Govºub S. HRG. 104-796 º IRAQ Y 4 - Ill By 17 - G - HRG- 104-794 UNIVERSITY OF CALFORN/A RIVERSIDE APR 2 | 1997 HEARIN ovº *Amonsore BEFORE THE _U.S. DEPOSTORY SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON IRAQ THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1996 Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence § U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 37-434 WASHINGTON : 1997 For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 ISBN 0-16-054,223-5 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] * ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska, Vice Chairman RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOHN GLENN, Ohio RICHARD.C. SHELBY, Alabama RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada MIKE DEWINE, Ohio BOB GRAHAM, Florida JON KYL, Arizona JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma MAX BAUCUS, Montana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, Louisiana WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia HANK BROWN, Colorado TRENT LOTT, Mississippi, Ex Officio THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio CHARLES BATTAGLIA, Staff Director CHRISTOPHER C. STRAUB, Minority Staff Director KATHLEEN P. McGHEE, Chief Clerk (II) 17 ritory from Iran, Turkey and Syria to put together such a region. I think that everybody looks at the necessary political difficulties in accomplishing that, each one representing a very significant, dif- ferent situation, is to say that it would create more uncertainty, more insecurity, especially with respect to Turkey—and well, all of those countries—that it looks like it’s just better to try and make SUII" here is sensible autonomy and peace and protection for those people. Senator BRYAN. Director, thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Bryan. Senator Robb. Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Deutch, good to see you again. Toward the end of your opening statement you made a state- ment, something to the effect that no stability will be achieved until the Saddam regime has been replaced. Would you expand just a bit on the consequences of a different regime? And specifically, if you will, address the regional balance that we so often refer to between Iran and Iraq in terms of what the role of Iraq has to be vis a vis Iran in your judgment to maintain the kind of regional stability that many of the people who concern themselves with that regime believe has to be maintained. Director DEUTCH. Senator, I think we saw over a decade of where there was a balance between Iraq and Iran. I mean, there was, in fact a major war which Iraq did very well at in the I guess the early '80s. My view is that the integrity of Iraq is important, for one of the reasons because it does form a military balance to Iran in the region. But the regime has to also pay attention to not threatening its southern neighbors. And also to pay some attention *: character of how they treat people, whether it’s Kurds or Others. Senator ROBB. I’m not quarreling with that. Indeed, I agree with it entirely. What I was asking you to focus on the difference be- tween a post-Saddam regime in Iraq in terms of the balance be- tween the two, and what would happen, in effect, say if Saddam, for whatever reasons through whatever means were to be removed or were to relinquish power in whatever form, what is the essential difference in the dynamics of the region that take place that are not present with Saddam in power? In other words how much does his regime specifically mean to the balance, and what happens if he's not there, just with respect to the balance? Director DEUTCH. I don't believe that the kind of regime that Saddam runs is essential to preserving that balance. You could have a very different kind of government, much more democratic and still maintain a defense and a military capability that would be able to balance Iran. What we expect to have in a subsequent regime to Saddam Hus- sein in one that does not threaten his neighbors to the south; one that does not pursue weapons of mass destruction; one that does not go out and kill thousands of citizens; and has the benefit of ex- porting, I guess 2.5 million barrels of oil a day, which would allow him to improve his economic circumstances. That's what I think one is looking for in a subsequent regime. 19 Senator Inhofe. Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Deutch, I hope you'll forgive all of us here because there is a propensity to ask you questions that are outside of your imme- diate position since you've been in the other positions. And I have three questions to ask, two of which may fall into that category. First of all, in response to your question—I believe it was from Senator Cohen when he asked the question, what do you think the chances are of Saddam Hussein invading Kuwait. You said, quote, “At present very low.” Did you mean the chances are very low that he'd do it at present or at present it doesn't look like it will happen at sometime in the future. Director DEUTCH. Senator Inhofe, he has shown in the past, as he did, I think, in October of ’94 of moving two divisions down there, we keep track of that quite precisely. He has the capability of doing it at any time, so we do not see any indications today that he is moving towards the south. We have not of course seen it for some period of time, but tomorrow we could gain information to show he's moving there. So it’s a question of his intentions. He's got the capability of doing it whenever he wants. Senator INHOFE. Okay. That leads me to the second question when you mention capabil- ity, Mr. Director. I don't remember the exact words, but I recall some time ago that Saddam had made a statement that if he had waited five years to make his invasion of Kuwait, he would have been in a better position. Whether he's talking about nuclear capa- bility, conventional capability or missile technology, I'm not sure. But I would ask a two-part question. First of all, do you believe— how do you think his capability in terms of force strength and mili- tary capability is today relative to the time that he invaded Ku- wait? And then secondly, the second part of that question would be how does that relate to our force strength, since we are now at about roughly 50 percent of where we had been in terms of Army divisions, in terms of Air Force wings. We are not as capable as we were in 1991. So, a two-part question. Director DEUTCH. First of all, with respect to his military capa- bility, it is significantly reduced, both in quality and quantity, com- pared to the posture he had in 1990, before DESERT SHIELD. I would say that as a rough—a very rough rule of thumb, less than half of his capability in terms of armored personnel carriers, tanks, artillery tubes, or aircraft even less than that. In readiness also, less. So I would say he is, while still a formidable regional power, it's significantly less than he had in 1990. In contrast, I would say that the deployment of US forces—and here I’m again, I’m not quite the right person to answer this, but let me just say, I would just tell you—is incredibly much better postured in terms of the number of aircraft, deployed ships, prepositioned equipment, a whole series of measures to respond very, very quickly indeed. So, the balance of power compared to 1990 in terms of today would be very much in terms of the coalition's favor as a military matter. In terms of response time, quality of weapons and the abil- ity to bring on sophisticated intelligence support and accurate air