6
planation for why our relations with our coalition partners appear
to have deteriorated this much?
Mr. BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I raised that question, as you know,
in my statement just now, and I do not know the answer. I also
said that when the President was asked the question at his press
briefing following the first Tomahawk missile strikes, he really did
not seem to me to have any real answer to that question.
I think it is a legitimate question. Did we try and keep the coali-
tion together? Did we consult sufficiently, or were we simply un-
able to persuade and convince? Or is it a case that our relationship
with coalition partners has deteriorated so much over the past few
years that we were not able to maintain the coalition? It is a very
appropriate question. I do not have the answer. I think the admin-
istration probably does.
Chairman THURMOND. Secretary Baker, in your statement you
say that you do not believe the U.S. attack last week was strong
enough, and that Saddam Hussein only understands overwhelming
military force. In your view, what §§ response would constitute
overwhelming military force?
Mr. BAKER. Well, in this instance, Mr. Chairman, as I indicated
in my statement, I think we at least should have considered or
looked at, and maybe we did and rejected, but I think it would
have been more appropriate if we had taken out some military tar-
gets around Baghdad. That would have sent a very clear signal to
the Iraqi people that the United States was not simply going to
stand by and let this kind of behavior continue, and I think per-
haps as well taken out some Republican Guard forces above the
36th parallel, where the violation of which we were complaining
took place.
That would have been a response, in my view, that would not
have necessarily been proportionate, and might well fall under the
classification of overwhelming force. As I said in my statement, it
is only that that I think he understands.
Chairman THURMOND. Secretary Baker, our unilateral actions in
attacking Saddam Hussein appear that we have de facto allied our-
selves with Iran. In light of the overall military situation in the
Persian Gulf with Iran and Syria, what do you believe would be the
most prudent long-term policy for the United States towards Iraq.”
Mr. BAKER. I think we must maintain the policy of containment
that we put in place after the end of Desert Storm, Mr. Chairman.
I think that the United Nations Security Council resolutions have
created a pretty good cage insofar as Iraqi misbehavior is con- .
cerned. We have seen, of course, that it does not mean that he will
be restrained completely, but I think this policy is one that should
be pursued, particularly as it relates to any threat from Iraq to the
south. As I said earlier, I think what we do from here on out in
the north should be the subject of some very serious study and con-
sideration.
It may be that we will have to rely on political and economic
sanctions to try and restrict misbehavior in the north. We went
into Nº. initially on humanitarian grounds, when Sad-
dam was butchering literally thousands of Kurds, pushing them
into the mountains where they were going to freeze to death. We
established Operation Provide Comfort and we saved, Mr. Chair-


10
Senator NUNN. Can you tell us why you think it is not verifiable
and never will be in terms complete assurance that we can verify
chemical weapons?
Mr. BAKER. That is a technical matter that I never really fully
understood, Senator Nunn, but I accepted it as Secretary of State.
The Secretary of Defense told me it was not verifiable, and I be-
lieved him. But that did not mean we should not have a chemical
weapons ban, and this is a good chemical weapons convention, in
my opinion, and the United States was in the lead in negotiating
it, and I think it ought to be ratified.
Senator NUNN. Thank you, Secretary Baker.
Chairman THURMOND. Senator Warner.
Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, I think it is very important that
we once again recognize the very significant achievements made by
President Bush and yourself at the time you formed the coalition
in 1990–1991 to combat the very aggression that we are once again
faced with today. I ask, Mr. Chairman, we place in the record fol-
lowing the Secretary's opening statement an article from today's
Washington Times which describes in some detail followup argu-
ments on that conflict.
Chairman THURMOND. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]


15
think there is any question but that it was the right thing to do.
The reasons I have assigned to you do not even get into the ques-
tion of the Lebanization of Iraq and what would fº happened in
terms of the Shi'ites in the south, the Kurds in the north, and the
fighting that might have occurred in the middle if we had just gone
up there to get him and then left.
Senator BRYAN. In your view, should our policy be one of contain-
ment or one of removal or both, and if the latter, what means
should be undertaken?
Mr. BAKER. I think it should be one of containment. I think we
should continue the policy approach that has been in effect since
1991, with a reexamination of that policy approach as it affects the
area in the north, in light of the fact that the Kurds have now had
a bloody war between themselves and aligned themselves, some
with Iraq and some with Iran. What we did in the north was moti-
vated, Senator Bryan, by humanitarian concerns, and as I indi-
cated earlier, we saved literally thousands of lives.
Senator BRYAN. There are some who look back and say that we
have in the past encouraged general uprising in the south and the
north. As you point out, we did come in after the fact to provide
some humanitarian aid, but we really did not do much to support
those efforts. So there are those who contend that we do not have
a whole lot of credibility in the region in terms of encouraging dis-
sident groups to, in effect, attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein.
What would your response be to that?
Mr. BAKER. I think that there is some merit to that argument,
Senator. I think that you have to, though, consider the fact that
our assets there are not all that unlimited. Without getting into
questions of intelligence and covert action and so forth, there are
only certain things that we can do.
Senator BRYAN. You have advocated a disproportionate response.
Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir.
Senator BRYAN. Could you be a little bit more specific? I mean,
there is no question we are going to do something, as you point out,
and we should. I think we are all in agreement on that. How far
do we go?
Mr. BAKER. Well, I suggest in my statement, Senator Bryan, that
we ought to at least consider military targets in and around Bagh-
dad, and Republican Guard units north .# the 36th parallel. Those
would, I think, send the clearest message to the Iraqi people and
to the Iraqi leadership that we really mean business and that we
are serious. As I said in my statement, I really think they only un-
derstand disproportionate force.
Senator BRYAN. You also made a comment with which I agree
that this fellow has an uncanny way of miscalculating in terms of
what we are going to do.
Mr. BAKER. Yes.
Senator BRYAN. Again, just hypothecating for a moment, assume
that we did that, that response. I must say I do not find any prob-
lem with it personally. I think you are right that we should be tak-
ing more forceful means. But what is the next step? Suppose that
we do that, and then a few days later he again paints our aircraft
with radar, SAM’s are fired at us, what is the follow-on? I think
we need to know what the end game is here, and you have had an


17
calation might be? So I find it extremely ironic that we are askin
you to calculate out what the options are and what the potentia
risks are.
I mention this because I was watching some of the networks this
morning, and comments coming from the White House were sug-
gesting this is no time for division on the part of Members of Con-
gress. Again, I was struck by the irony involved in all of that.
When I recall what you were trying to do during Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, the administration spent 6 months trying to build
congressional support for taking military action to try to throw
Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. Meeting after meeting we were
down there, arguing with you as a matter of fact, as to whether it
was the right thing to do, the wise thing to do, looking at the op-
tions. But the administration pursued that, working with Congress
to find out whether the President could generate support for very
trough military action that he wanted to take.
I recall that candidate Clinton at that time was not especially en-
thusiastic about lending his support as a candidate to the Presi-
dent's initiative. There was great division among Democrats as to
the wisdom of going forward militarily as opposed to using sanc-
tions. So I find it somewhat puzzling to me at this particular time
to say let us not have any division at a moment when we are not
sure exactly where we are going to proceed. I think it is entirely
appropriate for us to raise these †: of questions, because frankly
we have been kept totally in the dark. There has been no consulta-
tion, to my knowledge, not with any member of the key committees
on the Republican side. I do not know if there has been any con-
sultation with the big eight or the big four or anyone on this side.
So we are asked to silence our voices, to solidify ourselves behind
the administration and President, when in fact we have had no
consultation whatsoever, no request for our advice, no opportunity
to raise questions either privately or publicly about what the end
game is and what the options are.
So I mention that because I appeared, along with Senator
Lieberman, last week on a number of programs, and the question
was raised at that time, is President Clinton taking this action out
of political motivation. My response at that time was clearly no. It
was imperative that the President take military action. There was
time enough to question whether or not the action was sufficient,
but we could defer that. That was something that was debatable.
But nonetheless, he was not politically motivated. In fact, I sug:
gested at one time that Saddam Hussein may have made an illegal
campaign contribution to President Clinton by giving him an oppor-
tunity to strike at his forces at that time.
But I also want to say that political factors may in fact have
weighed in consideration of the nature and extent of the military
action that was taken, and I think that is open to question as to
whether or not the military might have had a different rec-
ommendation and political factors outweighed the military option.
Clearly—I am not one to be critical here—but clearly President.
Clinton is concerned about the political factors involved on the eve
of an election. The 90 days or less away he is well ahead in the
olls. He does not want to face a situation where we have blind-
olded Americans being paraded around as President Carter faced


21
of the air war in January of 1991. So I think it is a more com-
plicated situation.
We have had briefings from the administration. We have not had
the kind of consultation that is called for. I hope we do, and I hope
it can lead to even more unity and detail as we go forward here
because this clearly is not over.
Is there any action that you would recommend at this point to
try to bridge the difference in perception and interest of the diver:
sity of coalition partners that we had and still have, such as Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, and France? Is there anything particular you
would counsel that we do to try to bring them together at this point
on behalf of our stronger response that you called for? First, a
stronger response to what has happened, and then second, to make
sure they are with us if Saddam does move to the south.
Mr. BAKER. Senator, it would appear that we are going to make
a stronger response. It seems to me we have isié they are not
with us and we are going to go it with the UK and maybe Canada.
I think that that course has been set.
I think it is really important to get all of the coalition partners
to agree that the expansion of the no-fly zone in the south made
sense and to endorse that. That is one thing I think we should do
right away. We ought to get them all on the line and have everyone
of them stand up and say this was the right thing to do. This coun-
try represents a distinct and clear continuing threat to the Gulf re-
ion, and we are with you as you lead, America, we are with you
ike we were in 1991. That is the first thing I would do.
Senator LIEBERMAN. In other words, we may not have been with
you in the north, which was more complicated.
Mr. BAKER. May not have been what, sir?
Senator LIEBERMAN. We may not have been with you, the allies
might say, in the north, in the Kurdish situation, which was more
complicated, but let us be clear that we are going to be with you
in the south.
Mr. BAKER. I think that I would sure start working on them. I
would start working on them and make sure they were going to be
with us if we need to do º: in the sº where the more
important national interest is at stake.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Secretary. My time is up.
Chairman THURMOND. Senator Inhofe.
Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is an honor
to be here to hear your wisdom. I, only find one area of disagree-
ment, and that is in the chemical weapons convention, Mr. Sec-
retary. I would only suggest that there are a lot of people who are
very supportive early on, and time does change things. I am re-
minded a little bit of Kissinger's early support of the ABM, and
now he says, quote, it is nuts to make a virtue out of our vulner-
ability.
To kind of get a measure of the depth of your interest, or see,
first of all, if you agree or disagree, it is pretty well determined
that Russia has perhaps the largest supply of chemical weapons,
and you were there back during the bilateral destruction agree-
ment, which was not a treaty but an agreement. They have not
one forward with any types, or expressed any intention of destroy-
ing any of their chemical capability, and they have made the state-


23
Mr. BAKER. Senator, I share your concern, and I so state in arti-
cles and speeches all the time. I get the question could we do today
what we § in 1990 and 1991, and the answer in my opinion is
no, not in the time frame in which we did it, because we do not
have a call on the forces, particularly in Europe.
When I talk about disproportionate response, though, I am not
talking about putting troops on the ground. I am talking about
something else, as I indicated in my statement.
But to specifically answer your question, I think we have pulled
our forces down to the point that we could not repeat in the same
timeframe what we did in 1990 and 1991.
Senator INHOFE. In the time frame as well as in the exposure of
human life, which goes along with a greater activity on the ground.
Would that be accurate?
Mr. BAKER. Perhaps, on the latter point. I mean, I guess we
could put the same numbers in there ultimately, but it would mean
we would be pretty nude everywhere else.
Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman THURMOND. Senator Glenn.
Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a comment first on your last comment here on our size of
force. I could not agree with you more. I have argued on this com-
mittee that we are down too far. We put 540,000 over in the Gulf,
and the idea is you can put about a third of your force out, have
another force available to rotate through there, and another third
is in the Pentagon or plowing the runways in Omaha or something.
We could not #. that today, I do not §n. We could not repeat
a Gulf today. We are getting down too low in our personnel, so I
just wanted to comment on that first.
Mr. BAKER. Thank you, sir.
Senator GLENN. Now, I have looked at this maybe a little bit dif-
ferently, and I appreciate very much your being here, but I have
looked at most of what we are doing now not as a failure of leader-
ship, but mainly as a continuation of policies that we have followed
right along steadily since 1991, and I think we have done that. We
now are critical of a measured response, and I agree, maybe we
should have gone up-country and hit more, but the record has been
that we have not been able to convince Saddam Hussein even with
all the obliteration we did on targets over there during that war,
and to think that a few little more air strikes now are going to
make him change his mind I do not think is probably going to do
it.
When I say measured response, too, you can also term our deci-
sion not to go to Baghdad back there as a measured response in
that we had accomplished what we thought was going to convince
him, and we said okay, he will not do §: again, and so we will
pull out, instead of going up and taking Baghdad and doing the
things that you outlined before that would have had to have been
done. So we did a measured response then.
Then we basically said okay, we taught him a lesson and he will
not do that again, he would not dare—we misread him. All of us
did. I am not making this Republican-Democrat. We all did. We did
not think he could possibly do anything else, and yet he did. We
had led the way in pulling our ground forces out of there at the


26
sein, who might fill that power void, whether or not it would just
end up shifting our attention from Iraq to Iran as the next villain
or outlaw nation. Would you just talk a little bit about that, please?
Mr. BAKER. I think it is quite appropriate for us to pay a lot of
attention to Iran. I think Iran is a dangerous state, and the fore-
most sponsor of state-sponsored terrorism. So I think we have a
significant interest in paying a lot of attention to Iran.
Iraq historically, of course, has been a counterweight to Iran, and
there has been a lot of fighting between those two countries, and
indeed a major war. The Lebanization of Iraq, in my opinion, was
not in 1991, and is not today in the National interests of the Unit-
ed States. It is not something we ought to want to see, and I do
not think it is something that our coalition partners in the Gulf
Want to See.
So if you ask me what happens if he is gone, I do not think any-
body can answer that question. You might get someone in there
who is almost as bad. On the other hand, you might not. You might
see the Kurdish groups in the north take control of the north, the
Shi'ite groups in the south take control of the south, and a lot of
civil fighting and disturbance and commotion in the center of the
country, with anarchy and chaos, and that is not going to be in our
interest. I cannot predict for you who might take over if he were
removed internally or externally. -
Senator CoATS. One of the justifications for not pursuing Saddam
into Baghdad and not further undermining the military strength
was the idea that we would leave some counterweight to a resur-
gent Iran, is that correct?
Mr. BAKER. That is correct. That we did not want to see the
Lebanization of Iraq.
Senator COATS. I wonder if I could just shift gears. I know it is
off-topic here a little bit, but just take advantage of your expertise,
just to ask you a couple of questions about Bosnia. We are nearing
the 1-year period of time where the President has pledged to with-
draw the troops, but a lot of people are saying that without a mili-
tary presence on the ground we are going to return in Bosnia to
the factionalism and disruption that brought us there in the first
place. It appears to me that there does not seem to be a whole lot
of support for a multi-ethnic state among any of the parties in-
volved. Can you give me some of your thoughts on that?
Mr. BAKER. I do not think there is, Senator Coats. I do not think
there is. I have got serious reservations about whether conditions
exist for a free and fair election there. We are going to have an
election. I do not know exactly what it is going to mean, if any-
thing. Probably it means that we are going to ratify—we are in the
process of ratifying the de facto partition of Bosnia into three sepa-
rate entities. I think that is where we are.
Of course my view and President Bush's view was always that
we should not have ground forces in the former Yugoslavia, that
if we were going to participate it ought to be through logistics and
air and naval and intelligence and that sort of thing. This was a
problem occurring on Europe's doorstep, and having fought three
wars in Europe in this century, two hot ones and a cold one, we
really ought to expect our European allies to take care of this one.


31
The one reservation and caveat I think is that we must make
sure that we stand together behind our military men and women
when they are actually engaged.
When #j Bush moved massive numbers of forces to the
Gulf, there were hearings before this very committee, Senator
McCain—you were probably here—that talked—that were extraor-
dinarily critical of what he did and what he was about to do, and
that talked a lot about body bags and all the rest. So the idea that
somehow Republicans should not feel free to speak their minds and
their views is a canard that just will not wash, in my opinion, as
long as we are very careful that we do not criticize at a time when
our forces are engaged. . .
I have been careful not to do that, and I agree with you that I
think Senator Dole has likewise been careful not to do that.
Senator MCCAIN. So you think it was appropriate for the United
States Senate to pass a resolution supporting the troops as we did?
Mr. BAKER. Supporting our troops? I think it is always appro-
priate in any instance that you could conceive of.
Senator MCCAIN. Let me just ask a broader question, since I
think you have responded to many of the specific questions that I
and others had, but before I do that, let me just say, I do not know
how you can justify sitting in the Oval Office and calling cruise
missile strikes “a success” when it was clearly not a success and
not expect a response from this side of the aisle. It just simply was
an abject failure. We know it, and that brings me to my next ques-
tion. -
As the world's number one superpower, a lot of people around
the world pay attention to what we do or not do. It may be some-
thing to convince the American people that you are doing the right
thing with a compliant media, but it is a little harder to convince
the people in Beijing, Pyongyang, Tehran, and other places of the
world, when we act in an ineffective manner, as I believe has been
the previous military action, and I hope that the next set of strikes,
which are obviously going to happen, will be different.
What impact does that have on our relations with those coun-
tries, and their tendency towards adventurism?
Mr. BAKER. Well, I think it is very, very important, as I indicated
in my statement, that when the United States says certain actions
will have consequences, that those actions indeed have con-
sequences. I think it is important to carefully husband and pre-
serve the credibility of the United States in foreign and security
policy matters, a credibility, Senator, that has been built up over
at least 40-plus years under both Democratic and Republican ad-
ministrations.
It is very, very important that we be respected by our allies, and
that we be feared by our adversaries. We are the only remaining
superpower. Therefore, we must act accordingly. Therefore, it is im-
portant that the response be the right response, and we now know,
judging from news reports, that we are going to see an additional
response, and I think that is all to the good.
Senator MCCAIN. Finally, Mr. Secretary, many of us in hearings
concerning the President's commitment of troops to Bosnia which,
8S #." know, Senator Dole and I supported once the President
made the commitment, we were in a continuous dialogue with the


34
cluding whether we would have coalition support and collateral
damage? Would those be relevant factors?
Mr. BAKER. They are relevant factors, yes, sir.
Senator LEVIN. You, like all of us, regret the failure of those al-
lies who have not publicly joined us to join us in the response to
Saddam Hussein. Have you discussed with Secretary Christopher
the efforts which were made to get those allies, both publicly and
Priº, to join us?
Mr. BAKER. No, sir, and as my statement indicates, I pose a
number of questions there. I think it is important that this commit-
tee and the Foreign Relations Committee and, indeed, the Amer-
ican people know what happened, what did happen, why did they
not join us.
Senator LEVIN. I would agree with you, but you are not conclud-
ing that there were not .#. efforts. You regret that they did
not join us, and you think it is important that they do so.
Mr. BAKER. What I have said was, did we not consult sufficiently,
or was there simply an inability to persuade and convince? I mean,
I do not know what happened.
Senator LEVIN. So you have not concluded which of those two
things it was?
Mr. BAKER. No, sir.
Senator LEVIN. Now, the disproportionate response point that
you make is a point I also agree with. Secretary Perry yesterday
said that we would not be bound by any doctrine of proportionate
response, so I think you are being supportive of what he was say-
IIlº.
§r. BAKER. Well, I did not know he had said it when I wrote my
statement last night, but I was delighted to pick up the paper this
morning and see that he had said it, because I think t; is the
course we ought to follow. -
Senator LEVIN. So you do not disagree with what he said. You
basically support him.
Mr. BAKER. Oh, sir, I agree with him.
Senator LEVIN. Now, in terms of the diplomacy and the efforts
to get the Kurds to work together and somehow or other avoid
what happened here, have you discussed with Secretary Chris-
topher the efforts which were made in that direction?
Mr. BAKER. No, sir, I have not, but whatever efforts were made
did not work. That is the point I am making, and that is too bad.
Senator LEVIN. The U.N. recently agreed to permit Iraq to sell
oil in order to provide food and medicine for #. pur-
poses. There are people a lot of whom are innocent people, who are
suffering because of Saddam Hussein. The worst victims of Saddam
Hussein are his own people.
Mr. BAKER. That is correct.
Senator LEVIN. Now, there is an effort which had been made to
try to provide under some strict controls some food and medicine
to his own innocent people, not to his Republican Guards and to
his coterie around him, but to the innocent people.
Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir.
Senator LEVIN. What should we do relative to that effort, given
these recent events? Should we give up on that effort, or should we
kind of put it on the back burner?


51
What was different about this was that they moved Republican
Guards units, which are normally deployed around Baghdad and in
the area around Mosul and put them deliberately in support of a
Kurdish faction. Unfortunately this military encirclement of the
Kurds has gone on virtually since 1991 and, it has become very
clear in the last few days, that the Kurds have been so interested
basically in factional fighting and profiteering that they have done
virtually nothing to develop their own militias and military capabil-
ity.
Chairman THURMOND. My time is up. Senator Nunn.
Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Cordesman, would you counsel at this stage or would you
have initial strikes for the United States military forces to carry
out air attacks in northern Iraq against the Iraqi forces that were
carrying out the aggression?
Dr. CORDESMAN. Senator, in an ideal world, had we been able to
operate out of Turkey, which was denied to the administration, it
might have been possible to attack not the forces actually invading,
but their major kasurns or headquarters and the facilities they
.# but we would not be talking about a limited number of air
strikes.
If we examine Gulf War precedents, it would have taken hun-
dreds of strikes to stop or destroy a single brigade. To actually
achieve the kind of 50-percent damage criteria General
Schwarzkopf set during the Gulf War against a 40,000-man Repub-
lican Guard force would have required well in excess of 500 to 800
air strikes. Would I have advised that we do that? No.
I think at the end, it would have required a massive air cam-
paign that would have aroused all kinds of regional opposition, and
which Saddam would still have seen as an acceptable price to pay.
I have no idea what the end result would have been.
Senator NUNN. So basically you agree with the strategy of send-
ing a message to the south rather than the north, but you would
have sent, and probably still would send a stronger message than
was sent, is that right?
Dr. CORDESMAN. Yes, sir, but to the extent I understand the
original planning, from the start we sought a larger strike and to
use aircraft with the cruise missiles but, we ran into serious prob-
lems with our allies.
So, I think we are often second-guessing choices which have to
be made in the Pentagon, and which called initially for larger-scale
strikes than we were able to execute on such short notice.
Senator NUNN. We also have people that we had to get out of
Iraq, including Baghdad, including the U.N. inspection team, in-
cluding Americans that were there as part of that team. That was
a consideration that has not been given much attention, but it was
certainly a factor.
Let me shift to the longer-term, and that is the energy policy,
first as a security policy. I have read your papers, and I have read
not just yours today, but those that you have written in recent
months, and I think you make a very telling point here.
I guess my question is, which do we change, the security policy
or the energy policy, because the security policy basically is to pre-
vent the flow of oil from certain regimes that we have serious dis-





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