S. HRG. 107–798
F7612:5.HRG. 107-198
NEXT STEPS IN IRAQ
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SEPTEMBER 25 AND 26, 2002
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director
PATRICIA A. McNERNEY, Republican Staff Director
(II)


CONTENTS
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2002
Page
3
9
16
Holbrooke, Hon. Richard C., former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,
counselor, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY ......
Prepared statement
Letter to President Bush from Senators Biden and Lugar regarding Iraq,
dated September 10, 2002
McFarlane, Hon. Robert C., former National Security Advisor, chairman,
Energy & Communications Solutions, Washington, DC
Prepared statement .........
USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll, September 23, 2002—Questions on Invading
Iraq ...
12
14
30
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2002
52
56
109
110
87
Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., former Secretary of State, chairman, National
Democratic Institute, Washington, DC .....
Prepared statement
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement
Helms, Hon. Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, prepared statement
“In Iraq's Arsenal: Nature's Deadliest Poison,” article by Steve Sternberg,
USA Today, September 26, 2002 .....
Kissinger, Hon. Henry A., former Secretary of State, CEO, Kissinger Associ-
ates, Inc., New York, NY
Prepared statement
Letter to Particia A. McNerney, Republican staff director, from Ryan C.
Crocker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs,
dated May 29, 2002 .........
Powell, Hon. Colin L., Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington,
DC ........
Prepared statement
Response to additional question for the record from Senator Biden
58
61
74
111
118
158
(III)


NEXT STEPS IN IRAQ
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2002
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room
SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Wellstone,
Boxer, Bill Nelson, Rockefeller, Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, and
Brownback.
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order, please. Good
afternoon. In late July and early August, this committee held 2
days of hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq, and our purpose was
to begin a national discussion of that policy and to raise some of
the difficult questions surrounding any consideration of the next
step. We heard from a broad range of expert witnesses, and in the
weeks since prominent Americans with decades of experience in
foreign policy and national security policy have spoken out, and so
has the Bush administration in public statements, in hearings be-
fore the Congress, and President Bush's powerful speech in the
United Nations General Assembly.
As a result, I believe there is an emerging bipartisan consensus
on the basic principles for moving forward on Iraq, and rather than
give this entire statement that I have, let me suggest that I am of
the view, and speaking for myself, that no matter how well con-
ducted, foreign policy cannot be sustained without the informed
consent of the American people.
I personally am looking forward to the President shortly going to
the Nation, as he went to the United Nations, and making the case
for what he wishes to do relative to Iraq. He made a compelling
case in the United Nations as to why Iraq has violated the United
Nations' own rules, principles, and sanctions, but that is not suffi-
cient, in my view, nor do I believe the President believes it is suffi-
cient to convince the American people as to what we must do.
It is one thing to lay out the threat. But we need a clear, un-
equivocal statement of what the U.S. objective is in Iraq. Is it
weapons of mass destruction? Is it regime change? Is it return of
Bahraini prisoners? What is it? Why has—and I believe I am in-
clined to believe it has, but why has the policy of containing Sad-
dam failed? What is the urgency? What are the regional consider-
ations? What should we be prepared for? What is likely to occur in
the mind of the President, and what about–Senator Lugar and I
sent an extensive letter to the President prior to his speech before
(1)


7
Iraq, especially if protracted, could metastasize into wider conflict
between Arabs and Israel.
It is, in my view, irresponsible for people, some of them closely
allied to the administration and purporting to speak for it, to talk
of the war as a "cake walk” or a quick trip to Baghdad. They may
be right, and, like all Americans, I hope this will be the case if war
comes, but such language, Mr. Chairman, such language demeans
and insults the risks that brave young American men and women
will face and are already facing in Afghanistan and the Balkans,
and the casualties that will inevitably take place, even under the
best of circumstances.
I defer, of course, to several members of this committee whose
courage under fire in Vietnam is a matter of record, but as a vet-
eran of 342 years as a State Department civilian working alongside
the military in the Mekong Delta and in Saigon, as an eye witness
to war and its horrors on two other continents, I must stress the
obvious, war is truly hell. There is nothing noble or heroic about
its consequences. Even though it can bring out the best in people,
it can also bring out the worst. If war comes, let us go forward with
a sober appreciation of its horrors, its waste, its costs.
Let me turn now, finally, to the draft resolution itself. I note that
in transmitting it to the Congress, the White House invited a full
and frank discussion over the draft wording. As Chairman Biden
already noted earlier this week, it is just a draft. The last time
such a draft came up right after September 11, changes were made
in a bipartisan spirit. I believe the current draft proposal from the
administration would, indeed, need to benefit from the same action
by you and your colleagues, although I hope that it will be as rapid
as possible.
Let me offer four initial specific suggestions for improvement of
the draft before you, and I think there may be many others, but
I would like to offer you four. First, and most important, I believe
the authority requested in the final sentence, section 2, is too
broad, specifically in regard to the third phrase, which would au-
thorize the President to use all means to “restore international
peace and security in the region.”
This phrase, which I believe is taken out of context from para-
graph 34 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 of 1991, has a
different meaning in the draft resolution before you than it had in
Security Council Resolution 687. It is far too broad. It amounts to
virtual blank check authority. Resolution 687 clearly referred only
to the preceding paragraphs of that specific Security Council reso-
lution.
The region referred to in Security Council Resolution 687 meant
Kuwait and Iraq and, Mr. Chairman, I checked this with Ambas-
sador Pickering when he realized he could not be here today. He
was the Ambassador in New York at the time it was passed. He
was absolutely clear that that phrase in Resolution 687 meant only
Iraq and Kuwait, and I would like to offer that to you as you delib-
erate.
In the draft before you, however, the phrase could mean any-
thing at all, and I strongly endorse the concerns addressed by Sen-
ator Feingold and some of his colleagues. The phrase should simply
be removed. Refining it, which is an option, is simply too cum-


10
that included a fifteen percent reduction in U.S. dues to the UN. Yet despite the
best efforts of Senator Biden, Senator Helms, and many of you, the Congress has
still failed to release the remaining $244 million due in the third round of the effort
to pay down our arrears.
I mention this issue for a reason: in order to lead, in order to assemble inter-
national coalitions for action—as President George H.W. Bush did in 1991–ground-
work must be laid through efforts like the collaborative Helms-Biden reform effort.
Without the success of that effort, we would now be facing an arrears of such mag-
nitude that Secretary Powell's efforts would be weakened. Yet some still do not see
that the United Nations, with all its flaws, is still indispensable, and serves our na-
tional interests far more often than it weakens them. This is especially true if the
United States, instead of ignoring the UN, works to strengthen it through strong
leadership.
Let me now turn to the question of America's national security goals in this un-
folding drama. The last Administration supported regime change as a legitimate
policy goal. This was a change from the position of the first Bush Administration,
and one that I fully supported. I would point out that, after Kosovo and the indict-
ment of Slobodan Milosevic by the International War Crimes Tribunal, we adopted
a similar goal regarding Milosevic, and carried out a policy of isolation, covert and
overt assistance to his opponents, and—with the decisive involvement of the Serbian
people—succeeded. Saddam is even more dangerous than Milosevic, given his con-
tinuing quest for weapons of mass destruction. Left alone, he will only seek to be-
come stronger, and thus a greater threat to the region and beyond. Hence, I accept
the argument that once the goal of regime change is established, the United States
should work to achieve it.
Having agreed that regime change is desirable—even necessary-does not, how-
ever, go to the question of means. If events take a fortunate turn, the people them-
selves may rise up and remove a dictator after massive international pressure and
isolation. Although in the last seventeen years this has happened, in one form or
another, in such diverse places as the Philippines, Romania, and Yugoslavia, we all
understand that it is virtually inconceivable in Iraq. There is perhaps a somewhat
higher chance that an individual acting alone, or a small group of people with direct
access, might take action to eliminate a tyrant whose behavior threatens their own
survival. This is, in fact, the situation today in Iraq: the entire Iraqi military surely
must recognize that it will be destroyed—and probably quickly-if events follow
their present course to its logical conclusion. Yet even as we hope for such an out-
come, we cannot base policy on it; that would be substituting prayer for policy,
never a good approach to a serious venture. Still, it is tempting to entertain the
hope, before moving on to more realistic—and more difficult-scenarios.
This brings us back to the use of force to achieve our goals. If all else fails, collec-
tive action against Saddam is, in my view, justified by the situation and the record
of the last decade. While we talk of airtight weapons inspection-no notice, any-
where, anytime and disarmament, we must recognize that once launched on a
course for either of those objectives, the chances for a military conflict go up dra-
matically, since Saddam is unlikely to comply fully. So we should not deceive our-
selves on this point: we are talking today about a very possible war. And once start-
ed, that war will have as its objective, whether stated or not, a change of regime
in Baghdad.
It is highly unfortunate that some advocates of regime change have talked in
terms of “going it alone” or the need to act “unilaterally” or proclaimed an alleged
new doctrine of pre-emptive war. In fact, the United States will not be alone in such
a campaign, as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated last week. In addition to the
British, whose Prime Minister, Tony Blair, deserves enormous praise for his staunch
and eloquent support of the United States, I believe that Turkey, the indispensable
NATO ally, will be supportive, as well as several other key nations that will find
ways to assist a campaign without compromising their own domestic situation.
I also believe that the odds favor a successful outcome against Iraq, and, as Sen-
ator John Kerry has written, probably rather quickly. The deterioration of the Iraqi
military since 1991, and the vast improvement in the American military, which I
have seen first hand over the last several decades, suggests that success should be
readily achievable. However, in the fog of war terrible things can happen. There is
a real danger, which we should not ignore, that what starts as a war against Iraq,
especially if protracted, could metastasize into a wider conflict between Arabs and
Israel. It is irresponsible for people, some of them closely allied to the Administra-
tion and purporting to speak for it, who talk of the war as a "cakewalk” or a quick
rush to Baghdad. They may be right, and like all Americans I hope this will be the
case if war comes. But such language demeans and insults the risks that brave
young American men and women will face, and are already facing in Afghanistan


11
and the Balkans, and the casualties that will inevitably take place even under the
best of circumstances. I defer, of course, to several members of this Committee
whose courage under fire in Vietnam is a matter of record. But, as a veteran of
three years as a State Department civilian working alongside the American military
in Vietnam, and a eyewitness to war and its horrors on two other continents, I must
stress the obvious: war is truly hell. There is nothing noble or heroic about its con-
sequences, even though it can bring out the best in people; it can also bring out the
worst. If war comes, let us go forward with a sober appreciation of its honors, its
waste, its costs.
Let me turn now, finally, to the draft resolution itself I note that in transmitting
it to the Congress, the White House invited a full and frank discussion over the
draft wording. As Chairman Biden noted already, it is just a draft. The last time
such a draft came up, right after September 11, changes were made in a bipartisan
spirit. I believe that the current draft proposal from the Administration could ben-
efit from the same action, although I hope—and I urge—that it be as rapid as pos-
sible.
Let me offer at least four specific suggestions for improvement:
• first, and most important, I believe that the authority requested in the final
sentence (Section 2) is too broad, specifically in regard to the third phrase,
which would authorize the President to use all means to "restore international
peace and security in the region.” This phrase, which I believe is taken out of
context from paragraph 34 of UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), has
a different meaning in this draft resolution than it had in 687. It is far too
broad-amounting to a virtual "blank check” authority. Resolution 687 referred,
clearly, only to the preceding paragraphs of the Security Council resolution; the
region referred to in 687 meant Kuwait and Iraq. In the draft before you, it
could mean anything, and I strongly endorse the concerns expressed by Senator
Feingold and some of his colleagues. This phrase should simply be removed; re-
fining it, which is an option, is simply too cumbersome and unnecessary. Your
resolution should focus clearly on Iraq—nothing else.
• second, I believe the resolution should contain a statement of strong support for
the efforts of the president, the Secretary of State, and their colleagues to
achieve a satisfactory Security Council resolution. This would emphasize the im-
portance of the Security Council and show our unity to the nations now wavering
over this issue.
• third, I would suggest that you add a reporting clause, requiring the Adminis-
tration to inform and consult the Congress on a very timely basis, perhaps as
frequently as every month, in writing, and even more frequently in closed and
highly confidential meetings, as they proceed. The Administration should not be
left with the ability to say that if this resolution passes, they have discharged
their obligation to consult and inform Congress, as President Johnson did after
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in August 1964.
• fourth, I would strongly urge you to add a section concerning the importance
of post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq as part of a broad new policy towards the
region. Since the story of Afghanistan is not entirely satisfactory on this point,
to put it mildly—and since some people are already suggesting that reconstruc-
tion can be done either by other countries or simply through the Iraqis using
their own oil revenues, it is important to make clear that the job is not over
simply if Saddam is replaced by someone else. A successor might be almost as
bad, or bad in a different way. Chaos could follow. The material for Weapons
of Mass Destruction could fall into the wrong hands. We do not want to see Iraq
become a safe haven for other forms of terrorists, as happened in Afghanistan
after the United States turned its back on the country in 1989. That mistake-
second only, in my opinion, to letting Saddam survive in 1991—created the con-
ditions that led to Osama bin Laden and the Al-qaeda network setting up shop
in Afghanistan.
I would recommend, therefore, that you add to this resolution language making
clear that the post-Saddam structure in Iraq is of continuing concern to the United
States, not only in Baghdad but also in the south and in the Kurdish north. These
groups must not be betrayed and slaughtered again. The time to make that clear
is now—before anything begins on the battlefield.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. I look forward to entering
into a dialogue with you on this momentous occasion.


12
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for being here. Mr. McFar-
lane, thank you for being here. It is good to have you back before
the committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. McFARLANE, FORMER NA-
TIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, CHAIRMAN, ENERGY & COMMU-
NICATIONS SOLUTIONS, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. MCFARLANE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am deeply hon-
ored to be invited to participate in your deliberations on the deci-
sion to go or not to go to war, deeply honored always to be party
to the deliberations of this great body. My father served in the
other body, but I have had the honor of serving at the Armed Serv-
ices Committee under the leadership of Chairman Stennis, Senator
Goldwater, Senator Jackson, giants of this body.
I come today as one who was deployed in the Gulf of Tonkin in
1964, and shortly thereafter commanded a unit of the first landing
of American forces in Vietnam. That landing occurred under Presi-
dential authority, endorsed by the U.S. Senate. The events leading
up to our engagement there, specifically the fraud that was per-
petrated on this body and on the American people, profoundly af-
fected American attitudes toward launching war and, since that
day, and in the ensuing decades, the mistrust stemming from our
ill-conceived entry into that conflict has resulted in sustained seri-
ous introspection concerning why and how we decide to go to war.
We live in a world, not to say a community of nation states that
coexist, compete, covet, and conspire to survive and prosper.
Through centuries of struggle, we have conceived doctrines, de-
fenses, dogmas designed to settle disputes among states peacefully:
concepts like mediation, arbitration, arms control, collective secu-
rity have all been tried and have often succeeded in reducing ten-
sions and settling disagreements.
To be fair, even the failures of one or another of these frame-
works have been useful, for they have added to our knowledge of
what works and what does not work and, thus, they move us closer
to building an international system that can be effective in settling
disputes peacefully. But we are not there yet. Disputes and vio-
lence among nation states seem to be inevitable for as long as the
lust for power and hubris remain unchecked by institutions and
popular governments, and that is what brings us here today.
Today and for the past generation we have faced a threat from
Saddam Hussein that has proven resistant to all of the bodies, the
systems, the frameworks, the creations of architecture and
statecraft that we have devised. The threat is posed by weapons of
mass destruction in the hand of a monomaniacal despot bent upon
regional domination, with all that such domination would imply for
nations throughout the world.
Today, in Iraq, there are chemical and biological weapons and
systems to deliver them on the shelf that could be used to kill tens
if not hundreds of thousands of people in the region and beyond.
History tells us that Saddam Hussein also has the will to use these
weapons, and has done so. In short, we face a man with the means
and the willingness to attack his neighbors and us.
Through the years, through trial and error in the use of these
several efforts at dispute resolution that I have described, we have


13
begun to distill a few rules about going to war, and we have begun
to establish a few of them in custom and practice, although not in
law. The one that is most shared among nations is the notion that
force ought not to be used except as a last resort, and before resort-
ing to it, states should exhaust all of the nonviolent alternatives.
For the past 6 weeks, that is what President Bush has been
doing. Together with allies, he has presented the factual record of
Saddam Hussein's successful drive to attain chemical and biological
weapons and the means to deliver them. He has made the case for
action to deal with this clear and present threat to the peace as
called for in the United Nations charter.
Within weeks, the coming weeks, he will have made the case at
the United Nations, made the case with the U.S. allies, before the
U.S. Congress, and I believe before the American people, for taking
action to constrain once and for all the ruthless ambitions of Sad-
dam Hussein.
I agree with Ambassador Holbrooke that to move forward in this
action does not require a new U.N. resolution. Indeed, to insist on
yet another one in the face of the violations and persistent abuse
that we have seen in the past 10 years is to devalue the importance
of a U.N. resolution.
In calling for action, I recognize that some have called launching
a war today against Iraq preemption. I disagree. Preemption im-
plies precipitous action taken without warning against an evident
threat without affording the threatening country an opportunity to
cure the grievance. This is surely not the case with Saddam Hus-
sein. For 20 years he has been afforded the opportunity to dem-
onstrate a change in the aggressive behavior expressed in his inva-
sion of Iran and of Kuwait, his repressive brutality against his own
people, and his obvious ambition for regional hegemony.
Clearly, however, a launching of a war in Iraq will establish a
precedent that we cannot want to see emulated by others, without
fulfillment of accepted principles. I am confident that the President
and his administration are focused on that very issue, and that the
relevant criteria to justify a preemptive attack will be enunciated
in the days ahead.
They will include in my judgment, among others, transgressions
such as we are seeing in Iraq in recent history, a history of aggres-
sion against neighbors, unchecked power within Iraq, and the pos-
session and the will, the military means to inflict mass casualties,
the ability and readiness to use them on short notice.
It is a measure of moral strength in our society that we place a
very heavy burden of proof on our government before it launches
a war, but this forbearance does come at a price, a price measured
in the growing risk of attack by Iraq as we continue to explore al-
ternative means. It is never easy to judge how much lost time and
risk is prudent. Our modern tendency to hold out hope beyond all
reasonable expectations was born in an era when the threatened
action would not have been catastrophic. Today, however, the price
of error is much, much higher, measured in horrendous loss.
Mr. Chairman, in light of this history of aggression and brutality,
of willful violation of United Nations resolutions and obstruction of
its inspectors, with evidence of an extant and growing arsenal of
mass destruction systems and a willingness to use them, and hav-


14
ing used all alternative means at hand to avoid conflict, we must
now act. To do so is not to preempt. Far from it. It is to do our
duty. It is to vindicate the trust of generations before us to act with
prudence and deliberation to defend our values, our people, and our
way of life.
What specifically should we do? The President should shortly
complete the deliberate process of consultation with the Senate and
the House, he should complete his consultations and efforts to en-
gender support and cooperation among allies, and he should con-
tinue to work with the United Nations to engender its support and
understanding.
We should then stage our forces in the countries that Ambas-
sador Holbrooke just mentioned, and gulf states that I believe will
be ready to provide all the staging we need, and then we should
move deliberately to seize and hold Baghdad and, as necessary, to
neutralize the Republican Guards and organize Iraqi forces to de-
stroy the systems of mass destruction and to be prepared to under-
take the long building process to establish the institutions of gov-
ernment worthy of the name and the renewal of the Iraqi economy.
I join with Ambassador Holbrooke in lamenting the betrayal the
United States inflicted on Afghanistan 12 years ago, and of the
awful price we payed for that betrayal to a country that achieved
historic victory for us in the cold war. To have left it in ruins with
1,000 dead, 3 million refugees, infrastructure destroyed, and not to
have even cared enough to leave people on the ground to determine
if some day we might become threatened once again ourselves, rep-
resents a betrayal of historic proportion and ignorance begging cre-
dulity.
I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to join you today,
and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McFarlane follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE, FORMER NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the committee today.
I come as one who was deployed in the Gulf of Tonkin in the summer of 1964
and soon after commanded a unit in the first landing of U.S. forces in Vietnam
under presidential authority endorsed by the United States Senate. The events lead-
ing up to our engagement there-specifically the fraud that was perpetrated on this
body and our people-profoundly affected American attitudes toward launching war
since that day. In the ensuing decades the mistrust stemming from our ill-conceived
entry into Vietnam has resulted in sustained, serious introspection concerning why
and how we decide to go to war
We live in a world-not to say a community-of nation states that coexist, com-
pete, covet and conspire to survive and prosper. Through centuries of struggle we
have conceived doctrines, defenses and dogma designed to settle disputes among
states peacefully. Such concepts as mediation, arbitration, arms control, and collec-
tive security have been tried and often have succeeded in settling disagreements.
And to be fair, even the failures of one or another of these mechanisms have been
useful for they have added to our knowledge of what works and what doesn't and
thus lead us closer to a system that is truly capable of keeping the peace. But we
aren't there yet. Disputes and violence among states seem to remain inevitable for
as long as lust for power and hubris remain unchecked by institutions and popular
governance. And that's what brings us here today.
Today and for the past generation we have faced a threat from Saddam Hussein
that has proven resistant to all of the bodies, systems and architecture of statecraft
we have devised. This threat is posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands
of a monomaniacal despot bent upon regional domination with all that such domina-
tion would imply for nations throughout the world. Today in Iraq there are chemical


16
Moreover, you would help assuage international concerns that the
current unsettled situation in Afghanistan may be replicated in
Iraq, with far greater strategic consequences.”
[The letter referred to follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, DC, September 10, 2002.
The PRESIDENT
The White House
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
Thank you for meeting with us last week to begin a dialogue on Iraq. We very
much appreciate the spirit of the meeting and your desire to engage Congress, the
American people and the international community in this critical discussion. We
were pleased to learn that you intend to seek authorization from Congress prior to
any use of force by the United States Armed Forces to ensure Iraq's disarmament.
Mr. President, we share your conviction that the combination of Saddam Hussein
and weapons of mass destruction poses a significant threat to Iraq's people, its re-
gion and the world. Simply put, either these weapons must be dislodged from Iraq,
or Saddam Hussein must be dislodged from power.
Last month, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began hearings on Iraq and
heard from a broad range of expert witnesses. In the weeks since, prominent Ameri-
cans with decades of experience in foreign and national security policy have ex-
pressed their views. In the weeks to come, we look forward to hearing from the in-
telligence community and policy officials of your Administration in hearings before
Congress and from you in the case you make to the American people and the inter-
national community.
Mr. President, based on what we have heard to date, there is not yet a consensus
on many critical questions. For example, what is the likelihood that Iraq would use
its weapons of mass destruction against us, to deter us or to supply terrorists? What
are Iraq's links to terrorist groups, including those responsible for the attacks of
September 11, 2001? Can Iraq be disarmed without the use of force? Would attack-
ing Iraq precipitate the very thing we are trying to prevent: the use of weapons of
mass destruction against us or countries such as Israel? Can we shift substantial
resources to the Iraqi theater without compromising the war on terrorism in many
other areas? What would be our obligations to a post-Saddam Iraq militarily and
economically? It will be impossible to answer these questions with certainty in ad-
vance; however, they must be part of the calculus you make in weighing the various
courses of action.
Despite these uncertainties, in our judgement there are several principles that al-
ready enjoy broad bipartisan agreement and that would maximize the opportunities
for success while minimizing the risks as we move forward on Iraq. We urge you
to embrace them.
First, the United States should pursue a policy that has. broad international sup-
port. Such support is desirable for both substantive and political reasons. Our allies
around the world and our friends in the region have important, and possibly even
necessary contributions to make to the effort to disarm Iraq. We may need their
support for any initiatives we take at the United Nations. Should we pursue mili-
tary action, we will want them with us and, at a minimum, require basing and over-
flight rights from several countries. If, in the course of disarming Iraq, we end Sad-
dam Hussein's regime, a massive rebuilding effort will be required that the United
States will not want to shoulder alone. We also depend on the active and continued
cooperation of many allies in the unfinished war against terrorism. In short, build-
ing international support for our Iraq policy must be a priority.
Second, we should make it clear that Iraq is the world's concern, not just our own.
For more than a decade, Saddam Hussein has flaunted the will of the international
community, breaking solemn obligations to disarm. These obligations were made not
to the United States, but to the United Nations. In your speech to the General As-
sembly this week, we urge you to seek a new Security Council mandate requiting
Iraq to accept an unconditional weapons inspections regime that gives inspectors the
power to go anywhere, anytime. It could set a deadline for Iraqi compliance and
make clear that any failure by Iraq to comply will result in the mandate's enforce-
ment. Although we recognize that it will require difficult diplomacy, we believe your
Administration can succeed in gaining international support-much as President
George H. W. Bush did before the Gulf War. Such a mandate would have the merit


18
only choice, because I think it would be a choice so deleterious to
the national interest.
The CHAIRMAN. I happen to agree with you. I think that it would
be a gigantic mistake, as I indicated to the President when he
asked. The last thing the President needs is like that old joke, “the
board voted 5 to 4 for your speedy recovery.” That is not what is
needed here.
Let me ask you a second question, then. You indicated it is in
the national interest to get Security Council approval for the use
of force. Why is it in the national interest? It seems self-evident
that it is. Why do you say it is so clearly in the national interest?
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. It is in the interest, but it is important
but not essential. I want to underscore that. President Clinton and
the previous administration took military action in the Balkans
twice without Security Council resolutions and, unlike the current
situation, where there are at least a dozen resolutions already on
the books being violated, so you do have a basis for action without
a new resolution. There were none in regard to Milosevic.
Now, why, therefore, do I think it would be important? And here
Secretary Baker has written about this quite eloquently in the New
York Times, because the circumstances we are now contemplating
are somewhat new. It is a new situation. We are on the edge of
war, and when you go into an undertaking as serious as this, it is
very important to have support.
Now, in that regard, Mr. Chairman, let me make a point which
I know that no committee in the Congress is more familiar with
than yours, because around this very table a rather historic photo
was taken 2 years ago which I have on my wall, and I know you
do, where you and Senator Helms accompanied by Senator Warner
and Senator Levin, and many of the people here today, posed with
all 15 members of the Security Council, a photograph never taken
before and not replicated since.
The fact is that the United Nations Security Council, while it is
not in a position to declare itself the only authority that can legiti-
mize the use of force, and here I agree with Senator Helms' open-
ing comment, is nonetheless the body in the world, the only body
in the world that has the stature and authority that makes a dif-
ference.
Let us take two specific examples, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Both countries would love to see Saddam removed. Both countries
for different reasons will be in a much stronger position to assist
the United States, if the venture must begin, if there is Security
Council approval. That is true for Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, France,
and all our other allies in NATO.
The CHAIRMAN. My time is about up. How long are we going to
have to stay if we go?
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I cannot answer that question.
The CHAIRMAN. Give me your estimates.
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, we discussed this in re-
gard to other areas. I do not believe in exit strategies. I believe in
defining the mission, not setting deadlines, and then getting the job
done, and what Bud McFarlane and I are both saying, if you un-
dertake a venture and you are the world's leading country, you just
have to damn well see it through. We have troops in Korea 49


19
years later. We have troops in Bosnia 7 years later. We had troops
in the Sinai for a quarter century. We can afford this if it is in our
national interest, and I would never guess a question like that. I
do not think we should put a time limit on it.
The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. Is it fair to say you are saying
we would have to stay, whether it is a day or 20 years, we would
have to stay as long as it took to secure and stabilize that nation?
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I think that is fair to say. If we under-
take this venture, we cannot walk away from it like we did from
Afghanistan or Iraq in 1991.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms.
Senator HELMS. Mr. Ambassador, the United Nations has
passed, I believe, 16 resolutions pertaining to Iraqi conduct. Is that
about right?
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir.
Senator HELMS. With the exception of very limited air and cruise
missile strikes, as well as increasingly loosened sanctions, there
has been no serious effort to compel Iraqi compliance, has there?
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The Iraqis have defied the resolutions
and the inspectors withdrew 3 years ago, and since then it has
been a stalemate. There have, however, been very strong efforts to
enforce the sanctions and the economic limits. The Iraqis cheat, but
there is not any question that these have had an effect.
Senator HELMS. What do you think is the threshold beyond
which a failure to enforce these resolutions undermines the United
Nations' credibility and at the same time endangers U.S. national
security?
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I think that if Iraq defies the resolu-
tions they have weakened the importance of the Security Council,
and they have defied them in the past.
Now, not all the 16 resolutions involve weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Some involve prisoners of war from Kuwait and so on,
those are the second tier. No one should think we should go to war
with Iraq because they are still withholding information on Ku-
waiti POWs, but the core resolutions, and there are probably at
least 10 of those, are quite serious and fundamental.
Senator HELMS. I had a friend who called me from Raleigh the
other day and he said, “how many resolutions has the United Na-
tions already done,” and I said, I think it is 16, but I stand to be
corrected.
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. It is 16, but you will notice that in the
resolution the administration sent to you they only listed 11, so
they dropped 5 resolutions as being below the threshold that rises
to this seriousness.
Senator HELMs. Well, back to my question. Why do we even need
an additional resolution?
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, as I said, Mr. Chairman-excuse
me, Senator Helms, but I will always think of you as the chairman.
As I said in my opening statement, it is highly desirable, but not
essential, because the basis for collective action exists already. I
know that is a very difficult answer for some of my friends on this
committee, but it is my deepest considered opinion, and I want to
put it in four words, desirable but not necessary.
SO


20
Senator HELMS. I think maybe it ought to be mentioned here
sometime, I know the chairman knows it and other Senators prob-
ably do too, that it is my understanding that negotiations are, in-
deed, going on between House and Senate bipartisan leadership
with the White House, and I think that is of some interest in con-
nection with the questions we are asking and you are answering.
Do you agree, Mr. Ambassador, that the United States' national se-
curity interests are better protected through the use of these so-
called coalitions of the willing?
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes. You know, in practical terms—
and my colleague, who served in the military, on the witness stand
with me can attest to this. In practical terms, the going alone op-
tion is rhetoric. The military cannot get there without the support
of some of the countries in the area and coalitions of the willing
are always better than so-called unilateralism, and no matter how
good our logistical lift, our intelligence, our communications, we are
always better off and probably more than better off.
It is essential to have the support of, at a minimum, the Turks
for logistical reasons, somebody in the gulf for the same, and intel-
ligence. Going into who is up to the Secretaries of State and De-
fense. That is very sensitive and British political support has been
extraordinarily valuable. So I think the answer to your question is
clearly yes, and that is why we should not even think about so-
called unilateralism. It is a kind of a macho phrase that may sound
good in a talk radio show, but it is not a meaningful phrase to mili-
tary planners.
Senator HELMS. Let me turn to Colonel McFarlane, and by the
way, I join Joe in welcoming you to the committee. It is good to see
you again.
Mr. McFarlane, Saddam Hussein has a track record of manipu-
lating United Nations inspection demands as a way of buying time.
Even now, he is repeating his antics of 1998, claiming to accept in-
spections while he is throwing up roadblocks to their success and
dispersing his weapons programs.
Now, assuming that many of the permanent members of the Se-
curity Council believe that we need to go through this charade with
Saddam, do you think we ought to put a date on the U.N. resolu-
tion as an ultimatum?
Mr. MCFARLANE. Senator Helms, I believe that we should not
seek another resolution for the reasons that you have enumerated
already. If 16 of them in the past have been violated and rejected,
what promise is there, what prospect that yet another one is going
to result in a different behavior? But I think we need to present
that record to stress that renewed inspections hold little promise
of better results, to point out that the existing ones authorize in-
spectors to go back, but not to delude ourselves and to engage in
the delaying tactics that are inevitable if we go down this road.
Senator HELMS. By the way, before I use all my time, for the in-
formation of the committee, I believe most of us know this, the con-
ference report on the State authorization bill that releases the final
$244 million and should pass the Senate this afternoon or tomor-
row without any glitches, this will fully implement the Helms-
Biden U.N. reform bill. I think that ought to be made a matter of
record.


21
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. That is very good news, Senator.
Senator HELMS. I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me also add
how good it is to see the ranking member back here again at the
hearing.
I would like to thank the ranking member and the chairman for
convening these hearings on Iraq, which promise to be excellent fol-
low-ons to the hearings this committee held in July and August. I
attended all or part of the five panels of those hearings, and I am
glad I did. In August, I then traveled around my home State of
Wisconsin listening extensively to my constituents' views on Iraq.
I actually held 21 town meetings, and for the first time ever, in ad-
dition to health care, concerns on foreign policy and, in particular,
Iraq, led the list of concerns.
I attended numerous briefings and read countless reports from a
variety of sources. I tried to listen carefully to the administration,
and have read quite closely the proposed resolution authorizing the
use of force that the administration sent to Congress last week.
Mr. Chairman, after all of this, I still do not have answers to
some fundamental questions. I remain extremely troubled by the
administration's shifting justifications for going to war in Iraq. I re-
main skeptical about the need to take unilateral action now, and
to accept all of the associated costs of that decision. I remain un-
convinced that the administration has thought through the poten-
tial cost and challenges of post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq, or
even thought through how to address the issue of weapons of mass
destruction once an engagement begins, and I am surprised and
disappointed that, after months of heated rhetoric, the administra-
tion could not yet manage a more thoughtful and focused proposal
than the language we received last week.
Mr. Chairman, I also remain deeply concerned about Iraq's weap-
ons of mass destruction program. I reject the assertion that dis-
agreeing with the administration means resigning ourselves to
doing nothing. I would like to work with my colleagues and with
the administration to address this threat in a focused and serious
way that serves our national interest, including our interest in con-
tinuing to work with other countries around the world to fight ter-
rorism.
In the end, the use of force may well be required, but to date
what the administration is proposing does not make the grade. The
message is confused, the vision hazy, the assurances facile. We are
making decisions that could send young Americans to war, deci-
sions that could have far-reaching consequences for the global cam-
paign against terrorism and for America's role in the world in the
21st century. I think it is reasonable to demand policy that makes
sense.
Perhaps this hearing can help point the way to such policy. Our
witnesses today are distinguished and thoughtful, and committed
to working in the best interests of the country, and it has always
been a great pleasure to work with my friend Ambassador
Holbrooke and, of course, to see him here today.
Mr. Chairman, in terms of questions, let me begin by asking Am-
bassador Holbrooke, what would you say are the historical prece-


23
have you.
a time when we should have been focused on the specific threat.
And I do not know why it was done, and it does not help us inter-
nationally, and I think it confuses Americans.
We will respond to any threat, and any President will act pre-
emptively when he or she has to, but why declare a doctrine which
is unnecessary? It always was there, as those of you who partici-
pated in the debate over “no first use” will remember. This com-
mittee held many hearings on the issue.
The funny thing, Senator Feingold, is if you take away the rhet-
oric and the controversy, I do not think it amounted to much, but
it was presented in such a dramatic way that it has muddied the
discussion which we are having here today.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. I could not agree with that statement more.
Senator Lugar.
Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I want to use a portion of my
time to just discuss two or three issues. The first one is one that
you raised, and I think is very important, and that is, how is the
resolution going to be formulated, who will debate it, and what
Let me respectfully make a suggestion that the chairman work
with the leadership of the Senate, Senator Daschle and others, to
gain jurisdiction for this committee for 1 week with regard to this
resolution. This will not delay, as I understand, the work of the
Senate in terms of the bills that are now on the floor, but it would
firmly establish the jurisdiction of the committee and give Mem-
bers an opportunity to participate, and I will support that with
Senator Lott.
I would say to the chairman that there was a small meeting this
morning involving Senator Lott. I attended the meeting, Senator
McCain was there, and Senator Santorum, and in essence I made
some suggestions to him that he did not indicate that he would ac-
cept them, but he was going to discuss them with members of the
administration.
The CHAIRMAN. Without taking out of your time, let me respond,
because this is so important. I share the Senator's view. I did not
formally make the request. I raised that as the appropriate way to
proceed.
I was informed that either the combination of the administration,
or the administration and the joint leadership concluded that no
one should be in on the negotiations other than the Speaker of the
House, the majority leader and the minority leader in the House
and the majority leader and minority leader in the Senate and
their staffs. I think that is a mistake. I suspect it is a growing sen-
timent in my caucus, I may be wrong, that it should go through
this procedure. It would not be unduly delayed, I happen to agree
with you. I cannot guarantee the outcome.
Senator LUGAR. The second suggestion follows from the letter
you read that the two of us wrote to the President, and I want to
spell out again the importance, I think, not only of the President
speaking to this, to the American people, but of all of us of trying
to think through the cost of the war and the peace.
Now, people are making tries at this. Larry Lindsey, the chair-
man of the Council on Economic Advisors, suggests $100 billion.


28
ate very narrowly, by one vote, endorsed the President's action. I
think the Senate was acting in its traditional mode of care, perhaps
looking back to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in which an open-
ended authority was abused, and consequently endorsed the lim-
ited action of rejecting or expelling from Kuwait and restoring the
territorial integrity of Kuwait as the extent of authority.
Senator BOXER. I get your point. You are saying the resolution
was limited. I would just make the point that the big debate in the
Senate actually, and in the House where I was, was whether there
ought to be 60 more days of sanctions before force, but I do not
have time to get into it, and I appreciate your answer.
Let me get into a couple of other questions. I see the yellow light
is on. Mr. Ambassador, in your editorial that you wrote, which I
thought was very strong, on August 27, you said, “a campaign
against Saddam Hussein cannot be waged without allies,” and in
the resolution that was sent up there is no reference to doing this
with allies whatsoever, and I want to ask you two questions, then
I will yield.
My understanding is that some in Tony Blair's cabinet backed
the use of force for Britian to be involved if there was another U.N.
resolution, and through that resolution the use of force. That is my
understanding of what Britain did. Do you feel, am I accurate on
that point?
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I do not know.
Senator BOXER. And then second, do you think we could
strengthen the resolution if we talked about working with our al-
lies, because the one thing I know from my people back home, they
do not want us to do this alone. The blood, the treasure, it all
and I think they want to see that we have allies with us, and yet
there is no mention, and you did not mention it as you picked over
the resolution.
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I share your point. I suggested four
changes in the resolution, one deletion, three additions. What you
are essentially proposing is a fifth, an addition which stresses the
importance of allies. There is a very revealing poll in yesterday's
USA Today, whereby an overwhelming majority of the American
public would be willing to see U.S. troops in an effort to deal with
Saddam if we had allies, if the Congress approved and if the Secu-
rity Council supported it.
The more amazing thing was that, given the same option U.S.
troops in Iraq absent congressional support, absent allies and ab-
sent the Security Council, there was a swing of 30 to 40 points. I
have never seen such a swing on an issue like this, and this would
reinforce your point, Senator Boxer.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that again?
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yesterday's USA Today has a very re-
vealing poll in which by margins of something like 68 to 30—do not
hold me to the exact numbers, Mr. Chairman—the American public
said they would support an attack on Iraq with American ground
troops if there was congressional support.
A second question, if there is U.N. Security Council action, the
same margin, if there are allies, the same margin, slight dif-
ferences, and then the poll asked, would you support it without the


29
Congress, 35 to 60 no. Would you support it without the U.N. ap-
proval, the same margin, no, without allies, the same margin, no.
In other words, what Senator Boxer is saying is reinforced by, I
think, the good common sense of the American public. They want
to get rid of Saddam, as everyone on this committee does. They do
not want to go it alone. The only nuanced difference between us,
Senator, which you and I discussed privately, is whether a new Se-
curity Council resolution is required or not, and I am bound by my
previous comments on that and by my experience, but I think that
we cannot go it alone, and that is why I wrote that article, and if
you and your colleagues add an additional Therefore clause con-
cerning the need for allies, I think it would help the administra-
tion, but I cannot speak for them.
Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, can I indulge you for 30 seconds
more?
The CHAIRMAN. Sure.
Senator BOXER. In your first op ed piece you said, “existing Secu-
rity Council resolutions will not be enough.” In your second one,
you changed, but I agree with your first one, and let me just close
by saying this. I agree with where the American people are today.
Now, they may change. I agree with where the American people
are today, and the difference between us, I say, Mr. Ambassador,
is this:
I would want to put working with our allies, working with the
United Nations not in a Whereas clause, but in the actual Resolved
clause, because sticking something in a Whereas clause does not
mean anything, but if it is in the Resolved clause that we will do
this through the United Nations, we will do this with our allies, we
will not do it alone is a strong difference between where I am com-
ing from, where the American people are coming from, which is
right there, and where this administration is coming from with a
blank check, which I could never support, and I appreciate the
comments of both of you here today.
The CHAIRMAN. For the record, since it was referenced, with the
indulgence of my colleague from Nebraska, the question in the
USA Today poll, “some people say they would support invading
Iraq with U.S. ground troops only if certain conditions were true.
For each of the following conditions, please say if you favor or op-
pose invading
How about if the United Nations supported invading? And 79
percent would favor.
How about if the United States opposed invading? Only 37 per-
cent would favor.
Senator BOXER. The United Nations, or United States?
The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry. Would you oppose or favor if the
United Nations supported invading Iraq? And 79 percent said we
would support invading if the U.N. supported invading.
When asked if the U.N. opposed invading, only 37 percent said
they would favor it, and so it is overwhelming clear, at least-
Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, you might add, because
I was trying to remember the same question on Congress and our
allies
The CHAIRMAN. It says if Congress supports, 69 percent in favor,
if Congress opposes, only 37 percent favor, other countries partici-
83-463 D-2


31
There is something that does not quite fit with that kind of re-
sponse. I do not know if your nose is up against the window, but
the fact is, this is about as serious an issues as the Congress will
ever debate. My question to you, Mr. Chairman, and maybe you
could give us some sense of this, what was the procedure in 1991
when that resolution was passed? Did this committee have a role,
or was it bypassed like this committee is being bypassed today?
The CHAIRMAN. And again, this is not against the Senator's time
for questions. When I go back and refresh my recollection, exactly
what the sequence was, but there were three important points.
One, initially Kuwait was invaded in August. The President as-
serted he did not need congressional authority, and his Attorney
General, who is actually a good friend and has helped me teach a
couple of my classes, asserted that the war clause only was put
there for the Congress to be able to declare war if the President
did not, and that was literally asserted by the White House.
And then I, along with several others, probably Senator Lugar,
do not recall, insisted that that issue be litigated before the com-
mittee, of the requirement, and we had constitutional scholar after
scholar come and testify in open hearing saying the President must
submit a resolution seeking approval.
We solicited that resolution, and then President Bush did what
I thought, quite frankly, was a very wise thing, and that is, he
said, I do not want you to vote on this in the midst of congressional
elections. He said, this should be put over until the congressional
elections are over, even though it was more urgent then, in that
there was a country invaded and occupied, and we had 250,000
troops amassing on the ground. He still said, I guess because of his
experience as a combat veteran he still said, we should not vote
now.
And then we came back—we came back in January and voted
after the election, and I cannot say to my friend with certainty
whether or not the resolution of the President ultimately submitted
in that interim period was once again before the committee or not.
I do not recall. Maybe my friend from Indiana does.
But the point is, there was considerable debate, because we did
not vote in a highly charged electoral circumstance, but that was
the sequencing.
Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that, and it may
well be that we go back and examine that record as to how it was
done in 1990 and 1991, especially in light of the fact that we are
a few weeks away from an election, and this deserves the kind of
thoughtful time and debate that I think the American public de-
serve and, quite frankly, the world deserves.
I am also astounded that those who know most about those
issues, the ranking members of the Armed Services Committee, the
Foreign Relations Committee, the Intelligence Committee—some
are with us today—are not part of the process in writing or draft-
ing or amending a resolution, and I would hope that whenever that
resolution is taken up in the House and the Senate, that it will be
the Members, the senior Members of this committee that will lead
that floor debate, that will manage that bill.
Now, with that said, Mr. Chairman, I want to ask a question of
Ambassador Holbrooke. In his testimony he cites, I believe on page


35
been in refugee camps everywhere, I have been shot at, the whole
works.
The reason we have to contemplate it, in my view, although I
agree with Senator Boxer, as a last resort, is that he will be more
dangerous in the future. In 3 to 5 years he will be more powerful,
and I do not agree that nothing has happened to bring it to a crisis.
Why it is happening at exactly now, September of 2002, is a sepa-
rate issue, but he has had 12 years in which he has done every-
thing he can-he has made himself an international outlaw, essen-
tially.
If there is a state in defiance of the world system, the U.N. Secu-
rity Council, which everyone in this room has talked positively
about, it is Saddam and the Iraqis.
Senator CHAFEE. I do take exception to the definitive aspect that
he will be more of a threat in 5 years. That is debatable. Fidel Cas-
tro, you might have said he will be more of a threat if left un-
touched, and here, years later, he is not more of a threat, so that
is a debatable point. I do not take that as an absolute.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you want to respond, Mr. McFarlane?
Mr. McFARLANE. Please, Mr. Chairman. I do not think any of us
can give you certainties on almost anything regarding Saddam
Hussein. I would like to recall, however, Senator Lugar's comment
about the plausible risks and the stated ambitions that we have
heard from Saddam Hussein.
Nuclear materials are poorly guarded in much of the former So-
viet Union. Thanks to Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn, the pro-
gram that was so well begun and is continuing has to be sustained
and, unless it is, the plausibility of nuclear materials being mis-
directed, stolen, purchased, or whatever, cannot be denied, and the
existence of a nuclear program in Iraq, which is a matter of fact
under the United Kingdom's report, issued yesterday, gives us just
cause in guarding against the growth of that program.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me, before I yield to Senator Rockefeller,
make a point that I think is a distinction with a difference. I think
we miss the boat when we are talking about Iraq. Iraq violated
international norms, invaded another country, essentially sued for
peace, essentially signed an armistice, the conditions of which were
contained in the U.N. resolutions, and has clearly violated those
resolutions. Whether or not they are a threat or not, they violated
those resolutions.
I hope we stop talking about preemption. This is not preemption.
Maybe we should or should not go to Iraq, and I have an open
mind about that, but it is fundamentally different than invading a
similar country in terms of seeking weapons of mass destruction,
acted against their own people, not to the same extent, like Iran,
or North Korea. They are not in the same situation. Iraq signed es-
sentially a peace agreement with conditions. The conditions are
contained in U.N. resolutions. They have violated them on their
face. That is a fundamentally different thing.
I wish the President and everyone else would stop talking about
preemption and give people around the world the sense that we are
acting like cowboys, and/or they have a right to act preemptively.
This is a different deal.


41
man history. I do not consider this a long-term crisis, but going
back to Senator Rockefeller's question, it will definitely affect that
issue.
One last point. The Bundestag, your counterpart body, would
have to approve any German deployments. When Schroeder went
to the Bundestag for approval, he won by only two votes, so my
German friends have told me that he could not win a vote to send
forces directly into Iraq anyway. On the other hand, it did not have
to become this intense and this personal.
Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I wonder what recent history would have been
had we accepted the offer after he risked his career to send troops
to Afghanistan, had we accepted the offer. I wonder what it would
have been had we not unceremoniously pulled out of Kyoto as he
walked into the President's office.
So these personal things do matter, but I happen to agree, for
what it is worth, with the Ambassador that the core relationship
is so deep, so strong, that we will overcome personalities.
But let me speak to Afghanistan for a minute, because like Coop-
erative Threat Reduction and Nunn-Lugar, I do think it relates,
but not to the same extent, and that is that it seems pretty clear
now, I emphasize appears, fairly clear now that the Defense De-
partment has rethought a position that Senators Lugar, myself, I
believe the Senator from Florida and the Senator from Nebraska
all pushed for, which was that we expand the international secu-
rity force in Afghanistan, that we engage NATO—as a matter of
fact, Senator Lugar and I once again importuned the President to
take NATO up on its offer for participation in Afghanistan, arguing
that failure to do so was counterintuitive and counterproductive in
terms of U.S.-NATO relations, and it seems as though now—and
that was rejected over the strong objection on the part of the De-
fense Department, (a) to expand, (b) to include NATO, (c) to take
advantage of the French and/or German offers for deployment.
Now, if what we read is correct, and we had, by the way, several
hearings that addressed this issue, calling the administration up,
asking them to reconsider this position, specifically asking them to
reconsider this position, and now it looks like they may be recon-
sidering the position. I ask you both, starting with you, Mr. McFar-
lane, if during this somewhat tumultuous period the administra-
tion is able to reconfigure an international security force with some
muscle, some NATO signature, if you will, do it, and is able to put
it in place, will that have any positive or negative impact on our
ability to get support and/or succeed in Iraq, or is it not relevant?
How will it play?
I know you know so many foreign leaders. How do you think that
would play in terms of the objective we all seek, which is a more
cooperative effort to deal with Saddam? Saddam is not just our
problem, he is the world's problem. We may be the only solution,
but he is the world's problem.
Is there any correlation between how we handle, from this point
out, Afghanistan and its stability and our demonstrating to the
world we have kind of learned a—what we intend in Iraq, and I
will close this question—it sounds more like a diatribe than a ques-
tion, but I have met with the Foreign Ministers of most of the Eu-


44
Now, fortunately, we had the vote on January 11 which gave us
4 days to go before 250,000 people or more would go into combat.
So I am hopeful that we can sort of reconstruct all of that history.
I think it is relevant for this situation, because ideally I think we
still ought to take jurisdiction in the committee if we can do so for
a period of time, it is reasonable for us to fashion a resolution. It
may or may not be the one that is debated but nevertheless it
should be our job.
In it there were two resolutions that were offered in the Senate,
and they were the rival resolutions from the Armed Services Com-
mittee, one offered by my friend Sam Nunn, and another offered
by Senator Warner. These went together with the majority leader,
Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. Dole, the minority leader, and those were the
two offerings that we had at that point.
I just wanted to ask you, Mr. McFarlane, in your judgment,
would the Security Council be more likely to fashion a resolution
that dealt with Iraq if the Senate held a vote before the Security
Council acted? In other words, some have argued that the Security
Council members, quite apart from Saddam, may finally doubt the
resolve of this country, feel that once again we are bluffing, that
for the last 11 years or so people have huffed and puffed about vio-
lations of the Security Council resolutions, as well as incursions in
the no-fly zone, but not a whole lot has occurred and as a matter
of fact, we have been gone for 4 years.
If he was a betting man, he might guess we might be gone for
4 more, but would it be helpful for us to vote, just playing the dev-
il's advocate for a moment, sooner rather than later to indicate
some resolve, the administration and the Congress working to-
gether?
Mr. MCFARLANE. Senator Lugar, I think it would have a very
positive impact, and the demonstration of that resolve and support
and commitment that you suggest, and that that impact would be
felt by members of the Security Council.
This is not a direct analogy at all, but I recall very well the run-
up to the first summit with President Gorbachev in 1985 in Gene-
va, and the impact that the Senate, the majority resolution actually
had on Gorbachev, separately the action of all permanent members
of the Security Council, in joining in the support of President
Reagan as he left for Geneva, and this very vivid public solidarity
expressed in New York from Thatcher, Kohl, Mitterand, Craxi, I
believe, and Nakasone, echoed—not echoed, but in parallel with
that of the Senate, the joint resolution, and then of course the
American people were at 70 percent supporting the President's po-
sitions going to Geneva, were more than Gorbachev could ignore,
and it had a profound effect—it is in his memoirs—in influencing
his position of change and a revolution that gradually led to suc-
cesses in arms control and elsewhere.
I think it has a very positive impact.
Senator LUGAR. Let me ask a second question. What should be
the proper call with regard to the tactics of fighting a war in Iraq
if we have one? For example, some have argued, I think privately
rather than publicly, that the type of tactics that the United States
ought to adopt in Iraq that would minimize the loss of American
lives and minimize civilian losses and what-have-you are extraor-


49
would say, we just did not think of that, we were fastened on some-
thing else.
I think the committee hearing today, aided by our two witnesses,
did think of a number of things, and both of us and others have
indicated we are using this forum almost to send messages, and
please, to do things.
I would just like to say, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the spirit
with which you have approached this hearing, as well as others.
Sort of clamoring outside of the committee room are many who
want comments as to whether the whole Iraq issue has become vi-
ciously partisan, and so forth. The fact is that it could be, but it
should not.
The chairman is a candidate for reelection this year. Fortunately,
I am not, so I have the comfort zone at least of that situation to
say that I understand. People who are involved in election cam-
paigns, reading the analysis every day, does Iraq supplant every
other issue, or something of this variety, may be tempted to get
into some other analysis, but thank goodness, that was not the case
here, so I thank the chairman, and I think the bipartisanship and
the nonpartisanship really with regard to this issue has been very
important, and that was true of our first two hearings, it was true
of this one, and it is important in terms of our own credibility, be-
cause we are raising these questions with our administration as
well as the rest of the world.
If we do so from a degree of unity, why, obviously it is highly,
much more effective, so I thank the chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. We often kid about this, but it probably hurts us
both that at least you and I—not least, you and I have been almost
completely unified in this endeavor, as has Senator Hagel and, I
might add, if you notice way down the other end there in terms of
seniority is the Senator from Florida who has, to the best of my
knowledge, stayed for every last drop of every hearing.
We are not attempting to be self-congratulatory. We are trying
to send a simple message. This committee, this Congress, the peo-
ple who have primary responsibility in this Congress for at least
presenting this debate are unified and are trying to help, not be ob-
structionist. We are trying to help the President in resolving a very
difficult situation.
We all know-I have been here for almost 30 years, this Senator
has been here 28 years, if I am not mistaken.
Senator LUGAR. Twenty-six.
The CHAIRMAN. We have been around a long time We understand
that no President is ever in a position where he has 100 percent
of the information he needs to make a decision. We understand
that.
The only thing we want to know is that he has thought through,
the administration has thought through, even if the answers are
not available, has raised all the pertinent issues, because—I keep
saying how the American public has to be informed. I want to be
informed. I want to be informed before I vote on these things.
Again, I thank you all. Bud, thank you for sitting through our
little dialog here, our conversation among ourselves. You are very
gracious to do that.


NEXT STEPS IN IRAQ
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2002
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10:35 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Sen-
ate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of the
committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Sarbanes, Feingold, Wellstone, Boxer,
Bill Nelson, Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Frist, Chafee, Allen, and
Brownback.
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.
Starting in July, the committee has held a series of hearings on
U.S. policy toward Iraq, and we have heard from a broad range of
experts and witnesses, former senior officials on the basic questions
before the country, which is, what threat does Iraq pose to the
United States? What are our possible responses? How do our allies
around the world and our friends in the region see the problem?
What would be our responsibilities the day after? What is the goal
that we have here?
I think the President is dead right about the danger of Saddam
Hussein. The witnesses and my colleagues are tired of hearing me
say this. I think no matter how well formulated a foreign policy,
it will not be sustained very long without the informed consent of
the American people.
So one of the questions I have been asking is, at what point, if
it gets to this that we “take down Saddam,” do the Secretary of De-
fense and the Secretary of State turn to the President and say, we
are done here, Mr. President? We have met our goals and we can
go home. I think we should be talking about that.
This morning we continue our inquiry with two Americans who
have had an extraordinary impact on our country's foreign policy
and security problems: former Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, and former Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger. This
committee has heard from them on many occasions in the past and
I am pleased to welcome them both here again to help us work
through a difficult challenge posed by Iraq.
This afternoon we are going to hear from the current Secretary
of State, Colin Powell, and I will have a lengthier statement at that
time.
For now, let me simply welcome our two witnesses and tell them
how pleased we are they are here for this important process and
yield to my very good friend from North Carolina, Senator Helms.
Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
(51)


61
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Congress has an
opportunity to vindicate a system of international order. I urge you
to give the President the authority to enforce the appropriate U.N.
resolutions, together with the world community, if at all possible,
in concert with like-minded nations if necessary. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Kissinger follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE
Mr. Chairman: Congress is considering one of the most consequential expressions
of its views since the end of the Cold War: what action the United States should
take to deal with the threat posed by illegal stockpiles of weapons of mass destruc-
tion in Iraq and their potential growth. President Bush has reaffirmed America's
commitment to a cooperative world order by asking the United Nations to rectify
Iraq's defiance of a large number of U.N. resolutions mandating the destruction of
these stockpiles as well as Iraq's flagrant breach of its pledge to do so as a condition
for the suspension of the Gulf War in 1991. But were the world community, by fudg-
ing its response, to opt for the risk of a greater threat in the future, can America
and a coalition of the like-minded acquiesce in stockpiles of weapons of mass de-
struction in Iraq? Thus the Committee will need to consider not only the risk of ac-
tion but also the consequences of inaction.
The Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction will be growing in an inter-
national environment in which their danger merges with the threat of terrorism.
For on September 11, 2001, the world entered a new period in which private, non-
state organizations undertook to threaten national and international security by
stealth attacks. The controversy about preemption is a symptom of the impact of
this transformation. At bottom, it is a debate between the traditional notion of sov-
ereignty of the nation-state prevalent since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and
the adaptation required by both modern technology and the nature of the terrorist
threat.
Osama bin Laden's base was on the territory of a national state, though his was
not a national cause. Highly disciplined operatives are scattered around the globe,
some on the soil of America's closest allies and even within America itself. They
enjoy financial and organizational support from a number of states-most frequently
from private individuals ostensibly not under the control of their governments.
Bases for terrorists have been established in several countries, usually in areas
where the governments can plausibly deny control or are actually not in control,
such as in Yemen, Somalia, or perhaps Indonesia and Iran. Having no territory to
defend, the terrorists are not subject to the deterrent threats of the Cold War; hav-
ing as their aim the destruction of social cohesion, they are not interested in the
conciliating procedures and compromises of traditional diplomacy.
Unlike the previous centuries, when the movement of armies foreshadowed
threat, modern technology in the service of terror gives no warning, and its per-
petrators vanish with the act of commission. And since these attacks are capable
of inflicting catastrophic damage, traditional notions of sovereignty have to be modi-
fied with respect to countries that harbor terrorist headquarters or terrorist training
centers. The problem of preemption is inherent in the nature of the terrorist chal-
lenge.
The accumulation of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in violation of U.N. reso-
lutions cannot be separated from the post-Afghanistan phase of the war against ter-
rorism. Iraq is located in the midst of a region that has been the hotbed of the spe-
cial type of global terrorist activity from which the attack on the United States was
organized. And the consequences of weapons of mass destruction have many similar-
ities to those of terrorism. They can be used without warning; their impact is cata-
strophic. In some circumstances, their origin can be uncertain. If the world is not
to turn into a doomsday machine, a way must be found to prevent proliferation-
especially to rogue states whose governments have no restraint on the exercise of
their power.
Cold War principles of deterrence are almost impossible to implement when there
is a multiplicity of states, some of them harboring terrorists in position to wreak
havoc. The Cold War world reflected a certain uniformity in the assessment of risk
between the nuclear sides. But when many states threaten each other for incon-
gruent purposes, who is to do the deterring, and in the face of what provocation?
This is especially true when that which must be deterred is not simply the use of
weapons of mass destruction but the threat of them.
Suicide bombing has shown that the calculations of jihad fighters are not those
of the Cold War leaders. The concern that war with Iraq could unleash Iraqi weap-
83-463
D-3


62
ons of mass destruction on Israel and Saudi Arabia is a demonstration of how even
existing stockpiles of weapons turn into instruments of blackmail and self-deter-
rence. Procrastination is bound to magnify such possibilities.
The existence and, even more, the growth of stockpiles of weapons of mass de-
struction in Iraq poses a threat to international peace and stability. The issue is
not primarily whether Iraq was involved in the terrorist attack on the United
States. The challenge of Iraq is essentially geopolitical and psychological. Its policy
is implacably hostile to the United States, to neighboring countries, and to estab-
lished rules that govern relations among nations. It possesses growing stockpiles of
biological and chemical weapons, which Saddam Hussein has used in the war
against Iran and on his own population. Iraq is working again to develop a nuclear
capability. Saddam Hussein breached his commitment to the United Nations by pre-
venting the operation of the international inspection system he had accepted on his
territory as part of the armistice agreement ending the Gulf War. There is no possi-
bility of a direct negotiation between Washington and Baghdad and no basis for
trusting Iraq's promises to the international community. By what reasoning can the
world community—or America—acquiesce in this state of affairs?
If these capabilities remain intact, they will become an instrument-actual and
symbolic—for the destabilization of a volatile region. And if Saddam Hussein's re-
gime survives both the Gulf War and the anti-terrorism campaign, this fact alone
will compound the existing terrorist menace.
By its defiance of the U.N. Security Council resolutions requiring it to give up
weapons of mass destruction, Iraq has in effect asserted the determination to pos-
sess weapons whose very existence compounds the terrorist threat immeasurably.
Global terrorism cannot flourish except with the support of states that either sym-
pathize or acquiesce in its actions. To the extent that these countries observe the
flouting of U.N. resolutions, the weakening of international norms, and the defiance
of America, they feel less restrained in acquiescing in or ignoring terrorist activities.
For the nations of the world to accept the existence of growing stockpiles of weapons
of mass destruction where the new form of terrorism has been spawned is to under-
mine restraint with respect not only to weapons proliferation but to the psycho-
logical impulse toward terrorism altogether.
The campaign in Afghanistan was an important first step. But if it remains the
principal move in the war against terrorism, it runs the risk of petering out into
an intelligence operation while the rest of the region gradually slides back to the
pre-9/11 pattern, with radicals encouraged by the demonstration of the world's hesi-
tation and moderates demoralized by the continuation of an unimpaired Iraq as an
aggressive regional power. In short, the continuation of illegal proliferation, the
global dangers which it involves, the rejection or infeasibility of a viable inspection
system, and the growth of terrorism require action, preferably global, but as an ulti-
mate resort of America's, together with those countries prepared to support it.
It is argued that dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq weakens the
war against terrorism. The opposite is more likely to be true. Eliminating such
weapons in Iraq is an important aspect of the second phase of the anti-terrorism
campaign. It demonstrates American determination to get at the root causes and
some of the ultimate capabilities of what is, in essence, a crusade against free val-
ues. Enforcing U.N. resolutions in Iraq does not compete with the capabilities need-
ed to pursue the second phase of the anti-terrorism campaign. In all ſikelihood, such
action will strengthen it by additional deployments to the region.
Nor should it weaken the cooperation of other countries in the anti-terror cam-
paign. Assisting in this effort is not a favor other countries do for the United States
but ultimately for themselves. And what exactly will they decline to support without
risking their entire relationship to the United States? The fight against terrorism
will take many years. To wait for its end before acting is to guarantee that stock-
piles of weapons of mass destruction multiply.
At the same time, while reserving the option to act in concert with only the na-
tions it can convince, the United States is wise to appeal to cooperative action of
the world community. As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States
has a special unilateral capacity and, indeed, obligation to lead in implementing its
convictions. But it also has a special obligation to justify its actions by principles
that transcend the assertions of preponderant power. It cannot be in either the
American national interest or the world's interest to develop principles that grant
every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of threats
to its security. The case for enforcement of established resolutions should be the
opening move in a serious effort of consultation to develop fundamental principles
that other nations can consider in the general interest.
The United Nations is therefore challenged to come up with a control system that
eliminates existing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq-together with procedures


66
If I might just say this, when I sat at the United Nations, I used
to sit there and think, in my political science professor mode, that
this is the most fascinating thing in the world, that you actually
are talking about what is going on inside another country and that
you have the right to do that. That is a very different concept that
came into existence. And as Secretary Kissinger said, we are in a
very different phase where there are non-state actors and you have
to look at things in a different way. Nobody is denying the com-
plication of this.
But it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that your suggestion makes
a great deal of sense. I also know that when I was at the U.N. and
as Secretary, it helps a lot when you have the power of Congress
behind you. It is a big plus in your pocket. So I think a resolution-
I am not going to get into the wording of it—makes sense.
The CHAIRMAN. No, I am not either. Just conceptually.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. But the other thing I must say that bothers
me, if I might say this, I think we are loading too much onto this
issue. There are many people within or outside the administration
that had a different agenda from the very beginning, and I think
they are finding this, in some ways, a useful horse.
And I think the issue of preemption is a huge issue, and I would
definitely agree with Secretary Kissinger that it is worth dis-
cussing. It is a huge deal. It is a totally different way of operating.
It is one thing for self-defense, and I think that becomes a com-
plicated issue of how quickly do you move when you believe you are
being attacked. But I think to load this issue now with a major dis-
cussion of change in our whole strategic policy is a mistake, and
I think we need to deal with this issue as you have presented it,
and as I have heard the discussion. But we do not need to load it
with ideological issues that had nothing to do with this in the first
place.
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kissinger.
Secretary KISSINGER. When the President spoke at the General
Assembly, he did not base the case on a general doctrine of pre-
emption. He based the case on Iraq's violations of a whole series
of U.N. resolutions and agreements related to the gulf war.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree.
Secretary KISSINGER. Therefore, the issue of preemption is inher-
ent in the terrorist challenge because there you have non-state ac-
tors operating from the territory of states in pursuit of objectives
that go beyond national borders.
However, this is not an issue that needs to be settled theoreti-
cally now. To justify action against Iraq, it is sufficient to examine
the behavior of Iraq and the systematic violation of its under-
takings and of the U.N. resolutions.
Second, in order to establish a relationship between terrorism
and violations of U.N. resolutions on Iraq, it is not necessary to
demonstrate a specific connection between al-Qaeda and Iraq. It is
sufficient to point out that one of the motives of the terrorist
groups is to convey their belief that the will of the West and of the
United States is flagging and that they can assert their claims by
ruthless demonstration of power. And to the extent that a country
is surrounded by nations acquiescing to or helping terrorism explic-


68
tion to us and can be brought along? Above all, the war against ter-
rorism will take many years. The decision one has to make is
whether to wait, permitting the growth of stockpiles for many more
years until one has to address the issue under quite different inter-
national circumstances.
Second, when nations help in the fight against terrorism, they
are not just helping us; they are helping themselves. Russia has a
major interest in not permitting fundamentalism to become a domi-
nant force in the Muslim world. The war against terrorism must
be conducted on the basis of its protagonists having common inter-
est, rather than looked at as if it were a special challenge to the
United States. To the extent that other nations believe in the im-
portance of a strong America, they will not stop cooperating with
us on something that is so much in their own interest, because
after all we are enforcing U.N. resolutions.
I do believe that we must go through a process that is now al-
ready underway and which will make clear what support we can
generate and what coalitions we can create. I am sure the Sec-
retary of State will talk about this in the afternoon.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that I do not believe, nor did I say,
that the war on terrorism would have to be finished. First of all,
I think it will not be finished for a long time. It is unfortunately
what we have to live with for most of our lives and our children's
lives. So there can be no termination to our effort on it.
But I think that we are in a crucial phase as far as finishing the
job in Afghanistan. Just to use an image here, I think that we do
have Saddam in a box, a strategic box. We do not know a lot about
it, but I have a feeling that if we blow up the box, that as the
sparks fly out, they will have an effect already on a region that is
inflamed and we cannot forget what is happening or not happening
in the Middle East.
So I actually think we are probably not as far apart as might
seem. It is a matter of timing and our favorite diplomatic word,
"nuance,” in terms of when we do things. I agree with Henry that
we cannot persuade other countries to think that fighting the war
on terrorism is only in our benefit. It has to be in their benefit also,
obviously.
But I think it is just unnecessary to do this this moment, and
what I am advocating is that we play out the U.N. string with the
support of Congress in the pocket of the President and the Ambas-
sador, and we will have a better chance of getting support by the
other countries if it is evident to everybody that the Iraqis stiffed
us. And that is where my timing comes in.
Senator HELMS. Do you have any further comment?
Secretary KISSINGER. It really is a question of whether we are
talking about a few months or a few years. The process, as it now
seems to evolve, seems to me to require some months of clarifica-
tion and that seems to me also perfectly consistent with what the
administration is doing and saying. So I do not think there is a
fundamental difference, if that is what we are talking about.
The CHAIRMAN. You are both talking about a few months, are
you not, as opposed to a few years?
Secretary KISSINGER. Then there is no difference.
Senator HELMS. What was your answer to his question?


70
I would be open-minded enough to allow for the possibility that
somebody could produce an inspection system that can really oper-
ate. I do not think the issue should be defined strictly in terms of
who is for war and who is against war.
Senator SARBANES. Well, that is a pretty fundamental question,
is it not, whether we are going to go to war or not or whether there
is a peaceful path? I take it your position is you do not think there
is a peaceful path. You just sort of dismissed the inspection path.
So if we do that, what is left? War.
Secretary KISSINGER. No, no. I think there is a peaceful path.
Senator SARBANES. Well, what is that peaceful path?
Secretary KISSINGER. Theoretically, if the U.N. passes a strong
resolution and if an inspection system is devised that meets the ob-
jectives of the U.N. resolution, it is possible that they will agree to
it. Under those conditions, that would indeed be a peaceful solu-
tion. That it is unlikely this will happen, is a judgment, not a
course of action, and we should run out the full diplomatic string.
Senator SARBANES. Well, because you think it might work or just
as a matter of appearance?
Secretary KISSINGER. Not as a matter of appearance. I would like
it to work. I think it is unlikely to work, but I would be delighted
if it worked.
Senator SARBANES. You say in your statement that we have to
entertain a program of reconstruction for Iraq.
Secretary KISSINGER. Are you talking to me?
Senator SARBANES. Yes, and that is on page 5 of your statement.
Secretary KISSINGER. Right.
Senator SARBANES. What do you think about the program of re-
construction in Afghanistan?
Secretary KISSINGER. Afghanistan is a notoriously difficult coun-
try for foreigners to deal with or to reconstruct. I strongly favor
economic aid to Afghanistan.
Senator SARBANES. Do you think we are paying adequate atten-
tion to the question of reconstruction in Afghanistan? You argue
here on Iraq, we are going to go in, and then we are going to do
a major reconstruction program in order, in effect, to deal with the
aftermath. What about the reconstruction program in Afghanistan?
If we are going to look at what kind of reconstruction program
would we do, how committed have we remained in Afghanistan in
order to do reconstruction?
Secretary KISSINGER. It depends on how you define reconstruc-
tion.
First, about Iraq. Reconstruction in Iraq should be undertaken
not just by the United States, but by an international consortium,
international community, and a group of major interested coun-
tries.
Something akin to that should be done in Afghanistan, too,
though Afghanistan has the additional difficulty that the country
is run by a group of warlords whose subjugation would require a
major military effort. In the past, attempts to that have produced
a situation in which the warlords, who normally fight each other,
unite against the foreigner seeking to curb their power. So I would
be uneasy about a major military effort to pacify the whole country.
I would favor whatever can be done with a reasonable military ef-


71
fort and a significant economic effort, together with other nations.
But I do have a question in Afghanistan, which would not arise to
the same extent in Iraq.
Senator SARBANES. Is the effort underway in Afghanistan for re-
construction up to the standard that you think it should be? Are
we falling short, perhaps woefully short, in Afghanistan? There are
some who think we are risking turning a success into a failure by
not following up on the reconstruction.
Secretary KISSINGER. The first thing one has to consider, Sen-
ator, is this: if, on September 10, 2001, somebody had said that we
were going to have an expeditionary force in Afghanistan, were
going to overthrow the Taliban, operate all over the Middle East,
and do all this within 6 weeks, it would have been considered in-
credible. So, considering the magnitude of the challenge we have
faced and the unusual cast of thinking required vis-a-vis American
traditions, I think we have done well in Afghanistan. As things
continue
Senator SARBANES. You think at this point that our reconstruc-
tion effort is adequate and meets the standard? You do not think
we should be doing more?
Secretary KISSINGER. I think we have done the best that could
be done under present circumstances. As time goes on, we will
probably want to strengthen the reconstruction effort.
Senator SARBANES. Could I hear from Secretary Albright on
these points?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I disagree. I think that we have done a half-
way job in Afghanistan and we need to keep our attention on it.
I know that I certainly have met with some Afghan officials, and
they are grateful to us, but they understand that there is a lot
more to do and that there is reconstitution there potentially of
some al-Qaeda groupings, and Pakistan continues to be a haven for
some of these issues. So I think it is very hard. We have not fin-
ished the job and this concerns me.
And I might say that I think we have to deal with something
very serious here. The issue of Afghanistan is as a result of unin-
tended consequences of previous foreign policy decisions, and I
think we have to be very careful about the unintended con-
sequences of whatever decision we make on Iraq. And Iraq at the
moment, as I have said, I think is in a strategic box. We need to
be careful about blowing it up and seeing what the problems are.
And to answer your previous question, I do think there is a possi-
bility here that there could be some working of the issue if in fact
the international community is mobilized. We did it once, and the
problem was that it dissipated over the years. We do continue to
bomb. We have authority to do that. And I think we have got to
be careful about making this a war versus the fact that 40 percent
of Iraq is already under a no-fly zone. So it is a matter of enforcing
issues and giving strength to the United Nations resolution, that
maybe the threat of this will, in fact, make it possible to have a
different solution.
Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, and I
appreciate it. I hope we will have a second round because I want
to address this issue.


72
The CHAIRMAN. We will. I realize I am frustrating my colleagues
at the end here on both ends, but I am going to let the witnesses
go on, otherwise I will go to a 15-minute rule for each Senator.
Senator SARBANES. I just want to say I do want to come back to
the preemption issue. I see Secretary Kissinger has put Yemen, So-
malia, Indonesia, and Iran on the agenda here, and I want to ex-
plore that with him.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.
Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Kissinger in his testimony says “the United Nations is, there-
fore, challenged to come up with a control system that eliminates
the existing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, together with
procedures to prevent their being rebuilt.” This follows his discus-
sion of the violation by Iraq of United Nations resolutions dealing
with weapons of mass destruction.
And certainly he is right. This is at the heart of our problem, but
it is obviously very difficult to think through how the United Na-
tions is going to have this ability under current conditions or even
with Hans Blix and inspectors going back in. This does not negate
the discussion we have had of timing, but it is at the heart of the
matter. How in the world do you ever find weapons of mass de-
struction and then, as Dr. Kissinger said, have a control system not
only that destroys them but that makes sure that no one ever re-
builds them? That is a degree of invasion of sovereignty that is
very substantial.
Secretary Albright mentions it is naive to think that a peaceful
and democratic Iraq will automatically emerge in the ashes of our
invasion. It is crazy to believe, she says, we can run post-war Iraq
alone. It is essential that the administration think of the con-
sequence of all this through in advance. But she says, it has not
yet been done.
Now that is at the heart of our dilemma. As the chairman has
said, we are heading toward a resolution, a very imperfect one, in
which many Senators may vote in favor of authorizing our Presi-
dent to have this authority so that he has some bargaining ability
with the rest of the world.
But the consequences of this are critically important. I have not
heard any discussion of Secretary Kissinger's thought about how
the United Nations or anyone else comes up with a control system.
We need to hear about this rapidly.
And the chairman and I, about 5 o'clock last night, were having
a dialog between the two of us, and Mr. McFarlane who was left
as a survivor at the witness table at that point, essentially saying
we are trying to send messages. We are asking somebody. Now,
this afternoon we will have our Secretary of State, and we will ask
him. Is there a plan? Do we have any idea what we plan to do in
Iraq after we win the war? How do we stop the fragmentation of
this box that Secretary Albright has talked about?
All the testimony we have had from the Iraqis who came before
us before was simply to confirm it is a very complex country with
many nationalities and divisive groups, Iran coming in from one
area, Turkey from another. This is very tough business right now.
The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator will yield. And every one of those
witnesses said the United States has to be the one to manage this.


73
Senator LUGAR. Yes, so we come back to that. How about the
United Nations?
And you are probably both right. We ought to try to make sure
there are a lot of other helpers to help pay for this as well as sus-
tain it for a period of time.
But let us take the worst case scenario. It is us. Do we have any
idea, any plan for how to bring about peace in Iraq, the territorial
integrity, peace with the neighbors, to get the weapons of mass de-
struction?
Now, maybe somebody in the administration does. Maybe even
as we speak there are people who will come and say, we have
thought of those things. We have not told you about them and they
are highly classified. That would be reassuring.
But I simply use this opportunity to ask either of you. You do
not know what the administration is doing, but Secretary Albright,
what would you do? How would we begin to think through the situ-
ation at the end of the war in the worst case scenario that we are
there alone? Now, you said we enlist other people. We try to do
that. But what are the elements of a plan for a post-war Iraq?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I think that we do have to
recognize, while I agree with Henry that Afghanistan is full of war-
lords and a real problem, Iraq is not exactly a unified place. And
everything that we have ever heard is that it is a country that was
created by outside powers that put together at least three groups,
the Kurds, the Shiites, and the Sunnis. And that is the least of it.
So the integrity of the country is an issue.
I met previously many, many times with the Iraqi opposition,
and as somebody whose father was part of an exile movement, I
applaud those people, but I also know how difficult it is. Everybody
has a different view, and believe me, the Czechoslovak exile move-
ment had nothing in common with the Iraqi one.
So I think that there are very many different kinds of groupings.
When I met with them, they all had a different idea about what
to do. And I think the first thing that has to happen is to try to
bring them together in some particular way.
The reason that I also believe that it is essential to get more
international support is while it has not been perfect, Bosnia and
Kosovo have, in fact, provided a model of what happens when you
work with an international organization in terms of getting a high
representative and various countries participating in not only the
reconstruction, but the modeling of local elections, et cetera. We
cannot do that alone. So that is one of the reasons I think it is im-
portant to have U.N. support because it does provide some kind of
model. That is a beginning.
But I was plagued always whenever I suggested using force—and
I did—with what is the exit strategy. As far as I have heard, none.
And I do think that the administration, while there is no way they
can give us all the details on this—I think that is impossible—they
do need to give us a better blueprint for what is out there after the
day after.
Senator LUGAR. Secretary Kissinger, do you have any idea as to
how the control situation might work with regard to the weapons
of mass destruction, how we would get to something that is satis-
fying?


74
Secretary KISSINGER. I think this is a question that should be ad-
dressed to the Secretary of State.
At some point in this process, we have to make clear what we
would consider an adequate inspection system or, at the least, what
we do not consider an adequate inspection system. Otherwise,
there will be no criteria on which to base our actions. I have put
down here some general ideas, but I have not studied in detail
what you would require.
At the same time, I want to warn against the danger of using
the imperfection of any solution as an argument for doing nothing.
From where we stand now, the choice is this: will there be enforce-
ment of the U.N. resolutions, or will these stockpiles continue to
grow? I think the danger of acquiescing is greater than some of the
concerns that have been raised, but I also think we have to answer
this question.
Now, about a post-war Iraq and its political organization. That
really requires really a lot of thinking because it is easy enough to
say you have a democratic government. The question is, how quick-
ly can you create it and what are the interim arrangements that
have to be made. One also has to keep in mind that there will be
great temptations on the part of Iran to wreck any political struc-
ture in order to shift the balance of power in the region, and that
there will be other neighboring claimants as well. This is not a vac-
uum in which one can operate politically with an unlimited time
span, but an issue that has to be dealt with.
Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I would just add yesterday one
of our witnesses suggested, as Dr. Kissinger has, we may not have
the perfect solutions but that should not defeat action. But the ad-
ministration ought to report to the Congress at least every 30 days
on how it was going. In other words, if you are still trying to per-
fect the solutions, that one resolution to go to war ought not to suf-
fice for the next 8 years, given all the ramifications that we are dis-
cussing that would follow.
Secretary KISSINGER. Also, the power to improve what exists now
is not too high. We do not have to achieve perfection in order to
have the people of Iraq live under better conditions than they live
in now.
The CHAIRMAN. The interim solution will be a MacArthur in
Baghdad.
Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that a
letter relevant to what we are discussing right now from the State
Department be printed in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be placed in the record.
[The letter referred to follows:]
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC, May 29, 2002.
Ms. PATRICIA A. McNERNEY
Republican Staff Director,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Dirksen Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
DEAR Ms. McNERNEY:


75
As we discussed on May 23, the Bush Administration regards the Future of Iraq
project as a key part of our Iraq regime change policy. We notified the appropria-
tions and authorization committees on March 21 and held consultations on this
project with you and your colleagues in April and May. In response to questions
from you and the SACFO, on May 21 we provided you a paper describing how we
proposed (1) to move forward now to fund Phases I and II of the project, in the
amount of $1.54 million out of the total $5 million for the project, and (2) not to
use the Middle East Institute but rather to bring management of the project inside
the State Department. We plan to carry out this project through small, grants to
policy NGOs and to a neutral conference-planning institute. We will consult with
authorizing and appropriations committees before we decide to move forward on
Phase III and beyond.
In particular, I want to address the three questions you posed. First, for the sub-
stantive work of the working groups, it is our intention to fund the work in Phases
I and II of the project through policy-oriented NGOs that have expertise in the sub-
ject matter of the working groups, are able to work effectively and credibly with
Iraqi and international experts, and have the organizational capacity and ability to
handle a grant of funds from the State Department. For example, among the charac-
teristics of an ideal NGO to help handle the Public Health and Humanitarian Needs
working group, in addition to these general criteria, would be an understanding of
the health care and humanitarian needs of Iraqis inside Iraq, a track record of de-
livering health care and humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees, knowledge of
how to administer public health programs, and familiarity with best practices in
health care and humanitarian aid delivery. (This working group will be a particular
challenge, as no one group is likely to have the same high level of expertise in both
public health and humanitarian needs, so we intend to try to find the best fit.) We
would prefer the substantive work to be done by NGOs led by free Iraqis, though
we recognize that for some of the working groups, there may not be an existing Iraq-
focused group with the necessary expertise and organizational capacity to admin-
ister a grant of USG funds. In such a case, we would look at universities, private
businesses, or non-Iraq-focused NGOs with (i) special expertise in the subject mat-
ter, (ii) the necessary organizational capacity, and (iii) the ability and willingness
to work with a broad range of free Iraqis.
Second, we intend to involve about 10-20 Iraqis in each working group. We have
canvassed the broadest possible range of Iraq-focused groups, both political an non-
political to solicit names, although we have made clear that the final determinant
will be the Department, subject to approval by an inter-agency steering group that
includes members from the Department of Defense, the National Security Council,
and the Office of the Vice President. To date, we have received hundreds of names
from Iraqi opposition groups and others. To narrow the lists, we will look to the in-
dividual's expertise in the subject matter of the working group, to the individual's
ability to contribute to practical problem-solving, and to their ability to work with
Iraqi, U.S. and international experts.
Finally, in response to your view that we should start a discussion of political
issues in Phase I of the project, we are bringing forward the working group on Polit-
ical Principles and Procedures to Phase I. We believe we can do this within the ex-
isting $1.54 million budget, though we may have to move forward our consultations
on Phase III by a couple of weeks to accommodate this change, or we may delay
one of the other working groups until Phase III.
We hope that this information will be sufficient to enable us to, go ahead with
the Future of Iraq project. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require fur-
ther information.
Sincerely,
RYAN C. CROCKER,
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern Affairs.
1
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly appre-
ciate Senator Lugar's line of questioning.
To get some initial answers about some of these basic questions
about the day after is not to suggest that any of us are in a do-
nothing posture. The administration is passionate about regime
change in Iraq, and I subscribe to a policy that supports regime
change by reasonable means. It does not mean I will sign off on
any proposal aimed at that end. I cannot imagine any American
1


78
I would just add a comment to what the Senator from Wisconsin
and prior to the Senator from Wisconsin's comments, the Senator
from Indiana said, but more to the point, their line of questioning.
I think as you have sat through this for about an hour-and-a-half,
you both are getting a sense, at least from some on this committee,
where the thrust of this is, this great question, this debate, this
issue of whether we should go to war and the questions that you
both began with, how, when. I think it is clear to state that no one
has all the answers, and I think it is also clear to state, going back
to referencing the Senator from Wisconsin's point, I do not know
if there is a Member of the Congress certainly that I am aware of
that does not take seriously the threat of Saddam Hussein.
Now, that said, we differ a bit on how we deal with that. But
there are those who minimalize even such a debate and how out-
rageous to even question things like the destabilization of the Mid-
dle East. I mean, how foolish of you to ask such a question. If we
could just get rid of Saddam Hussein, then all of our problems
would go away. Everybody knows that. And you heard some of
that.
I want to go back to the destabilization issue in a moment and
would like very much to hear from each of you on a particular
question I will ask on that.
But before I do, Secretary Albright, you are the most recent Sec-
retary of State who has had to deal with this issue. You were Sec-
retary of State in the first 2 years after Saddam Hussein kicked
the U.N. inspectors out. What did your administration learn that
you could share with this committee on how we should be dealing
with Saddam Hussein and this issue today, the debate that is going
on today?
For example, did your administration ever closely examine or
pursue tightening those resolutions or forcing those resolutions at
the U.N. and looking seriously at a military option, to go through
maybe what President Bush is going through now, realizing that
you did not have the force of September 11? You did not have the
mobilization of the country, the world, the Congress behind you on
that. But is there anything that you can share with this committee
with the experience you had most recently that might give us some
assistance here as we grapple with this great debate of our time?
Because I am one who believes that we are not talking about just
going to war with Iraq. You both have talked about preemption,
about doctrines, about the future, of what this will do to balance
of power and geopolitical strategic interests, economic interests. We
are talking about an awful lot here. Your point, Madam Secretary,
about overloading the structure and the system, I generally happen
to agree with that.
But not to get off into that tangent, I would like to stay on focus
on asking you to answer the question and then I would come back
to a more particular question I have for each of you. Thank you.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I, unfortunately, do have more experience
with this than most, and I think we have to keep in mind the fol-
lowing, that we did try very hard to keep a consensus in the United
Nations. There began to be what we called sanctions fatigue. As we
know, certain of our friends and allies had a different idea. But we,
for a long time, kept a completely unanimous Security Council to


79
enforce the resolutions, but ultimately it was very hard I think to
keep everybody in line.
We began to think about very much the kind of thing that Sec-
retary Powell came forward with at the beginning of the adminis-
tration, which were the smart sanctions which was trying to limit
and tighten the box on the regime and not to punish the people be-
cause one of the things that was happening was we were losing
support because there was increasing-I would actually not have
agreed with this—propaganda, basically that it was our fault that
the people were suffering.
We also did consider a number of military options, and I think
we managed to do what was the right thing, which was to keep
constantly vigilance on the no-fly zones to make sure that he
stayed within that box, and were more and more robust in that
bombing not just when our pilots were illuminated, but when we
felt that there was danger from ground-to-air attacks. So I think
we really did bomb and do that job well, and they are continuing
to do it now.
I must say that while there were sometimes discussions about a
ground option, you point out very accurately the mood is very dif-
ferent after 9/1i, and I think that there was no way to do that psy-
chologically, much less do I think physically given what we knew
about the numbers that were necessary to do that.
I stand down to no one in terms of my characterization of Sad-
dam Hussein in terms of being a danger and an evil. And I think
the question is what is the best way to handle it. I do think that
the continued bombing is the way to do it. And as I suggested in
my testimony, if we know or have suspicions that some facility is
actually in the process of doing something with weapons of mass
destruction, I think we have the authority to just go and do the
bombing. So I think that we need to continue this robust keeping
him in a box until we are ready with all the plans that we need
to have some other aspect if it cannot be handled in some other
way.
May I just make one other point? The inspection issue is a dread-
ful one because what happened in the course of the years, the origi-
nal inspection regime became weaker and it did work at the begin-
ning. As I said, the inspectors managed to get rid of more weapons
of mass destruction than the war itself. But ultimately there were
changes in the modalities, and I do think that the deal that Kofi
Annan made in 1998 was a problem in terms of inspectors had to
be accompanied by diplomats and all that. But even that has not
been enforced. So we need to get back to an intrusive and overall
inspection regime, not the modalities that we have had in the past.
Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask if Secretary Kissinger
had any response to that, we would welcome his response?
Secretary KISSINGER. I think the conditions after September 11
produced the current situation. I understand why, before Sep-
tember 11, it was deemed not to be desirable but, sooner or later,
we would have faced this problem. Sooner or later, the problem of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq would have had to be faced,
but I generally sympathize with the answer that Madeleine has
given.
Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


80
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wellstone.
Senator WELLSTONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I
have been listening and I have a bunch of questions prepared by
staff, but I am going to try to go with our discussion and try to ask
some questions based upon what is on my mind.
I think it was Senator Hagel who said that there is no disagree-
ment about Saddam Hussein. Nobody I know wants to just put him
in parentheses and say we will get back to thinking about this in
3 to 5 years from now. I do not know anybody who has taken that
position at all.
A couple of observations and one question. Senator Sarbanes
asked Dr. Kissinger, is there a path to peace? Dr. Kissinger said,
I do not know but certainly we ought to play it out. I want to em-
phasize that again. It seems to me that, although Secretary of
State Albright is correct that this has not worked so far, it is sim-
ply not true that you cannot design an international arms inspec-
tion regime that could work and that insists on unfettered access
and that gets whatever weapons of mass destruction there are out.
It seems to me we would want to, first of all, pursue that with all
vigor before we talk about going to war. It seems to me the military
option would be the last option.
My question is when I hear you all say what happens afterward,
we win militarily but then we are there—and then I have heard
I think both of you say we do not want to be doing this alone. That
is for sure. Then I heard Secretary Albright say I have got some
real concerns about this war against terrorism and al-Qaeda and
I want to make sure this does not undercut our efforts in South
Asia and the Near East where we need the assets on the ground
and we need the cooperation. And then I think about the Israeli/
Palestinian conflict.
It would seem to me that there would be a world of difference
in terms of both what our men and women face if we have to go
in, God forbid, in terms of what the reaction in the Near East and
South Asia and throughout the world would be, much less who is
going to do the occupying afterwards. It would make a huge dif-
ference whether we did this with the international community or
we did it alone. Do you think there are some major differences here
in terms of all of the consequences? Because the resolution calls for
preemptive, unilateral military action. That is what we are voting
Do you think there is a difference in terms of the consequences
on all three fronts between our doing it alone versus if we have to?
And I still believe that the arms inspection regime ought to be
given the first priority. That if we have to, that we do it inter-
nationally would make a huge difference or not?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I happen to believe it makes a huge
difference to do it internationally, and the first gulf war was done
internationally. That was a huge difference to have that coalition,
and the first President Bush worked that very well. I admire what
was done, and there is great continuity where we picked it up in
1993 from there. So I do think that it is very important to do it
internationally. It would make a huge difference.
If it is impossible and if we are given better information than at
least I believe we have on how rapidly this has to be done, I think
on.


81
I agree.
that we then owe it to our people to take action. But all that is
missing. Those are the missing pieces.
And I must say that I think this is a remarkable discussion. I
think the fact that we are able to have these kinds of discussions
is what the American people need to hear because this is going to
be long-term and expensive. There are a lot of priorities that we
will have to set aside because of this. I am very concerned not just
about a unilateral foreign policy but a unidimensional foreign pol-
icy. We will suffer for that in the long run.
Senator WELLSTONE. Dr. Kissinger.
Secretary KISSINGER. Look back at the first gulf war, it is impor-
tant to understand its structure. It is indeed correct that the first
President Bush achieved an international consensus. It is also true
that he moved some 400,000 American troops into the region before
there was international consensus. For it was clear that we could
not march in and march out and that the implication of the Presi-
dent's conduct was that, if we did not achieve international con-
sensus, we would operate with those nations that would support
us. I believe that one reason he received as much support as he did
was that he opted for a way by which other nations could influence
our actions and participate in them. So in principle, the difference
is not so great in the methods of the Bush family with respect to
the gulf and with which, I must say, I
Second, in conducting these discussions, we have to keep in mind
that we do seem to agree that what we are talking about here is
timing. We are not talking about the principle. One has to take
care lest these discussions of the inspection system and of what
might happen are not used for endless procrastination. On the
other hand, we have to be serious in conducting them.
Senator WELLSTONE. Well, if I could say to me the two issues
that I feel like are staring me in the face—and I appreciate the an-
swer of both of you-are, one, as a matter of public policy, are we
not going to make it the first priority to try to put into effect an
arms inspection regime that will work, unfettered access, and will
insist that these weapons of mass destruction are out? Is that the
first priority or not? I think some, frankly, do not think it is. They
have other priorities. And some think it is.
The second point I would make is it seems to me that we are in
an odd position right now because, on the one hand, we are saying
to the United Nations we want your support. On the other hand,
we are asked to vote on a resolution that gives the United Nations
the back of the hand and says regardless of what you do, we are
going in. And if we go in unilaterally, I would just say to the chair-
man again, I think that the consequences throughout the Near
East and South Asia, the consequences in the world that we live
in, and the consequences for our men and women that are there
in Iraq could be very serious.
I think we need to pay very special attention to that, the dif-
ference between unilateral, going alone, and having the support of
the international community. If it requires more diplomatic heavy
lifting, we ought to at least make every effort to do that first. That
would be my plea here today.
Secretary KISSINGER. If one looks at the discussion taking place
in the Security Council, it is interesting that none of the perma-


82
nent members has threatened a veto. For they know that, by ab-
staining, if that is what they are indeed going to do, they will make
possible a resolution that will support our action—assuming we can
achieve nine votes. Britain will clearly be for us. And I am not sure
that France will abstain. But it is not necessary now to speculate
about what the individual countries may or may not do in a final
vote.
Second, as I pointed out before, I am convinced that, if military
action is taken, we will not be acting alone and that there will be
significant countries supporting the United States. None of this is
absolute, and one always has to keep focused on the alternatives.
But we all do seem to agree that we cannot acquiesce in the growth
of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, so what we are really talk-
ing about is the means for dealing with that problem.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Allen.
Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both,
our esteemed witnesses today, for your insights and comments.
I think I speak for everyone on this committee that no one cares
to risk lives unnecessarily of the men and women in uniform. We
do not want war. It is not in our interest. However, when you think
of the priorities of the Federal Government and you say, gosh,
there are a lot of different concerns and priorities, the top responsi-
bility is national security. Unfortunately, we only have a theo-
retical unimpeded path to disarming Saddam Hussein.
I would say to Secretary Albright that we have had briefings,
and some of these briefings were of a highly classified nature. We
cannot necessarily publicly state every bit of intelligence, very cred-
ible intelligence, about the capabilities that Saddam has as far as
chemical and biological weapons and the means of delivering those.
One can be in a box and still deliver outside that box. Also, the con-
cern is that he may transfer some of that capability to terrorists.
I know, Madam Secretary, you were Secretary of State in 1998,
and I do not mean to get into legalistic matters. But in 1998, the
Senate passed Senate Concurrent Resolution 71 with all the
Whereases and the Resolved clauses. In many ways, this resolution
is a furtherance of it. In fact, it is entitled a furtherance of the
1998 resolution. As Secretary of State, did you support this resolu-
tion, which urged the President “to take all necessary and appro-
priate actions to respond to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to
end its weapons of mass destruction programs?”
Secretary ALBRIGHT. First of all, we did want them to end every-
thing in terms of their weapons of mass destruction. But the terms
of that resolution were somewhat different. They were more narrow
in terms of the scope for the President. My reading of it here is
that it was to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obli-
gations.
I think part of the problem with the current resolution—and
again, I do not think it is up to me as a private citizen to even
begin to think about how you draft that last paragraph, but I think
what is troubling to me as a private citizen is it sounds very much
like a carte blanche to do things within the entire region. I think
that is one of the questions and how much impact and activity the
Congress wants to have in this.


84
I ask Secretary Kissinger: You mentioned if not now, why not
now? It reminds me of Ronald Reagan's statement about if not
now, when? If not the United States, then who is going to disarm
Saddam Hussein for his clear violations? We do need to have our
allies.
Do you feel that if the United Nations does not act, that we still
should act with as many allies as possible in the event military ac-
tion is necessary?
Secretary KISSINGER. Yes, I do because if we do not, we will face
a worse problem a year or 2 or 3 from now.
Senator ALLEN. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, could I ask Senator Allen,
when he quoted whatever it was he quoted to Secretary Albright,
what was he quoting from?
Senator ALLEN. I was quoting from Senate Concurrent Resolu-
tion 71, which was a resolution passed in 1998 condemning Iraq's
threat to international peace and security. This was the second re-
solved point.
Senator SARBANES. Did that pass?
Senator ALLEN. I asked the Secretary if she supported it and she
said she did.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. If I might ask. I was thinking we were talk-
ing about what happened August 14, 1998, which became public
law.
Senator SARBANES. That is not this resolution. This resolution
did not pass, and the resolution that passed on August 14 and the
public law that passed on October 31 were both more narrowly
drawn. The public law on October 31 said at the end: “nothing in
this act shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the
issue of United States armed forces except as provided in section
4(a)(2) in carrying out this act.” And 4(a)(2) talked about draw-
down of military defense articles for the Iraqi opposition.
And the other one, Public Law 105–235 at the end said that "the
President is urged to take appropriate action in accordance with
the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States,” which of
course includes, amongst other things, the War Powers Act, and
that was very carefully worked out in the Congress.
And my understanding—and if I am wrong, I certainly want to
be corrected—is that the resolution from which the Senator is
quoting in fact was not passed by the Congress.
Senator ALLEN. I would say, Mr. Chairman, to my good friend
from Maryland, I wanted to ask what her position was on this reso-
lution. This resolution, I would say to my friend from Maryland,
Senator Sarbanes, was sponsored by the following Senators who
are still here, and it had bipartisan support: Mr. Daschle, Mr.
Leahy, Mr. Dodd, Kerry, Moynihan, Byrd, Wyden, Hollings, and
Akaka, as well as others on our side of the aisle.
Senator SARBANES. It did not have Senator Biden or me cospon-
soring it or a number of others. In fact, it did not have Senator
Lugar. I am looking at this resolution. When the resolution was fi-
nally worked out, there was much more narrow and careful lan-
guage. That is the only point I am making.
I am laying this out because the premise that was given to the
Secretary was that this was passed by the Congress, presumably


85
acquiesced in by the administration. The language you quoted was
not passed by the Congress. I have the language that was passed
by the Congress. In both instances, the relevant paragraphs are far
more narrow and pointed than what you quoted to the Secretary,
which was an open-ended thing. The fact that some people went on
it when it was introduced—that was not the end product.
Senator ALLEN. Nevertheless, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that
it was the sentiments of those bipartisan leaders in it. I think we
can all stipulate that matters in Iraq have not gotten less dire
since 1998 when this concern was actually addressed by the Senate
and with Secretary Albright as Secretary of State.
Senator SARBANES. Oh, I am not addressing that issue. Maybe it
is getting more dire, maybe it is not. I am just addressing the issue
that you put a question to the Secretary, the premise of which was
that that language had been adopted by the Congress, and that is
not the case.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Senator Sarbanes, I appreciate very much
the clarification because the language that I have here that I was
responding to was out of Public Law 105–235 that does, in fact,
have the final paragraph from which I quoted in responding to
your question.
Senator SARBANES. It says any action should be “in accordance
with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States.” Is
that correct?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Right, and to bring Iraq into compliance
with its international obligations, not the broad language that is in
the resolution that has been proposed by the administration that,
as I said, gives carte blanche to the administration to do what it
wants in the Middle East. I disagree with that, and I hope very
much that that will, in the course of this, be redrafted.
But to the point, Senator Allen, I think that we have all, over
the years, tried to figure out how to deal with the horror of Saddam
Hussein and the mood in the country is different at different times.
I am very proud of what we tried to do to keep him in his box.
Senator ALLEN. Well, as we develop this draft resolution we will
fine tune it, if it needs fine tuning-and any legislative branch is
naturally going to change something; that is just the nature of a
legislative branch of the government. But the draft resolution does
say the President is authorized to use the means he determines to
be appropriate to enforce the United Nations Security Council reso-
lutions that are referenced above in the Whereas clauses.
I think that the chairman does have some good ideas that I
would like to work with him on, particularly having allies join with
us.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to take up Senator Boxer's time.
She has been so patient.
But I was involved in that negotiation. I will not characterize
anybody else. I will speak for myself. The reason why I felt com-
fortable in voting for the amended resolution was the addition of
the paragraphs that said “the Government of Iraq is in material
and unacceptable breach of international obligations. Therefore, the
President is urged to take appropriate action in accordance with
the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States.”


87
I personally demand that Iraq live up to the U.N. resolutions,
particularly regarding inspection and dismantlement of weapons of
mass destruction. They agreed to it. They must live up to it, and
the world must ensure that, not just our Nation, because if it is
just our Nation, I am very worried, as the Senator from the largest
state in the Nation, about the risks and the cost borne by our peo-
ple. The world must step up to the plate, and I think the world will
if we do this right.
Yesterday, Senator Danny Inouye took to the floor. Danny Inouye
is a war hero. He has more medals than, I do not know, probably
anyone that I know.
The CHAIRMAN. Including the Medal of Honor.
Senator BOXER. Including the Medal of Honor, and I want to tell
you what he said. He said, “there are those who plan war and
there are those who fight war,” and as we sit here talking about
post-war regime in Iraq, as we sit and plan for that, I want us to
think for a moment the path we are taking if we do not follow the
path for peace that I heard outlined here today, and I would ask
unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, at this time to introduce into
the record an article in today's USA Today.
It is entitled, “In Iraq's Arsenal: Nature's Deadliest Poison.” Bot-
ulinum toxin might be the most diabolical of Saddam's terror tools,
but the U.S. is far from ready to protect its troops. I would like to
put that in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.
[The article referred to follows:]
[From USA Today, September 26, 2002]
IN IRAQ'S ARSENAL: NATURE'S DEADLIEST POISON
(BY STEVE STERNBERG)
Botulinum toxin might be the most diabolical of Saddam Hussein's terror tools,
but the U.S. is far from ready to protect its troops—the only remedy is antitoxin
made from horse serum.
In the year since an unknown bioterrorist stuffed envelopes with anthrax and
mailed them, the government has stockpiled anthrax vaccine and antibiotics,
planned mass vaccination campaigns and ordered 209 million fresh doses of small-
pox vaccine.
Yet the United States is still unprepared to contend with other agents on its A-
list of potential biowarfare threats, especially botulinum toxin, an experimental ter-
ror tool of Saddam Hussein's.
Botulinum toxin, the most poisonous substance known, is about 100,000 times
deadlier than the neurotoxin sarin, which was used in an attack on Tokyo subways
in 1995 that killed 10 and sent 5,000 people streaming into hospitals. During the
Gulf War in 1991, Iraq reportedly stockpiled thousands of liters of the botulinum
toxin and funneled some into bombs.
Today, as the United States edges closer to another war with Iraq, U.S. troops
would be just as vulnerable to botulinum toxin as they were a decade ago. There's
still no government-approved vaccine, and the only antitoxin is made by extracting
antibodies from the blood of vaccinated horses using decades-old technology:
Antitoxin, which clears toxin from the blood, is so scarce that there isn't enough
to safeguard thousands of troops from a botulinum attack. There are other major
problems: Antitoxin is too difficult to administer on the battlefield, and it can have
life-threatening side effects.
Although a žlst-century biotechversion is in laboratory trials, it will be years be-
fore the experimental antitoxin reaches battlefield or civilian stockpiles.
“Unfortunately, there's nothing really available for people yet, other than horse
serum,” says George Lewis, a retired Army veterinary microbiologist who oversaw


88
the program that developed the equine antitoxin shipped to Saudi Arabia during the
Gulf War.
When botulism strikes, it strikes hard. The toxin destroys the nerves that enable
people to breathe and swallow. Until the nerves regenerate, which takes weeks or
months, paralysis sets in. Without ventilators and mechanical life support, victims
almost always die.
Botulinum toxin's availability and lethality make it a potentially fearsome weap-
on. It is difficult to defend against on the battlefield or in the hands of urban bio-
terrorists, who wouldn't have to kill millions or even thousands to have a consider-
able impact.
The toxin was so popular among Iraqi bioweapons scientists that they claimed to
have produced botulinum toxin on an industrial scale. After the Gulf War, Iraq told
U.N. weapons inspectors that it had stockpiled nearly 20,000 liters of toxin in solu-
tion in anticipation of a U.S. attack. Some of it, Iraq said, had been loaded into more
than 100 solution-filled "wet bombs," which were never used.
Security analysts believe Iraq's bioweapons arsenal is much larger than Iraqi
leaders acknowledge. Even the experts can only guess at what Iraqi biologists have
cooked up since 1998, when U.N. inspections ended.
“The biological program is a black hole,” says Avigdor Haselkorn, a Defense De-
partment adviser with the Geopolitical Forum, a consulting group, and author of
The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence, an analysis of the
Iraqi program.
If Saddam had chosen to use botulinum in 1991, he would have caught the U.S.
military with its guard down. At the start of the Gulf War, the U.S. stockpile of
equine antitoxin totaled roughly 2,600 doses. During the war, the Army bought a
herd of horses, vaccinated them and began extracting their antibodies for antitoxin.
But three years after the war, the funding died and the effort ended.
Military experts concede that biohazard suits and a costly, crude vaccine remain
the best defense against a battlefield botulinum attack. Antitoxin won't help much
on the battlefield, they say, because it must be given via a prolonged intravenous
drip right after exposure.
“If there was a massive exposure on the battlefield, there aren't enough medical
assets to give antitoxin to enough people,” says Col. David Danley of the Army's
Joint Program Office for Biological Defense.
Where it comes from
The toxin is made by a microscopic bacterium, Clostridium botulinum. Most peo-
ple think of botulism as a scary byproduct of careless home and commercial canning,
because the bacterium grows—and produces toxin-only in airless environments
such as vacuum-packed jars and cans.
Adults get botulism from direct exposure to the toxin in food or dirty hypodermic
needles, where spores can germinate in leftover liquid. But adults represent just
one-third of the roughly 100 cases that occur in the USA each year. The rest are
infants who are infected with spores traveling on dust motes in air or who are un-
wittingly fed spore-carrying honey. The spores germinate in the oxygen-free dark-
ness of the infants' intestines, producing toxin from within.
Microscopic C. botulinum spores, which are found in backyards everywhere, are
easily accessible to those with the know-how to extract and grow them. In the hands
of an urban terrorist, experts say, the toxin could wreak havoc.
“More people have died from West Nile virus than died from the anthrax letters,
but the chaos and terror and economic impact of anthrax were incalculable. You
could do that with botulinum toxin,” says Stephen Arnon of the California Depart-
ment of Health, who led the effort to develop a human version of antitoxin to treat
infants. “With the simplest of lab equipment, for $1,000, you could make enough
toxin to kill hundreds of people.”
If a bioterrorist were to release a cloud of botulinum in a major city, 50,000 people
would get sick, and 30,000 of them would die without antitoxin treatment, according
to a report released this year by the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Med-
icine, a think tank financed partly by Congress.
Because 80% to 90% of the beds in any intensive care unit in any given city are
usually full—and because most cities have just a few hundred intensive care beds
fewer than 100 cases of botulism could lock up every intensive care ward in a city
like San Francisco for weeks, says James Marks of the University of California-San
Francisco, an author of the report.
The gridlock would displace cancer patients, heart patients and candidates for
elective surgery, Marks says, depriving them of life support and turning them into
“collateral damage.”


89
nation."
The religious sect Aum Shinrikyo attempted to weaponize botulinum toxin before
its attack on the Tokyo subway system. Aum Shinrikyo's attempt failed because the
botulinum variant members used turned out to be non-lethal. Sarin was the group's
second choice.
“Botulinum toxin is a very scary agent,” says Arturo Casadevall, an infectious-dis-
ease specialist at Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York. “We wouldn't
know we were attacked until we had an epidemic of paralyzed people with no expla-
Casadevall notes that ordinary medicines wouldn't help the victims. “One of my
fears,” he says, “is that if we get hit we wouldn't have enough respirators in New
York City. If you had an attack that involved thousands of people, you couldn't put
them in the intensive care unit).”
Quick access to antitoxin would shorten the course of the illness. If a bioterrorist
were to release a cloud of botulinum toxin in a big city, antitoxin could save about
half of the lives that would be lost.
But antitoxin is in perilously short supply. After the Gulf War, the Army stock-
piled 5,000 doses of finished antitoxin from its herd of horses. The Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention stored some of what remains in freezers, but officials
will not disclose exactly how much they have on hand. The Army put 45,000 unproc-
essed doses into the deep freeze.
In 1999, the Army abandoned the program and donated 53 horses to the Air Force
Academy stables. Some were auctioned or sold, stable manager Billy Jack Barrett
says; others are kept at the stables for cadets and others to ride.
The story of the Army's botulinum antitoxin program provides a compelling exam-
ple of the nation's once-ambivalent commitment to biodefense, experts say.
Before the Gulf War, most military analysts were more concerned about nuclear
and chemical weapons than they were about biological agents. In 1972, 140 coun-
tries—including Iraq-renounced offensive biowarfare by signing the Biological
Weapons Convention. But the treaty didn't deter Iraq from launching a covert bio-
weapons program.
CIA bioweapons analyst Kimberly Stergulz says bioterrorism offers rogue nations
like Iraq-and “non-state actors” like al-Qaeda--cheap access to weapons of mass
destruction. A rogue nation can launch an extensive biowarfare program for about
$10 million, compared with the $2 billion needed to build nuclear arms.
Analysts estimate that by the time Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Baghdad had
spent $100 million on biowarfare delivery devices and agents. Besides botulism, the
Iraqis brewed up vast amounts of anthrax; ricin, a castor-bean toxin that blocks
breathing and circulation; and Clostridium perfringens, which causes gangrene.
No one knows how effective Iraq's arsenal would have been had Saddam elected
to drop those bombs. Some animal research suggests that botulinum is 40 to 80
times more lethal when it is consumed in food than when it is inhaled into the
lungs.
Before the United States abandoned offensive bioweapons research in 1969, tests
on Horn Island, near Pascagoula, Miss., suggested botulinum isn't effective when it's
dropped in a small bomb.
“It just didn't kill guinea pigs downrange,” says David Franz, former commander
of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases.
But a British intelligence report released Tuesday says Iraq is “judged to be self-
sufficient” in the technology needed to improve its bioweapons, including fer-
menters, centrifuges and spray dryers. The L-29 drone aircraft developed by Iraqi
engineers are basically high-tech crop-dusters capable of unleashing up to 80 gallons
of toxin or other agents in a deadly mist.
In the wake of Sept. 11 and the anthrax attacks, the government has developed
a renewed interest in the botulism antitoxin, says Nicholas Pomato, vice president
of research at Intracell, the Gaithersburg, Md., biotech firm that made the antitoxin
during the Gulf War.
Intracell has begun negotiating to finish the job of processing the Army's stored
horse serum, Pomato says, at a cost of $15 million to $20 million-about $500 a
dose. “Double that cost if you start making the material from scratch again from
horses,” Pomato says.
But he adds that it will take time to outfit a processing facility and begin the
work. New supplies, he says, won't be tested and ready for use until next year.
Since the Army has decided not to stockpile antitoxin because it would be un-
wieldy to use on the battlefield, Pomato says, the CDC plans to take over the serum
for use in the event of a bioterror attack against civilians.
But horse antitoxin isn't without drawbacks. The human body might recognize it
as foreign and reject it, much as it would a transplanted organ. Doctors who admin-
ister antitoxin must keep drugs on hand to counter allergic reactions and rejection.


90
Ironically, because botulism is such a rare disease, drug companies have elected
to invest in more profitable products—such as the toxin itself. A purified form of
botulinum toxin, sold as Botox, is used to treat a long list of ailments, including eye-
muscle spasms, post-stroke spasticity, migraine headaches and cerebral palsy.
Botox's popularity as a wrinkle relaxer also promises to turn it into a billion-dollar
cosmetic drug.
The anthrax attacks, impending war with Iraq and an imminent flood of govern-
ment research money could provoke new interest in treating the botulism itself.
Marks, at the University of California-San Francisco, and his colleagues at the
Army's infectious-diseases research institute already have begun exploiting the new
tools of biotechnology to develop an alternative to equine antitoxin.
In late August, they reported success in developing a trio of genetically engineered
human antibodies. Given together in animal tests, the three antibodies inactivated
botulinum toxin type A, the most lethal toxin and the one preferred by Saddam.
Biotech antitoxin, Marks says, could "deweaponize” botulinum toxin.
Because the antibodies persist in the body for months, troops going into battle
could be immunized; protection would last six months. The antibodies are 100 times
stronger than the human antibodies used to treat infants, but the experimental
antibodies will take years to develop.
Human clinical trials have not yet begun. Moreover, type A botulinum toxin is
only one of seven types; different antibody cocktails must be identified for each one.
Marks says vast amounts could be made cheaply in high-production fermenters
to treat civilians stricken in a bioterror attack. "One kilogram could treat 10,000
people,” he says, and an industrial fermenter could crank out 120 kilograms a
month.
The challenge now, Marks says, is to “make them, get them into humans and see
if they work.”
The Army has a vaccine, developed years ago, that primes the immune system
to make its own anti-botulinum antibodies. It is rarely used because so few people
run the risk of exposure to the toxin. The vaccine has never gotten government ap-
proval because the Army has never been able to mount a large-scale study showing
that the vaccine works. As a result, the vaccine can be used only under a special
exemption from FDA rules. Newer vaccines are also in the works, but they are years
from winning approval.
The Botox connection
In an odd twist, vaccinating soldiers or civilians also would immunize them
against Botox, the only potential bioterror agent approved for use as a drug.
Botox, which is made by Allergan, poses a dilemma to health officials and bio-
terror strategists. Vaccinating soldiers and the public would protect against expo-
sure to the toxin, but it also would deprive people of Botox's benefit—and knock a
blockbuster product with estimated sales of $430 million this year off the market.
Former FDA commissioner Donald Kennedy, a Stanford University neurobiologist
who has used the toxin for years in research, says the risk of leaving the public un-
protected is just too great.
“Who would have imagined a world in which terror weapons are used as beauty
aids?” Kennedy wrote in a recent issue of the journal Science.
Kennedy, the journal's editor, worries that mass producing Botox, and trying to
improve it, will ultimately make it a bigger threat. “I think we should develop a
vaccine,” he says.
Allergan vice president Mitchell Brin, a Botox pioneer, says his firm has chosen
to stay out of the vaccine debate. Brin says the company has assured the govern-
ment that it will keep its Botox operation secret to preserve national security. “We
don't talk about our manufacturing facilities,” he says. “We've agreed to keep a low
profile.”
WEAPONS AGAINST BIOTERRORISM—(BIOTERROR AGENT)
Anthrax
Symptoms: A high fever and flu-like symptoms for inhalation anthrax; a black le-
sion from cutaneous anthrax. Anthrax cannot be transmitted from person to person.
Defenses: Antibiotic Cipro, which must be taken for 60 days, is the only drug ap-
proved by the Food and Drug Administration to treat inhalation anthrax. But so far,
all of the anthrax strains have been identified also have been sensitive to
doxycycline and other tetracycline antibiotics, as well as penicillin. Bayer, maker of
Cipro, tripled it production last fall.


91
Botulinum toxin
Symptoms: Botulism always begins with paralysis in the muscles of the head,
eyes and face and throat. The first signs appear 12 to 72 hours after exposure. They
are typically droopy eyelids, the absence of smile lines around the eyes and dilated
pupils. Paralysis descends down the body, with muscles growing limp. Muscles that
govern breathing and swallowing stop working. Patients need life-support to sur-
vive.
Defenses: An experimental vaccine made from inactivated toxin is used mainly to
protect people who work with botulinum and Botox (purified toxin, which is sold as
a drug). Newer biotech versions are also in the works. Human anti-toxin made of
antibodies from the blood of vaccinated humans is used to treat infant botulism.
Horse antitoxin, made from the blood of vaccinated horses, is used to treat adults
with the disease.
Smallpox
Symptoms: High fever, chills and head and back aches begin one to six days after
exposure. A rash forms on the face, arms and legs and can cause severe scarring.
The disease is spread through person-to-person contact. It is highly contagious, es-
pecially in populations in which few people have been vaccinated or have had the
disease.
Defenses: Vaccination against smallpox in the USA ended in 1971; the world's last
naturally occurring case was in Somalia in 1977. The United States currently has
155 million doses of vaccine made decades ago kept in storage. Another 209 million
doses have been ordered and are expected by the end of the year, bringing the total
supply to 364 million doses.
Tularemia (also known as rabbit fever)
Symptoms: The bacteria-borne disease cannot be spread from person to person; it
is usually spread through contaminated animals or meat. Initial symptoms include
fever, chills and weakness. Tularemia triggers pneumonia, pleuritis and lymph-node
disease within three to five days of exposure. The disease is rare in the USA, but
outbreaks commonly occur in Europe and Russia.
Defenses: Tularemia is treated with antibiotics; the military has a vaccine, but
it's not available for general use. Treatment with antibiotics after exposure is effec-
tive.
Plague
Symptoms: High fever, chills and headache begin one to six days after exposure.
Death can occur within two to four days.
Defenses: The vaccine for bubonic plague, which is transmitted by fleas, is not ef-
fective against the aerosolized form that would be used in bioterrorism. Antibiotic
treatment must begin within 24 hours of symptoms to improve chances of survival.
Viral homorrhagic fever
Symptoms: Depending on the virus (Ebola, Marburg, others), symptoms can be
high fever, diarrhea and muscle aches, followed by severe chest pain, shock and
bleeding. Death can occur in seven days.
Defenses: No licensed vaccines exist for any of these diseases, though experi-
mental versions have been made for yellow fever and Argentine hemorrhagic fever.
The only therapy is supportive, mainly intravenous fluids. An antiviral drug called
ribavirin has proven useful in people with Rift Valley and Lassa fevers. An oral
form can be used when there are mass casualties and not enough health workers
or equipment to give it intravenously.
Senator BOXER. I think sometimes we are not paying enough at-
tention to this, at least in my opinion.
I want to say that I listened to National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice with great interest, and I spoke to the chairman
about what Condoleezza Rice said today about the presence of al-
Qaeda in Iraq, and Madeleine Albright, Secretary Albright, you re-
ferred to this, and to me it was very interesting.
It seems a whole new line is developing here as a rationale, and
since she raised the question, which we have been briefed on but
none of us really raised it, I want to say today what I believe to
be the case. I believe there may be some al-Qaeda there. I also be-
lieve, in my opinion, from what I know, there is more al-Qaeda in


94
and said, you are allowed to have an Iraqi military person standing
in the room. That is unacceptable.
We also discussed the possibility of the need for a military force
to accompany the inspectors, and to that, and I am anxious to hear
what the Secretary of State has to say, the Foreign Minister said
he was open to that. The Russians were open to that. So I would
not be so quick—and I know neither of the witnesses are sug-
gesting it. I would not be so quick to suggest that Secretary Powell
may not be able to pull off something very positive here to get us
down this road we all say we want to go down.
So I just want to make those two points as it relates to how it
is beginning to move, and hopefully, God willing, and my grandpop
used to say, “and the creek not rising,” we could end up at the end
of the day with the same kind of resolution agreement we had as
we work through the 1998 resolution with sufficient safeguards
built into it.
But at any rate—and Senator, you and the Senator from Florida
can take additional time to ask your questions, because you have
been so patient.
Senator CHAFEE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I
know we all share the same goals and had a good discussion about
that, but one of the areas that does concern me is the international
relations that have been, the dynamics that have been created by
this initiative and, of course, the elections in Germany are, I guess,
on the front burner as to how that became an issue in that country.
But one—and you read the comments from the various inter-
national leaders from around the country, whether it is China,
Japan, Kuwait, even our friends in Canada, they are all expressing
concerns about this, but particularly one of the quotes was from
President Mubarak, who is maybe one of the deans in the Arab
world, has been there since the early eighties as the leader of his
country, and he said just several weeks ago, “if you strike Iraq, not
one Arab leader will be able to control the angry outburst of the
masses.'
And maybe we should not argue, just for the sake of discussion,
about whether he is right or wrong, but supposing he is right, then
what happens, and from your experience, maybe you could take us
down that path. What countries are most susceptible in the region
to the angry outburst of the masses?
Jordan, certainly King Abdullah has expressed concerns, and
where do we go? Then do we go into Jordan and help him out? Do
we go into Saudi Arabia or Egypt to help them out? Maybe you
could go down that path a little bit, if he is right, just for the sake
of argument.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. First of all, could I just say I appreciate Chair-
man Biden straightening out the business about exuberance, be-
cause I did not say it about the President or the whole administra-
tion, but I do think, as I said earlier, that there are those who had
an agenda even before this started, so that concerns me.
I think Secretary Kissinger is right when he says that if we go
in and do this ultimately there will be some that have said they
would have nothing to do with us that will have something to do
with us, so I do not dispute that.


96
Dr. KISSINGER. That is right. I had not understood the degree to
which such feeling had evolved, but it surely has deeper causes
than a reaction to the immediate tactics regarding this situation.
Senator SARBANES. I thank the Senator.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. I will just followup a little bit.
At a hearing we had earlier this month, I asked one of the wit-
nesses about spontaneous combustion that has happened, and spe-
cifically I mentioned Iran, and how we were caught so flat-footed.
It just seemed to happen overnight. We did not even get our em-
bassy evacuated, obviously.
The witness responded by saying yes, as a matter of fact, one of
the leading scholars in the area wrote a book, “Iran Under the
Pahlavis,” by Professor Lenkowski, if I have pronounced it right,
and saying it is the most stable regime in the region—his book was
not a best-seller—so we have to be aware of that, and when Presi-
dent Mubarak is making these type of statements, no Arab leader
will be able to control the outbursts—let me get it right, the angry
outbursts of the masses, I think we have to listen, and if we are
going down this road, go down it.
And I guess I will ask one more time, if Jordan is, the Arab lead-
er cannot control the outburst of the masses, or Egypt, for the sake
of argument, then what do we do?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Could I, Senator—I think that—I hate to, I really
do hate to disagree with Henry on this. I think that as we look at
what the causes of terrorism are—I remember, Chairman Biden
asked me when I testified sometime ago whether poverty was the
cause of terrorism, and I remember saying, we do not know that.
We do know that there are people who are looking for reasons
to be opposed to us that are part of societies that are dysfunctional,
or where there is a great gap between the rich and the poor, or peo-
ple have no way of knowing what their future will be, that they are
out there as potential recruits for terrorism and therefore, if the
streets explode, it is not just a matter of controlling them by the
monarch or the ruler. It may be impossible, and it may, in fact, cre-
ate an environment that hurts us in the overall fight against ter-
rorism, and that is my concern.
Senator CHAFEE. I would agree with that.
Thank
you,
Mr. Chairman.
Dr. KISSINGER. One has to go back to the fundamental issue: that
there are stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, in vio-
lation of the U.N. resolution; that we are engaged in a diplomatic
process to attempt to deal with this. First of all, does Mubarak
really mean this, and second, even if he does, can we ultimately be
deterred from doing what we should do and leave these weapons
undisturbed? Will that not create a worse problem with the streets
as time goes on? These are the questions that need to be addressed.
Senator CHAFEE. I know my time is up, but I guess I did not get
an answer to the question, what does happen, just for the sake of
argument? Do we preemptively go into Jordan if there is someone
there, but I do not want to take any more time.
Dr. KISSINGER. The word “preemptively” is being thrown around
too loosely in the debate. It has always been understood that, if
there is a fundamental threat to national security, one reserves the
option for military action. There have been occasions in the past,


98
Laden in Afghanistan and, as these terrorist cells exist, it cannot
be precluded. But what it means in an international system both
as a concept and as something that can be more or less universally
accepted so that it does not become arbitrary, is a problem we are
at the beginning of not at the solution of it.
Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I have come away from this dis-
cussion and others we have had both in this committee and our
other committee, the Armed Services Committee, thinking that the
draft resolution that was sent to us clearly needs to be changed,
that Ambassador Holbrooke had four suggestions of change yester-
day that I think were excellent, and I am just curious about the
views of our two witnesses here with respect to those suggestions.
One was to delete the clause that would seemingly give carte
blanche to go into the whole area, and nail it down just as a resolu-
tion authorizing force in Iraq, another one was to make reference
to a U.N. Security Council resolution, a third would be the execu-
tive branch reporting clause to the Congress, and a fourth was a
clause as to the post-conflict Iraq, and what would be our planning
efforts and responsibilities there.
Are we moving in the right direction with such changes to the
resolution?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I do not think that as a private citizen it
is absolutely right to give you suggestions on this, but my problem
with the resolution that came here is its broadness, and you all
have in previous ways worked out a resolution that makes clearer
what the co-responsibility of the executive and legislative branch is
in this, and as somebody that was in an administration that we al-
ways have had discussions about the war powers, I do think that
it is up to you all to figure out how to refine this, and it is essen-
tial, frankly, but I am not sure it is appropriate for me to make
suggestions.
Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. KISSINGER. I have not studied the resolution enough to make
suggestions. As a general proposition, however I think the Presi-
dent should be given authority of a nature that makes clear that:
No. 1, the Congress understands the relationship of the Iraq issue
to other issues in the area, and does not just deal with it or look
at it in strictly Iraq terms; and No. 2, that the President is given
adequate flexibility to deal with this as to reporting requirements.
Senator SARBANES. I am not clear on that answer. Is it your view
the President should be authorized to take military action with re-
spect to issues in the region, and not just with respect to Iraq?
Dr. KISSINGER. I am now most concerned about the issue of Iraq.
The resolution should clearly indicate the relationship of the Iraqi
issue to others, though I really have not studied this enough to
make drafting suggestions.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brownback.
Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
very much for being here, and for lasting through this.
A couple of quick things. I want to apologize for not being here
during a portion of this hearing. There were other hearings I had
to be at.
A point that I would like to make is, at least for this Member,
if we need to narrow the resolution or add restrictions or reporting


100
country, north and south and in the middle, but that this could be
a very strong force for democracy once Saddam is removed in that
region.
Secretary Albright, you would have dealt with that a lot as Sec-
retary, and probably had a lot of opportunity to think about that
recently as well.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think it would be much wished, and clear-
ly the population of Iraq is a little bit different in terms of its mo-
dernity and education from some of the other places, but the ques-
tion that I think we have, and we raised, was, what is the plan to
get from here to there, that it will not be simple, that there is not
only the potential of democracy, but also the potential of inter-
necine fighting before we get there, and what I have wanted to
hear a little bit more from the administration, what is the plan
from getting here to there?
I am chairman of the board of the National Democratic Institute,
that has been working very hard at looking at different ways that
democracy might be possible in the Middle East. We have pro-
grams in Yemen and Bahrain, and I am not one of those people
who believes that it is impossible to have democracy in the Middle
East, but I think that we have to get there in a systematic way,
and understand how we get there, and I must say that while I
have a great deal of respect for those people who try to work with
the Iraqi National Congress, it is not a group that I think is
quite—has shown so far that it has the continuity and the coopera-
tion within it to be ready to have democracy.
I have talked to the Kurdish leaders. They would so much like
to hear us talking about not regime change but a freeing of Iraq,
and I think we should be thinking about that, but I think it is a
long way between here and there, and that is why we need to see
a little bit more how we get there, and what the role of the United
States in that will be.
Dr. KISSINGER. I would say that the choices with respect to weap-
ons of mass destruction are relatively limited. Our choices after a
military operation will require us to bring about substantial im-
provement in Iraqi conditions. I would consider it unlikely that one
could move there to full democracy in a very brief time. However
I think it is essential to move to accountability of the government
institutions toward some type of constitutional system, and to sub-
stantial improvement in the lives of the population. We cannot do
that all alone and it will require an international effort.
Senator BROWNBACK. I would certainly agree with that. I think
there is a potential to do something extraordinarily positive for a
lot of people and extraordinarily positive for our security here, not
without huge risks, substantial risks, but the risks of waiting I
have concluded are greater than those of acting now.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. You have been very patient. With your permis-
sion, I would like to let Senator Sarbanes-he says he has another
question, and I know you missed your shuttles, two of them here.
Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I am looking at a dispatch
from a Virginia paper reporting on a meeting at the University of
Virginia on Tuesday at the Miller Center, at which General Scow-
croft and Secretary Eagleburger spoke. They had a crowd of, it says


102
Senator SARBANES. What do you think we should do about these
four countries here?
Dr. KISSINGER. Well, one would have to deal with them, and
there is no general rule. Somalia has no government, really at least
no effective government. Thus the question is, what are these
places actually doing? Yemen has a government, but not in every
region of the country. With respect to bases from which terrorist
attacks are being planned or might be planned against the United
States, we cannot exclude, ultimately, the use of military action.
Obviously, a country like Indonesia is of such a magnitude that
this is not something to be done except under the most extreme
provocation—which does not exist right now. It is not even clear
whether there are bases on these islands, as some people claim, so
one would have to go about this country by country, and consider
the nature of each threat.
The CHAIRMAN. Not that you ever need me to defend you, Dr.
Kissinger, but as I listened to Senator Sarbanes and your response,
am I missing something, or is there—it seems to me that your un-
derlying premise is that if and when the President takes action, he
is not going to be antagonizing the rest of the world, that he is
going to have a sufficient portion of the rest of the world with him.
Is that, I mean, because I think everybody agrees-
Dr. KISSINGER. That is my underlying premise.
The CHAIRMAN. Again, though there is a disagreement, one of the
things that I find the most difficult as I try to go through this
Dr. KISSINGER. It depends upon how you define the rest of the
world. But, as a general principle, if you take all the major coun-
tries and all the other countries, I do not believe-
Senator SARBANES. What is your analysis if it is done unilater-
ally?
The CHAIRMAN. In other words-
Senator SARBANES. What is your analysis if it is done unilater-
ally, American military action unilaterally?
Ďr. KISSINGER. I do not believe it will happen.
Senator SARBANES. But we have to reason this through, do we
not?
Dr. KISSINGER. But I am convinced that
Senator SARBANES. Would you condition the President's ability to
act on the premise that it not be unilateral?
Dr. KISSINGER. We pay a higher price if we act unilaterally, but
I have enough confidence in the President that, if he did act, I
would assume it to have been necessary.
Senator SARBANES. Well, the rhetoric that has been used it
seems is moving us increasingly to the position where we do not
have options. If they do not act, then we say, aha, he did not act.
He said he was going to act, unilaterally or not, and he did not do
it.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, if I can, you have been here 3 hours. You
have been incredible. I just want to conclude by thanking you and
also pointing out what I think is a fair statement, I hope is a fair
statement, and that is that, as it relates to Saddam Hussein in
Iraq, as policymakers writ large, the President, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, they are never going to have more
than 75 percent of the facts they need to know to be certain.


104
post-conflict resolution questions and what we do. He says, “the re-
quirements are providing a core security for the largest city, about
10 million in population, in the largest state, which is about 40 per-
cent of the population, and humanitarian efforts, securing WMD
and associated facilities, patrolling the Iranian border areas, the
Kurdish areas, protecting the Shat Al-Arab oil fields, monitoring
the region from the Tigris to the Euphrates, and Syrian border-
the Tigris and the Euphrates contain the bulk of the population-
and then conducting the integrated disarmament and demobiliza-
tion process in coordination with the integrated efforts.”
He goes on to say, "the total cost of this force, once again based
on U.S. equivalence—there is wide variation in the country—could
range up to $16 billion and a force of 75,000 to operate within
Iraq.”
Now, it may not be 75,000, but I will conclude by saying, in my
last meeting with the President, along with 10 other congressional
leaders, the President turned to me in the presence of everyone, as
he asked other people, and he said, “Mr. Chairman, what do you
think,” and I said, Mr. President, I will be with you as long as you
make a clear case to the American people, including telling them
we are going to have to be there for a while, we are going to have
to put American forces on the ground there for a while, and it could
cost a lot of money. His response was, “I will do that.” That has
not been done yet.
Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, you are very thorough.
Would you mind if I make just a quick comment on this regard,
because I think you have got quite a valid point. I mentioned to
other people the calls into my office, many are running against
this, even though polling numbers say they are for it.
What the President did at the U.N. was, he spoke at the United
Nations, and I did not hear new information come forward, but he
recited, here is the case. I think we should have the President up
to a joint session of the Congress and have him say, here is the
case, and here is what we will do, because what the U.N. did, and
what the President took advantage of there was to say, OK, you
want me to go to the United Nations, I will go to the U.N. Here
is my case, and when you put it all together, it stacks up that Sad-
dam has made a great case against himself. He is the one who has
made the case.
I think if the President will come up to a joint session of Con-
gress, address the Congress and the American people similarly,
here is the case, and that you will cumulatively see, in the private
briefings we have, and the public hearings we have had, an ex-
traordinary condemnation, but it does need to be laid out collec-
tively to the American public, because you are right, no policy of
ours, if it is to engage a war effort in this country, can be sustained
without the sustained support of the American people, and I think
that would be an important thing for the President to do and for
us to engage.
The CHAIRMAN. I am making that point, and I appreciate the
witnesses sticking around for our intramural discussion here, but
I am making an additional point, an additional point not merely
what the threat is, which is critically important, but what we are


105
going to ask of the American people to meet the threat. I think
they are prepared, but we have to tell them.
What I worry about after being here 30 years, I do not want to
go through a process where we engage, we succeed on the military
front, we lose some or many American forces in the process, but we
will succeed and then find 18 months from now we do not have the
same people who called for going to war refusing in the budget
price to say, I am going to vote for an extra $30 billion for Iraq this
year, instead of—which will have to be made, instead of a tax cut,
or prescription drugs, or for whatever it is, because those are the
choices we are going to have to make.
And I watched in Afghanistan, Mr. and Mrs. Secretary, I asked,
I sat with the President for literally hours, over 3 hours on this.
The President said, we need a mini Marshall Plan. The President
said, we need to have forces there to provide security. The Presi-
dent said, this was a long term obligation. The President said, we
are in there for the long haul. We cannot get the House and we
cannot get some of our colleagues to vote the money we need there.
Now, I do not want to be around when my son, who just got back
from Kosovo, or his friends are sitting in the middle of Baghdad
and the U.S. Senate says, well, wait a minute, you did not tell me
that we had to vote for an extra $10, $20, $30, $40 billion to finish
this job. I want everybody on the line.
My father, who died 2 weeks ago, used to say, “I like to know
who is in charge so I know who to hold responsible,” and I am pre-
pared to do it, but I do not want to be part of an outfit that votes
to send us to war, or gives the President that authority, and then
leaves him hanging, or is unsure whether the President is willing
to come back to us and say, pay the price.
I promise you if we go, forget your permanent tax cut. There is
not enough money. If we go, forget the idea that we are going to
have a massive new health care program. Now, that, I am prepared
to make those choices, but let us not kid the American people, be-
cause I am not in for a guns and butter routine here. I am not
going down that route again.
I first met the distinguished Secretary of State when I first got
here as a 29-year-old kid, and our first meeting was on the Viet-
nam war. I am not going to go there again. We have to tell the
American people what the likely price is, even though we do not
know for certain. It may be a lot less.
We will have the present Secretary of State at 2:30. I thank my
colleagues. This has been incredibly helpful, and you have been
here for over 3 hours. We owe you.
[Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the committee adjourned to reconvene
at 2:30 p.m., the same day.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in room
SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold,
Wellstone, Boxer, Bill Nelson, Rockefeller, Helms, Lugar, Hagel,
Gordon Smith, Frist, Chafee, Allen, and Brownback.
83-463 D-5


106
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order. Good
afternoon. It's a pleasure to welcome the Secretary of State, Sec-
retary Powell, back to this committee.
Mr. Secretary, as you know, in late July this committee began
hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq and our purpose—and it's no
surprise to anyone, because we've both said it, you and I had dis-
cussions back then about those hearings and whether they should
take place and so on and so forth, and we've cooperated in this all
along, as has the administration, generally. Our purpose was to
start a national discussion on Iraqi policy, raise the difficult ques-
tions that surround it, and consider how that policy should move
and in what direction.
We've heard from a broad range of experts and expert witnesses.
Elsewhere, prominent Americans with decades of experience in for-
eign and national security policy have spoken out, and the Bush
administration has begun to do so, as well, in public statements
and hearings before the Congress and President Bush's important
speech to the United Nations General Assembly and, I would note,
in your testimony before our counterparts in the House.
As a result, I believe there's an emerging bipartisan consensus
on some basic principles for moving forward on Iraq. I want to
make it clear I speak for no one but myself here. I'm not speaking
for the committee, for the Democratic Party, or for anyone; I'm just
saying what I think is emerging here. And I think the emerging
consensus on some basic principles is, in no small part, due to your
leadership.
First, Iraq is the world's concern, not just the concern of the
United States. Mr. Secretary, I know that you were instrumental-
I believe; I don't know you were instrumental in shaping the
President's speech to the United Nations. I thought it was a dev-
astating indictment, by the U.N.'s own standards, of Iraq's defiance
of the international community. For more than a decade, Saddam
has flaunted solemn obligations, obligations made not to the United
States alone, but to the United Nations, and the President was
right to take the issue to the United Nations, and right to make
it clear that the legitimacy of that institution and its efficacy de-
pends, in no small part, on how it responds.
Second, it seems to me there's a consensus that we should pursue
a policy toward Iraq that has broad international support. To put
it in colloquial terms, it's obviously better if we move with the
world behind us than if we move with the world against us. I ap-
plaud your effort to build that support and hopefully you'll talk
about that today. I applaud your efforts. And our allies around the
world and the region have important contributions and, in some
cases, necessary contributions to make if we are to succeed, and
we—I think all of us on this committee support and encourage and
hope for the best in your unfinished business before the Security
Council as you pursue gaining this support.
The third general principle, I think, that has emerged here is
that many of us share the conviction that Saddam Hussein's relent-
less pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and his possession of
some already, especially his pursuit of nuclear weapons, which I do
not believe he possesses, pose a significant threat to Iraq's people,


108
I know we have no absolute answers to these, but I think, in fair-
ness to the American people, we should discuss them. There are
many more questions which I will not take the time to ask now,
because my colleagues will pursue them as we go around this table,
but ultimately, Mr. Secretary, your appearance here today is part
of a singularly important process that must culminate with the
President securing the informed consent of the American people for
our policy toward Iraq. I'm confident he can do that. I'm confident
that can be done. But I am also absolutely confident it can only be
done with some significant change in the resolution that has been
sent to us and some clear specification of what the President will
be asking of us.
Mr. Secretary, when the President had the congressional leader-
ship down to the Cabinet room about 2 weeks ago, he asked a num-
ber of us questions. And when he turned and asked me my view,
I indicated to him that I was prepared to be with him, assuming
several things. One, that he continued to pursue the course he was
pursing at the United Nations and exhaust those possible avenues,
as well as state clearly to the American people once we've suc-
ceeded in dethroning-removing Saddam—and I have no doubt we
will if we undertake that—what we are going to have to do—what
we may have to do in terms of staying in Iraq, and what the cost
may be without any clear definition of how many troops or how
long.
And the President said to me, as you recall, he would do that.
He has yet to do that. I'm confident he will do that. And only then,
I think, can we have some certainty that once we undertake this,
we will have the American people with us committed to do the
whole job.
Senator Brownback, I think, was the only person left in the room
when the two former Secretaries were leaving, and I indicated that
I hope to God we don't do—not you; we, the Congress, giving the
President the authority—I hope we don't say to the American peo-
ple what was said to them by previous Congresses just before I ar-
rived here in the 1960s, that we can have guns and butter, we can
have everything we want, the costs will be able to be borne, no
matter what they are, without us making any sacrifices.
It may be everything works out like clockwork and there's no
problem, but I do not want to be part of a Senate that gives the
President the authority where we move and it ends up that we are
required to commit billions of dollars a year to sustain a unified
Iraq after we defeat the present government and not be able to get
the money and the commitment up here to do it. I will not be part
of that, personally. And I think everyone should know what we're
in for and what the possible costs are, even though we can't say
for certain.
So, Mr. Secretary, I'm delighted you're here. I mean this sin-
cerely, I am thankful you are here and I'm thankful you're the Sec-
retary of State at this moment, and I look forward to hearing what
you have to say, but I will now yield, if I may, to Senator Helms.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]


109
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to welcome Secretary of State Powell back before
this Committee.
Mr. Secretary, as you know, in late July this Committee began hearings on U.S.
policy toward Iraq. Our purpose was to start a national discussion of that policy and
to raise the difficult questions that surround any consideration of next steps.
We have heard from a broad range of expert witnesses. Elsewhere, prominent
Americans with decades of experience in foreign and national security policy have
spoken out. And the Bush Administration has begun to do so as well-in public
statements, in hearings before Congress, and in President Bush's important speech
to the United Nations General Assembly.
As a result, I believe there is an emerging bi-partisan consensus on some basic
principles for moving forward on Iraq. And this is in no small measure due to your
leadership
First, Iraq is the world's concern, not just a concern of the United States. Mr. Sec-
retary, I believe that you were instrumental in shaping the President's speech to
the United Nations. It was a devastating indictment, by the U.N.'s own standards,
of Iraq's defiance of the international community. For more than a decade, Saddam
has flaunted solemn obligations-obligations made not to the United States, but to
the United Nations. The President was right to take this issue to the U.N. and right
to make it clear that the legitimacy of that institution and the effectiveness of inter-
national security cooperation is at stake.
Second, we should pursue a policy toward Iraq that has broad international sup-
port. To be colloquial about this matter, it is better if we move with the world be-
ħind us than against us. I applaud your efforts to build that support. Our allies
around the world and in the region have important and necessary contributions to
make in the effort to disarm Iraq. And we must continue to work with them in the
unfinished war against terrorism.
Third, many of us share the conviction that Saddam Hussein's relentless pursuit
of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, poses a significant
threat to Iraq's people, its region and the world. Ultimately, either Saddam must
be dislodged from his weapons, or he must be dislodged from power.
I believe there is a broad consensus on these principles. But important, indeed
fundamental questions remain about the Administration's Iraq policy and about the
consequences of the various courses of action under consideration.
And that puts us in an extraordinary situation. The President has asked Congress
for an expansive grant of authority to wage war before he himself has decided to
go to war or addressed these unanswered questions. I have no doubt that you are
here to answer these questions.
The President's speech to the United Nations was an important moment. He made
a powerful case, under the U.N.'s own standards, that Saddam Hussein is the
world's problem. But he has not yet made the case to the American people that the
United States must solve this problem alone, if necessary.
The threat posed by Iraq is real and escalating. The singular capacity of the
United States to deal with this threat alone is real. But so are the potential costs.
Indeed, I believe the degree to which we act alone correlates with the price we will
have to pay in lives, dollars and influence around the world.
That is a burden we may have to bear—one I know that you and the President
do not wish to bear alone. But before we bear that burden, the American people
have to know what they are being asked to sign up to.
And so Mr. Secretary, I hope that, here today, you will address some of these
questions, and that in the days and weeks to come, we will hear the President lay-
ing out what it is we are going to ask of the American people.
What is the likelihood that Iraq would use its weapons of mass destruction
against us, to blackmail us or to supply to terrorists?
What is our objective? To compel Iraq to destroy its illegal weapons of mass de-
struction programs? Or to liberate Kuwaiti prisoners? Or to end Saddam Hussein's
regime?
What is the rationale for our action? To enforce the U.N. Security Council resolu-
tions that Saddam has flaunted for more than a decade? Or to preempt the possi-
bility he will use his weapons against us?
Would attacking Iraq risk precipitating the very thing we are trying to prevent:
the use of weapons of mass destruction? I know we have no absolute answers to
these things, but I think in fairness to the American people, we should discuss
them.
Ultimately, Mr. Secretary, your appearance here today is part of a singularly im-
portant process that must culminate with the President securing the informed con-


111
that our committee has taken such an active role in considering (1) the threats
posed by the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein, and, (2) the appropriate U.S. re-
sponse to these threats.
The President's speech two weeks ago to the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions presented the clearest possible case for action against the Iraqi regime of Sad-
dam Hussein. I will support the President.
Ten years of noncompliance with United Nations resolutions, the continued bru-
tality waged against his own population, the imprisonment of hundreds of Kuwaiti
citizens held since 1990, and evidence of continued pursuit of weapons of mass de-
struction are all the evidence any Senator needs to support the President, which
certainly I do and will continue to do.
Mr. Chairman, there are two criticisms that have been directed against the Presi-
dent. First, it has been suggested by some that the President failed to pay due dili-
gence to the role of the United Nations. Well, that simply is not so. The President
has challenged the much-ballyhooed institution in New York to seize this oppor-
tunity to become an important actor in world affairs, not just a critic of people who
are doing the heavy-lifting in dealing with foreign affairs.
The truth is, the President's September 12 speech to the United Nations methodi-
cally detailed the history of Iraqi noncompliance with U.N. Security Council resolu-
tions. It is now up to the United Nations to demonstrate that it is the U.N. that
has the will to enforce its resolutions and rhetoric.
The ball is clearly in the U.N.'s court. If the Security Council now fails to support
action against Saddam Hussein, the U.N.'s ineffectiveness and irrelevance will be
incontrovertibly clear.
Surely, if the September 11 attacks taught us anything, it is that America does
not have the luxury of sitting idle while our enemies conspire against us. We simply
cannot wait for Iraq to acquire the nuclear weapons to add to the chemical and bio-
logical weapons Iraq already possesses.
Second, some have suggested that the President has not fully taken into account
the legitimate role of the Congress in fundamental questions of war and peace.
Mr. Chairman, the truth is, Congress has been, and continues to be, consulted.
The President formally asked Congress to pass a resolution giving him the authority
to end the Saddam Hussein problem once and for all.
Mr. Chairman, I am confident that the Senate will give the President the author-
ity he has requested.
Like the United Nations, we too must consider our own previous declarations and
mandates. We must consider our strong words in the Iraq Liberation Act.
We must consider our previous joint letters to the President. We must consider
our previous grants of authority to the President.
In 1998, the Congress authorized an earlier President to take appropriate action
to bring Iraq into compliance with its United Nations-imposed obligations. Are we
not obliged to give this President similar authority, and trust that he will take
meaningful action to address the dangerous threats to peace and security posed by
Saddam Hussein's regime?
The answer, to borrow a Latin expression used by lawyers—res ipsa loquitur.
Mr. Chairman, the thing does indeed speak for itself. Let's get about the business
of standing with the President.
The CHAIRMAN. The floor is yours, Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF
STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary POWELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Chairman, it's a great pleasure to be back before the
committee. I always look forward to the opportunity to discuss the
foreign policy of the United States before the distinguished mem-
bers of this committee, and I'm especially pleased to be here today
to follow the very distinguished witnesses who have preceded me,
Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Albright today, and Ambassador
Holbrooke and my old friend and former National Security Advisor,
as I was, Bud McFarlane yesterday, as well as other witnesses.
As I was working out of my office this morning and watching tel-
evision out of the corner of my eye and also looking at the clock,


113
The United Nations Security Council endorsed this purpose and
objective, and the international community responded with unprec-
edented political backing, financial support, and military forces. As
a result, we not only accomplished our mission in the gulf war, we
did it in a way that I think was a model of American international
leadership and international cooperation.
When that war ended, the United Nations Security Council
agreed to take measures to ensure that Iraq did not threaten any
of its neighbors again. Saddam Hussein, we knew, was a man who,
after all, had sent his armies against Iran in 1980 and then against
Kuwait in 1990. We knew he was a man who had fired ballistic
missiles at neighboring countries and who had used chemical weap-
ons in the war with Iran and even against his own people.
The United States and the international community were strong-
ly determined to prevent any future aggression, so the United Na-
tions Security Council Resolution 687 of April 1991 fixed the terms
of the cease-fire in the gulf. And the fundamental purpose of this
resolution and many more that followed was restoration of regional
peace and security by way of a series of stringent demands on Iraq,
particularly its disarmament with respect to weapons of mass de-
struction and ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilo-
meters.
Desert Storm had dramatically reduced Iraq's more conventional
military capability while at the same time and we did this delib-
erately—not leaving Iraq so prostrate that it could not defend itself
against Iran, its former enemy.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, you know the rest of
the story. You heard the President relate it at the United Nations
2 weeks ago today. Iraq has defied the United Nations and refused
to comply completely with any of the United Nations Security
Council resolutions. Moreover, since December 1998, when the
U.N. inspection teams left Iraq because of the regime's flagrant de-
fiance of the United Nations, the Iraqi regime has been free to pur-
sue the development of weapons of mass destruction.
Meanwhile, the world has changed dramatically. Since Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the world is a different place. As a consequence
of the terrorist attacks on that day and of the war on terrorism
that those attacks made necessary, a new reality was born. The
world had to recognize that the potential connection between ter-
rorists and weapons of mass destruction moved terrorism to a new
level of threat. In fact, that nexus became the overriding security
concern of our Nation. It still is, and it will continue to be our over-
riding concern for some years to come.
We now see that a proven menace like Saddam Hussein in pos-
session of weapons of mass destruction could empower a few terror-
ists with those weapons to threaten millions of innocent people.
President Bush is fully determined to deal with this threat. His ad-
ministration is determined to defeat it. I believe the American peo-
ple would have us do no less.
President Bush is also aware of the need to engage the inter-
national community. He understands how powerful a strong and
unified international community can be, as we have seen so well
demonstrated in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and else-
where.


114
The need to engage the international community is why the
President took his message on the grave and gathering danger of
Iraq to the United Nations on the 12th of September. Moreover, it
is the United Nations that is the offended party, not Iraq, as some
would have us believe or might even claim. It was the United Na-
tions resolutions that were systematically and brutally ignored and
violated for these past 12 years. It was United Nations inspectors
who found it impossible to do their job and had to leave the work
unfinished. The President's challenge, therefore, to the United Na-
tions General Assembly and through them to the Security Council
was a direct one and it was a very simple one, “If you would re-
main relevant, then you must act in the face of these repeated vio-
lations.”
I was there that day, and the President's speech was a powerful
one, and it energized the entire meeting hall. It changed the polit-
ical landscape on which this issue was being discussed—that one
speech—and it made it clear that Iraq is the problem. Iraq is the
one who is in material breach of the demands placed upon it by the
United Nations. It is not the United States that is in the dock; it
is not the United Nations that is in the dock. It is not the Security
Council that is in the dock. It is not France or Britain or Russia
or the United Kingdom or all the other members of the Security
Council. It is Iraq that is in the dock, and we must not lose sight
of that simple, clear fact.
The President, in his speech, then went on to make it clear what
was expected of Iraq to repair this material breach. He made it
clear that the issue was more than disarming Iraq by eliminating
its weapons of mass destruction and its mid- and long-range mis-
sile programs. The United Nations resolutions also spoke of ter-
rorism, of human rights, the return of prisoners and property.
Iraq stands guilty. It convicts itself by its actions. There can be
no question that it is in material breach of its obligations. All of
these demands on Iraq are spelled out in the 16 Security Council
resolutions levied against that country since 1991.
Over the weekend following the President's speech at the United
Nations, I watched the reaction. I watched the pressure build on
the Iraqi regime as the Arab League, the Secretary General, and
so many others pressed Iraq on their need to take action. They es-
sentially told Iraq the jig was up. Nobody was going to listen to
these phony excuses anymore, and the pressure built to an enor-
mous level.
On Monday of that week—the next week, Iraq responded with a
familiar tactical ploy. The Iraqi Foreign Minister said Iraq would
let the inspectors back in without conditions. And later in the
week, in a speech at the United Nations, their Foreign Minister
challenged President Bush's September 12 speech. He even called
for a discussion of the issues of inspection teams in accordance
with international law, already qualifying his Monday offer of in-
spections without conditions. Now, 2 days ago, we have an Iraqi
Presidential advisor telling the press in Baghdad that weapons in-
spectors would be allowed to go wherever they want.
But these people are not deceiving anyone. It is a ploy we have
seen before on many occasions. And on each of these occasions,


115
once inspectors began to operate, Iraq continued to do everything
to frustrate their work.
Mr. Chairman, I will just call your and the members' attention
to the written statement that I have provided where I record a
dozen examples of Iraq's defiance of these resolutions and of the
U.N. mandate. Cited in my longer statement is everything from in-
timidation at gunpoint to holding up inspectors while all the in-
criminating evidence was removed. It is a litany of defiance and
unscrupulous behavior and every sort of attempt at noncompliance.
And I, by no means, in my longer statement, have listed every-
thing, only a sampling.
The regime is infamous for its ploys, its stalling tactics, its de-
mand on inspectors, sometimes at the point of a gun, and its gen-
eral and consistent defiance of the mandate of the United Nations
Security Council. There is absolutely no reason at all to expect that
Iraq has changed; at least they haven't given us any indications to
suspect that they have changed. And this latest effort to welcome
inspectors without conditions is another ploy.
Let's be clear about the reason for their suddenly being willing,
after several years, to accept inspectors. Iraqis did not suddenly see
the error of their ways. They were responding to the heat and pres-
sure generated by the international community after President
Bush's speech at the U.N. We must keep that pressure on.
The United States has made it clear to our Security Council col-
leagues that we will not fall for this ploy. This is the time to apply
more pressure, not to relent. We must not believe that inspectors
going in on the same conditions and under the same terms that
they went in on so many occasions earlier would be acceptable now.
We won't fall for that. These 4 years have been more than enough
time for Iraq to procure, develop, and hide proscribed items well
beyond the reach of the kinds of inspections that were subject to
Saddam's cheat-and-retreat approach from 1991 to 1998.
It is up to the United Nations Security Council to decide what
action is now required of Iraq to deal with this material breach of
the U.N.'s mandate. If part of the solution involves an inspection
regime, it must be a regime that goes in with the authority of a
new resolution that removes the weaknesses of the present regime
and which will not tolerate any Iraqi disobedience. It cannot be a
resolution that we are going to negotiate with Iraq. The resolution
or resolutions must be strong enough and comprehensive enough so
that they produce disarmament and not just inspections.
Many U.N. members, including some on the Security Council,
want to take Iraq at its word and send inspectors back in right now
without any new resolution and new authority, and we believe that
this would be a recipe for failure. The debate we are having within
the Security Council now is on the need for and the wording of a
resolution or, some feel, more than one resolution.
Our position is clear. We must face the facts and find Iraq in ma-
terial breach. Then we must specify the actions we demand of Iraq.
And President Bush has already discussed what he believes is ap-
propriate.
And then there's a third element. We must determine what con-
sequences will flow from Iraq's failure to take action. Just laying
out a new inspection regime and declaring them in material breach


116
isn't enough. The Security Council must face up to their responsi-
bility to take action or to allow action to be taken in the face of
continued Iraqi violation.
That is what makes it different this time. This time, unlike any
time over the previous 12 years of Iraqi defiance, there must be
hard consequences. This time Iraq must comply with the U.N.
mandate or there will be decisive action to compel compliance.
We are listening to other points of view, and we are working to
reach agreement within the Security Council. It is a difficult de-
bate. There are strong views one way or the other. As you may
have noticed in some of the press reporting in the last 24 hours,
we have come into agreement with the United Kingdom of what
the elements of a resolution should look like. I am sending a senior
official from my Department to Paris this evening and then on to
Moscow to discuss with the French and the Russians what we be-
lieve should be in such a resolution. We are briefing representa-
tives of the Chinese Government here in Washington today. And so
far, in the last 12 hours, I've spoken to my French colleague, For-
eign Minister de Villepin, my Russian colleague, Foreign Minister
Ivanov, my Chinese colleague, Foreign Minister Tang, and Sec-
retary General Kofi Annan describing the progress we have made
with the British and the fact that we are now expanding the circle
of consultation. We're a long way from getting agreement, but we're
working hard, and there are many points where we are in agree-
ment, and there are some outstanding issues that have to be dealt
with.
Some have suggested that there is a conflict in this approach,
that U.S. interests should be our total concern. We are a member
of the Security Council. We are a member of the United Nations.
It is a multilateral institution whose resolutions have been vio-
lated. So I think it is quite appropriate for the President to seek
action by the United Nations through its Security Council.
But the United States, as an entirely separate matter, believes
that its interests is threatened. We believe that we are at risk and
our interests in different parts of the world are at risk by Iraqi de-
velopment of weapons of mass destruction and by the nature of this
regime. We are trying to solve the problem through the United Na-
tions and in a multilateral way. But, at the same time, if the
United Nations is not able to act, and to act decisively—and I think
that would be a terrible indictment of the United Nations—then
the United States will have to make its own decision as to whether
the danger posed by Iraq is such that we have to act in order to
defend our country and our interests.
I believe strongly, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
that our diplomatic efforts at the United Nations would be helped
enormously by a strong congressional resolution authorizing Presi-
dent Bush to take necessary and appropriate action. Language has
been proposed by the President, and I know it's a subject of intense
discussion in both bodies and with the White House and various
members of the President's national security team, and it is
healthy to have such discussion and debate. But I hope it is not
too prolonged, and I ask for your action in the very near future to
provide the President such a resolution to show the world that we
are united in this effort.


117
Mr. Chairman, my colleagues in the intelligence community and
the Department of Defense are giving the Congress the information
that it will need with respect to the details of our intelligence as-
sessment and military contingency planning that Secretary Rums-
feld is conducting, and I will leave those issues to them.
But let me just make two points before I end this presentation.
We can have debates about the size and nature of the Iraqi stock-
pile. We can have debates about how long it will take him to reach
this level of readiness or that level of readiness with respect to
these weapons. But no one can doubt two things. One, they are in
violation of these resolutions. There's no debate about that. And,
second, they have not lost the intent to develop these weapons of
mass destruction. Whether they are 1 day, 5 days, 1 year, or 7
years away from any particular weapon, whether their stockpile is
small, medium, or large, what has not been lost is the intent to
have such weapons of mass destruction.
The challenge before us now is to see whether or not the Iraqi
regime makes a sea change in this behavior because of this inter-
national presence, and they'll only make this kind of change if they
sense there will be consequences for not having made such a
change. The President is determined that we cannot look away
again. This matter must be dealt with. Hopefully, it will be dealt
with by nations coming together the way they came together 12
years ago.
We recognize the seriousness of this issue. We recognize the con-
sequences for our economy. We recognize the consequences for
other foreign policy interests that we have around the world. We
recognize the consequences for our Middle East policies. And we
also recognize that if it becomes necessary to see the regime
changed in Iraq, then a great obligation is placed upon those of us
who will be changing that regime for the future of Iraq and for the
future of the Iraqi people. And I can assure you that this issue is
receiving the highest attention within the State Department, the
Defense Department, and all the other institutions of government.
If I just may close with one other observation, because I know
it came up earlier in the hearings, this comment about “new doc-
trine of preemption.” If you would go to the new National Security
Strategy that the President issued not too long ago and look at the
specific section which talks about our strategy and doctrine, you
will find that we have not abandoned containment. We have not
abandoned deterrence. We still have thousands of nuclear weapons.
We still have a magnificent military force that can deter. We
haven't abandoned these time-honored methods of using our na-
tional power.
But, what that chapter specifically says is there is now a new
threat out there. There is a threat that doesn't respond the way
older threats did to deterrence, that did not respond to theories of
containment. These are terrorists. These are people who are willing
to ignore what's going to happen to them. They are suicidal. They
believe in evil concepts, and they're going to come at us. And so a
doctrine of preemption or an element of preemption in our strategy
is appropriate.
It's not a new doctrine. It's been around for as long as warfare
has been around. I can give you example after example in our own


118
history of preemptive actions. In fact, I might even suggest that
when President Clinton thought it necessary to attack the chemical
plant in Sudan not too long ago, one might say that was a preemp-
tive act or an act of prevention.
When you have this kind of new threat, this kind of new enemy,
then this doctrine of preemption should rise a little higher in your
consideration, because this kind of enemy will not be deterred or
contained the way perhaps the Soviet Union might have been and
was contained and deterred in the past.
So see it as elevation of one of the many tools that we've always
had, but don't see it as a new doctrine that excludes or eliminates
all the other tools of national security and military power.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Powell follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you to
testify on the Administration's position with regard to Iraq.
Senator Biden, Senator Helms, you and several other of the committee members
have been discussing Iraq with me for a long time. In fact, all the way back to the
Gulf War.
In 1990, Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait, brutalized the population, and
rejected the international community's ultimatum to withdraw.
The U.S. built a world-wide coalition with the clear political purpose of liberating
Kuwait. The military instrument of that coalition, led by America, had an equally
clear military objective that flowed directly from the political purpose: eject the Iraqi
army from Kuwait.
The United Nations Security Council endorsed this purpose and objective, and the
international community responded with unprecedented political backing, financial
support, and military forces. As a result, we not only accomplished our mission in
the Gulf War, the way we did it was a model of American leadership and inter-
national cooperation.
When the war ended, the UN Security Council agreed to take measures to ensure
Iraq did not threaten any of its neighbors again. Saddam Hussein was a man after
all who had sent his armies against Iran in 1980 and then against Kuwait in 1990,
who had fired ballistic missiles at neighboring countries, and who had used chem-
ical weapons in the war with Iran and even against his own people. The United
States and the international community were strongly determined to prevent any
future aggression.
UN Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 fixed the terms of the
ceasefire in the Gulf. The fundamental purpose of this resolution and many more
that followed was restoration of regional peace and security by way of a series of
stringent demands on Iraq, particularly its disarmament with respect to weapons
of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometers.
Desert Storm had dramatically reduced Iraq's more conventional military capability
while at the same time not leaving Iraq so prostrate it could not defend itself
against Iran.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, you know the rest of the story. You
heard the President relate it at the United Nations two weeks ago today. Iraq has
defied the United Nations and refused to comply completely with any of the UN Se-
curity Council resolutions. Moreover, since December 1998 when the UN's inspec-
tion teams left iraq because of the regime's flagrant defiance of the UN, the Iraqi
regime has been free to pursue weapons of mass destruction.
Meanwhile, the world has changed dramatically.
Since September 11, 2001, the world is a different place. As a consequence of the
terrorist attacks on that day and of the war on terrorism that those attacks made
necessary, a new reality was born: the world had to recognize that the potential con-
nection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction moved terrorism to a
new level of threat. In fact, that nexus became the overriding security concern of
our nation. It still is. It will continue to be for some years to come.
We now see that a proven menace like Saddam Hussein, in possession of weapons
of mass destruction, could empower a few terrorists to threaten millions of innocent
people.


119
President Bush is fully determined to deal with this threat. His Administration
is determined to defeat it. I believe the American people would have us do no less.
President Bush is also aware of the need to engage the international community.
He understands how powerful a strong and unified international community can be,
as we have seen so well-demonstrated in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and
elsewhere.
The need to engage the international community is why the President took his
message on the grave and gathering danger of Iraq to the United Nations last week.
Moreover, it is the United Nations that is the offended party, not Iraq, as some
might claim.
It was United Nations resolutions that were systematically and brutally ignored
and violated for these past 12 years. It was United Nations inspectors who found
it impossible to do their job and had to leave their work unfinished.
The President's challenge to the United Nations General Assembly was a direct
and simple one: If you would remain relevant, you must act.
The President's speech was powerful and energized the UN General Assembly de-
bate. It changed the political landscape on which this issue was being discussed,
Iraq is the problem. Íraq is in material breach of the demands placed upon it by
the United Nations.
President Bush made clear in his speech what Iraq must do to repair this breach:
• Iraq must immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or
destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related
material.
• Iraq must end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it, as all states are
required to do by UN Security Council resolutions.
• Iraq must cease persecution of its civilian population, including Shia, Sunnis,
Kurds, Turkomans, and others, again as required by UN Security Council reso-
lutions.
Iraq must release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still un-
known. It must return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen prop-
erty, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and it
must cooperate fully with international efforts to resolve these issues, once
again as required by Security Council resolutions.
• And Iraq must immediately end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program.
It must accept UN administration of funds from that program, to ensure that
the money is used fairly and promptly for the benefit of the Iraqi people.
All of these demands on Iraq are spelled out in the sixteen Security Council reso-
lutions levied against that country since 1991. If these demands on Iraq sound like
regime change, then so be it. And Mr. Chairman, if there is regime change, brought
about either by Iraqi voluntary compliance with these demands or by the use of
military force to compel compliance, the United States will commit wholeheartedly
to the reconstruction of Iraq as a democratic state with its territory intact.
Over the weekend following the President's speech, I watched the pressure build
on the Iraqi regime as the Arab League, the Secretary General and others pressed
Iraq on the need to take action.
On Monday of last week, Iraq responded with a familiar, tactical ploy. The Iraqi
Foreign Minister said Iraq would let the inspectors in without conditions. But he
is not deceiving anyone. And later last week, in a speech at the United Nations,
the Foreign Minister challenged President Bush's September 12th speech. He then
called for a discussion of the issue of inspection teams “in accordance with inter-
national law”_almost immediately rescinding his Monday offer of inspections “with-
out conditions.” Now, two days ago, we have an Iraqi presidential adviser telling the
press in Baghdad, that weapons inspectors would be allowed to go "wherever they
want."
It is a ploy we have seen before, on many occasions. And on each occasion, once
inspectors began to operate Iraq continued to do everything to frustrate their work.
In May 1991, for example, just after suspension of hostilities in the Gulf War,
Iraq accepted the unrestricted freedom of entry and exit without delay or hindrance
for UN inspectors and their property, supplies, and equipment.
In June 1991–a short month later–Iraqis fired warning shots at the inspectors
to keep them away from suspicious vehicles.
Three months later, in September, the Iraqis confiscated a set of documents from
the inspectors. When the inspectors refused to comply with an Iraqi demand to give
up a second set of documents, the Iraqis surrounded them and for four days refused
to let them leave the inspection site. Finally, when the UN threatened enforcement
action, the inspectors were allowed to leave.


120
In February 1992 Iraq refused to comply with a UN inspection team's decision to
destroy certain facilities used in proscribed programs and in April of that year Iraq
demanded a halt to the inspectors' aerial flights.
Later, in July of that year, Iraq refused the inspectors access to the Iraqi Ministry
of Agriculture. The inspectors had reliable information that the site contained ar-
chives related to proscribed activities. They finally gained access only after members
of the Council threatened enforcement action.
In January 1993, Iraq refused to allow the UN inspection teams to use their own
aircraft to fly into Iraq.
In June and July of 1993, Iraq refused to allow the UN inspectors to install re-
mote-controlled monitoring cameras at two missile engine test stands.
In March 1996, Iraqi security forces refused UN inspection teams access to five
sites designated for inspection. The teams entered the sites after delays of up to 17
hours—which of course permitted the Iraqis to remove any incriminating evidence.
In November 1996, Iraq blocked UN inspectors from removing remnants of missile
engines for in-depth analysis outside Iraq.
In June 1997, Iraqi escorts on board a UN inspector team helicopter attempted
physically to prevent the UN pilot from flying the helicopter in the direction of its
intended destination.
In that month also, Iraq again blocked UN inspection teams from entering des-
ignated sites for inspection.
In September 1997, an Iraqi officer attacked a UN inspector on board a UN heli-
copter while the inspector was attempting to take photographs of unauthorized
movement of Iraqi vehicles inside a site designated for inspection.
Also in September, while seeking access to a site declared by Iraq to be “sen-
sitive,” UN inspectors witnessed and videotaped Iraqi guards moving files, burning
documents, and dumping ash-filled waste cans into a nearby river.
Mr. Chairman, I have left out much and could go on—all the way to the departure
of the UN inspection teams from Iraq in December 1998 because they could no
longer do their job. And I could talk about Operation Desert Fox, the military action
that resulted.
But I believe you get the point.
The Iraqi regime is infamous for its ploys, its stalling tactics, its demands on in-
spectors-sometimes at the point of a gun, and its general and consistent defiance
of the mandate of the UN Security Council.
There is absolutely no reason at all to expect that Iraq has changed, that this lat-
est effort to welcome inspectors without conditions is not another ploy.
Let's be clear about the reason for their announcement. The Iraqis did not sud-
denly see the error of their past ways. They were responding to the heat and pres-
sure generated by the international community after President Bush's speech.
The United States has made it clear to our Security Council colleagues that we
will not fall for this ploy. This is the time to apply more pressure, not to relent.
We must not believe that inspectors going in on the same conditions that caused
their withdrawal four years ago is in any way acceptable. These four years have
been more than enough time for Iraq to procure, develop, and hide proscribed items
well beyond the reach of the kinds of inspectors that were subject to Saddam's cheat
and retreat approach from 1991 to 1998.
The United States has determined that Iraq's obstruction of UN Security Council
resolutions and its gross violation of its obligations cannot continue. In his speech
to the General Assembly, the President challenged the Security Council to live up
to its responsibilities. The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, said the same thing.
We, our closest allies, and our friends around the world are prepared to do our part
to enforce Security Council resolutions and render harmless the Iraqi threat. We are
discussing now the best way to proceed with the other members of the Security
Council and with close friends. We are trying to find a solution.
If part of the solution involves an inspection regime, it must be a regime that goes
in with the authority of a new resolution that removes the weaknesses of the
present regime and which will not tolerate any Iraqi disobedience. It cannot be a
resolution that will be negotiated with Iraq. The resolution must be strong enough
and comprehensive enough that it produces disarmament, not just inspections.
Many UN members, including some on the Security Council, want to take Iraq
at its word and send inspectors back in without any new resolution or new author-
ity. This is a recipe for failure.
The debate we are having within the Council is on need for and the specific word-
ing of a resolution. Our position is clear. We must face the facts and find Iraq in
material breach. Then, we must specify the actions we demand of Iraq—which
President Bush has already shown us. And we must determine what consequences
will flow from Iraq's failure to take action.


121
That is what makes this time different. This time, unlike any time over the pre-
vious 12 years of Iraqi defiance, there must be hard consequences. This time, Iraq
must comply with the UN mandate or there will be decisive action to compel compli-
ance.
In New York, we are listening to other points of view and trying to reach agree-
ment within the Security Council. It is a difficult debate. We are also preserving
the President's ability to defend our nation and our interests.
Some have suggested that there is a conflict in this approach, that U.S. interests
should be our total concern.
But Mr. Chairman, both of these issues are important. We are a member of the
UN Security Council. We are a member of the UN. It is a multilateral institution
whose resolutions have been violated. But the United States, as a separate matter,
believes that its interest is threatened. We are trying to solve this problem through
the United Nations and in a multilateral way. The President took the case to the
UN because it is the body that should deal with such matters as Iraq. It was created
to deal with such matters. And President Bush is hoping that the UN will act and
act in a decisive way.
But at the same time, if the UN is not able to act and, act decisively—and I think
that would be a terrible indictment of the UN—then the United States will have
to make its own decision as to whether the danger posed by Iraq is such that we
have to act in order to defend our country and our interests.
And Mr. Chairman, our diplomatic efforts at the United Nations would be helped
by a strong Congressional resolution authorizing President Bush to take action.
I ask for your immediate action on such a resolution to show the world that we
are united in this effort.
Mr. Chairman, my colleagues in the intelligence community and in the Depart-
ment of Defense are giving the Congress what it will need with respect to intel-
ligence on Iraq and on military contingency planning. So I won't speak to those
areas.
But let me say this about the Iraqi threat before I stop and allow the greater part
of this time for your important questions.
We can have debates about the size and nature of the Iraqi stockpile of WMD and
of midand long-range missiles. But no one can doubt the record of Iraqi violations
of United Nations Security Council resolutions, one after another, and for twelve
long years.
And no one can doubt that the Iraqi dictator's intentions have not changed. He
wants weapons of mass destruction as clearly as he wants to remain in power.
Thank you and I'll stop there and take your questions.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you. I thank you for that explanation.
And it's something that I think, as your two predecessors early this
morning said, warrants some legitimate discussion and debate
internationally. And I know you too well. I know you don't want
to set a precedent that allows India to say, “By the way, Pakistan
has done the following. We reserve the right to preemptively act.”
So I understand that. I've had lengthy discussions with Dr. Rice on
this. I think this is not so much a departure, although there are
some who wish to make it sound like a gigantic departure. But
we'll leave that for another day.
I just want to make sure that anything I vote for is not premised
on the notion that this is a preemptive doctrine. This is premised
on the notion that a bad guy invaded another country. He lost the
war. He had to settle. Certain terms were agreed to with the world
at the U.N. He's violated that. That's all we need. We're not invok-
ing a new rationale to move against Iraq.
But let me suggest, and I have already: we should start the
clock. I apologize. We'll stick to 7 minutes, if we can, because, obvi-
ously, there are many members here.
Anytime you need a little bit of a break, you just raise that pen-
cil and we'll recess for a minute. We're probably going to have to
recess at some point for a vote, at 3:45. That's Senate time. That
could be 4, 5, 6, 7.


123
with a U.N. Security Council resolution and he gets the authority
without-or in the absence, I should say
The CHAIRMAN. But it's sequenced.
Secretary POWELL [continuing). Of a Security Council resolution.
I'd have to see the language and then talk to the President.
The CHAIRMAN. I'm not asking you to commit to it, but-
Secretary POWELL. What we don't want to do, though, is to any
way suggest that we are not united as a Nation behind our efforts
to find a diplomatic solution.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, quite frankly, one of the reasons why I sug-
gest we're going to have to have a different kind of resolution—and
I've been discussing this with my good friend from Indiana, a dif-
ferent resolution is that the last thing I think we need, as I said
earlier this morning, is, “The board voted five to four for your
speedy recovery.” We want to be united here. We want whatever
we do to get as many votes as possible. And I fear that the present
resolution—and it's being negotiated—there's still good-faith nego-
tiation going on-is pretty far from that point right now.
Let me move to a second question in the time that I have and
probably the only other question I'll be able to ask you. You stated
at the end of your statement, and you indicated in your formal
statement, that—let me find the exact quote: “The U.S. will commit
wholeheartedly to the reconstruction of Iraq as a democratic state
within its territorial boundaries.”
Now, if I can ask you the question this way. Scenario. We go in
with or without the U.N. I'm confident we won't go in alone, be-
cause you'll get some folks to go with us, even if it's not the U.N.-
maybe a Kosovo model. I have great faith in you, boss. We take
down Saddam Hussein. We begin the commitment, which is, the
United States commits wholeheartedly to the reconstruction of Iraq
as a democratic state within its territorial boundaries. Whether or
not we get others to help us, implicit is that for a while, some U.S.
presence will be required, hopefully in conjunction with others, and
some financial assistance will be required, hopefully with others.
When do you, as Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Defense,
in that circumstance, feel confident to be able to say to the Presi-
dent—not how long it will take, but at what point do we have to
get before, consistent with this commitment, you're able to turn to
the President and say, “Mr. President, we can now leave. We can
now leave. We can now disengage”?
Is that at the point where there is a democratic government in
place, or is it at a point prior to that?
In other words, what are we—what is the end game here? I'm
not looking for an exit strategy in timing, but what is the end
game? Because with some in the State Department, as it related
to Afghanistan, there was, at the outset, a very different view of
what our role in Afghanistan was going to be, more consistent with
mine, which was we were going to have a greater presence. The
International Security Force was going to be expanded beyond
Kabul. The President sat with me and you and others and talked
about a mini-Marshall Plan. And we're a long way from there.
So what I'm trying to get at is, what are we signing the folks on
for? Not in terms of hours, days, or dollars. What is the point at
which we can, in good faith, say, “We can now leave”? Is it when


124
there is a democratic government, or what is it? That's my ques-
tion.
Secretary POWELL. I'd just preface my response by saying, of
course, the President has not made any decision with respect to
military action and still is hopeful for a political/diplomatic solu-
tion, but that really is in the hands of Saddam Hussein, not us or
the United Nations.
But should it become necessary to take unilateral action or ac-
tion that we would hope would be multilateral, or if it's the Kosovo
model with like-minded, willing nations, and we go in and remove
the regime, I think we would have an obligation afterwards first
to make sure that we remove all weapons of mass destruction,
which is what started this all, and use all of our presence, plus in-
telligence assets. Plus, I suspect, a lot of people would be coming
forward at that point in the absence of Saddam Hussein and his
regime, to tell us what's been going on and make sure that this na-
tion has been disarmed of those kinds of weapons or the capability
to produce those weapons, and that the government that we would
help put in place would be a representative government no longer
committed to use its wealth-great wealth, I might add—for any
such purposes. We would want to put in a government that would
be representative of the people.
And the term, really, “put in the government,” isn't the right way
to put it. The better way to put it is to “raise up a government,”
allow the Iraqi people to create a government, using those who are
outside the country who have expressed an interest in coming back
and helping with this, and who have been against this regime for
a long time, the opposition, and also those from within the country.
So there would be some effort at reconciliation and some commit-
ment to a single state that is not going to be broken up into three
pieces that will have a representative, democratic model as its po-
litical basis.
I won't sit before you today and say it's going to look like the
House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate in the Jeffersonian
model—we're a long way from there—but something that will be
seen by the international community as a representative govern-
ment that will keep this state together, that will foreswear the use
of any weapons of mass destruction or the development of them,
and that we will put in place a system that the great wealth of
Iraq-roughly $20 billion a year is available to the people of this
country—will be used to develop the country, to develop the infra-
structure, help people in need in a more equitable distribution of
the treasure of that nation for the benefit of the people of that na-
tion.
I think it will take time, and I can't tell you how many years.
The CHAIRMAN. I'm not asking for time.
Secretary POWELL. You didn't ask. But it will take strong Amer-
ican presence. That presence will be political presence, and it'll
probably be military presence, and we shouldn't deceive ourselves.
And we are not. In our conversations on this subject, we recognize
that we are on the cusp of a very, very demanding and long-term
commitment if we have to go down this road. But there are certain
opportunities that come with this commitment, the opportunity to
create this kind of a government in a part of the world where it's


125
almost unknown. And it could be a model for other nations in the
region, an opportunity, not to take a basket-case country like Af-
ghanistan, but a country with an educated population, although
there are disparities between the three different groups, and with
this wealth that can be used for legitimate purpose.
You made a comparison to Afghanistan. This morning I kicked
off a session at the World Bank of the Afghan Reconstruction Sup-
port Group. Sixty nations came again to talk about the rebuilding
of Afghanistan. We made an additional pledge to that effort, $33
million out of the recent supplemental. Other nations are making
their pledge. And we have accomplished a great deal in Afghani-
stan. There's a lot more to be done, and one can argue whether
ISAF should be expanded or not. But I think the security situation
is not as bad as some say, but it certainly isn't as good as we want
it to be. But we're working these issues, and we should be very
proud of what we've accomplished over the last 9 months.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, one thing is clear. When we succeed mili-
tarily, if we decide we have to go, it will not be like the gulf war
when Johnnie comes marching home within 3 to 5 days or several
weeks or months. Some Johnnies are going to stay there.
Secretary POWELL. We understand that.
The CHAIRMAN. OK. I just-
Secretary POWELL. We have to make sure.
The CHAIRMAN. I'm not opposing that. I just want to make sure
we understand.
Secretary POWELL. Ambassador Holbrooke made a point yester-
day that I just might touch on in this regard. The gulf war was
fought for the singular purpose of ejecting the Iraqi army from Ku-
wait, restoring a legitimate government, and stabilizing the region
and bringing Iraq down to conventional size. It was our hope that
Hussein would not survive it. He did. But nevertheless, the deci-
sion to do that was a wise decision and one those of us who were
there-
The CHAIRMAN. I'm not second-guessing.
Secretary POWELL [continuing]. Never regretted. And it wasn't a
decision made at the end of the war. It was made before the war.
That's how we got that coalition together.
The CHAIRMAN. This is a different deal, though.
Secretary POWELL. It is a different deal.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms.
Senator HELMS. Mr. Secretary, it's kind of refreshing to hear ev-
erybody singing from the same songbook on this. There are a few
voices, but they're out in the bushes somewhere and they're not
identifying themselves to the people.
Condoleezza Rice said the other day that the United States will
be completely devoted to the reconstruction of Iraq as a unified
democratic state in the event of a military strike that topples Sad-
dam Hussein. Now, this was said this morning. This was essen-
tially said by you this afternoon.
Now, one question that comes to mind, given the enormous finan-
cial stakes of countries like France and Russia and Germany, how
will their views, do you think, figure into a post-Saddam economy
and all the rest of it?


126
Secretary POWELL. We would certainly take their views into ac-
count. The Russians, for example, have a commercial interest in
Iraq, and Iraq has quite a debt to Russia. All of the other nations
will have, I think, an economic interest in Iraq, and I think they
will also have a desire to participate in the rebuilding.
We have been in conversation with our friends in the Security
Council on this, and Secretary General Kofi Annan and I have
talked about this in hypothetical terms, and I know that if it ever
came to this, the international community would be most willing
to play a role. And I think it'll be not just a role of how do we get
in there first and make the most money we can, I think it'll be a
role to establish commercial contracts and see, you know, what we
can do to make proper investments. But I think it'll be also for the
purpose of rebuilding a nation and trying to put in place the kind
of nation we'd all like to see in that part of the world. So I think
it is quite possible, under those circumstances, to harness the inter-
national community in a most positive and effective way.
Senator HELMS. Every once in awhile the Devil makes me do
things, and this morning was one of them. I wanted to get these
two former Secretaries, who are a little bit at odds with each other,
to talk to us in terms of specific questions. And the outcome was
interesting. For example, Madeleine Albright argued that Saddam
Hussein is “in a box,” quote/unquote, and that continuing a policy
of combining sanctions with containment will suffice. But then
Henry Kissinger got in there, and that didn't he had some dif-
ferent views. But it was interesting to hear these people who
served as Secretaries several years back.
Now, Secretary Albright also suggested this morning that all of
this attention to Iraq is distracting from the war on terrorism
around the world. Secretary of State Kissinger countered that to
wait for the end of our fight against global terrorism before acting
is to guarantee that the stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction
will multiply. And I wonder if you agree or disagree with Henry
Kissinger.
Secretary POWELL. On both points. With respect to containment,
keeping him in a box, but he continues to bounce against the walls
of that box, and one of these days he'll have a box cutter and then
he'll be out, and we don't want to wait and see that day. We think
we have been at this long enough, and it's time to deal with the
contents of the box.
With respect to the second point on distracting, I'm not sure
what evidence Secretary Albright put forward to the fact that we
are distracted from the war against terrorism. Almost every day
now we see another set of arrests somewhere in the world as we
work with our partners in the international community. We see al-
Qaeda cells being broken up here. We're working with the Yemenis.
We see things happening in Spain, in Portugal, in Germany. And
so we're hard at work, our law-enforcement activities, our financial
task forces that are chasing down al-Qaeda finances. We continue
to work in Afghanistan to rebuild that country. That's what I was
doing this morning before coming over here. So the campaign
against terrorism is going well.
And all of these actions, I might say, could be characterized as
preemptive actions: going after their finances, going after where


127
they might be next, ripping up the cells, all of this before they have
a chance to act.
So the campaign against terrorism is going in full swing, and I
don't see why there is a suggestion that somehow if we had to un-
dertake this mission, it would be at the expense of the campaign
against terrorism. Would it require a surge? Yes. Would it require
a lot of our energy? Yes. But the suggestion that we weren't going
to be able to continue the campaign against terrorism if we moved
in this direction I don't think is an accurate assessment.
Senator HELMS. I wonder of your reaction to anti-American rhet-
oric of the Schroeder campaign for Chancellor of Germany. I was
terribly offended by that. Now, the guy won. No question about
that. But it was a very small margin of victory. So what do you
think will be the long-term impact on U.S.-German relations if this
anti-American election rhetoric continues?
Secretary POWELL. We were deeply disturbed and offended by
how the Iraqi issue played into the recent German election, and we
were very disappointed. We made that disappointment known to
Chancellor Schroeder and to many other German officials, and we
were particularly horrified by the comments of the Minister of Jus-
tice and her comparison of President Bush and some of his actions
to those of Hitler. And we expressed our outrage over that.
But I have to stand back and take a look at some other things
to put this in context and perspective. Germany has been very
helpful in a number of areas over the past year. They've been very
supportive of our efforts in Afghanistan. They've been very sup-
portive of our campaign against terrorism. What we saw in this re-
cent election I don't think was so much anti-American as it was
anti a particular American policy.
Joschka Fischer, my Foreign Minister colleague, gives some of
the most powerful pro-American speeches you can hear. When we
needed a place to hold a conference to create the new Afghan au-
thority last year, it was Germany that stepped forward and volun-
teered, and we held the conference in Bonn. And when we had the
loya jirga recently and needed somebody to sponsor that, the Ger-
mans did it. And when we needed somebody to help train the new
Afghan police, military, and border forces, Germany stepped for-
ward. And Germany has indicated the desire now to take over the
ISAF.
So we have been good friends with Germany for many years. We
will remain good friends in the years to come. But a serious breach
occurred in recent weeks as a result of the matter in which this
issue inserted itself into the German election campaign, and we
were disappointed, disturbed, and we expressed our concerns to our
German colleagues.
Senator HELMS. Mr. Secretary, it's always good to see you, and
thank you for coming.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, before I yield to the Senator from
Maryland, it's been pointed out by one of my colleagues—you'll
never guess who, and I won't name them—but when I said
“Johnnie comes marching home,” I should have said “Johnnie and
Jill come marching home.”
Secretary POWELL. Absolutely.
The CHAIRMAN. And I apologize for that, because there are


128
Secretary POWELL. I knew that's what you meant, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for the help.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I'm looking at pages two and three of your state-
ment. Is the United States prepared to go to war against Iraq if
it engages in illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program that's
been established by the U.N.?
Secretary POWELL. The principal concern that we have are weap-
ons of mass destruction, and the principal focus of the U.N. resolu-
tions are on weapons of mass destruction, and that's what the in-
spection regime was trying to uncover and destroy. At the same
time, however, Iraq is in violation-
Senator SARBANES. I understand that, but I'm looking-
Secretary POWELL [continuing). Of many other provisions
and-
Senator SARBANES [continuing]. I'm looking at your statement,
and you say “what Iraq must do repair this breach.
Secretary POWELL. Right.
Senator SARBANES. And I'm trying to section this out. You list 5
things. The first, of course, is the removal of all weapons of mass
destruction. But I want to go to the others. Are we prepared to go
to war to make sure they comply with U.N. resolutions on illicit
trade outside the oil-for-food program? You've got it listed here.
Secretary POWELL. I've got it listed as one of a number of issues
that they are in material breach of. I don't think I linked going to
war to any one of them or any combination of them.
Senator SARBANES. Well, you say “what they must do.”
Secretary POWELL. Right.
Senator SARBANES. So they must do that or otherwise we're pre-
pared to move against them?
Secretary POWELL. I don't think I said that, Senator.
Senator SARBANES. OK, well, what about
Secretary POWELL. I'm saying-
Senator SARBANES. What about
Secretary POWELL. I'm identifying—if I may, I'm identifying the
specific U.N. resolutions that they're in violation of. And under
U.N. resolutions they are supposed to comply with those resolu-
tions. They have the force of international law.
Senator SARBANES. Well, you say, “If these demands on Iraq
sound like ‘regime change,' then so be it.” Will we take military ac-
tion or go to war in order to make them release or account for all
gulf war personnel whose fate is still unknown? Would we do that?
Secretary POWELL. I think the operating clause in that that is of
the greatest concern is the one having to do with weapons of mass
destruction. It is unlikely that any of the others individually would
lead to that kind of consequence.
Senator SARBANES. So if they did that, that's the one toward
which war is directed.
Secretary POWELL. I think what we have to do—no, I don't want
to make that connection, Senator. I think what we have to do is
look at their total response to these resolutions. And the resolution
of greatest concern, the issue of greatest concern are the weapons
of mass destruction, which is why, in 1998, both the U.S. Congress


129
and the previous administration made that the policy of the U.S.
Government.
Senator SARBANES. Why are you listing all these things if the
weapons is the thing? Shouldn't we—do you want authority to use
military force against Iraq, from the Congress, in order to make
them comply with U.N. resolutions on illicit trade outside the oil-
for-food program? Do you want that authority?
Secretary POWELL. The principal reason for the authority is for
the President to do what he needs to do to focus on the principal
offense that he has been presenting to the Nation, and that is
weapons of mass destruction. The rest of those elements
Senator SARBANES. All right, I want to take you through the rest
of them. Do you want authority to go to war in order to
accomplish–
Secretary POWELL. The President hasn't asked for any
authority
Senator SARBANES [continuing). Compliance with those resolu-
tions?
Secretary POWELL. The President has not linked authority to go
to war to any of those elements. The President has asked for-
Senator SARBANES. It's right in the resolution. You have all these
Whereas's where you enumerate these resolutions, and then you
say, “The President is authorized to use all means that he deter-
mines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the
United Nations Security Council resolutions referenced above.” And
the ones that are referenced above are all of them. And all of them
encompass illicit trade outside the oil for food—accounting for the
missing, et cetera, et cetera.
So you want the authority to use force to carry out those resolu-
tions. Is that correct?
Secretary POWELL. Yes, he wants the authority to use force to
carry out those resolutions where he believes force is the appro-
priate way to get implementation of those resolutions. I think it
unlikely that the President would use force if he complied with the
weapons of mass destruction conditions. It seems very unlikely,
then, that he would be using force to comply with any of the other
resolutions.
Senator SARBANES. But you want the authority to use the force
even if he complies with the weapons of mass destruction resolu-
tion. You want the authority to go beyond that to all the other reso-
lutions. Is that correct?
Secretary POWELL. The President was putting the case forward
that all of these resolutions produce a pattern of misbehavior and
material breach that he wanted the authority to deal with in a way
that he thought appropriate.
Senator SARBANES. So if they comply with the weapons of mass
destruction, but not the others, you want the authority to be able
to use force to compel compliance with the others. Is that correct?
Secretary POWELL. That's the way the resolution is currently
worded, but we all know, I think, that the major problem, the of-
fense, what the President is focused on and the danger to us and
to the world are the weapons of mass destruction.
83-463 D-6


130
Senator SARBANES. Why did you word it this way? I mean, you
worded this resolution. We're trying to examine it, and we see a
broad reach of authority here.
Which leads me to my next point. I want to ask, who prepared
the preemptive doctrine here in this National Security Strategy?
Who's the author of this document?
Secretary POWELL. It's an administration document, and we all
participated in it.
Senator SARBANES. Well, I know, but someone must be the re-
sponsible person for-
Secretary POWELL. The actual pulling it together was done in the
National Security Council, but we all participated in it. I had au-
thors working on it. Others had authors working on it.
Senator SARBANES. So, I mean, this is your document.
Secretary POWELL. It is the President's document.
Senator SARBANES. And this notion of a preemptive strike, you
don't regard that as a departure from past American I know you
spoke earlier, “Well, you know, we've done preemption under cer-
tain circumstances.” I think the example you used was a strike
against a chemical plant.
Secretary POWELL. There are many others I could use.
Senator SARBANES. Yes. But when have we ever launched a war
against another country on this basis?
Secretary POWELL. Where does that document say we're going to
launch a war against a country? What it says is that there is a new
threat that is different from the threats we have engaged in the
past. Deterrence and containment, as strategies, has not gone
away. Preemption has always been a tool available to a President,
not just in this administration, but throughout military history.
I would say that when we launched an attack against Panama
the 20th of December, 1989, it was a form of preemption, because
we were afraid that Noriega would be killing more American citi-
zens, other than the ones that he killed. And the specific context
of preemption there is that when you're dealing with terrorist
threats—it is written almost exclusively around terrorist threats-
when dealing with terrorist threats of the kind we saw on the 20th,
or excuse me, on 9/11, threats of that nature, preemption rises
higher in our hierarchy of options because they tend not to be—ter-
rorists tend not to be deterred or contained in the way that states
are deterred and contained.
The chapter also concludes with some discussion about the fact
that this is not to be entered into lightly and one should look for
other alternatives, and it should be done with the most serious con-
sideration.
Senator SARBANES. Well, Mr. Chairman, my time's up. I'd just
close with this observation. Every article about it, about the doc-
trine you've put out, has language such as this: “Bush Details Pre-
emptive Strike Policy Under New Security Plan,” “U.S. Will Attack
Nations, Groups That Pose Threats,” “Will Act Alone If Necessary,”
and that's just out of one newspaper. They're all saying the same
thing.
Now, you sort of addressed it to and tried to put it in a different
context, but a lot of people are either misinterpreting you or per-
ceiving it as it is, and I'm not sure which is the case yet. But it


132
you will.
the interval, that he and I have been working on some language
with regard to the resolution that we thought might have a broader
support, listening to our colleagues around the table. I raised, yes-
terday, the hope that our committee might, in fact, have jurisdic-
tion with regard to the resolution for at least a week so that we
at least fulfill our role. Whether that will happen or not, I do not
know, but it is true that the chairman and I have been trying to
work through this.
Now, from the press over in front of the Senate I had the ques-
tion, “Well, what do you think of the latest administration draft?”
And so I said, well, I have not seen any such draft. I'm unaware
that there is such a draft. And they said, “There is.” Now, if the
chairman is aware of this, he hasn't told me. I am not aware of it.
And I would just simply say again, we are trying very hard to
obtain substantial support for the President. It is very difficult to
do this when we are working constructively and simply discover in-
advertently that somebody in the press is already informing us
that there is a new draft. I will say no more. But please register
that thought if
The third thing, I appreciated very much your outlining this
afternoon what a new Iraq Government might look like. Granted
we do not know that there will be military action. And, as Sec-
retary Kissinger pointed out today, there could be a coup in Iraq:
the military might dispatch Saddam, and they deal with us, and
that's a different picture.
But in response to all the contingencies that you were asked-
that is, if a regime change occurred—you pointed out that it would
have to be a regime that would help us find and destroy the weap-
ons of mass destruction. That will take some doing, as you pointed
out: scientists, intelligence sources, everybody. But at least that's
a formation of a plan. It indicates some sound thinking about this
area, which we asked for.
With regard to a new Iraqi Government, you said we'd try to
raise up a government representative of the people with the demo-
cratic model as the basis, keeping the state together. Oil resources
would be focused on financing humanitarian projects for the people.
A strong American presence will be required, both political and
military, probably for some time and preferably the presence of a
lot of our allies and friends in the area.
Now, that is important, and I suspect that it comes not only from
your own supposition, but from the planning efforts on the part of
the administration. In other words, there are people actually at
work on this. The chairman and I have been asking for this in the
hearings, evidence that, even in our important discussion about
war and peace, we are thinking about the consequences. And there
are consequences, obviously, coming.
And we would hope, perhaps, as a part of the resolution to be
adopted by the Congress, some formal structure for regular con-
sultation between the administration and the Congress as we iden-
tify the resources and authority that will be needed. The American
people must understand how this will evolve as opposed to the Gulf
of Tonkin situation in which we go to war, Vietnam goes on and
on, there is no really formal way of telling what was going to hap-
pen. So all of this, I just simply wanted to say at the outset.


133
Now, having said this, an interesting piece the 23rd of Sep-
tember in the Wall Street Journal by David Price Jones, the senior
editor of National Review. He points out the origin of Iraq, at least
in his formulation, came because the British when they put to-
gether a state after World War I. They put together several clash-
ing groups. His claim is that it took a dictator then, a king that
was imposed, and it's taken one ever since to hold this country to-
gether. Maybe true, maybe not.
Evolution in Iraq-and we all need to learn much more about
that-may permit this coalition, this representative government
that speaks for all the people. There are other voices who say there
could be a bloodbath of Shiites mopping up on Sunnis because of
all the slights in the past, or the Iranians intervening, quite apart
from the Kurds and Turkey in the north.
So it's still a stretch for many, historically, to try to think in
terms of this representative democracy. On the other hand, it is im-
portant that the Iraqis know, that the world knows, that the Amer-
ican people know that that is our goal, that that's the formulation,
a different government in a difficult neighborhood implying a great
deal of American resources—human, military, and civilian and
money and time. And it seems to me if that is the formulation you
and the President are able to present, the case is much more pow-
erful. It represents, really, as you say, an opportunity, as opposed
to a situation of chaos and gloom in comparison to Afghanistan or
what have you.
Do you have any comment about any of the above?
Secretary POWELL. Well, just, first, thank you for your comments
about the waiver authority we requested. And with respect to the
latest, quote, “administration draft,” I will check on that when I get
back to the office and make the point to the White House that you
have made to me.
On reconstruction, I'm sure that the President would want to
consult regularly, and if that sort of guidance was contained in a
resolution, I don't know that he would find anything objectionable
about it.
And with respect to the Wall Street Journal comment and arti-
cle, quite true. The British created this in 1921, and it is something
of an odd creation, and that's the way they did it and disengaged,
and there is no democratic tradition. But we've seen a lot of states
in recent times with not much of a democratic tradition, but when
exposed to the possibility of moving in that direction, they have
done so with dispatch. That doesn't mean it can't be done, but it
will be a difficult and challenging task for all of us, and we very
much recognize this. And we also know the kind of commitment
that'll be required from us and from others to bring it about. But
if we do bring it about, it will be an historic change in that part
of the region, and there is an opportunity there.
We have to be mindful, as came out in the questioning earlier,
about the fact that there will still be a campaign against terrorism
going on in other parts of the world. Afghanistan will still be going
on. And we'll be stressed. We will truly be stressed. But I think it
is possible to manage it all.
Senator LUGAR. Thank you.


134
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your candor. And I hope the State
Department, which is very good at coming up with phrases, comes
up with a new word for nation-building, because that's what we're
going to be doing.
The Senator from Wisconsin.
Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, if I might add, I don't think the
concern about nation-building comes out of the State Department.
The CHAIRMAN. No, it doesn't. No, no. But maybe they can be
helpful with the White House to come up with–I wasn't imply-
ing—you had a
Secretary POWELL. I know you weren't.
The CHAIRMAN. We may need a word, though.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here today to dis-
cuss United States policy toward Iraq, and I welcome the oppor-
tunity.
For months, the administration has continued to rachet up the
rhetoric on Iraq, and, as we've already talked about, last week sent
proposed language authorizing the use of force to the Congress. It
is high time that this committee had the opportunity to hear a bit
about just what is being proposed and what the implications are
for our national security and foreign policy priorities.
And I think this is especially true because, I've got to say, that
because months into this debate I think we still lack clarity on a
number of points. I think we're hearing shifting justifications for
taking military action in Iraq now. Part of this was illustrated by
Senator Sarbanes' listing of the different possible justifications, vis-
a-vis Security Council resolutions, some of which I'm quite certain
this country would not invade Iraq in order to enforce.
The same thing goes for the sort of intermittent popping up of
the claim that Iraq and al-Qaeda were in league on 9/11. Yester-
day, the Secretary of Defense basically asserted that. When some-
one asked the press secretary of the President whether or not that
was the case, he said, “Well, they could get together.” So the trou-
ble is, Mr. Secretary, it's unsettling to get this feeling that there
are really shifting justifications for what is being contemplated
here.
We still know very little about precisely what mission is being
proposed and what kind of commitments the American people are
being asked to make. And so I, for one, given where we're at at this
point, am very reluctant to support any resolution without clarity
on these critical issues.
As you know, I have tremendous respect for you, though, Sec-
retary Powell, and I take your views very seriously, and that's why
I'm very pleased that we have the chance to talk to you today.
Mr. Secretary, the administration has asked for the authority to
use force in Iraq. Actually, the administration has asked for au-
thority to use force throughout the region, but we are talking about
Iraq today. What is the mission being proposed? Is it disarmament?
Are we proposing to do that? Or is it regime change? How does re-
gime change relate to the problems of weapons of mass destruc-
tion? Or is it enforcement of U.N. resolutions? Which mission is it?
Secretary POWELL. The President hopes that it will be possible
to solve this problem and deal with this crisis with military force


135
as the last resort. If it is necessary to use military force because
Iraq does not come into compliance with the resolutions, particu-
larly—and especially, really—the focus is on weapons of mass de-
struction resolutions. The others might be considered a lesser in-
cluded offense within a principal offense of weapons of mass de-
struction.
If the President finds it necessary or the international commu-
nity finds it necessary to use military force to enforce those resolu-
tions, at that point, I would not prejudge what the international
community would say or what the President might say, but it
seems to me clear that we're using military force because the re-
gime intends not to come into compliance, and, therefore, the re-
gime has to be changed.
Senator FEINGOLD. Is it possible that it would involve disar-
mament without regime change?
Secretary POWELL. It would seem to me if the Iraqis—
Senator FEINGOLD. The military action.
Secretary POWELL. If the Iraqis do not cooperate and do not
allow inspectors in under a new inspection regime to do the work
that has to be done, then there is no point in continuing to deal
with this regime in any way, shape, fashion, or form.
And I think what comes into play at that point is what came into
play back in 1998 when President Clinton looked at this problem
and when the Congress looked at this problem. Both President
Clinton and the Congress—and, in the case of this administration,
we continue their policy of regime change because we had doubts
about the willingness of this regime to come into compliance with
these resolutions, especially those resolutions dealing with disar-
mament, getting rid of weapons of mass destruction.
Senator FEINGOLD. Under that formulation then, the mission is
disarmament, and the regime is an impediment to that mission. It
is not the mission-
Secretary POWELL. That's right.
Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. To change the regime.
Secretary POWELL. The mission from 1991 to 1998 was to get the
inspectors in to make sure that they had disarmed. In 1998, when
the inspectors could no longer do their work, the administration at
that time and the Congress at that time said that the only way to
get disarmament was for regime change, and regime change be-
came American policy because the regime would not disarm.
Senator FEINGOLD. I understand. Now, let me follow on that.
Secretary POWELL. Yes.
Senator FEINGOLD. If that's the case, are you aware of any sig-
nificant planning for securing WMD sites in Iraq in the event of
a military invasion? If the government were to be toppled and some
degree of chaos were to reign for some period, isn't there a very
real risk that weapons of mass destruction and the means to make
them will be taken out of the country or sold off to exactly the kind
of non-state actors that the United States is worried about? Do we
know enough about where WMD sites are to be confident in our
ability to secure them? And it seems that it would take a pretty
large force to secure these throughout the country, and that if we
don't succeed in all of this, then we've not actually succeeded in


137
I think I can speak for the world, we are glad you are where you
are and we appreciate it, and the team that you have backing you
up, your ambassadors and all, who are part of your operation. So
thank
you.
Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Senator.
Senator HAGEL. I also want to say that I was very pleased to
learn that it appears now that Assistant Secretary Kelly is going
to North Korea. I know that is hourly and that could yet change.
But, as you know, we have had some discussion about “axis of evil”
and the countries, and I think the direction that we appear to be
headed here is the responsible direction.
I had an opportunity to be briefed by the Japanese Ambassador
here the last couple of days as I know you have, and the President
has by the Japanese Prime Minister about this. And Iraq obviously
seeps into everyone's conversation regardless what the issue is.
I want to take the time I have to frame up a general question
for you, Mr. Secretary, one that some of us have been concerned
about; it's been dismissed by some. And that is maybe that the gen-
eral area of the possibility of a ripple effect in the Middle East,
South Asia, Central Asia, focusing on, a bit on the Israeli situation,
the Israeli-Palestinian problem, what kind of an effect this could
have, short-term, long-term, if, in fact we invade Iraq with a coali-
tion. And followup questions that we have discussed here, how long
the United States would have to stay in Iraq.
I know they are all subjective. You cannot calibrate it precisely.
But I think this committee, certainly this Senator, would be very
interested in having you address that. You obviously have had to
think through this a little bit as to some of the "what ifs.” What
if we get into a little more than we thought? What if Saddam Hus-
sein throws some Scuds with biological/chemical-tipped warheads
and all these things that you've had to think through—not just the
Defense Department, but you've had to think through them. You
went through that once.
And also in connection with that, maybe you could go a little
deeper in your response to Senator Sarbanes as he quoted you back
about the United States wholeheartedly committed to reconstruc-
tion.
A plan. How far are we along the way with a plan? I know what
you've said, and I hear it from the administration, "We want a de-
mocracy and democratic institutions." You said today that it most
likely won't be a U.S. model in the first year. We accept that. But
is there any plan? Who's working on something? Identify for me
who is out there as to who we can go to to help us on the ground.
I know I've thrown a lot at you, but take it in any sequence you
like.
Thank you.
Secretary POWELL. With respect to the Middle East peace situa-
tion that you touched on, I think that it is important that during
this period of tension and buildup we do everything we can to keep
the Middle East peace process on track. We're working very hard
on this, Senator Hagel. We had good meetings in New York last
week with Arab leaders with the quartet. And for the first time in
a long time in the presence of the quartet, we brought in represent-
atives of the Israeli Government and the Palestine Authority. We


138
had a rather energized debate, let me put it that way. And we have
seen some progress with respect to transformation within the Pal-
estinian Authority and some other things happening. Some slow
progress, but I was encouraged by that progress.
Unfortunately, as so often happens in that part of the world, the
events of the last week and the situation at the Muqatta once
again, with the Israeli ringing of it, has been a very unhelpful de-
velopment, and we're working hard to see if we can break this
siege once again and get back on a positive track and not con-
stantly be sliding back down the hill.
It is important for us to do everything we can to stabilize that
part of the world and show progress, regardless of what else is
going on, but especially in light of what might be going on in Iraq.
There is also no doubt—there is no love lost for Saddam Hussein
in any of the countries in the region. They recognize that he is one
of the biggest destabilizing elements in the whole region and that
a different kind of regime in Iraq would be quite welcome. They are
not unmindful of the fact that the two invasions he's conducted in
the last 20 years have been against neighbors. And they would like
to see that kind of a change, but they are uneasy about how that
change comes about and whether it will be in a way that further
destabilizes the region. So it'll be a time of great tension.
But I think if such an operation becomes necessary, that if it is
done with dispatch, with efficiency, and with a clear sense of pur-
pose and determination to bring this to an end, it will generate
support and we can deal the other issues of uncertainty, such as
the Middle East peace plan and concerns that might exist in the
Arab street.
With respect to Scuds and how they may be used against neigh-
boring countries, it is an issue I've faced before for real. We went
into the Desert Storm conflict quite confident they would use chem-
ical weapons. They did not. We were expecting it. And we knew
they had radiological capability and biological capability, and we
prepared ourselves for that. And they did fire Scuds at neighbors,
and we dealt with that. And we are thinking through the con-
sequences of potential responses from neighbors, and all that is
part of our calculus.
And on your last point, the plan for reconstruction, there are
task forces at work. There's a task force in my department. We're
working with the Defense Department, National Security Council,
and others. And as that work progresses, I think there will be op-
portunities to share that work with the Congress. As you can ap-
preciate, it's quite sensitive and compartmentalized at the moment.
Senator HAGEL. I've got the little yellow timing light here.
It was referenced recently by a member of your administration
that one of the areas that we could count on if we invaded Iraq was
to use Jordanian areas. Can you talk about that? It was my under-
standing that that was still pretty iffy.
Secretary POWELL. I think I would rather yield to my colleagues
in the Defense Department who might be having more direct con-
versations of this nature, and I would not want to speak for the
Jordanian Government in this
Senator HAGEL. Has King Abdullah's position shifted publicly on
this? The last I knew-


139
Secretary POWELL. From what to what, Senator?
Senator HAGEL. From what he last I knew, what he said pub-
licly was that he wasn't prepared yet to commit to any invasion or
use of Jordan for an invasion of Iraq.
Secretary POWELL. I think that remains his public position, and
I don't think we have asked him for permission to do anything yet.
So the question is not before us at the moment.
Senator HAGEL. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry.
Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. How much time are
we operating on?
The CHAIRMAN. Seven minutes.
Senator KERRY. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, welcome, and thank you so much for your superb
efforts at the United Nations. We do appreciate it.
Let me begin by saying that I completely support what you have
said in your testimony, and hope the United Nations will under-
stand there's a broad base of support for that here in the Congress,
that the regime of an inspection regime must, in your words, have
the authority of a new resolution, it must remove the weaknesses
of the present regime and cannot tolerate Iraqi resistance and
games and so forth. We can't go back to where we've been. And I
think everybody of common sense, hopefully, would support that
notion.
Would you say to Americans that we are in a stronger position
with respect to the prosecution of a war and our relations in the
world if we have the support of the United Nations?
Secretary POWELL. Yes.
Senator KERRY. And given that fact, would you also say that it
is important to proceed now to try to give time to the U.N. to try
to—and I'm not saying how much, and I certainly am not sug-
gesting that our rights ought to be subjugated—but to give them
sufficient time to be able to lend us that support so we are oper-
ating from a position of strength?
Secretary POWELL. Yes, and that's what we're doing now, Sen-
ator. We are in the most intense consultations. And earlier I men-
tioned that the United States and the United Kingdom have come
together on a proposed resolution which I've sent my Under Sec-
retary for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, off this afternoon to
visit Paris and Moscow and present our ideas to the French and
the Russians. And I've discussed those ideas with my Chinese col-
league earlier this morning on the phone and presented it to one
of his Foreign Minister associates who is visiting here in Wash-
ington. So we are working to try to bring the Security Council to-
gether on a resolution.
Senator KERRY. And if the United Nations were to pass a resolu-
tion that, indeed, changed the regime and provided for genuinely
airtight, comprehensive, unfettered, unconditional access, which I
think is the only standard that can exist here, is it your judgment
that if that were not complied with and they didn't provide author-
ity for force commensurate with that, that they would then have
no choice but to provide authority for use of force? I mean, I as-
sume that they would be completely rendering themselves useless


140
and meaningless and have held themselves up to the highest level
of contempt if they didn't.
Secretary POWELL. It's certainly the case that I am making and
the President is making to our colleagues in the Security Council,
don't go down this road unless you are prepared to take action if
there is continued violation of the kind we have seen in the past
with respect to a new resolution.
Now, the debate really is, should we come back to the Security
Council again for new authority, or should the authority be
imbedded in one resolution?
Senator KERRY. I understand. But what I'm asking you really is,
isn't the new authority an inevitability if they, in fact, give you this
regime?
Secretary POWELL. If they give—well, I believe it should be inevi-
table, either under the framework of the United Nations or if, for
one reason or another, the United Nations does not wish to take
that action.
Senator KERRY. Well, that brings me
Secretary POWELL. But the President reserves the right to take
the action with like-minded nations, just as was done in Kosovo.
Senator KERRY. Fair enough. And I would accept where we are
up until this point.
Now, the purpose of the resolution that the President has sub-
mitted to us, and, indeed, the purpose of your going to the United
Nations, is to seek the strength of a U.N. resolution, really to en-
force the U.N.'s purpose in all its prior resolutions, correct?
Secretary POWELL. Yes, sir.
Senator KERRY. And what you are seeking from us in the resolu-
tion you have submitted to us is, in fact, enforcement of the U.N.
resolutions. I mean, that's—there's a list of U.N. resolutions, cor-
rect?
Secretary POWELL. Yes.
Senator KERRY. And so you're seeking, from the U.S. Congress,
the right to use force to enforce those. Now, let me ask you-
Secretary POWELL. Either—if I just-just to make sure we have
a common understanding—to act as part of a multilateral effort,
but also, in the event that the President sees that the U.N. will not
be able to act and
Senator KERRY. Well, I understand.
Secretary POWELL [continuing]. Decides that it is in our interest
to act with like-minded nations. And we believe there would be
like-minded nations at that time.
Senator KERRY. But the action, this is what I'm trying to get at.
What we're seeking now, what you have acknowledged is the
United States would be stronger if we had the United Nations. The
United Nations has already expressed itself in a series of resolu-
tions. All of those resolutions were listed in the President's speech.
They are now listed in the resolution before us. What we are effec-
tively being asked is to provide the capacity for the enforcement of
these resolutions, the most important of which, you have acknowl-
edged, is weapons inspection.
Secretary POWELL. Right. Weapons disarmament. Disarmament.
Senator KERRY. Weapons destruction-
Secretary POWELL. Right.


141
Senator KERRY [continuing]. Not inspection. Now, none of those
resolutions mention or seek regime change.
Secretary POWELL. That's correct.
Senator KERRY. So the United States is, in effect, sort of moving
unilaterally to decide there is another goal here outside of the
United Nations. They don't mention regime change except to the
degree that enforcement of the inspection and destructions may ul-
timately require a regime change.
Secretary POWELL. Yes. That's the basis for U.S. Government
policy, as expressed both by two Presidents in a row and the Con-
gress since 1998.
Senator KERRY. So, therefore, I would ask you, Mr. Secretary,
and, through you, the President, based on some of the questions
Senator Sarbanes asked earlier—I mean, I would assume, based on
your experience and, I mean, just knowing you as I do, I can't be-
lieve
you would recommend to the President that he should go to
war simply to enforce, what, the proper sale of oil. I would assume
the President is not going to go to war simply—where is the listing
here
Senator SARBANES. Page three.
Senator KERRY [continuing]. The release of the gulf war per-
sonnel. Let me sort of come to my question. I mean, if—if—and I
know it's a huge if; but if Iraq were pushed to a point that they
had to comply, and did comply fully with an unfettered, uncondi-
tional spot inspection satisfactory to the new regime which you are
seeking from the United Nations, and it was met, would you go to
war?
Secretary POWELL. If Iraq was disarmed as a result of an inspec-
tion regime that gave us and the Security Council confidence that
it had been disarmed-
Senator KERRY. Correct.
Secretary POWELL [continuing). I think it unlikely that we would
find a causus belli.
Senator KERRY. Then don't we have to give that its opportunity
to work? Don't you have to exhaust that possibility?
Secretary POWELL. That's exactly the challenge that the Presi-
dent presented to the United Nations.
Senator KERRY. Then why are we being asked-
Secretary POWELL. Because we believe
Senator KERRY [continuing]. For a very broad resolution where
we would give the authority to the President to go to war for so
much more than that, prior to that even happening? I mean, you're
asking the Congress of the United States to give a blanket permis-
sion to go to war for a broad set of things that aren't even encom-
passed in the resolutions, none of which rise, in your own testi-
mony now, to the level of going to war?
Secretary POWELL. Which broad set of things that
Senator KERRY. Well, I mean, are you telling me we're going to
go to war because they haven't returned all the stolen property and
accepted losses from the war?
Secretary POWELL. I think the President has made it clear in all
of his conversations with Members of Congress, in his presen-
tations to the American people, and his presentation to the United
Nations that Iraq has to be disarmed. That-


142
Senator KERRY. I agree.
Secretary POWELL [continuing]. Is the major problem.
Senator KERRY. I agree completely.
Secretary POWELL. But there are also, as you talked about, the
various resolutions, the 16 resolutions, the almost 30 conditions
contained within all those resolutions, there are a lot of other
things that Iraq is in violation of.
Senator KERRY. I completely agree.
Secretary POWELL. But there is no question that light that is
glowing at us is the one that has to do with weapons of mass de-
struction. And the whole inspection regime went after that one.
There was no inspection regime on Kuwaiti prisoners or the oil-for-
food program. There are other ways to deal with that.
And so what the President is asking for the authority to do is
to take appropriate action either with the U.N. or, if the U.N. does
not act, for him to work with other like-minded nations to disarm
Iraq.
And the whole purpose of a regime-change policy that came in
in 1998 was because the regime, the Iraqi regime at that time, was
acting in a way that suggested the only way you could get satisfac-
tion of that disarmament requirement was through a change in the
regime.
Senator KERRY. Well, if I could just say, Mr. Secretary, the rea-
son—and I'll close. My time is up, and I don't want to abuse it. But
may I say to you, sir—and I don't want any misinterpretation
about my position. I really want none whatsoever. The issue, to me,
is not whether Saddam Hussein should be held accountable. Of
course he should. The issue is not whether or not these weapons
are a threat. Yes, they are. The issue is, how do we go about this?
And the question remains why, if the gravamen of threat to the
United States, according to most rational people's judgment, is the
weapons of mass destruction, the capacity of Saddam Hussein to
miscalculate, the capacity of those weapons to slide off to a surro-
gate terrorist group—all of those threats are real—but if
you
could
satisfy that threat without a drop of blood spilled because the
United Nations succeeds in putting in place an unfettered, uncondi-
tional spot inspection that results in destruction-I have no con-
fidence, incidentally, that that will happen automatically. But it
seems to me that's what builds you the legitimacy of the casus belli
and the consent of the American people to finally make that com-
mitment, and it just baffles me why the resolution doesn't reflect
that, rather than this extraordinary broad overreach.
The CHAIRMAN. Because it was written by the White House
Counsel and not the Secretary of State.
Secretary POWELL. May I make one final point?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Senator. And I understand your
point. If I can, just before shifting, come back to Senator Hagel
briefly, yes, Assistant Secretary Kelly will be traveling to
Pyongyang on the 3rd of October as a Presidential envoy.
Senator SARBANES. Was the resolution written—I heard from
someone the State Department wrote it. But I now understand
from what Senator Biden said that that's not the case and that the


143
resolution was written by the White House Counsel. It came up
here under the White House Counsel's name.
Secretary POWELL. I think it came up from the White House. We
all saw the resolution in the process of it being drafted. I saw it
before it was submitted.
Senator SARBANES. Where was the locus for writing it, at the
State Department?
Secretary POWELL. I can't tell you, Senator, whether my lawyers
were involved in it or not, but I think the principal focus of writing
and authorship was in the White House.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, on a different subject of some interest,
since you mentioned it at the front end of your testimony, we just
passed the State Department Authorization bill. The House has
passed it. The President will get it soon. If he signs it, which I hope
he will, you'll have $80 million to take care of your last
payment
Secretary POWELL. Whew.
The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And a lot of other things, so I just
thought that might give you a little good news in all the fun you're
having here today.
Secretary POWELL. The money was going to expire Monday, so
thank you.
Senator KERRY. Mr. Secretary, I just want to thank you.
Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Senator.
Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Chafee.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Secretary, for being here.
At the earlier session, I asked the former Secretaries a question
relative to what President Mubarak said several weeks ago, and
that was, “If you strike Iraq, not one Arab leader will be able to
control the angry outbursts of the masses.”
Now, as we go forward and you listen to someone who's been in
the country since the early 1980s, probably longer than anybody
else in the region, what do you think? Is this hyperbole? And if
we're going to listen to these respected leaders in the world—and
I'll also quote General Musharraf, “An attack on Iraq will have
very negative repercussions around the Islamic world”—how do we,
absent the overwhelming proof that constraints on Saddam Hus-
sein are not working, how do we listen to these leaders and risk
what they're saying?
Secretary POWELL. There will be a period of heightened tension
if we have to undertake military operations against Iraq. Many of
them have also said to us that if it becomes necessary, it would be
better if it was done under the provisions of a U.N. mandate, U.N.
resolution. That would assist them enormously in dealing with the
problems that might exist within their countries.
There's no question there will be tension. But, at the same time,
every one of these leaders also tells us that there is no question
in their minds that Saddam Hussein is in violation, there's no
question in their minds that he's a threat to regional stability and
peace, there's no question in their minds that he is a threat to the
region and has demonstrated previously his willingness to use
weapons of mass destruction, and there is no doubt in their minds


144
that he continues to have the intent to develop these weapons of
mass destruction. And so if it was done in a way that was decisive
and that was swift and with the promise of a better life for the
Iraqis afterwards, I think the spill-out-spill-off problems that
might exist in the region for some period of time could be managed.
Senator CHAFEE. În light of that, what's the difference between
your experience in 1991 in forming an international coalition and
the trouble, obviously, that we're having this year? You talked
about these leaders knowing Saddam Hussein is a threat. Back in
1991 they gladly signed up to an international coalition, save Jor-
dan, but this time, obviously, the dynamics are so different. It's 11
years later, and they're expressing grave, grave reservations. Does
that tell us something?
Secretary POWELL. Well, there are many differences. In 1990, it
was a invasion of a fellow Arab nation. I mean, Iraq left its borders
to invade another nation and take it over and eject a ruling family.
It was on the verge, perhaps, of invading another neighbor, Saudi
Arabia. And so there was no doubt about the threat. It was clear,
it was present. And the response that the international community
made to that aggression was that we would reverse that aggres-
sion, and we would do it in a way that did not invade an Arab
country in the process of doing it. We weren't going to Baghdad.
We weren't invading Iraq. We were ejecting Iraq from Kuwait. And
that gave us the wherewithal to put together this international coa-
lition that consisted of Arab armies cooperating with us and fight-
ing alongside of us. The Syrian army, the Egyptian army, the gulf
military forces, and other Muslim nations participated in it. And it
was for that reason that we had a limited mission, which was to
eject the Iraqi army and not move on Baghdad.
This is different. We have now seen, 11 years later, that this in-
dividual still remains a threat, still tries to develop weapons of
mass destruction, and it is a different context. And it's also a dif-
ferent context with respect to the situation between the Israelis
and the Palestinians. It's a much more heated environment. But
keep in mind, it was heated then. People were worried then. And
as the results of our success in the gulf war, we found that we were
able to manage this heat that existed in the region and even use
our success in the gulf war to get the Madrid process underway,
the Madrid meetings that took place in the fall of 1991 which, in
due course, led to other progress in trying to solve the Middle East
crisis. Unfortunately, that did not solve the Middle East crisis and
it's still with us, and it's in a much more difficult situation than
it was then.
Senator CHAFEE. So to get right down to it, the threat is dif-
ferent.
Secretary POWELL. The threat is different, the environment is
different, and the only way to deal with the threat right now if we
do not get compliance on the part of the Iraqi regime, Saddam Hus-
sein—if we don't get compliance this time, then it is a different
kind of military mission that must be undertaken, must be to go
in and remove the regime.
Senator CHAFEE. Would it be fair to say the threat is lesser?
Secretary POWELL. The threat-if you're talking about the capac-
ity of the Iraqi military, its conventional capacity is nowhere near


145
where it was 12 years ago. I would guess it's about perhaps 30 per-
cent of its—30 to 40 percent of its size and certainly of its effective-
ness. Its weapons of mass destruction, we destroyed a lot. The in-
spectors did great work.
Sometimes people talk down to the inspectors about the wonder-
ful work they did for a period of 7 years. They helped with intel-
ligence and helped with defectors who gave them information, but
then they were thrown out and we don't know what's been reconsti-
tuted over the last 3 to 4 years. So there is still the threat of weap-
ons of mass destruction being used in any new conflict.
Senator CHAFEE. It seems to me then that if the threat is lesser,
we're having to horsewhip our allies into a coalition, the Arab
friends and neighbors in the region-
Secretary POWELL. Yes.
Senator CHAFEE [continuing). Are all saying, “Don't do it.”
Secretary POWELL. The coalition just-
Senator CHAFEE. Madeleine Albright said, “This is a mistake.”
And all you have to do is run your hand over the black granite at
the Vietnam Memorial to see what mistakes do.
Secretary POWELL. The coalition just didn't snap together on the
first day of the conflict back in 1990. It took a lot of hard work.
It took a lot of discussion and a lot of hard work on the part of Sec-
retary Baker, then-Secretary of Defense Cheney, yours truly, as
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, above all, President
Bush and the other members of the Cabinet, to bring that coalition
into being. And we are working in that same vein now. That's why
President Bush took it to the United Nations on the 12th of Sep-
tember. He didn't go to the United Nations on the 12th of Sep-
tember to issue a declaration of war. It was a declaration of pur-
pose, “We've got to do something about this.”
And, yes, there are these dangers in the region that Secretary
Albright spoke of, but we believe one of the greatest dangers in the
region right now is the danger of this individual being able to
thumb his nose once again at the United Nations, and the United
Nations doing nothing about it, and his intent, unchanged, to con-
tinued to develop weapons of mass destruction. And we may not be
able to keep him in his box forever. We might not be able to con-
tain him forever. We can't continue to take the risk of him coming
out of that box or him showing up one day with the capability that
threatens his neighbors or threatens our interests or threatens us
directly, or his working with terrorist organizations which threaten
us directly.
Senator CHAFEE. Before my time runs out, I know Senator Kerry
talked about it. Isn't that all the more reason to have more time
on debate on this and
Secretary POWELL. Well, I think
Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. Giving the time for the
Secretary POWELL. I think we are having that debate now, both
here in the United States and in the United Nations. We're—I
mean, I haven't spent—I've been doing nothing for the last 2 weeks
since the President's speech but working this—yes, I have been
doing other things, let me not sell myself short, others will do that
for me.


146
But this certainly has been a priority for me for the last several
weeks.
Senator CHAFEE. You're terrific. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, do you need a break?
Secretary POWELL. No, I'm fine.
The CHAIRMAN. OK. And if you'd like a cup of coffee or
something
Secretary POWELL. I'm great.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you know better than I do that
when I guess it was, I don't know–Senator Lugar or Senator
Hagel were talking about the, sort of the artificial construct of this
country named Iraq after 1921. This country, and I know you know
this, but make sure I get it right-is divided Arab, Indo-Euro-
pean—that is, Kurds—and the rest of the population is Arab. Arab
population is split Sunni and Shia. Kurds, non-Arabs, are Sunnis.
Sixty percent of the population is essentially in the southeastern
part between the Tigris and the Euphrates, generally.
The Shia, there are 600,000 to 700,000, based on, I think, your
Department's estimates, Shia in Iran right now as displaced refu-
gees. Do we have any sense——I'm not suggesting you should know,
but do we have any sense whether or not if Saddam were gone,
they'd come back? Do we have the problem and opportunity of
600,000-700,000 people moving back across the border, and all that
that entails, good and bad? And do we have any sense of whether
or not they'll come back looking to settle scores with the roughly
20 percent of the Arab Sunni population, which is the Ba'ath, the
essence of the Ba'ath Party?
In my discussions, and we've all had them over the years, with
the Iraqi National Congress, there are real deep disagreements. Do
we have any sense of what this diaspora of Shia in Iran, particu-
larly, are likely to—anything about their attitudes, about democ-
racy, or their attitudes about a united Iraq. Can you talk to us
about that?
Secretary POWELL. I don't know, Senator. I haven't seen any data
on attitudes or whether we have done any analysis of that or poll-
ing of that population. I'll have to look at that. If we have, I'll pro-
vide it for the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, you may not be able to answer the question
in public, but we all know from our individual interfacing with for-
eign leaders that the Turks are very concerned about the Kurds.
We also know that the Kurds, some Kurds, kind of like it just the
way it is. This is as close to an autonomous republic that they have
had since 1921. And we know that not all Kurds, but a number of
Kurds, still harbor a desire for a Kurdistan, which, I know you
know this, the map is very small—but which goes well into Turkey
and into Iran. Are we going to have to make any commitments to
the Turks that the Kurds aren't going to know about? Or are we
going to have to make any commitments or lay down the law to the
Kurds before we enlist the Turks?
In other words, everybody we've spoken to, military, non-mili-
tary, says this operation—and you are one of the most well-known
military men; you don't think that way anymore, but you are-ev-
erybody tells us that without Turkey's participation or accommoda-


149
ful for our willingness to stand up for what we believe in. They are
appreciative of our efforts to break down trading barriers and to
expand the circle of economic liberalization and to talk about
human rights.
We spend a great deal of time saying, well, we haven't made
enough progress in the Middle East, or, we have this Iraq problem,
but we don't spend enough time talking about rapprochement and
the strong relationship we've built with Russia, strong relationship
we're building with China, our successes with respect to free trade
agreements and how the President's going to trade promotion au-
thority. We don't talk enough about the President's leadership with
respect to HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. We don't talk
enough about the African Growth and Opportunity Act expanded.
And so we have got a lot of good things going on. We don't talk
enough about how we got a Treaty of Moscow and we put the ABM
Treaty in the past, and we're still going to cut ballistic missiles
pointed at each other by some 60 or 70 percent, all without destroy-
ing the strategic framework. Yet everybody last year resented the
United States even thinking in these terms. Well, we pulled it off
and we got a good agreement with the Russians, which I trust this
body will ratify in the not-too-distant future.
And so we've got a lot of good things going on that occasionally
don't get talked about because we're focusing on the crisis of the
moment, which is the way it is and the way things tend to be
looked at. But we have had a number of foreign policy successes.
There are a number of initiatives underway. And if you occupy the
position of leadership that the United States does, you must assert
it. You must lead. That's what President Bush is doing. And I
think we will be showing to the world that success comes from such
assertive, responsible behavior working with our friends and allies.
Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I think that the NATO nations
that listen to what the Secretary just said will be heartened by
that. I appreciate your being that explicit and comprehensive.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to offer a word of congratulations-
and maybe I'm historically inaccurate, so you may check the record.
But I think there has not been an authorization bill for the State
Department that passed both houses and was conferred upon and
signed by the President since 1986.
Secretary POWELL. See, another foreign policy success that I
wasn't even going to take credit for.
Senator BIDEN. But whose is it?
Senator LUGAR. But congratulations.
The CHAIRMAN. I'm sure the President is responsible for that.
Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, seriously. Mr.
Chairman, that bill cleans up a lot of things and gives us a lot to
work with, and we really are appreciative.
The CHAIRMAN. We had a lot of help.
Senator Sarbanes. Oh, I'm sorry. Senator Nelson. I beg your par-
don.
Senator SARBANES. I don't think you had a turn, did you?
Senator NELSON. Not yet.
The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon. Sorry.
Senator NELSON. Mr. Secretary, we have a downed American
pilot from the gulf war. You and I have talked about this. Since I


150
have spoken to you, I have spoken to every leader that I can get
my hands on from the gulf region asking them to task their intel-
ligence apparatus to see if they can get any information. Indeed,
Captain Scott Speicher's status has been changed by the Depart-
ment of Defense from killed in action to missing in action. And
there is some consideration right now of perhaps changing his sta-
tus to missing-captured, because there was a credible live sighting
of Captain Speicher alive being driven to the hospital by a defector
who was deemed credible.
So I would just encourage you—Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas
and I and Senator Bob Smith of New Hampshire are the ones that
have been involved, mainly. Captain Speicher is from Jacksonville.
His family is there. There's a wife and children and you can imag-
ine the agony they're going through. So as we are getting ready to
do an inspection regime on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, I
would encourage you to press the issue of the missing American
pilot, as well.
Secretary POWELL. Senator, you should have no doubt about
that. I think I mentioned it in my prepared testimony. I'm in close
touch with Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz,
who has a personal interest in this and monitors it, and there were
some developments earlier this week that I spent time on and,
through intermediaries, was in touch with the family, so we take
it very, very seriously and we watch it very closely and it will
never be far from our mind. He went down when I was chairman,
and I'll never forget it.
Senator NELSON. Thank you.
Could you help me understand how what is being trumpeted as
a preemptive doctrine is any different from how we've always oper-
ated, that the President clearly has the authority, as Commander
in Chief, to act if it's in the interest of the United States, to protect
the United States?
Secretary POWELL. Well, I agree with you, Senator, and I had a
chance to talk about this a little bit earlier, but I would like to say
another word about it. In the National Security Strategy, what we
attempted to convey with that language was that traditional means
of deterrence and containment that worked against state actors-
the Soviet Union, China, others—when you look at what happened
to us on 9/11, we were struck by a terrorist group, not by a state
actor, by a terrorist group that didn't come out to fight us in the
field of battle, but sent in suicide bombers.
And so it is a different kind of threat. And as we look at the tools
available to us to deal with this threat, one of the tools that we
have to be able to use are preemption tools. When if we see this
kind of attack coming at us, then the act of preemption or taking
preemptive action should be something we consider and perhaps
consider it more readily than we might have in the past.
I have reread that chapter a number of times since seeing all the
press speculation and all the editorials being written on how it rep-
resents a revolutionary new doctrine, and I, frankly, don't find it
revolutionary. I find it sensible.
The reason it's focused on so heavily in that particular section of
the National Security Strategy, it was an effort on the President's
part and the author's part to explain to people why this new threat


152
stopped all the dueling op-ed pieces and the dueling leaks and all
the other things that were happening in August. Once the Presi-
dent put the case down clearly and asked the U.N. for action, that
changed a number of attitudes among our Arab friends.
Senator HAGEL. Back to the issue on opposition forces, wherever,
however they be and what role they may play. I noted here in the
paper we are now engaged or soon will be engaged in training some
form of opposition force. I think some of the terms used is “scouts”
and other descriptions. What do you know about that? Where are
they coming from? Is this a Northern Alliance kind of an effort?
Are they there? Where are they? Why didn't we know about them
before?
Secretary POWELL. Senator, no decisions have been made yet, but
there is certainly a great deal of planning underway as referenced
in newspapers. But I would really prefer to yield to my colleagues
in the Pentagon in a closed session to get into the details of this.
Senator HAGEL. OK.
Back to the issue of the resolution questions that were asked,
and maybe you said this and I didn't hear it—the current back and
forth and negotiation, if that's what's going on-most of us are not
aware of it are you involved in that? Do you have a representative
involved in that day to day negotiation with the language
Secretary POWELL. I haven't been involved in the day to day dis-
cussions that may be taking place between the administration and
Members of Congress on the resolution. We all were involved in the
preparation of the resolution or—although it came out the White
House signed out by the President's Counsel, Mr. Gonzalez, I be-
lieve. I'm quite confident that as Congress decides what changes it
believes are appropriate to the resolution and the President con-
siders those changes, that we will have a chance to weigh in as to
the impact that those changes would have on anything we're doing
diplomatically.
I would just reinforce, however, that I believe it's important that
action be taken on a resolution quickly as a way of showing unity
of purpose within the U.S. Government. That would be helpful to
me in my diplomatic efforts with the U.N.
Senator HAGEL. Well, obviously, my implication there, and you,
I'm sure, follow it—and I have nothing against lawyers. I've got one
in the family, actually, one of my brothers.
Secretary POWELL. Me too.
Senator HAGEL. And you do, too. But one per family should be
sufficient. And I apologize to Sarbanes and Biden on this point, but
I don't think framing up the verbiage in an intent of going to war
should be left to the President's Counsel's office, and I am con-
cerned—maybe only I am concerned about that. It's important that
the people who are going to have to implement this and carry out
whatever it is the lawyers decide is the right way to do it be part
of that, as well as you.
And the other thing that concerns me about the resolution is
this, I think, is the same office who had counseled the President
that he doesn't need any involvement by the Congress to go to war
in Iraq. And so if you'd care to comment on that, I'm sure we would
welcome any thoughts you have.


153
Secretary POWELL. The resolution that the President sent up, we
all saw, had an opportunity to comment on–I did—and reflected
our input, but it came out of the White House, which is where I
would have expected it to come out of. As modifications are made,
as changes are made, and I think as we get closer to what the will
of the Congress might be, I'm quite confident that the President
will share it with the rest of us and we'll have a chance to give our
input.
Senator HAGEL. Well, thank you. I've got a little more time here,
and I've got one additional question.
In the Washington Post today there's a headline, “Bush Asserts
That Al Qaeda Has Links To Iraq's Hussein.” And I know you gen-
erally responded to that over here, but there's a quote in here from
Secretary Rumsfeld—I know you don't speak for him: “A few hours
before Bush's remarks, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was
asked by reporters traveling with him in Warsaw if there are any
linkages between al-Qaeda and Iraq.” After, there's now been some
generalization that there might be new evidence here on training
and there was past training and so on. And this is the quote, if this
is correct, from Secretary Rumsfeld in response to that question, “I
have no desire to go beyond saying the answer is yes.”
Well, I find that interesting. I know it's not your quote. I'm not
saying you answer for anyone other than yourself on this, but there
is a thing that is rumbling around, I think, in the country and the
world, Mr. Secretary, and that's the credibility of the argument
here. And if the credibility of the argument continues to be
stretched and pulled, and one week it's this and this week it's this,
and much of the evidence of what I'm talking about, too, came out
today in the hearings, as you know, trying to define a number of
the questions that were asked what is the objective.
I know you know this, but I don't think we can ever overstate
the importance of the credibility of our senior members of our gov-
ernment. And to say, yes, I know there is evidence there, but I
don't want to tell you any more about it, that does not encourage
any
of us, nor does it give the American public a heck of a lot of
faith that, in fact, what anyone is saying is true. We've been
through one of those experiences before.
Secretary POWELL. I think Director Tenet has spoken to this in
his classified testimony, and I would encourage you to take a look
at what George said.
To summarize what I can say in open testimony, there is evi-
dence of linkage between al-Qaeda and Iraq. Second, there is no
linkage to 9/11 that we are aware of, but I can't dismiss that possi-
bility. And, third, perhaps part of the confusion on this issue is
that we're learning more over time as we get access to more and
more people who have been detained or captured and as we have
other defectors coming forward and as we really focus our intel-
ligence assets on this question. And so there is no doubt that there
are linkages, that there have been al-Qaeda members in Baghdad,
and there have been contacts that have occurred over the years.
There's no smoking gun linkage to 9/11, but it cannot totally be
ruled out. And one of the reasons for the development of this story
over the recent days and weeks is that we're learning more. And
I think George Tenet, in his prepared classified testimony, talks to


156
It highlights the fact that terrorism of the kind we saw practiced
in 9/11 presents a new threat to us and we have to consider the
doctrine or the idea or the concept of preemption as a way of deal-
ing with these. And it also puts it in a context that says it should
not be done lightly, it should not be done without understanding
of the consequences, and it should not be done in a way that people
would think that we are just simply running around looking for
wars. I think that is an overstatement of what the document says.
Senator SARBANES. Well, I think it's safe to say that it redefines
“imminent threat."
I'd just end on a sort of a—perhaps a lighter note. I enjoyed this
cartoon by Tom Toles in the Post. It says, “A new policy. The U.S.
has the right to do whatever we want, whenever we want, wher-
ever we want, to whomever we want regardless of what anyone
else in the world thinks about it.” And then he says, “Did I leave
anything out?” The fellow says, “Well, with rights, don't there also
come responsibilities?” He thinks about that and then he says, “It
is the responsibility of the rest of the world to help us pay for it.”
So I just commend that to you for your attention.
Secretary POWELL. What I would commend to you, Senator, is
the United States should have the right to defend itself-
Senator SARBANES. Absolutely.
Secretary POWELL [continuing]. Against terrorist threats that are
coming our way.
Senator SARBANES. But you've been-
Secretary POWELL. And if a terrorist threat is coming our way or
if there is a nation out there that we know is planning to conduct
action against us that we could preemptively stop, then I see no
reason why the President should not do that.
Senator SARBANES. Now, Secretary Kissinger this morning men-
tioned those potential candidates for that approach because of the
presence of al-Qaeda terrorism-Somalia, Yemen, Iran, and Indo-
nesia-in his testimony. What's your view of that?
Secretary POWELL. I'm not putting anybody on a candidate list.
It depends on what the threat is, the reality of that threat, the
proximity of that threat, the danger of that threat, and whether or
not a President of the United States should take action to preempt
or prevent such a threat.
And if he has sufficient information that this threat is coming
against the United States and he can take action to prevent it or
preempt it, however—whichever word you prefer—I see no reason
why we should deny a President of the United States the option
to do that, or we should find that to be objectionable or somehow
distasteful or somehow inconsistent
Senator SARBANES. Is that to suggest that
Secretary POWELL [continuing]. With our policies of long dura-
tion.
Senator SARBANES. Is that to suggest there are other potential
candidates lined up behind Iraq?
Secretary POWELL. We're not looking at candidates. We're looking
at national security strategy, at a strategy of dealing with threats
that might be coming at the United States of America, and I be-
lieve it would be irresponsible for us not to consider the doctrine
of preemption or prevention or concept, if you wish to call it that.


157
When we see a real and present danger that is coming our way and
we can do something about it, then why should not the President
do something about it to protect the American people?
Senator SARBANES. Unilaterally-
Secretary POWELL. I think the American people understand that.
Senator SARBANES. Unilaterally do something about it?
Secretary POWELL. Sir?
Senator SARBANES. Unilaterally do something about it?
Secretary POWELL. Maybe it's unilaterally, maybe-
Senator SARBANES. Do other-
Secretary POWELL [continuing). It's not unilaterally.
Senator SARBANES [continuing]. Do other nations
The CHAIRMAN. Senator?
Senator SARBANES [continuing). Can other—
The CHAIRMAN. Senator?
Senator SARBANES [continuing]. Do other nations have recourse
to the same line of thinking?
Secretary POWELL. There is no nation that should not have re-
course to a line of thinking when a threat is coming its way. It's
inherent in the sovereignty of a nation to protect itself.
The CHAIRMAN. One of the problems-
Secretary POWELL. If we saw—if we were able to spot—well I
don't want to get into anecdotal stuff, the Japanese fleet sailing on
Pearl Harbor and knew what was going to happen and knew what
was coming our way, preemption would have been a very sound
policy, in my judgment, if the President had enough information
and if he could present to the world, before or after the fact, why
he did it and make the case for it. It seems to me that's the kind
of thing you would have done.
Senator SARBANES. I don't find that analogy really on all fours.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary-
Secretary POWELL. Yes?
The CHAIRMAN. One of the problems of having a powerful chair-
man of another committee on your committee is he thinks he's
chairman of that committee, too.
And the only prerogative of being the chairman is you get to ask
the last question, at least I thought it used to be. At any rate-
Senator SARBANES. I yield to the chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you. After 20 minutes, he yields to me.
But I love him, and he has good questions.
But let me ask you a concluding question here, because we only
have a few minutes left on this vote and I'm sure you will not miss
being able to leave.
I'm not looking for percentages, but can you tell us what the next
stages in your negotiations are,
in
your attempt to get a resolution
through the Security Council that has teeth in it on a different re-
gime of inspection? And ancillary to that, are you unalterably op-
posed, is the President unalterably opposed, to a two-step process?
Or need it be one-step?
Secretary POWELL. On the first question, within the last 24 hours
we came into agreement with the United Kingdom on what we
thought a good resolution looked like and should contain. And, as
I mentioned earlier, we are now—both the United States and the
United Kingdom have begun consultations with the other perma-


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