
ll
3
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
Page
Hon. April C. GLASPIE, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq ......................... .. 2
APPENDIXES
1. Supplemental questions submitted by the Subcommittee on Europe and the
Middle East to the Department of State, and responses thereto ...................... .. 63
2. Supplemental questions submitted by Hon. Dan Burton to the Department
of tate and responses thereto....' ............................................................................. .. 67
3. Biography of Hon. April C. GLASPIE ....................................................................... .. 68
(III)


UNITED STATES-IRAQI RELATIONS
THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1991
HOUSE or REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met at 2:30 p.m. in room 2237 Rayburn House
Ofﬁce Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton [chairman of the subcom-
mittee] presiding.
Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee will come to order.
The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East meets in open
session today to hear testimony from the Honorable April C. Gla-
spie, United States Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq.
Ambassador GLASPIE has had a long and distinguished career in
the United States Foreign Service. She has performed with distinc-
tion throughout her career and has received many awards.
She has served in several different posts in the Middle East, as
well as in Washington and in New York at the United Nations.
Late in the summer of 1988, Ambassador GLASPIE arrived in Iraq
to serve as Ambassador. She served in Iraq until July 31, 1990,
when she left to return to the United States.
Since the August 2nd Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, she has not re-
turned to her post. Relations between the United States and Iraq
were severed in January, 1991, by Iraq.
The purpose of today’s hearing is to review United States-Iraqi
relations during a critical period, especially from early 1990, to the
hectic events of July of last year.
Madam Ambassador, we are pleased to have you with us today.
Perhaps, you would like to make some opening comments before
we turn to the Members for questions?
I am advised Mr. Gilman would like to make a statement.
Mr. Gilman?
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN GILMAN
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador GLASPIE, it is with the utmost respect and admira-
tion that I welcome you to this afternoon’s meeting.
For many months, one of the central questions concerning the
origins of the Persian Gulf crisis was whether our Embassy in
Baghdad had adequately conveyed U.S. concerns about potential
Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. During this period many detrac-
tors of U.S. policy in the Gulf alleged that you had not been "tough
enough“ with Saddam Hussein.
Never were so many so wrong.
(1)


2
Today it is clear that you represented our government with great
distinction and professionalism. Rather than appeasing Saddam
Hussein, as some have alleged, you told Saddam that Iraq’s griev-
ances with Kuwait would have to be resolved peacefully, that the
United States would not countenance Iraqi threats, intimidation, or
aggression, and that the United States had vital national interests
in Kuwait.
In short, you did everything that the situation at that time called
for. The fact that Saddam Hussein was bent on aggression—or that
he continued to underestimate our resolve—cannot fairly be attrib-
uted to your diplomacy.
Now, as post-war U.S. diplomacy concentrates on building a
framework for peace in the Middle East, the need for American
diplomats with expertise in Arab affairs, such as yourself, will be
greater than ever before.
I sincerely hope that our government will give you an opportuni-
ty to contribute to this process in a manner that is commensurate
with your talents and experience.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing the testi-
mony of Ambassador GLASPIE.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Gilman.
Any other statements from Members?
If not, we will proceed.
Ambassador GLASPIE, would you like to make some comments?
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR APRIL C. GLASPIE, UNITED
STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
Ambassador GLASPIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Congressman Gilman. I hadn’t prepared an opening
statement.
It was explained to me that I am not a policymaker, and only
policymakers make opening statements. However, I am prepared to
be immodest and if you would wish I could very quickly set a
framework for our conversation. Let me remind the Members of
the situation as we saw it from our Embassy in Baghdad in 1990.
The year began in many ways in February for us in Baghdad,
with the sudden series of speeches in about three to ﬁve days by
the President of Iraq, viciously attacking the United States, and
providing a new logic by which the Iraqi Government would an-
nounce and analyze foreign policy, henceforth.
The basic principle he said being that the Soviet Union had with-
drawn from the Middle East in a phrase he kept repeating, had
withdrawn to Moscow to lick its self-inflicted wounds, leaving the
United States as the sole superpower—as best I can, repeating his
words, the sole superpower in the area, and this was very danger-
ous for the area he thought.
The United States would be in a position, for example, to exer-
cise an effect on the price of oil, which would not be healthy for
those countries who wished a higher price rather than a lower
price. ..
He spoke with concern about the presence of our ﬂeet in the
Gulf, where, of course, it has been since the late 1940s. He spoke
very bitterly.


5

So, miscalculations by Saddam Hussein about American resolve,
miscalculations Arab Government’s resolve, decisions on his part
which had precisely the opposite effect that he intended, and the
most striking one, of course, is that by invading Kuwait he galva-
nized Arab Governments into doing something that Arab Govern-
ments have never or certainly only rarely done in the past, and
had been totally opposed to up until that moment, and that is they
were prepared——-in fact, eager to have Western troops pass through
their country, and even set up their bases.
So it is a very sad story and the President of Iraq has brought a
tremendous tragedy, of course, on his own people, as well as on the
Kuwaiti people, and on all the Coalition partners who so sadly lost
their sons and daughters in this dreadful business.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Madam Ambassador.
We will begin under the ﬁve-minute rule.
The Chairman Mr. Fascell and follow with the ranking Member
Mr. Broomﬁeld.
Chairman Mr. Fascell?
Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
LONG DELAY IN GLASPIE,S APPEARING AS A WITNESS
First of all, let me congratulate you and the Administration.
We ﬁnally got to this point we had a meeting of minds with
regard to this witness.
It is no fault of hers, but I am delighted that the hearing is being
held, that the issue can be clariﬁed, and that the Ambassador be
given an opportunity to say what she has been saying on the
record.
Madam Ambassador, you are a career service officer.
You started when?
Ambassador GLASPIE. 1966.
Mr. FASCELL. And you have had many posts, as the introductory
remarks indicated.
While I wish to avoid asking this question, it is a fair and neces-
sary one.
I am sure there is a sensible and reasonable answer and some
day we will hear it. I don’t know why you are testifying now.
It makes—and I am not a suspicious person, but I do have a
question as to why a career service officer would be taken advan-
tage of, in my mind, by being kept locked up in the halls of the
State Department, or some place else, for all these months, while
all these questions were ﬂoating around in the air, bouncing on
only her head, and nobody else’s.
I don’t think that is fair. I don’t think it is right. And none of
this should redound to the discredit of your service, which has been
long and distinguished in the United States Diplomatic Service.
So all I can say, is that I am pleased that at long last you have
the opportunity to tell the American people what it is that you
need to say.
Mr. HAMILTON. Do you care to respond?
Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes.
Mr. Chairman, I certainly was locked up. I was working very
hard.


10
Our policy was that we would defend our vital interest. Saddam
Hussein who is a man who lived by the sword, believed we were
going to do it by the sword.
Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Ambassador, I don’t hold you responsible
for the statements I cited. I know you as an Ambassador in that
famous interview where acting according to instructions, I want to
come back to that at a later time.
No American Ambassador is going to say to a foreign leader that
we are not going to defend our vital interests. The question is what
is the vital interest. There must be no doubt.
Ambassador GLASPIE. We deﬁned—
Mr. HAMILTON. Did you deﬁne it?
Ambassador GLASPIE. I said sovereignty and integrity of our
friends in the Gulf. That is certainly Kuwait.
AMBIGUITY OF U.S. STATEMENTS
Mr. HAMILTON. It is one thing to say you are concerned about
that. That is what Mr. Kelly said.
Ambassador GLASPIE. Ms. Tutweiler said publicly, and I said pri-
vately, and I am sure Mr. Kelly recalled it when he testiﬁed, we
were strongly committed to the collective self defense of the Gulf
and their individual self defense, and we said that very carefully
because we weren’t sure there was going to be a GCC defense and,
in fact, there was not.
Mr. HAMILTON. Let me quote the words of Ms. Tutweiler. “We do
not have any defense treaties with Kuwait and there are no special
defense or security commitments to Kuwait.”
Ambassador GLASPIE. That is absolutely correct. We don’t need-
Mr. HAMILTON. The kind of message you are conveying to
Saddam Hussein, and your conviction that Saddam Hussein knew
that the United States would ﬁght if Iraq invaded Kuwait, is the
thing that I am curious about. The record shows that State Depart-
ment ofﬁcials are saying that there is no special defense treaty or
special commitment. They are saying simply that we would be ex-
tremely concerned.
Now that language does convey just the opposite. It conveys, look
we have no treaty commitment.
We have no treaty obligation, we have no special commitment.
We are deeply concerned.
That is a very different signal than saying “you walk across that
line we are going to ﬁght.”
Ambassador GLASPIE. Mr. Chairman, you cited two members of
the Administration who were asked direct questions, one by your,
the other by a member of the press corps at the State Department,
whether we had any kind of special arrangement or treaty ar-
rangement with Kuwait. Obviously, the answer had to be no.
I am sorry they had to say it on the record, but it seems to me
they were forced to do so. What else could I say.
I am saying to you, Mr. Chairman, I spent an hour and a half
with a man who railed at me, and a lot of that is in the transcript
that the Ministry of Information—of course, they left that in, he is
railing at the American Ambassador, it is accurate.


12
Somebody—I did read, and I think in the Don Oberdorfer article
someone said it was about 80 percent correct. I could buy that.
There is 80 percent of some sentences present, and a good 20 per-
cent of the serious material of it is certainly absent.
Mr. HAMILTON. If I understand the thrust of your testimony, it is
that the transcript really gives a very distorted view?
Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. It is a distorted view of your recollection of that
conversation?
Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. To the point where it really creates a very false
impression of the conversation, is that correct?
Ambassador GLASPIE. Precisely, what I would expect from the
Iraqi Ministry of Information, which is not a Ministry of Informa-
tion, but a ministry for the enhancement of the image of the Presi-
dent of Iraq.
Mr. HAMILTON. That raises a question in my mind, why the State
Department called it “essentially correct” and why it did not move
to correct that impression that was widely created in this city and
in the world, that the conversation you had with Saddam Hussien
was one which suggested that you were trying to be very polite, if
not appease the President.
Ambassador GLASPIE. I have tried to answer that in my response
to the Chairman, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HAMILTON. I understand.
Mr. Gilman?
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
COULD THE UNITED STATES HAVE DONE ANYTHING TO PREVENT THE
IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT?
Ambassador GLASPIE, knowing what we know today about
Saddam Hussein’s failure to understand as you said, American’s
determination to protect our vital interests in the Gulf, and their is
proclivity towards violence, is there anything we could have done
in the months before August 2nd, to persuade him not to attack
Kuwait?
Ambassador GLASPIE. In the months before August 2nd, we were
afraid he was going to attack Israel, Mr. Congressman.
He was talking, we thought in terms which suggested not simply
defense, which is what he said, but also the possibility of preemp-
tion. You recall, the missile launchers that we heard much more
about later on, were moved to Western Iraq and pointed in the gen-
eral direction of Israel sometime in the summer.
There was really nobody who had, at least that I was aware of,
thought or believed that the Iraqis were thinking about Kuwait.
Now, I think that one of the main reasons that he moved on
Kuwait was the reason which didn’t develop in his own mind until
the summer. That is he began to realize that the coffers were not
only empty, but the price of oil was low, and there was literally no
more credit after all these years of heavy borrowing during the
war, and these two years or at least a year and a half of overspend-
ing on both guns and butter, lead to no credit being left in the
world, except the U.S., and we weren’t going to let him have any.


13

So we couldn’t and shouldn’t have prevented him from going
bankrupt. In that sense I don’t think there was anything we could
have done. That was the new factor that entered into his calcula-
tions, which I think swung his attention to Kuwait.
Mr. GILMAN. So then in your mind there was very little we could
have done to prevent him from heading toward Kuwait, because
his mind had been made up pretty strongly prior to August 2nd.
Ambassador GLASPIE. I am sure Members of this committee will
ﬁnd it perfectly extraordinary that I can say yes to that question,
but I can. I am not suggesting that the policy succeeded because,
obviously, it didn’t. We had to go to war.
But what we could have done to prevent it. First let me recall
what a previous boss of mine said. He said, there are some things
in the world the United States just can’t help, and Iraq this is one
of them. How could we have prevented him?
Either by diplomacy or by war. I tried to explain before he invad-
ed Kuwait, that we couldn’t forge a blocking coalition, we just
couldn’t do it. The Arabs wouldn’t let us use their land. They
didn’t agree on the approach we should take.
The idea of sanctions, for example, would have made us feel mor-
ally good—I would have felt great. As I said in the statement the
other day, but nobody would have followed us.
So if there was something that we could have done I admit I
haven’t thought of it, and I have given it a great deal of thought.
Our best chance was to tell him, draw a line in the sand. We did,
and he walked over it into defeat for himself and his country.
PRESENTATION OF THE U.S. POSITION TO SADDAM HUSSEIN
Mr. GILMAN. Do you feel you told him as forcefully as possible
that we would use every bit of our inﬂuence and force to prevent
him from moving against any other nation in the Gulf?
Ambassador GLASPIE. I certainly can’t say, Congressman Gilman,
that I said we would use everything in our arsenal, so to speak, I
wouldn’t do that. I used precisely the words I gave you. I am abso-
lutely conﬁdent that he understood what I was saying.
Mr. GILMAN. Those instructions were to you, we would defend
our vital interests in the Gulf?
Ambassador GLASPIE. We would support the sovereignty and in-
tegrity of the Gulf countries.
We would maintain freedom of navigation in the Gulf and move-
ment of oil through the Gulf.
It is an inclusive list.
Mr. GILMAN. Did he ask you for any explanation of that list?
Ambassador GLASPIE. Not at all. He felt this was our neo-imperi-
alist agenda, and I would like to add one point that I think is abso-
lutely critical.
SADDAM HUSSEIN’S HOSTILITY TO THE UNITED STATES
Throughout this period, he remained as convinced as he had
been for the previous 20 years the United States was irredeemably
hostile to Saddam Hussein Government. He, over and over, accused
us of trying to subvert his government.
43-452 — 91 — 2


23

way to go forward. It was frankly ﬂattering to be asked by the
President.
Why was I not speaking out previously? Wasn’t that the same
question, the ﬁrst and last questions struck me as the same. Who
made that decision? It was the Secretary of State. It is his job to
run his department as he wishes to. If he wishes to be the spokes-
man for it, with one designated spokeswoman, it seems to me that
is his business, Congressman.
What was the last about instructions?
Mr. OWENS. What instructions are you under now in terms of
your testimony?
Ambassador GLASPIE. I am to offer myself to answer any ques-
tions that you may put that I can answer. Of course, there are
many questions I cannot answer. But from the standpoint of Em-
bassy Baghdad, I can answer many questions.
WHY WAS GLASPIE UNAVAILABLE AS A WITNESS FOR 7 MONTHS
Mr. OWENS. Can you say why it has been seven months? I have
been unable to reach you by telephone.
Ambassador GLASPIE. I was grateful.
Mr. OWENS. I was frankly concerned about your physical safety.
Ambassador GLASPIE. Under house arrest? NO, as I mentioned
earlier it was clearly the view of the Administration that we
should be talking, 100 percent, I think it was before you came in,
Congressman Owens, that we should be focusing 100 percent on
pursuing our aims which were building a coalition, developing
those aims, supporting in every way our troops in the ﬁeld.
There was a very strong feeling in the department of late as well
as everywhere else in the government and Congress that our troops
must know the nation is fully behind them. This was not the time
to be talking about anything but the task at hand.
Happily the war was over quickly and successfully and really
almost right after that I was asked to come up, as you can imagine.
I didn’t have to be dragged. I was happy to come up. But that
seems to me merely fair and reasonable way to run a business.
Mr. OWENS. You have again proven that you are a loyal, strong
supporter of the State Department’s policy.
Thank you very much.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Leach.
Mr. LEAOH. I have been out for a few minutes. I would like to
defer to Mr. lagomarsino.
GLASPIE,S RELATIONSHIP WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Ambassador there is the impression among some in this
town and some in Congress I guess and certainly those who write
to me in opposition to our policy that you had some kind of a
buddy-buddy relationship with Saddam Hussein, you representing
the United States Government. I would be interested in knowing,
how long were you in Kuwait as Ambassador in Iraq.
Ambassador GLASPIE. Two years.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. How many times did you meet with Saddam
Hussein during that time.


29

who said he was a changed man and was already a moderate
simply because he wanted to form an Arab Cooperation Council
and wanted to sign non-aggression pacts with all of his neighbors. I
don’t think many of his neighbors believed he was not aggressive.
That wasn’t it at tall. The point is he was there. I don’t mean to
be oversimplistic, and I hope that you won’t think I am, but I be-
lieve there were two general categories of policy action before us at
that point. We could have tried to teach him a lesson, in general to
isolate him, give up the opportunity of access to decision-makers in
the government, if not to him, but certainly to decision-makers in
the government, to ameliorate his policies or to soften his policies
abroad, and perhaps in a way that Americans feel important, to do
something for the—especially minority Iraqi communities who
were living there. We chose to do that.
Appeasement—the tone of my two years of dialogue with the
Iraqis was not seen by them as appeasement. I uttered words like
inﬂammatory and abysmal and unacceptable more times in those
two years than I hope I ever have to do again. The substance of
what we were talking about was certainly not appeasement. We
had an agenda and we told him about it. Human rights was very
high. I spent, I would say the majority of my conversations in Iraq
were on human rights issues of one kind or another. I mentioned
the STARK, which was very important to our government and to
the 37 families involved.
Am I responding at all to your concerns?
Mr. ENGEL. Yes, but it seems to me, how could we have hoped to
moderate his views if in fact he was convinced that we were hostile
to him and there was nothing we could do to change that?
Ambassador GLASPIE. We weren’t convinced there was nothing
we could do to change it. We were convinced on the contrary we
should try, cautiously. We should not open the gates of the bank to
him. There was very few things we should do, but we should not
give up, apply sanctions, tell him unless he behaves we won’t talk
to him again and go home, which is the effect of a sanctions policy.
I have never understood a sanctions policy which will not make
the victims of it change their policy. He was—he has lots of money
from oil revenue. If we decided we won’t sell him grommets, he
was going to get them somewhere else. He wanted to buy military
equipment, of course, from us that we didn’t allow him to do.
SANCTIONS AGAINST SYRIA BUT NOT AGAINST IRAQ
Mr. ENGEL. Well, you see it just seems to some of us if that is the
attitude that we take that an individual sanctions policy won’t
work, then why has Syria, our worst ally on a list of countries that
exports terrorism had lots of sanctions. Many of us saw no differ-
ence between Iraq and Syria leading up to the invasion.
Ambassador GLASPIE. The difference, of course, was the criteria
for the terrorism. The Syrians are supporting particular terrorists.
The Iraqis had thrown them out. They went to Syria directly. Abu
Nidal got on a bicycle and drove across the border and sat down.
Poor Ambassador Eagleton, who had spent 4 years, I think, getting
him out of Iraq, was then assigned to Syria, and there he was
again. I showed him, on the way to the airport—there’s Abu
43-452 — 91 — 3


31
Ambassador GLASPIE. Congressman, you know I can’ t discuss in-
telligence issues.
Mr. ENGEL. One ﬁnal thing, Mr. Chairman.
POSSIBILITY THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL BE OVERTHROWN
Mr. Gallegly asked a question about what now. I am wondering
with your assessment having been there for two years, what do you
feel are the chances of someone within the Baath party or Sad-
dam’s inner circle toppling him? I feel very incomplete. We had a
tremendous victory, but somehow this man was sitting there in
Baghdad.
Ambassador GLASPIE. If that were to happen, and it could be a
very grim ﬁgure, indeed. It could be, for example, this man who is
so well-known in Kurdistan and who was exported to do the same
evil deeds in Kuwait and was appointed Minister of Interior recent-
ly, so there would be no question about what would happen to the
Shi’a if they didn’t stop their insurrection.
It could indeed be somebody like that. I think the silver lining
there, Congressman, would be that it would deﬁnitely be an inter-
im government. I do not believe somebody who lacks Saddam Hus-
sein’s organizational abilities, which he certainly has, unfortunate-
ly, would hang on.
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much.
Ambassador GLASPIE. I do think the most likely thing is a mili-
tary commander.
Mr. HAMILTON. Second bells have rung.
Mr. faleomavaega, do you want to begin your questions? The
Chair would be glad to have you do it.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If there is no problem.
Mr. HAMILTON. No problem at all. We recognize the gentleman
from American Samoa. The Chair will vacate here in order to vote
and I will get back as quickly as we can. You may proceed.
MR. FALEoMAvAEGA’s COMMENTS
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would like to, ﬁrst of all, compliment you,
Madam Ambassador, and to personally welcome you before the
subcommittee and before this committee, and I want to compliment
your sincerity and the forthrightness of your responses to the ques-
tions not only before this subcommittee, but certainly most of us
who had the opportunity of witnessing your responses before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
I also want to state for the record that I agree entirely with
Chairman Fascell’s observations, concerning the way that you were
treated, and in my humble opinion you were treated quite shabbily
by your superiors and to note also for the record that you certainly
have a very distinguished career.
I just returned yesterday from the Persian Gulf and to afﬁrm
that from your colleagues and those who are still there, sharing
with you also the fact that it was not a very pleasant experience
for me, to say the least; reminiscing also of my own personal expe-
riences in Vietnam, but very proud of the fact that shortly our na-
tion’s military capability, without question, is second to none, the
best in the world. But cautioning that observation, I would say that


34
haps as a background to the negotiations, that they hoped he was
going to begin, it would be yet another in a long series of incur-
sions that Iraq had made since 1963, or even ’61 since Kuwaiti in-
dependence. There had been a number of incursions, some very ﬂa-
grant ones.
In 1973 a well-known one, for instance, and I think as I men-
tioned yesterday, a less well known one about a year before August
2nd. So it was true that Arabs talked about this as a possibility,
but after the 25th, King Fahd and President Mubarek felt they had
a commitment that would not be broken.
SYRIAN PURCHASE OF SCUD MISSILES FROM NORTH KOREA
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. One more question. One very serious con-
cern that I was given—at least this is something I am sure every-
one is aware of; Syria has recently purchased several scud missiles
from North Korea. Now Syria and Iran are not the most destabiliz-
ing forces now in the Persian Gulf. Where do we go from here?
Ambassador GLASPIE. It is very tempting for me_ to answer that
question, Congressman. I would like to offer my views, but I am not
the person to ask. I am assured the Secretary of State will be ap-
pearing before this committee right after the Easter break. I think
he is the one.
ASSIGNMENT OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS TO POSTS ABROAD
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Your expertise is in the Middle East, is it
not?
Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It strikes me funny that I met with one of
the Foreign Service agents who is Chinese and who is afﬂuent in
Mandean, and he is assigned to the Middle East.
Ambassador GLASPIE. It is his choice.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It blows my mind. Here is someone who spe-
cializes in Asian Paciﬁc issues and who can make a contribution to
our country—has he gone through ﬁve years in training and appre-
ciating Middle Eastern-
Ambassador GLASPIE. He is a very ﬁne Foreign Service ofﬁcer. I
think he will make a real contribution wherever he is.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. That is not the point.
Ambassador GLASPIE. I know.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It is like if I were to go to the university, if I
want to understand more about the Middle East, would I be study-
ing Arabic, I mean Chinese, if I—I just am a little confused on how
you move personnel within the State Department when they are
not—they don’t have the necessary tools to work—and this is not
in any disparaging remark against this gentleman for whom I have
the highest respect.
Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. Thank you very much.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Solarz.
Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
April, you and I go back a long way together. I think we met for
the ﬁrst time almost 17 years ago to the week in Cairo during the
course of my very first trip abroad as a member of the Foreign Af-
fairs Committee and you were assigned to me as my control ofﬁcer.


35

Ambassador GLASPIE. I didn’t do very well controlling you,
either, Congressman.
7
GLASPIE S MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN
Mr. SOLARZ. I have watched your career with considerable inter-
est over the years, and even though I had little to do with your ad-
vancement, I must say I took a certain amount of pride in it, be-
cause I was tremendously impressed with you at the time, and I
always thought you were one of the best and brightest in the For-
eign Service, and in a way, it was precisely for these reasons that I
was so dismayed when I read the transcript that Iraq released of
your meeting with Saddam Hussein, particularly when the State
Department, by refusing or failing to issue any denials as to its ve-
racity appeared to lend the kind of implicit legitimacy to that ac-
count.
I hope you understand, if I fulﬁll my institutional responsibilities
by asking you some questions about it. First of all, I would like to
know, did they make a videotape of that meeting?
Ambassador GLASPIE. They may well have, but the camera was
hidden.
Mr. SOLARZ. You didn’t see one?
Ambassador GLASPIE. No.
Mr. SOLARZ. Who is your note-taker for the meeting?
Ambassador GLASPIE. Since I had been invited to come back for
the Foreign Ministry, which I assumed was a resumed session, I
didn’t have a note-taker with me. We had a small Embassy, every-
body was real busy.
Mr. SOLARZ. The cable you subsequently sent back, you wrote, or
dictated from your memory of the meeting?
Ambassador GLASPIE. I did.
Mr. SOLARZ. Did you take notes during the course of it?
Ambassador GLASPIE. As you know, we are perhaps immodest to
believe after 25 years of training, we can remember—in my case, I
was lucky, because it was broken by the President Mubarak tele-
phone call, so I had plenty of time to take notes during the meet-
mg.
Mr. SOLARZ. On July 25th, when the meeting took place, had you
been apprized of the fact they had deployed 100,000 troops along
the Kuwaiti border?
Ambassador GLASPIE. I don’t recall, frankly, Congressman, what
our count was at that time, but it was certainly a high count, yes.
Mr. SOLARZ. But you knew they had deployed forces?
Ambassador GLASPIE. Oh, yes, of course.
WHY DIDN,T THE STATE DEPARTMENT DENY THE VERACITY OF THE IRAQI
TRANSCRIPT OF THE MEETING?
Mr. SOLARZ. After you returned to Washington, and following the
release by Iraq of their version of this discussion, were you explicit-
ly instructed by the Department to say nothing about it, to neither
conﬁrm nor deny, as it were, the veracity of their version of the
discussion?
Ambassador GLASPIE. I don’t believe I was explicitly instructed
not to say anything. It was explained that a decision had been