Shia and Kurdish leaders make
concessions to the Sunni for the
sake of presenting a chance for
a unity government.
the themes and the scenario sketches that predominated in the previous workshop: ethnic
and sectarian politics, the role of the neighboring countries, and Iraqi security.
Each of the breakout groups was guided but not constrained by the previous scenario
sketches in developing a robust flow of events describing the key actors and the impact
of the other forces and factors. The second workshop developed five different scenarios
in some depth.
0 Ethnic and Sectarian Politics. Two scenarios focus on the extent to which the Iraqi
people and their government forge a working arrangement among the key ethnic
and sectarian groups. In one of these scenarios, a functioning state is created as
the parties find common ground. In the other, ethnic and sectarian politics result in
division.
0 Neighboring Countries. Two scenarios focus on the role of the neighboring countries
and the extent to which their role helps support Iraq's stability and unity rather than
encouraging political divisions and instability. In one scenario, the sectarian divisions
in Iraq spill over into the region. In the other, neighboring countries help stabilize
Iraq and quiet the divisions.
0 Security. One scenario focuses on a deteriorating security situation in Iraq, in which
the United States acquiesces to increased Iranian influence to provide short-term
stability.
In the third workshop the participants examined each of the five scenarios and identi-
fied the goals and the strategies the United States and the Iraqi government could adopt,
either to alter the scenario outcome or achieve its goals within the scenario.
Below are sketches of the five scenarios and the goals and strategies for each.
The Long Slog to Overcome Ethnic and Sectarian Politics
This is an Iraq that slowly, in fits and starts, trudges down the difficult road of creat-
ing a functioning state.
Shia and Kurdish leaders make concessions to the Sunni for the sake of preserving a
chance for a unity government. The key concessions are agreements not to form a large
Shia region, a more equitable distribution of oil revenues, maximization of production
from current oil fields for the benefit of all, and relaxation of strict de-Baathification.
Other major elements of the concessions are acceptance of an autonomous Kurdistan
and recognition that Sunnis and Shia need each other to create any semblance of a united
Iraq (or even Iraqi Arabistan). The parties find common ground in opposing the foreign
fighters, who are on a mission of disruption.
A positive feedback loop is created when the UN mission returns in force and the
World Bank offers substantive assistance. As conditions improve, the interest of investors
increases.
It is a delicate balancing act to have a limited national government, which tries to do
what it can reasonably succeed at, and effective, governorate-level economic and political
activity. But the government works to diminish ethnic-sectarian divisions.
Goals and Strategies
This is a positive story: The United States would embrace and seek to reinforce the
dynamic of the scenario. Necessary predicates of the scenario would include agreement,
by side-letter or otherwise, not to create a large region in the south as a Shiastan;
some formula for the equitable distribution of oil revenues; and relaxation of de-
Baathification.
The United States would assist in strengthening the social center, building civil soci-
ety, and supporting moderate elements and institutions to help create an Iraqi identity. It
would reinforce the political center and the capacity of central and local governments to
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deliver sen-ices through a USAID Community Action Program (CAP) for small infrastructure
projects, training, and election law improvements.
Working with the Iraqi government, the United States would engage Iraq's neighbors
(Iran, Turkey, and Jordan) by gently encouraging them to keep at arm's length, rather than
interfering in Iraq's internal affairs. With U.S. support Iraq would seek to establish work-
ing diplomatic relations with all its neighbors and encourage them to locate diplomatic
missions in Baghdad. The United States would encourage distance between Iraqi Shia
and Iran by supporting Howza (the Imam Mahdi Seminary) and other moderate Islamist
elements. The United States would enhance military collaboration with Iraq and training
and exchanges with NATO. The United States and Iraq would focus attention on foreign
fighters in Iraq.
Ethnic-Sectarian Politics Derail the Political Process
The Iraqi political process fails to bind the country together.
When a new government forms, ministries are doled out to accommodate all the factions;
the result is a collection of fiefdoms. The Kurdish and Shia blocks remain the largest but
still cannot be effective on behalf of their constituencies with a balkanized set of minis-
tries. The Iraqi government is weak and unable to deliver sen-ices on a national basis, or
indeed on any uniform basis.
Secondary rounds of elections at the governorate and regional levels further polarize
the electorate. Weary of the task of national rule, the parties retreat to their own turfs.
At the local level, governance is extremely uneven, depending on the capacity of local
administrators and the presence of militias.
Marginalized, the Sunnis have few options. De-Baathification is completed, and Sunnis
are welcome only in their own territory. The Sunni insurgency initially is intensive, as they
have the most to lose, but they cannot compete militarily with the more numerous and
better-equipped Kurdish and Shia militias.
The United States and its troops move to remote bases and have little need or desire
to intervene in daily Iraqi life. They are neither wanted nor welcomed.
Over the years, a self-directed ethnic cleansing of the regions takes place. Baghdad is
still a patchwork, but the neighborhoods are more sharply divided than ever. There is a
1990s Beirut-like quality to the city. Gangs supplement militias in enforcing the boundar-
ies. The city itself hardly functions anymore.
By 2008 a de facto division of the country into three parts has taken place. The division
further weakens the national government and makes it less relevant.
Goals and Strategies
In this scenario, Iraq is unstable and could deteriorate without substantial intervention.
Here the overarching U.S. goal would not be to make major improvements but to avoid
major downturns.
To avoid the breakup of Iraq, the United States would seek to maintain at least the
appearance of a unitary state, with the hope of greater cohesion and central government
capacity in the future. It would try to make Baghdad work so it did not look like Beirut.
It would use economic incentives to help maintain a united Iraq by creating a "single
commercial space." To further this goal, Iraq would adopt a national commercial code to
foster the creation of truly national enterprises and encourage external economic interest
in Iraq as a national economic entity. In addition, Iraq would try to capture some revenue
flow from oil or international trading for the central government. It would seek to secure
the borders for customs purposes and create a national taxing mechanism.
Recognizing that most power would reside at the regional and governorate levels, Iraq
and the United States would attempt to even out the power disparities among them, espe-
cially to improve the relative position of the Sunnis. To this end, the United States would
5
The United States would encour-
age a distance between Iraqi Shia
and Iran by supporting moderate
Islamist elements.
The Iraqi government is unable to
deliver sen-ices on a national basis,
or indeed on any uniform basis.
The United States would try to
make Baghdad work so it did
not look like Beirut.