2
is being encouraged to believe it can quite literally get away with
murder.
Currently, U.S. law severely restricts U.S. relations with coun-
tries that engage in a “consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights.” In my opinion, Iraq has
really about the worst human rights record of any country in the
world as of now, and it certainly meets that statutory standard.
With our administration and public witnesses, we intend today to
explore Iraq's human rights record and, in particular, its treatment
of its Kurdish minority in light of the statutory standard. More
broadly, I hope the hearing today may encourage the administra-
tion to take a more aggressive stance in securing Iraqi adherence
to the basic rules of international law and human decency.
We have with us today two of my colleagues, Senator D'Amato, if
he would care to come forward, and the Honorable Arlen Specter
will be with us shortly.
Senator D’AMATO. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, let me commend you for calling these hearings,
and also, Mr. Chairman, for your steadfastness of purpose in at-
tempting to focus in on the incredible human rights violations that
have taken place in Iraq under, what I term, the new mad dog of
the Middle East replacing Qhadafi, Mr. Saddam Hussein.
Several weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, you, along with the ranking
member of this committee, joined me in offering an amendment to
the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act of 1989 imposing
sanctions against Iraq for engaging in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.
Iraq's record of abuses is so clear, so chilling and so compelling
that I will only touch on some of the highlights. The attempted liq-
uidation of Iraq's Kurdish minority is Saddam Hussein's most hor-
rifying undertaking. Article II of the Genocide Convention defines
genocide as: “any of the following acts committed with an intent to
destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group, killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part.”
Hussein's so-called final offensive against the Kurds began in
August 1988. It involved indiscriminate gas attacks on population
centers. Untold numbers were killed. The lucky among the survi-
vors were able to flee to Turkey. The unlucky, estimated at
500,000, were cut off by elements of the Iraqi Army and as internal
exiles have been herded into barren areas of the country, where
they can be more easily controlled. Hundreds, perhaps, thousands
of cities, towns, and villages are known to have been put to the
torch, dynamited, and bulldozed. Hussein's scorched earth policy,
has created a 30-kilometer deep security zone running the entire
length of Iraq's shared border with Turkey and Iran.
Hussein's wrath is not limited to the Kurds. The following pas-
sage from the State Department's Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 1989 summarizes Iraq's abysmal human rights
record, and I quote it: “Effective opposition to government policy is
stifled. The intelligence services engage in extensive surveillance
and utilize extralegal means, including torture and summary exe-


3
cution to deal with antiregime activities. The civil rights of Iraqi
citizens continue to be sharply limited. And Iraqis do not have the
right to change their government. The freedoms of speech and
press and of assembly and of association are virtually nonexistent.
Other human rights problems include continuing disappearances
and arbitrary detentions, lack of fair trial, widespread interference
with privacy, excessive use of force against Kurdish civilians, and
almost total lack of workers' rights.”
This passage, Mr. Chairman, is as damning an indictment as any
we have heard.
I have introduced my amendment along with yourself and Sena-
tor Helms and others to impose sanctions against Iraq, not to hold
Iraq to some higher standard, not to place some special or inordi-
nate burden upon Iraq, but rather to force Saddam Hussein to
adhere to the body of international law, the U.N. Charter, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Geneva Convention
designed to protect human rights.
Today Iraq is an outlaw nation, no different from Nazi Germany.
It is time we had the courage to enforce the law of the land. Sur-
prisingly, many rose against my amendment to defend Saddam
Hussein, a man who one colleague described, and I quote: “A
spokesman for peace in the Middle East.” I would like to know
where that spokesman has been, and what evidence of this so-
called peace we can find in the record. My colleague urged us to
give President Hussein the opportunity, and I quote, “to see wheth-
er or not Hussein is prepared to take the first step on the road to
peace in the Middle East.”
I found those arguments difficult to accept. Was this not the
same Saddam Hussein who threatened to lay waste to Israel with
chemical weapons, who was thwarted recently in his attempt to
import a supercannon, who gloated over his illegal acquisitions of
nuclear triggers and who masterminded a communique at the end
of the recent Baghdad summit that included the following points:
Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel was denounced, and the par-
ticipants vowed to assess their relations with other states on the
basis of their position on Soviet Jewish immigration, therefore very
ºlºry threatening those countries who supported free immigra-
1OIl.
The administration and Congress were blamed for, I quote,
“bearing the primary responsibility for tensions in the Middle
East.” This is the same man who we say maybe is an avenue for
peace. The representative Arab states threatened to, and again,
uote: “take political and economic measures against any nation
that acknowledged Jerusalem as the capital of Israel,” and, quote,
again, “appropriate support of Arab measures were threatened
against any unilateral or multilateral measures that sought to re-
strict technology transfers relevant to Iraq's development of chemi-
cal and nuclear weapons.”
I would say that Saddam Hussein at Baghdad really got the Arab
states not moving toward peace but condoning his building chemi-
cal weapons and nuclear weapons. And I ask this distinguished
group, and I see my senior Senator from New York, who has been
distinguished in the leadership role of fighting for human rights, as
to where there is the faintest glimmer that Hussein is ready to


5
Mr. KELLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for those kind
words. I am delighted and honored to appear before the committee
this morning on this important subject. I have a brief opening
statement, with your leave, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome this opportunity to review with this committee our re-
lations with Iraq. In the 1990's, we expect the Persian Gulf and
Iraq to increase in importance to United States national security
and interests. Now and in the future Iraq will play a major role in
the gulf, whatever United States policy is. That role may be for
good or for ill. We would like to see Iraq work toward stability in
the gulf, human rights for its citizens, moderation in the Middle
East peace process, and effective global implementation of all inter-
national understandings and agreements regarding nuclear, biolog-
ical, and chemical weapons.
Energy is a salient reason for Iraq's new role. Gulf producers ac-
count for about 30 percent of world oil production and 70 percent
of world excess oil production capacity. Given trends in consump-
tion and the depletion of resources elsewhere, we expect the gulf to
provide an increasing percentage of the world's oil. Iraq's reserves
are second only to those of Saudi Arabia. Iraq not only produces a
large quantity of oil, but also has great influence for better or for
worse over the stability of the entire gulf and its oil.
U.S. national security interests and the interests of all nations in
the region are affected by the proliferation of nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons and the missile systems capable of deliver-
ing them. Iraq's programs in these areas are a matter of great con-
cern to the United States.
Human rights are a central element in our policy worldwide.
And Iraq is no exception.
Iraq's human rights record is abysmal. My colleague, Josh Gilder
from the Bureau of Human Rights Affairs, will address our con-
cerns in detail in his statement. I want to make clear that Iraq's
human rights record is an integral part of our agenda with Iraq
and will continue to influence the climate of our bilateral relations.
In recent years, Iraq has taken some steps the United States has
wanted in an effort to improve bilateral relations for its own bene-
fit. One step, for example, was the expulsion of the Abu Nidal
gang, a group of terrorists. And as recently as the autumn of last
year we could point to some modest steps in the right direction.
Iraq was cooperating with Arab League efforts to end the fight-
ing in Lebanon. Iraq was discussing a new constitution which
would potentially provide greater recognition of human rights. Iraq
had participated in the January 1989 Paris Review Conference of
the 1925 Geneva Chemical Weapons Protocol.
Iraq participated in the September 1989 Canberra Government
Industry Chemical Weapons Conference. Iraq had joined as an ob-
server the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where we are
working toward a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.
On the Middle East peace process, Iraq was not obstructing the
parties more directly involved from moving forward.
Since then, a series of Iraqi actions have raised questions about
Iraqi intentions. We have all noted President Saddam Hussein's
criticism of the United States presence in the Persian Gulf, the
arrest of Smugglers in Britain, the construction of missile launch


6
sites within range of Israel, our expulsion of an Iraqi diplomat
from New York, and the seizure of parts of an alleged big gun by
authorities in Britain, Greece, Turkey, and Italy.
We have heard President Saddam Hussein's outrageous and irre-
sponsible threats regarding the use of chemical weapons. We have
read the criticism President Saddam Hussein directed against the
United States in his opening speech at the Arab Summit in Bagh-
dad, when he raised what he called United States imperialism.
These actions and statements raise two sets of serious questions
about Iraq, each of which has an impact on United States-Iraqi bi-
lateral relations. One set of questions relates to Iraq's intentions
toward the region, both the gulf and the Middle East in general,
including Israel. The other relates to Iraq's intentions toward its
obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, under the
1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and under the 1972
Convention on Biological Weapons.
With regard to the region, President Saddam Hussein seeks to
enhance his and Iraq's standing among Arab countries. He por-
trays himself as a defender of the Arab nation, whether through
seeking to deter Israeli attack or through opposition to the pres-
ence of foreign fleets in the gulf or through technological advances
that he says the West wants to deny to the Arabs.
Many Arab leaders may have private misgivings about President
Saddam Hussein's aims and tactics, but they will stand behind
'. fellow Arab country that claims to be persecuted for being
ItalD.
Iraq's power and wealth guarantee that it will insist on playing a
major role in intra-Arab politics. The question for us is whether
Iraq will use that influence responsibly. Saddam Hussein's state-
ments about burning up one-half of Israel have alerted and antago-
nized public opinion. Saddam Hussein has only managed to in-
crease regional tensions and raise more questions about Iraq's ulti-
mate intention to play a responsible role.
With regard to the proliferation issue, Iraq has demonstrated a
willingness to go to great lengths to develop nonconventional weap-
ons. In that respect, Iraq is placing itself on a collision course, not
...ith the United States, but with the rest of the industrialized
WOrld.
None of our friends and allies among the industrial countries is
willing to impose either sanctions or an export embargo against
Iraq. However, Iraq’s own actions in smuggling capacitors well
Suited for nuclear weapons application, as well as parts for a super-
gun, have made licensing authorities and customs officials around
the world doubly cautious.
Iraq will quickly reach a point at which its genuine economic de-
velopment aims will be hampered by its clandestine attempts to
procure exotic and nonconventional weapons from the West.
We do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that Iraq poses a near-term
nuclear proliferation threat. Iraq's missile material is under Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and is inspected regu-
larly. However, Iraq's intentions and not its present capabilities
are at issue here.
In considering our response to these Iraqi actions, it may be
useful to review the few programs of cooperation we have with


7
Iraq, none of which is aid. U.S. taxpayer dollars do not go to Iraq.
Each of our programs is designed to be a benefit to the United
States and its economic interest. Like other industrial countries,
we have programs designed to promote United States exports to
Iraq and to other countries on commercial terms in a highly com-
petitive international market.
The first and largest program is a program of credit guarantees
run by the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corpo-
ration, which has been ongoing annually since 1983. The credit
guarantees that are made available to Iraq ensure against nonpay-
ment by Iraqi purchasers of loans made by commercial banks for
the purchase of United States agricultural commodities.
In past years, the program has consisted predominantly of short-
term, that is up to 3-year, credit guarantees, with a small amount
of intermediate term—that is 7- to 10-year credit guarantees. The
entire program for this year is short-term credit.
Under this program in calendar 1989 we exported about $1 bil-
lion in agricultural commodities to Iraq. Items exported included
rice and other grains. Iraq is our largest export market for rice,
which comprises 23 percent of total United States exports, for
cattle, eggs, chickens, lumber, tobacco, and a variety of other agri-
cultural products.
In the current fiscal year, we have provided Iraq some $500 mil-
lion in credit guarantees under this program. At present, release of
further CCC guarantees for this fiscal year has been deferred,
pending the outcome of investigations by the Departments of Agri-
culture and Justice into allegations of past irregularities.
The second program involves the U.S. Export/Inmport bank which
has a short-term revolving credit insurance program of $200 mil-
lion. Like the CCC, Ex/Im Bank ensures U.S. exporters and banks
against nonpayment. The program finances the purchase of U.S.
commercial goods, and a large number of American companies
have used it.
In other areas, trade with Iraq is limited. As a matter of policy,
we do not sell items on the Munitions List to Iraq. We do not coop-
erate with Iraq's nuclear program. An interagency committee re-
views licensing requests on the Department of Commerce's nuclear
referral list and rejects all of those which it determines would con-
tribute to Iraqi capabilities to develop nuclear weapons.
All items on the missile technology control regime annexes are
reviewed for possible use in Iraq's missile programs—50 chemicals
are now on the list of CW precursors whose export to Iraq and cer-
tain other countries is controlled.
Mr. Chairman, this brings me to the question of sanctions. There
have been several bills drafted to impose sanctions against Iraq.
One, the Inouye-Kasten amendment, would impose a total trade
embargo against Iraq. It goes beyond sanctions we have imposed on
Cambodia, Vietnam, Cuba, Iran, or Libya, or any other country
outside of wartime.
Its sanctions are so extensive that an Iraqi citizen permanently
residing in the United States could not visit his family in Iraq
without incurring a $500,000 penalty. Any company that sold him
an airline ticket to do so would risk a $1 million fine.


10
With regard to the second set of questions, on Iraq's proliferation aims, Iraq has
demonstrated a willingness to go to great lengths to develop all sorts of non-conven-
tional weapons. In that respect Iraq is placing itself on a collision course not just
with the U.S., but with the rest of the industrialized world. None of our friends and
allies among the industrial countries is willing to impose either sanctions or an
export embargo against Iraq. However, Iraq's own actions in smuggling capacitors
well suited for nuclear weapons application, and parts for a “super gun,” make li-
censing authorities and customs officials around the world doubly cautious. Iraq will
quickly reach a point at which its genuine economic development aims will be ham-
pered by its clandestine attempts to procure exotic and non-conventional weapons
from the West.
For the record, we do not believe that Iraq poses a near-term nuclear proliferation
threat. Iraq's missile material is under IAEA safeguards, and is inspected regularly.
Most recently, the IAEA published the finding that there was no evidence of diver-
sion following the inspection that took place in April of this year. However, Iraq's
intentions, and not its present capabilities, are at issue here.
In considering our response to these Iraqi actions it may be useful to review the
few programs of cooperation we have with Iraq, none of which is aid. U.S. taxpayer
dollars do not go to Iraq. Each of our programs is designed to be of benefit to the
U.S. and its economic interests.
Like other industrial countries we have programs designed to promote U.S. ex-
ports to Iraq on commercial terms, in a highly competitive international market.
The first, and the largest, is a program of credit guarantees run by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). The credit guarantees
that are made available to Iraq under the CCC GSM 102 and 103 programs insure
against nonpayment by Iraqi purchasers on loans made by commercial banks for
the purchase of U.S. agricultural commodities, thereby facilitating U.S. farm ex-
ports. In past years the program has included a small amount of GSM 103, or 4–7
year guarantees; the entire FY 90 program is in GSM 102, or short-term guarantees
up to 3 years. Iraq has never defaulted on CCC-insured loans. Under this program,
in calendar 1989 we exported about $1 billion in agricultural commodities to Iraq.
Items exported included rice and other grains (Iraq is our largest export market
for rice), cattle, eggs and chickens, lumber and a variety of other agricultural prod-
ucts. In the current fiscal year, we have provided Iraq some $500 million in credit
guarantees under this program. Iraq has used almost all of these credit guarantees.
At present, the Department of Agriculture has suspended consideration of further
CCC guarantees for FY 90 pending the outcome of investigations into allegations of
past abuses.
The U.S. Export-Import Bank has a short term revolving credit insurance pro-
gram of $200 million. Like CCC, Eximbank insures U.S. exporters and banks against
nonpayment. The program finances the purchase of U.S. commercial goods. A large
number of U.S. companies have used it.
In other areas, trade with Iraq is limited. As a matter of policy we do not sell
items on the munitions list to Iraq. We do not cooperate with Iraq's nuclear pro-
gram. An interagency committee reviews license requests on the Department of
Commerce's nuclear referral list, and rejects all those which it determines will con-
tribute to Iraqi capabilities to develop nuclear weapons. Likewise, all items on the
missile technology control regime annexes are reviewed for possible use in Iraq's
missile programs. Fifty chemicals are now on the list of CW precursors whose
export is controlled to Iraq and certain other countries. We continue to work within
the Australia Group—an informal group of 21 like-minded industrialized coun-
tries—to harmonize the export controls of many nations to deny Iraq materials for
its chemical weapons program.
Iraq is a signatory to the 1972 convention banning biological weapons (although it
has not deposited an instrument of ratification). We have denied Iraqi license re-
quests for technology, such as cell dryers, which could conceivably be used in fur-
therance of a biological weapons program.
The United States is active in trying to prevent the spread of missiles, especially
in volatile areas such as the Middle East. We work with our allies through our Mis-
sile Technology Control Regime to deny missile-related technology to a number of
countries, including Iraq.
This extensive network of controls is not perfect. Efforts are underway to improve
them and to remind our allies to the dangers of contributing to Iraq's weapons pro-
grams. But as the recent arrests of Iraqi smugglers in London shows, controls can
work effectively.
Mr. Chairman, this brings me to the question of sanctions. There have been sever-
al bills drafted to impose sanctions against Iraq. One, the Inouyekasten amend-


15
ment's efforts to crush the rebellion militarily resulted in approximately 8,000
deaths, many of them civilians killed indiscriminately by chemical weapons in 1988.
Although the fighting was at a reduced level in 1989, Kurdish military operations
continued, as did government measures to contain them, Kurdish rebels continued
to announce their hostility towards the central Government. On August 29, 1989,
the leader of one group of insurgents stated to the press in Geneva that his group
would target foreign interests in Iraq supporting the Iraqi regime. At year's end, the
cycle of Kurdish rebellion and government repression remained unresolved.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The freedoms of speech and press are not respected. The Constitution prohibits
“any act aimed at undermining the national unity of the people, provoking racial,
sectarian, and regional bigotry, or violating gains and achievements of the country.”
The Government views political dissent as a threat to its security and strictly con-
trols speech and all information media. All publications are subject to censorship.
The Government and the Ba'ath Party own and operate the press, radio, and televi-
sion. The media do not criticize the Government, and news reporting is strongly
biased. There is no presentation of opposition viewpoints.
Few foreign periodicals reach Iraq and those that do may be censored. Western
newspapers are not sold. Foreign visitors' magazines, newspapers, cassettes, cam-
eras, and video cassettes may be confiscated at the airport. To control the dissemi-
nation of political leaflets, word processors and computers must be registered. Fail-
ure to register is a criminal offense. Iraqis no longer need to register their typewrit-
ers or photocopiers, hut foreigners in Iraq must do so Taking photographs of mili-
tary installations, government buildings, or areas near sensitive locations is forbid-
den arid punishable by imprisonment. Journalists and photographers visiting Iraq
at the invitation of the Government are required to present film taken in Iraq for
inspection by the authorities.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are severely limited. public meetings may only be organized
under the auspices of the Government or the Ba'ath Party. Association for nonreli-
gious purposes and demonstrations without government approval have met with
severe repression. Professional organizations are subject to control by the Ba'ath
Party Central Vocational Bureau.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to labor unions, see Section
C.a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Iraq is an ethnically and religiously diverse society. Since its rise to power in
1968, the Ba'ath Government, while carefully controlling religious groups, has en-
forced tolerance of religious diversity, seeking to submerge religious differences in
the promotion of secular nationalism. A 1981 law gave the Ministry of Endowments
and Religious Affairs the authority to promulgate laws and regulations governing
places of worship, appointment of clergy, publication of religious literature, and par-
ticipation in religious councils and meetings. Muslim religious leaders operate under
close government supervision, are considered government employees, and receive
their salaries through the Government. The Government administers the principal
Muslim shrines and mosques and has provided allotments to them and to churches
for maintenance and refurbishing. There are no penalties under Iraqi law for chang-
ing one's religion, although there is a social stigma for Muslims who convert to an-
other faith.
While the Government has assumed much greater authority in Islamic religious
affairs since 1981, it has been less intrusive into the religious affairs of Iraq's Chris-
tians, who number more than 500,000 and constitute nearly 4 percent of the popula-
tion. Their freedom of worship in churches of established denominations is legally
protected, but they are not permitted to proselytize or to hold meetings outside
church premises. Convents and monasteries exist, and some new churches have
been constructed, in some cases with government financial support. The Jewish
community has decreased from 150,000 following World War II to under 400. There
is no evidence of recent persecution. One synagog in Baghdad still functions.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and
Repatriation
Iraqis are generally free to travel within the country and to change their resi-
dences or workplaces. However, they are likely to be constrained by social, cultural,
and religious traditions which define the areas occupied by the various ethnic and


21
from the omnipresent threat of government repression and vio-
lence.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilder follows:
PREPARED STATEMENT OF Joshua A. GILDER
Human rights, as such, are not recognized in Iraq. As our report details, the ordi-
nary Iraqi citizen knows no personal security against government violence. Disap-
pearances, followed by secret executions, appear to be common. In some cases, a
family only learns that one of its loved ones has been executed when the security
services return the body and, in line with the Iraqi regime's view of justice, require
the family to pay a fine.
The penalty for expressing opinions deemed objectionable by the regime is swift
and brutal. We believe that over the past 10 years many thousands to tens of thou-
sands—and I will speak to the inexactitude of our figures in a moment—have been
arrested by the secret police on suspicion of opposition to the government. While the
judicial system seems to function fairly well by regional standards for people ac-
cused of crimes with no political implications, there is not even the charade of due
process for those charged with security-related offenses. I should add that security-
related offenses are broadly defined to include such routine criminal matters as cur-
rency violations.
Torture is routine, for security offenses and ordinary crimes alike, and confessions
extracted under torture are admissible in court. Treatment is reported to be the
worst immediately following arrest and during the period of interrogation and in-
vestigation, which can last for months.
Compiling accurate information on human rights in Iraq is made extremely diffi-
cult by the highly secretive and repressive nature of the regime. Diplomatic travel
is severely restricted, and most Iraqis are, quite understandably, fearful of speaking
their minds to foreigners—or to anyone else for that matter.
The Iraqi regime is authoritarian in the extreme. There are some exceptions. The
practice of religion is largely free. There has been some attempt to relax the worst
aspects of the statist command economy. In general, however, the regime is ruthless
in its efforts to maintain absolute control over the population.
Control is exercised in part through the Ba'ath Party apparatus. The party is a
secretive one. While it has a large grass roots membership, decision-making is con-
centrated among the few at the-top. The lower ranks serve as informers on the po-
litical reliability of their neighbors. There are many other intelligence networks
through which the government monitors the citizenry, as well as keeps a careful eye
on the military and the Ba'ath Party itself. I have already described the punish-
ment for stepping out of line, or being deemed unreliable by the government. Peri-
odically, over the last 2 years, the regime announced that it had uncovered incipient
coup plots within the military. Hundreds were arrested. We do not know how many
were executed.
The Ba'ath Party is a Pan-Arabist party. As such, it has integrated Arabs of vari-
ous religions and sects quite well, but has had trouble finding an ideological niche
for Iraq's non-Arab citizens, most of whom are Kurds. The disaffection of elements
of the Kurdish population did not begin with Ba'ath Party rule, but the current gov-
ernment's policy has resulted in enormous human rights abuses.
With respect to the Kurds, the Iraqi government has followed a policy of carrot
and stick. It has sought to gain the support of as many Kurdish tribes as it can,
using the carrot of ethnic cultural freedom. There is a Kurdish Autonomous Region
with its own institutions, providing patronage for Kurdish tribes that support the
regime. Kurdish language and culture are fostered, and education in Kurdish is
available through the secondary level.
But the stick of Iraqi policy has been brutal. During the gulf War, in which Iran
took advantage of the dissatisfaction among Kurdish tribes, the Iraqi Government
began a campaign of destroying suspect villages, relocating the populations to close-
ly-watched cities and new settlements. After the ceasefire with Iran, Iraq's cam-
paign to dislodge rebels from the areas they controlled was accompanied by the
shocking, indiscriminate use of chemical weapons—killing thousands of men,
women, and children. After Iraqi troops regained these areas, destruction of villages
and towns, and population transfers were speeded up, until finally some 500,000–
about one-seventh of the entire Kurdish population of Iraq–were displaced. Al-
though we understand Iraqi authorities are now allowing displaced villagers to com-


J}
mittee that the very sort of nuclear triggers halted in a sting oper-
ation last March have just been decontrolled at the COCOM meet-
ing in Paris last week. Here again, if we do not recognize what is
going on, then it is probable that we have overdosed on dumb pills.
This raises the very real possibility that Iraq will be able to pur-
chase these devices on the open market.
Now, how Iraq and the other countries of the region have ac-
quired poison gas and similar weapons is a story of almost unbe-
lievable greed on one side and bureaucratic bungling on the other.
International press has identified at least 30 West German firms
involved in this trade, as well as companies from Austria, Belgium,
France, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and yes, even the United States of America.
Undoubtedly, Western governments could expand upon this list
considerably, but let this be clearly understood: there has been no
failure of intelligence. Very early on, we knew who was attempting
to sell what to whom. The failure has been one of an unwillingness
to put our own house in order and insist that our closest allies do
the same. Maybe we will now wake up.
In any case, we now know that our own Centers for Disease Con-
trol in Atlanta use the regular mail service to send some of the
world's deadliest viruses to Iraq, to Communist China, to Cuba, and
the Soviet Union. No one seems to have any concern. Nobody both-
ered to even tell the centers that all of these countries are develop-
ing germ warfare weapons.
We repeatedly sent our allies polite requests asking that they
control the dangerous exports of their firms. In diplomatic jargon,
these protests are called “demarches” but these were so weak that
they should be more aptly named “demarshmallow.” Naturally,
they were ignored, and naturally we, the United States, did noth-
1ng.
Mr. Chairman, I regret going on so long, but this subject bothers
me, as I know it does you, and I thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. I will limit my
statement to 10 minutes and we will be under the 10-minute rule,
and I would like to start out by asking either Mr. Kelly or Mr.
Gilder, in your view, does Iraq’s conduct constitute “a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights?”
Mr. GILDER. In our annual report and in my testimony here
today, we have attempted to describe in detail the seriousness of
human rights abuses in Iraq. They are abysmal. They are appall-
ing. I feel that we have been objective and, as I said, detailed, and I
believe accurate. We have pulled no punches in describing Iraq's
just terrible record on human rights.
The violations get to the very core of the question of human
rights, which is that people just have no security in their persons
or homes against government violence, and that is very serious
indeed. We in the State Department and the administration will
continue to report accurately on this situation, and we will contin-
ue to tell it like it is. Those particular words are legal language.
They are found in approximately eight different pieces of legisla-
tion that have established programs such as foreign assistance and
foreign lending.


26
Middle East? Or is President Hussein just getting involved in a lot
of bombast?
Mr. KELLY. Senator, you raise several questions, let me try to
tackle them. First of all, Iraq's military capability, almost 2 years
after the ceasefire in the war with Iran remains significant. Iraq
still has an army in the neighborhood of 50 divisions; it has a very
large air force as you pointed out. And it is certainly, I suppose, the
strongest military power in that particular part of the Arab world.
In public statements by members of the Iraqi Government, by
Saddam Hussein, they identify two potential enemies: Iran, which
they fear might at some point reinaugurate the fighting; and in
that regard, there is a cease-fire, but there is not a peace agree-
ment or settlement between Iran and Iraq. And very obviously,
Saddam Hussein has identified Israel as a potential enemy.
In the public statements by Saddam Hussein and other members
of the Iraqi Government they have talked about deterring war,
they have talked about retaliating against attacks against them.
They have not publicly threatened on their own to initiate a war
with countries in the region. But, clearly, Iraq's record is signifi-
cant and worrisome in this regard.
Senator BOSCHwitz. Well, they certainly have threatened the Is-
raelis with chemical attacks and so forth.
Mr. KELLY. They certainly did, although, Saddam Hussein in sub-
sequent comments when asked about that has said in each case
that he specified an attack against Israel in retaliation for an Is-
raeli strike against Iraq. And he has since qualified that as an
attack by Israel with weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weap-
ons or something along those lines. But, clearly, his bombast has—
we have described it as outrageous and inflammatory and as heat-
ing up the region.
We have said that nobody should be trumpeting chemical weap-
ons or threats to use them. And this administration has very
firmly and publicly, the President himself has spoken to the issue,
deplored and regretted this kind of rhetoric.
Senator Boschwitz. So that the Iraqis have rebuilt their mili-
tary? How big are their divisions?
Mr. KELLY. I am sorry?
Senator BOSCHwiTz. How big are their divisions? Are they small
divisions? Large divisions? 9,000? 14,000?
Mr. KELLY. I think they are in the neighborhood of 10,000 to
12,000, but I could correct that for the record, if necessary.
Senator Boschwitz. Do that, if you will. And so now they have
restored their military vigor from the exhaustion following the Ira-
nian war?
Mr. KELLY. Well, their military position is certainly very strong.
How exhausted the populace is, or what kind of a taste the popu-
lace has to reengage in warfare is a different question.
Senator BOSCHwitz. Let us turn to Mr. Arafat, who has not yet
clearly indicated what he intends to do with respect to Mr. Abu
Abbas, and that would certainly, at least from my vantage point,
draw into question whether or not talks with the PLO should con-
tinue. I did not object to those talks beginning, and as a matter of
fact, welcomed them. Can you give us an update on the status of
that and how you feel that is going to move?


29
You wish they had not done it. Does it mean anything to violate
the treaty? Does it mean anything to violate an international con-
vention on something as serious as gas warfare? Can the United
States do anything?
Mr. KELLY. Senator, in the autumn of 1988 following the outra-
geous uses of these noxious gases——
Senator Moynihan. Instead of saying “outrageous” why do you
not say “illegal”?
Mr. KELLY. Following the use of these gases in contravention of
the 1925 Geneva Protocol——
Senator Moynihan. That is pretty close for the Department of
State. [Laughter]
Mr. KELLY. I should hasten to add, I am not an international
lawyer, but nevertheless—
Senator MOYNIHAN. International law is not something for which
you take a bar exam.
Mr. KELLY. Well, I am not any kind of a lawyer, I guess I should
Say.
Senator MOYNIHAN. But you are a diplomat, and you are in-
volved with the standards of international conduct which this con-
vention—please do not recuse yourself, or excuse yourself. You are
the Assistant Secretary of State. The Geneva protocol was violated.
It was signed with the utmost concern of mankind at the time that
this never happen again. It happened. It finally happened. What
have we done?
Mr. KELLY. There was indeed a vigorous debate, as you well re-
member, Senator—I think you took a leading part in it—in the
autumn of 1988. The administration then in office condemned the
usage, but resisted the imposition of sanctions. My recollection—
and I was not present in the city of Washington then—was that the
administration took the position that it wanted to attempt to influ-
ence Iraq never to repeat the use of chemical weapons.
Senator Moynihan. But not to punish. If we could go back to
1925 and remember the horrors of the First World War—the
horror. A shock to mankind, and nothing was more shocking than
poison gas, and we solemnly undertook never to use it again, with
the absolute presumption that the first nation that did would be
punished, would wish it had not, that the international community
would punish it.
That is what law means. When you bring these treaties to us and
you ask us to take them seriously, well, there was never a more
serious treaty agreed to in the world. I think I can say that honest-
Mr. Chairman, I think that the Geneva protocol on poison gas
was probably the most solemn undertaking the world has ever
made. It was an absolutely hideous assault on humanity, and never
again would it happen—and never did it happen. Through the bru-
talities of the Second World War it never happened, and then it
does happen.
What do we do? We say, we certainly cannot withhold agricultur-
al credits. Oh, dear. The Iowa primary. I mean, did we not go to all
the other—there are about 80 other nations that have signed that
protocol, or—are there probably more? Probably 120.
Mr. KELLY. I suspect more, yes.
31–408 0 – 90 – 3


31
who would in effect be punished. The Iraqis would be able to pur-
chase the same kinds of goods and products elsewhere on the world
market, so there is that intrinsic problem.
It came up with South Africa. Do you engage with South Africa,
or do you cut off contacts? Do you sanction them? When the Sovi-
ets shot down the Korean airliner in 1983, there was a debate then.
Do you cut off contacts with the Soviets? How do you alter this
kind of outrageous behavior?
One school is: sanctions. Walk away from them. Cut off contacts.
The other school is: you attempt to remain engaged, to persuade, to
argue, to dissuade, to bring moral pressure to bear. Obviously these
are incomplete solutions, Senator.
Senator Moynihan. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
h The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed, Senator Moyni-
all.
Senator Helms.
Senator HELMS. Senator Moynihan, amen.
Let us get down to the nitty-gritty. Greg Stanko of the committee
staff is posting a satellite photograph.
Mr. Kelly, you see a satellite photograph of what has been al-
leged to be a germ warfare facility at Salman Pat, which is, as you
know, an ultramodern facility south of Baghdad. Now, the photo of
this plant was revealed by NBC News on April 11 of this year. My
questions—and I have three of them on this—does the U.S. Govern-
ment believe that biological warfare research is going on at that
facility?
Mr. KELLY. At that particular facility? I think that answer will
have to be provided on a classified basis, Senator.
Senator HELMs. Well, why?
Mr. KELLY. Because it derives from intelligence sources and
methods.
Senator HELMS. Bullfeathers. The Iraqis know they have got it.
They also know whether we have got it or not. It was on NBC
News. You know, something that pains me around this city is that
there is so much stuff that the American people have a right to
know, is slapped under a classification.
But let me ask you another one and see if the answer is going to
be the same. Does the United States Government believe that Iraq
is conducting research on anthrax, typhoid, and cholera?
Mr. KELLY. Senator, the answer is going to have to be the same.
We will be happy to supply that answer on a classified basis.
Senator HELMS. Which means that we can learn it, but we
cannot let the American people know. Is that correct?
Mr. KELLY. There are good and sufficient reasons to protect
sources and methods that have existed for many decades, Senator.
Senator HELMs. Well, my third question, which will elicit the
same answer, I am sure, is which non-Iraqi firms provided plant
and equipment to that facility?
Mr. KELLY. I do not know the answer to that question, but we
will try to provide it for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Question. Is the West Nile fever virus being investigated at Fort Detrick, MD?
Answer. This question should be directed to the U.S. Army Medical Research and
Development Command at Fort Detrick, MD.


32
Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, let us at least get this informa-
tion on a classified basis for this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. If you would make that information available to
us, we would be grateful. Thank you.
Mr. KELLY. By all means, Senator.
Senator HELMs. Now then, NBC also on April 11 reported, as did
the U.S. News and World Report on June 4, 1990—they were a
little bit behind NBC—both of these have reported that the Centers
for Disease Control sent West Nile fever to Iraq and other danger-
ous viruses to Cuba, to Communist China, and to the Soviet Union.
Now, my question is, is West Nile fever being investigated at our
biological warfare facility at Fort Detrick, MD?
Mr. KELLY. I do not know the answer to that, Senator. I would be
happy to provide it for the record.
Senator HELMS. Well, let us speculate a little bit. Do you have
any idea how these viruses could have been allowed to be exported,
if they were exported?
Mr. KELLY. Senator, I knew that West Nile fever virus had been
shipped to Iraq in 1985. The Center for Disease Control has ac-
knowledged publicly that it shipped that. I was not aware of these
other shipments. I asked, like most other citizens, when I first
heard of this several months ago, you know, how does something
like that happen? I was told, “Well, there were no controls in
place, but now there are.” I was not aware, until you mentioned
them, of these other shipments.
Senator HELMS. Well, I certainly hope that you can include in
your answer to the question—and I am not being hostile toward
you——
Mr. KELLY. I understand, Senator.
Senator HELMS. I just want to know, just as Senator Moynihan,
why these things happen, and obviously from some of the com-
ments you have made on your own, you have the same questions
going in your mind.
Mr. KELLY. Can I make a sort of general answer to that, Senator?
Senator HELMS. Absolutely.
Mr. KELLY. I think that there has been a growing public and gov-
ernmental awareness, but only in recent years, regrettably, that
there has been a tremendous traffic in equipment and systems that
can contribute to these weapons of mass destruction.
There is now an international regime to try to limit the ship-
ments of any missile parts or components. That was not adopted
until 1987. That means that in 1984 or 1983, or whenever, people—
governments—were selling things like that. There is an interna-
tional regime now against the sale of equipment or items that can
contribute to nuclear weapons production. That did not exist in the
early 1970's. It was only negotiated and adopted in the late 1970's.
So, I think that in the period since World War II, it is only in the
very recent past that countries and governments—and they are im-
perfect even today—have recognized the need to try to control
things, whether they are biological viruses or whether they are
parts for nuclear weapons or chemicals or so on. But as people
have said, you know, “The horses are out of the barn in some of
these cases. They have already gone.” So, I think that is one of the
reasons why there has been that kind of development.


33
Senator HELMs. Mr. Chairman, we had a little bill pass the
Senate twice, did we not?
The CHAIRMAN. Correct. It was opposed by the administration
and also by some of our friends in the House.
Senator HELMS. Well, my time is almost gone, and I want to get
into another line of questioning, and so I am going to yield my
time.
The CHAIRMAN. Before yielding it, it would seem to me that the
witnesses could at least give their impressions as to whether the
statements were correct or not in your first questions.
Senator HELMS. Well, I guess they would say that is classified.
The CHAIRMAN. Would your opinion be classified? That has noth-
ing to do with sources.
Senator HELMS. Now, please do not feel compelled to give a quick
answer. I mean, it is a serious question.
Mr. KELLY. I think prudence dictates that we are going to have
to supply that answer on a classified basis to the committee, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Question. Why do things like the CDC's shipping West Nile fever virus to Iraq and
other such countries occur?
Answer. Until recently, there were no controls on the export of microorganisms
from the United States to medical or research institutions overseas. Controls were
established last year and the CDC itself tells us that Iraq has been placed on a pro-
scribed destination list for such microorganisms.
Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, maybe you will let me have a
little extra time in my next round by surrendering the rest of my
time at this time, but before I do I ask unanimous consent that
today's hearing be printed. I at least want Senators to have the
benefit of the answers.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.
Senator HELMS. I also ask unanimous consent that the record be
kept open until the witnesses can answer some questions that I
intend to put to them in writing.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
RESPONSES OF MR. MILHOLLIN To QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR HELMS
Question. In your prepared testimony you say that our exports to Iraq are secret.
Could you elaborate?
Answer. Over the past few years the United States has sold Iraq high-speed oscil-
loscopes and powerful computers that are undoubtedly being used to develop long-
range missiles. As Iraq's nuclear program progresses, the equipment will also be
used to help develop nuclear weapons. These exports were only possible because the
Commerce Department, which approved the exports, refuses to open its records to
public scrutiny.
The Commerce Department argues that all records of its export licensing deci-
sions must be confidential in order to protect business information obtained from
U.S. exporters. This position prevents Congress and the public from learning about
exports that could threaten U.S. and world security. I am convinced that if Congress
or the public had known about the applications that were approved for Iraq, Com-
merce would have not have dared to approve them. Under the current system, only
the exporters have the ear of the licensing authorities. This results in special plead-
ing, and in licenses which sacrifice national security to short-term commercial inter-
est.
Congress should request from the Commerce Department a list of all exports of
nuclear- and missile-related items sent to Iraq over the past five years, together
with a list of all pending applications for such items to Iraq. The names of the ex-
porter could be deleted in order to protect any commercial interest. After inspecting


39
. we exclude everybody, not just Soviet Jews, in terms of film.
erS.
Senator Moynihan. How about Brighton Beach?
Senator SPECTER. If you will join me in the invitation, Senator
Moynihan, I will invite him to Brighton Beach.
I will not go into the details as to President Saddam Hussein's
misinformation. I will conclude in just a moment or two, Mr. Chair-
IT1a11.
There was a large delegation led by Senator Dole, including Sen-
ator Metzenbaum, Senator Simpson, Senator McClure, and Senator
Murkowski which visited Iraq. And our meetings in Iraq have been
followed by discussions with Iraq’s Ambassador Al Mashat here.
I believe that there is an opportunity—or may be an opportuni-
ty—to pursue discussions with Iraq and think that it is not the
right time to impose sanctions. But it may be the right time to
impose sanctions at some point in the reasonably near future, de-
pending on what events occur.
Not to impose sanctions, however, is not to say we should make
gifts to Iraq. I strenuously disagree with the advance of $500 mil-
lion in credit guarantees. I do not think that is the sensible course.
And I had discussed this with Secretary Yeutter of Agriculture.
And the second $500 million are on hold for a variety of reasons.
So that I think that, while the imposition of sanctions at this
moment is unwise, that we ought not to be making gifts. It is a
very complex subject, Mr. Chairman, and those are just a few of
my thoughts on the matter. But I counsel a very active pursuit by
the State Department, and I have discussed this with Secretary
Kelly. And we have some plans as to what we would like to accom-
plish. Perhaps, an effort to get a specific positive statement from
Iraq and President Saddam Hussein in regard to the peace process.
I think there are opportunities. And the Iraqi Ambassador Al
Mashat thinks that that is a possibility. So that the stakes are very
high; it is a perilous course. We have to proceed very carefully. We
ought not to be making any gifts, but we ought to be very, very
active in focusing U.S. attention on the Mideast peace process, be-
cause the possibilities are fraught with extreme peril on what is
going on there now, and we ought to act with dispatch.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
I would point out that we still have more questions on the part of
the Senators here, and then we have a public panel following.
I think Senator D'Amato, one of our guests, has a couple of ques-
tions, and then Senator Helms, I know, does, and Senator Moyni-
han goes and then I would hope we could move to the public
panel.
Senator D’AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Kelly, on page 10 of your testimony, and I quote, you
say: “We believe Iraq has clearly received the important message
of United States Government concern from both the administration
and Congress over its recent actions.” That implies, it seems to me,
or are you attempting to imply that somehow their behavior is
changing and would lead us to believe that there is hope that they
are going to stop the kinds of practices that we have all talked
about? In other words, their treatment of their own population, the


52
They expelled the Soviet Union after the invasion of Finland.
They did impose sanctions.
Mr. KELLY. I beg your pardon, they did?
Senator Moynihan. The League voted sanctions on Italy. They
just were not upheld by the institutions that could do it, which
would be the national Governments of Britain, of France. In this
case we have not done anything.
Those of you who think in terms of the future of the internation-
al order, does it not bother you that we could have taken this issue
to the Security Council? And I am reminded by Mr. Galbraith that
Franklin D. Roosevelt imposed sanctions on Italy for the invasion
of Ethiopia.
There was a sense that there were rules. I am wondering, is
there any sense of the rules today? And I say, again—and Mr.
Gilder, you wanted to say something—supposing a chemical war-
fare treaty is agreed to in Geneva, why should this Committee on
Foreign Relations pay any attention to it?
Mr. GILDER. If I might, chemical weapons, until they are actually
used on people, is not my field. But, from the angle of human
rights, we very much share your frustration with the inefficacy of
international law. It is a very imperfect instrument.
Senator Moynihan. To speak about the inefficacy of internation-
al law is to speak about the unwillingness of nations and to abide
by it and insist that it be abided by.
Mr. GILDER. That is exactly true.
Senator MOYNIHAN. You are carrying around the U.N. Charter.
Mr. GILDER. Well, I carry this around. It happens to be the unfor-
tunate fact that probably a majority of the nations who have
agreed to this do not really abide by it.
Senator Moynihan. Those early provisions about the word
“human rights” is about——
Mr. GILDER. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Senator Moynihan. Well, I think if you look at the preamble,
the words “human rights” appear at about the 40th and 41st
words, round there on the first page.
Mr. GILDER. Yes. But if I might, I think that——
Senator Moynihan. That is a treaty. That is international law.
Mr. GILDER. Well, yes, it is. I mean, there are no actual signato-
ries to it, but one assumes that if one——
Senator MoyNIHAN. There are not signatories to the U.N. Char-
ter'.
Mr. GILDER. I have talked to the lawyers about this and tried to
get some sense of just exactly how binding it is, and I am not
lawyer enough to tell you all the permutations.
Senator Moynihan. I am not a lawyer either. I will tell you it is
absolutely binding.
Mr. GILDER. Well, one would expect them to abide by it as mem-
bers of the U.N. But if I might, another one that——
Senator Moynihan. That is a very—I mean, are things so bad in
the State Department that they say that the United Nations Char-
ter is optional?
Mr. GILDER. No, we certainly do not say it is optional, and we use
every opportunity to——


54
I mean, it has just sort of slipped away from us. I am informed
that, as I remembered, the Abyssinian experience was very brief in
1935. Also, the Japanese may have used gas in 1937.
Mr. KELLY. In Manchuria.
Senator Moynihan. In Manchuria.
Mr. KELLY. That is right.
Senator Moynihan. Do not use that word “Manchuria.” That
was one thing I was taught.
Mr. KELLY. I beg your pardon.
Senator Moynihan. That is Japanese propaganda. The proper
word is China. You know, why are the Japanese in Manchuria?
Well, it is like a lot of the Canadians have not invaded the United
States, they have just invaded New York.
Mr. KELLY. Does this mean that we can no longer refer to the
Manchurian incident?
Senator Moynihan. You can but say Manchuria/China or Man-
churia in China, quite seriously. Manchuria is a part of China, but
by talking about it as if it is something separate——
Mr. KELLY. And you will accuse us of vagueness, sir?
Senator Moynihan. Yes. Of that you can be sure. [Laughter.]
Egypt may have used some gas in Yemen in the 1960's but did
nothing comparable to the full-scale use by Iraq.
International law is the law of the land. It is your law and my
law. It is Mr. Gilder's law. Pax et humana, how is that? Article VI
of the Constitution says that treaties shall be——
Mr. KELLY. The supreme law of the land.
Senator MOYNIHAN [continuing]. The supreme law of the land.
Very good. I mean this quite seriously. Treaties are the supreme
law of the land. And they are entered with a very special arrange-
ment. It takes a two-thirds vote of the Members present and voting
in the Senate.
“The Congress shall have the power to define and punish of
fenses against the law of nations.” At Philadelphia two centuries
ago they said, “Well, certainly, they have the right to punish,” but
was the law of nations that clear? Well, better have Congress
define as well as punish. Vagueness in a criminal statute is always
fatal. But in overwhelming degree, international law today consists
of written agreements, charters. It is a treaty which binds this
country, not optional and not intermittent.
And we had a hearing 1 year ago, with our Ambassador, our
present Ambassador in South Korea, a very able man, a man who
spent his life in the intelligence community, Mr. Gregg. And he
. involved in the planning of the mining of the Nicaraguan har-
OrS.
And I asked him at that time, “Was the issue ever raised that
this would be a violation of international law,” and he said, “No.”
And I pursued it a little bit. And I said, “But we have treaties.”
And he said nothing. And then my time was up, and Mr. Simon
resumed that line of questioning.
At which point, Mr. Gregg suddenly looked up and said, “Oh,
wait, I am sorry, I thought that Senator Moynihan was talking
about American law, not international law.” And you know, this
was a transparently honest statement. He did not think any treaty
we might have entered into made any claim comparable to a law


55
we might pass and put on the statute book. It does. It is there in
the Constitution. Treaties are the supreme law of the land.
Now, Mr. Gilder, just one last question for you, last March in a
typical grizzly event Iraq executed an Iranian-born journalist who
was a correspondent for the London Observer. Would you like to
tell us any thoughts you have on that subject or anything the com-
mittee might want to know?
Mr. GILDER. Well, we deplored this when it happened very force-
fully. We were concerned when he was arrested, and we followed
the case very closely. It is always very difficult to know exactly
how to respond in a case like that when a human life is on the
line, and you are dealing with such a regime. We consulted with
others, and we took the actions that we thought would be best. It is
probably true that no matter what we did, it probably would not
have made much difference.
Senator Moynihan. It would probably not have made much dif-
ference. It is the regime we are dealing with.
But there are levels on which the international community can
respond. We should have taken that matter to the Security Coun-
cil. I am absolutely convinced we should have done that, and if we
did not succeed, then the fact of failure would be there to look at
and say, “Okay, friends, we are putting out a big show and hurrah
in Geneva about taking things to the Security Council.” Here is
something for the Security Council. If the institutions do not work,
we need to know that very much.
Mr. KELLY. I take your point on that, and getting back to the
chemical weapons use, during the 1980's the United States did
twice condemn that use by Iraq in United Nations Security Council
resolutions, but in August 1988 we failed to get a favorable vote in
the United Nations Security Council to send an international in-
spection team to Iraq. We did, Mr. Chairman, avail ourselves of
international institutions.
Senator Moynihan. You should not have this off the top of your
head. Let the committee know which nations voted against this.
Mr. KELLY. By all means, sir.
Senator Moynihan. Let us not forget that, either.
[The information referred to follows:]
Question. Who in the Security Council voted against the 1988 resolution concern-
ing sending a team to Iraq to investigate the use of chemical weapons?
Answer. The Iraqi Government announced that it would not allow a U.N. team to
carry out an investigation in Iraq, and the resolution never came to a vote.
Senator MovMIHAN. I think we have had you here long enough.
Senator Pell has some questions for both of you which we will
send. This is an important record which we want to keep. So, we
thank you, Mr. Gilder. Again, welcome to your first appearance
before the committee, and Mr. Secretary, we thank you.
Mr. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Moynihan. Now we have a public panel, the members of
which have waited patiently, I hope not all of the State Depart-
ment persons will have to leave. Some may. We have another half
hour. We will conclude the hearing at 1 p.m. promptly.
So, would Mr. Curt Goering come forward? Mr. Goering is the
Deputy Executive Director of Amnesty International.


56
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. James Graham. Mr. Goering could not be here
today, so I will be representing Amnesty International.
Senator Moynihan. We welcome you. Mr. Najmaldin Karim. Do
I have that pronounced correctly, Karim? Mr. Karim, good morn-
ing—or, I suppose, good afternoon. We welcome you here, sir—and
Prof. Gary Milhollin. Professor Milhollin. You are a panel, gentle-
men. That is the way we organize this. So, Mr. Milhollin, sit right
down there.
Gentlemen, we welcome you, and in the order that I called the
names, that is how they are listed on our agenda, so Mr. Graham,
will you proceed, representing Amnesty International.
STATEMENT OF JAMES GRAHAM, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA
Mr. GRAHAM. We have an additional brief report on the status of
Iraqi refugees which we would like to have added to the record, if
we could.
Senator Moynihan. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. GRAHAM. Amnesty International welcomes the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee's review of human rights in Iraq. It believe it has
come at a crucial moment, and greatly appreciate the opportunity
to present our concerns here today. Amnesty International has
been concerned about the widespread and systematic violation of
fundamental human rights in Iraq for some time. These concerns
existed well before the Iran-Iraq war and increased during the war
years.
Since the cessation of hostilities, we have been particularly
alarmed by the continued assaults by the Iraqi armed forces
against the Kurdish population and other groups or individuals
who are perceived to be opponents or critics of the Government of
Iraq. Amnesty International believes the abuses detailed below
clearly amount to a gross and consistent pattern of human rights
violations and a greater effort must be made by the international
community to hold the Iraqi Government accountable for its ac-
tions.
Amnesty International is also concerned about the fate of an es-
timated 27,500 Iraqi Kurds who are currently in refugee camps in
southeast Turkey. The absence of any legal protection places them
at great risk of being forcibly returned or extradited from Turkey
to Iraq where they could face disappearance, torture, or execution.
According to reports, pressure has been used by the Turkish au-
thorities to coerce some Iraqi Kurds to return to Iraq under official
amnesties. Reports suggest that in the past 18 months, hundreds of
Iraqi Kurds, as well as Assyrians, Arabs, and Turcomans who
sought to benefit from official amnesties have since disappeared in
custody, or tortured, or executed.
The Government of Iraq permits no meaningful expression of dis-
sent. Thousands of political prisoners, including possible prisoners
of conscience, are arbitrarily detained without charge or trial, or
after summary trials. They include actual or suspected members of
prohibited political parties, army deserters, and draft resisters. Rel-
atives of such people are arrested as hostages in lieu of suspects
being sought by the authorities. The children of political opponents
have also been arbitrarily arrested and detained as hostages in


57
order to compel their parents or relatives to confess to alleged po-
litical offenses.
Routine torture and ill treatment of prisoners continues to be
widely reported. The victims include political prisoners tortured in
order to force them to sign confessions or to renounce their politi-
cal affiliation. Some political prisoners have reportedly been tor-
tured shortly before being executed. The victims include detainees
below age 18 said to have been beaten, whipped, sexually abused,
given electric shock, and deprived of food. On at least one occasion,
the bodies of executed children and youths have been returned to
family members with their eyes gouged out and with other marks
of torture.
In recent years, thousands of individuals have disappeared, many
of whom it is feared have been killed. Some 178 Shi'a declared by
the government to be of Iranian descent disappeared while in de-
tention between 1980 and 1985. The fate of some 8,000 Kurds, in-
cluding 315 children who disappeared following their arrest in
August 1983, is also unknown.
All 8,000 were male members of the Barzani clan ranging in age
from 8 to 70. It is believed that the action was in retaliation for the
Kurdistan Democratic Party's military activities, as the detainees
included close relatives of Mas'ud Barzani, leader of the KDP. It is
feared that many have been executed.
In October 1988, a group of 353 Kurds, including 52 children, re-
portedly disappeared while in custody in Duhok Province, despite a
government amnesty for all Kurds announced the previous month,
and in March 1989, 33 Assyrian Christians, including entire fami-
lies, reportedly disappeared after returning from Turkey and Iran
in late 1988 and early 1989.
Each year, hundreds of executions are reported, but it is never
possible to ascertain the precise number. In the last 2 days of 1987
alone, more than 150 political prisoners reportedly died before
firing squads in Abu Ghraib Prison, on the outskirts of Baghdad.
Included in their number were Arabs, Kurds, and Turcomans.
Those executed have included members of banned political parties,
other suspected government opponents, and army deserters. In
most cases, it is difficult to determine whether they have been
tried and sentenced to death or extrajudicially executed.
In order to demonstrate the gravity of concern about the situa-
tion of human rights in Iraq, Amnesty International in May 1988
made a 1503 submission to the United Nations seeking to demon-
strate a consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights. Con-
cerns raised include the death penalty and execution after unfair
trials, extrajudicial executions, disappearance, torture and ill-treat-
ment, arbitrary arrests of political prisoners, and unfair trial pro-
cedures.
Since then, Amnesty International has registered its concerns on
numerous occasions with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
and directly with the Government of Iraq. The Commission for the
most part has chosen not to act. The government has sought to
deny that abuses occur or that government forces are responsible
for them.
The government have announced amnesties for those who have
fled, yet reportedly imprisoned or executed some of those who sub-


58
sequently returned. It has spoken of possible changes in its consti-
tution and protested its respect for human rights, but the killings
and torture continue. In March 1989, Amnesty International stated
before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights that Iraq clearly
and incontrovertibly presents a situation of the most flagrant and
massive violations of human rights, and that the situation cried out
for international attention and action. That remains our assess-
ment today.
Amnesty International believes that no member of the interna-
tional community should be free to abuse the basic human rights of
its citizens at will. We ardently hope that these hearings will in
some way ensure that the Government of Iraq is held to the same
standards of decency and humanity to which all governments must
adhere.
One final remark I wanted to make before I conclude my state-
ment, I would like to point out that when the congressional delega-
tion was visiting in Baghdad last January the Iraqi military was
extensively engaged in the south of Iraq. Over 30 villages were as-
saulted at that time. The military was ostensibly in search of de-
serters and their sympathizers, and according to our information
hundreds of individuals were killed during a 2- or 3-week period.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Amnesty International USA follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
INTRODUCTION
Amnesty International welcomes the Foreign Relations Committee's review of the
situation of human rights in Iraq. We believe it has come at a crucial moment and
greatly appreciate the opportunity to present our concerns here today. Amnesty
International has been concerned about the widespread and systematic violation of
fundamental human rights in Iraq for some time. These concerns existed well before
the Iran-Iraq War and increased during the war years. Since the cessation of hostil-
ities we have been particularly alarmed by the continued assaults by the Iraqi
armed forces against the Kurdish population and other groups or individuals who
are perceived to be opponents or critics of the government of Iraq. Amnesty Interna-
tional believes the abuses detailed below clearly amount to a gross and persistent
pattern of human rights violations and greater effort must be made by the interna-
tional community to hold the Iraqi government accountable for its actions.
Amnesty International is also concerned about the fate of an estimated 27,500
Iraqi Kurds who are currently in refugee camps in southeast Turkey. The absence
of any legal protection places them at risk of being forcibly returned or extradited
from Turkey to Iraq, where they could face I, “disappearance,” torture or execution.
According to reports, pressure has been used by the Turkish authorities to coerce
some Iraqi Kurds to return to Iraq under official amnesties. Reports suggest that in
the past 18 months hundreds of Iraqi Kurds, as well as Assyrians, Arabs and Turco-
mans, who sought to benefit from official amnesties have since “disappeared” in
custody, were tortured or executed.
The government of Iraq permits no meaningful expression of dissent. Thousands
of political prisoners, including possible prisoners of conscience, are arbitrarily de-
tained without charge or trial, or after summary trials. They include actual or sus-
pected members of prohibited political parties, army deserters and draft resisters.
Relatives of such people are arrested as hostages in lieu of suspects being sought by
the authorities. The children of political opponents have also been arbitrarily ar-
rested and detained as hostages in order to compel their parents or relatives to
“confess” to alleged political offenses.
Routine torture and ill-treatment of prisoners continues to be widely reported.
The victims include political prisoners tortured in order to force them to sign “con-
fessions” or to renounce their political affiliation. Some political prisoners have re-
portedly been tortured shortly before being executed. The victims include detainees
below age 18, said to have been beaten, whipped, sexually abused, given electric


59
shock and deprived of food. On at least one occasion the bodies of executed children
and youths have been returned to family members with their eyes gouged out and
with other marks of torture.
In recent years thousands of individuals have “disappeared,” many of whom, it is
feared, have been killed. Some 178 Shi'a, declared by the government to be of Irani-
an descent, “disappeared” while in detention between 1980 and 1985. The fate of
some 8,000 Kurds, including 315 children, who “disappeared” following their arrest
in August, 1983, is also unknown. All 8000 were male members of the Barzani clan
ranging in age from 8 to 70. It is believed that the action was in retaliation for the
Kurdistan Democratic Party's (KDP) military activities as the detainees included
close relatives of Mas'ud Barzani, leader of the KDP. Its feared that many have
been executed.
In October of 1988 a group of 353 Kurds, including 52 children, reportedly “disap-
peared” while in custody in Duhok Province, despite a government amnesty for all
Kurds announced the previous month. And in March of 1989, 33 Assyrian Chris-
tians, including entire families, reportedly “disappeared” after returning from
Turkey and Iran in late 1988 and early 1989.
Each year hundreds of executions are reported but it is never possible to ascertain
the precise number. In the last two days of 1987 alone, more than 150 political pris-
oners reportedly died before firing squads in Abu Ghraib Prison in the outskirts of
Baghdad. Included in their number were Arabs, Kurds, and Turcomans. Those exe-
cuted have included members of banned political parties, other suspected govern-
ment opponents, and army deserters. In most cases it is difficult to determine
whether they had been tried and sentenced to death or extrajudicially executed.
In order to demonstrate the gravity of its concern about the situation of human
rights in Iraq, Amnesty International in May 1988 made a 1503 Submission to the
United Nations seeking to demonstrate a “consistent pattern of gross violation of
Human Rights.” Concerns raised included the death penalty and execution-after
unfair trials, extrajudicial executions, “disappearances,” torture and ill treatment,
arbitrary arrests of political prisoners and unfair trial procedures.
Since then Amnesty International has registered its concerns on numerous occa-
sions with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and directly with the govern-
ment of Iraq. The Commission, for the most part, has chosen not to act. The govern-
ment has sought to deny that abuses occur or that government forces are responsi-
ble for them.
The government has announced amnesties for those who have fled yet reportedly
imprisoned or executed some of those who subsequently returned. It has spoken of
possible changes in its constitution and protested its respect for human rights, but
the killings and torture continue.
Amnesty International believes that no member of the international community
should be free to abuse the basic human rights of its citizens at will. We ardently
hope that these hearings will in some way ensure that the government of Iraq is
. to the same standard of decency and humanity to which all governments must
acInere.
EVENTS SINCE THE CEASEFIRE IN AUGUST 1989
In March of 1988 the international community was justifiably appalled when it
learned that an estimated 5000 people were deliberately killed and thousands
wounded as a result of chemical weapon attacks by Iraqi forces on the town of Ha-
labja, in Sulaimaniya province. Most of the victims were civilians, many of them
women and children.
Unfortunately, this was not an isolated incident. In recent years Amnesty Inter-
national has received numerous indications of the willingness of Iraqi government
forces to commit widespread deliberate killings of unarmed Kurdish civilians and
the mass execution of political prisoners.
At about the same time as the chemical attacks in Halabja, some 400 Kurdish
civilians, including women and children, were said to have been wounded as a result
of chemical weapon attacks on villages in the Qaradagh region, and to have been
apprehended as they made their way to the city of Sulaimaniya to seek medical
treatment. They were reportedly taken to the military garrison of Tanjaro and exe-
cuted by firing squad on April 2, 1988.
In another incident in mid-April 1987, following a chemical attack on the Balisan
Valley in Arbil Province, some 360 people from the village of Shaikh Wasanan who
had been wounded in the attack were transferred to Arbil hospitals for treatment.
The victims were reportedly denied media treatment and were transferred by secu-
rity forces to a detention center. They “disappeared” several days later after being


60
ºrred to an unknown destination and their fate and whereabouts remain un-
nown.
In August 1988, just three days before a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War went into
effect, Amnesty International brought these incidents to the attention of the U.N.
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and
characterized them as part of “a systematic and deliberate policy on the part of the
government of Iraq to eliminate large numbers of Kurdish civilians, both as punish-
ment for their imputed political sympathies and in retaliation for the activities of
opposition forces.” Amnesty International further cited “grave fears that in the
aftermath of the war a further significant deterioration in human rights could occur
in Iraq if the government takes further action against its internal critics and oppo-
nents.”
These fears were soon realized as the ceasefire permitted military units on the
war front to be redeployed to join the tens of thousands of troops already in north-
ern Iraq. By early September, 1988, there were numerous reports that hundreds of
unarmed Kurdish civilians, including women and children, had been deliberately
killed and thousands of others wounded as a result of attacks by Iraqi government
forces on Kurdish villages in the north. The Iraqi military utilized tanks, helicop-
ters, gunships, artillery and chemical weapons in its assault on hundreds of Kurdish
villages in the northern provinces of Duhok, Mosul and Arbil.
Thousands of villagers fled the affected areas in August to seek refuge in Turkey.
Amnesty International estimated that some 120,000 Kurds crossed the border into
Turkey within a two week period. On September 4 the flow of refugees was reported
to have halted as Iraqi armed forces reached the northern border and prevented fur-
ther crossings into Turkey. On the same day, several thousand Kurds fleeing from
similar attacks reportedly crossed the eastern border into Iran.
On August 28 government forces reportedly entered several villages near the
town of Duhok and arrested over 1,000 people who had been unable to flee. Some
were suffering from wounds sustained in chemical weapon attacks. Those detained
were allegedly summarily executed and then buried in mass graves nearby.
There was also fear for the lives of several thousand Kurds, many of them un-
armed civilians, who were reported to have been arrested in late August in the
Zakho region by advancing government forces. Iraqi armed forces reportedly cut off
their retreat as they fled towards the Turkish border.
Two days after Iraqi forces had successfully sealed off the border with Turkey,
and after a six-week military offensive by government forces in northern Iraq in-
volving the killing of hundreds of unarmed civilians, Iraq's Revolutionary Command
Council announced an amnesty for all Iraqi Kurds in the country and abroad. The
decree called upon those wishing to take advantage of the amnesty to return to Iraq
within 30 days.
On September 8, 1988, Amnesty International issued an unprecedented appeal to
the U.N. Security Council to act immediately to halt the massacre of Kurdish civil-
ians by Iraqi forces and stated that “these killings represent a most serious denial
of the purposes of the United Nations Charter and a flagrant contravention of fun-
damental international human rights norms.” A qualified welcome was given to the
Iraqi government's announced amnesty, but it was noted that there had been re-
ports in the past of Kurds being imprisoned and executed after responding to previ-
ous amnesties.
The following month, October, 1988, a group of 353 Kurds, including 52 children
ranging in age from 11 to 17, reportedly “disappeared” from custody in the Qal'a
(Castle) in Duhok Province. Their fate remains unknown.
Despite the Turkish government's initially positive steps taken in granting tempo-
rary refuge on humanitarian grounds to some 50,000 Kurds, there was concern in
late October of 1988 that some refugees had been returned to Iraq against their will:
As of October 28, some 1400 Kurds had been returned to Iraq under the amnesty.
Amnesty International expressed fears for' the safety of those who had been repatri-
ated. Amnesty International was also concerned that Turkish authorities considered
verbal assurances given by the Iraqi government that the terms of the amnesty
would be applied to all Kurds to be a sufficient guarantee for their safety.
In December 1988, large numbers of military personnel and civilians, perhaps as
many as 200, were believed to have been arrested on suspicion of plotting a coup. Of
those arrested, 14 army personnel and officials of the ruling Ba'th Party were re-
portedly executed in early January, 1989. In a separate incident, approximately 83
people, mostly army deserters, arrested in June or July, 1988, were reported to have
been executed in mid-December. Army deserters had not been included in the vari-
ous amnesties proclaimed by the Iraqi government after the ceasefire announce-
ment.


61
In February of 1989, Amnesty International issued a report on Iraq subtitled Chil-
dren: Innocent Victims of Politico Repression. The report contained information
which suggested that the government had over the years been repeatedly and fla-
grantly in breach of its own domestic legislation as well as that of international
human rights treaties it had ratified. The report described a clear and long-standing
pattern of political abuse of young people. Among the evidence cited was an account
of school children who had been apprehended, lined up and summarily shot in
public; the case of a boy, Mirza Rasho, who was still imprisoned in Mosul after his
arrest with his brother 3 years before, when he was 6 years old; and the case of a
former political prisoner released in 1985 who described how 12 relatives, some aged
between 5 and 13, were tortured in front of him and how an incarcerated five-
month-old baby had been deliberately deprived of milk in an effort to force his par-
ents to confess to political offenses.
Despite the evidence cited by Amnesty International and numerous other sources,
the political realities in March, 1989 were such that the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights decided to take no action on the systematic and wide ranging abuses
in Iraq. On March 7, it was announced that the Commission would not consider the
human rights situation in Iraq under its confidential 1503 procedure used to exam-
ine consistent patterns of gross violations of human rights. The following day the
Commission rejected a resolution calling for a special rapporteur to be appoints to
study the country's human rights record.
Tragically, at about the same time that the Commission on Human Rights chose
not to act, thirty-three Assyrian Christians, including entire families from Duhok,
apparently “disappeared.” These had been among the Iraqis who had returned in
the winter of 1988–89 from Turkey and Iran.
In a statement delivered in August, 1989 to the chairman of the U.N. Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Amnesty
International reiterated its major concerns about summary band arbitrary execu-
tions in Iraq and urged the Sub-Commission to express its “profound concern about
Iraq's grave human rights abuses and to recommend effective action to combat
them.” Amnesty International noted in its statement that the Iraqi government had
previously announced amnesties for all Kurds and for political opponents, and that
seven Kurds executed in April, 1989, were said to have given themselves up to au-
thorities in order to benefit from those amnesties. At least 4 other Kurds had been
similarly executed in March or April. All eleven were suspected of having links to
Kurdish opposition groups. Amnesty International was also concerned that the situ-
ation of 1900 other Kurds who had returned remained unclear.
The Sub-Commission failed to pass a resolution on Iraq.
In addition to the various amnesties of 1988 and 1989, the Iraqi government took
other steps to counter adverse international publicity. Early in 1989 it announced a
major liberalization program and issued official statements indicating a commit-
ment to the protection of human rights. In anticipation of increasing public pres-
sure, the Iraqi government issued a press release during the convening of the U.N.
Sub-Commission in which it sought to justify the forcible relocation of hundreds of
thousands of Kurds in the north and extended an invitation to selected journalists
to observe the democratic process in the country. Farzad Bazoft, a journalist for The
Observer, was one of those who was invited. Bazoft was hanged by that same gov-
ernment on March 15, 1990.
In late 1989 it was reported that the Iraqi government was seeking the extradi-
tion of 138 Iraqi Kurds from Turkish refugee camps in Diyarbakir and Mardin os-
tensibly for criminal offenses, including smuggling and drug trafficking. It was be-
lieved, however, that many of these individuals were wanted for suspected member-
ship or support of the prohibited Kurdistan Democratic Party. There were also con-
tinued unconfirmed reports during this time of the arrest, “disappearance” and exe-
cution of those who had returned to Iraq to benefit from the various government
sponsored amnesties.
The Iraqi military turned its attention to the south this past January when, be-
tween the 10th and the 23rd, it reportedly attacked over thirty towns and villages in
the predominantly Shi'a provinces. Apparently this attack was related to the gov-
ernment's attempt to capture hundreds of army deserters who for some years had
been hiding in the alahwar (marshes) region in the provinces of al-Basra, al Nasir-
iyya and al-Amara. Reports indicate that large numbers of both army deserters and
unarmed civilians were killed or wounded, although actual numbers are not yet
known. It should be noted that this onslaught was occurring bat the same time Iraqi
government officials were meeting in Baghdad with a U.S. Congressional delegation.
The execution of British-based journalist Farzad Bazoft this past March received
world-wide attention and need not be reviewed in depth in this report. Amnesty


62
International believes, however, that this case illustrates two important points.
First, it should be noted that Bazoft was originally invited into Iraq as part of a
government attempt to demonstrate its increasing liberalization. His execution dem-
onstrated, on the contrary, that the government's contempt for basic human rights
has not changed in practice, despite post-war talk of reforms that would increase
press and political freedoms.
Second, it should be recalled that on March 7, 1990, only three days before Ba-
zoft's death sentence was announced, the U.N. Human Rights Commission voted to
take no action on a draft decision which would have simply allowed human rights
violations in Iraq to be brought before the commission next year. In March of 1989,
Amnesty International stated before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights that,
“Iraq clearly and incontrovertibly presents a situation of the most flagrant and mas-
sive violations of human rights. We can think of none which cries out more for
international attention and action.” That remains our assessment today.
Three months after his death there is nothing this body can do for Farzad Bazoft
and the thousands like him who have been killed by the Iraqi government in recent
years. There is a great deal that can be done for those who reside in Iraq and more
especially for those who have managed to find refuge in Turkey and elsewhere. It is
this latter group for which Amnesty International is currently extremely concerned
and on whose behalf the U.S. Congress must act.
RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Amnesty International believes that the abuses by the government of Iraq con-
stitutes a gross and persistent pattern of internationally-recognized human rights
violations and strongly encourages Congress and the Administration to examine the
evidence on which this assessment is based, and to take into account seriously this
information when determining U.S. policy with respect to Iraq. The U.S. Govern-
ment should use all available opportunities to act against these violations.
(2) Amnesty International calls on the administration to appeal to the govern-
ment of Iraq to cease the systematic abuse of human rights and to adhere to its
international treaty obligations, and specifically to take the following steps:
1. Release from detention all prisoners of conscience.
2. End executions, especially those of Kurds and other Iraqis who have returned
to Iraq under official amnesties.
3. Conduct an immediate and impartial inquiry into the reported disappearance
and execution of such people, and make the findings public.
4. Allow a suitably qualified international agency, such as the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to monitor the return to Iraq of Kurds and other
Iraqis who choose to return under official amnesties.
(3) Amnesty International also calls on the U.S. Government to implement vigor-
ously the provisions of the Congressional Resolution Against Torture (P.L. 98–447),
including to instruct the U.S. chief of mission in Iraq to:
1. examine allegations of the practice of torture;
2. express concern in individual cases of torture brought to the attention of the
U.S. mission;
3. report to the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs regarding efforts made by the mission to implement U.S. policy with respect
to combating torture; and
4. meet with indigenous human rights monitoring groups knowledgeable about
the practice of torture.
(4) Amnesty International also calls on the Government of the United States to
hºal to the government of Turkey to prevent the forcible return of refugees to
raq.
IRAQI KURDS: At Risk of Forcible REPATRIATION FROM TURKEY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN IRAQ
Amnesty International is concerned about the fate of an estimated 27,500 Iraqi
Kurds who are currently in refugee camps in southeast Turkey. More than 21
months since they fled from Iraq to escape chemical weapons and other military at-
tacks by government forces, they are still without any legal protection and their
future remains uncertain. This absence of legal protection has placed many of them
at risk of refoulement or extradition to Iraq, where they could face torture, execu-
tion, or “disappearance” following arrest. Refoulement is the forcible return of per-
sons to a country where they risk being subjected to human rights violations. It is
prohibited by internationally recognized standards. Reports received by Amnesty


64
too numerous, but that it could provide details of individuals who had been released
from detention as a result of the amnesties. Amnesty International is awaiting re-
ceipt of that information. At the same time, the organization has received reports
indicating that the number of refugees who have returned from Turkey alone may
be as high as 9,300, somewhat higher than that suggested by the Iraqi Government's
figures.
The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that
between 6,000 and 8,500 Iraqi Kurds have returned to Iraq under the various am-
nesties, many of them from Turkey. Amnesty International is seriously concerned
about the lack of formal procedures to provide protection to those Iraqi Kurds who
wish to remain in Turkey, which would ensure that none are returned to Iraq
against their will, and fears that the Turkish authorities may continue to seek to
induce the refugees to return. Furthermore, the lack of independent international
monitoring of the repatriation process at all stages is all the more crucial since the
Iraqi Government, for its part, has failed to protect the lives of its citizens upon
their return to Iraq. Following the announcement of the 6 September 1988 amnesty
the Turkish Government invited the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to handle the repatriation of those refugees who expressed a wish to return
to Iraq. The ICRC initially accepted to play this role, but on 2 October 1988 it an-
nounced that it had “declined to handle the repatriation” following the Iraqi Gov-
ernment's objection to its involvement. The Iraqi Government informed the ICRC
that since Iraq and Turkey enjoyed diplomatic relations, all repatriation would be
handled on a bilateral basis, thereby making the involvement of a third party un-
necessary. The Turkish authorities nevertheless proceeded with the repatriation
without the involvement of the ICRC or any other suitably qualified agency. Turk-
ish Foreign Ministry officials informed Amnesty International's delegates in early
October 1988 that they lad received “verbal assurances” from the Iraqi Government
as to the safety of the returning refugees, and that these assurances were deemed to
constitute sufficient guarantees.
As a result of the ICRC's announcement, some of the Kurdish refugees who had
initially expressed their willingness to return to Iraq became reluctant about doing
so. Nevertheless, an estimated 1,900 Kurds were repatriated by 6 October 1988.
Turkish officials informed Amnesty International that none of the Kurds had been
forcibly returned. Yet, according to accounts given by many of the refugees inter-
viewed in Turkey by Amnesty International in October 1988, some of those who had
changed their minds about returning were nevertheless forced by Turkish camp offi-
cials onto buses bound for Iraq.
On 28 October 1988 Amnesty International once more called on the Turkish Gov-
ernment to allow a suitably qualified international agency, such as UNHCR, to be
involved in the protection of the Kurdish refugees at all stages. However, the gov-
ernment continues to refuse the UNHCR such involvement. UNHCR is not allowed
to conduct regular visits to the temporary shelters to provide material assistance
and protection to the camp population. Assistance, in the form of food and shelter
and work permits for those who wish to work outside the camps, is provided entirely
by the Turkish authorities. However, since September 1988 the Turkish government
has allowed UNHCR approximately six “unofficial' visits to the camps, after which
the organization reportedly expressed its concerns about the inadequacy of the shel-
ters with respect to overcrowding and sanitation, particularly in Kiziltepe camp
near Mardin, where refugees remain housed in tents.
According to UNHCR's mandate, the organization's protective (legal) role extends
to all refugees, regardless of whether the country where they seek asylum is a party
to the 1951 refugee Convention. In this capacity, while it has not been granted
access to the camp population as a whole, in some cases it has provided assistance
and protection to those Iraqi Kurds who approach the organization individually.
The organization provides documentation to such people who have entered Turkey
without official authorization. It interviews them to ascertain whether they have “a
well-founded fear of persecution” which would qualify them as refugees under
UNHCR's mandate. Provided they have not been granted asylum elsewhere before
their arrival in Turkey, the UNHCR then arranges for other governments to offer
the permanent asylum. Such people are granted temporary financial assistance, but
are not eligible for UNHCR's resettlement program. UNHCR has also assisted some
of the Kurdish refugees in the temporary camps who have been threatened with re-
patriation or extradition to Iraq by intervening with the Turkish authorities on
their behalf and providing them with lawyers as necessary. Nevertheless, Amnesty
International has continued to receive reports of the attempted repatriation or ex-
tradition of Kurdish refugees and is concerned that they are being systematically


65
denied legal protection through the Turkish Government's refusal to grant UNHCR
direct, regular access to the camps.
Since September 1988, all repatriation of Kurdish refugees to Iraq has continued
to be handled on a “bilateral basis,” without independent international monitoring
and amidst reports of forcible repatriation on the one hand, and of the arrest, "dis-
*" or execution of individuals who surrendered to the Iraqi authorities on
the other.
Amnesty International takes the view that official amnesties declared by the Iraqi
Government have not in themselves guaranteed the physical safety of those wishing
to benefit from them. On the contrary. the organization believes that such amnes-
ties may have been used to lure back to Iraq or to bring out from hiding suspected
government opponents who, in the absence of independent international monitoring,
are at considerable risk of further human rights violations. Amnesty International's
concerns in this regard have intensified in the past eighteen months after receiving
a number of reports of the “disappearance” in custody, torture or execution of indi-
viduals who sought to benefit from official amnesties. Many of the several thousand
refugees who returned to Iraq from Turkey and Iran in the past eighteen months
are believed to have been taken to Baharka and other so-called resettlement camps
located near the Kurdish cities of Sulaimaniya and Arbil in the north. Their future
there remain precarious. In the past, Kurds who were resettled in such camps were
subsequently taken into custody and then “disappeared.” Such victims include an
estimated 8,000 male Kurds of the Barzani clan who in August 1983 were taken into
custody en masse from Baharka, Qoshtapa, Harir and Diyana resettlement camps
and transferred to unknown destinations. Their rate to this day remains unknown,
and many are feared to have been executed. The Iraqi Government has denied any
knowledge of their whereabouts.
In May 1989, Amnesty International received the testimony of a member of the
prohibited Kurdistan Socialist Party-Iraq (KSP-I) who was taken into custody in
February 1989 after surrendering to the authorities following the 30 November 1988
amnesty. He stated that he was held without charge or trial for 37 days before being
released, initially in the Military Intelligence Directorate in Baghdad, and then in
Prison No. 1 in the al-Harithiyya district of the city. He and 22 others were held in
a small cell and were repeatedly beaten by their guards. One detainee was denied
medical treatment when he suffered a broken wrist as a result. Amnesty Interna-
tional received the names of three men who were among a group of Iraqi Kurds who
returned to Iraq from Turkey in 1988 following the announcement of the 6 Septem-
ber amnesty. The three, Arjan Narl Hassan, Mari Hari Hassan and Khaled Khu-
daida, were all suspected members of the prohibited Kurdistan Popular Democratic
Party (KPDP) and were said to have disappeared. In another incident, 33 Assyrian
Christians and their families who returned from Turkey and Iran to Iraq in late
1988 and early 1989 under various official amnesties were reported in March 1989 to
have disappeared. Most were from Duhok Province. The Iraqi Government has
denied any knowledge of such disappearances, but has requested details on their
cases for verification.
On 16 August 1989, Amnesty International delivered an oral statement before the
41st Session of the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities which cited, among other abuses, “the execution of Kurds who
were said to have given themselves up to the authorities in order to benefit from
amnesties.” At least seven such Kurds were known to have been executed in mid-
April 1989, “reportedly because of their past links with the Pesh Merga forces.” The
seven, executed in Dibs garrison near Kirkuk, were: Saber Sa'di, Qader Sa'di, Abdal-
lah Mala Muhammad, Darwish Mala Muhammad, Abdal-Karim Chitto, Saber
Hamad and Hatem Hamad. An Iraqi Government representative responded by de-
nying that anyone has been executed after seeking to benefit from an amnesty. In
another oral statement delivered before the 46th Session of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights on 19 February 1990, Amnesty International once again expressed
its concern about “the continued reports of the arrest and subsequent “disappear-
ance' (of Iraqis who have surrendered to the authorities) * * *,” and about “fears
that some may have been summarily executed.”
In November 1989, Amnesty International also received the names and details of
353 Kurds, among them 52 minors aged between 11 and 17, who were arrested by
Iraqi security forces between 27 and 30 August 1988, in Amadiyya, northern Iraq,
during the chemical weapons offensive. According to reported received they were
initially taken with their families to Sorsonk military barracks, where the men
were separated from the women and younger children. The men were then trans-
ferred to the Qal'a (castle) in Duhok and “disappeared” one month later. This was
despite the general amnesty for Kurds announced on 6 September 1988. Those were


66
“disappeared” included some members of the Pesh Merge forces (armed Kurdish
units), but most were civilians. Before their arrest, some of them had been in hiding,
but they surrendered after reportedly receiving assurances from the Iraqi authori-
ties in Amadiyya that they would not be harmed. Amnesty International has sub-
mitted details of these cases to the Iraqi Government for investigation, and it await-
ing a response.
In a telex to the Iraqi Government dated 15 May 1990, Amnesty International ex-
pressed serious concern about the lack of any independent international monitoring
of the repatriation of Iraqi Kurds, following reports that large numbers of them had
returned to Iraq in April and May after the extension of the deadline of the 10
March amnesty. The organization again urged the Iraqi authorities to take immedi-
ate steps to ensure the physical safety of all Iraqis returning under official amnes-
ties.
In June 1990, Amnesty International received reports that 30 Turcomans were ex-
ecuted in Iraq in late January of this year. Among them were said to be four who
returned from Turkey in order to benefit from official amnesties.
Reports such as these explain the reluctance of many Kurdish refugees currently
in Turkey to return to Iraq. Their fears are further compounded by reported at-
tempts on the part of the Iraqi Government to seek the extradition of some of them.
Amnesty International has been informed that under the terms of an extradition
treaty between Turkey and Iraq dated 29 May 1946, persons accused of political of
fenses would not be extradited. The organization has not received any information
indicating that this treaty has since been abrogated, and while recognizing that
countries may be affected by serious security problems unrelated to bona fide refu-
gees, it is Amnesty International's view that the fundamental principle of nonrefou-
lement, including nonextradition of anyone who could reasonably be expected to
face human rights violations, must be scrupulously observed.
In December 1989, Amnesty International received reports that the Iraqi Govern-
ment was seeking the extradition of 138 Kurds from refugee camps in Diyarbakir
and Kiziltepe (Mardin). The 138 Kurds were said to have committed criminal of
fenses in Iraq, including smuggling and drug trafficking. However, other informa-
tion received by Amnesty International suggests that among them were suspected
members or supporters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), whose extradition
was being sought on ostensibly criminal grounds. Amnesty International received
the name of three of them, one of whom was reportedly arrested by Turkey's Na-
tional Intelligence Organization (MIT) in Diyarbakir on 12 December 1989, and was
last seen at the Habur crossing point on the Turkish-Iraqi border on 14 or 15 De-
cember. Amnesty International later learned that he had escaped custody and has
since left Turkey.
Also in December 1989, Amnesty International received the names of two Kurds
from the refugee camp in Mus, whose extradition was allegedly being sought by the
Iraqi Government. The two men, Muhammad Tawfiq and Haji Arafat, were report-
edly sent to Iraq against their will on or around 8 December 1989, and their fate
and current whereabouts are unknown. They were said to have been ill-treated by
Turkish camp authorities and forced to sign false statements to the effect that they
wanted to return to Iraq. It was not known whether they were among the aforemen-
tioned group of 138 Kurds. In January 1990 Amnesty International received reports
that six Kurdish refugees from Kiziltepe camp (Mardin) were informed in late De-
cember 1989 that they were to be returned to Iraq. The six are: Ali Jawad Kadhim,
Taleb Abed Ahmad, Arkan Ibrahim Matti, Ibrahim Muhammad Wali, Salem Mirza
Nuri and Basem Muhammad Fathi. Subsequent reports indicated that five of them
were members of the Pesh Merga forces, and that they were forcibly returned to
Iraq on 2 and 3 January 1990. In addition, another 40 Kurdish refugees were report-
ed to have been forcibly repatriated to Iraq on 21 January 1990. Their fate and cur-
rent whereabouts are unknown.
Amnesty International has continued to urge the Turkish authorities to ensure
effective protection for Iraqi Kurdish refugees from forcible repatriation, and not to
extradite those who risk falling victim to further human rights violations in Iraq.
On 5 January 1990 the organization submitted to the government the names of
seven such Kurds who faced extradition. On 1 February 1990, Amnesty Internation-
al received a response from the Turkish Embassy in London, which reiterated the
government's position on the status of the Iraqi Kurdish refugees and denied the
threat of extradition: “Turkey ratified the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the proto-
col of 1967 on refugees with a reserve on geographical basis. According to this re-
serve, Turkey assured the obligation of accepting refugees only from European
countries.


67
In line with this disposition, the Iraqis who arrived in Turkey during September
1988 are not in a position to be granted the ‘Status of refugee' by the Turkish au-
thorities. However, with a humanitarian approach to this problem, Turkey provided
temporary shelter to these people.
None of the Iraqis were sent back to their country against their will. Forced repa-
triation of these people [is] out of the question and no request was received from the
Iraqi Government for the extradition of 138 Iraqis.”
hile Turkey's treaty obligations under the 1951 refugee Convention and its Pro-
tocol apply only to refugees originating from countries in Europe, Amnesty Interna-
tional believes that non-refoulement is a principle of general international law
which is binding on all states, regardless of their specific treaty obligations or of the
country of origin of the refugees concerned.
In March 1990, Amnesty International learned that the Iraqi Government was
seeking the extradition of a Kurdish man who could face the death penalty If re-
turned to Iraq. Reports indicated that he was accused of killing a member of the
Iraqi secret police who was pursuing him. He is also said to be a KDP activist and
draft evader who was sentenced to death in absentia after fleeing Iraq in May 1988.
He was recognized as a refugee under UNHCR's mandate in late 1988. The Turkish
authorities arrested him in late February or early March 1989 reportedly for the
purpose of extradition, but he remained in detention in Turkey pending investiga-
tions into his case to determine whether the alleged murder was a political or crimi-
nal offense. Two officials of the Iraqi Government arrived in Turkey in late March
1990 reportedly to put pressure on the Turkish authorities to release him into their
custody. Amnesty International learned in late May that he was extradited to Iraq
earlier that month and is reportedly to be tried in June for murder, which carries
the death penalty. He was initially held at a detention center in Baghdad but his
current whereabouts are unknown. This extradition has taken place despite
UNHCR's involvement in his case, including providing him with a defense lawyer.
In June Amnesty International condemned the extradition and urged the Turkish
authorities once more not to extradite to Iraq any persons who are clearly at risk of
human rights violations there.
In early May 1990 the Prime Minister of Turkey, Yildirim Akbulut, met President
Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Among the topics reportedly discussed was the return
of the Iraqi Kurdish refugees who remained in Turkey. Between March and early
June 1990, 2,548 refugees were said to have been repatriated to Iraq under an offi-
cial amnesty announced on 10 March. Of these, 1,923 were from Mus camp, 475
were from Kiziltepe (Mardin) camp and 150 were from Diyarbakir camp. More are
expected to be repatriated before the current deadline of 11 July, suggest that poor
hygiene and intolerable camp conditions, notably three outbreaks of large-scale food
poisoning (on 8 June 1989 in Kiziltepe camp; on 17 December 1989 in Mus camp;
and on 1 February 1990 in Diyarbakir camp) affecting several thousand refugees,
has contributed to a general climate of insecurity which may be driving some reluc-
tant refugees back to Iraq. In addition, pressures in the form of reduced food and
water supplies, limited medical treatment, official bans on work outside the camp,
curfews and other security restrictions, allowing Iraqi Government officials to visit
the camps, and threats of forcible repatriation, are reportedly being used by the
Turkish authorities to coerce some of the Kurdish refugees to return under the cur-
rent amnesty.
These practices are said to be most widespread in Mus and Kiziltepe (Mardin) ref-
ugee camps, where the majority of the Kurds who returned to Iraq in April-June
1990 had been living. Recent Information received indicates, for example, that there
have been outbreaks of typhoid, malaria and dysentery in Kiziltepe camp, for which
only a handful of people are said to be treated daily. The following are extracts
from the testimony of a Kurdish refugee in Kiziltepe (Mardin) camp received by
Amnesty International in June 1990, and is one of a number of such testimonies
received by the organization: -
“Since the beginning of this year [1990] the camp administrations, particularly in
the camps of Mus and Mardin, began adopting a practical program to pressurize the
refugees to return to Iraq. That is what the Iraqi regime wants and is also working
to achieve it. For this purpose, an exchange of visits at various levels took place
between the two countries * * * The aim is to force the refugees to return to Iraq
under any circumstances. A policy of depriving the refugees of food began in the
camps of Mardin and Mus. Much of the nutritious foods given to the refugees every
fifteen days has disappeared. They also imposed further restrictions on movement
within and out of the camp * * * Hitting the refugees on their hands with sticks
i. slapping them has become a daily practice. Here are some documented exam-
ples:


68
1. On 21/5 the police attacked the refugee Yassin Abdal, aged 36, married and has
two children. They hit him with sticks on his hands until they started bleeding be-
cause he was late in returning [to the camp).
2. On the night of 22-23/5 two refugees were arrested: Sabah Sidiq and Ghazi
Sidiq, who are brothers. They wanted to go through the barbed wire in order to
enter the camp, since the past incidents of beatings and insults had frightened the
refugees who had been visiting their relatives in Diyarbakir. So they [the two refu-
gees] were intending to enter the camp out of sight of the police in order to avoid
the beating and torture. They were beaten to the point of losing consciousness and
were transferred to the hospital as a result.
3. On 1/6 the police severely beat these refugees: Sulaiman Mustafa—aged 42, a
village “mukhtar” [government-appointed village chief].
Sidiq Bilizani—aged 60, he is ill and had gone to the police center to obtain a
permit allowing him to receive treatment at Diyarbakir hospital, even though he
had a paper from the doctor for that.
Hamid Jamil Shaikho Bamarni—aged 25. They hit him for no reason other than
that when he was talking to the police officer he raised his head a little more than
necessary and [there are] hundreds of other similar incidents
And after these attacks of the refugees by the police on 1/6, a delegation from the
camp [composed of seven camp leaders] confronted the police officer * * * in charge
of the police center in the camp, asking him to call the Governor and [tell him] that
we wished to visit him in order that [he may] relieve our suffering and the attacks
to which our sons are being subjected to. The officer's reply was that the Governor
is not prepared to meet anyone, and that our method’s [of dealing] with you will not
change. If you accept you can stay, and if life here does not suit you, go to Iraq
+ + +??
On 3 June, six refugees in the same camp ware reported to have been beaten by
police with hose pipes. Four of them are: Ja'far Haji Mustafa Hruri, aged 35, mar-
ried; Mustafa Salim Hruri, aged 32, married; Ibrahim Ihsan Hruri, aged 18, single;
and Hussain Isma'il Garka, aged 45, married and has eight children.
On 12 Hay 1990, clashes broke out between Kiziltepe (Mardin) camp authorities
and the refugees, leading to arrests and threats of forcible repatriation of some refu-
gees to Iraq. According to Initial accounts of the incident, disturbances had broken
out in the camp between a group of refugee's and suspected “collaborators” with the
Turkish and Iraqi authorities. The Governor of Mardin Province and security forces
reportedly intervened to break up the fighting. The security forces were said to have
fired at random into the crowds and to have beaten some of the refugees. Reinforce-
ments in the form of additional security forces and armed personnel carriers were
brought into the camp, which was sealed off and a curfew imposed. Subsequent re-
ports received by Amnesty International linked this incident to attempts by the
Turkish authorities to return a group of Kurdish refugees to Iraq. The following are
extracts from an account of the incident made by one of the refugees in the camp:
“What happened on the night of 12-13/5/1990 surpassed anything that had hap-
pened before. A group of refugees, and they are: Hussain Besifki, Jumhur Uzmani,
Mustafa Bamnrni, Amin Ali and Muhammad Salman, were summoned to the camp
administration, and there they were asked by the police to go to the town of
Mardin, at a distance of 12 kms. from the camp. The hospital car had been made
ready for that purpose. The police clarified that the Governor was asking for them
in order to meet some people who had arrived from Iraq. The [refugees] refused to
get into the car * * * The police threatened that they would be handed over to the
Iraqi authorities if they did not obey the orders, but their threats were to no avail.
When [the police] gave up trying to make them go, they told the Governor * * *
who ordered the release [of the refugees]. Directly after that [the Deputy Governor]
himself came to the camp. A group of people were gathered at a distance of about
100 meters from the administration and police center. [The Deputy Governor], with
a stick in his hand, headed toward them and started beating one of the refugees
called ‘Izzat Barbahari " " " who tried to get away * * * [The refugees] could not
contain themselves and threw stones at the Deputy Governor and the armed police
* * * The police started firing with the guns which I believe the state had provided
them with for our protection. The bullets went through the tents and frightened the
sleeping refugees * * * After half an hour an armored carrier with a police contin-
gent entered the camp * * * the refugees took refuge in their tents * * * The fol-
lowing day the armored carrier made a military display, going through the passages
between the tents at top speed. The children did not venture out and people re-
mained in their tents. When the armored carrier could find nothing to run over, it
proceeded to level the camp store * * * to the ground * * * And when they gave up
trying to provoke us they withdrew their armored carrier. And on 15/5 the police


69
summoned the villages leaders (mukhtars) in the camp and informed them that per-
mission to leave the camp would once again be permitted, but that some refugees
would not be allowed out, and they are: Zubair ‘Abd al-Rahman Ma'i, Jamil
Mahmud Besifki, Rizgar Saleh Kamaki, Hussain ‘Abd al-Khaliq Besifki and Hassan
'Ali Biduhi. These refugees are not allowed to leave the camp and they are not al-
lowed to us the telephone or receive calls " " * This is one aspect of the inhuman
practices used to force the refugees to return “ ” “”
The eleven refugees named in the above testimony, together with four others
from the camp (Raving Hruri, Ziravan Kuveli, Fariq Ma'i and Tayyar Ma'i) are re-
ported to be under threat of forcible return to Iraq. Among them are military cadres
of the KDP and student leaders of Kurdish youth organizations. Some are also refu-
gee committee leaders. Reports indicated that an Iraqi government representative
met Turkish camp authorities in late January or early February 1990, urging that
they be handed over to the Iraqi authorities. Subsequently, a camp official was said
to have attempted to induce nine of them to return “voluntarily” to Iraq.
On 14 Nay, Amnesty International raised its concerns with the Turkish Govern-
ment about the lack of adequate safeguards ensuring that no Kurdish refugees
would he sent back to Iraq against their will. On 16 May, the organization sent
urgent appeals to the Turkish authorities urging once again that “immediate steps
be taken to ensure that no Iraqi Kurds are placed under pressure or forced in any
way to return to Iraq under the existing amnesty.” It also requested the names of
all those taken into custody from Kiziltepe (Mardin) camp and details of the legal
basis for their detention. In a response to Amnesty International dated 30 May 1990,
the Turkish Embassy in London did not comment on the specific incidents and cases
which the organization had raised, but stated that:
“* * * forced repatriation of the Iraqis living in Turkey is out of the question.
These unfortunate people were given temporary shelter in Turkey and our govern-
ment, out of its limited sources, provided living standards for these people above the
level they enjoyed in their homeland. The Iraqis who are currently hosted by the
Turkish government are free to travel to any country in line with their own wishes.
Since last September, more than three thousand Iraqis went back to their country
voluntarily when the Iraqi authorities announced, a general amnesty and made
public that these returnees would not be prosecuted. Obviously, Turkey always
acted [in conformity] with the wishes of these people and let them have their free
choices on whether [to go] back home, [stay] in Turkey or [seek] refuge in a third
country. The Turkish authorities, to avoid any criticism which may arise in the
future, asked those refugees to sign documents indicating that their return takeſs]
place [in conformity] with their own wishes.”
On 2 June, clashes were reported to have broken out in Mus camp after a group
of refugees gathered in front of the camp administration calling for an end to ill-
treatment and for permission to leave the camp. Only a small number of refugees
are said to have permission to venture outside the camp, and for no more than two
hours at a stretch. According to reports received, the gathering developed into a
demonstration which was then dispersed by police firing into the crowd. Five of the
refugees sustained bullet wounds. They are: Delawer Tahsin, aged eight; Muham-
mad ‘Umar, aged 30; Tamar Jangir, aged 35; Nu'man Saleh, aged 50; and Iqbal
Fattah, aged 18. Eight other refugees and one police officer sustained other injuries.
The eight refugees are: Isma'il Shukr, aged 50; Idris Shalabi, aged 20; “Aqid Haji,
aged 14; Shawkat Hussain, aged 20; Qadri Brindar, aged 19; Jangir Hassan, aged 30;
Karam ‘Abd al-Jabbar, aged 30; and Muhammad Kamel, aged 55. Six other refugees
were reportedly arrested, of whom three are believed to be still in detention: Mu-
hammad Salim Shukri, aged 35; Nawzad Tawfiq, aged 35; and ‘Ali Ramazan, aged
25.
Today, an estimated 27,500 Iraqi Kurds remain in Turkey in the camps of Diyar-
bakir, Kiziltepe (Mardin) and Mus (others have left for Syria or Iran, or resettled in
other countries). Their future remains uncertain, as does the fate of those who
return to Iraq. Disturbing and consistent reports of abuses committed against Iraqis
who have returned to their country under official amnesties make the need for safe-
guards against forcible repatriation end extradition even more urgent. In view of
these abuses, Amnesty International urges the Turkish authorities provide them
with effective and durable protection against forcible return to a country where
they would be at risk of human rights violations. It calls on the Iraqi authorities to
respect both its national and international legal obligations by taking immediate
and effective measures to protect the lives of all Iraqi citizens who return to their
country under official amnesties, and to account for their fate and current where-
abouts. To this end, Amnesty International urgently calls on both governments to


70
accept the independent, international monitoring of the repatriation process at all
stages of those Iraqi who choose to return to their country.
Senator Moynihan. Thank you, Mr. Graham. We will return to
your testimony.
Dr. Karim. Did I pronounce that correctly?
STATEMENT OF DR. NAJMALDIN KARIM, KURDISH NATIONAL
CONGRESS OF NORTH AMERICA
Mr. KARIM. Yes, sir.
Senator Moynihan. Good afternoon again, and please proceed as
you will.
Mr. KARIM. Mr. Chairman, allow me to introduce into the
records first a list of information about the plight of Kurds in Iraq.
Senator Moynihan. Without objection, that will be entered into
the record and printed.
[The information referred to follows:]
THE PLIGHT OF THE KURDS IN IRAQ
Numbering 4 million, the Kurds represent 28 percent of the population of Iraq.
Their country, for the most part mountainous, runs alongside the entire length of
the Turko-Iranian border and 520 kilometers of the border between Iran and Iraq.
The total surface area of Iraqi Kurdistan is 74,000 square kilometers (approximately
twice that of Switzerland).
The Iraqi state was created by Great Britain immediately after the First World
War on the remains of the Ottoman Empire. At the San Remo Conference held in
April, 1920 by the Allies, the British Empire awarded itself the mandate over Arab
Iraq. On August 23, 1921, the British high commissioner in Mesopotamia enthroned
Emir Faycal, son of Cherif of Mecca, as king of Iraq. The Kurds refused to recognize
the authority of this Saudi sovereign imposed by London, and demanded their own
state on the territories occupied by British troops. In his Society of Nations project,
U.S. President Woodrow Wilson also declared himself to be in favor of the creation
of a Kurdish state. In order to discover the desires of the population, the S.N. sent
an international investigative commission to the site which remained in the Kurd-
ish provinces from January to March, 1925. In its report, filed on July 16th in
Geneva, it noted that “seven-eighths of the population of these provinces desires the
formation of an independent Kurdish state.”
As the mandating power, Great Britain did not take into account these desires
and obtained from the S.N. the annexation of the Kurdish territories to the Iraqi
state under the pretext that “without the oil and agricultural riches of Kurdistan,
Iraq could not be economically viable.” In exchange, it promised to recognize the
right of the Kurdish population to possess its own autonomous government and to
enjoy cultural freedom. The latter was, in fact, respected during the British man-
date which ended prematurely in 1932. The Kurds didn't have, however, an autono-
mous government and the previously acquired cultural rights were questioned and
progressively eroded by the Arab authorities of Baghdad. This resulted in a whole
series of conflicts and revolts which have studded the contemporary history of Iraq.
In July 1958, following the overthrow of the monarchy by General Kassem, of Kurd-
ish origin, the new constitution proclaimed the “principle of equality and the free
union of Arab and Kurdish sister nations in the heart of the Iraqi Republic.” For 3
years, the Kurds enjoyed all their rights and became, as a result, the most enthusi-
astic defenders of the young republic. However, this evolution was violently contest-
ed by the nationalist Pan-Arab wing of the regime which ended by winning out. The
Kurdish separatist movement was outlawed and presented as being “as dangerous
for the Arab world as Israel.” In September 1961, one entered a new period of
armed confrontation. After 9 years of deadly combat, a military solution seeming
improbable, a peace agreement was concluded in March, 1970 between General Bar-
zani, chief of the Kurdish movement, and Iraqi vice-president Saddam Hussein. This
agreement provided for a rather large autonomy for the Kurdish regions and 5
Kurdish ministers entered the Baghdad government. All the dispositions of the
agreement were to be applied within a period of 4 years. Iraq took advantage of this
delay to massively arm itself, in particular through the graces of the USSR, with
which it signed a 25 year friendship and security treaty in April, 1972. It refused, at


72
Halabja (22,000 inhabitants), Khourmal (17,000 inhabitants), Penjwln (31,000 in-
habitants, Tchoman (35,000 inhabitants), Chwarta (28,000 inhabitants), Dokan
(50,000 inhabitants), Sldekan (18,000 inhabitants), Qala Diza (80,000 inhabitants),
Sengaser (42,000 inhabitants).
The following small villages called nihiye (chief district sites) in the Iraqi adminis-
trative division, which had populations running from 4,000 to 20,000, have also been
destroyed: Gelala, Haj Omran, Sengaser, Khelekan, Bingirt, Berzinga, Khourmal,
Syd Sadiq, Slrwan, Kareza, Sengaw, Qeredagh, Chorech, Qere Hassan, Qadir Kerem,
Serqela, Newjoul.
(This list, established on the basis of information reaching Paris at the end June
and confirmed by several sources, is not exhaustive.) The cities in which the inhabit-
ants have been advised of an upcoming evacuation are: Kanl Masl (30,000 inhabit-
ants), Rania (120,000 inhabitants with its outskirts), Mergesor (25,000 inhabitants),
Koy Sandjak (60,000 inhabitants).
According to the information currently available, this second phase will be fol-
lowed by a third during which more important cities (Amadia, Aqra, Rewandouz,
Shaqlawa) will be destroyed. There will only remain, in Iraqi Kurdistan, the frontier
posts of Zakho and 1Chanaqin, the oil-producing city of Kirkouk (already largely
arabicized), Dohuk, Suleymanieh and Arbil. However, the latter, which has been in-
habited without interruption for more than 4,500 years and is considered as the
oldest city in the world by historians, already feels its existence threatened.
At present, one estimates that approximately 10,000 square kilometers (out of
74,000) of Iraqi Kurdistan still remains inhabited, mainly on the sites of surviving
cities and of relocation camps.
2. The deportations.—The populations of destroyed villages and cities are massive-
ly deported. Most of the deportees are shipped to “new habitation zones” located in
Kurdistan along the major routes linking Arbil-Kirkouk, Arbil-Mossoul and Soulai-
ºn Kirkou Others have been sent to camps installed next to the Jordanian
Orcier.
In general, future deportees have from 2 to 3 days to assemble their personal be-
longings before being embarked by military transports to their “new residence
sites.” Their livestock or domestic animals are confiscated to be slaughtered on site
or shipped to army camps. The deportees are sometimes given the choice between
any unbanned city of Kurdistan (with the exception of the oil-producing cities of
Kirkouk and 1Chanaqin, reserved for Arabs) or the camps. On arrival in the camps,
they are charged an “indemnity” of 1,500 dinars (30,000 French francs at the official
rate, approximately 10,000 French francs on the open market) per family to build a
cement brick shanty.
The relocation camps being installed according to military imperatives, they cur-
rently have access to neither educational services nor economic activities. There is
not even potable water: it is distributed twice a day by water trucks. Deprived of
productive activity, the deportees survive as best they can thanks to an allowance of
50 dinars (approximately 450 French francs) per person per month, given by the au-
thorities. So the Kurdish peasantry, which through its rearing, horticultural and ag-
ricultural activities assured the nutritional self-sufficiency of the whole of Iraq, now
finds itself dismantled, destroyed, reduced today to charity.
The Kurdish population living currently in the relocation camps is estimated at 1
to 2 million persons., according to informed sources. The Iraqi government, which
should possess rather precise statistics on this subject, has quoted no figure to this
day. It is therefore impossible to give a precise estimate. The most one can say is
that there are several hundreds of thousands of Kurds, realistically more than a
million, torn from their homes, from their traditional way of life, from their histori-
cal heritage, from their economic culture and packed into camps.
It is fitting to add that approximately 200,000 Iraqi Kurds are also living in refu-
gee camps in Turkey (36,000), Iran (160,000) and Pakistan under nearly insupport-
able conditions.
THE REPRESSION
This aspect of the policy of the Iraqi government is relatively better known to
public opinion, thanks to the actions of humanitarian organizations (Amnesty Inter-
national, F.I.D.H.) and the efforts of the media to sensitize the public. The press
gave large coverage to the chemical weapons bombings of March, 1988 (Halabja) and
of August-September,1988 (provinces located along the Turkish border). Kurdish
sources estimate at 15,000 the number of civilians killed by chemical weapons.
The “extra-judiciary” executions of persons suspected of belonging to or conspir-
ing with Kurdish guerrillas is counted in the thousands for the year 1988. The
annual report of the American State Department as well as that of Amnesty Inter-


73
national provides numerous precisions on torture and execution, as well as the
names of the better known victims.
In February, 1989, Amnesty International published a voluminous report (70 pgs.)
filled with figures and names of the Kurdish children martyrized in Iraq. From the
torture of babies in the presence of their parents to force the latter to talk, to the
putting to death by torture of children aged from 12 to 13 years because of the al-
leged political activities of their parents, this report teems with unendurable infor-
mation. It also notes that the bodies of young victims are only returned to their rel-
atives after the payment of an “execution tax!”
The repression sometimes takes the form of massive extermination. On July 30,
1983, approximately 8,000 women and children belonging to the Barzani tribe and
living in the Qouchtepe resettlement camp, 10 kilometers from Arbil, placed under
the control of the Iraqi army, were taken to an unknown destination. The steps
taken by humanitarian organizations and the Red Cross to obtain information about
them have remained without response. Saddam Hussein contented himself with
stating on television that these “traitors are doubtless in hell.” A Kurdish source
maintains that they have been exterminated after having served as guinea pigs in
experiments on chemical and bacteriological weapons.
ANNEx I
TEXT OF THE DECREE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF IRAQI KURDISTAN
The letter of the first legion SF/1725 dated June 21st, notified by letter of the
positions FL 1 SF/4089 dated June 22 and begins as follows:
(A letter from the commander of the offices of the Northern Organizations SF/
4008 dated June 20) in consideration of the end of the period officially announced
for the collectivization of the “villages forbidden for security reasons” which expires
June 21, we have decided to execute the following, beginning June 22:
1. All the “villages forbidden for security reasons” should be considered as sites
(bases) of the subversive agents of Iran, successors of treason and the equals of Iraqi
traitors.
2. The existence of human beings and animals in these regions should be absolute-
ly forbidden, these regions should be considered as operational zones where firing
should not be restrained by any order other than those emanating from our base.
3. Traveling through these regions, as well as all agricultural, animal or industri-
al activity should be strictly forbidden, and the authorities concerned are responsi-
ble for following this order to the letter, each within his field of competence.
4. Your commanders should, from time to time, prepare special attacks using ar-
tillery, helicopters and combat planes as often as possible and without respite
against those living in these regions, and day and night.
5. Anyone found in these forbidden regions should be taken and interrogated by
the organs of security. Those whose ages vary from 15 to 70 years should be execut-
ed after one has benefited from the information that they have given.
6. The organs of security concerned should interrogate those who surrender for a
maximum of three days, and for 10 days if necessary. If the questioning requires
more time than this, they will receive our assent, which will be communicated
either by telephone or by telex.
Any object confiscated by the combatants of the Regiments of National Defense
(government militia) should be given to them, with the exception of heavy, medium
and support weapons. On the other hand, they may keep light weapons under the
condition that they simply inform us of their number.
The officers of the regiments should inform actively and in detail the unit and
detachment commanders of the army about their activities within the Regiments of
National Defense. We hope that the above will be executed by everyone within their
field of competence.
Mr. KARIM. I also would like to introduce into the record this
book, which shows the villages in Kurdistan, which has been de-
ported of its population. The date and the number of people who
lived in those villages, the schools, the churches, and the hospitals
that have been destroyed by the government, and also the areas
that have been Arabized, where the Kurds have been depopulated
and non-Kurds have been settled in their place.
Senator Moynihan. Dr. Karim, earlier the chairman, Senator
Pell, had the same document and asked that it be made part of the


74
files of the committee, and that will be done, and we thank you.
We have two copies now.
Mr. KARIM. Mr. Chairman, let me say for the record how much
the Kurdish community in the United States of America and
indeed everywhere else, appreciate what you and your committee
have done for them: the recently passed resolution by your commit-
tee to have Voice of America broadcast in Kurdish is a very impor-
tant and necessary step to provide 25 million Kurds with accurate
news and information in their own language, which does not exist
in any part of Kurdistan, and your leadership in passing the reso-
lution to impose sanctions on Iraq following its use of chemical
weapons on the Kurds in 1988, and sending the factfinding mission
to Iraqi Kurdistan and to Kurdish refugee camps in Turkey.
Senator Moynihan. May I say to you that that is very good to
hear. It is the first indication that anybody has taken official
notice, you might say. That was reported unanimously from the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
Mr. KARIM. We do appreciate that. We are honored to speak
before you today as a Kurdish-American on behalf of the 4 million
Kurds in Iraq who cannot speak to you on their own behalf.
The Kurdish National Congress of North America, of which I am
a member of the executive committee, is deeply grateful to your
distinguished committee for the attention you have directed to the
denial of Kurdish human rights in Iraq. A day does not go by that
each one of us Kurds do not think of our family members now
trapped in Kurdistan that is no longer theirs, a Kurdish nation
that is brutally and systematically being forced into submission
and extinction by all the governments that occupy it.
Today the focus is on Iraq, a country whose oppression of the
Kurdish people has gone beyond mere violation of human rights to
a full-scale systematic genocidal policy of eradication of the Kurd-
ish identity within Iraq and the elimination of any persons who
oppose this policy. No policy of this scope is set in Iraq without the
direct orders of Iraq's President, Saddam Hussein. A full compre-
hensive account of many of the atrocities that have been and con-
tinue to be committed by the Iraqi Government against the Kurds
W. take many hours to present but are well-documented else-
Winere.
The list of the crimes committed by the Iraqi Government
against the Kurdish population grows longer with each passing
day, adding to an increasing body of evidence that reveals Iraq's
intent to destroy Kurdish identity is more than the policy to stamp
out and repress political opposition. It is a policy whose ultimate
goal is the elimination of the 4 million Kurds and all things Kurd-
ish from Iraq.
The crimes committed by the Iraqi regime to eliminate political
opposition, the use of chemical weapons, the imprisonment, torture,
and execution of suspected opponents of the Iraqi regime and their
relatives including infants and children, the assassinations and at-
tempted assassinations of dissidents and Kurdish leaders outside
Iraq are in themselves enough to justify the condemnation and boy-
cott of Iraq both economically and militarily by the rest of the
world community, but the slower more insidious forms of Iraq's
genocide against the Kurds, the policies against its own Kurdish


75
citizens who are supposedly protected as citizens under the Iraqi
constitution are crimes as heinous and abhorrent as its more fla-
grant abuses of human rights.
Among these are: No. 1, 4,000 Kurdish villages and towns have
been destroyed and leveled. There are no villages left in Kurdistan.
A militarized zone of -
Senator Moynihan. There are no villages left in Kurdistan?
Mr. KARIM. In Kurdistan. A militarized zone of 20 to 30 kilome-
ters wide has been established along Iraq's border with Turkey and
Iran in Kurdish areas only. Anything that moves in this area is
shot on the spot. Some estimates place the number of Kurdish vil-
lages deprived of their homes, land, livestock, property, and liveli-
hood at the very least at half million; this is a conservative figure.
No. 2, displaced Kurdish villagers have been forced to live in
camps located near largest population centers, Erbil, Sulaimaniya,
and Dihoak. Others were dispersed to the southern deserts and
others to unknown locations. All camps are located next to heavily
armed Iraqi army garrisons. The camp inhabitants are at the
mercy of the Iraqi Government to provide them with food. There
are no means of economic support for them. Some of the camps
have no water. Even the wells dug there were dry.
No. 3, dislocated Kurds are prohibited from visiting their villages
of origin. For example, Kurds from Sinjar cannot go back to Sinjar.
No. 4, Kurds are prohibited from buying land in areas targeted
for Arabization, such as Kirkuk, Sinjar, Khanakeen, Sheikhan,
Tuzkhurmatoo, Kifri, and other places.
No. 5, an Iraqi Arab who marries a Kurdish woman is paid 500
Iraqi dinars by the Government of Iraq.
No. 6, the Kurdish land has been damaged environmentally.
There is a massive project to divert water from Kurdish areas. Nat-
ural springs in Kurdish areas have been plugged by cement, trees
have been cut and roots poisoned so that they will not grow back
agaln.
No. 7, Kurdish students are not admitted to military or police
academies nor to college of education, unless they are members of
the Arab Ba'ath Socialist party; and
No. 8, all teachers must become members of the Arab Ba'ath So-
cialist party to keep their job.
The Iraqi Government's intrusion into every aspect of every citi-
zens’ daily life is beyond comprehension of persons who have
grown up and lived in a free society. They have even sent Iraqi
agents into refugee camps to intimidate the Iraqi Kurds in Turkey,
they succeeded in poisoning the bread given to the refugees; 2,000
persons fell ill. Kurdish refugees who accepted Iraq’s offer of am-
nesty and return to Iraq have never been heard from again.
As Kurds we are grateful to those who, at last, are telling the
alarming story that needs to be told about Iraq. But for the 150,000
Kurds still in refugee camps in Turkey and Iran words are not
enough. For the 4 million Kurds inside Iraq today, words are not
enough.
Their very lives, their culture, their heritage, their identity, their
future and the future of their children is in jeopardy. We, there-
fore, ask for the following actions be taken, if you allow me, Mr.
Chairman.


76
Senator Moynihan. Please do, Doctor.
Mr. KARIM. No. 1, we ask that the United States grant refugee
status to the Kurdish refugees from the Turkish and Iranian camps
and admit those who wish to come to the United States. We have
compiled a list of the people who have relatives in this country and
are willing to come here.
We ask that the United States grant political asylum in the
United States to those Kurds who seek it. We ask that the United
States Embassy in Baghdad grant visas to those Kurds who wish to
visit their relatives in the United States or seek medical care in
this country.
No. 2, we ask that the United States use its influence and put
pressure on the Governments of Turkey and perhaps on Iran,
which may be more difficult, and work with the U.N. High Com-
mission of Refugees and with the International Red Cross and
other organizations to improve the condition of the refugees in the
refugee camps.
Kurdish refugees in Iran are not forced to remain in camps like
they are in Turkey, but most have been forced to become beggars
in the streets for lack of food. Just this week, we learned that three
Kurds who have been arrested in Dyarbakir, Turkey, for attempt-
ing to deliver $6,000 to the refugees which have been donated by
the Kurds in the United States and elsewhere.
About a month ago, a Kurdish medical student in Dyarbakir,
Turkey publicly burned herself to death to call world attention to
the plight of the Kurdish refugees. Unfortunately, this received
little notice.
No. 3, we ask that the position of observer status be created for
Kurdistan in the United Nations like that has been created for the
Palestinians. We ask that a session of the United Nations be devot-
ed to a discussion of the Kurdish issues, as was proposed by the
late Dr. Andre Sakharov in the Paris conference on the Kurds.
No. 4, we ask that the United States exert pressure on Iraq to
compensate those Kurds who have suffered from its chemical
weapon attacks and forced dislocations, that Kurds be allowed to
return to their villages and rebuild them, that their human and
ethnic rights be respected.
And last, we ask that the United States discontinue its credit to
Iraq through Import-Export Bank and impose military and econom-
ic sanctions on Iraq until its genocidal policies are discontinued,
compensation paid, and human rights restored to all Iraqi citizens.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Karim follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF NAJMALDEEN KARIM
It is indeed a great honor to speak before you today, as a Kurdish American on
behalf of the four million Kurds in Iraq who cannot speak to you on their own
behalf. The Kurdish National Congress of North America, of which I am a member
of the Executive Committee, is deeply grateful to your distinguished committee for
the attention you have directed to the denial of Kurdish human rights in Iraq. A
day does not go by that each one of us Kurds does not think of our family members
now trapped in a Kurdistan that is no longer theirs, a Kurdish nation that is brutal-
ly and systematically being forced into submission and extinction by all the govern-
ments that occupy it.
Today, the focus is on Iraq, a country whose oppression of the Kurdish people has
gone beyond mere “violation of human rights” to a full scale, systematic, genocidal


77
policy of eradication of the Kurdish identity within Iraq, and the elimination of any
persons who oppose this policy. No policy of this scope is set in Iraq without the
direct orders of Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein.
A full comprehensive account of many of the atrocities that have been and contin-
ue to be committed by the Iraqi government against the Kurds would take many
hours to present, but are well documented elsewhere. Your committee staff report
on Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds by Peter Galbraith and Chris-
topher Van Hollen, Jr., David Korn's comprehensive report, “Human Rights in
Iraq,” published this year by Middle East Watch, the State Department's annual
report on human rights, the proceedings of the First International Conference on
Kurdish Human Rights in Paris last October sponsored by France Liberte headed by
Madame Danielle Mitterand of France, reports by Amnesty International, Physi-
cians for Human Rights, Cultural Survival, numerous journalists and others have
described vividly in sickening detail the terror to which the Kurdish people of Iraq
have been and continue to be subjugated.
The list of crimes committed by the Iraqi government against the Kurdish people
grows longer with each passing day, adding to an increasing body of evidence that
reveal Iraq's intent to destroy the Kurdish identity is more than a policy to stamp
out and repress political opposition. It is a policy whose ultimate goal is the elimina-
tion of four million Kurds and all things Kurdish from Iraq.
The crimes committed by the Iraqi regime to eliminate political opposition: the
use of chemical weapons; the imprisonment, torture, and execution of suspected op-
ponents of the Iraqi regime and their relatives including infants and children, the
assassinations and attempted assassinations of dissidents and Kurdish leaders out-
side Iraq are in themselves enough to justify the condemnation and boycott of Iraq
both economically and militarily by the rest of the world community. But the
slower, more insidious forms of Iraq's genocide against the Kurds, the policies
against its own Kurdish citizens who are supposedly protected as citizens under the
Iraqi constitution, are crimes as heinous and abhorrent as its more flagrant abuses
of human rights. Among these are:
1. Four thousand Kurdish villages and towns have been destroyed and level led.
There are no villages left. A militarized' zone 20 to 30 kilometers wide has been es-
tablished along Iraq's borders with Turkey and Iran in Kurdish areas only. Any-
thing seen moving in this area is shot on the spot. Some estates place the number of
Kurdish villagers deprived of their homes, land, livestock, property, and livelihood
at the very least one half million.
2. Displaced Kurdish villagers have been forced to live in camps located near
larger population centers: Erbil, Sulaimaniya, and Dihoak. Others were dispersed to
the southern desert, others to unknown locations. All camps are located next to
heavily armed Iraqi army garrisons. The camp inhabitants are at the mercy of the
Iraqi government to provide them with food. There is no means of economic support
for them. Some of the camps have no water. Wells dug there were dry.
3. Dislocated Kurds are prohibited from visiting their village of origin. For exam-
ple, Kurds from Sinjar cannot go to Sinjar.
4. Kurds are prohibited from buying land in areas targeted for Arabization, like
Xirkuk, Sinjar, Khanakeen, Sheikhan, Tuzkhurmatoo, and Kifri.
5. Any Iraqi Arab man who marries a Kurdish woman is paid 500 dinars (official-
ly $1,500) by the Iraqi government.
6. The Kurdish land has been damaged environmentally. There is a massive
project to divert water from the Kurdish area. Natural springs in the Kurdish area
have been plugged by cement. Trees have been cut and the roots poisoned so that
they will not grow back.
7. Kurdish students are not admitted to military or police academies, nor to the
College of Education unless they are members of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist party.
* All eacher. must become members of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist party to keep
their job.
The Iraqi government's intrusion into every aspect of every citizen's daily life is
beyond the comprehension of persons who have grown up and live in a free society.
They have even sent Iraqi agents into the refugee camps to intimidate the Iraqi
Kurds in Turkey. They succeeded in poisoning the bread given to the refugees. Two
thousand persons fell ill. Kurdish refugees who accepted Iraq's offer of amnesty and
returned to Iraq have never been heard from again. As Kurds, we are grateful to
those who at last are telling the alarming story that needs to be told about Iraq.
But for the 150,000 Kurds still in refugee camps in Turkey and Iran, words are
not enough. For the four million Kurds inside Iraq today, words are not enough.
Their very lives, their culture, their heritage, their identity, their future, and the
future of their children is in jeopardy.


79
shift in power in the Middle East, and I believe it will be a clear
and present threat to world peace.
So, I think that it is—I cannot imagine a thing more important
than preventing Iraq from succeeding in this import effort. The
fact is that the United States over the last few years has exported
to Iraq technology that Iraq is now using to make ballistic missiles.
Senator Moynihan. Do we have some specifics on that?
Mr. MILHOLLIN. I was hoping you would ask that question, Sena-
tor. Yes. The Commerce Department approved the export of high-
speed oscilloscopes to Iraq. These machines are on the nuclear re-
ferral list, which means that they can used in the production of nu-
clear weapons. These machines also are used to develop and test
and maintain the guidance systems of long-range ballistic missiles.
These were sent to Iraq, I understand, by the Commerce Depart-
ment over the last few years.
into: Moynihan. The Commerce Department agreed that they
COUICI.--
Mr. MILHOLLIN. Agreed that they could be exported to Iraq.
Senator Moynihan. All right. Let us have the staff get right on
to that. All right, Peter? Let us learn of that. I mean, that is a spe-
cific, and we will pursue that.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. I also have the impression that the Commerce
Department and the State Department are now considering the
export of other similar items on the nuclear referral list to Iraq
and that the Government is divided over whether these should be
approved.
I recommend to the committee that the committee inform the
Commerce Department that it opposes any further export of sensi-
tive technology to Iraq until further notice. It seems to me that
that is the least we could do to translate into action our feelings
about what Iraq is doing.
Senator Moynihan. Yes, very clearly. COCOM-that is an inter-
national organization.
Mr. MILHollin. All right. Let us go to the COCOM question. Iraq
tried to smuggle a thing called krytrons out of the—
Senator Moynihan. Yes.
Mr. MILHoLLIN [continuing]. Out of the United States. I have a
list of the items that were deleted in the last week from the
COCOM list. Item 1542 covers krytrons. It was deleted from the
COCOM list last week.
Senator Moynihan. COCOM, that is the Coordinating Committee
on Multilateral Export Controls to Communist Countries?
Mr. MILHollin. Yes.
Senator Moynihan. That is a Cold War structure.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. That is right.
Senator Moynihan. The Cold War is kind of coming apart now.
Why would those have been deleted?
Mr. MILHoLLIN. They have been deleted because of the desire to
free the transfer of technology to the newly free countries in East-
ern Europe.
Senator Moynihan. Exactly. So, it is a Cold War structure.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. Yes.
Senator Moynihan. That does not respond to the kinds of situa-
tions we are dealing with here.


82
At present, Iraq has no means of making nuclear weapon material. Its forty
megawatt, French-supplied nuclear reactor called Osirak is not operating. The reac-
tor is still suffering the consequences of having been bombed by Israel with U.S.
planes in 1981. If the reactor is rebuilt, it could make enough plutonium for up to
two atomic bombs per year. There has been one report that the reactor may be
about to start, but the International Atomic Energy Agency states that the reactor's
fuel has not been taken out of storage.
Iraq is also trying to make enriched uranium—the other nuclear weapon materi-
al. It hopes to build gas centrifuges that will enrich natural uranium to nuclear
weapon grade. To do so, it has imported machines from Germany for making centri-
fuge bodies and, according to press reports, special magnets from China that will
help º centrifuges operate. It is unknown how far Iraq's centrifuge effort has pro-
gressed.
To make parts for the bomb itself, Iraq tried to smuggle the components for a
nuclear weapon triggering system out of the United States in March. The nature of
the components, and the fact that Iraq tried to smuggle them, show that they were
not intended for peaceful purposes.
Iraq also has an ambitious program for making long-range missiles. It has modi-
fied a Soviet-supplied tactical missile to increase its range to about 400 miles, it has
tested a longer range version of that missile that flies 560 miles, and it has cooperat-
ed with Egypt and Argentina to develop a two-stage, solid fuelled intermediate-
range missile. In December 1989, Iraq surprised the world by testing the first stage
of a satellite launcher made from five Soviet-style tactical rockets strapped together.
During the same month, Iraq claimed that it had tested a ballistic missile with a
range of over 1000 miles.
I have appended to my statement tables showing the current status of Iraq's nu-
clear and missile programs.
It is clear that Iraq has fielded a well-financed, world wide procurement network
that will test export controls to their limit. Unfortunately, the Western countries
are weakening their export controls at exactly the same time that this is going on.
Last week, the COCOM countries met in Paris to remove thirty items from the
COCOM export control list. COCOM (the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral
Export Controls to Communist Countries) was set up by the United States and its
allies after World War II. COCOM was invented to stop the Soviet Union from get-
ting the American technology going to Europe under the Marshall Plan. Since then,
COCOM has expanded to include Japan and all the NATO countries except Iceland.
It prohibits high technology exports to the Warsaw Pact and other Communist coun-
tries.
Among the items decontrolled last week were the very nuclear weapon triggers
that Iraq tried to smuggle out of the United States in March. Also decontrolled were
the very machines that Iraq is counting on to make the bodies for its uranium en-
richment centrifuges—called spin-forming and flow-forming machines. Although the
COCOM countries intended to decontrol these items mainly to benefit the newly-
#. countries of Eastern Europe, the effect will probably be to decontrol them for
raq too.
This is true for several reasons. First, by dropping these items from the COCOM
list, they will, in the normal course of events, be removed from any licensing control
at all for buyers in Eastern Europe. From any COCOM country they can go to
Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia like a bag of onions. There will be no record of
the shipments. Hence, there will be no control on reexport from East Europe to
other destinations. This means that Iraq can order U.S. bomb triggers through front
companies in Eastern Europe without breaking any laws. So can India, Israel, Paki-
stan, South Africa and any other country that wants to make the bomb or long
range missiles.
Second, these items will fall completely off the export control lists of the Europe-
an members of NATO unless each country makes a special effort to keep them on.
Unlike the United States, where the commodities dropped off the COCOM list will
still be controlled because of the U.S. policy against nuclear arms proliferation, the
COCOM list is the only basis for export control in most European members of
NATO. There is no separate control list for stopping nuclear arms proliferation or
the spread of ballistic missiles. If an item falls off the COCOM list it drops complete-
ly out of these countries' export control systems. So far, there is not much evidence
that our COCOM partners will make a special effort to control these items for nu-
clear or missile proliferation purposes. If they don't, our partners' companies will be
able to export the decontrolled items to the Third World directly.
Third, even if there were some form of control over these items when exported to
Eastern Europe, there would still be a great risks of diversion. These cash-starved


83
and capital-poor regimes do not have functioning export control systems. There will
be a great risk that their companies will break the conditions of sale even if condi-
tions are imposed.
The thirty items taken off in June are just the beginning. By the end of 1990 the
entire COCOM export list will be scrapped and a much shorter one substituted.
Unless something happens to change things, the deletions will be a giant import bo-
nanza for Third World bomb and missile makers.
Unfortunately, the United States itself is not entirely free of guilt when it comes
to exporting to Iraq. During the past few years, the Commerce Department has ap-
proved the export of mainframe computers and high speed oscilloscopes to Iraq.
High speed oscilloscopes are uniquely able to process the data from nuclear tests.
They are also used to develop, test and maintain missile guidance systems and to
receive and sort the telemetry from missile flight tests. It is virtually certain that
the U.S. oscilloscopes are now helping Iraq develop ballistic missiles. It is very likely
that the mainframe computers are helping too.
These exports were quietly approved in the days when Iraq was fighting Iran.
This short-sighted decision was only possible because the U.S. export control process
is secret. The Commerce Department, which makes the export decisions, and the
Department of Energy, which keeps the records, refuse to tell the public what cases
have been approved or even considered. Not even the export license, which is the
official record of a government action, is available despite the fact that all of these
exports are required to be for civilian purposes. I believe that if the Commerce De-
partment's export control process were opened to public and Congressional scrutiny,
dangerous exports like the oscilloscopes would not be approved.
There are other examples of U.S. confusion on exports to Iraq. In March 1990, the
Commerce Department announced a list of commodities that would be controlled to
inhibit missile proliferation. The list was intended to implement the Missile Tech-
nology Control Regime, a seven country accord to which the United States is a
party. Two of the commodities added to the U.S. list in March, however, were delet-
ed from the COCOM list in June. This means that a U.S. exporter will not be able
to send the commodities to Iraq without a validated license, but could send them
almost anywhere in Europe without such a license. Thus, an Iraqi buyer could
obtain the U.S. items simply by ordering through a European front company. The
United States seems to be controlling the same commodities with one hand that it is
trying to decontrol with the other.
The United States has also been too timid in its reaction to Iraqi smuggling. Iraq
tried to buy the same switches in March that Israel obtained in 1980 and Pakistan
tried to obtain in 1983. Iraq's chance of success in such a clumsy operation was
probably less than ten percent. It is clear that the risk of getting caught was not a
deterrent. If the United States is going to stop such brazen actions, it must do more
i. .." the small fry that get caught. It must act against the governments that
ire them.
This does not appear likely under the current policy of the State Department. Ac-
cording to the Los Angeles Times, the State Department opposed the sting operation
against Iraq in March. State said that it preferred to “work quietly with Iraq to
discourage Iraq from trying to produce nuclear weapons without creating a public
furor * * *” According to the Washington Post, a State Department official even
said that, “Our approach has been to try to find common areas to engage Iraq so
that the more antisocial aspects of its nature could be modified in time by drawing
it into international activities.”
It is time to recognize that the spread of weapons of mass destruction to countries
such as Iraq threatens U.S. security at least as much—and possibly more—than
technology transfers to what remains of the Warsaw Pact. The East-West arms race
is being replaced by a North-South arms race. We must now change our export
policy to accommodate this fact.
Iraq: Status of Nuclear Reactors in 1990
Plutonium
Research reactors Type of capacity Start-up date generatºrough Safeguards
IRT-5000 Pool; 5-10MWt 1967 l.…. Yes
Osirak (Tammuz I) Pool; 40 MWt: Destroyed in 1981 |...................................... Yes
HEU fuel air strike
Tammux II (critical assem- || Pool; 500–800 1987 l...................................... Yes
bly) KWt


84
Iraq: Missiles in Service in 1990
Name
Range (miles)
Payload (pounds)
Accuracy (CEP
in yards)
Comments
FROG-7
SS-1 Scud-B
Al-Husayn (modified-Scud
B)
40
170–190
380–400
1000
1900–2200
300–860
550–750
975–1000
1760–3520
Single stage, solid-fueled,
unguided, spin-stabi-
lized, with mobile
launch platform. Import-
ed from the Soviet
Union.
Single stage,
liquid-fueled, inertially
guided, with mobile
launch platform. Import-
ed from the Soviet
Union.
Single stage,
liquid-fueled,
guided, with mobile
launch platform. Iraqi
modification of Soviet
Scud.
storable
storable
inertially
Iraq: Missiles Under Development in 1990
Name
Range (miles)
Payload (pounds)
Accuracy (CEP
in yards)
Comments
Al-Abbas
B)
(modified-Scud
Condor II
Tammouz I
560
500–600
1250
250+
1000
N/A
3520–5280
N/A
N/A
storable
inertially
Single stage,
liquid-fueled,
guided, with mobile
launch platform. Iraqi
modification of Soviet
Scud. Status: flight-
tested.
Two stage, solid-fueled, in-
ertially guided, with
mobile launch platform.
Original development
undertaken as a joint
effort by Egypt, Argenti-
na and Iraq. Egypt and
Argentina subsequently
dropped out. Status:
rocket engines tested.
Status: Iraq claims to have
tested: reported uncon-
firmed by third party
Sources.
Senator Moynihan. That is a very powerful statement. You are
part of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Would it
be possible to ask if you could give the committee a brief to this
point about a violation of the nonproliferation treaty?
Mr. MILHOLLIN. I can supply you with additional materials in
support of the statement I have just made, or I could cover it quick-
ly orally.
Senator Moynihan. Go right ahead. Do that, or do both.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. At the time the treaty was put together, it was
generally agreed that making bomb parts would be a violation of
the treaty, and it was also provided in the treaty that a country
such as Iraq, a nonnuclear weapons state, would not seek assist-
ance from outside in order to make the bomb. It seems to me that
to attempt to smuggle parts for the bomb out of another country is
to seek assistance, and does violate the treaty.





A PP E N D IX
RESPONSEs of MR. KELLY AND MR. GILDER To QUESTIONs AskED BY SENATOR PELL
HUMAN RIGHTS
Question. Has the administration made a determination whether Iraq's conduct
constitutes “A consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights.” If not, how can the administration enforce the laws imposing sanc-
tions on countries that meet this standard?
Answer. The United States has described Iraq's appalling human rights record in
detail in our annual human rights report. We have been objective, we believe accu-
rate, and we have pulled no punches. This question, however, uses a specific legal
formulation that has implications affecting at least eight statutes relating to prohi-
bitions of assistance and other forms of cooperation with foreign countries. We in
the Department are keenly aware of these statutes. Although The President has
never made a formal finding that any country is guilty of “gross violations,” we are
extremely careful never to engage in actions that could contravene these statutes.
In the case of Iraq we also note that country's role in the sensitive Middle East
region. We believe it important to preserve the Executive's flexibility in responding
to events in the region which would have significant and long-term impact on our
overall interests in the region.
Question. In your opinion, what countries in the last two decades have engaged in
“a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights?” How does Iraq's human rights record compare to that of the countries you
cite? (For example, how many killings of its own citizens has the Iraqi Government
engaged in as compared to that of other countries?)
Answer. As I have explained above the United States has never made a formal
finding that a country is guilty of “gross violations.” Clearly, Iraq's human rights
record is extremely poor. In our annual human rights report, we have described
Iraq's appalling human rights record in detail, describing that record as abysmal.
The United States is fully aware of this situation and as a result human rights is
one of our highest priorities in dealing with the Iraqi Government.
Because of the closed and secretive nature of the Iraqi's regime, compiling accu-
rate information on the overall number of killings due to extrajudicial executions,
execution without due process, the use of torture and other government violence is
extremely difficult.
Question. The Iraqi Government asserts that it is undertaking reforms to bring
about political pluralism and respect for fundamental human rights. What is your
assessment of these reforms? Do you see any actual improvement in Iraq's human
rights record?
Answer. Iraq is engaged in drafting a new constitution which Iraqi authorities
have said will liberalize Iraq's political system and contain other guarantees protect-
ing human rights. We have not yet seen a draft of this document and, therefore,
have no firsthand assessment of it. However, we note that the present constitution
provides guarantees against torture and other violations, with no apparent effect on
practice. The key is for the Government of Iraq to take specific actions to improve
its human rights record. This is what we are looking for, not merely words in a new
constitution.
THE KURDS
Question. What is your estimate of the total number of Iraqi Kurds to die in
chemical weapons attacks carried out by the Iraqi military?
Answer. There are no reliable figures with which to answer this question. Rebel
Kurdish sources put the figure at between 5,000 and 10,000.
Question. What specifically has the administration done to protest the treatment
of the Iraqi Kurds?
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90
Answer. The administration has repeatedly raised directly and at a senior level
with the Iraqi Government our concerns regarding Iraqi Kurdish citizens. You will
recall that the United States was in the forefront of those who publicly and private-
ly criticized Iraq's use of chemical weapons against its Kurdish citizens. We have
also expressed our concerns about the forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of
Iraqi Kurds from the border regions to settlements in the interior. Our overall effort
is to promote greater respect for the human rights of all Iraqi citizens, which will
directly affect the lot of the Kurdish minority. -
Question. The Iraqi Kurds find themselves isolated from the outside world. Would
Voice of America broadcasts in Kurdish help alleviate that isolation?
Answer. VOA broadcasts would have only a marginal effect, especially in relation
to the resources they would consume. Iraqi Kurds speak two distinct dialects (Kur-
manche and Sorani) which are not easily mutually intelligible; VOA could probably
not broadcast to both groups. VOA and BBC broadcast to the region in Arabic and
Turkish, which many Iraqi Kurds understand.
Question. What information do you have about the torture and execution of Kurd-
ish children?
Answer. Amnesty International has issued reports on the subject based on
charges by rebel groups, and has published a report stating that the Iraqi Govern-
ment has confirmed the execution of 29 Kurdish youths. Amnesty alleged that the
bodies of these youths bore the marks of torture. Independent information to con-
firm the allegations cited in AI reports is not available.
Question. Does Iraq's treatment of the Kurds constitute “a consistent pattern of
gross violations” of their human rights?
Answer. The answer we have provided to the first question addresses the “con-
sistent pattern” issue.
The Iraqi Government has used a carrot-and-stick approach to the Kurds seeking
to gain the support of as many tribes as possible.
During the war with Iran the Iraqi Government began a campaign of destroying
villages of Kurds suspected of siding with Iran, and relocating their inhabitants to
closely watched cities and new settlements. After the cease-fire with Iran, Iraq's
campaign to dislodge rebels from the areas they controlled was accompanied by the
shocking, indiscriminate use of chemical weapons killing thousands of men, women
and children. After these campaigns, destruction of villages and towns and the pop-
ulation transfers were speeded up until finally some 500,000—about one-seventh of
the Kurdish population—were displaced. Although we understand Iraqi authorities
are now allowing displaced villagers to commute to their lands to cultivate the
fields and orchards, we remain extremely concerned about the overall effects of this
massive displacement.
Question. What is the extent to which the government of Iraq has depopulated the
rural areas of Iraqi Kurdistan? In your judgment, does the depopulation of Iraqi
Kurdistan constitute a human rights violation?
Answer. Since 1987, the government of Iraq has acted to establish a depopulated
security zone along the full length of Iraq's borders with Iran and Turkey. The gov-
ernment has destroyed villages within a 30-kilometer wide zone and relocated about
500,000 Kurdish and Assyrian inhabitants into more easily controlled and protected
towns, cities and newly constructed settlements within traditionally Kurdish areas.
This program of forced relocation violates the human rights of those affected and is
a matter of great concern, particularly against the background of Iraq's abysmal
overall human rights record.
EFFECT OF PELL-HELMS SANCTIONS BILL
Question. What impact did threatened U.S. sanctions legislation (the 1988 Pell/
Helms bill) have on Iraq's treatment of its Kurdish population? Do you believe the
1988 Pell/Helms sanctions bill, which passed the Senate three times, had an impact
on Iraq's thinking about the use of chemical weapons as a counterinsurgency tool?
If so, how?
Answer. We have no evidence that Iraq was influenced by the Pell/Helms sanc-
tions bill. Lacking direct information, we have no good means of accurately assess-
ing Iraqi thinking on such U.S. legislation.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE
Question. How extensively did Iraq use chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war?
Did Iraq initiate the use of chemical weapons in that war? Did Iraq's use of chemi-
cal weapons put it in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol?


91
Answer. Iraq first used chemical weapons in 1983, before Iran had acquired chem-
ical weapons. In the late stages of the war we believe Iraq used chemical weapons
extensively, Iran less so. Iraq's first use of chemical weapons would indicate that it
violated its commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
RIGHT OF RETALIATION
Question. Does the United States recognize a right under international law to use
chemical weapons in retaliation for such use? Was Iran's use of chemical weapons
permissible retaliatory use? If not, why not?
Answer. Under a reservation the United States has taken to the 1925 Geneva
Protocol, the United States has, in effect, reserved the right to respond in kind to
any use of chemical weapons by an enemy state. Iraq has a similar reservation.
Iran has not taken such a reservation but would, in its relations with Iraq, be
entitled under international law to claim the same right of retaliation as Iraq has
reserved. As far as we are aware, however, Iran has not invoked this reservation
with respect to its use of chemical weapons.
ACTIONS TO DETER CW USE
Question. What concrete actions did the United States take to deter Iraq from
using chemical weapons or to punish Iraq for the use of such weapons?
Answer. The United States and 18 like-minded industrialized countries estab-
lished the Australia group to attempt to prevent Iraq and other proliferating coun-
tries from obtaining the materials they needed to manufacture chemical weapons.
We were also active in the U.N. in condemning Iraq's use of CW and in calling for
an end to such use. In 1988 we obtained from the Iraqis a pledge to comply with
their commitment to the nonuse of chemical weapons under the 1925 Geneva Proto-
col. Finally, we strongly supported and were instrumental in achieving the declara-
tion from the Paris conference last year in which 149 countries, including Iraq, reaf-
firmed their commitment not to use chemical weapons and to work quickly toward
a global ban on chemical weapons.
IRAQ CHEMICAL WEAPONS THREAT TO ISRAEL
Question. Do you consider that Iraq has threatened Israel with destruction by
chemical weapons? How should Israel and the United States respond to such a
threat?
Answer. In an April 1 speech to a group of military officers Iraqi President
Saddam threatened to “burn up half of Israel” in retaliation for an attack on Iraq.
He also claimed that Iraq had “dual chemical” weapons. Saddam later clarified, in a
meeting with a delegation led by Senator Dole, that he would retaliate for any Is-
raeli attack but would only use chemical weapons in response to an Israeli nuclear
attack on Iraq. Addressing the Arab League summit May 28, he said he would re-
spond to an Israeli attack with “weapons of mass destruction” with Iraq's own
“weapons of mass destruction.”
The United States has condemned these statements as outrageous and irresponsi-
ble. Rather than boasting about chemical weapons, Iraq should work with other na-
tions to find ways to get rid of them.
We cannot speak for Israel. However, the United States has joined with other con-
cerned nations in the Australia Group to deny Iraq and other potential proliferators
access to chemical weapons precursors. We have also urged Iraq to live up to its
responsibilities under the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
ISRAEL
Question. Has Iraq adopted a more hard-line approach toward Israel since the end
of the Iran-Iraq war? Does this suggest that previous Iraqi policy was based on expe-
diency'.
Answer. Since the end of the war Iraq has made irresponsible and inflammatory
statements vowing retaliation, including with chemical weapons, if Israel attacks
with nuclear or chemical weapons.
Iraq's formal position on the Middle East peace process has not changed: Iraq will
accept any solution acceptable to the Palestinians. It has sharpened its rhetoric,
however, particularly in response to the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration.
Iraq has used both of these issues to pursue its own ambitions and agenda within
the Arab world.


92
IRAQ AND KUWAIT
Question. What is the status of Iraq's dispute with Kuwait?
Answer. Iraq has in the past put forward historical claims on Kuwaiti territory.
This is reflected, inter alia, in the problem of an undemarcated border with Kuwait.
The Iraqi port of Basra was unusable during the war with Iran, and Iraq is interest-
ed in securing approaches to its port of Um Qasr, which abuts Kuwaiti territory.
On July 16 Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz sent a letter to the Secretary Gener-
al of the Arab League that listed other alleged Iraqi grievances against Kuwait and
the United Arab Emirates. The letter accused Kuwait of encroaching on Iraqi terri-
tory and oil fields and of seeking to undermine Iraq's economy.
The United States takes no position on the issues in dispute. However, we feel
strongly that they can only be resolved by peaceful dialog between the countries in-
volved in an atmosphere free of intimidation and inflamed rhetoric. We have made
our views known to both governments.
Our gulf policy is unchanged: We remain determined to ensure the free flow of oil
through the strait of Hormuz and to defend the principle of free navigation. We also
remain strongly committed to defend the individual and collective security of our
friends in the gulf with whom we have deep and longstanding ties.
IRAN-IRAQ PEACE TALKS
Question. What are the prospects for a peace settlement between Iran and Iraq”
Answer. The foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq had their first direct talks under
U.N. auspices in Geneva on July 3. We hope these discussions will lead to progress
ºard a lasting peace and the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution
598.
We continue to support the Secretary General's efforts to implement Resolution
598, which calls for the exchange of POW's, noninterference in the internal affairs
of each country, and withdrawal of forces to international boundaries. Iraq still oc-
cupies more than 2,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory.
We are especially concerned that over 100,000 POW's are still held on both sides
against the principles of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war.
LEBANON
Question. What is Iraq's involvement in Lebanon? Has Iraq's role been construc-
tive'
Answer. On balance, Iraq's role in Lebanon has not been constructive. Iraq ini-
tially refused to support the Taif agreement or recognize the Hrawi government.
Until September 1989 it provided Michel Aoun military supplies.
Iraq has now ceased its direct support of Aoun, and it has specifically recognized
the Taif agreement and the Hrawi government.
BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Question. In recent remarks, Saddam Hussein seemed to indicate that Iraq pos-
sessed the capability to produce binary chemical weapons. Do you believe Iraq has
that capability? If so, how was it acquired? If not, how do you explain his assertion
that Iraq possessed the “dual chemical,” which was believed to exist only in the
United States and the Soviet Union?
Answer. We believe Saddam Hussein's claim to possess binary technology or
weapons is credible. Given other Iraqi technical advances we believe Iraq probably
could manufacture a relatively simple binary device indigenously, with little or no
foreign assistance.
SIZE OF IRAQ's CW ARSENAL
Question. How large is Iraq's chemical arsenal, and what capabilities do we know
it to possess for delivering chemical weapons?
Answer. We do not have a good estimate on the current size of Iraq's CW stock-
pile. We believe that Iraq has the largest and most advanced CW program in the
Arab world with a stockpile in the thousands of tons. Iraq can deliver chemical
weapons using a wide variety of weapons systems, including artillery, multiple
rocket launchers, mortars, and air-delivered bombs.
CW WARHEAD FOR SCUD MISSILE
Question. Is it possible that Iraq can mount chemical warheads on its modified
SCUD missiles with a 400-mile range?


93
Answer. Although we have no evidence to confirm Iraq has developed a chemical
warhead for its SCUD or modified SCUD missiles, we judge Iraq's advances in other
areas of missile development indicate that it could probably develop a warhead of
this type.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Question. What is your opinion of reports that Iraq is engaging in a biological
weapons program?
Answer. Iraq is actively engaged in the development of BW, including botulinum
toxin and anthrax, and either has already achieved or may soon achieve full scale
production. There is some debate among technical experts over whether Iraq has
actually weaponized BW agents, but all agree that it is close to having an operation-
al BW capability.
IRAQI SUPERCANNON
Question. What is the status of the case in Iraq attempted to secure eight forged
steel tubes in order to construct a 131-foot cannon?
Answer. The British Government has stated that the tubes seized by British cus-
toms are components of a large cannon, based on designs for a long-range gun by
Gerald Bull, a ballistics expert who was murdered in Brussels in March 1990. The
matter is now in the courts in both Britain and the United States.
CAPACITOR SMUGGLING CASE
Question. In your view, does the recent case in which Iraq attempted to secure
krytons (high voltage nuclear triggers) violate Iraq's commitments as a charter
member of the NPT.
Answer. The switches are controlled military electrical components which could
conceivably be used in a variety of applications. These include nuclear applications,
such as in firing sets of nuclear devices, and nonnuclear applications, such as in the
separation of missile stages. Thus, although this procurement effort calls into ques-
tion Iraq's nuclear intentions, we have no evidence to indicate that this attempt is a
violation of Iraq's NPT commitment.
BNL INVESTIGATION AND CCC
Question. What is the status of the investigation of irregularities in Iraqi pur-
chases through the Banco Nazionale del Lavoro under loans guaranteed by the Com-
modity Credit Corporation?
Answer. The Department of Agriculture released a report May 21 on its review of
the Iraq CCC program. I refer you to USDA for a detailed explanation of the report.
Briefly, it concluded that the high prices paid by Iraq for corn, rice, and sugar from
1985 to 1987 reflected market conditions, and there was no evidence to suggest that
commodities sold to Iraq had been diverted.
The report suggested that certain exporters improperly included freight charges
in amounts registered with and guaranteed by USDA. In addition, it concluded that
a number of exporters provided Iraq with “after sales services,” which, if unreport-
ed at the time the guarantees were obtained, would violate GSM regulations. These
possible violations have been turned over to the USDA Inspector General for
reW1eW.
The BNL case is the subject of a grand jury investigation in Atlanta, and I there-
fore cannot comment on any aspect of it.
IRAQ–POISON GAS
Question. German machinery produced the poison gas which was used against the
Kurds. Under the precedent of the Nuremberg trials, could the German business-
men who sold poison gas equipment to Iraq be charged with war crimes or crimes
against humanity?
Answer. No. The Nuremberg trials involved crimes committed as part of the Nazi
war effort in the Second World War. Use of poison gas by Iraq against its own popu-
lation occurred during an internal military action that would not fall under the law
of international armed conflict. Moreover, the Nuremberg trials were conducted in
an international penal tribunal specially established following the war. There is
presently no such international penal tribunal under which international crimes
may be tried.
Criminal prosecution of persons who may have sold poison gas equipment to Iraq
would depend upon applicable domestic laws.
O