HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman
BOB STUMP, Arizona RONALD W. DELLUMS, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, Mississippi
JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio PATRICLA SCHROEDER, Colorado
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
CURTWELDON, Pennsylvania JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina
ROBERT K. DORNAN, California SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado OWEN PICKETT, Virginia
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey LANE EVANS, Illinois
RANDY “DUKE” CUNNINGHAM, California JOHN TANNER, Tennessee
STEVE BUYER, Indiana GLEN BROWDER, Alabama
PETER G. TORKILDSEN, Massachusetts GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
TILLIE. K. FOWLER, Florida NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York CHET EDWARDS, Texas
JAMES TALENT, Missouri FRANK TEJEDA, Texas
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
ROSCOE.G. BARTLETT, Maryland ROBERTA. UNDERWOOD, Guam
HOWARD “BUCK". McKEON, California JANE HARMAN, California
RON LEWIS, Kentucky PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania
J.C. WATTS, JR., Oklahoma PETE GEREN, Texas
MAG THORNBERRY, Texas PETE PETERSON, Florida
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee MIKE WARD, Kentucky
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
WALTER B. JONES, JR., North Carolina
JAMES B. LONGLEY, JR., Maine
TODDTIAHRT, Kansas
RICHARD “DOC HASTINGS, Washington
ANDREw K. Ellis, Staff Director
THOMAS DONNELLY, Professional Staff Member
DAVID TRACHTENBERG, Professional Staff Member
WILLIAM MARSH, Staff Assistant
(II)


C O N T E N T S
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Page
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland ................................. 38
Bateman, Hon. Herbert H., a Representative from Virginia ............................... 41
Dellums, Hon. Ronald V., a Representative from California, Ranking Minority
Member, Committee on National Security ......................................................... 3
Edwards, Hon. Chet, a Representative from Texas .............................................. 52
Geren, Hon. Pete, a Representative from Texas ................................................... 51
Hefley, Hon. Joel, a Representative from Colorado .............................................. 45
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California .................................... 49
Pickett, Hon. Owen, a Representative from Virginia ........................................... 83
Sisisky, Hon. Norman, a Representative from Virginia ....................................... 43
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri .............................................. 40
Spence, Hon. Floyd D., a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman,
Committee on National Security......................................................................... 1
Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi ........................................ 47
PRINCIPAL WITNESSES WHO APPEARED IN PERSON OR SUBMITTED
WRITTEN STATEMENTS
Eisenstadt, Michael, Washington Institute for Near East Policy:
Statement .......................................................................................................... 16
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 20
Haass, Richard N., Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institu-
tion:
Statement … 4
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8
Perle, Richard, The American Enterprise Institute:
Statement .......................................................................................................... 26
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30
Riedel, Bruce, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and
South Asian Affairs:
Statement … 54
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 57
Van Alstyne, Maj. Gen. J.A., Vice Director for Operations, Joint Staff: State-
ment ...................................................................................................................... 67
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Authority for United States Strikes Against Iraq ................................................. 64
Relevance of U.N. Resolution 688 .......................................................................... 66
Riedel, Bruce O., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and
South Asian Affairs, Memo To Hon. Floyd D. Spence, Chairman, Committee
on National Security ............................................................................................ 63
Was the U.S. Response “Proportional?” ................................................................. 65
(III)


2
ern Iraq proved too hard to keep united. While this is not a sur-
prise, neither is it an excuse.
We have lost 5 years of investment in our efforts to contain Iraq
from the north. We have also blown the cover for our covert oper-
ation and put in jeopardy the lives and efforts of our agents and
their contacts.
Saddam Hussein's second victory is even greater. He has cracked
the American-led coalition that won the gulf war and which had
been key to our post-war policy of containment. The silence of our
allies is deafening. Saudi Arabia, the keystone of our gulf strategy
and the primary staging basis for our military operation over Iraq
is now a more reluctant partner.
Turkey, another key regional ally and member of NATO, is also
less enthusiastic about hosting American troops on its soil.
Jordan, persuaded by our victory in the gulf war to make historic
peace with Israel, nonetheless refused to base United States war
planes on its soil.
Even Kuwait, completely defenseless without United States pro-
tection, has only reluctantly agreed to what should have been a
routine augmentation of our forces.
France is beginning to hedge on its bets in anticipation of reviv-
ing its historic ties to Baghdad.
Likewise, Russia seeks to regain its traditional influence in the
region; and only Great Britain is willing to participate in the ex-
panded air operation over southern Iraq.
In sum, the international support to contain Iraq continues to
crumble. Without the strong support of these allies, our ability to
operate in the region is greatly limited.
After the damage Saddam Hussein suffered and recovered from
in the gulf war, cruise missile attacks against a handful of air de-
fense radars are meaningless. Extending no-fly zones mean little
against a pitiful Iraqi air force and proved no deterrent whatsoever
against Saddam Hussein's army in the north. The overall result is
then to present Saddam with his third and greatest victory. From
the rest of the world's perception, American leadership and credi-
bility in the region of vital national security interest is now in
question.
Our pinprick response to Saddam's aggression in the north has
strained our own coalition without hurting Saddam either mili-
tarily or diplomatically. Iraq only had to repair some air defense
sites while the United States must try to repair a 5-year coalition
policy of containment.
If the President perceives this as success and believes that Sad-
dam Hussein is strategically worse off, I would hate to know what
his definition of failure is.
Indeed, it is not Saddam Hussein who is worse off; it is the Unit-
ed States. It is the United States that now finds itself with more
military challenges. It is the United States that now has fewer
strategic options. It is the United States that now is confronting
the very real prospect of a strategic policy failure of some mag-
nitude.
I hope today's hearings will help us to understand in greater de-
tail our policy with regard to Iraq. As such, we begin with a panel
of independent experts, and they are: Mr. Richard Haass, the


4
quently states, and I quote, “Multilateralism is closely tied to inter-
national legitimacy.”
This is a vital issue both of strategy, cost, and legitimacy. I look
forward to both panels helping us to understand how this issue
might play itself out in both the near and far term. With those
opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your generosity and
yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. We will begin with Mr. Haass and, gentlemen,
without objection your complete statements will be submitted for
the record.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. HAASS, DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN
POLICY STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Mr. HAASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this oppor-
tunity to appear before you and your colleagues to discuss United
States policy toward Iraq and the Persian Gulf region.
United States policy since the gulf war has been marked by the
reality that United States relations with the two strongest states
of the region, Iran and Iraq, are adversarial. The problem facing
us is that no combination of friendly local states can offset either
Iran or Iraq. As a result, continued U.S. involvement in the region
will be necessary for the foreseeable future to square this circle of
strong enemies, weak friends, and vital interests.
The Clinton administration dubbed its posture “dual contain-
ment.” The goal was to limit the ability of either Iran or Iraq to
threaten United States interests in the region and beyond. Still,
this phrase is less than ideal. Iran and Iraq pose different threats
and call for different responses.
Also, limiting their reach, as containment suggests, is not
enough. The United States can and should aim for more. Moreover,
the isolation of Iran and Iraq is increasingly challenged by a num-
ber of states whose support is necessary if this policy is to succeed.
The result is that dual containment gives us a slogan when what
we really need is a strategy and sustained efforts on its behalf.
Now, about 6 years after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, just over 5
since Kuwait's liberation, on one level, the United States has fared
extremely well. Economic sanctions against Iraq remain in place
and for the most part are complied with. One can also point to sub-
stantial progress in the effort to uncover and eliminate Iraqi weap-
ons of mass destruction. Iraq is in all sorts of economic trouble and
it is politically divided.
The net result is that Saddam Hussein's Iraq is significantly
weaker today than it was at the start of this decade and is better
understood as constituting a dangerous nuisance rather than an ac-
tual strategic threat.
But the glass is also half empty. Saddam Hussein remains in
power despite numerous attempts to oust him. He has rebuilt the
strength of his military capability above where it was when the
war ended. France and Russia regularly champion for lifting sanc-
tions, while in the Arab world there is growing opposition to sanc-
tions on humanitarian grounds. Recent developments have altered
the reality and the perceptions.
On balance, Saddam Hussein gained more than he lost. Indeed,
September 1996 has been Saddam's best month since March 1991,


TESTIMONY OF
RICHARD N. HAASS
DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
Mr. Chairman:
I welcome this opportunity to appear before this Committee
to discuss U.S. policy toward Iraq and the entire Persian Gulf
region. Before starting, I only wish to note that the views you
are about to hear are my own and do not necessarily reflect those
of staff members, officers, or trustees of the Brookings
Institution.
U.S. policy toward the region of the Persian Gulf has
changed more and more often over the years more than any other
foreign policy I can think of . Current U.S. policy can be traced
back more than half a century. This said, the most useful place
to begin to understand how we arrived where we are today is to
return to the late 1960s, when Great Britain decided it could no
longer sustain its commitments east of Suez.


12
understood by his Arab neighbors.
The second principal error involved the use of force itself.
The U.S. action--using a few dozen cruise missiles to destroy a
number of Iraqi air defense sites--was both too small and too
remote. To be sure, there was coalition resistance to using
military force against Saddam at this time, a view that reflected
a lack of sympathy for the Kurds and concern over Iranian
behavior. But the United States will only have a limited number
of occasions to use force against Iraq and it must make the most
of them. Since any use of force will create unhappiness, any
military intervention on our or the coalition’s part should be
large enough to hurt Saddam militarily and demonstrate his
inability to protect his country from continuing pain and
humiliation.
Next Steps vis-a-vis Iraq
Despite these setbacks, it would be wrong to conclude that
the U.S. position is irretrievably damaged. The weakness of the
coalition in responding to Saddam's actions inside his country
should not be interpreted as the demise of the coalition more
generally. A good deal of consensus continues to exist, enough
so that it should be possible to keep the sanctions in place and
to prevent Iraq from again becoming a strategic threat to his
neighbors. What will such a policy take to succeed?
The first priority ought to be to reinvigorate the coalition
that won the war against Saddam and has kept the peace since.
This means repairing the U.S.-Turkish relationship and consulting
closely about how best to deal with future crises in northern
Iraq. We should not delude ourselves. It is more a question of
"when" than "if" such a crisis will come about. Saddam is a
serial prober; at some point he will turn on his new Kurdish
friends, in the process triggering a large refugee flow in the
direction of the Turkish border. It must thus become a foreign
policy priority to continue Operation Provide Comfort, both to
avoid suggesting to Saddam that he enjoys a free hand in the
north and so that we and the Turkish government are prepared for
a new crisis that would require U.S. military use of Turkish
bases.
We similarly need to make sure that there is consensus in
the region and beyond that Saddam will not be able to mass forces
against any of his neighbors as he did in July of 1990 and again
in October 1994. If he does, we and others need to strike—-and
strike hard. More generally, any use of force by the coalition--
be it to prevent an attack on Kuwait, respond to state support of
terrorism, or punish Iraq for violating UN resolutions or
preventing UN weapons inspectors from carrying out their mission-
-needs to be large enough to hurt Saddam militarily and


20
U.S. Policy Towards Iraq: Balance, Dismember, or Contain?
Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives, National Security Committee
September 26, 1996
by Michael Eisenstadt
Recent events in Iraq have spurred calls for a reevaluation of U.S. policy towards Iraq. Some have
advocated a revival of the balance of power approach in the Gulf, using lnaq or Iran to balance off each other,
and thereby render the U.S. presence in the region superfluous. Others have called for the breakup of Iraq,
asserting that Iraq is a failed state—an artificial construct that binds together mutually antagonistic communities
in a hostile embrace, resulting in instability at home and aggression abroad. And finally, some have called on
the U.S. to stay thc course, continuing its policy of containment, despite its manifest problems. This papcr will
attempt a preliminary examination the efficacy of each approach and outline possible options for the filture.
A New Balance of Power?
During the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. tried to create a balance of power in the Gulf in order to
maintain regional peace and stability. During the 1970s the U.S. built up the Shah as the region's policeman,
but these efforts came to grief as a result of the 1978-79 Iranian revolution, with the unintended consequence
of bequeathing to the new Islamic Republic a large, modem military. Then, during the 1980s the U.S. helped
(indirectly) to build up Iraq as a bulwark against Iranian expansionism. Howcver, the failure of the U.S. to
adjust its policy of support for Iraq following the end of the Iran-Iraq War emboldened Iraq, and probably
contributed to its 1990 decision to invade Kuwait. Thus, the second attempt to build up a regional power to
maintain the regional balance had unintended conscquences that resulted in the U.S. fighting its first major war
since Vietnam. As a result of this bitter experience, the U.S. now longer depends on unreliable, aggressive
regional powers to maintain the balance in the region. Rather, since the 1991 Gulf War, Washington itself has
emerged as the keeper of the regional balance of power.
Clearly, it would be desirable if the regional parties could maintain a regional balance without a U.S.
presence, and this should be the long-term goal of thc U.S. in the region. In the short term, however, it is
unrealistic. As long as Persian Gulf oil remains key to America's economic future, and as long as Iraq and Iran
are ruled by regimes that harbor aggressive designs toward their neighbors, a policy predicated on establishing
a regional balance between Iraq and Iran (other than a balance of weakness—which is the current state of
affairs), is unviable.
Why? Some people, for instance, have argued that the U.S. will eventually have to case sanctions on
Baghdad or cven rehabilitate Iraq to counterbalance an ascendant Iran. This is wrong, for several reasons. First,
Iran's military build-up is much less rapid and extensive than widely believed. The quantitative balance of
*The authoris a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He previously served as an
analyst with the United States Army, and the U.S. Air Force Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), contributing a
chapter on Iraqi strategy and planning. He is author of Like a Phoenix from the Ashes? The Furure of Iraqi Military
Power (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, 1993).
l


27
one outside the White House takes seriously the claim that we
have strengthened our position by enjoining Saddam from flying
over parts of the south that he controls with his superior ground
forces; not even, one hopes, the administration itself.
For however unappealing this disingenuous pretense may be, the
possibility that the administration believes its own lies is down-
right dangerous. We will never even try to fix our Iraq policy if we
nurture the illusion that it is not broken. I urge you to bear that
in mind as you hear the administration witnesses.
Our interests in the north of Iraq, which was supported by Oper-
ation Provide Comfort, included but were not limited to, dem-
onstrate that this opposition to Saddam Hussein was such that he
could not control a large part of Iraqi national territory. Moreover,
control over the north was, and remains, a necessary precondition
for any effective concerted action against Saddam Hussein's re-
gime.
In any case, the United States offered protection to the Kurds of
northern Iraq and others, worked with them and sought to rec-
oncile differences among them, supported non-Kurdish opposition
groups based in northern Iraq, and promised to deter action
against them by making it known to Saddam Hussein that an at-
tack against them would have, and I quote, “serious consequences.”
When tested, those interests were abandoned. The promises were
broken and the fiction that we never had any interests in the north
was created to excuse the failure. The serious consequences turned
out to be a few dozen costly cruise missiles delivered against low-
cost targets.
In sum, the 7 weeks since Saddam invaded Irbil and other north-
ern cities and towns, have been a disaster for American policy in
Iraq that calls into question the underlying competence of the de-
partments responsible for developing and administering adminis-
tration policy as well as the competence and resolve of the most
senior officials in this Government.
Let me just add, Mr. Chairman, that I am critical here not only
of this administration, but its predecessor as well. And in this re-
gard, permit me to observe that Mr. Eisenstad has demolished the
cliche to which the administration and its predecessor so erringly
subscribed; that we should look with equanimity on the continued
rule of a thug like Saddam Hussein because, however objectionable
he may be, Saddam is necessary to contain Iran.
And I was disappointed to hear my friend Richard Haass repeat
that rubbish here this morning. In what sense? In what sense does
Saddam Hussein in power inhibit Iran from its support for inter-
national terrorism?
In what sense does Saddam's continuation in power diminish
Iran's search for nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de-
struction? In what sense does Saddam in Iraq diminish Iran's sup-
port for radical fundamentalist insurgencies around the world?
The truth is this is a simplistic cliche that was adopted unhap-
pily by the previous administration and has been continued by this.
And I urge this committee to examine it in detail, because it won't
stand up.
Mr. Chairman, the essential points about Saddam Hussein can
be stated simply: He rules Iraq by force without legitimacy and


28
over the objections of a broadly representative elected opposition
known as the Iraqi National Congress.
He has not abandoned his goal of dominating the gulf and con-
trolling the region's wealth and resources.
He will continue to use force, including terrorism to achieve this
purpose.
He has failed to comply, and continues to fail to comply, with a
number of U.N. resolutions, including those relating to his weapons
of mass destruction.
He will gain, continue to gain, political and economic strength
unless we act decisively and in a manner that integrates military
and political policies in a coherent whole, to reverse his recent
gains in the north.
And finally, no one can exclude the possibility that he will once
again use force to seize control over Kuwait.
And we can only ask ourselves whether we could mount an effec-
tive opposition again as we did once before.
Given these facts, and the situation we must now confront, what
should be the future of United States policy toward Iraq” First, we
must not repeat the administration's mistake in acquiescing in a
partial lifting of the sanctions that have been in effect since 1990.
We should announce immediately that Saddam's action has ended
any possibility that the United States would agree to permit even
a limited sale of Iraqi oil.
The idea that a lifting of the sanctions was necessary for human-
itarian purposes was wrong and shortsighted. You know, and I
know, where the revenues from that oil would have wound up and
who would have benefited from it. And you know, and we all know,
that if Saddam wished to put the resources that now go to rebuild-
ing his military to the mitigation of his humanitarian problems, he
could do so and far more effectively than lifting the sanctions
would allow.
That decision to lift the sanctions signaled an end to the isolation
of Saddam's regime and I believe encouraged him to believe that
he could get away with his attack in the north.
Second, we should openly support the Iraqi National Congress as
the best hope for a future Iraqi Government that is broadly based
and democratic and that would live in peace with its neighbors. We
have political options. It is time we looked seriously at implement-
ing them.
We should ask the Iraqi National Congress to reestablish the co-
alition of Iraqis opposed to Saddam's regime on terms acceptable
to all the members of the INC. Until this is accomplished, we
should regard the KDP, Barazani's Kurdish faction, as allied with
Saddam Hussein against the INC.
It is appalling that Assistant Secretary Pelletreau, who is one of
the architects of this disaster, should now be saying that we should
welcome, we should welcome Barazani's treachery because now we
have a single Kurdish faction with which to deal. If necessary, we
should be prepared to use air power and the supply of military
equipment to protect the coalition of the INC.
Third, future actions taken in response to unacceptable behavior
by Saddam Hussein must be aimed at the Republican Guard and
the secret police, Saddam's elite forces and the instrument by


49
gets in and around Baghdad, Republican Guard divisions, military
headquarters, command and control headquarters and the like.
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I thought one of your criticisms was that we
did not attack the troops that were actually attacking the Kurds.
You have the same disconnect. You are not actually going after the
ones that are causing the problem if you are shooting at barracks
in downtown Baghdad.
Mr. HAASS. That was not one of my criticisms. In this case, one,
it would have been awfully difficult, without access to Turkish
bases, simply doing it in any militarily feasible way.
Second, given that fact that one of the Kurdish factions did invite
in the Iraqis, I was, for one, nervous about finding the United
States possibly caught up in the internecine struggles there. I
thought it was better to put the battle on the battlefield of our
choosing rather than Saddam's.
Mr. EISENSTADT. I would just add that I don’t think that every
response has to be symmetric. And I don't mean proportional. If he
is threatening Irbil and it is difficult to hit there, we can hit other
Republican Guard targets in other parts of the country that he
needs very much to stay in power. I would say that it does not have
to be symmetric. It could be an asymmetric response, but I do
think it should be disproportionate.
Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, my last question, again, I am just
curious about this whole thing. At the same time that Saddam was
attacking the Kurds in his own country, the Russians were attack-
ing the Chechens in their country. I have seen a lot of people say
that we didn't do enough in the case of Iraq, but those same people
didn't say anything about what was happening in Russia. Could
you gentlemen please explain that to me?
Mr. HAASS. Congressman, I think the intelligent conduct of for-
eign policy is about double standards, triple standards, quadruple
standards. In each case you have to look at what you can accom-
plish, the costs and benefits and what your priorities are.
I don’t like much Russian attacks on Chechnya, but there are
certain aspects of the United States Russian relationship which are
higher priority, for example, the command and control of nuclear
materials. We have to ask what are our priorities and what can we
usefully accomplish?
Mr. EISENSTADT. I second that.
Mr. PERLE. At the same time, it seems to me we would have done
Boris Yeltsin a good turn if, when he made the initial mistake in
Chechnya, we had tried to discourage it rather than standing on
the sidelines and, in effect, giving a blessing to what turned out to
be a disastrous misadventure for him, the Chechens and for Rus-
sia. So I wouldn’t have gone in militarily, but I would have cer-
tainly tried to dissuade him from what turned out to be a very fool-
ish decision.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.
STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNLA
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor, if you had a followup, you were trying to give, go
ahead, I will yield to you.


55
We believe that Saddam's goal remains to dominate this region
and that he has been prevented from this goal only by our contain-
ment policy. The critical elements of this policy are the coalition of
regional allies, each contributing incredible military forces, and our
own United States formal military forward presence. The linchpin
of that containment policy is Operation Southern Watch, conducted
by United States, British, and French aircraft from Saudi, Kuwaiti,
UAE, and on temporary occasion also bases in Jordan, Qatar, and
Bahrain.
Since 1992 Operation Southern Watch has flown over 115,000
sorties to enforce the no-fly zone. There is also a very strong
ground, air, and naval presence throughout the region designed to
send a signal of support to our allies and a warning to Saddam.
In addition to the air assets I mentioned already, we have powerful
naval assets, the 5th Fleet in Bahrain and ground force assets
prepositioned in the Kuwait and Qatar as well as afloat. These
forces remain in the region at the invitation of the gulf countries
to enforce U.N. resolutions.
Mr. HUNTER. Could you, Mr. Riedel, just briefly recap what we
have in the terms of air power—Air Force air power and naval air
power?
Mr. RIEDEL. Why don’t I let General Van Alstyne show you on
the chart.
h. HUNTER. He is going to do some specifics. Go right ahead
then.
Mr. RIEDEL. As I said, Saddam Hussein continues to pose a seri-
ous potential military threat to his neighbors and the security of
the region. Despite all of the damage inflicted on Iraq in Desert
Storm, his military remains among the largest in the area, with
some 400,000 soldiers, more than 2,000 tanks, and over 300 combat
aircraft.
He has repeatedly challenged the containment box we put him
in. He did it in 1993 by trying to kill former President Bush. He
did it in 1994 by actually sending several elite Republican Guard
divisions down to the Kwaiti border, again in 1995 by threatening
Kuwait and Jordan and he is doing it now. This time it began
against the Kurds in the north and then became a confrontation in
the no-fly zones. In each case the administration has faced this
challenge and left him in the box at the end the day.
The real danger is in allowing Iraq to go unchecked in its use
of military force. Again and again Saddam Hussein has dem-
onstrated the means and the motivation to use his Armed Forces
recklessly. If his repeated transgressions go unchallenged, he will
be emboldened by his actions and break out of containment. In
doing so he will develop weapons of mass destruction—so far that
has been prevented by the U.N. sanctions—and move to either co-
erce or even attack his neighbors to the south again. We have no
doubt that if the U.N. sanctions regime were removed, Iraq would
recreate its weapons of mass destruction arsenal again in months.
Thus, we believe it is necessary to take firm action to keep Iraq
contained. The key to our action this time was expanding the no-
fly zone up to the 33d parallel almost to the southern border of
Baghdad thereby striking at Saddam's strategic center. This no-fly
zone extension effectively closed down the operations of two major