from the effects of
dirty water.
The most recent leaked military plan for invading Iraq, the so-called “inside-out”
plan based on a relatively small contingent of U.S. ground troops with heavy reli-
1 Douglas Jehl, "Holy War Lured Saudis as Rulers Looked Away," New York Times, December
27, 2001.


267
ance on air strikes, would focus first and primarily on Baghdad. The Iraqi capital
is described as being ringed with Saddam Hussein's crack troops and studded with
anti-aircraft batteries. What is never mentioned in the report is the inconvenient
fact that Baghdad is also a crowded city of four to five million people; a heavy air
bombardment would cause the equivalent human catastrophe of heavy air bombard-
ment of Los Angeles.
THE U.S. AND OUR ALLIES
There is no international support, at the governmental or public level, for a U.S.
attack on Iraq. Our closest allies throughout Europe, in Canada, and elsewhere,
have made clear their opposition to a military invasion. While they recognize the
Iraqi regime as a brutal, undemocratic regime, they do not support a unilateral pre-
emptive military assault as an appropriate response to that regime. Yes, it is certain
that if the U.S. announces it is indeed going to war, that most of those governments
would grudgingly follow along. When President Bush repeats his mantra that "you
are either with us or with the terrorists,” there is not a government around the
world prepared to stand defiant. But a foreign policy based on international coercion
and our allies' fear of retaliation for noncompliance, is not a policy that will protect
Americans and our place in the world.
In the Middle East region, only Israel supports the U.S. build-up to war in Iraq.
The Arab states, including our closest allies, have made unequivocal their opposition
to an invasion of Iraq. Even Kuwait, once the target of Iraqi military occupation and
ostensibly the most vulnerable to Iraqi threats, has moved to normalize its relations
with Baghdad. The Arab League-sponsored rapprochement between Iraq and Ku-
wait at the March 2002 Arab Summit is now underway, including such long-overdue
moves as the return of Kuwait's national archives. Iraq has now repaired its rela-
tions with every Arab country. Turkey has refused to publicly announce its agree-
ment to allow use of its air bases, and Jordan and other Arab countries have made
clear their urgent plea for the U.S. to abjure a military attack on Iraq.
Again, it is certain that not a single government in the region would ultimately
stand against a U.S. demand for base rights, use of airspace or overflight rights,
or access to any other facilities. The question we must answer therefore is not
whether our allies will ultimately accede to our wishes, but just how big a price are
we prepared to exact from our allies? Virtually every Arab government, especially
those most closely tied to the U.S. (Jordan and Egypt, perhaps even Saudi Arabia)
will face dramatically escalated popular opposition. The existing crisis of legitimacy
faced by these undemocratic, repressive, and non-representative regimes, monar-
chies and president-for-life style democracies, will be seriously exacerbated by a U.S.
invasion of Iraq. Region-wide instability will certain result, and some of those gov-
ernments might even face the possibility of being overthrown.
THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
We claim to be a nation of laws. But too often we are prepared to put aside the
requirements of international law and the United Nations Charter to which we hold
other nations appropriately accountable.
When it comes to policy on Iraq, the U.S. has a history of sidelining the central
role that should be played by the United Nations. This increasingly unilateralist
trajectory is one of the main reasons for the growing international antagonism to-
wards the U.S. By imposing its will on the Security Council—insisting on the con-
tinuation of economic sanctions when virtually every other country wants to lift
them, announcing its intention to ignore the UN in deciding whether to go to war
against Iraq—the U.S. isolates us from our allies, antagonizes our friends, and sets
our nation apart from the international systems of laws that govern the rest of the
world. This does not help, but rather undermines, our long-term security interests.
International law does not allow for preemptive military strikes, except in the
case of preventing an immediate attack. We simply do not have the right-no coun-
try does—to launch a war against another country that has not attacked us. If the
Pentagon had been able to scramble a jet to take down the second plane flying into
the World Trade Center last September, that would be a legal use of preemptive
self defense. An attack on Iraq—which does not have the capacity, and has not for
a decade or more shown any specific intention or plan or effort to attack the U.S.-
violates international law and the UN Charter.
The Charter, in Article 51, outlines the terms under which a Member State of the
United Nations may use force in self-defense. That Article acknowledges a nation's
“inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken meas-
ures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” [Emphasis added.]


270
Perhaps even more important than these relief and development efforts has been
MCC's focus on relationship-building. In addition to having MCC staff present in
Baghdad since 1998, MCC has sponsored numerous learning trips to Iraq. As direc-
tor of MCC's Washington Office I traveled to Iraq twice, in October of 1998 and
again in May of 2002. In my most recent trip, we met with church leaders and U.N.
and Iraqi government officials.
TESTIMONY
From our tradition as an historic peace church and out of MCC's experience in
Iraq, we strongly urge the Senate to oppose military action against Iraq. The con-
sequences of a military invasion are many, and there are compelling nonviolent al-
ternatives to war. Many points similar to those below were issued in a 20 April 2002
statement by the MCC Executive Committee.
1. War will cause enormous human suffering
For more than 20 years, ordinary Iraqis have suffered from the aftermath of the
Iran Iraq and Gulf wars and from the impact of comprehensive U.N. sanctions in-
tended to contain and control the Iraqi government. According to UNICEF (May
2002 figures), one in eight Iraqi children currently dies before their 5th birthday
and one in three suffer from chronic malnutrition. The UNICEF director told our
delegation that, in 1989, Iraq ranked 3rd out of 16 Middle Eastern/North African
countries on the Human Development Index. By 1999, Iraq ranked 13th and per-
haps ranks even lower today. One-fifth of Iraqi children weigh less than 5.5 pounds
at birth, making them more vulnerable to diseases.
While the U.N.'s oil-for-food program has halted the decline in most sectors, the
director of UNICEF told our delegation that the education sector has not yet hit bot-
tom. Some 3,000 to 4,000 schools need to be rehabilitated and another 5,000 new
schools are needed. With the lack of a cash component in the oil-for-food program,
teachers in Iraq are paid only $5 per month.
A U.S. invasion of Iraq will only make a bad situation worse. The likely and fore-
seeable consequences of another war include the deaths of thousands of innocent
Iraqi children and civilians, in addition to significant U.S. casualties.
Furthermore, war will divert critical development resources toward emergency re-
lief. CARE International—who has been rebuilding Iraq's water infrastructure, dam-
aged in previous wars—told our delegation in May 2002 that they are already mak-
ing contingency plans to refocus on emergency relief if the United States declares
war on Iraq.
2. War will make the United States and the Middle East less secure, not more
War against Iraq will increase anti-American sentiment in the region and around
the world. One Iraqi told our MCC delegation that a whole generation of Iraqi youth
are growing up with “bitterness in their bellies” toward the United States. Whereas
many Iraqis of the previous generation were educated in the West, the current gen-
eration of Iraqi youth know only of U.S. bombs and sanctions.
War will provide yet another example that the world's superpower is unilaterally
able to impose its will and wish on less powerful countries. One Iraqi evangelical
church leader told our delegation, “We hope that someday your country will stop
doing everything with force.
War will increase the divide between the United States and the Arab world, and
will strengthen the view that the United States has a strong anti-Muslim bias. By
some estimates, there are up to one million Iraqi Christians, 3-5% of the population.
A U.S.-led war may well make their situation more vulnerable, to say nothing of
the increased difficulties it will create for Muslims in the United States.
War will also destabilize the region by fueling the more radical elements of soci-
ety. Furthermore, war could well lead to internal fragmentation in Iraq, creating
long-term uncertainty and instability. The longstanding divisions within Iraqi soci-
ety are well-documented in books like Sandra Mackey's, “The Reckoning."
3. There are no compelling moral grounds for declaring war
As an historic peace church, Mennonites and other Anabaptist groups oppose all
war. But a war against Iraq fails to meet even the more popular “just war” cri-
teria-e.g., just cause, likelihood of success, proportional to provocation, all alter-
natives exhausted, no significant collateral damage, etc.
By failing to uphold even these minimal standards for launching and fighting a
war, the United States will certainly develop a moral laryngitis to speak to other
situations of conflict in the world. If the United States so readily resorts to war to
settle its differences, what voice will it have to encourage peacemaking between In-
dians and Pakistanis or between Israelis and Palestinians?


271
4. There are no compelling legal grounds for declaring war
The United States has established no credible link between Iraq and the events
of September 11. Military action against Iraq would be a preemptive strike based
on speculative threats, not a matter of self-defense. As such, it appears to violate
the UN Charter and raises serious questions about U.S. respect for and commitment
to international law. It sets a dangerous precedent of preemptive military attacks
for other countries who may feel threatened by their neighbors.
5. There are good alternatives to war
At a minimum, the United States should have direct face-to-face conversations
with the Iraqi government before going to war. One Iraqi minister appealed to our
MCC delegation to encourage such face-to-face dialogue and, specifically, invited
members of Congress to visit Iraq.
It is more productive for the United States to address specific objectionable behav-
iors in face-to-face conversation than to trade harsh rhetoric through the media or
to paint, with broad brush strokes, a whole country as evil.
The United States should also work in good faith with other countries to reintro-
duce U.N. weapons' inspectors. Iraq has no incentive to cooperate with weapons in-
spectors when the United States has publicly declared its intentions of overthrowing
the Iraqi government. Furthermore, a regional approach to disarmament holds more
promise than simply shining the spotlight on Iraq. Indeed, the cease-fire agreement
ending the Gulf War called for a “Middle East zone free from weapons of mass de-
struction.”
Finally, international tribunals provide opportunities to adjudicate allegations
against perpetrators of crimes against humanity without subjecting entire popu-
lations to the devastating effects of war.
CONCLUSION
Responding to a question about a possible U.S. invasion of Iraq, an Iraqi evan-
gelical Christian told our MCC delegation two months ago, “The United States will
do what it wants to do. We will trust God.”
What will the United States do?
More than a decade ago, the United States went to war with Iraq because of its
aggression against Kuwait. Now the United States is considering its own military
aggression.
The U.S. Congress can help cast a more compelling vision and choose a more
hopeful path. We are at a critical juncture in human history. If the United States
does not in this moment of crisis demonstrate a resolute commitment to the rule
of law, show respect for the international will and vigorously uphold human rights,
how will it encourage the development of these values around the world?
There is a more positive path forward. War is not the answer. It should be a
strong word of caution that our European and Arab allies are steadfast in their op-
position to declaring war on Iraq.
I urge you to carefully calculate the costs of war and to seriously consider the al-
ternatives.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PETER L. PELLOT, EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF NUTRI-
TION, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS IN AMHERST AND DR. COLIN ROWAT, LEC-
TURER IN ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM
POTENTIAL CIVILIAN CONSEQUENCES OF INCREASED U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST
IRAQ
Introduction
This note outlines some potential consequences for Iraq's civilian population of in-
creased U.S. military action designed to topple the Iraqi regime. These depend sub-
stantially on the actual conduct of any such action which is, at present, unknown.
Thus, this note combines information from Iraq's experience in the Gulf war with
more recent information on civilian vulnerability.
Nutritional considerations and vulnerabilities
In 1990-1991 widely varying estimates of Iraqi food reserves were cited. One
month after sanctions imposition, on 13 September 1990, Marjatta Rasi, chair of the
Security Council's Iraq Sanctions Committee, estimated Iraqi food stocks to be


272
“enough to last anywhere from two months to more than six months.” 1 The previous
week, U.S. officials on the Sanctions Committee had blocked Bulgarian baby food
shipments to Iraq, arguing that “that there is enough food stockpiled in Iraq and
Kuwait to last a year”; U.S. officials had previously estimated Iraqi stocks to last
three months.2
By February 1991, vegetable oil, sugar, tea and dairy products were reportedly
depleted by February; wheat shortages were possible before the May-June harvest;
rice supplies were short, livestock were being slaughtered. Fruit and vegetables
were scarcer, but severe shortages were not expected. 3
Estimates of current levels of preparedness are also speculative. There are some
indications that Iraqis are hoarding supplies but,4 having depleted their savings
over the early 1990s, and they may not be in a position to build up substantial per-
sonal reserves. It is rumored that the Iraqi government has been stockpiling food-
stuffs in preparation for war. The 1990s have eroded health as well as savings.
Despite significant increases in the food ration since the "oil for food” programme
began in 1996, child malnutrition rates in the South Center of the country do not
appear to have improved significantly and nutritional problems remain serious and
widespread.5 Wasting in under five-year-olds is unacceptably high at around 10%.
The indication of high levels of malnutrition supports UN findings that infant and
child mortality have more than doubled since the end of the 1980's.6 Classical rec-
ognizable signs of severe malnutrition such as marasmus and kwashiorkor continue
to be observed in hospital pediatric wards. The nutritional status of school children
aged five to eight years based primarily on stunting and those aged nine to 15 years
based on low BMI (Body Mass Index) is a cause for concern especially for those from
rural areas and poor households. Micronutrient deficiencies are common and iron
deficiency anemia is high. The existing food rations do not provide a nutritionally
adequate and varied diet. Although, since its effective implementation in 1997, the
"oil for food” program has halted further deterioration in the nutritional situation,
these activities have not by themselves been able to reverse this trend. In spite of
the fact that the ration is reasonably adequate in food energy and total protein, it
is lacking in vegetables, fruit, and animal products and is therefore deficient in
micronutrients and animal protein.
The monthly food basket has lasted up to three weeks depending on the type of
ration. This deficit has to be made up by food purchases, further straining re-
sources. Many households cannot afford to supplement their diet with an adequate
variety of non-ration foods and intakes of micronutrients such as iron and Vitamin
A remain far below requirements. Adequate amounts of items such as meat, milk
and vegetables are too costly for many families to purchase to supplement their diet
given the parallel decline in the economy and the residual effects of the recent
drought on the availability of crops and horticultural products. Consequently a sig-
nificant portion of the population requires special attention, particularly the most
vulnerable population groups of women and young children whose coping strategies
are quickly being eroded. As is now well recognized, even mild malnutrition leads
to greater susceptibility to infectious diseases with increased mortality as a con-
sequence of the poor water quality and deficient sanitation.
Against Iraqis' vulnerable nutritional status, the sanctions on Iraq are looser in
theory than they were in 1991. In practice, the humanitarian program's escrow ac-
count is almost $2.1 billion in deficit, preventing the ordering of new supplies. 8 Or-
ders awaiting delivery mean that the consequences of this shortfall are likely to be
felt in the coming months rather than immediately. As the Sanctions Committee re-
mains deadlocked over oil pricing formulae, optimism is not warranted. In fact,
suggestions that the deadlock may deepen as the U.S. administration seeks to deny
114 September, 1990. “U.N. Council Votes Strict Limits On Food Aid to Iraq and Kuwait",
Paul Lewis, New York Times.
28 September, 1990. “Baghdad ‘has enough food for a year'”, Leonard Doyle, The (London)
Independent.
3 26 February_1991. “Iraq's Food and Agricultural Situation During the Embargo and the
War", Susan B. Epstein, CRS Report for Congress.
4 26 July 2002. “Waiting for war exacts terrible toll”, Yasmine Bahrani, USA Today.
52000. "Assessment of the Food and Nutrition Situation: Iraq”, Food and Agricultural Organi-
zation of the United Nations. Rome Italy, ES:TCP/IRQ/8924.
627 May 2000. "Sanctions and childhood mortality in Iraq”, Mohamed M. Ali and Iqbal H.
Shah, The Lancet, (9218) pp. 1851-57.
7FAO 2000.
8 23 July 2002. "Weekly Update (13-19 July 2002)", UN Office of the Iraq Programme.
9 29 July 2002. “Talks on Disarmament and Oil Pricing at an Impasse”, Middle East Economic
Survey, A9-A10.


273
the Iraqi government access to oil revenues are grounds for pessimism.10 In the
event of military action, most civilian trade is likely to be interrupted.
A 20 February UNICEF brainstorming exercise imagined
that interruption of food distribution is possible. Pregnant and lactating
women as well as young children are the most likely victims. Chaos would
be the immediate effect. Very rapid intervention by the [World Food Pro-
gram] (in the midst of chaos) would be required to avoid further deteriora-
tion of malnutrition and even famine on a large scale.11
It asked: “Does the WFP have the capacity to rapidly distribute 350,000 metric
tons/month (the current Government food ration) in Ŝ/C Îraq if required?”
Damage to civilian infrastructure
Iraq's electrical grid is likely to be one of the first targets of U.S. military action.
In 1991, “electrical power was the most severely damaged component of the whole
Iraqi target system” with Baghdad losing power 10 minutes into the air war, and
not regaining power until after the cease-fire, nearly three months later. 12' This
quickly caused “the loss of perishable foods, such as frozen meat and refrigerated
produce.” 13
Orders were given that “electrical targets will be targeted to minimize recuper-
ation time” 14, including by the use of carbon-fiber warheads to short-circuit facili-
ties. Nevertheless, post war assessments estimated that it would take five to nine
years to restore Iraq's electrical power system.15 There is some evidence that initial
repairs were conducted more quickly than expected, 16 but the most recent evidence
suggests that Iraq's electrical supply is still at 38% of installed capacity during peak
summer load.17 Iraq is “dependent on electrical power for water purification and dis-
tribution, sewage treatment, and the functioning of hospitals and health care cen-
ters” 18 as well as for the refrigeration of food and storage of medicines.
Damage to water treatment plants had removed some 2.5 million Iraqis from the
government water supply and left those still connected to it receiving one quarter
their pre-war levels in quantitative terms; water quality had declined. This led di-
rectly to an outbreak of diarrheal diseases, typhoid and cholera as well as decreas-
ing the ability of Iraq's medical system to maintain public health.19
Mortality estimates
U.S. estimates of the direct casualties of the Gulf war are as low as 10,000 deaths.
The Iraqi government has reported a figure of 20,000 deaths, 1,000 of which were
civilians, and 60,000 wounded. 20
Studies of post-war Iraqi child mortality have sought to identify indirect deaths
as well. A 1991 international study of 16,000 Iraqi households in 1991 concluded
that “the Gulf war and trade sanctions caused a threefold increase in mortality
among Iraqi children under five years of age”, estimating that 'an excess of more
than 46,900 children died between January and August 1991.” 21 Subsequent cor-
respondence noted that the largest rises had occurred in regions affected by the
1991 uprising, leading to the suggestion that as few as 21,000 excess under five
child deaths may have been caused by the "Gulf war and trade sanctions alone”. 22
10 29 July 2002. “US raises pressure on Iraq using oil revenues”, Roula Khalaf, Financial
Times.
11 20 February 2002. “Food Security in Iraq: Some Food for Thought”, Carol de Rooy, Unicef
Baghdad.
12 1993. The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, Lawrence
Freedman and Efraim Karsh, Princeton University Press, p. 322.
13 Epstein.
14 1995. The Generals' War: the Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, Michael R. Gordon
and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, Little Brown, p. 316.
15 Freedman and Karsh, p. 322.
16 Gordon and Trainor, p. 519 note 18.
1720 November 2001. Report from the Electricity Working Group to the Iraq Sanctions Com-
mittee, Slide6.
18 26 Septeqiber 1991. “The Effect of the Gulf Crisis on the Children of Iraq”, Harvard Study
Team, New England Journal of Medicine, pp. 977-980.
19 17 July 1991. "Report to the Secretary-General dated 15 July 1991 on humanitarian needs
in Iraq prepared by a mission led by the Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General for hu-
manitarian assistance in Iraq”, Sadruddin Aga Khan, S/22799, para. 16-17.
20 Freedman and Karsh, p. 408.
21 24 September 1992. "Effect of the Gulf War on Infant and Child Mortality in Iraq”, Asherio
et al., New England Journal of Medicine, pp. 931-936.
226_May 1993. “The Gulf War and Infant and Child Mortality in Iraq”, Arthur Bierman, The
New England Journal of Medicine, correspondence.


274
This discrepancy may also reflect greater damage done in southern Iraq by Desert
Storm itself and greater vulnerabilities both there and in Iraqi Kurdistan.
A 1998 study of Iraqi child mortality that examined associated social indicators
concluded that the rise in under five child mortality in Iraq “mainly associated with
the Gulf war” was, at minimum, 25,000 but more likely to be around 56,000.23
Iraqi Kurdistan
Iraqi Kurdistan is generally held to enjoy better living conditions than does South/
Central Iraq. Its inhabitants receive a higher per capita allocation under the “oil
for food” program; its climate is more amenable to agriculture, receiving more rain;
KDP-controlled regions have benefited from the Iraqi-Turkish diesel trade; the UN
distribution system may be more efficient than the Iraqi government system.
At the same time, it is subject to particular vulnerabilities. Unlike in South/Cen-
ter Iraq, the ration in Iraqi Kurdistan is distributed by the UN, and stored in ware-
houses in South Center Iraq. As UN staff are likely to evacuate rapidly upon the
escalation of hostilities, the ration system can be expected to collapse. It is not
known whether Kurdish regional authorities have stockpiled reserves. Against this,
winter rainfall was good this year, leading to an expected wheat harvest of 500,000
metric tons.24 Nevertheless, in February, Save the Children UK, an NGO working
in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991, warned that Iraqi Kurds were highly dependent on
the ration system for their food and that its diminution could, “send Kurds living
in Northern Iraq over the edge into a humanitarian catastrophe.” 25
In 1991, nearly two million Kurds fled to Iran and Turkey. The conditions of those
in Turkey were sufficiently appalling to generate an international uproar; during
the worst period, the U.S. State Department and relief agencies estimated the refu-
gees' daily death toll at 500-1000.26 A withdrawal of UN staff may suffice to trigger
a similar exodus. The Turkish authorities may now be more hostile to Iraqi Kurds,
having been surprised and disturbed by the establishment of the Kurdish Autono-
mous Region. Iran may already be preparing to accept refugees from Iraq,27 but the
ability to provide for them may be complicated by the U.S. administration's harsh
stance towards Iran in spite of the latter's assistance during the Afghan campaign.
Co-mingilng of civilian and military targets
In 1991, Iraqi assets were exposed to systematic destruction by Coalition forces.
While their positioning away from civilian centers likely reduced civilian casualties,
it is unlikely that they will be so deployed again. It is possible that the increased
accuracy of U.S. munitions will be sufficiently able to discriminate between military
and civilian targets to hold civilian casualties low. At the same time, U.S. forces
have no recent live experience in the co-mingled environment that they may face
in Iraq.
Contingencies
It is feared that, if the Iraqi government is faced with its overthrow, it will not
hesitate to use any non-conventional resources at its disposal. Given its record of
harsh measures against the Iraqi population, it is possible that these will not only
be deployed on the battlefield or against Israel and other neighboring countries sup-
porting military action, but against U.S. forces in Iraqi urban centers. Iraq's civilian
population is unlikely to be equipped for such a possibility and may suffer substan-
tial casualties. Some international NGOs working in Iraq are aware that they have
no experience operating in environments contaminated with non-conventional weap-
Armed conflict uncoordinated by the U.S. may also occur. As previously men-
tioned, a large proportion of child deaths following the Gulf war may have owed to
the civil war. While an uprising of this sort may not be repeated, there is the new
possibility of Turkish military action, both in Iraqi Kurdistan, and possibly reaching
as far in as Kirkuk. 28
ons.
23 March 1999. “Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children from 1990 to 1998: Assessing
the Impact of Economic Sanctions", Richard Garfield, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper, 16:OP:3.
24 24 May 2002. “The Humanitarian Programme in Iraq Pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tion 986 (1995)", Benon Sevan, Executive Director, UN Office of the Iraq Programme, para. 52.
25 4 February 2002. “Save the Children warns of potential humanitarian crisis in Iraq”, press
release.
26 1999. Sanctioning Saddam: the Politics of Intervention in Iraq, Sarah Graham-Brown, I. B.
Tauris, pp. 23-24.
27 9 June 2002. “Iran vows to accept refugees if war breaks out in Pakistan, Iraq”, Agence
France Presse.
28 21 July 2002. “Would Turkish troops cross into Iraq?”, Fikret Bila, Milliyet.


275
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Concluding remarks
As a team leader of successive FAO missions in Iraq, one of us must emphasize
the reality of the human tragedy in Iraq caused by the sanctions. These have had
a major effect on food availability, nutrition and health, especially for children.
From a country that was edging towards Western standards in health and nutrition,
Iraq has, since 1990, experienced a precipitous decline towards poor Third World
status. Thus, the potential civilian consequences of new military action are enor-
mous for the vulnerable majority of the population. These are likely to be far greater
than in 1990 because of the continuous decline in the overall infrastructure and the
consequent deterioration in health status that have both occurred as direct and indi-
rect effects of the economic sanctions over the last 12 years.