HSSE Y 4. F 7612. S.HRG. 108-16? S. HRG. 108-167 BEYOND IRAQ: REPERCUSSIONS OF IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION POLICIES HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION JUNE 12, 2003 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations PURDUE UNIVERSITY DEC 15 2003 U.S. DEPOSITORY Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2003 90–076 PDF For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 1039-A 2004-41-P CONTENTS Page 6 7 11 Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement Galbraith, Hon. Peter W., distinguished fellow, Institute for International and Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC Prepared statement Kemp, Dr. Geoffrey, director, Regional Strategic Programs, The Nixon Center, Washington, DC ...... Prepared statement Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement Wisner, Hon. Frank G., vice chairman, External Affairs, American Inter- national Group, New York, NY Prepared statement 15 20 3 25 28 (III) BEYOND IRAQ: REPERCUSSIONS OF IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION POLICIES THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 2003 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SD- 419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chair- man of the committee), presiding. Present: Senators Lugar, Alexander, Sununu, Biden, and Fein- gold. The CHAIRMAN. The meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee is called to order. This is the third of a series of hearings on the post-conflict Iraq situation. During our first two hearings, adminis- tration witnesses identified the needs and problems in rebuilding Iraq, and outlined the administration's responses. Those hearings have given the American public and the Congress insight into the complex decisions involved in formulating United States policies in post-conflict Iraq. Today, the Foreign Relations Committee will hear from expert witnesses from outside the Bush administration. And we welcome Ambassador Peter Galbraith, from the National Defense Univer- sity, a long-time associate of this committee, and, of course, a former Ambassador; and Dr. Geoffrey Kemp, director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, who was very helpful to the committee prior to Iraq, and we look forward to his comments, especially at this juncture; and Ambassador Frank G. Wisner, co- chair of the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force, which re- cently published the report, “Iraq: The Day After,” an extensive and very important contribution. Ambassador Wisner is a many- time participant in our hearings, a long-time friend of all of us. We're delighted that all three of you are here to share your wisdom this morning. Each of these experts has a wealth of experience and knowledge on Iraq, the Middle East region, and United States foreign policy. We've asked them to examine our policies and our plans in Iraq from three perspectives. First of all, how should the United States deal with domestic issues in Iraq and in other Middle Eastern countries; in particular, how can we promote the prospects for democracy or stability or eco- nomic reform, all simultaneously? And, second, what are the reper- cussions of United States' policies in Iraq on regional political and (1) 5 view—and you know this well; you share the same view—the American people are prepared to do whatever they are told or con- vinced is in the interest of the United States, including making sac- rifices. We are going to see more body bags come home. They're going to come in dribs and drabs, as we both, you and I, predicted last October. If we have only American uniforms guarding oil fields, guarding buildings, guarding checkpoints, maintaining peace and order, it's inevitable. And it's a heck of a price to pay, but it's an inevitable price to pay. It's also going to cost us and the world community, God willing, if we do this right, billions of dollars. There's not enough oil in Iraq to provide for all of the needs, let alone the billeting of our troops in that country for the expected time. And that expected time, of most informed observers, is a whole lot more than a year, and less than 10. Everybody can argue in between, but nobody is, any longer, talking about being able to bring American forces home in the near term. And which leads me to the primary point that I wish to make and I hope our witnesses will speak to, and that is that, as I said, I firmly believe if you tell the American people the facts, they will do whatever it takes, and they're prepared to do it. One of the things that this notion about Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz saying, “We cannot have unrealistic expectations”—the American people have no real good expectation yet, because they have not been told yet, by the President or others, what is likely to be expected of them, other than the generic phrase, “We'll stay as long as it takes.” And we're soon going to find, I predict, that an awful lot of those National Guard units in Delaware and Indiana and Cali- fornia and Wisconsin and all over the United States, who are there, who are now being extended for another 6 months and 8 months and 4 months—you're going to find that, in the neighborhoods back home, people are going to want a broader, clearer explanation of what is expected and what it's going to take. And so I'm going to ask, at some point, not that any of the three are military experts, but what are the realistic expectations of how long we are going to be deeply involved, whether that means with 75,000 forces or where we have now over 160,000 forces, or wheth- er that means with large numbers of deployed MPs, or whatever it means, just what are we talking about here? What do these three experts think we're talking about here, in terms of duration? In broad terms. Broad terms. I'm not looking for someone to say “16 months and 4 days,” or “9 years and 2 months,” but just in broad terms. And the other point that I'd like to make, and I'll cease, is, before the war, we heard a great deal of discussion about the so-called de- mocracy domino theory. And I'd like to hear our witnesses talk about what impact they think will occur in the region if we handle the situation in Iraq well, as it relates to democratization in the region, and what is the impact-it's a version of which you said, Mr. Chairman-if we do not get it right. And, most importantly, I'd like to know, from these three men, who I have an inordinate amount of respect for—I mean, they've been before this committee, and I count two of them as personal 6 friends, because I've known them longer and I've known them more intimately—I'd like to know what you all think constitutes success in post-Saddam Iraq. What is it? Because we talk about democra- tization, we talk about stability, we talk about—we use a lot of phrases, but I'm not sure what we really mean by what constitutes success. For me, the notion of being able to have a democratic—a liberal, democratic government in Iraq in the near term would be difficult even if the Lord Almighty came down and sat at the witness table and told us every single decision to make. I think it would be dif- ficult, even with divine guidance. But I do think it's possible to have a stable democracy, to paraphrase a delegate from Pennsyl- vania at the Continental Convention, that “squints toward democ- racy,” one that is more of a republic, that has a growing and sus- tained respect for human rights, for the rule of law, for the market- place. But I think that's a pretty tall order, all by itself. So, in conclusion, I'd like to get a sense, at some point, from the witnesses, what they think would constitute success in Iraq. And, again, we have a number of specific questions, all of us. I really am grateful to the three of you for being here. We've called on you many times, and the record should note that the chairman and I and others on this committee call on you person- ally, as well. Poor Dr. Kemp was sequestered in my office for about 2 or 3 hours this week, my asking his advice. I did the same with Peter. I've often done it with Frank. And so your commitment to trying to get this right, across party lines, in a bipartisan way, is something that is greatly appreciated and very much needed. So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm anxious to hear our wit- nesses. [The opening statement of Senator Biden follows:] OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses today. Last July and August, you and I held a comprehensive set of hearings on Iraq. One of the panels we convened was devoted to the subject of the regional context. In fact, Dr. Kemp testified on that panel. Clearly, the aftermath of hostilities in Iraq cannot be viewed in a vacuum. The ultimate success of our efforts to create a stable, representative government at peace with its neighbors will both influence and be influenced by the regional environ- ment. A number of important American interests intersect in the Middle East-includ- ing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the war on terrorism, the dec- ades long goal of achieving Arab-Israeli peace, our nation's dependence on gy supplies, and the glaring absence of democracy in the Arab world. For better or worse, the United States is now a Middle Eastern power. In fact, we are the pre-eminent power. With 150,000 troops in Iraq and alliances stretching across the region, we have deeply vested interest in seeing the Middle East evolve in a positive direction. We look to our witnesses today to help us identify the choices we face and to offer guidance on the larger strategic focus of American policy in the region. Are Iraq's neighbors playing a constructive or destructive role? What objectives do the Syrians, Iranians, and Turks have? Could a different U.S. policy toward Iran have an impact on Iranian actions in Iraq? How would Iran react to an aggressive regime change policy? How would it respond to a policy of engagement? How will the composition of the next Iraqi gov- ernment affect Iranian perceptions and behavior? More broadly, what should our policy be toward Iran? How should we conceive of security in the Persian Gulf? Should we expect to see the military competition between Iraq and Iran continue? How will the smaller 7 states of the Gulf react to the new reality? Is it time to think of a new security ar- chitecture for the Gulf-if so, what would be its main elements? What is the best way to deal with Syria and get it out of the terrorism business and get it out of Lebanon? Can coercion alone work? Is there a credible alternative to the present regime in Damascus and how would that impact our interests? What is the best approach to take with respect to Saudi Arabia? What reforms can we realistically expect the Royal Family to take? What should our long-term posture be with respect to the Kingdom? Before the war we heard a great deal of discussion of the so-called “democracy domino theory.” I'd like to hear what impact our witnesses think the war has had on regional attitudes toward democracy. What is the best way to advance democracy throughout the region? I'd also like to hear the assessment of our witnesses regarding the reconstruction effort in Iraq. Ambassador Wisner chaired a Council on Foreign Relations Task Force that produced a first-rate planning document for post-Saddam Iraq. Ambas- sador Galbraith, who served on the Committee staff for several years, was recently on the ground in Iraq for three weeks. And Dr. Kemp has consulted closely with Europeans and Arabs on the Iraq issue. Where in your judgment could we be doing better? Have we done enough to in- volve our friends and allies in the reconstruction and peacekeeping effort? What sort of political process would you design for the post-conflict transition? There is a lot of ground to cover and I look forward to your testimony. The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Senator Biden. Let me indicate that we'll hear the witnesses in the order of, first of all, Ambassador Galbraith, then Dr. Kemp, and then Ambas- sador Wisner. All of your statements will be made a part of the record in full, so you need not ask for that to happen. It will. And each of you may proceed to summarize or extemporize, but present the ideas that you have in the most effective way possible. The Chair will be liberal in terms of the time that's required to do that, because the purpose of the hearing is to hear you, not to constrain you, but to make certain that your ideas are fully presented. And then we will have questioning by the members. Procedurally, there will be a rollcall vote, I am advised, on the Senate floor at 11 a.m. So, at that point, we probably will have completed the original testimony by the witnesses. We'll be into the questioning period. We'll take a short recess, so that members may vote, and then come back. We will ask for your patience during that recess. It's now a privilege to call upon you, Ambassador Galbraith, for your testimony. STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. GALBRAITH, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC Ambassador GALBRAITH. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Senator Feingold, Senator Alexander, as a former staff member of this com- mittee, it is, of course, a real honor to be invited back to testify. I consider that the work I did for this committee in the 1980s and 1990s, documenting the atrocities of the Saddam Hussein regime, to have been some of the most important of my career. And what I talk about today draws on 20 years of experience with Iraq, as well as a 3-week trip I took shortly after American forces entered Baghdad, from April 13 to May 2 of this year. I would note, for the record, that while I'm an employee of the Department of Defense at the National Defense University, my views do not necessarily reflect the views of those institutions. 11 Kurds will insist on equality of the Kurdish and Arab languages, and that Iraq not define itself as an Arab state. It is not clear how the Arab parts of Iraq would organize them- selves. Some Shi’ite leaders have spoken of creating a predomi- nantly Shi’ite province in the South that would, in essence, be a mirror of the Kurdistan province. Others have spoken of using the existing Arab governates as a basis for federalism. It is likely that a future Iraqi federation will be asymmetric, meaning Kurdistan will have more power than other federal units. Federalism, espe- cially when combined with revenue sharing, resolves many of the contradictions of modern Iraq. In the South, the Shi’ite religious parties may be able to adopt a more Islamic form of local adminis- tration without imposing it on the aggressively secular Kurds or on all of Baghdad. Federalism may help ease the fears from Sunni Arabs about domination from an unholy alliance of Kurds and Shi 'ites. And federalism may persuade the Kurdish people, over time, that they can have a place within Iraq. Creating a federation will be complicated. Among the difficult issues to be resolved will be the boundaries of different provinces, and particularly how much territory south and west of the former green line would be included in Kurdistan. Presumably, this would have to be resolved by local referendums or censuses. All parties will have to take into account the interests of other communities who may have their own demands for self-government, such as the Turkomans, Assyrians, and Chaldeans. The United States should refrain from imposing its own views on the outcome and should avoid coercing any of the parties into accepting political arrange- ments they will later regret. It seems to me that President Bush had it right when he out- lined his vision of Iraq as a place where Shi'ite and Sunni and the Kurds can get along in a federation. Indeed, in my view, this is the only way Iraq can long survive. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Galbraith follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PETER W. GALBRAITH, DISTINGUISHED FEL- LOW, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY Mr. Chairman, Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Operation Iraqi Freedom has transformed Iraq. Even Iraqis opposed to the Amer- ican military occupation embrace the result—the removal of Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath regime. In three weeks in Iraq beginning April 13, I saw many scenes exemplifying the joy of liberation. These included: • Shiites exuberantly marching to Karbala to commemorate as-shoura, an impor- tant religious pilgrimage banned for 27 years; • Kurds posing for family pictures on ruined Iraqi tanks; • Picnickers in Mosul playing soccer on the grounds of Saddam's hundred acre palace, and swimming in his swimming pool; and • Ex-political prisoners banging away at toppled statues of the fallen dictator. Everywhere, there are signs of the horror from which the people of Iraq escaped. In Mosul, I watched as men dug up bodies with their bare hands. The forearms of each corpse had been tied together with nylon rope, and bullet fragments lay nearby in the ground. On this trip, I had the opportunity to visit prisons and torture cen- ters near Kirkuk and Baghdad that I heard about from survivors who had escaped in the 1990s. If anything, these places were more horrific than even the survivors could convey. And every place in Iraq (except for the Kurdish-governed region), I 12 encountered Iraqis holding faded pictures and scraps of papers as they searched for loved ones who disappeared into Saddam Hussein's murder apparatus. For thirty-five years, the peoples of Iraq endured a regime that carried out two genocides, the “anfal” campaign against the Kurds in the late 1980s and the de- struction of the Marsh Arabs in the 1990s, that murdered hundreds of thousands of political foes, that routinely engaged in torture, and that killed upwards of 300,000 Shiites in the months following the failed 1991 uprising. (Just one mass grave near al Hillal contains 30,000 corpses.) Because of this exceptional record of genocide, murder, and cruelty, I supported President Bush's decision to go to war to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. I believe the war can be fully justified as a humanitarian intervention to save lives, very similar to those the United States undertook in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. A CATASTROPHIC AFTERMATH Unfortunately, U.S. goals in stabilizing Iraq, and creating conditions for democ- racy in that country were seriously undermined by the U.S. failure to prevent cata- strophic looting in Baghdad and by an uncertain and confused approach to post war governance. While Ambassador Bremer has clearly brought greater coherence to U.S. efforts, it may be impossible to recover from the weak start to the Coalition occupation. When the United States entered Baghdad on April 9, it entered a city largely undamaged by a carefully executed military campaign. However, in the three weeks following the U.S. takeover, unchecked looting effectively gutted every important public institution in the city-with the notable exception of the oil ministry. The physical losses are huge. They include: • The National Library, which was looted and burned. Equivalent to our Library of Congress, it held every book published in Iraq, all newspapers from the last century, as well as rare manuscripts. The destruction of the library meant the loss of an historical record going back to Ottoman times. • The Iraqi National Museum, which was looted. While the losses of archae- ological artifacts are not as great as originally feared, thousands of items have been smashed or stolen. The 34 display pieces stolen include some of the muse- um's most valuable items. The 5000-year-old Warqa Vase contained the first im- ages of religious ceremonies and is estimated to be worth as much $100 million. • Banks, which were attacked everywhere. • Hospitals and other public health institutions, which were stripped of medical equipment, medicines, and, in some cases, patient beds. Baghdad and Mosul Universities which were stripped of computers, office fur- niture, and books. The furniture and computers are replaceable. Decades of aca- demic research went up in smoke or was scattered, and is not easily replaced. • Government ministries, which were looted and/or burned. At the Irrigation Min- istry, millions of dollars worth of hydrologic records may have been lost, a mat- ter of vital importance in a country known as the land of two rivers. These losses will certainly complicate efforts to undo one of the worse crimes of the Saddam Hussein regime, the systematic draining of the southern marshes. The Ministry of Higher Education held records of professional qualifications that are now lost. • The National Theater, which looters set afire nearly three weeks after U.S. forces entered Baghdad. Even more surprising, the United States failed to secure sites related to Iraq's WMD programs or obvious locations holding important intelligence. As a result, the United States lost valuable information that related to Iraq's WMD procurement, paramilitary resistance, foreign intelligence activities, and possible links to al- Qaeda. Let me provide a few examples: • On April 16, looters attacked the Iraqi equivalent of the Center for Disease Con- trol taking live HIV and live black fever. The building had long been considered a highly suspicious place by both UNMOVIC and UNSCOM, and had been sub- ject to repeated inspections. It is quite possible that the building contained evi- dence relating to Iraq's biological weapons program, but if that is the case we may now never now. The Marine Lieutenant who watched from next door as looters ransacked the building told us: “I am afraid I am responsible for Arma- geddon, but no one told me what was in that building.” Fortunately, I saw no 14 The initial decision to reappoint judges from the old regime shocked Iraqis even more. The old judges had administered injustice for 35 years, and with mass graves being uncovered every day, Iraqis desperately want justice. Even more incompre- hensible, the American official in charge of prisons had apparently begun to consult with Au al-Jabouri, the warden of Abu Ghraib on how to reestablish an Iraqi prison system. Abu Ghraib was the most notorious prison in Iraq, and with the Khmer Rouge’s Toul Sleng, probably the most deadly prison in the world since 1945. Ambassador Bremer quickly, and rightly, reversed these decisions, disqualifying high Baath officials from public office. But the initial appointments—and then the sudden reversal-created an impression among Iraqis that the U.S. authorities did not quite know what they were doing. The handling of the political transition has contributed to the impression of inco- herence. General Garner traveled around Iraq promising that a representative as- sembly would soon be convened to name provisional government. Ambassador Bremer has reduced Iraqi participation in the new administration to a small, ap- pointed advisory council. In this case, I think General Garner had the better of the argument. However, the greater damage comes from the appearance of uncertainty. A POLITICAL PATH The first weeks of U.S. occupation have shown the limits of American power in Iraq. The missteps have also served to limit American power in the country. The United States cannot decide the political future of Iraq, although can help influence the process. This has a short term and long term dimension. In my judgment, any occupying power has a relatively short window before which the goodwill generated by liberation is replaced by anger and frustration at the lack of progress in improving the quality of life of the people of the country. For reasons outlined above, the United States may have an especially short window in Iraq. This means transferring real power to Iraqis as soon as possible. The problem is, which Iraqis? The U.S. occupation authorities should, in my view, give up the search for the mythical insiders who can help lead Iraq to prosperity and democracy. Obviously, there are many talented men and women who stayed in Iraq through the Baath pe- riod, and probably some of them are committed to liberal democracy. However, given the nature of Saddam's regime, any such person kept his or her views secret, or was dead. Except for the Kurdish-controlled region, there are no identifiable leaders from inside Iraq with democratic credentials. Unless we plan on staying in Iraq for the decade (or more) needed to develop an alternative leadership, we must work with the former exile leaders and the Kurdish leaders. While it easy to belittle the exiles as “Saville Row” or “armchair” revolu- tionaries, I think this is very unfair. Many are talented individuals, deeply con- cerned with the future of their country. They have kept alive the cause of freedom in Iraq for decades when the international community, and even the United States, saw Saddam Hussein as a strategic partner, not a pariah. Iraqis, even if exiles and Kurds, will have more local knowledge than the coalition authorities. They know enough to avoid some of the mistakes ORHA made, such as working with the old Iraqi prison authorities. And, from the U.S. perspective, it is far better to have Iraqis blaming their own provisional government for the inevi- table shortcomings of the occupation than for everyone to be blaming the U.S. VOLUNTARY UNION The long-term challenge facing the United States in Iraq is developing a demo- cratic political system while holding the country together. Most people in Iraq do not primarily identify themselves as Iraqis, and one group, the Kurds, would prefer not to be Iraqis at all. Iraq is an ancient land but a relatively new state cobbled together at the end of World War I from three quite different Ottoman Provinces—largely Kurdish Mosul, Sunni Arab Baghdad, and Shiite Basra. Throughout its ninety-year history, Sunni Arabs have run the country, often brutally repressing the non-Arab Kurds and the majority Shiites. Clearly, this historical domination of the country by one group has impeded the development of a single national identity. The Shiites speak of themselves primarily through their religious identity. While the Shiites are not separatists, many feel their status as long time victims and as the majority population entitle them to run the country. This terrifies Sunni Arabs who not only fear the loss of historic privilege but also retribution. Ironically, Sad- dam Hussein's pan-Arab Baath ideology also encouraged Sunni Arabs to think of themselves not primarily as Iraqis but as a unit of the larger Arab nation. 15 The people least accepting of an Iraqi identity are the Kurds. For the last twelve years, four million in Kurds have governed themselves in a de facto independent state protected by the United States and Great Britain. With their own elected par- liament and having enjoyed relative freedom and prosperity, the Kurds have no de- sire to return to control from Baghdad. For most Iraqi Kurds, Baghdad is associated with decades of repression and, more recently, Saddam Hussein's genocide. With Kurdish replacing Arabic as the language of schools, media, and government, the Iraqi identity has largely disappeared in Kurdish-run regions, especially among younger people. Holding Iraq together by force is not an option. The Kurds now control the only remaining Iraqi Army—the 100,000 strong peshmerga who now possess the heavy weapons they long coveted. It is unlikely a future Iraqi regime will have the power to destroy Kurdish self-government. It is inconceivable that the United States would-or could coerce the Kurdistan Region into accepting political arrangements for a future Iraq that did not include a continuation of the current levels of self- government. The Kurds, after all, were America's second major ally in the recent war, sustaining more casualties than the British, and compensating for Turkey's noncooperation by creating the desperately needed northern front themselves. If Iraq cannot be held together by force, then the only alternative is to build in- centives for its peoples to form a voluntary union. Fortunately the prospect of shar- ing oil revenues does provide an incentive for Iraq's diverse peoples to stay together. The Iraqi opposition has long supported federalism as a model for a future Iraq, a position both secular Arab and Shiite religious parties have reaffirmed since the fall of Baghdad. While there are different views of Federation, it clearly will be at best a loose federation. The Kurds look to Canada and Bosnia as possible models. They will want a single Kurdistan Parliament and government, the power to tax and spend, control of the police, ownership of natural resources (although oil reve- nues may be pooled), and the right to maintain a Kurdistan self defense force. The Kurds will insist on equality of the Kurdish and Arabic languages, and that Iraq not be defined as an Arab state. It is not clear how the Arab parts of Iraq would organize themselves. Some Shiite leaders have spoken of creating a predominantly Shiite province in the South, in essence a mirror image of Kurdistan Province in the north. Other Arabs have pro- posed using the existing 14 Arab governates as a basis for federation in their part of the country. It is likely that in a future Iraqi federation will be asymmetric- meaning Kurdistan will have substantially more power than the other federal units. Federalism-especially when combined with revenue sharing-resolves many of the contradictions of modern Iraq. In the South, the Shiite religious parties may be able to adopt a more Islamic form of local administration without imposing it on the aggressively secular Kurdish leadership or on all of Baghdad. Federalism may help ease fears from Sunni Arabs-particularly those in the Baghdad-Ramadi- Tikrit-Samara heartland-about domination from an unholy alliance of Kurds and Shiites. Federalism may persuade the Kurdish people, now accustomed to running their own affairs that they can do so without separating from Iraq. The future of Iraq will have to be sorted out with the agreement of all the rel- evant peoples-i.e. the Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shiites. The United States should refrain from imposing its own views on the outcome, and should avoid coercing any of the parties into accepting political arrangements they will later come to regret. Creating a Federation will be complicated. Among the difficult issues to be re- solved will be the boundaries of different Provinces, and in particular, how much of the territory south and west of the former green line should be included in Kurdistan. (Presumably, there should be local referendums or censuses to decide the matter). All parties will have take into account the interests of other communities, such as the Turkomen, Assyrians, and Chaldeans. President Bush had it right when he outlined his vision of Iraq as a place where “Shia, and the Sunni and the Kurds can get along in a Federation.” Indeed this is the only way Iraq can long survive. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Galbraith. Dr. Kemp, would you please give us your testimony? STATEMENT OF DR. GEOFFREY KEMP, DIRECTOR, REGIONAL STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, THE NIXON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC Dr. KEMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Chair- man and Senator Biden, for your kind remarks. 19 into the occupation of Iraq, and would, at some point, lead to voices in the United States calling for massive retaliation against Iran if its sponsorship of such acts was clear and proven. Alternatively, if the mullahs decide to be pragmatic and to follow a wait-and-see policy, then there are those in Iran who believe that there are opportunities for the United States and Tehran to ad- dress some of their longstanding disputes and for Iran to re- appraise its own foreign policy on matters such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, its support of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, and even their nuclear program. Were the Iranians to use the new bal- ance of power in the region to reassess their relationship with America, this could, indeed, become one of the great positive out- comes of the war. But for this to happen, Mr. Chairman, the United States must adopt a more sophisticated and nuanced policy toward Iran and stop using simplistic sloganeering, including extremely unwise and potentially dangerous talk about destabilizing or overthrowing the regime in Tehran. Such behavior will only convince the hard-line mullahs that they must resist the American military presence, and make it difficult for the reformers, both inside and outside the gov- ernment and on the universities and the streets, to push for their own reforms. Now the question of Israel, Mr. Chairman. Aside from Kuwait, no country benefited more, in the short run, from the coalition vic- tory than Israel. Ever since the founding of the Jewish state in 1948, the Israeli military strategic concerns focused threats from three primary fronts: Egypt, Syria, and the East. So long as Iraq was controlled by a hostile leader, Iraq's military potential could never be ignored by Israel, particularly since it had engaged in pre- vious Arab-Israeli wars. The Israeli fear was that if Saddam was not removed decisively by the United States, there could come a time when he would be able to reconstitute his weapons programs, the sanctions would end, and Iraq would, in a matter of years, re- establish itself as the predominant military power on the penin- sula. This is no longer the case. Israel now has strategic dominance over all its neighbors and no longer has to worry about an eastern front. It is the only nuclear power in the region and has the support and largesse of the United States. Some Israelis believe, possibly even Prime Minister Sharon himself, that, for this reason, Israel must use the victory in Iraq to make bold strategic decisions about its own future with the Pal- estinians and its place in the Middle East. Last, Mr. Chairman, what about Europe and NATO? All these scenarios about what's going to happen in Iraq are subject to the ebbs and flows of the reconstruction and stabilization program itself. In the worst case, one can imagine a situation where the United States finds itself deeper and deeper embroiled in counter- terrorist operations, and U.S. casualties continue to mount on a daily, if not weekly, basis. Once the number of U.S. casualties lost in the postwar period exceeds those lost during the war itself, the political stakes for the administration will become even greater. How long the American people will wish to stay in such an inhos- pitable region without clear results is anyone's guess, but—and I think this is one of the reasons you asked us these questions 22 Several realities must be acknowledged, particularly when discussing the short- term conditions. Until Saddam and his immediate entourage are found alive or dead and the issue of Iraq's WMD is resolved and the day to day conditions of Iraqis im- prove, it would be premature to pass definitive judgment on current policies. Post- war scenarios are always messy and, while clearly there was a lamentable lack of foresight and preparation for the aftermath of Saddam Hussein, perhaps because his army collapsed so quickly, postwar Iraq is very much a work in progress and therefore requires the most careful scrutiny by the U.S. Congress and the American public. This is the time to look at the facts on the ground and interpret them in a sound and sober manner. No one anymore doubts the effectiveness of U.S. military power in destroying regimes such as the Taliban and the Iraqi Ba’athists, but the early mistakes of the administration in handling the postwar reconstruction need to be fixed quickly. At this time, post-Saddam Iraq does not look like postwar Ger- many or Japan; it looks more like Afghanistan or Bosnia. The coming months will be decisive in determining whether or not a brilliant military campaign and faulty postwar policies can be formulated into a successful outcome. The tasks facing the coalition forces in Iraq are truly formidable. Security remains the key because without it, nothing else will work. (For instance, infrastructure can- not be repaired if the moment it is, facilities are looted.) But security concerns must be balanced against the priorities of establishing good governance and a justice and reconciliation process that deals with the horrendous legacy of the Ba'ath party. This includes the huge problem of Iraq's internally displaced persons, especially Kurds and Shias, and the growing resentment of these groups who, as in the case of the Kurds, embraced the Coalition victory and fought alongside its forces. The Shia population was less enthusiastic in view of the terrible legacy of 1991 and their perceived abandonment by the U.S. REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES • Syria For the last couple of years, prior to the war, Syria's leadership under Bashar al Assad reestablished close relationships with its Ba'athist cousins in Baghdad. The bitter personal feud between Bashar's father, Hafez al Assad, and Saddam has ended and Syria benefited greatly from trade with Iraq, including the illegal impor- tation of Iraqi oil through Syria's pipeline. Whether there was any military coopera- tion and how extensive it was remains one of the intelligence mysteries of the war. But the fact of the matter is Syria opposed the war. During the first week of the fighting when things were not going so well for the coalition, Bashar al Assad gave å blistering interview to the Lebanese newspaper al Safir in which he, in effect, called for guerrilla operations against American occu- pying forces equivalent to those conducted against both the United States and Israel in Lebanon in the 1980s. Once the war went well for the coalition both Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell weighed in against Syria, including a visit by the latter to Da- mascus. Since that time Syria has remained quiescent. One reason for this is that the United States has been on record for many months indicating that Syria's in- volvement in support of terrorism that kills Americans, notably its protection of Hezbollah, will eventually become a target for U.S. wrath. This was put very explic- itly by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in an address to the United States Institute of Peace on September 5, 2002 when he said, in effect, “Hezbollah's part of the A-team and we will come after them.” Syria finds itself in a difficult position, being accused of harboring Ba'athist rene- gades and possibly storing Iraqi weapons. Syria fears that Iraq could emerge as a powerful challenge to its own influence and interest in the region and therefore may have interests in destabilizing the American presence. However, it must be very careful for it now has on its borders three countries with extremely powerful mili- tary establishments, Turkey, Israel and the United States. Any false move by Syria could prove fatal to the regime. However, Syria, along with its neighbor Lebanon, will want to keep the pot boiling if only because both Syria and Lebanon have unre- solved issues with Israel. In the case of Syria, until the Golan Heights problem is addressed as part of a formal agreement with Israel, Syria's interests will lie in non- cooperation with the United States but not to the point where it is likely to attract a military response. • Iran Iran is the country that probably has most at stake with what is happening in Iraq. It also has the most potential to influence, for good or ill, how the U.S. policies emerge. Of course, there was no love for Saddam Hussein in Iran and no tears when his regime was ousted. Iranians are still bitter about their isolation during their 24 • Israel Aside from Kuwait, no country benefited more in the short run from the Coalition victory than Israel. Ever since the founding of the Jewish state in 1948, the Israeli military strategic concerns have focused on threats from three fronts—Egypt, Syria and the east. Šo long as Iraq was controlled by a hostile leader, Iraq's military po- tential could never be ignored by Israel, particularly since it had engaged in pre- vious Arab-Israeli wars. The Israeli fear was that if Saddam was not removed deci- sively by the United States, there would come a time when he would be able to re- constitute his weapons programs, the sanctions would end and Iraq would, in a mat- ter of years, reestablish itself as the predominant military power on the peninsula. This is no longer the case. Israel now has strategic dominance over all of its neigh- bors and no longer has to worry about an eastern threat. It is the only nuclear power in the region and has the support and largesse of the United States. Some İsraelis believe, and possibly even Prime Minister Sharon himself, that for this rea- son, Israel must use the victory in Iraq to make bold strategic decisions about its own future with the Palestinians and its place in the Middle East. The three underlying threats to Israel's future (aside from a very intense and dif- ficult internal struggle amongst Israelis themselves) are terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and demography. Israel's formidable military forces cannot stop ter- rorism and the spread of WMD. Only the United States and the international com- munity can do this. The demographic challenge to Israel is stark. Within ten years there will be more Arabs living in the area between the Mediterranean and the Jor- dan River and Israel cannot continue occupation of this territory and remain a de- mocracy with a Jewish majority which, of course, is the underlying purpose of Zion- ism. The fact that Prime Minister Sharon has talked about "occupation” and the possible evacuation of settlements suggests that this reality has sunk in even to those hardliners in Israel who for many years pursued a Greater Israel strategy. In other words, at a time of strategic superiority, with the full backing of the United States, Israelis are debating whether this is the moment to finally compromise on the territorial issue and accept the fact there will be a Palestinian state. Europe and NATO All regional scenarios will, of course, be subject to the ebbs and flows of the recon- struction and stabilization effort in Iraq itself. In the worst case, one can imagine a situation where the United States finds itself deeper and deeper embroiled in counterterrorist operations and U.S. casualties continue to mount on a daily, if not weekly, basis. Once the number of U.S. casualties lost in the postwar period exceed those lost during the war itself, the political stakes for the administration will be- come even greater. How long the American people will wish to stay in such an in- hospitable region without clear results is anyone's guess, but the betting would be not forever. On the other hand, if things go better than expected in Iraq and a via- ble leadership emerges within a year, then, indeed, the contagion effect may have positive benefits for the region and international security. Whatever happens, the United States cannot do it alone which is why it is so important to eventually bring in outside powers, including the much maligned Europeans. Despite the hope on the part of some that Europe would just stop meddling in the Middle East, geopolitical realities rule this out. It is Europe, not the United States, which is adjacent to the Middle East. The EU is Israel's largest trading part- ner. As EU expansion continues, perhaps eventually including Turkey, its relation- ship with the Middle East and the Muslim world will grow ever closer. But this in turn, could lead to serious conflict potential as representative government continues to elude most Middle East countries. Europeans argue that a failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict has a profoundly negative impact political and economic envi- ronment in the Middle East. Immigration, both legal and illegal, from Muslim countries has become a critical factor in contemporary European politics. Europe has huge political, economic and strategic stakes in what happens to its south and southeast. Europeans know that there can be no stability in the Middle East without the direct and powerful involve- ment of the United States. Like it or not Europe needs America's help to manage its own neighborhood. But America must be sensitive to European, as well as Arab and Israeli concerns as it presses its agenda on the region. Without European co- operation, American diplomacy will fail and without American diplomacy, European hopes for peaceful relations with the Muslim world will be stymied. Which brings up the question of NATO and its potential involvement in Iraq. If the U.S. and Britain decide that a broader military presence is required, NATO is the natural choice, as has been the case in Afghanistan. A NATO decision to partici- pate would go a long way to repair the bitter schisms that developed in the period leading up to the war. However, such a development would invariably mean that 25 key NATO members other than the U.S. and the UK would have a greater say in the management of Iraq. This could be to the benefit of the United States which has neither the temperament nor the will to be a permanent hegemon in such an inhospitable region of the world. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Kemp. Ambassador Wisner. STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK G. WISNER, VICE CHAIRMAN, EX- TERNAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, NEW YORK, NY Ambassador WISNER. Senator Lugar, Senator Biden, it is a real pleasure to be here, again, before your committee and to join two men, who I respect as much as I do, Mr. Galbraith and Mr. Kemp; and, Senator Alexander, an honor, as well, to be able to appear be- fore you, I think, for the first time. I bring to the table today some reflections on the two subjects that Mr. Galbraith and Mr. Kemp have addressed, on Iraq and on the region around it. Borne of a number of a number of years of experience in the region, including my own time in the diplomatic service, which included a time as Ambassador in Egypt during the first gulf war, a period of reflection on nearly two-and-a-half dec- ades of Saddam's persistent attempts to undermine American in- terests in the region, repress his own country, engage in terror and subversion, and commit aggression against his neighbors, I bring, as well, today, Senator Lugar, to the table, the reflections that were put together by the Council on Foreign Relations in two re- ports 1 that came out earlier this year, and both of which I will leave for the record today. In my written testimony, I have advanced a number of conten- tions about the situation and about American policy. Let me sum- marize these in four points. The first, which I consider absolutely vital as all of us look at the future in Iraq, is the issue of the maintenance of law and order; of public security. The United States has done a number of things right in Iraq. But one has to recognize that, where we've succeeded, we've made a huge contribution through the liberation of the coun- try, through feeding its population, and we're moving rapidly to re- establish its infrastructure. That said, it is time now to move to involve a broader inter- national community, as my two fellow witnesses have pointed out. We've begun to do so by establishing the basis of international le- gitimacy with the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483. We are already sharing the humanitarian and stabilization burdens of Iraq, and we're starting to reach out for financial sup- port. These are powerfully important directions in American policy, for we cannot and should not try to bear the burden alone, but broaden the base to increase the legitimacy of ours and the coali- tion's efforts. More needs to be done to involve the United Nations in the proc- ess that is underway in postwar Iraq. The United Nations is not only playing the roles I mentioned shortly before, but has the po- 1 The reports referred to can be accessed on the Council on Foreign Relation's Website at: http://www.cfr.org 34 From that flows, as Peter has just said, a number of practical steps that one has to take. I recall reading the history of the last 2 years of World War II, the bloody fights inside the U.S. Govern- ment over what shape nation-building should take with regard to Germany and Japan, and how far off the plans in those two re- gards were from the outcome. One is always reminded of General Marshall's wonderful statement that plans never work out the way you think, but you always must plan. In the Western European context, we worked out very different arrangements. We have to be flexible. But the political mindset, that we would stick with it, that we would have the right people, we would follow policies with broad principles, all of that made sense, and that we would have the resources available to be a nation-builder. I believe we know how to do it. It's a question of establishing the political priority and a consensus among ourselves the job needs to be done. You asked specifically about NĂTO and the international dimen- sion, the coalition dimension of nation-building and our responsibil- ities in these post-conflict phases. We've all been talking, during the course of the morning, about the role the United Nations must play, or NATO or ad-hoc coalitions. All can play roles, and they're, indeed, playing roles right now in Iraq. As we sat down to think about the coming conflict in Iraq, in New York, at the Council, we all recognized that one of the tough- est problems about the first phase, justifying our intervention in Iraq, would be where it would leave us when the war was over, who we would have on our side, what our legitimacy would be. Get- ting our diplomacy right struck us as absolutely important. It couldn't be truer today. It is possible to get our diplomacy right. I think the world is, on the whole, prepared to cooperate, to try to share some of the bur- dens to create an Iraq that will be more stable, and accommodate the United States, key members of the coalition, in their diplomacy, to contribute treasure, contribute funds, contribute forces. It is im- portant the United States not only look for that, not to escape re- sponsibilities, but to involve the world and to legitimize our pres- ence in Iraq by enveloping it in a stronger international consensus, to get the level of our profile down so that we are not the targets of all the criticism and the failures, a point I think Peter made when he talked about making certain we get Iraqis into office as quickly possible. The same is true of broadening the base of the international coloration of our efforts there. So let me associate myself with your two remarks. We are na- tion-builders, we will be nation-builders. We must prepare to be na- tion-builders, accept that responsibility. And, second, it's best done in a coalition framework, an international framework. We have an opportunity in Iraq to do that. The CHAIRMAN. Ďr. Kemp, do you have anything to add? Dr. KEMP. I have very little to add to what my two colleagues have said, Mr. Chairman. I mean, I would just stress that I think, you know, historically, the United States has not wanted to set up a colonial service, so there are not institutions that train civilians to go out and manage the rest of the world, as some countries have done in the past; and that part of the problem is that, you know, we have extraordinarily effective military forces who can intervene 36 One of the things that I spent the last 12 months apparently fall- ing on deaf ears in the administration is, you can't expect a back end if you don't have some discussion on the front end. The idea that we can unilaterally decide where we want to change the world and then, after the fact, go out to the rest of the world and say, “Now, by the way, you clean it up with us, and you take on the major responsibility in doing that,” they may do it, because they have no choice because the chaos that may be left if we don't do it and they're left with it, but it sure would be a heck of a lot better had we had a thing called diplomacy at the front end of this proc- ess, which I think was sorely lacking. Which leads me to a point I want to make for—well, relative to the last hearing, this hearing, and future hearings. Speaking only for myself, but I suspect the committee may share a similar view, when we discuss with you, as we will today and in the future, why we were so unprepared for the post-Saddam period, it is not to as- sign blame. It is not to say, “Aha, I told you so. You didn't do what you were supposed to do. You failed.” That is not the purpose; at least it's not my purpose. The answer to that question as to why we were so woefully un- prepared—although there were some serious successes; the oil fields are basically intact, people are not starving, there's not major exoduses, there's not major flight, and there is not major recrimina- tions that are going on at the moment, so there are genuine suc- cesses—but why were we so unprepared? The answer to that ques- tion is important, not because we need to assign blame, but to de- termine whether there is an ideological impediment to this notion of nation-building that exists among very important people in this administration. The people who have been primarily in charge are very, very, very, bright people, among the most informed and brightest people I've dealt with in 30 years as Senator. It's not that they could not have known what the Council recommended in a number of its areas, including establishing stability and the need for, on page 3 of your executive summary or on page 5 of the first report to the Council, of establishing law and order. There's no one in this ad- ministration who could have failed to understand that. They aren't tone deaf. And what I'm trying to get at, the reason I keep pursuing this, is-look at Afghanistan. I am not saying anything out of school. Dr. Rice has said it publicly. When I would meet with her once a week, back when I was the chairman, we were pushing, many of us in this committee, for expanding the international security force be- yond Kabul so that there was something other than that there was a prospect that Mr. Karzai would be something other than the mayor of Kabul. We talked, in great detail, about the need for all the aid to go through his hands, so he had something to dissemi- nate in Herat or something to disseminate in other parts of the country, that there was some reason for the warlords needing him. I remember midway through this debate, after we lost the de- bate, and the State Department lost the debate, on expanding the ISAF and making it more muscular and so on, so forth, Dr. Rice said, “There is stability.” I said, “Yeah, Ishmael Khan is in control of Herat.” She said, “Yes, there's stability.” That was a definition 40 have much comparisons in history to this kind of nation-building, as I think—at least not the ones we usually think about. We think about Germany. You mentioned Germany. You men- tioned Japan. You mentioned Korea. But all those are nations who are nations because of the great principles or conditions that usu- ally create a nation, and those are almost always the same. They begin with religion. They usually have to do with ethnicity. They often have to do with a common language. Then there are some cultural attitudes. Then there sometimes is a common enemy. And when all those factors are in play, you have a nation. And so one says, “I'm a German,” or, “I'm a Korean,” or, “I'm a Japanese.” And what we forget, as Americans, is if we move to Ger- many, we don't become German. If we move to Japan, we don't be- come Japanese. If we move to Korea, we don't become Korean. And we look at the world in terms of people moving here. And if a Korean or a Japanese or a German moves here, we expect them to become Americans. And what makes them Americans? Well, none of the things I just—not many of the things I just sug- gested, because we come from many places, have many different re- ligions, started out with different languages, and our ethnicity has really nothing to do with what it means to be an American. In fact, we deny that it has anything to do with it. So in trying to apply our notion of what it means to be a nation to Iraq, seems to me to be completely impossible, and we should recognize that to start with. It wasn't a nation to start with; it was just lines drawn in the sand around three different kinds of people. And Mr. Wisner then after World War I, then Mr. Wisner then began to state the principles that we might suggest to them. Now, they're all great-sounding principles-you know, free market, the you know, I can think of the things that unite us: liberty, equal op- portunity, rule of law, individualism, democracy, laissez faire—we might suggest all that, but it would be as if the French were sug- gesting it to us 230 years ago. So the question is, If we were going to—if someone were going to write, “We hold these truths to be self-evident,” in the new na- tion of Iraq, I mean, who would do it? Who is the Washington and Jefferson and Madison? And then what would they say? Would they say, “We hold these truths to be self-evident. Give us our share of the oil money and leave us alone in our three sections”? Those are the truths. Is there anything else that unites the Nation of Iraq—are there any principles? Are there any cultural atti- tudes?—besides federalism and a share of the oil money? Ambassador GALBRAITH. Senator, I think you've really put your finger on the central problem of Iraq. It is not a nation-state, be- cause it's not a single people, not a single nation. The Arabs are part of a larger Arab community. The Kurds are, in fact, part of a larger Kurdish community. And there are other peoples there, as well. If we were back in 1919 or 1923, I think we might wish to recon- sider the idea of creating Iraq. It has been basically a failure for most of the people who live there for its entire history, and this didn't just begin with Saddam Hussein. But, unfortunately, we're not in 1923; we're in 2003. And it would be very complicated, and possibly bloody, to redraw the 43 Ambassador GALBRAITH. Mr. Chairman, I think the first point about public diplomacy is that it is the policies and the results that matter most. I think, as you know—and I worked on those issues for this committee—so often, we hear, “If only people understood us better.” But I think the core of the problem is that people do have an idea about what our policies are, and they simply disagree with them. In this part of the world, I think it's obvious that a genuine commitment to solving the Palestine-Israel conflict, the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty, a number of these steps will produce results. I think there are some things that we can do, in the Iraqi con- text, that will be very important. One of them is to really get out the story—and, again, it's not telling a story; it is just the facts- about what the Saddam Hussein regime was about. I'm not sure that this should be done by the U.S. Government. I think this is the perfect thing for an international commission, like the Bassiouni Commission, which you'll recall documented some of the crimes in Bosnia and was a precursor to the International Criminal Tribunal. But that information should be recorded, a record cre- ated, and the people responsible for massive crimes should be iden- tified. And doing that will help make the case that what we did in Iraq was, in fact, the right thing. I think there's a larger point, which is that—and one that Sen- ator Biden, I think, was also alluding to—in the whole process, I think it is important to have respect for the opinions of others, even if we disagree with them. And I think sometimes our officials need to realize that statements made for domestic consumption have ramifications abroad. I'm sorry to say I think we rubbed the salt unnecessarily in the wounds with the Germans and the French. I don't think it served any national interest. And I think this is true of some of the comments that have been made about post war Iraq. The Iraqis, for example, were constantly saying to me, “Is the looting of our museum your idea of a little bit of exu- berance? Of democracy?” So we need to be careful in some of our statements, because in this interconnected world, they have an audience beyond the do- mestic one. These things are heard around the world. The CHAIRMAN. Anyone else have a view on public diplomacy? Ambassador WISNER. I'd perhaps add a couple of thoughts to Pe- ter's statement. I think that, in addition to the fact that our poli- cies will decide the framework of public opinion—some people will like them; others will not; perfectly fair—I would also argue that, as a core view of the success of the United States over the past 50 years, I hold to the notion that we have been successful because we appear to operate within international norms. We appeared to try to legitimize our efforts by going through the United Nations, involving international instances, building coalitions. And while not everybody agreed with what we were doing or what we stood for on a given case, a given instance, the fact that the United States attempted to subject itself to an international—a framework of international norms, improved our policy. To take the opposite view that our national interests will override an international con- sensus, then I think we open ourselves to huge doubts about the legitimacy of American efforts.