E S. HRG. 108–132 76/2: S.HR6.108-132 IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: U.S. POLICY AND PLANS HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION MAY 22, 2003 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations PURDUE UNIVERSITY DEC 0 2 2003 U.S. DEPOSITORY Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2003 89-516 PDF For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 1039-A 2004-31-P SE1-801.22:Sjur COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director (II) 11€-HOS IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: U.S. POLICY AND PLANS THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2003 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in room SD- 106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chair- man of the committee), presiding. Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Brownback, Enzi, Coleman, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Feingold, Bill Nelson, and Corzine. The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order. It is a great personal privilege to wel- come today Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace. We have been looking forward to your testimony and to our discussion of the status of policies and plans for Iraqi stabilization and reconstruc- tion. This is the first of several hearings over the next few weeks that our committee will hold on Iraq stabilization and reconstruc- tion issues. These hearings are intended to help the committee per- form its oversight function and to inform the American people, whose support is necessary for United States efforts in Iraq. The United States military and coalition forces and the President and his team, including our witnesses today, deserve high praise for execution of a brilliant war plan that brought the combat phase of conflict in Iraq to a decisive and speedy conclusion. We mourn those who lost their lives in this conflict. We recognize the extraor- dinary care taken to prevent such loss. In fact, the comprehensive planning that went into the military campaign that ousted Saddam Hussein's regime was evident in every aspect of the resounding military victory declared by Presi- dent Bush on May 1. This military success, however, was only the first step in winning the war in Iraq. Victory is at risk unless we ensure that effective post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq succeed over the long term. The measure of success in Iraq that matters most is what kind of country and institutions we leave behind. Iraq has some impor- tant ingredients for success, an educated population, a tradition of trade and industry, large reserves of oil to benefit its people. The achievement of stability and democracy in Iraq present an oppor- tunity to catalyze change in the region that can greatly improve United States national security. Stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq (1) 2 are key to success in this larger context of the Middle East region and in the global war on terrorism. Given these stakes, the United States must make a long-term commitment to achieving our objectives in Iraq. A sustained Amer- ican commitment would heavily influence the political dynamics of the region and reinforce the credibility of United States diplomacy around the world. I am concerned that the administration's initial stabilization and reconstruction efforts have been inadequate. The planning for peace was much less developed than the planning for war. Moreover, the administration has not sufficiently involved Congress and the American people in its plans regarding the costs, the methods, and goals of reconstruction Iraq. Congress has already voted $2.5 billion toward the rebuilding ef- fort in Iraq, but we have heard estimates before this committee that the final bill may be over $100 billion. Now, I believe the proc- ess could take at least 5 years. There is little understanding of the administration's short-and mid-term plans and priorities to address increasingly urgent issues such as providing food, water, electricity, and fuel. The United States and coalition forces are struggling to create a secure environment to allow civil engineers and humani- tarian assistance workers to do their jobs, but there seem to be in- sufficient military and police forces to establish this security. Given these circumstances, talk of a reduction in forces by year's end is premature. To restore law and order, we may need to put more sol- diers and marines into Iraq, rather than draw them down. There also is uncertainty about the long-term plans for the tran- sition from military to civilian authority in Iraq, and increasing fear that vacuums of authority will lead to sustained internal con- flict in Iraq and greater instability throughout the region. We should not underestimate the ethnic and religious rivalries of a long-repressed people. Now, these challenges should be met by a unified command structure that clearly articulates objectives and shares transparent plans for political transition, and this committee is hopeful that the recent appointment of Ambassador Bremer as the Civil Adminis- trator of the Department of Defense's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is the first step in a carefully coordi- nated, integrated plan for dealing with Iraq. In addition, our plans must be clear about the roles of all forces, agencies, and organizations involved in the stabilization and recon- struction process. The specific responsibilities of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and other agencies must be more clearly delineated. We also want to hear about the administration's plans for generating alliance contributions that will reduce long- term American burdens. Can NATO play a peacekeeping role in Iraq that would allow for the replacement of United States' units? The main criteria for involvement of allies in international organi- zations beyond the coalition must be their ability to make contribu- tions that will advance our goals in Iraq. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace, we look forward to your testimony today to give us confidence that comprehensive planning is occurring, that our strategy in Iraq is designed to be a spring- board to a greater regional stability and wider peace in the region. Achieving such ambitious goals will not be easy, quick, or cheap, 3 and we are engaged in nation building in Iraq because it is in our national interest. This is a complicated and uncertain business that requires both a sense of urgency now, and patience over the long run. Before I ask our distinguished witnesses to testify. I would like to add that Hon. Alan Larson and Hon. Wendy Chamberlin are at the table, and they may be of benefit and of counsel throughout the hearing today. It was at the specific request of Secretary Wolfowitz that we wanted to make certain that all those who might have information today that would be supplemental were on hand, and we appreciate your presence. [The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:) OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR I am very pleased to welcome Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace. We have been look- ing forward to your testimony and to our discussion of the status, policies, and plans for Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction. This is the first of several hearings over the next few weeks that the Foreign Re- lations Committee will hold on Iraq stabilization and reconstruction issues. These hearings are intended to help the committee perform its oversight function and to inform the American people, whose support is necessary for U.S. efforts in Iraq. The U.S. military and Coalition forces and the President and his team, including our witnesses today, deserve praise for the execution of a brilliant war plan that brought the combat phase of conflict in Iraq to a decisive and speedy conclusion. We mourn those who lost their lives in this conflict. We recognize the extraordinary care taken to prevent such loss. In fact, the comprehensive planning that went into the military campaign that ousted Saddam Hussein's regime was evident in every aspect of the resounding military victory declared by President Bush on May 1st. This military success, however, was only the first step in winning the war in Iraq. Victory is at risk unless we ensure that effective post-conflict stabilization and re- construction efforts in Iraq succeed over the long-term. The measure of success in Iraq that matters most is what kind of country and institutions we leave behind. Iraq has some important ingredients for success—an educated population, a tradition of trade and industry, and large reserves of oil to benefit its people. The achievement of stability and democracy in Iraq present an opportunity to catalyze change in the region that can greatly improve U.S. national security. Stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq are a key to success in the larger con- text of the Middle East region and in the global war on terrorism. Given these stakes, the United States must make a long-term commitment to achieving our objectives in Iraq. A sustained American commitment would heavily influence the political dynamics of the region and reinforce the credibility of U.S. diplomacy around the world. I am concerned that the administration's initial stabilization and reconstruction efforts have been inadequate. The planning for peace was much less developed than the planning for war. Moreover, the administration has not sufficiently involved Congress and the American people in its plans regarding the costs, methods, and goals of reconstructing Iraq. Congress has already voted $2.5 billion toward the re- building effort in Iraq. We've heard estimates that the final bill may be over $100 billion. I believe the process could take at least five years. There is little understanding of the administration's short and mid-term plans and priorities to address increasingly urgent issues such as providing food, water, electricity, and fuel. U.S. and Coalition forces are struggling to create a secure envi- ronment to allow civil engineers and humanitarian assistance workers to do their jobs, but there seems to be insufficient military and police forces to establish this security. Given these circumstances, talk of a reduction in forces by year's end is premature. To restore law and order we may need to put more soldiers and Marines into Iraq, rather than draw them down. There also is uncertainty about the long-term plans for the transition from mili- tary to civilian authority in Iraq and increasing fear that vacuums of authority will lead to sustained internal conflict in Iraq and greater instability throughout the re- gion. We should not underestimate the ethnic and religious rivalries of a long-re- pressed people. 6 units supported by special forces and air power could prevail on the 21st century battlefield.” Later, the article says, “Officials inside and outside the adminis- tration say the shift in mission should not have been a surprise. In January, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, published an 'action strategy for Iraq that recommended that the Pentagon plan as diligently for the post-war period as for the war. “To avoid a dangerous security vacuum it is imperative to organize, train, and equip for post-conflict security missions in conjunction with planning for combat,' the document states. “In February, an official from the U.S. Institute of Peace briefed the Defense Policy Board, an influential advisory panel on a $628 million proposal developed by the institute and based on the peace- keeping experiences in Kosovo. It called for bringing 6,000 civilian police officers, 200 lawyers, judges, court administrators, and cor- rections officers into Iraq as soon as the fighting stops. Both pro- posals,' according to senior administration officials, 'were matched by debates inside the government.' But the Pentagon had no plan for civilian policing assistance in place and almost no military po- lice on hand when the fighting stopped in early April.” Last paragraph: “Before the war began, General Eric K. Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, told Congress that 'several hun- dred thousand forces would be necessary to stabilize Iraq after the war. Several days later, Wolfowitz told another congressional com- mittee that far fewer troops would be needed, calling Shinseki's es- timate ‘way off the mark.' Well, this is not the first time we are hearing this kind of thing. The points highlighted in this story were raised during the hear- ings that the chairman and I have held since last July, and it is no surprise. The Deputy Secretary, I am sure, will have an answer for this, but I am confident you have come prepared today to ad- dress and rebut several of these items mentioned in the story, and there is no doubt that we are seeing positive changes in Iraq, that we are making progress, especially outside of Baghdad, but the overall impression has begun to take hold, and justifiably, in my view, that there was either a lack of planning or overly optimistic assumptions, or both. I mean, we were honestly surprised by the rise of the Shiites and the resurgence of fundamentalism. Did we plan for that? Were we honestly surprised by the lawlessness that plagues Baghdad? I have to say, Mr. Secretary, in my view there is a real danger that if we do not recover quickly, the damage may be irreparable. The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan was a sobering lesson to the people willing to pay almost any price for a basic sense of secu- rity, and the longer it takes us to restore law and order, the more likely it is the Iraqis will turn to extremist solutions, in my view. Just as many in Iraq and the region invented the conspiracy the- ory that the United States wanted Saddam to remain in power, they will now begin to believe that we want to see Iraqis remain in a state of anarchy so that we can control their riches. We have two competing pressures, I acknowledge. One is the understand- able desire to leave as soon as possible and not become occupiers. The other is to stay as long as necessary to make sure that Iraq 9 erations with adequate forces mystifies military officers, administration offi- cials and defense experts with peacekeeping experience in the 1990s. Defense experts inside and outside the Pentagon say military planners were clearly influenced by the Pentagon's belief, expressed by Deputy De- fense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz and other senior leaders, that U.S. forces would be welcomed as liberators. They also point to the Bush administra- tion's professed antipathy to military peacekeeping and nation-building, as articulated by the president during the 2000 campaign when he charged the Clinton administration with overextending the armed forces with such missions. Defense experts and some military officers also cite the Pentagon's deter- mination to fight the war and maintain the peace with as small a force as possible, noting it reflected Rumsfeld's determination to use the war in Iraq to support his vision for “transforming” the military by showing that small- er and lighter armed units, supported by Special Forces and air power, could prevail on the 21st century battlefield. Later, the article says: Officials inside and outside the administration say the shift in mission should not have been a surprise. In January, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Wash- ington think tank, published an 'action strategy for Iraq that recommended the Pentagon plan as diligently for the postwar period as for the war. “To avoid a dangerous security vacuum, it is imperative to organize, train, and equip for the post-conflict security mission in conjunction with planning for combat,' the document states. In February, an official from the U.S. Institute of Peace briefed the De- fense Policy Board, an influential advisory panel, on a $628 million pro- posal, developed by the institute and based on peacekeeping experiences in Kosovo. It called for bringing 6,000 civilian police officers and 200 lawyers, judges, court administrators and corrections Officers into Iraq as soon as the fight- ing stopped. Both proposals, according to a senior administration official, “were matched by debates inside the government.” But the Pentagon had no plan for civilian policing assistance in place, and almost no military police on hand, when the fighting stopped in early April. Before the war began, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, told Congress that "several hundred thousand” forces could be necessary to sta- bilize Iraq after a war. Several days later, Wolfowitz told another congres- sional committee that far fewer troops would be needed, calling Shinseki's estimate "way off the mark.” This isn't the first time we're hearing this. The points highlighted in this story were raised during hearings that the Chairman and I have held since last July. There's no surprise here. Mr. Secretary, I'm confident that you have come prepared today to address and rebut several of the items mentioned in this story. And there is no doubt that we are seeing positive changes in Iraq—that we're making progress, especially outside of Baghdad. ut the overall impression has begun to take hold—and justifiably—that there was either a lack of planning or overly-optimistic assumptions, or both. I mean, were we honestly surprised by the rise of the Shiites and the resurgence of fun- damentalism. Did we plan for it? Were we honestly surprised by the lawlessness that plagues Baghdad? I have to say, Mr. Secretary, in my view, there is a real danger that if we do not recover quickly, the damage may be irreparable. The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan was a sobering lesson that people are willing to pay almost any price for a basic sense of security. The longer it takes for us to restore law and order, the more likely it is that Iraqis will turn to extremist solutions. Just as many in Iraq and the region invented the conspiracy theory that the United States wanted Saddam to remain in power, they will now begin to believe that we want to see Iraq remain in a state of anarchy so that we can control its riches. We have two competing pressures in Iraq. One is the understandable desire to leave as soon as possible and not become occupiers. The other is to stay as long as 10 necessary to make sure that Iraq can stay together and function on its own without descending into chaos. It is still my view—it has not changed—that the only way to satisfy these com- peting demands is to share the burden with others. It would seem to me that the common sense solution remains. Involve NATO. In- volve our European allies. Involve friendly nations in the Arab and Muslim world. It will lighten the burden on our forces, spread the risk, prevent us from being seen as occupiers, and vastly improve our chances of success. And, yes, getting the endorsement of the much-maligned U.N. will make it easier for governments whose people opposed the war to contribute to building the peace. I'm pleased we've made good progress on a new U.N. resolution, and that NATO has said yes to Poland's request for assistance in managing its sector. Now, if we would show a little magnanimity in victory instead of talking about retaliation and limiting contacts with countries that were not with us in the war, maybe we can get even more friends in on the peace. Iraq is not some kind of prize. In Iraq, just as in Afghanistan, and, Mr. Secretary, I can't say I've seen it yet- security is the single most important issue. Security should be our number one pri- ority. Everything follows from that. If people are afraid for their lives, they won't go to work or to school. If shooting and lawlessness reign, engineers, builders and technicians won't be able to make the repairs needed to get the economy going and the oil flowing. Civil servants will stay away from their offices and doctors from their hospitals. The people who drive the buses, run the power plants and pick up the garbage won't do their jobs. As good as our soldiers are, most of them are not trained to be police—to control crowds—to capture common criminals. Where are the Military Police—the gen- darmes—who know how to do this? How could we have failed to learn from the Bal- kans and Haiti about the need to bolster our soldier peacemakers with properly trained peacekeepers? Mr. Secretary, I read your prepared remarks. You argue that the situation in Iraq is profoundly different than the situation in the Balkans or Haiti because the enemy, while largely defeated, is still capable of killing Americans. As a result, you conclude, our emphasis has to be on soldiers, not police in Iraq. With all due respect, this is not a zero sum game. We need both. If we had more police, we'd free up more soldiers to take on the remnants of the enemy. If we had more police, our soldiers would have more flexibility to perform other critical tasks where we've fallen short of the mark, like securing nuclear facilities where we've seen looting. No one is talking about “100,000” police as you claim in your statement. We're talking about maybe 10,000 and we should have planned for it. And if the security situation is still too dicey for even heavily armed gendarmes, then we need more troops—maybe even the “several hundred thousand” that Gen- eral Shinseki proposed. We're pretty close to that number now. Indeed, I find it a little ironic that you are quoted today as saying that one of the lessons from the Balkans in terms of post-conflict situations is to have forces "so big and so strong that nobody would pick a fight with us.” But in your testi- mony, you say they are still picking fights with us in Iraq. And our land com- mander, General McKiernan, complained a week ago that we can't stabilize a coun- try the size of California with only 150,000 troops. Finally, Mr. Secretary, I was glad to read in your statement that you believe we must be in Iraq for the long haul. You remind us that we're still in Bosnia 8 years after Dayton-and rightly so—and that the stakes in Iraq are even greater and the tasks more difficult. I agree. I only wish that the President had made this clear to the American people ahead of time—something I asked for repeatedly in the many months leading up to the war. I wish that the President would tell the American people now that we are going to be in Iraq for years and it is going to cost us tens of billions of dollars. No foreign policy, no matter how well conceived, can be sustained without the in- formed consent of the American people. And they have not been informed. There are many other critical issues, including where we are in the search for weapons of mass destruction and what we're doing to support the creation of an in- terim Iraqi government that is seen as legitimate by the people of Iraq, not a U.S. puppet. But let me leave it at that for now and thank you both, again, for being with us today. 11 PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL Thank you, Chairman Lugar for calling this and subsequent hearings on Iraq Re- construction. Let me begin by fully associating myself with your op-ed on this sub- ject in today's Washington Post. I would like to take the opportunity offered by the appearance today of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace to express my respect and appreciation for the spectacular performance of our Armed Forces in Iraq. War is never an easy op- tion, and American men and women have taken great risks and made great sac- rifices in meeting our initial objectives in Iraq. Our men and women in uniform have the respect and admiration of all Americans. We are now in the business of “nation building” in Iraq. The complexities of Iraq-its size, its culture, its geography, its demography-make nation-building there one of the greatest challenges this country has ever faced. We are only at the beginning of a process that Chairman Lugar estimates could take at least five years. I agree. That the American military would defeat Saddam Hussein's regime was never in doubt. What was in doubt was what comes next in Iraq and how we manage a tran- sition to stability and democracy in such a complicated region of the world. The sudden change in the structure, mission, and personnel at the Office of Re- construction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in Iraq indicates that we may have underestimated or mischaracterized the challenges of establishing security and rebuilding Iraq. This is an area of great unknowns and uncertainty. No one can ac- curately predict the future. I encourage the Bush Administration to continue to reach out to the United Na- tions and our NATO and Arab allies to work with us as partners in this immense task of rebuilding Iraq. President Bush and Secretary Powell have achieved a major diplomatic success with today's vote at the United Nations. Our interests are well- served by UN engagement and legitimacy. NATO also has taken steps to get more involved in security in Iraq. We need to encourage them to do more. America can- not, and should not, bear this burden alone. Iraq cannot be considered in a vacuum. Without progress on the Israeli-Pales- tinian peace process; new confidence-building measures in the Persian Gulf, and real steps toward political reform and economic development in the Arab world, our efforts in Iraq and throughout the Middle East will be frustrated and fail. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing today. I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses. PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on the status of ac- tivities in this post-conflict stage of Operation Iraqi Freedom. I must first begin by congratulating the President on today's resounding victory in the United Nations Security Council on lifting sanctions. I hope members from this committee soon will be able to visit Iraq to survey the country and to provide support to the Bremer administration for the enormous task that is now just beginning to unfold. I espe- cially hope we are able to visit the southern Shi'a areas of Iraq where I understand we are having notable successes. I hear many reports from the field and while it is not a perfect picture, I believe much is being achieved by our many able-bodied soldiers, diplomats and others on the ground. There has been much criticism from my colleagues about the purported events transpiring in this newly liberated country. First, I would like to begin by talking about the threat Iran poses to America's security and our efforts to bring security and stability to Iraq and Afghanistan. I want to call the committee's attention to some important revelations that have come out in this week's news regarding Iran. From the May 21st, New_York Times—the headline: “U.S. Suggests Al Qaeda Cell in Iran Directed Saudi Bomb- ings” and the L.A. Times, the headline: “U.S. Ends Talks with Iran Over Al Qaeda Links.” Mr. Chairman, these headlines say it all. To say that we can not trust the Ira- nians is perhaps the understatement of the year. I know many on this committee have hoped that we could reach some type of deal with the so-called reformers in this country—but it is obvious that this is not only impossible, but that trusting in such an approach is extremely dangerous for U.S. security. The NY Times quotes a senior Bush administration official as saying that “The United States has rock-hard intelligence' that at least a dozen Oaeda members, in- cluding Mr. Adel [the organization's security chief] had been idirecting some oper- 12 ations from Iran?” Furthermore, the article goes on to cite a senior Saudi official confirming the view that it is Adel—who is in Iran, who directed the Riyadh attack. The Iranian regime is a terrorist regime. A longstanding truism of American for- eign policy has been that you can not and should not negotiate with terrorists. I hope that the current revelations will put an end to the dangerous desires by some to make a deal with these tyrants. • What examples have you seen of Iran's meddling in the reconstruction of Iraq? • In clear violation of Iran's promises, we have heard reports that the Iran is sending numerous agents into Iraq to stir up the Shiite community. What is being done to combat this? • If we do not confront Iran-it seems that by removing Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, we have merely paved the way for export of the Islamic Revolution? Could you address the importance of confronting Iran on the nuclear, terrorist and human rights abuses-as it relates to our ability to ever achieve long-term stability in Iraq? I would like to extend to my colleagues the question of what their expectations are for moving forward in Iraq, whether on reconstruction, political transition or se- curity? Sadly, I think many of us have wrongly pointed to already existing difficul- ties and blamed a lack of immediate solution on the President. I would point out to you that it took us quite a while to establish a constitution to govern our own country after we liberated ourselves. We should not be so arrogant as to expect in- stant gratification on these matters. In the southern Shi'a cities, the children are in school, people are being fed and are making much headway with very little. The expediency with which we have de- ployed a civilian administrator is validation of the success of the post-conflict oper- ation. Many have beat-up on General Garner and claimed that he was being sent back home with his tail between his legs. That is not the case and to my knowledge, the pre-supposed expectation by many that he would stay indefinitely in Iraq was not part of the plan-in fact, he was told that he had no obligation to deploy and his leadership of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) would be for a specific task for a short period. The Bremer team is just now on the ground. I hope Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz will highlight the successes, but I certainly hope he will give us an unvarnished view of the things transpiring on the ground. I hope he emphasizes the twenty-five year theft by Saddam Hussein of the resources, the energy and the vitality of the Iraqi people that is clearly our biggest challenge. In his wake are destroyed lives, decaying and unattended infrastructure, a regime indoctrinated in fear, and the imagination, traditions and talent of a strong people suppressed. In addition, I would hope we are able to look into past human rights abuse and war crimes, and be able to intercept new violations of human rights and religious freedom. First, reports have been coming out of the country of mass graves and ru- mors have circulated that we are on the verge of uncovering a massive tragedy- graves that could total in excess of a million people. I think the scale of the crimes against humanity are still widely unknown here on Capitol Hill. Emotions are running high in the country and I understand our military, at the request of local clerics, has tried to remain out of sight so as to be sensitive to the families who want to bury their relatives according to Islamic customs. I am afraid it will soon be apparent to all of us here that these crimes will be on the scale of Hitler and Stalin in their brutality and in the number of lives taken. Currently, I understand Chaldean Catholics, Assyrian and other religious minori- ties in Iraq are reporting that they are being targeted with violence for religious reasons throughout Iraq-in Baghdad, Basrah, and Kirkuk. Some have been hunted down and murdered, others are reporting that their homes, factories, and businesses have been burned or otherwise destroyed. According to a recent LA Times report, Christian women are reporting threats and intimidation for not wearing “Islamic” dress. These Christian communities are 2000 years old and constitute one of the largest Christian communities in the Middle East. There are now fears that they could be forced out under such treatment over the next few months. Their co-reli- gionists are expressing fear and frustration about an apparent lack of concern by U.S. authorities for the protection of religious minorities. • Beyond efforts to restore law and order, is the ORHA taking steps to protect vulnerable religious minorities? What are they? • Is there anyone in the Bremer administration charged with monitoring and re- lating to religious minority groups? Who? 17 already way ahead of where we were in either Bosnia or Kosovo at a comparable stage in those deployments. Despite claims that there were no plans for peace operations in the wake of military operations, Presidential envoy Bremer and Jay Garner are implementing plans drawn up long before the war to strengthen and rebuild the country. Assertions that we were al- ready failing, detailed at some length in the Washington Post arti- cle that the ranking member read from, assertions that remind me of similar assertions that the military campaign had taken us into a quagmire just one week into the war, reflect in my view an in- complete understanding of the situation in Iraq as it existed before the war, and an unreasonable expectation of where we should be now. Security is our No. 1 priority, and our most urgent task in the post-Saddam Hussein era is to establish secure and stable condi- tions throughout the country. Secretary Rumsfeld reiterated re- cently, and I quote, “security remains the No. 1 priority in Iraq precisely because security and stability are the fundamental pre- requisites for everything else we need to accomplish, essential for providing the basic normal life and services, and beyond that to create a climate”—and this is important—“where people for the first time in their history can express political views in an atmos- phere free of rear and intimidation.” Much of what I read on this subject suggests what I believe is a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of the security problem in Iraq, and consequently a failure to appreciate that a re- gime which had tens of thousands of thugs and war criminals on its payroll does not vanish overnight. The people who created the mass graves that are now being uncovered in Iraq still represent a threat to stability that was not eliminated automatically when the statues came tumbling down in Baghdad. I read recently in that same article that unnamed officials and experts say that the Pentagon ignored lessons from a decade of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, and Af- ghanistan. It seems to me that those anonymous sources ignore the difference between normal peacekeeping operations and the kind of situation we are in now, which is a combination of peacekeeping and low-level combat. In just the last 24 hours alone I emphasize this is just the report that came in this morning-in Baghdad, the 3rd Infantry Division raided a Baath Party meeting and detained nine Baathists in Fallujah, which continues to be a hotbed of Baathist activity, some of it with connections to foreign extremists, possibly al-Qaeda. An Iraqi vehicle attacked a checkpoint in the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, two enemy were killed and one de- tained. In the same area, in the same 24-hour period, three Iraqi snipers engaged U.S. troops, and in a third incident in the Fallujah, area a Bradley was disabled by a rocket-propelled gre- nade fired from a mosque. In Baqubah, another town in north central Iraq, again in just the last 24 hours, the 4th Infantry Division conducted a raid and cap- tured seven Iraqis and seized 15 million dinars. In al Kut, a patrol of the 1st Marine Division engaged 20 enemy, killed two, wounded one, and captured 11. Fortunately, in this 24-hour period there were no U.S. casualties, but that level of activity illustrates contin- 19 enough, is on Baghdad, and there is no question that the capital is one of the keys to the future of the country, but we would make a mistake if we saw it as the only one. Conditions in other parts of the country are generally better. For example, in the south, the second largest city in the country, Basrah, with a population of almost 1.3 million people, most of them Shia, are overwhelmingly grateful to be free of Saddam's tyr- anny, and the city is largely stable. In Nasiriah, local police are now armed, and the force has grown to over 600. In Diwaniya, nearly 300 Iraqi police officers have been hired and the coalition is installing two 911 emergency phone lines. In Northern Iraq, the two large cities, Mosel and Kirkuk, with a combined population of more than 242 million people, are largely stable thanks to the successful efforts of Major General Dave Petraeus and the 101st Air Assault Division. There remain some problems in those two cities, most significantly problems arising out of the property disputes created by Saddam's policy of Arabization, a kind of slow-motion ethnic cleansing, but we are tak- ing political and legal measures to try to address those problems. We sent a study team led by former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq William Eagleton, that included distinguished experts from Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bosnia, countries that have had experi- ence with these kinds of property restitution problems in the past, and they will come up with some recommendations of how we can address those problems by legal means and discourage the use of force. Finally, if you would indulge me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to give a little detail about what I think is potentially a very impor- tant success story in the somewhat smaller city, although it is still a city of half a million, called Karbala. Karbala's significance far exceeds its size, because as one of the two holy cities of Shia Islam, it has enormous potential to point the direction for Iraqi society, or at least for the Shia segment of Iraqi society. There, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marines has worked effec- tively with local officials to create what are reportedly excellent conditions of law and order in that town. A political officer from our embassy in Kuwait visited Karbala recently and he reported that, and I quote, “with support from U.S. military forces, moderate reformers are engaged in an audacious experiment aimed at build- ing democratic rule in one of Shiism's two holiest cities.” In cooperation with civil affairs teams from 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, they have achieved notable successes, and that report goes on to note that the infrastructure in Karbala is largely func- tioning. Electricity service has returned to pre-war levels and al- most all homes have running water. The three local hospitals are open, although they admittedly lack basic medicines. U.S. Marine engineers are repairing local schools, hospitals, and the water plant. Most significantly, in addition to fostering the reestablishment of basic public service, and this, I think, is particularly important, the Marines have supported the emergence of a functional, competent provisional government in Karbala Province that advocates-re- member, this is in the heart of Shia Iraq—that advocates a secular democratic future for that country. 20 Significantly, the leadership of this new secular and democratic local government is a religious figure, Sheikh Ali Abdel Hassan Kamuna. He is not only a Said, which means a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, and a member of a prominent local tribal clan, but, apparently no contradiction, he is also a member of the secular intelligentsia. The council elites contain other senior tribal figures, including five other Saids, but also representatives of the secular intelligen- tsia and business world, including a university professor, a civil en- gineer, a merchant, a retired army colonel, several lawyers, sociolo- gists, and ophthalmologists. I am going to ask if there are any women among them, because that would be a good sign of progress, but I think that is pretty impressive by itself. The religious intelli- gentsia is represented by a sheikh who endured 12 years in Saddam's prisons for his part in the 1991 uprisings. The fact that a new day has dawned in Iraq was nowhere so evi- dent as in the recent Arbayeen pilgrimage in the cities of Karbala and Najaf. For the first time in 26 years, more than a million Shia pilgrims walked to their holy cities without fear and without vio- lence. In judging the success or failure of the military plan for dealing with the aftermath of the collapse of the regime, one cannot judge it against the standard of unachievable perfection. There is no plan that could have achieved all of the extraordinary speed of this one, and at the same time been able to flood the country with military policemen. Choices had to be made. I think we made the choices, the right choices, choices that saved both American and Iraqi lives and prevented damage to the environment and to the resources of the Iraqi people. Let me just say a little bit about those plans. Starting in January of this year we recruited Jay Garner to stand up the Office for Re- construction and Humanitarian Assistance. To my knowledge, this is the first time we have created an office for post-war administra- tion before a conflict had even started. It was obviously a sensitive matter because we did not want to do anything that would under- cut the efforts to reach a diplomatic resolution of the crisis pre- sented by Iraq's defiance of U.N. Resolution 1441. For that reason also, we did not brief key Members of Congress perhaps in as much detail as we would have liked. We should certainly have ensured that Jay Garner briefed you before he left for the theater. We will work hard to do our best to remedy those_errors, including arranging secure video telecon- ferences with Envoy Bremer and Mr. Garner as appropriate. Hav- ing said that, let me also say we picked Jay Garner because he had demonstrated at other times in his career, most significantly when he was a commander in the extraordinarily successful operation in Northern Iraq in 1991, a capacity for putting organizations to- gether quickly and energizing them and focusing them on getting practical tasks accomplished. Fortunately, as I noted earlier, a great deal of our pre-war plan- ning turned out not to be needed, because there were no massive food shortages, there was no massive destruction of oil wells or gas platforms, and I believe in large measure that is attributable to the 21 success of the military plan. I would like to briefly mention some of the features of that plan that I think contributed to that success. At the heart of the military plan was the imperative to defeat Iraq's major combat forces. The emphasis was on speed. We con- sciously chose to keep our force size relatively small, limiting the amount of people and materiel deployed on the initial thrust into Iraq. This plan gave great flexibility. Those forces quickly plunged deep into Iraq, bypassing a good portion of the country in their push to Baghdad. We recognized that was a choice, and that we would be leaving problems in our rear. Despite the fact that Saddam's regime had strategic warning of an impending attack, because of our speed, coalition forces were able to achieve substantial tactical surprise. In short, we began the war with a timetable the regime did not expect, and we combined it with a speed that made it difficult for the regime to react and regroup. The enemy was never able to mount a coherent defense, nor was it able to blow up dams, bridges, and critical infrastructure or use weapons of mass terror, perhaps because it was caught so completely off-guard. As a result, in less than 3 weeks we were in Baghdad, and with the toppling of Saddam's statue, history's annals tallied another victory for freedom akin to the fall of the Berlin Wall or the libera- tion of Paris. Our plan worked even better than we could have hoped. For ex- ample, in Baghdad we tried a few armored raids to probe and shock the Iraqi Army. We had not expected to see resistance col- lapse completely as a result, but when those armored raids actually caused the collapse of Iraqi resistance, we capitalized on our suc- cess and moved into the heart of Baghdad, a decision that testifies to the flexibility of the war plan as well as its speed. Mr. Chairman, not only did this plan achieve its military objec- tives, this plan saved lives, American lives and Iraqi lives. The un- precedented use of precision not only destroyed the intended mili- tary targets, but protected innocent lives and key infrastructure, and the Iraqi people stayed home. They understood our military ac- tions were directed against Saddam and his regime, not against them. As a result, there is a list of crises we have averted, successes that are measured as much by what did not happen as what did. There is no food crisis in Iraq. There have been no major epidemics. There was not the refugee crisis that many predicted would destabilize the region. There was no wholesale destruction of oil wells or other critical infrastructure after the war began, and the regime did not use weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Chairman, let me say a few words about costs, or more im- portantly about how we are going to pay for them. The costs of re- construction are difficult to estimate, since many of the problems we face resulted from decades of neglect and corruption, but there are a number of funding sources that can help Iraq. First, there is $1.7 billion in formerly frozen Iraqi Government assets in the United States that the U.S. Government vested by Presidential order. Second, there is about $700 million, and the number grows almost daily, in State- or regime-owned cash that has so far been seized and brought under our control and is available to be used 22 for the benefit of the Iraqi people. Third, once Iraqi oil exports re- sume, and with the passage of the U.N. Security Council resolution today, they can resume immediately, the proceeds from those sales will be devoted entirely to the benefit of the Iraqi people, except for a 5 percent fund that the U.N. is setting aside for reparations from past conflicts. Under the terms of the recently passed U.N. Security Council resolution, assets from two additional sources would be placed in the Iraqi Assistance Fund, and there have been public pledges from the international community of more than $600 million under the U.N. appeal and nearly $1.3 billion in other offers of assistance for the food, health, agriculture, and security sectors. Indeed, I believe the passage of the resolution today is an important watershed in making it possible to get contributions on both military assistance for stability operations and on the nonmilitary side for reconstruc- tion from many countries around the world. Mr. Chairman, just a few words about the political side, which in the long run will turn out to be the most important, although it is not at the moment our most urgent task, but we continue to work toward the establishment of an Iraqi interim administration [IIA] which will assume increasingly greater responsibility for the administration of Iraq. The IIA will draw from all of Iraq's religious and ethnic groups and provide a way for Iraqis to begin to direct the economic and political reconstruction of their country, but the interim adminis- tration's most important responsibility will be to set in motion a process leading to the creation of a new Iraqi Government, for ex- ample by setting up local elections, drafting a new constitution and new laws. This is a process that foreigners cannot direct. It must be a process owned by Iraqis. In the final phase of our plan, an Iraqi Government would as- sume full sovereignty on the basis of elections in accordance with a new constitution. Our intention is to leave Iraq in the hands of Iraqis themselves, and to do so as soon as we can. As President Bush has said, the United States intends to stay in Iraq as long as necessary, but not a day longer. To those who fear that Baathists and Iranians may intervene when we have left, our mes- sage is simple. While we intend to withdraw as rapidly as possible from Iraqi political life and day-to-day decisions, we will remain there as an essential security force for as long as we are needed. I would also caution that this process will take time, and it is necessary to get it right. Mr. Chairman, currently 24 coalition countries are providing military support, some of that publicly, some of it is still private. Thirty-eight nations have offered finan- cial assistance, totaling now $1.8 billion, and very importantly, a number of countries have made commitments to providing brigade- size and larger forces for the stability operation once the U.N. Se- curity Council resolution has passed, as has just happened. I would just like, before I conclude, to note that there have been some very significant successes already as a result of the efforts of ORHA and our pre-war planning. Some Iraqis today have more electric service than the past 12 years. For the first time since 1991, the people in Basrah have electricity 24 hours a day. When the national grid backbone is operational later this month, Bagh- 24 bors. We are committed to helping Iraqis build what could be a model for the Middle East-a government that protects the rights of its citizens, that represents all ethnic and religious groups, and that will help bring Iraq into the international community of peace-seeking nations. Now that this goal is within sight, Iraq represents one of the first and best opportunities to build what President Bush has referred to as a “just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.” Saddam Hussein was a danger to his people and a support to terrorists and an encouragement to terrorist regimes. His removal from power opens opportunities to strengthen governments and institutions in the Muslim world that respect funda- mental human dignity and protect freedom, and that abhor the killing of innocents as an instrument of national policy. Success in Iraq will continue to demoralize those who preach doctrines of hatred and oppression and subjugation. It will encour- age those who dream the ancient dream of freedom. In the last half century, those ideals of freedom and self-government have been the most powerful engines of change in the world. They give us hope for further development in the Muslim world, a development that will benefit every nation throughout the world and bring us important allies in the war against terrorism. We cannot afford to fail. We cannot afford to allow Iraq to revert to the remnants of the Baathist regime that now range throughout Iraq in their desperate bid for influence and power—or, to see it vulnerable to other extremist elements. As the distinguished Chairman said as recently as Sunday at Notre Dame, “Iraq must not become a failed state and a potential incubator for terrorist cells.” We cannot and we will not allow such a threat to rise again-nor can we dash the hopes of the Iraqi people. Make no mistake: recent efforts to destabilize Iraq represent the death rattle of a dying regime. We can defeat them. And we will. As Presidential Envoy Paul Bremer has told me, “If the Baathists have any staying power, let there be no doubt—we have more.” We will not stop our efforts until that regime is dead. Rebuilding Iraq will require similar time and commitment. Mr. Chairman, I've just returned from a visit to Bosnia and Kosovo, where my main purpose was to thank our American troops for their dedication and commitment and to assure the authorities in the region that the United States will see our tasks through to com- pletion. To those who question American resolve and determination, I would remind them that we are still playing our crucial role in Bosnia eight years after the Day- ton Accord, long after some predicted we would be gone, and we continue to be the key to stability in Kosovo and even in Macedonia. The stakes in Iraq are even greater than in the Balkans. But if the stakes are huge in Iraq, there is no question that our commitment to secure a peaceful Iraq is at least equal to the stakes. Mr. Chairman, I have noted with strong agreement your statements about the need for America to stay the course in Iraq. I applaud your determination and appreciate your support and the support of this Committee in helping the American people understand the stakes that we have in success. Mr. Chairman, today marks only day 67 since the start of major combat oper- ations in Iraq. It is only three weeks since President Bush announced the end of major combat operations, and, as I will explain at greater length later, smaller com- bat operations in Iraq still continue. Even though the war has not completely ended, we are already started on the process of rebuilding Iraq. Several months before the war even began, we established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian As- sistance in order to be able to address that task. As the title of the office implies, much of its early focus was on planning for two disasters that fortunately did not happen: First, to provide humanitarian assistance to a war-ravaged population, including the possible victims of large-scale urban fighting, and secondly, to halt the environmental damage that was anticipated from large-scale torching of the Iraqi oil fields and to begin the reconstruction of that vital national asset. Thanks to the speedy success of the military operation, the task we face has turned out to be very different. There is no humanitarian crisis in Iraq. The humanitarian problems of war have been largely avoided, in no small meas- ure because of the speed with which the campaign was carried out. However, a great deal of other work remains to be done, most of it anticipated in ORHA's plan- ning and staffing, work such as restoring rapidly the functioning of the electric power in Iraq and restoring essential medical services. Most of these problems are not primarily a result of the war, but rather the result of decades of tyrannical ne- glect, where the wealth and treasure of the country was poured into creating pal- aces, building tanks and procuring weapons of mass destruction, instead of caring for the Iraqi people. That damage has been compounded by widespread looting in the aftermath of the Saddam regime, some of it clearly conducted by surviving ele- ments of the regime themselves. The task before us is more about construction than reconstruction—the building of a society that was allowed to rot from within for more than three decades by one of the world's worst tyrants. The good news in all 26 Much of what I read on this subject suggests a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of the security problem in Iraq, and in particular, a failure to ap- preciate that a regime which had tens of thousands of thugs and war criminals on its payroll does not disappear overnight. The people who have created the mass graves that are now being uncovered in Iraq represent a threat to stability that was not eliminated merely when the statues came tumbling down in Baghdad. I have read recently that unnamed officials and experts say that the Pentagon ignored les- sons from a decade of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans and Afghanistan. It seems to me that those speaking anonymously ignore the difference between normal peacekeeping operations and the kind of situation that we are now in. In just the last 24 hours alone, in Baghdad the 3rd Infantry Division raided a Baath Party meeting and detained 9 Baathists. In Fallujah, which continues to be a hotbed of Baathist activity, some of it with connections to foreign extremists, an Iraqi vehicle attacked a checkpoint of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment and two enemy were killed and one detained. In the same area, three Iraqi snipers engaged U.S. troops and, in a third incident, a Bradley was disabled by an rocket propelled grenade fired from a mosque. In Baqubah, again in just the last 24 hours, the 4th Infantry Division conducted a raid and captured seven Iraqis and seized 15 million dinars. In Al Kut, a patrol of the 1st Marine Division engaged 20 enemy, killed two, wounded one, and captured 11. There were no U.S. casualties in any of these inci- dents, but they illustrate the level of continued hostile activity, much of it appar- ently associated with elements of the old regime. In short, while major combat operations have ended, American soldiers continue to be shot at almost daily. While we made substantial progress in catching the peo- ple on the black list, there is still additional work that needs to be done. We face in Iraq a situation where a substantially defeated enemy is still working hard to kill Americans and Iraqis who are trying to build a new and free Iraq in order to prevent Iraqi society from stabilizing and recovering. Bizarre as it may sound, their goal is to create nostalgia for Saddam Hussein. We cannot allow them to succeed. We need to recognize that this is completely different from Haiti, Bosnia or Kosovo, where opposition ceased very soon after peacekeeping troops arrived in force. In those situations, we could successfully adopt a strategy that emphasized the intimidating effect of presence, rather than active combat operations. Indeed, the strategy in both those places was to minimize the extent to which we got involved in direct confrontation with any of the local forces. We do not have the choice in Iraq of avoiding confrontation with the repressive elements of the old regime. We have to eliminate them, root and branch. We will do so, but it will take time. It's perhaps worth noting that the striking exception in that list of peacekeeping operations is the case of Somalia, where we, in fact, encountered the enormous dif- ficulties of taking on armed elements without adequate force and preparation. This task requires more than just military policemen. There is a very difficult balance to be struck, particularly in Baghdad, between providing ordinary civil order forces on the streets-which we are doing-and being prepared to deal with snipers and armed bands. CENTCOM is making that transition. There are now 45,000 Coalition military personnel in the Baghdad area, approximately 21,000 of whom are actively involved in security operations. In just the last 24 hours alone, the 3rd Infantry Di- vision has conducted nearly 600 patrols, secured 202 fixed sites, and manned 85 checkpoints. The total number of patrolling battalions in Baghdad has increased in just the last 24 hours from 22 to 29. Again, General Abizaid reports from his recent visit that we are already seeing much more commerce, many more people on the street, and much shorter gas lines. In Sadr City—the notorious Shi'a slum in Bagh- dad that used to be known as Saddam City—the people are already reporting that their conditions are better than before the war. General Pace will be able to com- ment on that in more detail. We are making progress. In my most recent conversation with Presidential Envoy Bremer, he reports that, while the security situation is serious—and still imposes severe restrictions on our ability to move freely—Baghdad is not a city in anarchy- shops are open and the city is bustling with traffic. Let me offer some details about our progress in achieving law and order: In Baghdad, some 7,000 Iraqi police are on duty, and reports of looting, curfew violations and gunfire are decreasing. How- ever, one of our principal challenges is that the old Iraqi police are much less unable than we had planned. Their leadership was corrupted by the old regime and they were trained to raid people's homes at night rather than conduct street patrols. It is also important to distinguish the security situation in different parts of the country. Most of the attention, appropriately, is on Baghdad, and there is no ques- tion that Baghdad is one of the keys to the future of the country. We would make a mistake if we saw it as the only one and overemphasized the importance of the 31 There are many other contributions, and they will be described in the future. Our continued progress will depend on international assistance, including that of the United Nations. To facilitate our goals, we advocate a Security Council resolution that will lift the sanctions from the Iraqi people, define the UN's role in Iraq, and encourage the greater international community to participate in building a free and peaceful Iraq. This support must be geared for the long haul for, as one Iraqi coun- cilman in Um-Qasr has said, “it will take time. People need to understand that we cannot undo years of Saddam overnight.” CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES We knew that certain systems and services we take for granted here would not exist in a formerly totalitarian regime. And we also knew that we could not fully understand the scope of Iraq's needs until we were in the country and on the ground. One area that did surprise us, as I mentioned, was the extent of decay in Iraq's overall infrastructure. The coalition campaign went to great lengths to pre- serve Iraq's schools, mosques, hospitals, bridges, dams and roads. But, it has become clear that the Baath regime did not. As with any plan, we were ready to readjust and recalibrate when we could care- fully assess conditions. We are doing that, and have begun addressing Saddam's leg- acy of destruction and decay. We began by calling in civilian companies familiar with tackling vast rebuilding challenges. USAID is developing a contractual mecha- nism to permit immediate action by Bechtel for emergency repair of power facilities. Among other successes we can point to are the following: • The World Food Program has large stocks of food in Iraq and has plans to bring in each month some 487,000 metric tons; June's rations are on their way. Al- though it will be a challenge to distribute the food, we're working with the WFP manager at CENTCOM to get it done; • Some Iraqis have more electric service than in the past 12 years. For example, people in Basrah have electricity 24 hours a day. Only Baghdad suffers from electrical shortages above pre-war levels. When the National Grid Backbone is operational later this month, Baghdad will receive excess power from the north and south; • Primary schools throughout Iraq opened on May 4. Jay Gamer is hopeful that secondary schools and universities will open soon; • Emergency civil servant payments have been made to more than a million civil servants; Baghdad's water system is at 60% of pre-war levels; in some places where there is reliable electric power, there are claims of higher levels of drinkable water than before the war; • Privately hired stevedores began ship off-loading operations and put rice di- rectly on trucks. Currently, over 1,500 tons per day are off-loaded. • In a first, the UN will use oil-for-food funds to buy Iraq's cereal crop. • In Karbala, the DART team reports that 130 school buildings have been cleared of unexploded ordinance; battalion teams have begun the renovation of five schoolbuildings. Energy infrastructure: One of the keys to getting Iraq up and running as a coun- try is to restore its primary source of revenue: its oil infrastructure. As with many other facets of life in Iraq, this infrastructure had been allowed to decay to a sur- prising degree. Fortunately, the coalition plan averted the destruction of many of the oil wells. And a great deal of repair work is underway to ensure operations can safely resume at oil facilities. While the coalition will be involved at the outset, the goal is to have production and marketing responsibility in the hands of a stable Iraqi authority as soon as possible. Iraqi oil operations are now being run by an In- terim Management Team, led by Thamir Ghadban, who was a senior Oil Ministry official under the former regime. Ghadban is advised by an American former oil ex- ecutive and the former head of Iraq's State Oil Marketing Organization. The Iraqis have demonstrated in the past their skills in operating their energy infrastructure in the face of adversity. We are confident they will do even better now. The resolution before the UN Security Council will also relieve shortages of gaso- line and cooking fuel. The resolution envisions the resumption of oil exports, and provides that revenues be deposited in the Development Fund for Iraq, with trans- parency provided by independent auditors and an international advisory board. Decisions regarding the long-term development of Iraq's oil resources and its econ- omy will be the responsibility of a stable Iraqi government. The United States is 35 However, having said that, if you were chief executive of Iraq oil today, the problem is still there and you may clarify this a little bit more for us. Somebody has to deposit the money, somebody has to disburse the money, and make decisions as to who it goes to. You have set aside 5 percent for reparations and past wars, and 95 percent is out there. The transparency of all of that is obviously important, and overhanging this is the debt situation. As you take a look, if you are chief executive of this, how much do you put into repair of that which is there, and has been in dis- repair even before the damage and looting. How much do you put in new investment? How much do you allocate to debt? Now, I had a meeting yesterday with a gentleman who has been an advisor to Russian rulers as they come and go, and his sugges- tion was, as perhaps Secretary Powell found, that the Russians were deeply interested in contracts. When it comes to debt, that is maybe something else. He had a lot of experience with both. They would like a lot of their debt forgiven. So would a lot of other na- tions who are involved in this. With that overhanging problem there, somebody has to be in charge of the fiscal situation of the country and the allocation of resources, the business management of it. There cannot be temporizing, in my judgment, about that. This is a very serious matter right now in terms of the confidence level that this money come out. Now, in doing that, the papers today point out that the Kurds in the north, are very worried about allocation of these oil re- sources for, say, relief of all of the country. They would say this is ours. Well, once again, we are back into what does it mean to be an Iraqi? Is there a sense that Iraqis want to be Iraqis? Most would say, sure, and the testimony we have had is that there is a very cultivated sense of that over decades. Still, we must promote the ability of the Iraqi people to come together and make compromises, to begin to think as we would like for Iraqis to think of themselves, as a cohesive society and country that are prepared to have great diversity in one government as opposed to a theo- logical tyranny. All of these things you have thought of, and you must do so every day. Specifically, on the question of the oil money and the manage- ment of resources, those are not the only revenues. You have point- ed out some others, but I am not sure how many taxes are being collected of any sort, on the fiscal side, on the income side. What can we expect and how can people manage that? In the absence of a legislature, a congress, or a President, will we make those deci- sions? Are they being made, or is there planning in a fiscal sense for the country presently? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. If I could say first of all, just very briefly, your suggestion of having, if not daily, at least regular briefings up here I think is an excellent one. I am impressed-Bill Luti who is sitting behind me I think was the OSD representative of the daily ones we had during the war, and it did seem to really establish a good pattern of communication, and maybe daily is too often, but let us work together and figure out what is the right schedule, because it helps us, and it is not just to transmit good news. There is plenty of bad news, too, and we could use help. 36 The CHAIRMAN. Because we need to share, as opposed to being ultra critical. We must be prepared to be supportive. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. And I think it is very important. I notice this on a transatlantic meeting in Europe over the weekend that a lot of our allies are reassured when they hear that, in fact, we intend to stay the course. I do not know why, after what we have done in Bosnia, they doubt it, but at any rate we need to say it. This is an opportunity to do it, and I appreciate that, and I think you were correct in singling out Envoy Bremer's decree on de- Baathification. We are hearing already that just the mere declara- tion has had a big political impact. On the key question you brought up about these decisions about—and there are many decisions, one, there are decisions about how you get the oil sector up and running and how you in- vest to repair it, and I was pleasantly surprised to discover that we have found an Iraqi, his name I mentioned in my testimony- Tamir Gadban—and I am told that he had a senior position in the Oil Ministry despite his refusal to join the Baath Party. It is pretty remarkable. It also says he must be extremely competent, because they did not tolerate that in other people, but he will be running it. We have an advisory board and an American advisor who will help him make decisions and give us some guidance as to whether we think those are the right decisions. Ultimately, for the time being he is under the authority of the coalition provisional adminis- trator, who is Ambassador Bremer. The issues about how the revenues get spent and invested are again under the authority of the coalition provisional administra- tion. The key individual under Ambassador Bremer is a very dis- tinguished American official, a former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Peter McPherson, who was the president, still is, I guess, he is on leave, from Michigan State University. We have had some extraordinary Americans volunteer to help us out there—a former commissioner of the New York police is going to help us with the police job. Peter McPherson I guess for the time being is a de facto finance economics minister for the provisional authority, but I would also emphasize we are looking for help everywhere we can get it, and in ORHA right now the current staffing is 617 U.S. and 471 coali- tion, about 1,000 people, and about 40 percent non-Americans, and I am pleased at that 40 percent number. I have been pushing par- ticularly hard to tap into the expertise, which I think is substan- tial, of our friends in Poland and other Central European countries who have had to undertake this kind of tricky economic transition themselves and have a better sense of the tradeoffs than we have, with our experience of running a functioning economy, but it is a big effort. There are a lot of decisions to be made. What I tried to describe, maybe too briefly, in my statement is, there are two things that have to happen, and they need to happen in parallel. On the one hand we need to make sure that the coun- try runs, and it is not that we want this responsibility, but we know that if we do not take it on, and with some unity of command and some ability to make decisions, things will limp. 45 Senator SARBANES. And are we expecting to increase that num- ber? General PACE. The number is being increased as we speak, sir, by about 18,000 with the arrival of the 1st Armored Division, and then beyond that there are no current projected deployments. Senator SARBANES. So we are going to go up to over 160,000? General PACE. Potentially, sir, although some of the troops that are there now, the ones who did all the fighting early, as General Franks sees the opportunity, when the security environment allows he will bring home who got there first. Senator SARBANES. Well, General Franks is stepping down, is that right? General PACE. Sir, General Franks' time as commander there would normally end around 1 July. I believe the Secretary of De- fense and the President are still discussing how long his tour will be and who would replace him. Senator SARBANES. I gather he is retiring. There is a story on CNN to that effect. Is that correct? General PACE. Sir, that is likely, but again it is not confirmed. The President and the Secretary to my knowledge have not made a decision, nor have they discussed the final outcome with Tom, that I know of. That is a likely outcome, sir, but it is not a decision. Senator SARBANES. All right, just to be clear, I am looking at an Associated Press dispatch here,“ U.S. Army General Tommy Franks, who planned and commanded the American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, has decided to retire, Defense officials said Thursday.” General PACE. Sir, I am not trying to be cute at all, sir. The fact of the matter is that before he- Senator SARBANES. I was not suggesting that you were trying to be cute. General PACE. Before he can retire he has to ask for it, and the Senate of the United States has to say yes, he may, neither of which has happened, and then the President and the Secretary of Defense need to decide who is going to replace him, and to my knowledge, they have not decided that, so I am just trying to be accurate, sir. Senator SARBANES. My time is up, but I just want to pursue this point quickly. Being over 160,000 troops, Secretary Wolfowitz, I would ask you whether you think it was fair to label General Shinseki's remarks back in February that we would need roughly several hundred thousand troops in post-war Iraq as an estimate "wildly off the mark.” Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would say several hundred thousand is 300,000 or more, and I do not think we are close to that. Senator SARBANES. You would say what? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Several hundred thousand to me means 300,000 or more, and I do not think we are close to that. Senator SARBANES. If it means 200,000, which is how I would read it, would you say we are close to that? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, I would—several, to me—we are close to 200,000, but the other point, there are a couple of other points, Senator, which are important to make. We are looking, particularly now that the U.N. resolution has passed, at having some substan- 46 tial contributions from other NATO allies and, indeed, from other countries. Senator SARBANES. How many? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We do not-we are just starting. There are countries that have said come talk to us after a U.N. resolution and we are going to be doing that, and the issue, too, is one number today, another number a year from now, another number 2 years from now. I think if you look at the experience in the Balkans, where we drew down from 60,000 NATO forces in Bosnia 8 years ago to 12,000 today, you can see a pretty sharp downward trend. What concerned me most about that very large number being out there, and I think most people take several to be three or more, is the implication that we were going to treat Iraq like Japan or Germany and occupy it indefinitely, and that, frankly, is what a lot of our enemies in the Arab world were trying to say about us, and I thought it was very harmful, otherwise I would have preferred not to have commented on the whole subject. Senator SARBANES. How many British troops are there? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. About 20,000. Senator SARBANES. About 20,000. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes. Let me just announce that there is a supposition that there will be roll call votes starting at about 4:15. They may run back-to- back. What I would propose is that we proceed with the ques- tioning, because our witnesses' time is very valuable, as is the time of Senators. I will recognize Senator Chafee. I will proceed to vote on anticipation that vote can be cast swiftly and return. In the event I have not, Senator Chafee, you are in charge until I return, and then you may proceed to vote and we will try to expedite that. Senator BIDEN. That is OK by us, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I understand. Senator Chafee. Senator CHAFEE [presiding). Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to the distinguished panel. It seems to me that we have thrown a rock into the pool that is the Middle East, and just for the sake of my question, if all goes well with restoring order in Iraq, what is the strategic vision of the ripples that are now going out from this rock? What is the strategic vision in the Middle East now? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would say several things. I think some of them hopefully will happen even perhaps before some of the other results are achieved inside Iraq. I think one of the ripples is a positive im- pact on the Arab-Israeli peace process, and clearly we need it. We need to move that process forward. I think we have credibility, enormous credibility, not that we did not have it before. We have it more than we did before. I think the removal of Saddam Hussein as somebody who was providing $25,000 to every terrorist family is already a sign that that is having a positive impact. I think a less direct, but maybe even more important impact is that I think the defeat of Saddam Hussein has improved the strategic position of Saudi Arabia, and the events of the terrorist attack of 10 days ago demonstrate that they need an improved strategic position. 49 Senator CHAFEE. Love it. Senator DODD. Thank you very much. Let me thank our wit- nesses, and I apologize for arriving a little bit late. I am sorry I was not at Bilderberg this weekend. I gather from my colleague from New Jersey it was a rather lively discussion with the Secretary. I will leave it at that. I do not know if time will permit me to follow two lines of questioning, but let me pro- ceed if I can. I would like to ask you to comment on the role of international inspectors, and let me preface the question with this, if I may Generally, we have asked—the United States, we have called on the IAEA, as I understand it, to play more of a leading role in con- demning Íran for its alleged nuclear weapons program, and I think that is the appropriate and proper thing to do, yet we appeared al- most simultaneously, at least it does appear this way, to undercut the IAEA's credibility with Iraq, and let me tell you why I say that. The IAEA, as you know, is responsible for carrying out the U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq under Resolution 1441. Its inspectors, I think most would agree, have some pretty solid information of sites, suspected links to nuclear weapons programs, along with de- tailed inventories of existing Iraqi inventories of low enriched ura- nium and spent fuel stored under IAEA physical safeguards. Since the end of the war, the United States has refused to allow the IAEA inspectors to return to Iraq to verify that no tampering with the safeguards has occurred. At the same time, we barred UNMOVIC—if that is how you pro- nounce that—teams headed by Hans Blix from Iraq, and this week, after Mohammed ElBaradei issued an ominous warning that looted radioactive material may create a, to quote him, “humanitarian nightmare,” Secretary Rumsfeld expressed some flexibility on the possible return of IAEA inspectors. I wonder if you might describe the current state of discussions for us between our government and the IAEA, and their possible return to Iraq, and second, what lay behind this month-long delay in starting these talks with IAEA? At the very least, we could have exchanged some notes, I think, on their detailed knowledge of pre- Iraqi stocks of the low enriched uranium and spent fuel cells and the like, so you would comment generally where we are with this, and if you disagree with any characterization I have made about this, certainly feel free to respond to that as well. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I honestly do not have the sort of detailed track record on who said what to whom over the last few weeks. What I do know now is that—and by the way, I am making an assump- tion. I know how difficult it has been just to get civilians into Bagh- dad for the reconstruction effort. I mean, every single new job that we had, especially if it involves protecting civilians, is another bur- den on CENTCOM, and that has come up over and over again in a whole bunch of issues that have no political overtone to them whatsoever. In any case, where we are today is that we are—and the U.N. resolution obviously helps also to eliminate some of the possible barriers. We are happy to have them come. We are, I believe, in discussions with them about who would come and for what pur- 50 poses, but there is no desire to keep them away, and I think they do have something useful to contribute. Senator DODD. Do you have any idea when that may occur? Are we going to try and facilitate their return, and tell me about this latest report that was described as a humanitarian nightmare. If we have actually lost materials, what can you tell us about that? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I have seen the same reports that there has been some looting of sites where people may have picked up radio- active material. We are not sure who did it, or therefore why they might have done it. If they did not know what they were doing, ob- viously they could have caused themselves a lot of trouble. General Pace, can you comment on how many of the sites are currently secured? General PACE. Sir, there are 22 known sites, and they are all se- cure right now. I am not 100 percent sure of the details on the health hazard, Senator, but I do know that there are some con- tainers that were holding yellowcake that were taken by local peo- ple. The yellowcake was dumped out of it and the containers were being used to hold water, which, of course, creates a radiological hazard for the people who are drinking that water. The containers have all been recovered, and there are medical teams onsite trying to assist with determining what, if any, contamination the local people contracted. Senator DODD. Thank you for that, and any more information on that, I am sure the Armed Services Committee would be interested, and we would be as well, I think, in this committee. And I do not know if it is the major rationale, one of the major rationales for taking military action in Iraq was obviously the weapons of mass destruction, and so I appreciate the news that we are allowing them to come back in, but it seems to me it should have been a higher priority to some degree, given their knowledge, and the possible loss of some of these materials to terrorist States or terrorist organizations and groups is disturbing, but I am heart- ened to know that they are moving back in. Quickly again, and I do not know how much time we have here, but I would like to ask you as well about the looting that is going on, and what we sort of anticipated here? Obviously, we have all read the stories about the archaeological losses, the museums, the libraries. In fact, I am told that the destruction as a result of looting exceeds the destruction that was caused by the bombing during the phase of the war, and I wonder if, No. 1, did we antici- pate that this might be a problem following the collapse of the re- gime? I am told that there were warnings that we received from ar- chaeologists and others that this might occur prior to the actual commencement of hostilities, and if there were warnings, why were not they heeded, or at least apparently not heeded, and I wonder if you might share with us whatever discussion might have taken place, now that it is after the fact, in planning for this, to the ex- tent we thought this might be a problem, and what steps we were going to take to address it. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let me speak specifically to the museum and ask General Pace to speak to the larger issue of how the military planning anticipated this issue. 64 Ms. CHAMBERLIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know Senator Brownback would like me to do a little bit of work this afternoon, so perhaps I can help a bit here with this answer. We, of course, with USAID are members of ORHA and, in fact, our USAID Mission Director is double-hatted as the USAID Mission Director but also as the Director of ORHA, the pillar of reconstruc- tion. He is an Arabic speaker. He had been Mission Director in Jordan at one time, and that is why we recruited him, but that is not how USAID has tried to address this problem of how do we reach out for both Americans and people in the region, and Iraqis who have a lot to contribute to the effort that we are dedicated to, and in this case it is in the sectors of health, education, reconstruction and local government. We have a mechanism where we reach out to the American pri- vate sector. It is a group that we have not really talked about it very much, but that plays an enormously important role in ORHA to deliver some of the objectives of ORHA. We do it through our contracting method. We are quite proud of it, but we reach out to the American private sector and they in turn subcontract to Iraqi- American NGOs. We have several of them that are participating in this effort and we have, through our contracting, through the American private sector, they are hiring at this count about, well, several thousand Iraqi-American citizens in our effort in several of these sectors, so we are able to expand the pie. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. That is very helpful infor- mation. I just want to conclude by saying I appreciated General Pace's facts that as many as 18,000 additional military personnel might join the 145,000 that are there. Likewise, he added that there will be some troops withdrawn among those that were in- volved in the battles early on, and for that matter a lot of rotation, I guess, given the reserves and the large dependence on that, but that fact alone demonstrates I think something that most Ameri- cans do not realize, including myself, that, in fact, additional people in the military are going to Iraq presently. There is the general view that a whole rush of people are coming out, that it is simply a one-way stream, which is totally inaccurate, but, you know, until you told us this, maybe others have picked it up somewhere else, we really did not know, and so I emphasize again our appreciation to you for sharing this information with us and with others, really, through this hearing. Senator Biden. Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Along those lines, I would like to request, if you think it is appro- priate -I think it is in order—that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, in addition to making briefings available to us in a timely way, which you have committed to do and have done in the past, and I am con- fident you will do in the future, that you either in classified form and/or in open form in writing, give us your best estimates, because I know Under Secretary Larson was at this meeting today, on the potential of oil revenue in Iraq and whether we are really not going to have to take a lot out of our pocket in order to get whatever has to be done done. 67 did not want anyone to think that we had prejudged that we would go independently, absent the U.N. participation. I think that is kind of thin, but I will accept it. You then told us that General Garner did not come to us when we asked him to come to us to give us a sense because you thought it was not appropriate at that time, and events overtook us, and that you want to rectify that. I, for one, do not want to be on the other side of that glass look- ing in after the fact, being told that our requirements are some- thing no one told me about, and I will end by saying there is a Wall Street Journal/NBC poll which goes to the very first point I raised, because we are going to have a hard time—I do not know whether this is going to cost us, sum total, a billion, $20 billion, $60 billion $100 billion more, I do not know, but in the poll done by NBC/Wall Street Journal, support or oppose the United States spending up to $60 billion over the next 3 years, that is $20 billion a year over the next 3 years to rebuild Iraq, 37 support, 57 oppose. I am confident if we told the American people now what it takes, they would be prepared to do whatever it takes, which leads me to the concluding point. I would also think it is useful if you would, for the record, state, and I will not ask you to do it now unless you want to, what the stakes are in Iraq. I have a clear view of what the stakes are in Iraq if we do not get it right. The chairman and I have both written about it. My good friend from Nebraska has a clear notion of what he thinks the stakes are. I would like to know what the President and the administration think the stakes are for failure. What is it? We are not going to fail, but in order for me to convince my constituency to continue to spend this money, I have got to say to them—we all have to say to them, if we do not succeed, this is what will happen. This is what will happen. So you have stated several times, you must have a notion of what you think is at stake. What is at stake here? I would like that in writing for the record. What is at stake? And so there are my four requests, the oil projections, police training, if any, the schedule for standing up any indigenous Iraqis and what is at stake, and I will not try to take any more of the committee's time. I thank the chair. If we had time I would ask them to answer them now, but we do not. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator. [The following information was subsequently supplied:] OIL PRODUCTION In the past week, Iraq has been averaging 1.1 million barrels/day of oil produc- tion, which equates to roughly 600,000-700,000 barrels/day of export. Iraq should sustain 1.5 million barrels/day of production, and (at least) 1 million barrels/day of export, within one or two months, barring any major security problems. None of this will require major investment. Our goal is for Iraq to reach 3 million barrels/day of output by the end of 2004, which translates into at least 2.5 million barrels/day of export. This would return the country to its prewar production capacity. It is estimated that it might cost roughly $3 billion to reach that target. The Iraqi Oil Ministry has had plans for years to reach 6-8 million barrels/day of production, which some analysts believe will require 7-10 years and at least $30-40 billion of investment. It is not part of our mission to help Iraq reach those long-term production targets. 75 tions where Iraqis really can express their views freely, I think partly because of the enormous diversity of that society and partly because it is hard for me to imagine that the 50 percent of the soci- ety that are women, many of whom are relatively educated by standards of developing countries, are going to accept any kind of theocratic tyranny, or that the Kurds or the Turkamens, or for that matter the Sunni Arabs are going to want to accept a Shia theo- cratic State. There is a lot of pluralism built into that country, and as I think we have seen in our country, if it is structured properly, pluralism is a great force for liberty, so I think it may take some time, but I do not think one should anticipate the Iranian result in Iraq and, frankly, the Iranian model is a model of failure at this point, so I do not think it inspires anybody. Senator CHAFEE. So you would say that if there were free elec- tions, and a theocratic government—we would oppose—there are conditions on our vision of democracy, is that what you are saying? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think there are standards that people who participate in this political process need to meet. They need to be committed to protecting the basic rights of the Iraqi people. They need to be committed to the principle of equal justice under law. If they are held to those commitments, then I think they will set up institutions that have a reasonable chance of success. There is no guarantee in this world. At some point they are going to be on their own, and people could abuse things, but I think we have a better chance here than we have had anywhere in the Arab world for decades, and I think a lot of Arabs—I mentioned the Mo- roccan Foreign Minister. I think there is a long list, especially of nonruling Arabs, who hope that this will be a successful model. Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee. Senator Biden. Senator BIDEN. Just to followup on the point that Senator Hagel was making, the reason why some of us are confused is that 1700 hours, 11 April, 2003, General Garner's staff briefed my staff and other staffs here and presented us with a chart, à flow chart of au- thority, and there is no place on here not only for Bremer, for any Bremer-like person. Asked specifically who was going to be over General Garner as Director of ORHA, he said it was going to be McCarron, the guy on the ground responsible to Franks, and Franks. And so that is the reason for our confusion. We are not making this up. That is why it looked to us like maybe you guys knew it, but you were a little bit of pea-in-a-shell game with us, because this is what was submitted by Garner's staff to our staff in an official briefing as to what the command flow would be, and so I would hope we do not have that kind of confusion again as to what you are going to do from this point on, because that was officially given to us, and I will give you a copy of it. That is why we are a little confused. That is why it looks like a little bit of revisionist history to us. I am sure you are telling the truth, but understand why-we are not just looking to pick a fight-it looks like revisionist history based on not what we just thought, but what we were told as of that date.