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108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - — - - — — - - House Document 108-50


EPORT IN CONNECTION WITH PRESIDENTIAL
A R
DETERMINATION UNDER PUBLIC LAW 107-243
ii-i—
COMMUNICATION
FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF TI-IE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING
A REPORT CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 3(b) OF THE AUTHORIZA-
TION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION
OF 2002 (PUBLIC LAW 107-243)
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PURDUE UNIVERSITY
APR 152003
U.S. DEPOSITORY


19 2003 —Referred to the Committee on International Relations
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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REPORT n~1 CONNECTION WITH PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION
UNDER PUBLIC LAW 107-243
This report summarizes diplomatic and other peaceful means
pursued by the United States, working for more than a dozen years
with cooperating foreign countries and international organizations
such as the United Nations, in an intensive effort (1) to protect the
national security of the United States, as well as the security of
other countries, against the continuing threat posed by Iraqi devel-
opment and use of weapons of mass destruction, and (2) to obtain
Iraqi compliance with all relevant United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) resolutions regarding Iraq. Because of the intransigence
and deﬁance of the Iraqi regime, further continuation of these ef-
forts will neither adequately protect the national security of the
United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq nor like-
ly lead to enforcement of all relevant UNSC resolutions regarding
raq.
This report also explains that a determination to use force
against Iraq is fully consistent with the United States and other
countries continuing to take the necessary actions against inter-
national terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those na-
tions, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, com-
mitted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001. Indeed, as Congress found when it passed the Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Pub-
lic Law 107-243), Iraq continues to harbor and aid international
terrorists and terrorist organizations, including organizations that
threaten the safety of United States citizens. The use of military
force to remove the Iraqi regime is therefore not only consistent
with, but is a vital part of, the international war on terrorism.
This document is summary in form rather than a comprehensive
and deﬁnitive rendition of actions taken and related factual data
that would constitute a complete historical record. This document
should be considered in light of the information that has been, and
will be, f1nnished to Congress, including the period reports con-
sistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and the Authorization for Use
gf:l$viilita1'y Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-
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1. 'I‘HE GULF WAR AND CONDITIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE
On August 2, 1990, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq initiated
the brutal and unprovoked invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The
United States and many foreign governments, working together
and through the UN, sought by diplomatic and other peaceful
means to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and to establish
international peace and security in the region.
(3)


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President George H.W. Bush’s letter transmitted to Congress on
January 16, 1991, was accompanied by a report that catalogued the
extensive diplomatic, economic, and other peaceful means pursued
by the United States to achieve U.S. and UNSC objectives. It de-
tails adoption by the UNSC of a dozen resolutions, from Resolution
660 of August 2, 1990, demanding that Iraw withdraw from Ku-
wait, to Resolution 678 on November 29, 1990, authorizing member
states to use all necessary means to “implement Resolution 660,”
to implement “all subsequent relevant resolutions,” and “to restore
international peace and security in the area.”
Despite extraordinary and concerted efforts by the United States,
other countries, and international organizations through diplomacy,
multilateral economic sanctions, and other peaceful means to bring
about Ira i compliance with UNSC resolutions, and even after the
UN and the United States explicitly informed Iraq that its failure
to comply with UNSC resolutions would result in the use of armed
force to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s regime
remained intransigent. The President ordered the U.S. armed
forces, working in a coalition with the armed forces of other cooper-
ating countries, to liberate Kuwait. The coalition forces promptly
drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, set Kuwait free, and moved into
southern Iraq.
On April 3, 1991, the UNSC adopted Resolution 687, which es-
tablished conditions for a cease-ﬁre to suspend hostilities. Among
other requirements, UNSCR 687 required Iraq to (1) destroy its
chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with ranges
greater than 150 km; (2) not use, develop, construct, or acquire bio-
logical, chemical, or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems;
(3) submit to international inspections to verify compliance; and (4)
not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow
others who commit such acts to operate in Iraqi territory. On April
6, 1991, Iraq communicated to the UNSC its acceptance of the con-
ditions for the cease-ﬁre.
2. IRAQ’S BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE CONDITIONSI THREATS TO
PEACE AND SECURITY
Since almost the moment it agreed to the conditions of the cease-
ﬁre, Iraq has committed repeated and escalating breaches of those
conditions. Throughout the ﬁrst seven years that Iraq accepted in-
spections, it repeatedly obstructed access to sites designated by the
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On two occasions, in 1993
and 1998, Iraq’s refusal to comply with its international obligations
under the cease-ﬁre led to military action by coalition forces. In
1998, under threat of “severest consequences,” Iraq signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding pledging full cooperation with UNSCOM
and IAEA and “immediate, unconditional and unrestricted” access
for their inspections. In a matter of months, however, the Iraqi re-
gime suspended cooperation, in part an effort to condition compli-
ance on the lifting of oil sanctions; it ultimately ceased all coopera-
tion, causing the inspectors to leave the country.
On December 17, 1999, after a year with no inspections in Iraq,
the UNSC established the United Nations Monitoring, Veriﬁcation
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor to


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UNSCOM, to address unresolved disarmament issues and verify
Iraqi compliance with the disarmament required by UNSCR 687
and related resolutions. Iraq refused to allow inspectors to return
for yet another three years.
3. RECENT DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER PEACEFUL MEANS REJECTED BY
IRAQ
On September 12, 2002, the President addressed the United Na-
tions General Assembly on Iraq. He challenged the United Nations
to act decisively to deal with Iraq’s systematic twelve-year deﬁance
and to compel Iraq’s disarmament of the weapons of mass destruc-
tion and delivery systems that continue to threaten international
peace and security. The White House background paper, “A Decade
of Deception and Deﬁance: Saddam Hussein’s Deﬁance of the
United Nations” (September 12, 2002), summarized Iraq’s actions
as of the time the President initiated intensiﬁed efforts to enforce
all relevant UN Resolutions and demonstrates the failure of diplo-
macy to affect Iraq’s conduct:
For more than a decade, Saddam Hussein has deceived
and deﬁed the will and resolutions of the United Nations
Security Council by, among other things: continuing to
seek and develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weap-
ons, and prohibited long-range missiles; brutalizing the
Iraqi people, including committing gross human rights vio-
lations and crimes against humanity; supporting inter-
national terrorism; refusing to release or account for pris-
oners of war and other missing individuals from the Gulf
War era; refusing to return stolen Kuwaiti property; and
working to circumvent the UN'S economic sanctions.
The President also summarized Iraq’s response to a decade of
diplomatic efforts and its breach of the cease-ﬁre conditions on Oc-
tober 7, 2002, in an address in Cincinnati, Ohio:
Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian
Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its
weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of
such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups.
The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It
possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It
is seeking nuclear weapons. It has given shelter and sup-
port to terrorism, and practices terror against its own peo-
ple. The entire world has witnessed Iraq’s eleven-year his-
tory of deﬁance, deception and bad faith.
In response to the President’s challenge of September 12, 2002,
and after intensive negotiation and diplomacy, the UNSC unani-
mously adopted UNSCR 1441 on November 8, 2002. The UNSC de-
clared that Iraq “has been and remains in material breach” of its
disarmament obligations, but chose to aﬂbrd Iraq one “ﬁnal oppor-
tunity” to comply. The UNSC again placed the burden on Iraq to
comply and disarm and not on the inspectors to try to ﬁnd what
Iraq is concealing. The UNSC made clear that any false statements
or omissions in declarations and any failure by Iraq to comply with
UNSCR 1441 would constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s


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obligations. Rather than seizing this ﬁnal opportunity for a peace-
ful solution by giving full and immediate cooperation, the Hussein
re%'.me responded with renewed deﬁance and deception.
or example, while UNSCR 1441 required that Iraq provide a
“currently accurate, full and complete” declaration of all aspects of
its weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”) and delivery programs,
Iraq’s Declaration of December 7, 2002, failed to comply with that
requirement. The 12,000-page document that Iraq provided was lit-
tle more than a restatement of old and discredited material. It was
incomplete, inaccurate, and composed mostly of recycled informa-
tion that failed to address any of the outstanding disarmament
questions inspectors had previously identiﬁed.
In addition, since the passage of UNSCR 1441, Iraq has failed to
cooperate fully with inspectors. It delayed until two-and-a-half
months after the resumption of inspections UNMOVIC’s use of aer-
ial surveillance ﬂights; failed to provide private access to officials
for interview by inspectors; intimidated witnesses with threats; un-
dertook massive efforts to deceive and defeat inspectors, including
cleanup and transshipment activities at nearly 30 sites; failed to
provide numerous documents requested by UNMOVIC; repeatedly
provided incomplete or outdated listings of its WMD personnel; and
hid documents in homes, including over 2000 pages of Iraqi docu-
ments regarding past uranium enrichment programs. In a report
dated March 6, 2003, UNMOVIC described over 600 instances in
which Iraq had failed to declare fully activities related to its chem-
ical, biological, or missile procurement.
Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, reported to
the UNSC on January 27, 2003 that “Iraq appears not to have
come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament
which was demanded of it.” Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, Director
General of the IAEA, reported that Iraq’s declaration of December
7 “did not provide any new information relevant to certain ques-
tions that have been outstanding since 1998.” Both demonstrated
that there was no evidence that Iraq had decided to comply with
disarmament obligations. Diplomatic efforts have not affected
Iraq’s conduct positively. Any temporary changes in Iraq’s ap-
proach that have occurred over the years have been in response to
the threat of use of force.
On February 5, 2003, the Secretary of State delivered a com-
prehensive presentation to the UNSC using declassiﬁed informa-
tion, including human intelligence reports, communications inter-
cepts and overhead imagery, which demonstrated Iraq’s ongoing ef-
forts to pursue WMD programs and conceal them from UN inspec-
tors. The Secretary of State updated that presentation one month
later by detailing intelligence reports on continuing efforts by Iraq
to maintain and conceal proscribed materials.
Despite the continued resistance by Iraq, the United States has
continued to use diplomatic and other peaceful means to achieve
complete and total disarmament that would adequately protect the
national security of the United States from the threat posed by
Iraq and which is required by all relevant UNSC resolutions. On
March 7, 2003, the United States, United Kingdom, and Spain pre-
sented a draft resolution that would have established for Iraq a
March 17 deadline to cooperate fully with disarmament demands.


8
rity in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material
and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by,
among other things, continuing to possess and develop a
signiﬁcant chemical and biological weapons capability, ac-
tively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and sup-
porting and harboring terrorist organizations.
Nothing that has occurred in the past twelve years, the past
twelve months, the past twelve weeks, or the past twelve days pro-
vides any basis for concluding that further diplomatic or other
peaceful means will adequately protect the national security of the
United States from the continuing threat posed by Iraq or are like-
ly to lead to enforcement of all relevant UNSC resolutions regard-
ing Iraq and the restoration of peace and security in the area.
As the President stated on March 17 , “[t]he Iraqi regime has
used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage.” Further
delay in taking action against Iraq will only serve to give Saddam
Hussein’s regime additional time to further develop WMD to use
against the United States, its citizens, and its allies. The United
States and the UN have long demanded immediate, active, and un-
conditional cooperation by Iraq in the disarmament of its weapons
of mass destruction. There is no reason to believe that Iraq will dis-
arm, and cooperate with inspections to verify such disarmament, if
the U.S. and the UN employ only diplomacy and other peaceful
means.
4. USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ IS CONSISTENT WITH THE WAR ON
TERROR
In Public Law 107-243, Congress made a number of ﬁndings con-
cerning Iraq’s support for international terrorism. Among other
things, Congress determined that:
0 Members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for
attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including
thel attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be
m raq.
0 Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist
organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and
safety of United States citizens.
Q It is in the national security interests of the United States and
in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Na-
tions Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through
the use of force if necessary.
In addition, the Secretary of State’s address to the UN on Feb-
ruary 5, 2003 revealed a terrorist training area in northeastern
Iraq with ties to Iraqi intelligence and activities of al Qaida affili-
ates in Baghdad. Public reports indicate that Iraq is currently har-
boring senior members of a terrorist network led by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, a close al Qaida associate. In addition, Iraq has provided
training in document forgery and explosives to al Qaida. Other ter-
rorist groups have been supported by Iraq over past years.
Iraq has a long history of supporting terrorism and continues to
be a safe haven, transit point, and operational node for groups and
individuals who direct violence against the United States and our
allies. These actions violate Iraq’s obligations under the UNSCR


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687 cease-ﬁre not 3 2754 Q76 91 Q Q45 if international ter-
rorism or allow Others who commit such acts to operate in Iraqi
territory. Iraq has also failed to comply with its cease-ﬁre obliga-
tions to disarm and submit to international inspections to verify
compliance. In light of these Iraqi activities, the use of force by the
United States and other countries against the current Iraqi regime
is fully consistent With—indeed, it is an integral part of—the war
against international terrorists and terrorist organizations.
Both because Iraq harbors terrorists and because Iraq could
share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists who seek them
for use against the United States, the use of force to bring Iraq into
compliance with its obligations under UNSC resolutions would be
a signiﬁcant contribution to the war on terrorists of global reach.
A change in the current Iraqi regime would eliminate an important
source of support for international terrorist activities. It would like-
ly also assist efforts to disrupt terrorist networks and capture ter-
rorists around the globe. United States Government personnel op-
erating in Iraq may discover information through Iraqi government
documents and interviews with detained Iraqi officials that would
identify individuals currently in the United States and abroad who
are linked to terrorist organizations.
The use of force against Iraq will directly advance the war on
terror, and will be consistent with continuing efforts against inter-
national terrorists residing and operating elsewhere in the world.
The U.S. armed forces remain engaged in key areas around the
world in the prosecution of the war on terrorism. The necessary
preparations for and conduct of military operations in Iraq have
not diminished the resolve, capability, or activities of the United
States to pursue international terrorists to protect our homeland.
Nor will the use of military force against Iraq distract civilian de-
partments and agencies of the United States Government from con-
tinuing aggressive efforts in combating terrorism, or divert re-
sources from the overall world-wide counter-terrorism effort. Cur-
rent counter-terrorism investigations and activities will continue
during any military conﬂict, and winning the war on terrorism will
remain the top priority for our Govemment.
Indeed, the United States has made signiﬁcant progress on other
fronts in the war on terror even while Iraq and its threat to the
United States and other countries have been a focus of concern.
Since November 2002, when deployments of forces to the Gulf were
substantially increased, the United States, in cooperation with our
allies, has arrested or captured several terrorists and frustrated
several terrorist plots. For example, on March 1, 2003, Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed was captured in Rawalpindi, Pakistan by Paki-
stani authorities, with U.S. cooperation. The capture of Sheikh Mo-
hammed, the al Qaida “mastermind” of the September 11th attacks
and Usama Bin Laden’s senior terrorist attack planner, is a severe
blow to al Qaida that will destabilize the terrorist network world-
wide. This and other successes make clear that the United. States
Government remains focused on the war on terror, and that use of
force in Iraq is fully consistent with continuing to take necessary
actions against terrorists and terrorist organizations.