HSSE DOO 109TH CONGRESS 1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. PRT. 109-40 14. F 76/2: S.PRT. 109-40 IRAQ: ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS IN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY STAFF TRIP REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION DECEMBER 2005 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations Available via World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 24–804 CC WASHINGTON : 2005 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 1039-A 2006-0083-P 10 stability, planning, leadership, resources and dedicated personnel at all levels of the particular organization. Stability has not been helped by the various iterations of Iraqi governments in the past two years, and by changes in U.S. leader- ship and emphasis. Chargé d'Affairs Satterfield expressed the ex- pectation that the election and installation of a new “permanent” government will provide leadership committed to the serious tasks at hand. (More than one U.S. official expressed their frustration with the interim governments' inability to focus on basic governing necessities.) Ambassador Satterfield emphasized the importance of the next year becoming a collective effort led by the Iraqis with strong participation by the Coalition, regional nations and the international community. He further highlighted the outreach the Iraqis are leading to generate regional and international support, such as the Arab League organized conference held 19–21 Novem- ber in Cairo. Although it is unfair to compare a coalition government oper- ating in a parliamentary system to U.S. politics, as yet, no one Iraqi leader has emerged with a vision for Iraq that has captured the imagination or provided a rallying point for the people. This will be a challenge for whoever is elected in December to lead the country for the next four years. MINISTERIAL LEVEL CAPACITY The right formula appears to be in place, with excellent relations established between experienced U.S. advisors and their respective Ministers at the Ministry of Electricity, the Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the Minister of Municipalities and Public Works. A great deal of controversy surrounds management and advisement at the Ministry of Interior, which is perhaps the most critical to es- tablishing law and order. Recent news stories about abused pris- oners in MOI jails and the comments of Minister Bayan Jabr presage challenges that lie ahead. The Ministry of Transpor- tation-run by a Sadrist who has literally thrown the American ad- visors out of his office—is also struggling. Under Saddam Hussein, the Ministry of Interior leadership was 100% Ba'ath and the enforcer of Saddam's rule. Purged of its senior Ba’ath party elements, the Mol faces great challenges in building capacity to handle not only the insurgency and law and order chal- lenges but also the routine business of training and discipline, pro- viding pay and benefits, writing regulations and managing per- sonnel. Staff visited the Ministry and met Assistant Deputy Min- ister Ayden Qadir to discuss Elections Security, Deputy Minister Ali Ghalib to discuss police training and policy matters, and Gen- eral Ghazi who led a tour of his National Joint Operations Center. Staff also visited the Karida-Marium District Police Station in the International Zone. Deputy Minister Ayden Qadir had a solid grasp of the mission of elections security. He described with pride, and with nodding heads of the U.S. advisors, the progress the Iraqi Security Forces demonstrated from January to October and looks forward to De- cember elections for which they have a solid plan to maintain con- trol with greater autonomy from U.S. forces. 18 All excavation has been completed and more than 10,000 m3 of concrete have already been poured from concrete batch plants erected on the premises. A great deal of effort has been made to secure the site and to pre-load materials to alleviate work stop- pages due to waylaid deliveries, as materials make the journey from outside Iraq. The third-country national workforce of more than 900 men is housed on the premises. The Overseas Building Office staff collaborates closely with Dip- lomatic Security personnel. They have incorporated into the design additional set-backs, additional perimeter clearance areas, struc- tures are reinforced to 2.5 times the standard and they will build systems to allow 100% independence from city utilities, including wells, electric generation and sewerage. First Kuwaiti is the lead contractor for the project that is budg- eted at the Congressionally-appropriated level of $592 million. $483, 202,966 has been awarded to date. The progress that has been made in only four months is impres- sive, reflecting a high level of planning to allocate and distribute risk in this unprecedented effort to build an embassy in a war zone on time and on budget. Most major construction projects under- taken in Iraq since 2003 have not met these standards. The Senior Project Director stated that the Iraqi government has reacted very positively to the building efforts, as they demonstrate that the U.S. is committed to staying and seeing the Iraq mission through. It also shows that that we are committed to returning properties to the Iraqis, such as the Republican Palace, that we have been occu- pying Recommendation 6: The SFRC should maintain its close scrutiny of this program. No large scale, US-funded con- struction program in Iraq has yet met its schedule or budg- et. First Kuwaiti, the lead contractor, should be encouraged by the Department of State's Overseas Building Office to consider hiring more local nationals as personnel screening and security conditions allow. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SECURITY ISSUES This SFRC staff member was not permitted to travel outside the International Zone (IZ), which may say more about the security sit- uation in Iraq than anything. Interactions between US officials and their Iraq counterparts do not occur frequently, and when they do, Americans travel in five-vehicle convoys with a very heavy com- plement of security. Many Foreign Service Nationals, Iraqi Assem- bly members and other government officials live in the ÎZ, either in homes or apartments or in the al-Rasheed Hotel, because they have been threatened directly or fear that their association with the government or the Americans endangers them or their families. The brother of one of the deputy ministers staff met during this. trip was assassinated, and one of the Iraqi National Assembly members interviewed said that members of his family have been threatened. The Regional Security Officer (RSO) has 44 permanent officers and 2237 contractors providing security for the Embassy and its personnel. The RSO is very engaged in working to manage the 19 risks embassy personnel face every day. He told staff that he chal- lenges the necessity of meetings outside the International Zone that appear overly risky, noting that almost all Iraqi officials have U.S.-issued cell phones to facilitate communications. Most embassy and USAID staff said they go outside the IZ rarely if at all. Staff and the RSO discussed the net worth of having an Embassy when it is so isolated, because of the risk avoidance posture he enforces, the ability of its personnel and the USAID team to carry out their responsibilities, and the challenges of working with the military who operate under different regulations. It causes friction and chal- lenges the mission's effectiveness when the civilian advisor cannot go to a meeting, but military advisors can. The RSO stated candidly that there are no rules for this mis- sion-ensuring the safety of civilian personnel and securing an em- bassy in a war zone. Normally, there is an Emergency Action Plan that outlines the tripwires that would lead to a closure and evacu- ation of an embassy. And, he said, “We cross those tripwires every day. EVERY day.” The Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security con- firmed that there is not a clearly defined arrangement for oper- ating an embassy in a war zone. Safety of the Mission and its per- sonnel is delegated to the Ambassador and his principle security advisor, the RŠO. U.S. Embassies have been the target of large scale attacks as re- cently as the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The Department of State makes considerable efforts to manage the risks undertaken by diplomats living in dangerous places around the world. Unlike the U.S. military, it does not “accept” casualties. Iraq embassy personnel, all of whom are volunteers and who re- ceive limited crisis reaction training to deploy to Iraq, are not ex- pected to sacrifice their lives for the mission. State will need to be- come an even more effective risk manager to be truly effective in an environment like Iraq. Officials in Baghdad and Washington recognize that these issues will be compounded by the “PRT” plan. Recommendation 7: The SFRC should continue active dialogue with Diplomatic Security personnel on these chal- lenging issues, which are not unique to Iraq. Funding im- proved telecommunications, such as video-teleconferencing systems in countries where risks are high, can save lives and improve interaction. PERSONNEL AND EMBASSY STAFFING Embassy management, staffing and personnel issues were raised with the Embassy's Management Counselor, Ambassador Greg Engle, with respective section heads and with the Chargé d'Affairs. In short, State Department personnel are out-gunned by the mili- tary. Ambassador Engle joked that when he has meetings with the military, a half-dozen colonels will file into the room and wonder why there is only one official on his side of the table. There is no redundancy in embassy staffing. An empty position or vacationing official means that work is left undone. It also means that Foreign Service Officers find themselves at their desks for long hours, often spending as much time keeping up with Washington as with Iraq. Purdue University Libraries 3 2754 078 870 718