5 ed Nations sanctions. They are not causing any difficulty for the international community. And they are freely elected by the Kurd- ish people. None of those things which has given impetus to the sanctions against Iraq exist with regard to the Kurdish people. These people are victims of Saddam Hussein. They have lost ar- guably a quarter of a million people to genocide. Maintaining the sanctions simply serves no objective. LIFTING OF SANCTIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ Mr. HAMILTON. Let me ask you this. What would be the reaction in Turkey if the sanctions were lifted on the northern part? Mr. TORRICELLI. If the sanctions were lifted, and it were not made clear that this is not part and parcel to policy to give inde- pendence to the Kurdish area, making clear that we respect the territorial integrity and are not seeking an independent Kurdish nation, it should cause no complications. The Turks are, of course, concerned about both the independent efforts of the Kurds, which we do not support and they oppose, but they are also gravely concerned about Kurdish refugees fleeing into Turkey and giving rise to this independent effort. Every day that we maintain this embargo and cause economic suffering to the Kurds, we are both politically radicalizing the Kurds and increasing the flow of refugees into Turkey which con- tradicts Turkish policy. Therefore, in lifting, the embargo for the Kurdish area, it is a question of the tone of how we do it, making clear why we are doing it, that it is done in concert with Turkish objectives and international objectives and it is not contradicting them. Mr. HAMILTON. When you say radicalize, the risk is radicalization of the Kurdish leadership. What do you mean by that? Mr. TORRICELLI. Because there are competing Kurdish leaders. There are those who seek a Kurdish state which includes both cur- rent Iraqi and Turkish territory and those that simply want to safeguard the Kurdish people within the Iraqi state, gaining some limited autonomy within that federated state. American policy, international policy has been to support the lat- ter, not the former, independence effort. That is obviously critical to Turkey. I believe that lifting the embargo on the Kurdish people is important to achieve and that effort does not contradict it. GAO REPORT ON U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE KURDS Mr. HAMILTON. I just want to say for the record that the sub- committee has requested a GAO report on the U.S. assistance pro- gram. We requested it last year. The program of assistance to the Kurds. We expect that report any day now. When we get it, I want you to take a careful look at it, if you would, and you and I then should consult with respect to what steps we ought to take. Thank you very much for your testimony. Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, if I might. In closing I want you to know that, having raised this issue now at almost every level of the U.S. Government, I have yet to have a senior official who argues with the premise or the recommendation. This is simply a problem that just is not getting resolved 8 on that. Long term monitoring with this regime in power is an illu- sion. One cannot assume either that while we wait,we want to keep sanctions on, Saddam has to go, it is going to take time—but we cannot assume that he is not going to do something in that period. For one thing, he would like to kill his opponents, the opposition leadership. One well-placed car bomb at some meeting in Iraqi Kurdistan could finish off the INC leadership and the Kurdish leadership and put Saddam in a much better position and he really would like to do that right now. Then there is Saddam's attitude toward us, America. I know it may be hard to understand but he wants revenge for what we did to him. He tried to kill President Bush. And I would like to introduce something. The World Trade Cen- ter bombing—what about the World Trade Center bombing? I will be very brief but it is something that I think people should pay some attention to. There are two individuals in the world with rewards, $2 million, on their heads for acts they committed in the United States. Those people have those $2 million rewards on their heads for the World Trade Center bombings. They are fugitive suspects, they are in- dicted. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, $2 million. Abdul Rahman Yasin, $2 million. [Wanted posters appear in the appendix.] These people are, wonders of wonders, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, they are Iraqi passport holders. Iraqi passport number M0372369. Abdul Rahman Yasin, Iraqi passport number M0887925. They played more important roles in the World Trade Center bombing than any of the suspects on trial. Their journeys to the United States began in Iraq. Abdul Rahman Yasin is in Baghdad right now. The FBI has talked to him there. Does this not signify anything to anyone? Is it not possible that Saddam Hussein might be behind the World Trade Center bombing? Is it not something we should look into? As far as I know, that has not happened. OK. If you would like to discuss this further, I am more than ready to do that. I think that is clear. Let me turn to discuss a few things that could be done to in- crease pressure on Baghdad so we are not in this slow wait for Saddam to fall. Demand the return of Abdul Rahman Yasin who is sitting in Baghdad. It will put the world on notice that we think that Sad- dam just may be a suspect in the bombing and we have a bigger quarrel with him than what happened during the Gulf War and it will take away the pressure of the calls to lift sanctions. Jordan is Iraq's chief source of foreign exchange. Cut off the Iraqi selling of oil to Jordan. It should be possible to get a country like the UAE or Qatar to supply oil to Jordan on the same terms that Iraq does. Moreover, that oil tanker trade is used to smuggle con- traband between Jordan to Iraq. Illegal things that Iraq is not sup- posed to have. Three, ease the application of sanctions to northern Iraq. 23 The United Arab Emirates or Qatar, we did save them in that war, and say we would be very grateful if you could supply your Arab brothers in Jordan oil on the same terms that Iraq does in exchange for which the Iraqi trade will be cutoff all together, which is also in the interests of the UAE. I do not really understand why some kind of vigorous diplomacy cannot achieve that end. It is terribly important to do. Mr. GILMAN. Jordan has no access to oil other than Iraq today? Mr. BARAM. Not to any major source. Jordan is getting all its needs, 95, 97 percent of its needs, from Iraq, 30,000 barrels a day crude and 25,000 barrels a day-roughly-oil derivatives. And at first it was legitimate in the sense that the U.N. recognized that Iraq owed Jordan about $800 million and they wanted to help Iraq repay the debt and yet it does not give Iraq any cash. Iraq did that but for the last 18 months or so Iraq has been sell- ing oil to Jordan, giving oil to Jordan free of charge. Now, there are two interpretations. I believe that Laurie is right. It seems to me as far as I know that Jordan is actually using that oil in order to buy commodities in the West and give it to Iraq free of charge. So it is like a barter trade. But there are some people who believe that, no, this is just a present. Saddam Hussein is giving King Hussein a present and he is getting nothing in exchange for the last 18 months. This.is not very much like Saddam Hussein. I find it difficult to believe. Mr. GILMAN. So this is an open valve, really, for Iraq to maintain their sales of oil despite all the sanctions, despite whatever we are saying Mr. FULLER. I think it is important to recognize that Jordan is in this case not pro-Saddam Hussein and seeking to prop him up but simply has very little other options, as Laurie mentioned, in terms of the oil, receiving its oil. Its economy is in very bad shape after the Palestinians were expelled from the Persian Gulf during the last war. Remittances from workers all over that region have been drastically reduced. The Saudi assistance to Jordan in that area was cutoff because the Saudis did not like King Hussein's po- sition. They are not pro-Iraqi and indeed King Hussein has publicly called for Saddam Hussein to step down. But they are desperate and they are deeply dependent. I think as Laurie suggested, only by replacing that dependence with some other form can we really get Jordan to comply. Mr. GILMAN. How does Jordan react to the sanctions? Have they asked that the sanctions be continued or that they be lifted? Mr. BARAM. On Iraq? Mr. GILMAN. Yes. Mr. BARAM. Well, Jordanian cabinet ministers have visited, a couple of them, Baghdad recently and they demanded the imme- diate lifting of the embargo. The Jordanian press is pressing con- tinuously for the lifting the embargo. However, the king and his brother have not said a word about it. I tend to believe that Jordan will be glad to get a replacement from Saudi Arabia or whatever Gulf state and be off the hook of this dependence on Saddam Hussein. But we have to recognize that in the Jordanian public opinion there is a lot of support for Saddam still. We have to recognize that, too. 32 the other sanctions and you will have a breakdown of the sanction regime. The second argument they make is it undermines the territorial integrity of Iraq and the third argument they make is that Turkey would oppose it and probably you would jeopardize the operation and provide comfort there. Now, I know those arguments are familiar to you. You have weighed them. I just want to make sure you have said all that you want to say on the record with regard to those arguments. Mr. FULLER. I would suggest, sir, the first argument, namely, the breakdown of sanctions would loosen the general sanctions regime against Iraq as a whole in the practice of other nations. Those are, first of all, being violated. Iraq is managing to skirt- Mr. HAMILTON. It is already breaking down? Mr. FULLER. Yes. I mean, with the trade across from Iran, ille- gally across from Turkey, from Jordan, there is a great deal of it going on. So I do not see that it would get much worse and I think it would immensely profit the Kurdish region dramatically and im- mediately in a way that would be—whereas its impact on Iraq's overall ability to survive sanctions I think would be an insignifi- cant addition. Secondly, on the breakup of Iraq, as all of us have said, Saddam is breaking up Iraq. The longer this situation goes on, the longer the Kurds are autonomous and other elements, maybe even seek independence, the longer there is this separatism within Iraq, the worse it is going to be for the future. So I do not see that this is leading to the breakup at all. And lastly the Turkish position is rather ambivalent. The Turks are desperately uncomfortable with the idea of this autonomous Kurdish region because it does affect their own Kurds but the Turks also know they have never had it so good. The regime in northern Iraq today, the Kurdish authorities, are cooperating more precisely and more carefully than any other force in Iraq has ever done in modern history. Saddam used to turn that border on and off against Turkey whenever he felt like it. The present Kurdish government there now is desperately determined to keep Ankara happy in almost any respect because they know their own future depends on it totally. So I would not use that to typify the Turkish position. Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Mr. BARAM. About affecting the sanctions against Iraq, I agree 100 percent with Mr. Fuller. Everything now is getting to Iraq through Iran and Turkey and Jordan except for main weapon sys- tems. And I do not believe that the Kurds would be getting main weapon systems and thus I do not see how they can send it over to Saddam As to territorial integrity, I would put it in a very different way. As long as the Kurds- Mr. HAMILTON. Wait a minute. I want to go back there. Every- thing is already getting through? Mr. BARAM. More or less. Mr. HAMILTON. So the practical impact of lifting the sanctions is to let weapons go in, is that correct?