CONTENTS
Page
17
20
4
80
3
Adams, Dr. Gordon, director of the Security Policy Studies Program, Elliott
School of International Affairs, the George Washington University, Wash-
ington, DC
Prepared statement
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement
Corzine, Hon. Jon, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, statement submitted for
the record
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement
Marr, Dr. Phebe, former senior fellow, National Defense University, Wash-
ington, DC .....
Prepared statement
Mitchell, Ms. Sandra, vice president of Governmental Relations, International
Rescue Committee, Washington, DC
Prepared statement ......
Romero, Ms. Bernice, deputy director of Policy and External Affairs, Oxfam
America, statement submitted for the record
Schwartz, Mr. Eric P., senior fellow and director, Independent Task Force
on Post-Conflict Iraq, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC
Prepared statement
Executive Summary of Report of an Independent Task Force on Post-
Conflict Iraq
41
47
30
34
81
9
12
14
(III)


6
This is a very, very important hearing this morning and I am
deeply grateful to our witnesses for being here to explore what is
being done to plan for humanitarian relief and reconstruction in
the event we choose the road of war with Iraq. We are all very,
very anxious. I tried to find the right word here—uneasy, nerv-
ous—I think anxiousness is how I describe my constituency—I was
home over the weekend-about where we are in all of this issue.
And I am especially interested in knowing how far along the ad-
ministration and the international community are in planning for
what we may soon embark on. And that is a regime change in Iraq.
Has the administration, for instance, determined what it is likely
to cost, both the military operations and the aftermath? Has the
administration identified sources of financing to cover these costs?
Who will join us, if not in the coalition to deal militarily, but in
the aftermath? Are there countries that would not be a part of a
military operation but would be willing to be a part of a humani-
tarian effort in the wake of this? Will they contribute to some of
the costs of that?
How about the safety of people with the weapons of mass de-
struction, I think most recognize are in existence still in Iraq-as
to what extent the humanitarian relief workers receive the kind of
protections necessary for them to be able to go in and do the job?
These are just a couple of the questions that come to my mind
immediately. I know there are countless other ones that people
need answers to. And I think we need them sooner rather than
later.
Clearly, long-term peace and stability, as the chairman so right-
fully has already pointed out this morning, in the Middle East will
be affected by how well we plan for and handle humanitarian relief
and the longer term reconstruction in the post-Saddam Hussein
Iraq, should that come to pass.
Our witnesses this morning will, I hope, allow us to get a better
sense of the planning that is, and should be, under way at this
juncture-planning in the administration, the international hu-
manitarian relief organizations, private non-governmental organi-
zations.
I would also welcome their perspectives on how far along inter-
national relief agencies and the NGO community are, generally, in
their logistical preparations and pre-positioning of supplies in order
to meet the challenges that may confront us in Iraq in the coming
days and weeks. How much progress has been made in the sector-
by-sector planning, in calculating the costs of such programs, or in
identifying the resources, as I mentioned earlier, to pay for them?
I am terribly concerned that we are not as far along as we should
be at this juncture, considering we may just be days away from
military action; but frankly none of us really knows because the ad-
ministration, unfortunately, has been extremely vague. And I un-
derstand they cannot be as specific as some would like, but it
seems to me there is a distance between vagueness and specificity
that would allow us to at least have some idea of where we are
headed here.
I welcome our panel of expert witnesses this morning. I believe
they will add to the committee's knowledge on this subject, given
their long background experience in this area of discussion.


7
I regret, as the chairman has mentioned, that there are no rep-
resentatives of the administration here this morning. I know that
this is not due to any lack of effort on the chairman's part that
they be here. And I gather that the administration declined to
make either Mr. Natsios, the USAID administrator, or General
Garner, the Director of the newly established Office of Reconstruc-
tion and Humanitarian Assistance at the Pentagon, available to us
today. That is too bad in my view, because these are two very im-
portant individuals in the U.S. Government who will be primarily
responsible for overseeing U.S. humanitarian relief and reconstruc-
tion efforts in Iraq.
Just because the Congress already voted for H.J. Resolution 114
last year, providing the President with the authority to disarm
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, certainly did not mean that
Congress need not be kept apprised of what the administration in-
tends to do, not only in planning for military action but also in the
humanitarian relief and reconstruction of Iraq in the aftermath of
such action.
The administration, in my view, has an obligation to be as fully
candid as they can with the Congress and most especially-not so
much to us—but with the American people as we ramp up for war,
particularly as the decision to go to war will commit the United
States to an extensive and costly involvement in the aftermath of
that war. It will be even more costly and prolonged if the adminis-
tration moves ahead alone, because a sufficient number of U.N. Se-
curity Council members are not yet convinced that all peaceful
means of disarming Iraq have been exhausted.
It is not as though the administration has not discussed its plans
with others. According to recent news articles, Mr. Natsios has
asked five U.S. construction companies: Bechtel, Fluor Corporation,
Halliburton-owned Kellogg, Brown and Root, Louis Berger Group,
and Parsons Corporation to bid on a $900 million contract to re-
build Iraq-clearly only the first phase in what is likely to be a
much more costly undertaking, depending upon the war damage in-
curred and the presence or absence of a burden-sharing by others.
General Garner has also reportedly been in discussions with one
of Kofi Annan's deputies at the U.N. about contingency plans for
wartime humanitarian relief.
In light of those discussions, it is extremely difficult to under-
stand why the administration declined our invitation to be here
today. I do not think I am alone when I say that I am extremely
uneasy with the manner in which the administration has ap-
proached this issue at the United Nations, with the Congress, with
relief organizations, and most of all with the American people.
The time has come for the administration to be fully candid with
all of us and to listen to what we and others have to say about its
plans and timetable for action. Military action against Iraq may be
swift and simple. Alternatively, our involvement in Iraq may turn
out to be a long and protracted U.S. commitment.
Because one should always plan for the worst possible options,
the administration should, in my view, be doing everything possible
to be honest and forthcoming with all interested parties, particu-
larly this committee, the Congress, and the American people. And


8
then if the worst comes to pass, and we certainly hope it does not,
then we will be prepared and be willing to act accordingly.
So my hope would be, Mr. Chairman, that we would find a little
more willingness—and I want to emphasize the point here—I know
the administration has balked at the idea of giving sort of a specific
dollar amount, and I understand their concern about that. But
coming forward and saying this is, at least, our best case judgment
at this juncture, I think, would be very, very helpful in giving us
a better and clearer idea of how we ought to proceed.
But nonetheless, I am very grateful to these witnesses and very
grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, to give us a chance, at least, to ex-
plore the subject matter with people who are tremendously knowl-
edgeable about the subject matter before us today, and I thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
Just in fairness to Mr. Natsios, he has testified before our com-
mittee in another hearing, and I think he will be back in due
course.
Senator DODD. Right.
The CHAIRMAN. I was startled, however, as the Senator has
pointed out, that already a contract for perhaps $900 million has
been sent out to five bidders. At least we were apprised of that by
good coverage in the paper. And so we will continue to be per-
sistent and do our best.
Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement here from Sen-
ator Biden, which he would like to be included in the record. That
ought to precede my comments this morning.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. And all of Senator Biden's opening
statement will, of course, be made a part of the record.
Senator DODD. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me call now upon our panelists, and I will
introduce them in the order in which I will ask them to testify.
Mr. Eric Schwartz, senior fellow and director, Independent Task
Force on Post-Conflict Iraq, Council on Foreign Relations in Wash-
ington, DC; Dr. Gordon Adams, director of the Security Policy
Studies Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, The
George Washington University, Washington, DC; Ms. Sandra
Mitchell, vice president of Governmental Relations, International
Rescue Committee in Washington, DC; and Dr. Phebe Marr, a
former senior fellow of the National Defense University in Wash-
ington, DC.
In introducing Mr. Schwartz, let me simply mention that he is
going to publish tomorrow an independent task force study which
he has headed on post-conflict transition in Iraq; and so we look
forward to that study, which will be available to members of the
committee and the public fairly soon.
Dr. Marr is always busy, and she is currently updating the final
stages of her book, “The Modern History of Iraq.” We appreciated
her testimony of last year. The committee was somewhat prescient
in asking many questions of Dr. Marr, and we look forward to your
testimony again today.
First of all, Mr. Schwartz.


12
And if action is now centered at the Defense Department, how
can our government take better advantage—better advantage than
it is now taking, of the considerable expertise in management of
post-conflict requirements that exists in other U.S. Government
agencies, including the State Department and the U.S. Agency for
International Development?
In conclusion, recent history has demonstrated that post-conflict
peace building can be extraordinarily complex. In Iraq, where U.S.
efforts will involve uncertainty, trial and error, and uneven
progress, U.S. success will depend on our determination to sustain
a long-term and substantial commitment of American resources
and personnel, to ensure the active involvement of others in post-
conflict reconstruction, and to promote participation by the people
of Iraq in a process that validates their expectations about political
reconciliation and about a more hopeful and democratic future.
Thank you.
The ČHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Schwartz.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schwartz follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERIC P. SCHWARTZ, SENIOR FELLOW,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:
I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify on the critical issue of post-
conflict Iraq. I have looked at these questions rather closely in recent months, in
my capacity as director of the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force
on Post-Conflict Iraq. That Task Force, which is chaired by Ambassador Thomas
Pickering and Dr. James Schlesinger, will release its report tomorrow morning, and
I'd be grateful if the Committee would agree to include the Executive Summary of
that report in the written record of this hearing.
Although much of my testimony is informed by the work of the Task Force, I'm
here today in my personal capacity.
In addition to my work at the Council, I was formerly a senior NSC aide during
the Clinton administration, and had responsibilities for humanitarian assistance,
United Nations issues, and the management of complex crises. I have some appre-
ciation for the enormous challenge confronting the Bush administration. And while
much of what I say may be somewhat critical in tone, I want to emphasize that
there is a lot of good work being done by committed public servants to ensure that,
if a war takes place, battlefield victory will not be lost in the post-conflict environ-
ment.
If the United States goes to war and removes the regime of Saddam Hussein,
American interests will demand an extraordinary commitment of U.S. financial and
personnel resources to post-conflict transitional assistance and reconstruction. These
interests include securing the elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction; end-
ing Iraqi contacts, whether limited or extensive, with international terrorist organi-
zations; ensuring that a post-transition Iraqi government can maintain the country's
territorial integrity and independence while contributing to regional stability; and
promoting an internal democratic process in which the people of Iraq have a mean-
ingful voice in the policy decisions that impact their lives.
Given the limited time, let me offer five key questions which I would encourage
Committee members to raise with administration officials, and then briefly offer my
own perspectives.
1. What is the extent of our long-term political commitment to Iraq? What are
we prepared to spend, and when will the administration describe this in detail
to the American people?
It is critically important that the president step up his efforts to explain to the
American people the rationale for U.S. engagement in post-conflict Iraq, and it is
also essential that he begin to describe the magnitude of the American post-conflict
commitment. This is necessary if we are to sustain long-term support
after senior officials have turned to other crises in years to come.
So what are the costs? If you estimate a requirement of about 75,000 peace sta-
bilization troops—at a cost estimated by Congressional Budget Office (CBO) at $1.4
billion per month—and you add, say, a first-year U.S. contribution of humanitarian


15
States will be prepared to make substantial additional contributions in the future.
This initial contribution would include $2.5 billion for reconstruction and $500 mil-
lion for humanitarian aid. (However, if there are significant interruptions in the
availability of Iraqi oil revenues for the Oil for Food Program, the figure for humani-
tarian assistance would need to be considerably higher).
Key Recommendation #2: Protecting Iraqi civilians-a key to winning the peace
From the outset of conflict, the U.S. military should deploy forces with a mission
to establish public security and provide humanitarian aid. This is distinct from the
tasks generally assigned to combat troops, but it will be critical to preventing law-
lessness and reassuring Iraqis who might otherwise flee their homes. As women and
children will constitute the majority of refugees and internally displaced persons, spe-
cial efforts should be made to ensure that they are protected from sexual assault and
that their medical and health care needs are met. The Bush administration should
sustain this public security focus throughout the transition. None of the other U.S.
objectives in rebuilding Iraq would be realized in the absence of public security. If
the administration fails to address this issue effectively, it would fuel the perception
that the result of the U.S. intervention is an increase in humanitarian suffering.
Additional recommendations-protecting Iraqi civilians
• Assist civilian victims of any use of WMD. The U.S. and coalition partners
should be ready to conduct rapid assessment of any WMD use, publicize the re-
sults of such assessments, provide information to Iraqis on how to mitigate the
impact of WMD, and provide assistance to alleviate the health effects of WMD
exposure should it occur.
• Seek to ensure protection for displaced persons and refugees. Administration offi-
cials should press neighboring governments to provide safe haven in their coun-
tries for fleeing Iraqis. If the government of Turkey and other governments are
determined to estabīish camps within the territory of Iraq, U.S. officials should
seek to ensure that such camps are safe and secure.
• Sustain, for the time being, the basic structure of the Oil for Food Program. U.S.
officials should work closely and intensively with the World Food Program
(WFP) to ensure the continuation of the distribution network that sustains the
Oil for Food Program. The program should be modified over time to ensure
transparency and effectiveness in meeting Iraqi needs.
• Actively recruit international civilian police (ciupol) and constabulary forces.
Constabulary units such as Italy's Carabinieri have equipment, training, and
organization that enable them to maintain public order and address civil unrest.
In addition, international civilian police could play an important role in vetting,
training, and mentoring Iraqi police.
Key Recommendation #3: Sharing the burden for post-conflict transition and recon-
struction
The Bush administration should move quickly to involve international organiza-
tions and other governments in the post-conflict transition and reconstruction proc-
ess. This move will lighten the load on U.S. military and civilian personnel, and help
to diminish the impression that the United States seeks to control post-transition
Iraq.
The Bush administration will likely be reluctant, especially early in the transition
process, to sacrifice unity of command. On the other hand, other governments may
be hesitant to participate in activities in which they have little responsibility. The
Task Force recommends that the administration address this dilemma by promoting
post-conflict Security Council resolutions that endorse U.S. leadership on security
and interim civil administration in post-conflict Iraq, but also envision meaningful
international participation and the sharing of responsibility for decision-making in
important areas. The resolutions could direct WFP or another international humani-
tarian organization to assume lead responsibility for humanitarian assistance (and
involve NGOs and Iraqi civil society in aid management and delivery); indicate that
the United Nations will take responsibility in organizing (with U.S. support and as-
sistance) the political consultative process leading to a transition to a new Iraqi gov-
ernment; establish an oil oversight board for Iraq; authorize the continuation of the
UN's Oil for Food Program; establish a consortium of donors in conjunction with the
World Bank and the IMF to consider Iraqi reconstruction needs as well as debt re-
lief; and indicate that responsibilities in other areas could be transferred to the
United Nations and/or other governments as conditions permit.


32
In the event of military action, the United Nations will withdraw
international staff, interrupting the oil for food system, which can
quickly collapse, if the food supply pipeline or the distribution is
then disrupted by war.
Maritime insurance rates are already spiking and risks increase
daily for food shipments navigating their way to Iraqi ports past
the U.S. naval fleet and ground forces.
The United Nations' top humanitarian official for Iraq said 2
weeks ago that food stocks and supplies being prepositioned are not
sufficient for the known needs of Iraq.
Iraq's emergency response capacity will weaken during conflict
and cannot provide for the humanitarian needs of its 25 million
people.
U.S. planning has so embedded humanitarian tasks and activi-
ties with the military war plan that vital information remains clas-
sified and meaningful dialog continues to be muffled and one-direc-
tional. Coordination of relief efforts is best handled by civilians and
preferably on a multilateral basis by the United Nations.
Coordinating a humanitarian response must also be de-linked as
much as possible from any planned response against Iraq. Re-
cently, the administration stated its willingness to separate the hu-
manitarian issues from the political issues facing North Korea. The
same should be done for Iraq. This is best accomplished by U.S.
support for all necessary actions that grant the United Nations
clear authority for coordinating and mounting a humanitarian re-
sponse that is inclusive of its implementing partners.
I would like to emphasize this point and explain from the hu-
manitarian community's perspective why U.N. authority and civil-
ian oversight of humanitarian activities is so important.
First, the military should do what it does best, fight wars. And
the humanitarian organizations should do what we do best, care for
civilians and deliver assistance to those in need.
Second, humanitarian assistance must be provided on an impar-
tial basis to ensure that all civilians in need, regardless of race,
creed, nationality, or political belief, have fair and equal access to
aid. The United Nations is clearly more independent and impartial
than any one party to the conflict; and, therefore, should coordinate
and direct relief efforts.
And, third, confusing humanitarian and military activities car-
ries great security risks for those delivering assistance. Aid work-
ers, obviously, are not armed. We cannot defend ourselves and we
must never be mistaken for members of the military. Their lives
depend on this.
On this point, I would like to call your attention to the continued
abduction of Argan Erkel, a Dutch humanitarian worker abducted
7 months ago in Dagestan. We see Mr. Erkel's case as part of an
increase in violence against civilian populations and against hu-
manitarian aid workers trying to assist victims with relief. Please
join the humanitarian community in asking the Russian authori-
ties to give their highest political commitment to assure the release
of Mr. Erkel.
I would like to conclude with some steps that the United States
must be prepared to take to avoid humanitarian crises after war.


33
We have seen no plans on how the Bush administration plans to
protect Iraqi civilians after an intervention and while transitional
institutions are being stood up. The U.S. Government should be
formulating plans now to transfer power as quickly as feasible to
legitimate civilian structures in Iraq.
The Fourth Geneva Convention, of which the United States is a
signatory, sets forth essential steps that occupying powers must
take in order to avoid humanitarian crises. These steps hinge on
the United States protecting the rights of Iraqi civilians in Iraq in
the same way it does for Americans here. These duties are obliga-
tory upon first contact with Iraqi civilians and they require much
more than providing the basic needs of food, water, and shelter.
Grave humanitarian concerns will continue to befall Iraq the day
after the regime falls. Of critical importance to any provision of hu-
manitarian aid for Iraq is public order and security. The delivery
of humanitarian assistance cannot be assured in areas that are not
secure.
As Saddam's regime falls, the internal security framework will
collapse and conditions for lawlessness and impunity will ripen. Se-
curity vacuums will then appear.
Under the Geneva Conventions, the United States will have the
duty to restore and ensure public order and safety in Iraq. This
duty requires the United States and its allies to use their own per-
sonnel to provide a safe environment and ensure public order as
they advance into Iraq. These forces must transition quickly to po-
licing functions and fill a security vacuum that exists to provide no
space for reprisal and revenge.
The Geneva Conventions also require the United States to pro-
mote the rule of law and ensure that basic judicial and due process
guarantees exist for all Iraqis. As a signatory of the Geneva Con-
ventions, the United States will be expected to fulfill all these obli-
gations.
It will be critical that U.S. forces correctly identify and protect
vulnerable populations and communities that may be most at risk.
USAID disaster assistance response teams and the Office of Transi-
tion Initiatives are well suited to identify and assess the immediate
protection needs of the Iraqi population, and they should be encour-
aged to do so.
I understand that Senator Biden is crafting legislation to address
the protection needs of women and children in armed conflict.
would urge the committee members to support this legislation be-
cause it will focus USAID and the State Department's response to
the protection needs of conflict-affected populations, which are
equally as important as food and shelter.
My final comment concerns the state of preparedness for re-
sponding to the humanitarian consequences of weapons of mass de-
struction. I am afraid nothing has really been done to coordinate
a planned response to help Iraqis if weapons of mass destruction
are released upon them. There is no capacity in the international
and/or American humanitarian community to respond to emer-
gencies involving weapons of mass destruction. We do not know
what the capacity is of the U.S. military to help in such a case. A
serious discussion of this question remains to be held.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


34
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Mitchell, for that very
important testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Mitchell follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SANDRA MITCHELL, VICE PRESIDENT, GOVERNMENT
RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE
The International Rescue Committee (IRC)1 continues to advocate for a peaceful
resolution to the Iraq crisis. Nevertheless as a humanitarian organization we must
take prudent, preparatory measures to meet the humanitarian consequences of a
conflict. In that regard, the IRC remains concerned about the lack of preparedness
for emergency relief operations and reconstruction efforts if they are required for
Iraq.
I. HUMANITARIAN NEEDS ALREADY EXIST
A. Current Situation. The starting point for contingency planning begins with an
already bleak humanitarian situation in Iraq. The United Nations' statistics are
well known:
• one million children under the age of five are chronically malnourished;
• five million Iraqis lack access to safe water and sanitation;
• 60% of the population or an estimated 16 million Iraqis are dependent on the
UN Oil-for-Food Program for their food rations. 2
Assuming there are no population movements, household food reserves are ex-
pected to last for no more than six weeks if the pipeline breaks. Economic hardship
is already driving many poor families to sell extra food rations distributed by the
regime in anticipation of war.3 Water treatment and electric generation plants are
in disrepair, and hospitals and clinics suffer from chronic shortages of medicines
and equipment. If populations do move, then in addition to food and medicine, sani-
tation, safe water and diarrhea-control programs will be essential to prevent death.4
The UN Oil-for-Food Program is the single largest humanitarian assistance effort
underway in the world, and it has existed in Iraq for more than a decade. Any mili-
tary intervention will further shock and disrupt the fragile humanitarian condition
of Iraq.
B. Inadequate Response Capacity in Iraq. The current state of emergency pre-
paredness in Iraq is cause for alarm. Estimations are that there are less than 20
international humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Iraq. While
more than that number have attempted to carry out assessment missions, few
NGOs have been able to establish an operational capacity inside Iraq during the
last 6 months. This is due to sanctions, both UN and U.S. for American NGOs, a
lack of funding, difficulty in obtaining visas from the regime and the expenditure
of private resources to other more immediate crises around the world. Many of the
international agencies with emergency capacity in Iraq are expected to withdraw
staff in the event of a military intervention—this includes the United Nations. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a handful of aid agencies are
preparing to stay during a conflict but only the ICRC has amassed significant sup-
plies and resources for such contingencies. Although ICRC will reduce its inter-
national staff by 50% in the event of conflict they have pre-positioned food and non-
1 Founded in 1933, the International Rescue Committee is one of the world's largest non-
sectarian nonprofit organizations, providing global emergency relief, rehabilitation, protection,
resettlement services and advocacy for refugees, displaced persons and victims of oppression and
violent conflict. The IRC, which currently provides assistance in some 30 countries, is committed
to freedom, human dignity, and self-reliance.
2 For a comprehensive discussion on the Oil-for-Food Program and health of the Iraqi popu-
lation see: “Health and Human Rights Consequences of War in Iraq: A Briefing Paper” Physi-
cians for Human Rights, 14 Feb 03. http://www.phrusa.org/research/iraq/021403.html
3 UN Press Briefing on Humanitarian Preparedness Planning for Iraq, 13 Feb 03 (Under-Sec-
retary General).
4 Yip, R., Sharp, T.W., Acute Malnutrition and High Childhood Mortality Related to Diar-
rhea-Lessons Learned from the 1991 Kurdish Refugee Crisis, JAMA, Vol. 270, Issue 5, pp. 587-
590, August 4, 1993. In March of 1991, fearing further persecution from the Iraqi Army, ap-
proximately 500,000 Kurds fled toward Turkey. From March to May 1991, the leading causes
of death for Kurdish children under 5 in the mountain camps along the Turkey-Iraq border were
diarrheal disease, dehydration and malnutrition. These diseases represented 75% of the total
under-5 mortality. One of the lessons learned from the 1991 Kurdish refugee crisis is that “ade-
quate food and basic medical care may not be sufficient to prevent high morbidity and mortality
where sanitation, safe water and diarrhea-control programs are lacking.” (p. 590)


41
of security forces often contain documentation essential for clarifying property inter-
ests and the status of those displaced.
K. Protect Detainees and the Missing. Political detainees and issues relating to
missing persons will also require fast attention and a planned response. When Sad-
dam opened the prisons a few months ago, he left an unknown number of Iraqis
in detention as “enemies of the state” and ignored the pleas of family members
searching frantically for their missing kin. Quickly the affected populations will de-
mand action and answers from U.S./Coalition forces on these issues.
V. CONCLUSION
It is the conclusion of the International Rescue Committee that while much plan-
ning regarding the above issues has occurred very few resources have been spent
to operationalize the plans. The lack of preparedness for the humanitarian con-
sequences of war stands in stark contrast to the military state of readiness. It is
urgent that all available resources be marshaled as well for this humanitarian re-
sponse.
The CHAIRMAN. Before I call upon you, Dr. Marr, let me make
this announcement: On behalf of the committee, we understand
that at 10:30, which is not far away, a rollcall vote will be held on
the Senate floor on a motion to instruct the absent Senators to
come to the floor. It is a parliamentary vote but, nevertheless, one
in which we shall all want to participate in.
At 11 o'clock, there is to be a meeting on the Senate floor, in
which all members have been requested to discuss the advise-and-
consent provisions as they pertain to judicial nominations; and the
Vice President will be in the chair, I am advised.
Dr. Marr, after you commence your testimony, will you please go
through to the conclusion. I will be here to hear you, and probably
other members will be here as well.
The Chair will then recess the hearing to vote, and will then re-
turn, and other members may do the same; but we will continue
to proceed with the hearing. This is a very important hearing on
behalf of the Senators and the American people.
And so at that point, as we return, we will have a round of ques-
tions from Senators as they are able to participate.
Dr. Marr, would you please proceed?
STATEMENT OF DR. PHEBE MARR, FORMER SENIOR FELLOW,
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. MARR. Well, I, too, would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman,
and the committee for inviting me again. And I hope I can add
something to what I have said previously.
Like Mr. Schwartz, I have five questions that I have asked my-
self and would ask you about this venture, and I realize that my
task is to attempt to look at this from the Iraqi perspective, as best
I can.
I have been asked to address some of the issues the United
States will face in the aftermath of this military action. Obviously
the task is going to be affected by what military action is taken,
how successful it is going to be, and what kind of destruction might
ensue.
It is also clear that humanitarian efforts will be needed in the
immediate aftermath of the war. I did not intend to address those
issues; they are not my focus.
I am assuming here that it is the day after, the allies are in con-
trol of Iraq, and that such humanitarian efforts are underway.


42
Here are the five fundamental issues and problems that I see the
United States facing in the transition period as it attempts to es-
tablish a new regime. First, I would make a distinction between
two tasks here, governance and administration. By governance I
mean the political process of selecting leaders, mobilizing public
support, adequately representing various elements of the popu-
lation, and implementing policy. That is going to be a long-term ef-
fort and very difficult job in Iraq.
By administration, I mean the daily business of running govern-
ment and providing services. As I say, the first is going to be dif-
ficult, probably the most difficult task facing the United States in
Iraq.
The second should be relatively easy, if all goes well. Unlike
many other developing countries, Iraq does have a functioning bu-
reaucracy capable of running most services in the country. After
the United States has vetted top levels of this administration, the
political levels, the United States should plan to use this bureauc-
racy, which is the repository of much of Iraq's skilled middle class,
to run much of the country.
These Iraqis should constitute the new face of the post-Saddam
administration. Nonetheless, I think we need to be aware of some
difficulties in using this bureaucracy.
Iraq is over-bureaucratized. In its heyday, possibly a third of the
population, exclusive of the military, worked for the government,
directly or indirectly. In Iraq's command economy, government con-
trolled the education system, much of the media, all large and most
medium-sized industry, as well as providing the usual government
services. We all know about a large military and a numerous and
ubiquitous security service. This service should be reduced.
In any event, in the post-gulf war Iraq, under sanctions, these
institutions have already shrunk. The Ba’ath party cadre, which
used to constitute about 10 percent of the population is now down
to about 2 percent. The military, of course, has been drastically
downsized since the gulf war, but is still very large.
The bureaucracy has shrunk as well. Moreover, it is not as effec-
tive as it used to be. Because of sanctions, most bureaucrats, on
fixed salaries, often work a second or third job, which obviously
gives them less time to do the work for which they were hired.
Corruption is now rife in the bureaucracy for much the same rea-
son. There are two additional weaknesses of this bureaucracy
worth mentioning. One is that it is highly centralized. There is no
tradition of decentralization in Iraq.
Under the Ba'ath, the civil service has been thoroughly cowed by
the political leadership. It is not used to—and perhaps not even
yet-capable of taking much initiative. Initiative is going to be in
short supply.
And second, we want to keep in mind that this central bureauc-
racy does not function in the Kurdish area of the north, which has
developed its own administration.
A second aspect of this first point is governance. The establish-
ment of some kind of representative political system capable of for-
mulating and implementing policy is going to be much more dif-
ficult. We all know that Iraq has not had such a system for dec-
ades. The closest it came to a representative system was in the last


54
states which are very close to failing and are unable to protect the
citizens.
I am side-stepping the issue of the justness of the war with re-
gard to Iraq. The obligations of this country are pretty clear in a
day-after scenario, which are the Geneva Conventions. The United
States has stated its intent to occupy—it is a cold war term, I
know, but nevertheless, I think the meaning is that we have re-
sponsibilities as a nation, should a military intervention be under-
taken with regards to Iraq.
The humanitarian crises, which could befall Iraq in a day-after
scenario could, indeed, be extremely serious if the security frame-
work collapses.
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Marr.
Dr. MARR. I do not think we should be quite so pessimistic. We
tend to keep pointing out all the negatives.
I would say two things about Iraq that perhaps do not apply to
other failed states. Since the gulf war, for which we had some re-
sponsibility we have unintended outcomes, particularly in the
north, partly as a result of a humanitarian crisis. Iraq is a failing
state.
I agree that it has not failed yet. But if you look at the north,
you see, exactly what we are talking about, lack of control of bor-
ders, lack of control of territory. And we have a little pocket of ter-
ritory right up there, which is worrisome.
The longer we leave Iraq in the current state, the more it is
going to fail. It has not yet failed; it is still revivable. So to me,
pulling the plug and saying, “Well, what comes after is going to be
worse than went before,” is not acceptable. In other words, putting
it off is going to be worse than taking care of it now.
Second, although I recognize resources are going to have to be
put into Iraq and it is going to take some time to revive the oil in-
dustry, we know that it has oil resources.
I am less pessimistic about the financial side of this over the long
term. Iraq has a very energetic population. They do have oil re-
sources and, within a reasonable period of time, they should not be
on the dole at all.
What this is going to require is a long-term effort in human re-
sources and a political effort to do it right. That is going to be the
cost, I think, more than a burden to the budget.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
Senator DODD. No. Thank you all and that is excellent.
I think Senator Lugar asked the pivotal question. I guess I am
at a juncture here. My questions will work off an assumption. I do
not really like the assumption I am about to make, but let us for
the sake of discussion, make it, and that is that the war has hap-
pened, that we have—whatever time it has taken-hopefully very
short—that we have “prevailed militarily.” And it is now a question
of what will we do.
And I would like to use the opportunity of your presence here to
sort of try to be optimistic about this and talk about what we ought
to be doing in order to minimize the costs here, to maximize the
participation of others, principally to see to it that the innocent ci-
vilian populations and the people of Iraq who deserve a lot better
than they have been getting certainly under Saddam Hussein and