3
In point of fact, we can never be sure that dictators or terrorists are in any “stra-
tegic box" as long as they are in power or at large.
Secretary of State Powell's "targeted sanctions" is intended to concentrate the ef-
forts of the world community on denying Saddam technology and illicit revenue. Un-
fortunately, however, it seems likely that it will allow Saddam to “pick the lock” of
his cage or to break down its door altogether.
Thus, I very much doubt that the proposed approach will yield the hoped-for plug-
ging up of leaks in the sanctions regime. Leaks, for example, that permitted a Chi-
nese company to install new fiber optic cable to link Iraq's air defense network and
make it more effective against U.S. aircraft patrolling the skies over Iraq. Leaks
that allowed Iraq, six years ago, to import through Jordan Scud missile guidance
systems from Russian middleman.
There is no reason to believe that Saddam would shrink from providing his weap-
ons of mass destruction technology to terrorists, although there is not reason to be-
lieve he has done so as of yet. We cannot rule out the possibility that a man who
would kill five thousand Iraqi Kurds in a poison gas attack at Halabja would con-
template the use of such weapons against American targets.
I am on record, along with the Chairman of the Committee and many of its Mem-
bers as advocating the overthrow of Saddam Husayn. Indeed, under the Iraq Libera-
tion Act of 1998, it is officially declared U.S. policy to change Iraq's regime. There
is no other way to fully and finally end the threat Iraq poses to our national secu-
rity.
This is an important goal, whether or not Saddam is demonstrated to have played
a role in the September 11 attacks.
We do not, of course, want to unnecessarily complicate the struggle we are cur-
rently undertaking against Osama bin Laden and terrorists of his ilk.
But the United States should be able to “chew gum and walk at the same time.”
At the earliest possible moment—which might be very soon, and certainly will have
to come before we can declare total victory over terrorism-we must turn our atten-
tion to ending a regime we should have dismantled years ago. Saddam's regime con-
tinues to defy the will of the international community, all norms of acceptable inter-
national behavior, and well as all human rights norms. While we're striking at other
terrorists, we ought to end regime of a master terrorist like Saddam.
Today, we'll here from three distinguished experts on Iraq and its weapons of
mass destruction programs, Geoffrey Kemp, Charles Duelfer, and Gary Milhollin. I
will introduce them in more detail after Mr. Ackerman makes any opening state-
ment he may wish.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling today's
hearing. In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, I
think it is important that we as a Nation not lose sight of those
states that in the past have wanted to do us harm. Indeed, in the
case of Iraq, we have a state that clearly intends to do us harm
in the future as well.
It is also appropriate for the Subcommittee to take up this sub-
ject, because at the end of November the United States will again
have to make the case in the United Nations Security Council for
continuation of sanctions on Iraq. In past discussions of the sanc-
tions issue, we have heard a chorus of calls for the relaxation of
sanctions from Russia, China, France, and the Arab world, osten-
sibly because the sanctions hurt the Iraqi people.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we must be clear and emphatic,
that only Saddam Hussein hurts the Iraqi people. If he were to
abide by the conditions laid out in the U.N. Security Council reso-
lutions, conditions which he accepted and which the international
community demanded, the sanctions would be lifted. But over the
last decade, what we have seen is the continued pursuit of weapons
of mass destruction by Iraq in direct contravention of those resolu-
tions. But even if the sanctions remain, it is still Saddam Hussein
who chooses not to use the money from the Oil for Food program
to provide for the Iraqi people. Billions of dollars flow annually
through that program, and yet somehow Iraqis continue to suffer


8
Arab-Israeli conflict. In the event of clear, substantive and persua-
sive evidence connecting Saddam to September 11th, the objective,
as I said, must be the removal of the regime as well as a coherent
policy for a post-Saddam Iraq.
There is no guarantee that any of Saddam's successors that come
from within the regime will be any less anti-American than Sad-
dam, or that they will disband their WMD programs or abandon
their wish to rebuild Iraq's military conventional forces.
Under the circumstances of Iraq being responsible in part for
September 11th, the military choices the United States faces are
formidable. While airpower and missiles can wreak a great deal of
damage on Iraq's facilities and demoralize Iraqi security forces,
most notably the Republican Guard, there is no assurance such an
operation would lead to the end of the regime. In the process we
could anticipate a severe backlash throughout the Muslim world,
since a sustained bombing campaign would need to be more intense
than anything witnessed during the Clinton Administration. This
would undoubtedly lead to civilian casualties, probably deliberately
orchestrated by Saddam.
While Iraqi forces are much weaker than in 1991, they may still
have access to WMD, and certainly they possess short-range sur-
face-to-surface missiles. My colleagues will talk in more detail
about this, I believe. The occupation of an Arab country by Amer-
ican forces would reinforce Muslim radicals' basic tenet that we are
intent on waging a war against Islam. Nevertheless, we may have
no option but to take such a step. Kuwait would likely make facili-
ties available, but this provides a very narrow base from which to
launch an invasion. If Saudi Arabia decided to support such an ac-
tion, the operation becomes much more favorable for the United
States.
As for coordinating a guerrilla war using Iraqi opposition forces
against Saddam, this too requires bases in regional countries.
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria are unlikely to support such oper-
ations from their territory. Kuwait might agree, but the terrain in
southern Iraq is not well suited to guerrilla operations. Turkey and
Iran are much better suited, but Iran will clearly not participate.
Turkey might, but will continue to be extremely concerned about
the role of the Kurds, given its fear of instability on the border in
its own Kurdish problem.
Now, what should we do if the evidence linking Saddam to Sep-
tember the 11th is flimsy and inconclusive? First, we should not
abandon the efforts to strengthen the sanctions regime. The
present regime against Iraq is unraveling, and until September the
11th regional support for Saddam Hussein was growing. The re-
vised sanctions policy proposed by the Administration deserves
support. Today President Putin may be prepared to go along with
the U.S. proposal to tighten the sanctions regime. China and
France have already agreed to.
But for this to work, we will have to provide more aid to Jordan
and to convince Turkey and Iran that their interests are served by
working with a new U.N. Security Council resolution on sanctions.
The question of support for Iraqi opposition forces outside Iraq
arouses controversy both within the United States Government and
among our allies. Iraqi opposition groups could and should be en-


22
The U.S. proposal would retain U.N. control over Iraq's oil income and would for-
bid the purchase of arms and sensitive dual-use items; however, it would abolish
controls on just about everything else. It would not require Iraq to re-admit U.N.
inspectors or to take any steps toward disarmament.
Without inspectors, there is no internal restraint on Iraqi efforts to rebuild the
infrastructure necessary for rearmament, including efforts to develop weapons of
mass destruction. In particular, there would be no on-the-ground control to prevent
diversion of Iraq's increased civilian imports to military ends. One panelist pointed
out that when the United States and its allies compromised in December 1999, and
agreed to U.N. Resolution 1284, they were trying to allay the humanitarian argu-
ment against sanctions by allowing Iraq to sell unlimited amounts of oil. The U.N.
received, however, nothing in return. Now, with smart sanctions, the process would
be repeated. Controls on Iraq would be weakened once again without any Iraqi
movement toward disarmament or inspections. There is no reason to believe that
Iraq will cooperate with the new sanctions any more than with the previous ones.
Thus, the new sanctions may be a slippery slope, with further reductions of sanc-
tions to follow. The illusion of controls would be preserved while sanctions continue
to erode.
Finding 7—The prospects are dim for a satisfactory outcome in Iraq. Options are
few, and there are no good ones. The United States has never had a long-term
strategy for dealing with Iraq; this would be a good time to devise one.
Most panelists agree that Iraq has won the public relations battle over sanctions.
The general public no longer realizes that if Saddam Hussein truly decided to dis-
arm, he could clear Iraq's name in a matter of months, end the embargo, and re-
move any restraint on the flow of goods to the Iraqi population. He has been reject-
ing this opportunity, however, since 1991. Saddam Hussein obviously believes that
preserving his mass destruction weapon programs is more important than the bil-
lions of dollars in oil income that his country has foregone and will continue to fore-
go.
In the face of Iraq's intransigence, the West has tried to compel its compliance,
both by economic means through sanctions, and by political and military means
through a multilateral coalition. Neither of these efforts is succeeding. The principal
remaining option-full-scale military intervention-carries a price no one is willing
to pay. Thus, an uneasy status quo remains.
Yet the status quo is unacceptable. The Gulf states and others are already cur-
rying favor with Iraq because they perceive that it will not be compelled to give up
its weapon potential. They also perceive that Iraq has a growing chance of evading
U.N. control of its bank accounts. Thus, there is an increasing willingness to violate
sanctions. The result is that sanctions are eroding even while Iraq is working to en-
hance its mass destruction weapon capabilities.
This outcome will undoubtedly spur weapons proliferation in the region. If Iraq
is successful in pursuing secret weapon programs, others will see that they can do
the same. Iran, in particular, will be under pressure to match Iraq in mass destruc-
tion weaponry, and Saudi Arabia will be watching. The United States and its allies
have been able to threaten countries with an array of sanctions for proliferation, but
if sanctions prove unsuccessful in Iraq, they will necessarily lose credibility. The
price of not making things better in Iraq may be to make things worse in the region.
The alternatives seem to be to keep sanctions as strong as possible or to replace
them with something better. However, giving up on sanctions would hand a tremen-
dous victory to Iraq; there would be no way to “spin” it otherwise. Thus, while there
may be a temptation to declare victory on sanctions and retire from the field—by
arguing that sanctions have at least slowed down Saddam for a decade—it is not
possible to abandon sanctions unless something more effective can be substituted.
The opposition to sanctions is fundamentally driven by money. The reason why
Russia, France and China oppose sanctions is that they want access to Iraq—to “get
the money out,” in the words of one panelist. France, in particular, has always seen
Iraq as a major source of income. What is needed is an arrangement in which these
countries can get dollars out of Iraq while preserving international security. That
arrangement cannot mean a resumption of Iraqi mass destruction weapon pro-
grams.
One of the reasons the United States may not have been more successful in the
Gulf is that U.S. diplomats have pointed their energy further west—to the Israeli
peace process. Because the United States sees the peace process as its most impor-
tant interest in the region, it has been willing to overlook things, for example, tak-
ing place in Jordan. To make progress in the Gulf, the United States needs to
spread its efforts across both parts of the Middle East more equally.


23
.
U.S. Iraq policy continues to be largely tactical, without an evident long-term
strategy for dealing with the threat that Saddam Hussein presents. “Smart sanc-
tions” are primarily a tactic—designed to counter the criticism that too many sales
are now being held up by U.S. and U.K. objections. Even if these new sanctions are
adopted, however, Iraq would be no nearer to disarmament than it was before.
The longer-term strategic question seems to be whether some common ground can
be found among the former members of the Gulf Coalition and the permanent mem-
bers of the U.N. Security Council. Most panelists believe that little such ground ex-
ists. Nevertheless, it might be feasible to fashion a consensus around the principle
that Iraqi military moves against its neighbors will not be tolerated; that Iraq's mili-
tary capabilities must be strictly limited; and that information should be shared on
what Iraq is up to. The United States may be compelled to seek such a consensus
eventually. The panel concludes that “solving" the problem of Iraq does not now
seem feasible. The removal of Saddam Hussein does not have the support of U.S.
allies, nor is such a step within the power and resources that the United States is
willing to commit. Nor is Iraq likely to disarm or re-admit arms inspectors with real
authority. This situation, coupled with the rise in Iraq's oil income, will produce a
steady increase in Iraqi arms, with weapons of mass destruction likely to be part
of the mix. This is a hard conclusion to accept, but given present policies toward
the Gulf, the risk that Saddam Hussein will plunge the world into another crisis
remains.
SHOPPING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN
By GARY MILHOLLIN & KELLY Motz 1
Commentary Magazine
July-August 2001, pp. 23–7
Whether or not the world is ready, Saddam Hussein is back. With oil income now
reaching the levels he enjoyed before the Gulf war, Iraq's president is beginning to
buy his way out of the box” in which former Secretary of State Madeleine K.
Albright famously declared we had confined him.
What Saddam chooses to spend his money on is of cardinal importance. During
the decade before the 1991 Gulf war, when he could buy what he wanted, his weap-
ons scientists imported factories to make poison gas, strains of microbes for germ-
warfare agents, missiles that during the Gulf war would kill U.S. troops in Saudi
Arabia, and equipment that, had the war not intervened, would long since have pro-
duced an atomic bomb.
But the Gulf war did intervene, and as a consequence, after its troops were routed
in Operation Desert Storm, Iraq pledged to disarm. To verify that it had done so,
a UN inspection regime was put into place, coupled with a ban on international
· trade with Baghdad that had been imposed in 1990. The inspectors were in for a
big surprise. They uncovered a complex of secret sites in which virtually every kind
of weaponry of mass destruction was being fabricated. Iraq had purchased giant
magnets and centrifuges for enriching uranium, had imported German components
to enhance the range of Scud missiles purchased from the Soviet Union, had bought
plants for producing chemical and biological agents, and had actually loaded those
agents into warheads. (The record of these purchases can be found in our online
publication, Iraq Watch.org.)
It was these discoveries, and the resulting friction with Saddam's regime, that led
in 1998 to the UN inspectors being forced out. The sanctions on international trade,
however, remained in place, though increasingly they had come to resemble what
President Bush last January characterized as so much “Swiss cheese.” Now a joint
British-American proposal has been put forward that would replace the current
broad-based sanctions with prohibitions only on the sale of arms and some civilian
"dual-use” items. The new arrangement would also continue the current "oil-for-
food” system, under which Iraq can sell as much oil as it wants but is supposed to
deposit the revenue in a UN-supervised escrow account and use it only to buy civil-
ian goods that the UN has specifically approved.
The new proposal—whether adopted by the UN or not—has little hope of stopping
the Iraqis from sneaking in what they need to rebuild their weapons sites and
sneaking out the oil to pay for it. For the truth is that even when the UN inspection
regime was in place, the Iraqis had already figured out how to do just that.
Here is how the system works. Suppose an Iraqi site needs a new computer-con-
trolled machine tool, one especially capable of making the high-precision parts need-
ed for long-range missiles or nuclear weapons. Since such a purchase would be ve-
1 GARY MILHOLLIN is the director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, where
KELLY MOTZ serves as a research associate. This is their first appearance in Commentary.


28

The New York Times
Week in Review
Sunday, December 20, 1998
What the Inspectors Can't Find and Why They Can't Find It
Aims inspectors have been trying for seven years to
verify that Iraq has kept its promise to destroy its
tiemcal, nuclear and biological wartare capacity, but
say many pieces of the puzzle are still unaccounted for.
This table was compiled by the Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control, a research group based in
Washington that tracks the spread of weapons of mass United Nations Special Commission and the
destruction. The authors. Gary Miſholin and Kelly International Atomic Energy Agency, and statements by
· Nugent based their work principally on reports from the Richard Butler, the commission's chief inspector
Poison Gas
UMSCCOUNTED FOR IN IRAQ
Ar teasi-3.9 tons of VX nerve gás.
WHAT ISAL SAYS
The gas was low quallly
and the effort to make it tailed.
The evidence was planted.
A nerve gas put into warheads.
HOW INSPECTORS KNOW.
Iraq admits producing this
amount in 1988 and 1990.
U.S. and French tests found traces
of nerve gas on warhead remnants.
Out of 805 tons on hand, only 191
could be verified as destroyed.
trag admits producing agents in the 1980 8.
About 800 tons of ingredients for VX gas.
Iraq had enough ingredients to make
more poison gas than it admits producing.
Iraq admits importing or producing them.
Everything was destroyed or
consumed in production.
They were used, thrown away or destroyed
by U.S. bombs during the 1991 gulf war,
All poison gas production
has been declared
No records of what
happened to them are available.
They were secretly destroyed.
trag admits producing them.
Up to 3.000 tons of other
Poisoregas agents.
Several hundred additional tons of poison
gas agents that raq may have produced
34,000 tons of ingredients to
a make poison gas
500 bombs with parachutes to deliver gas or
germ payloads
About $50 artillery shells filled with mustard gas.
107.500 casings for chemical arms
a1,658 filled and empty
Themical munitions:
An Iraqi Air Force document showing how
much poison gas was used against Iran,
and thus how much Iraq has left.
The results of a project to make binary
artilery shells for Sarin nerve gas,
Production procedures for making poison gas.
Iraq atiraits they existed.
Iraq admits producing or importing them.
Iraq admits producing or importing them.
A U.N. inspector held the document briefly
in her hands before traq confiscated it:
They were lost shortly after the gaff war.
No records are available,
They were thrown away, destroyed
secretly or destroyed by U.S. bombs.
Inspectors might be able to see it, but
only in the presence of the Secretary
General's personal envoy
There are no records or physical
traces of the program.
No documents containing these
procedures can be tound.
No such docuntieris can be found.
Iraq admits it can such a project
and made experimental shells
Such proceedures are needed for large-
scale producion.
Irispectors determmed that specific
documents are still missing
Documents showing the overall size
of the chemical weapons prageant
Ramazan Ozturk/Spa Pos
A Kurdish rimther and her child killed in Halabja, where Trag is accused of using xison gas in 1988;


35
These procurement efforts continued during the 1990s, despite the prohibitions of
the U.N. embargo. In 1999, our organization revealed that Iraq had imported a half
dozen machines called "lithotripters” (which pulverize kidney stones inside the body
without surgery) under the guise of humanitarian supplies. Each machine, however,
required a high-precision electronic switch that had a second use: it could trigger
an atomic bomb. Iraq wanted to buy 120 extra switches as “spare parts.” Iraq placed
the order with the German electronics firm Siemens, which supplied the machines
but forwarded the order for the extra switches to its supplier, Thomson-C.S.F., a
French military-electronics company. It is uncertain whether the French govern-
ment barred the sale. Stephen Cooney, a Siemens spokesman, claimed that Siemens
shipped only eight switches, one in each machine and two spares. Sources at the
United Nations and the State Department, however, believe that the number sup-
plied is higher. It only takes one switch to detonate Iraq's latest bomb design.
In March 2001, our organization disclosed that the Chinese company Huawei
Technologies, recently caught supplying fiber optic technology to Iraq's air defenses,
had previously imported a large amount of sensitive U.S. equipment, and had an
important license application pending to import more from Motorola. In fact, Motor-
ola proposed to sell routing and switching technology that would have been ideal
for improving an air defense network. The technology allows communications to be
shuttled quickly across multiple transmission lines, increasing efficiency and immu-
nizing the network from air attack.
Iraq also shopped for military items throughout the 1990s, despite U.N. sanctions.
In the article in Commentary, Ms. Motz and I showed that Iraq's procurement ef-
forts were focused mainly in former eastern bloc countries. We based the article on
a series of U.N. reports in which the U.N. inspectors detailed what they knew about
Iraq's foreign suppliers. The reports revealed that in violation of the U.N. embargo,
Iraq had continued to "import goods . . . from at least . . . twenty different coun-
tries” and that Iraq's shopping list included “turnkey facilities, full-sized production
lines, industrial know-how, high-tech spare parts, and raw materials.”
Iraq made agreements to buy missile and conventional weapon components from
companies in Ukraine, Belarus, Romania and Russia. The deals also included high-
tech machine tools useful in building both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
Jordanian middlemen played a key role in most of the sales.
"SMART SANCTIONS."
The "smart sanctions” proposed by the administration are not likely to improve
the situation in Iraq and could make it worse. The U.S. proposal would retain U.N.
control over Iraq's oil income, would bar Iraq from purchasing arms, and would bar
Iraq from purchasing sensitive dual-use items; however, it would allow Iraq to buy
almost everything else. The U.N. would stop controlling most of the goods that Iraq
now buys with its oil-for-food revenue.
The U.S. proposal is unlikely to help the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein has delib-
erately chosen to maintain the suffering of the Iraqi population by refusing to buy
civilian goods with his existing oil-for-food revenue. He has used the suffering, in
turn, to build pressure for ending U.N. control over his oil revenue. In fact, none
of the major players on Iraq's side in the present debate—Russia, China or France-
appear to be motivated by concern about the Iraqi population and neither does Sad-
dam Hussein. Ordinary Iraqis are only pawns in the struggle for control of Iraq's
bank accounts.
Under the administration's plan, Iraq could find it easier to buy what it needs
to rebuild its conventional forces and even mass destruction weapons. Militarily use-
ful items will probably be sent to Iraq under the guise of civilian purchases. In ef-
fect, the U.S. plan is a unilateral concession. It relaxes controls on what Iraq can
buy, but asks nothing in return. It does not require Iraq to re-admit U.N. inspectors
or to take any steps toward disarmament. Its main virtue seems to be that it will
diminish complaints from Russia and France that the United States is holding up
too many contracts. Simply diminishing these complaints is not an effective policy.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that Iraq will cooperate with the new sanc-
tions any more than with the previous ones. Thus, the new sanctions may be a slip-
pery slope, with further reductions of sanctions to follow. The illusion of controls
would be preserved while sanctions continue to erode.
There is also the problem of smuggling: oil is being smuggled out of Iraq; goods
are being smuggled in. In recent years, Iraq's methods for smuggling oil have grown
more sophisticated and the financing harder to trace or block. The smuggling of
goods has also grown, and become more sophisticated. It now consists of a multi-
layered infrastructure that reaches back through the highest levels in Jordan, Syria,
Turkey and even Iran. Overall, Saddam's oil revenue has now reached the levels he


48
Mr. GILMAN. I have one last question to all of our panelists.
There have been some reports suggesting Iraq may have been
aware of or involved in the September 11th plot. There was some
report that they met with an Iraqi intelligence person before they
undertook their attack. What is your assessment of those reports,
and what has been the relationship, if any, between Iraq and al
Qaeda? Mr. Duelfer?
Mr. DUELFER. Well, let me take—I would be surprised, again, if
there were not a relationship between al Qaeda and Iraqi intel-
ligence and Iraqi expertise. Iraq has certainly maintained contact
with all kinds of nefarious actors and organizations. But I am not
sure I would say that because an Iraqi intelligence officer in
Prague met with a guy who turned out to be conducting one of
these activities, I don't think that would necessarily be evidence
that they were connected with September 11th. Iraqi intelligence
officers are all over the place. They are in New York. They are ev-
erywhere. There are a lot of people who meet with Iraqi intel-
ligence officers, whether they know it or not.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Kemp?
Mr. KEMP. Yes, I would keep an open mind on this Mr. Chair-
man. We are in the process of conducting the most intensive intel-
ligence investigation in history, and sooner or later if there is a
connection, we will find it. So far, I have not seen any evidence
that that exists, but I would not rule it out.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Milhollin.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. I do not see any evidence of the contents of any
of these meetings, so without that, I don't think it is possible to
know whether the Iraqis knew about the event before it happened
or whether they had any role in it.
I think, though, that we have to assume—well, on an optimistic
note, I guess I could
say that Saddam right now seems to be doing
pretty well. He is escaping the embargo. If we want to make an as-
sumption, we could assume it would not be prudent for him at this
time to be connected with an attack on the United States. But like
all assumptions, that could turn out to be wrong.
Mr. GILMAN. One last question. Some do not want to pursue or
oppose the overthrow strategy and try to disparage the opposition's
unity and fighting capability. What is your assessment of the capa-
bility of the opposition to overthrow the regime of Saddam? To all
the panelists. Mr. Duelfer.
Mr. DUELFER. I think they should be incrementally given the op-
portunity to prove themselves. The INC and others they were in
Iraq when it was not pleasant to be in Iraq. And I think that a lot
of people unfairly criticize them. But incrementally they can be
given a chance to prove themselves, and if they demonstrate
progress, give them some more support.
Mr. KEMP. That is my view, that is what I said in my formal tes-
timony. And I think you need to have some military personnel tes-
tify on this, because I cannot judge how good they would be mili-
tarily, but I agree it has to be incremental, they have to prove
themselves first.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. I agree with Mr. Duelfer.


52
Before being forced out in 1998, the UN inspectors compiled a series of con-
fidential reports detailing what they knew about Iraq's foreign suppliers. :
What they recount is an ongoing effort to build weapons of mass destruction.
These reports, in truth, recount no such thing. While the many inspections ex-
posed the leakage of the sanctions regime, nothing was discovered that could point
to an effort to rebuild Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
My reading of these documents provides a much more realistic assessment. Take,
for instance, the report of the combined Missile/Export-Import team inspecting the
Karama State Establishment (Iraq's major ballistic missile facility) on May 27,
1997. During this inspection, Dr. Hamid Khalil Ibrahim, a leading Iraqi missile sci-
entist, told the team that no foreign goods had been received since May 1996. The
team then asked Dr. Hamid (as he was known familiarly) about precision machine
tools that Iraq had declared to UNSCOM in December 1996. These tools, of Italian
manufacture, did not fall under the technical specifications set forth in Resolution
1051, and so were deemed legitimate (despite having been brought into Iraq in vio-
lation of sanctions). The same held true for seven boxes of production tools (of Ro-
manian origin) for gyroscopes, and a British-made grinding machine.
The inspection was conducted in a very thorough manner, and concluded as fol-
lows: “No proscribed activity or details were observed.” This phrase is repeated
throughout the documents UNSCOM produced concerning Iraq's compliance with its
obligations under the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) plan. In fact,
since the implementation of Resolution 1051, the inspectors uncovered not a single
example of proscribed export-import activity. How Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz
can assert the contrary escapes me.
None of this is to deny today's harsh reality that goods are pouring through the
defunct, and discredited, regime of economic sanctions. Is Iraq using the oil-for-food
program to support such activity? Of course it is. One of the last major operations
Î carried out under Tea Cup was aimed at disrupting efforts to obtain ballistic-mis-
sile technology and production capabilities from Aerofina, a Romanian military-in-
dustrial company. In the end, none of the activity turned out to be of a proscribed
nature, but intercepted conversations between the Iraqi team, headed by Dr. Hamid,
and his Romanian intermediary pointedly referred to the oil-for-food program as a
means of facilitating the transfer of goods from Romania. He said: "We would use
the oil-for-food agreement. The Jordanians don't ask why, so we could call it ‘elec-
trical parts for sewage system,' “pumps for irrigation,' 'coolers for water pumps,’ ‘ma-
chine tools,' 'instrumentation for pipelines,' or 'raw materials.””
Clearly, then, the Iraqis were, and probably still are, violating the economic sanc-
tions by misrepresenting goods as part of the so-called humanitarian relief effort.
But such violations do not automatically translate into schemes for acquiring weap-
ons of mass destruction; in linking the two, Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz are mix-
ing apples and oranges. Nor does the failure of one program (sanctions) automati-
cally translate into the failure of another inspections). In fact, the history of
UNSCOM's work shows just the opposite: despite the failure of the sanctions re-
gime, inspectors were able to keep a tight lid on Iraq's ability to rebuild its past
prohibited programs.
Unfortunately, on-site inspections have been tossed into the garbage heap by
those U.S. policy-makers who seek not the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction but rather the removal of Iraq's president. It was the mixing of these
two disparate objectives that ultimately condemned UNSCOM, and their continued
mixing ensures that the United Nations Monitoring and Verification Inspection
Commission, UNSCOM's predecessor, will never be allowed back on the job. Yet the
fact is that inspections did, and can, work.
If the authors were sincere, they would try to help formulate a policy that might
result in a resumption of inspection activity. That they chose instead to denigrate
the process by distorting facts shows that they are motivated by concerns other than
nonproliferation. This is a shame, and does a grave disservice to a cause they pur-
port to champion.
SCOTT RITTER
Delmar, New York
GARY MILHOLLIN and KELLY MOTZ write: Scott Ritter both misunderstands our
article and makes a series of claims that are patently false.
Mr. Ritter begins by stating that none of the secret missile deals we described was
"in violation of relevant UN resolutions." He also contends that “Iraq was not pro-
hibited from possessing any of the material in question” as long as it was declared
to the United Nations.
Nothing could be farther from the truth. UN Security Council Resolution 661
barred the sale to Iraq by any nation of “any commodities or products," with only