N 4. Ag H2 a. ººl
|I||
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
1999
Page
HEARING:
Wednesday, March 10, 1999, United States Policy Toward Iraq ........................ 1
APPENDIX:
Wednesday, March 10, 1999 ................................................................................... 31
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 1999
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com-
mittee on Armed Services .................................................................................... 2
Spence, Hon. Floyd D., a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1
WITNESSES
Hillen, Dr. John, Senior Fellow in Political-Military Studies Center for Stra-
tegic and International Studies .......................................................................... 10
Kºº, Dr. Thomas A., Executive Director, Foreign Policy Institute, Paul
H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity … 6
Woolsey Hon. R. James, Former Director of Central Intelligence ....................... 3
APPENDIX
PREPARED STATEMENTS:
Hillen, Dr. John ................................................................................................ 46
Keaney, Dr. Thomas A. .................................................................................... 42
Spence, Hon. Floyd D. ...................................................................................... 32
oolsey, Hon. R. James ................................................................................... 37
(III)





2
By most counts Saddam Hussein remains in control of Iraq. In-
deed, the apparent collapse of the United States weapons inspec-
tion regime in Iraq allows him to inch closer to a lifting of sanc-
tions and to easier development of the weapons capabilities and the
consequent leverage he covets. Until the United States articulates
a consistent policy that brings coherence to our military efforts in
the Gulf, we will find ourselves faced with small scale technical
military victories within the broader context of strategic defeat.
Nor do I believe the time is on our side. When Iraq or Iran feels
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction is only a matter
of time, in my estimation our position in the Gulf will be signifi-
cantly complicated and more dangerous.
In sum, the pattern I see in the Gulf where our interest in doing
it but our long-term influence is in question is disconcerting. I hope
that our witnesses today will help us better understand the chal-
lenges, the problems and options for placing the United States pol-
icy toward Iraq on a firmer footing.
Before they begin, I would like to recognize the committee's rank-
ing Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spence can be found in the ap-
pendix on page 32.]
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me join
you in welcoming our witnesses, the Honorable Jim Woolsey, Dr.
Tom Keaney and Dr. John Hillen. We look forward to receiving
your testimony regarding United States policy in a strategic and
important area of the world.
Beginning at the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the
United States has undertaken an effort with the support of other
nations to contain Iraq and to prevent it from acquiring weapons
of mass destruction and to prevent it from deploying systems that
can deliver these weapons against the United States, our troops in
the area or our allies.
Our policy has included disarmament and economic sanctions. As
part of the disarmament effort we have imposed no-fly zones in
both northern and southern Iraq. Unfortunately, our efforts have
not brought about a change in the attitude of Saddam Hussein or
a change in the regime itself. Indeed, the weapons inspection in the
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, a centerpiece of the
disarmament effort, has been discontinued in the face of Iraq's re-
fusal to permit them, a refusal that is in direct defiance of U.N.
resolutions.
As we all know, this continuing violation of U.N. resolution by
Iraq caused us to launch Operation Desert Fox in 1998, and now
we are seeing almost daily provocations from Iraq in the northern
and southern no-fly zones. All of us would like to see a long-term
effort to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to hold power, this
effort which I call containment plus, means: One, keeping substan-
tial American military forces in the Persian Gulf for the foreseeable
future; second, devoting considerable diplomatic efforts to rebuild-
ing the allied coalition that has fragmented over the past 8 years;


3
third, maintaining economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein
while permitting humanitarian food and medicine to make it clear
that our argument is with Saddam Hussein and not the Iraqi peo-
ple; fourth, helping those Iraqis opposed to Saddam Hussein to
fashion a viable option to the current regime; and, fifth, being pre-
pared to use military force when necessary to enforce the relevant
U.N. resolutions, including the no-fly zones.
If we are serious about the threats Saddam Hussein poses to the
world through this program to develop weapons of mass destruc-
tion, we must set the agenda rather than having Saddam Hussein
set the agenda. I look forward to receiving the views and rec-
ommendations of this quite distinguished panel.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Skelton.
Without objection our witnesses' complete written statements
and any accompanying material can be submitted for the record,
# "H| Woolsey, the floor is yours, followed by Dr. Keaney and
T. H.1116. Il.
STATEMENT OF HON. R. JAMES WOOLSEY, FORMER DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to be
asked to testify before this committee, again, on this important
subject. If it is all right, I will use my statement as notes and
speak from it informally.
I testified over a year ago before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee about an overall approach toward Iraq. Nothing that
has occurred in the meantime suggests to me that this approach
was wrong. I still think it is the best of what is frankly a rather
undesirable lot of choices under the current circumstances left to
the United States.
I would suggest, and did then, that we maintain the existing no-
fly zones in the north and south; we make it for all Iraqi aircraft,
including helicopters, and to expand those zones—to create no
drive zones, so-called, for Iraqi military vehicles; recognize an Iraqi
government-in-exile, possibly centered in the first instance on the
Iraqi National Congress, and arm it with light weapons, including
anti-armor, and when areas of the north and south of Iraq can be
adequately protected from Iraqi ground force encroachments by a
combination of indigenous troops, including defecting forces and
our own use of air power, to permit those areas to be free of trade
restrictions imposed on Iraq; for example, to let such regions pump
oil; fourthly, to bring charges against Saddam Hussein in inter-
national tribunals and do everything possible to hinder his use of
offshore assets, and to indicate that we do not support the contin-
ued existence of a Ba'athist regime; broadcast into Iraq in the fash-
ion of Radio Free Europe and utilize any opportunities to conduct
air strikes, such as his current efforts to attack our aircraft in the
no-fly zones, in order to damage as severely as possible the instru-
ments of his state power; and although the current strikes seem to
be limited to air defense forces, perhaps broadly construed, I see
no reason why they should need to be, why we should not retaliate
also against the Special Republican Guard, Special Security Orga-
nization, Iraqi intelligence, and the like.


4
Over the last year, we have done something quite different. We
have rather reversed Teddy Roosevelt’s dictum about speaking soft-
ly and carrying a big stick; we have spoken loudly, waved the stick
around and emoted about how we didn't really want to hit any-
thing with it. On several occasions, beginning in the fall of 1997,
we made bold threats to try to encourage Saddam Hussein to co-
operate with UNSCOM or otherwise live up to his obligations and
then back down, most dramatically last October.
And finally in December we did conduct several days of appar-
ently rather effective air strikes, and we also expanded recently the
way we retaliate for Saddam Hussein in the no-fly zones. But con-
fusion has been introduced, both by the fact that the President now
has a somewhat belatedly stated policy of working to replace the
Iraqi regime, statements by his Secretary of Defense which seem
then to be taken back and statements by his military commander
in the field, General Zinni, or by his new appointee the National
Security Council staff, Mr. Pollack, which seem to cut in the direc-
tion opposite from what the President stated in terms of removing
the Ba'athist regime.
Perhaps the administration needs to post a sign on the wall of
the White House situation room in order to stay focused, “It’s the
regime, stupid.” The concerns of General Zinni, Mr. Pollack and
others about the probable failure of an effort to replace the Iraqi
regime seems to be rooted in four views. These are not irrespon-
sible views. I think they are debatable, however, and let me take
them up one at a time.
First, opponents of removing the Ba'athist regime seem to want
to dash any optimism that there will likely be a quick and easy re-
placement of this regime by a coherent and fully democratic opposi-
tion. Well, the point is taken, no one should expect any of this to
be quick and easy.
Second, opponents of removing the Ba'athist regime emphasize
the really divided character of the Iraqi opposition. That point is
taken in part, but David Wurmser in his recently published Tyr-
anny's Ally, an excellent book on this subject, demonstrates clearly
I believe to any objective observer that a major share of the divi-
siveness within the Iraqi opposition can be laid at the feet of Amer-
ican actions, particularly in 1995, 1996.
Third, opponents of removing the Ba'athist regime seem to be to
underemphasize the practical importance of an opposition being
able to hoist the standard of democracy as a rallying point, either
because they undervalue the role of belief and ideology and conflict
or because they despair of a movement toward democracy succeed-
ing in this part of the world.
I would only say that I would once have been somewhat skeptical
of the role of ideology in such matters myself, Mr. Chairman, but
I changed my views about a decade ago. On a diplomatic assign-
ment in Europe, I got to know some of the members of solidarity
in Poland and the Czech resistance in the Czech Republic. I believe
that Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel were right in saying that
Radio Free Europe might have been the single most important
thing the United States did during the cold war.
And, yes, it is indeed the case that the culture and history of the
Mideast have not to this point been friendly toward democracy, but


6
As Judith Miller makes clear in her fine book on Islamic extre-
mism, God Has Ninety-Nine Names, the wilayat, the theocracy in
Iran, is a marked departure from Shia tradition. There are many
courageous Shia clerics even in Iran who speak for the mainstream
view of the proper relationship between the Shia clergy and a
state, a relationship like that of the clergy in most other religions,
and who urge the clerics who are involved with the Iranian govern-
ment to come home to Qom; that is, to the Holy City, and to as-
sume a traditional role.
It is a major mistake to blame Islam or Shia Islam for the state
of affairs in Iran today. The problem is that a few men, in the gov-
ernment and among Iranian clerics, have chosen terror to be a
major tool of the Iranian state. There are some bright spots in Iran,
of course, the election of President Khatami 2 years ago and even
the recent local elections.
But the point is the one I think that David Wurmser expertly
makes in his survey of the history of Shi’ism in Iraq in Tyranny's
Ally. He outlines why the Iraqi Shia are far more a threat to Iran's
wilayat, to Iran's theocracy, than they are to Saudi Arabia. He out-
lines why the Iraqi Shia—this was demonstrated in the spring of
1991, when the Iraqi Shia revolted, Saudi Arabia urged us to assist
them, as then Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has re-
cently set forth, and Iran abandoned them. We sadly took a path
parallel to Iran.
To this point, this has had 8 years of tragic consequences. David
Wurmser concludes, I believe correctly, that a free Iraqi Shi'ite
ºnly would be a nightmare to the theocratic Islamic Republic
OI IITaTl.
Now, I don’t pretend that these issues are free from doubt, Mr.
Chairman, and I know there are experts who support General
Zinni and Mr. Pollack's views. But it is far from the case that the
only clear eyed, intellectually sound approach is to spurn the effort
to establish democracy in Iraq and instead to fiddle around with
doomed coup attempts by other Ba'athists or merely to contain
Saddam Hussein and thereby giving him time to perfect his weap-
ons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.
In my judgment, the far sounder approach under current cir-
cumstances is to declare solidly for democracy in Iraq and to give
it all support short of actual invasion by American ground forces.
I believe we should also take steps to reduce our and the rest of
the world's long-term dependence on Middle East oil, but that may
be a subject, Mr. Chairman, for another day.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Woolsey can be found in the ap-
pendix on page 38.]
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Woolsey.
Dr. Keaney.
STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS A. KEANEY, EXECUTIVE DIREC-
TOR, FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Dr. KEANEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again I echo Mr.
Woolsey, it is an honor to be asked to testify before this committee
this morning.


8
But there were some similarities. When you look at Desert Fox
this past December, they were aimed at the leadership, the com-
mand and control, the weapons of mass destruction production sys-
tems. They were carried out almost entirely with precision weap-
ons, and during the Gulf War most of the attacks on those specific
targets were carried out with precision weapons. So there are some
similarities that can be looked at.
First of all, the leadership, command and control in Desert Fox,
there were some attacks against the Iraqi military, but they were
principally aimed at the Iraqi leadership of four Republican Guard
divisions, certainly not the Iraqi armed forces overall. Second of all,
Desert Fox took place, was actually a very limited operation, it took
place in only 4 days, only at night, and actually very few surprises
in the campaign, and almost all precision. There were more Toma-
hawks launched in those 4 days, Tomahawk cruise missiles, than
there were in the entire Gulf War.
Now, what are the effects of those attacks in Desert Fox this past
December? One can assume, for instance, that they were more ef-
fective than what took place in the Gulf War simply because by
1998, we had far better intelligence of what Iraqi's command and
control, their leadership targets, the weapons of mass destruction,
far more information than we had in 1991.
But when you try to measure Desert Fox bombing, that begs the
question. Compared to what? And here the answers get a bit
murky, because the stated objectives of Desert Fox were to degrade
and diminish, Saddam Hussein's ability to make and use weapons
of mass destruction, to diminish his ability to wage war against his
neighbors. Without some specific metric about how much to dimin-
ish, how much to degrade, the answer becomes an almost auto-
matic yes. In other words, as soon as the first bomb falls, you have
in fact diminished at least to some degree. So you have ensured
yourself of some success.
But I assume that the objectives that were stated were not the
only ones; that is, there was a reason for stating those for, one for
political cover, to show that the attacks were going to be a success,
but they certainly couldn’t have been the basis for the military
planning. There were unstated objectives that were just as impor-
tant; that is, to specifically weaken the regime control of its armed
forces and the control of its people; if not in Desert Fox, then cer-
tainly in the attacks since then have certainly aimed and become
an explicit part of the United States strategy since then.
Now there is some evidence that Desert Fox had some good re-
sults; that is, there were reports after Desert Fox of security forces
moving throughout the area and General Zinni mentioned there
were signs of Saddam Hussein having trouble controlling his re-
gime and maintaining control within Iraq. But if Desert Fox was
going to be more than just 4 days in December, something more
lasting has to be effective. There has to be some sort of continuing
impact than an immediate aftermath of what happened in Decem-
ber. There must be some impact, in other words, to counteract
what the most visible impact of Desert Fox was; that is, that there
is no longer an inspection regime in place. And this raises a few
questions now that this inspect regime is no longer in place of some


10
so these aircraft don't come under attack. In short, in terms of the
targeting of these systems, they have very little relationship to the
kinds of targets that were attacked in Desert Fox and the initia-
tives seems to have gone to the Iraqis.
My point is based on the fact that an air defense system, attack-
ing and destroying an air defense system is important, but it is im-
portant as an enabler to do something else. Destroying the Iraqi air
defense system simply for its own sake has not a great deal of
value, unless it opens the door to some attacks and some other
sorts of weapon systems or some other larger strategy.
For the operations themselves, a number of questions arise.
What happens when something goes wrong? Now, Iraqi air de-
fenses appear to be in pretty bad shape. In fact, the risk of an air-
craft malfunction or a midair collision is probably a greater danger
to the crews than losing them to a missile or an Iraqi aircraft. But
what happens is if you lose an aircraft and the crew is seized?
What is the response? What is going to be the next reaction? And
it is simply more retaliation.
Finally, there doesn't appear to be any difference right now be-
tween the United States and the British perspective on attacking
these targets, although the French have signed off as part of the
U.N. operations. But there are some important seams I think be-
tween the United States command that require a closer look.
Northern Watch, the forces in Turkey that are enforcing the no-fly
zone in the north are a part of the European Command; Southern
Watch is a task force of Central Command.
They are conducting essentially parallel operations with no sin-
gle command in charge; though they are confronting obviously a
single Iraqi strategy. If two commands are required, certainly great
attention is required to the principle of maintaining unity of com-
mand so that the Iraqis confront a single integrated United States
strategy in whatever is attempted against these strikes.
With that as an opening set of questions, I thank you for your
attention. I will be ready for questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Keaney can be found in the ap-
pendix on page 42.]
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. This might be a good point to break
for the vote we have. And so we will break and come right now,
Dr. Hillen, and take you up then.
[Recess.]
The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will please be in order.
Dr. Hillen, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN HILLEN, SENIOR FELLOW FOR PO-
LITICAL-MILITARY STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Dr. HILLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sny-
der, members of the committee. It is an honor to come before you
today and offer some thoughts on current United States policy to-
ward Iraq. Eight years ago today I was in southern Iraq. Indeed,
we were the northernmost unit in southern Iraq, and ironically we
were confronted with almost the same set of questions even then.


20
Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I appreciate so much your testimony today. I think
it has been excellent. I apologize that I haven’t been able to be in
all of it, because of the interruption and trouble getting back. So
you may have answered this question a dozen of times, and I apolo-
gize. I have recently had the opportunity to be in that neighbor-
hood and to visit with some of the neighbors over there, the Turks
and the Greeks and Cyprus and so forth. When you press them, al-
most to a person, you say are we accomplishing anything with
what we are doing now, our policy in Iraq, and almost to a person
the response was that, well, really we don't think you are, that we
think you are solidifying his dictatorship, that here is the guy that
is standing up to the big bully, the United States, and succeeding.
He is going right along his way, and we are exploding things and
so forth. But in reality, he is succeeding and standing up to us and
they are proud of him and it solidifies his strength.
Would each of you respond to that concept?
Dr. HILLEN. I agree with you entirely, Congressman, and much
of my testimony went to that. They get actually quite giddy in the
White House when our bombs hit their targets, and there is a lot
of self congratulations. But nobody really seems to be asking to
what end, to what does this lead, that this is not actually the end
game, and I think that has been picked up by a lot of our allies
in the region.
I think the allies are willing to be led and our experience with
the Persian Gulf allies has shown that if the United States is de-
termined and has a realizable plan and an achievable and sustain-
able objective, they will come on board. Nobody expected in August
1990 that the Gulf allies would fall in behind a huge United States
led coalition that would involve over half a million troops in Saudi
territory and an invasion.
But as soon as then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney showed
King Fahd we had a real plan and we were going to exert real
leadership and we were determined to see it through to a conclu-
sive outcome, King Fahd gave the nod. And, similarly, in the late
1970's when President Carter sent a squadron of F-15s to reinforce
Saudi Arabia, then it was leaked they were unarmed, the Saudis
were very offended and turned around and sent them home. So I
think a real key is a United States leadership.
If there is a real plan I think our allies will support it. If we con-
tinue to just kick the can down the road and take these incremen-
tal steps that may add up to nothing but may be therapeutic for
us in the meantime, I think the allies will grow tired of it.
Dr. KEANEY. Yes, two points. One, it is my opinion that Saddam
Hussein has started this—these incursions of the no-fly zone per-
haps to try to knock down a United States aircraft, British aircraft.
That would be fine, but that is not the real purpose. The real pur-
pose—the real target of this strategy I believe is both—is primarily
domestic but also international, domestic public opinion within
Iraq, in other words setting himself up as the savior of the Iraqis,
in other words that he is the only thing that is standing between
them and further destruction by this Western coalition.
To a lesser degree, I think it is international opinion, in other
words, to the allies, making him wear out, making the United


24
If the Kosovars don't sign on to it as well as the Serbs, then cer-
tainly we should not go in. But if the Kosovars agree to the auton-
omy for a period of years, structure, that we have been seeking to
negotiate and the Serbs insist on maintaining the regime of mas-
sacres essentially as they have been, I believe that given the cover
provided by NATO and the regional situation in Europe and poten-
tial instability for the rest of southeastern Europe, I think this is
a close call, but I would support, yes, going ahead and putting the
forces in.
Mr. HUNTER. All right.
Dr. HILLEN. Mr. Hunter, at the risk of jinxing myself, my col-
league and I, Bob Zoellick, have a long piece on this coming out in
tomorrow’s Washington Post on what we think should be United
States policy in Kosovo. I will just sum up some of our main points.
It appears to us that the United States right now, and this is all
very particular, are negotiating merely to put United States forces
in Kosovo without a clear end to what they might accomplish while
they are there and what the United States actually hopes to accom-
plish in the Balkan region in general.
This is a confusion of means and ends and so it relates to our
discussion on Iraq. If the goal is to stop the bleeding, we are going
to be there a long time, as we have seen the Bosnia mission drag
on. If the United States is absolutely seeking to use this power to
effect a solution insomuch as one is possible in that area of the
world, then we need to have a strategy where we treat the causes
and not the symptoms.
So we argue for a diplomatic and then possibly military strategy
down the road that isolates and weakens and seeks ultimately to
remove Slobodan Milosevic. I think one of the points that I am sure
Congress is going to address, and I hope you do, because I think
it is a big constitutional question that has flummoxed this Con-
gress in particular for the past few years is that it seems to me
that Congress never gets to vote on the merits of a military deploy-
ment, that the vote comes to you only after the decision has been
taken and then it is sort of a mom and apple pie vote just to sup-
port the troops that have already been committed.
So I would hope in your discussions and in your votes you can
get out in front of that wheel so we can restore some of the con-
stitutional balance that the founders put in in relation to where
and how and when and why American military forces should be
used.
Mr. HUNTER. OK.
Dr. KEANEY. I would be in favor of using American ground troops
if there is an agreement between Kosovars and the Serbs. I think
there is a more difficult problem if the Serbs don't agree to this.
I think at that point the issue is going to be sort—will not be do
we go in with ground troops only but do we use air power in order
to convince the Serbs they ought to do that. I think that is going
to be the tougher call.
But I think if the Serbs agree to it, I think it would be all to the
good to have United States as part of the UN-NATO force in the
region to try to enforce this divorce or to give it some time to actu-
ally take place, even without knowing whether it is going to lead
to autonomy or eventual independence for the Kosovars.


25
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Woolsey, I would like to get a little deeper
into one aspect of United States policy that you mentioned briefly.
And let me start by just laying out some facts, and then I would
like to see what your conclusions are. In 1997, Iraq exported
700,000 barrels of oil a day, and in 1998, it tripled and they ex-
ported about 2.1 million barrels of oil a day. Most of the oil ana-
lysts, industry analysts believe that Iraq is producing oil at its full
capacity. In other words, the oil for food program cap is a dollar
cap. With the low price of oil, they are getting every barrel possible
out beyond what makes economic sense and beyond what makes
geological sense for the health of their oil reservoirs.
Money is not going to feed the Iraqi people. Last week, Secretary
Cohen was quoted as talking about several hundred million dollars
of food and medicine and supplies that are stored in Iraqi ware-
houses that are not being distributed to the people. The world, as
you know, has too much oil. We overproduce roughly about a mil-
lion barrels a day, and some people have reached the conclusion
that Iraq is basically waging economic warfare against its neigh-
bors, because the amount of increased production which it supplies
doesn't make any sense really, but it does depress the price and
that hurts Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Iran and puts their econo-
mies in a real bind.
And, of course, the other thing it does is, it drops other producers
out of business, making us more dependent upon that region of the
world, and perhaps gives him more leverage in the future to ma-
nipulate the price and supply.
Do you think there is economic warfare going on here?
Mr. WOOLSEY. Most certainly. I think Saddam is a street fighter
and will use anything that he can get his hands on, and one thing
he has got his hands on is the oil for food program. I think you are
quite right, the production levels that are permitted are above
Iraq’s current actual physical capacity to pump, given the state of
its oil business now. And he almost certainly is sequestering his
largest share of those resources as he possibly can for his own per-
sonal benefit and for the benefit of those who are close to him and
loyal to him, and not seeing that most of it goes for food for the
Iraqi people, and using the deprivation of the Iraqi people as clev-
erly as he can on CNN and otherwise street demonstrations and
all the rest to try to weaken support in the Arab world and among
our allies for maintaining the sanctions.
I think he is doing all of that, doing it quite consciously and
doing it rather cleverly and I think that continuing to raise those
oil-for-food ceilings as we have in the past is an extremely short-
sighted way to buy a bit of diplomatic peace with some of our Secu-
rity Council colleagues, and they just come right back in another
few months asking for higher and higher ceilings.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. Dr. Hillen, I would like to hear your com-
ments. And also from what you have seen, does his attempt to ac-
quire weapons of mass destruction benefit from oil-for-food; if not
directly, indirectly in some way?
Dr. HILLEN. Well, absolutely indirectly, because insomuch as he
has any sort of cash at all, especially with the state of some of





32
OPENING STATEMENT
CHAIRMAN FLOYD D. SPENCE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
OPEN HEARING ON U.S. STRATEGY IN THE PERSIANGULF
MARCH 10, 1999
Today the committee begins two days of hearings on the
security challenges facing the United States in the Persian Gulf
and, in particular, relative to Iraq. Tomorrow we will hear from
Administration witnesses, but today we have a panel of outside
witnesses to help us sort through the confusion that characterizes
U.S. policy toward Iraq. Joining us are:
• The Honorable James Woolsey, the Clinton Administration’s
first Director of Central Intelligence;
• Thomas Keaney (“KEEN-ey”), Director of the Foreign Policy
Institute at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced


33
International Studies and co-director of the Air Force’s Gulf
War Air Power Survey; and
• John Hillen, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies and a decorated U.S Army veteran of the
Gulf War.
Gentlemen, we welcome you.
Many of us are deeply troubled by the course of U.S. policy
and the pattern of U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf.
Iraq and Iran are clearly determined to develop long-range ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Yet we seem to shy
away from the kinds of resolute actions required to deter and
defend against these threats, or to affect change to political
ambitions and calculations which underlie them.


39
Our role as a symbol of democracy is a powerful tool, if we will but use it. For example,
both Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel have said that Radio Free Europe was the most important
thing the United States did during the Cold War. Getting to know members of Solidarity and the
Czech Civic Forum ten years ago in Europe confirmed in my mind the practical importance of
taking a clear stand for democratic values. Yes, culture and experience with democracy are both
different in the Mid-East than they are in the West, but Asian dcrinocracics werc also rare to non-
existent until after World War II. Now we have India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the
Philippines, Mongolia. And until rather recently Latin America was a dark forest of
dictatorships, relieved by only a few flowering democracies such as Costa Rica; now change
across the entire continent has left Fidel Castro virtually alone as the remaining dictator.
Democracy is not a hot-house plant that can grow only in fifth century B.C. Athens or eighteenth
century Virginia. Where are those experts who told us yesterday that democracy was
incompatible with Asian culture or with Latin American culture? Tellingus today that
democracy won't work in the Middle East?
When we stand for a people's right to govern themselves and to defeat tyranny, we add a
lot of arrows to our quiver. Stalin once asked cynically "how many divisions does the Pope
have?" John Paul II showed Stalin's heirs that he had quite a few in the struggle over Eastern
Europe in the 1980's. If a more military reference is needed, skeptics might look up what
Napoleon said about the relative importance of the moral and the physical in war.
Finally, those who do not support moving to replacc thc Ba'athist rcgime with democracy
stress that if the regime were overthrown, Iraq might come apart -- with Iraqi Kurds joining
others from Turkey, Iran, and Syria to try to establish a Kurdish state, and with Iraqi Shia either
falling under the sway of Iran or encouraging revolt among the Shia of Saudi Arabia and the rest
of the Gulf.
Those whose judgment I value the most in these matters suggest that the Iraqi Kurds
would highly prize local autonomy with regard to language and education, within some sort of
federal structure, but that they will likely prove willing to work within the structure of an Iraqi
state. A little of the same approach that Spain has used with regard to its Basque minority would
go along way toward accommodating the Kurds in a post-Ba'athist Iraq or in democratic Turkey.
Spain has granted a great deal of autonomy with respect to Basque culture and language and has
thereby been able to split the majority of the Basque people away from the violent ETA. The
capture of Ocalan by Turkey gives it the opportunity to do the same. If Turkey, our democratic
ally, and a post-Ba'athist Iraq can both be persuaded to adopt a Spanish-type model to deal with
their Kurdish regions, it is not our problem to save either Syria or Iran from the consequences of
their oppression of their Kurdish minorities.
Concerning the role of the Shia, both Iraqi and Iranian Shia have been unfairly tarred by
the behavior of a powerful but small, and declining, faction within their division of Islam: those
who support Khamenei and the rest of the Iranian wilayat al-faqih, often translated "rule of the
jurisprudential", i.e. the theocratic and dictatorial portion of the Iranian government under first


42
be used with caution. For instance, in Desert Storm, the principal targets were the deployed Iraqi
army and the support of those units and to a lesser extent Iraqi naval and air forces. The total
number of strikes against Iraqi leadership and command and control targets was less than 5%
percent of the total; number of strikes against the nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
programs and Scud targets was just over 5%. And, the numbers support the focus of that
campaign: it was to get the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. Some were watching to see if the Iraqi
leadership would be pressured by strikes against Baghdad, but the focus by Gen. Schwarzkopf
and the Washington planners was on the Iraqi army itself, letting its destruction pressure Saddam
Hussein. Finally, the numbers of precision weapons represented only a small part of the totals.
General-purpose bombs used outnumbered laser guided bombs by more than 20 to 1, though here
the numbers can be deceiving in the other way. For the types of targets of most interest for
understanding Desert Fox—leadership and command and control targets—there was a
disproportionately higher employment of precision weapons in Desert Storm. Nearly all of the
attacks on Iraqi government leadership during Desert Storm, for instance, were by precision
weapons. In other words, Desert Storm results do have relevance for effects against these kinds
of targets.
Desert Fox of December 1998 bears some similarity to the attacks on the strategic targets
in Desert Storm. The focus was on leadership, command and control, weapons of mass
destruction (NBC category of the Gulf War) and their delivery means (Scuds). Four Republican
Guard units were attacked, but here too the emphasis was on the command and control of those
units. The attacks took place for only four days, only at night, and precision weapons were the
dominant means used. The numbers of Tomahawk cruise missiles and airborne cruise missiles
used exceeded the number used in all of Desert Storm. And, while the effects of these attacks
must be greatly speculative, one can assume that there was far better intelligence available to the
planners on these targets than was the case in 1991.
Measuring effectiveness of Desert Fox bombing, of course, begs the question of
“compared to what”, and here the answers get murky. The stated objectives were to degrade, to
diminish, and to demonstrate. Did the strikes degrade Saddam Hussein’s ability to make and use
weapons of mass destruction and diminish his ability to wage war against his neighbors?
Without some metric of how much degraded or diminished, the answer becomes an almost
automatic yes as soon as any weapons hit their target. I assume that the objectives were stated
that way for reasons of political cover, not as the basis for military planning for the attacks. I
also assume there were unstated objectives that were just as important: to weaken the regime's
control of the armed forces and the Iraqi people, for instance. If not in Desert Fox, such
objectives have become much more an explicit part of US strategy since then. For both sets of
objectives, stated and unstated, there is some evidence that Desert Fox was quite effective. For
example in the immediate aftermath of Desert Fox, there were reports of Iraqi security forces
moving throughout the country, and General Zinni stated that there were signs that Saddam was
having problems. But for Desert Fox to be deemed truly successful there needs to be some
continuing impact, aside from the immediate effects of what took place during four days in
December. There must be some effects to counteract at least one visible effect of the bombing
campaign—that the inspection regime is now no longer in place. The line of inquiry I would
have for the those responsible, now almost three months after Desert Fox, would be (a) whether