ºf a nº sle A-2001-2009/A42 [H.A.S.C. No. 107-46] N DIEGO |||||||| 333 Ö2885 0576 UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION HEARING HELD SEPTEMBER 10, 18, 19, 26, AND OCTOBER 2, 2002 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 83–011 WASHINGTON : 2003 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS BOB STUMP, Arizona, Chairman DUNCAN HUNTER, California JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah CURTWELDON, Pennsylvania JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado JIM SAXTON, New Jersey JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York TERRY EVERETT, Alabama ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland HOWARD P. “BUCK" McKEON, California J.C. WATTS, JR., Oklahoma MAC THORNBERRY, Texas JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina JIM RYUN, Kansas BOB RILEY, Alabama JIM GIBBONS, Nevada ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico KEN CALVERT, California ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia ED SCHROCK, Virginia W. TODD AKIN, Missouri RANDY FORBES, Virginia JEFF MILLER, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina IKE SKELTON, Missouri JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas LANE EVANS, Illinois GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts ROBERTA. UNDERWOOD, Guam ROD R. BLAGOJEWICH, Illinois SILVESTRE REYES, Texas THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine VIC SNYDER, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington LORETTA SANCHEZ, California JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California ROBERTA. BRADY, Pennsylvania ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey BARON P. HILL, Indiana MIKE THOMPSON, California JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut SUSAN A. DAVIS, California JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island RICK LARSEN, Washington ROBERT S. RANGEL, Staff Director MARK ESPER, Professional Staff Member JUSTIN BERNIER, Research Assistant (II) C O N T E N T S HEARINGS: Tuesday, September 10, 2002, State of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Program and the History of the United Nations Inspection Efforts in Iraq ... 1 Wednesday, September 18, 2002, U.S. Policy Toward jºb --------------------------------- 75 Thursday, September 19, 2002, Iraq's Weapons Mass Destruction Program and Technology Exports ...................................................................................... 177 Thursday, September 26, 2002, U.S. Policy Toward Iraq .................................... 285 Wednesday, October 2, 2002, U.S. Policy Toward Iraq ........................................ 341 APPENDIXES: Tuesday, September 10, 2002 ................................................................................. 53 Wednesday, September 18, 2002 ............................................................................ 133 Thursday, September 19, 2002 ............................................................................... 215 Thursday, September 26, 2002 ............................................................................... 325 Wednesday, October 2, 2002 ................................................................................... 381 TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2002 STATE OF IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM AND THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS INSPECTION EFFORTS STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California .................................... 1 Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services .................................................................................... 2 WITNESSES Kay, Dr. David, Former United Nations Chief Weapons Inspector in Iraq ........ 3 Spertzel, Dr. Richard O., Former Head of the Biology Section, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq ................................................................................ APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Hunter, Hon. Duncan ....................................................................................... 57 Kay, Dr. David .................................................................................................. 68 Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 59 Spertzel, Dr. Richard O. ................................................................................... 62 Documents SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Documents submitted.] QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Questions submitted.] WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2002 U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California .................................... 75 (III) IV Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services .................................................................................... WITNESSES Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff........................ Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., U.S. Secretary of Defense ......................................... APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Hunter, Hon. Duncan ....................................................................................... Myers, Gen. Richard B. .................................................................................... Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H. ............................................................................... Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Documents submitted.] QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: Mr. Graham ...................................................................................................... Page 175 THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2002 IRAQ'S WEAPONS MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM AND TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California .................................... Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services .................................................................................... WITNESSES Hamza, Khidhir, Former Iraqi Nuclear Engineer, Director, Council on Middle Eastern Affairs ..................................................................................................... Milhollin, Gary, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control ............. APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Hamza, Khidhir ................................................................................................ Hunter, Hon. Duncan ....................................................................................... Kyl, Senator Jon ............................................................................................... Milhollin, Gary .................................................................................................. Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: Atomic Bomb and Missile Builders ................................................................. Beefing Up the Scud Missile: Who Helped? ................................................... Commentary Magazine, October issue ........................................................... Iraqs Bomb, Chip by Chip ............................................................................... Iraq's Purchases in the A-Bomb Supermarket ............................................... Licensing Mass Destruction Report ................................................................ New York Times op-ed, Monday September 16, 2002 ................................... New York Times, Week in Review, September 15, 2002 .............................. Saddam Hussein Collected Nuts and Bolts and Lethality for his Scuds from the Nations that Deplored Him .......................................................... Who Armed Iraq” Answers the West Didn't Want to Hear .......................... 177 178 183 180 V QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2002 U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California .................................... Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services .................................................................................... WITNESSES Clark, Gen. Wesley K., U.S. Army (Retired) ......................................................... Perle, Richard, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute ........................ APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Clark, Gen. Wesley K. ...................................................................................... Hunter, Hon. Duncan ....................................................................................... Perle, Richard ................................................................................................... Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Documents submitted.] QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Questions submitted.] WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2002 U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services .................................................................................... Weldon, Hon. Curt, a Representative from Pennsylvania .................................... WITNESSES Cohen, Eliot A., Professor and Director of Strategic Studies, The School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University ....................... Margelov, Mikhael, Chairman, International Affairs Committee, Russian Fed- eration Council ..................................................................................................... O'Hanlon, Michael, Senior Fellow, the Brookings Institution ............................. Page 283 285 286 289 287 342 341 343 APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Cohen, Eliot A. .................................................................................................. O'Hanlon, Michael ............................................................................................ Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. Weldon, Hon. Curt ............................................................................................ DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Documents submitted.] QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Questions submitted.] 343 348 STATE OF IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM AND THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED NA- TIONS INSPECTION EFFORTS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, September 10, 2002. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 4:05 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNLA Mr. HUNTER. The committee will come to order. Today, on the di- rection of our chairman, Bob Stump, the Committee on Armed Services meets in open session to discuss weapons inspections in Iraq with specific emphasis on the experiences of the United Na- tions Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) from 1991 through 1998. Today's hearing marks the first of a number of planned public sessions designed to educate and inform the committee and the American people on the various issues surrounding Iraq's contin- ued violation of numerous United Nations (U.N.) resolutions, its il- licit development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States, the Middle East, and the international community. In fact, the committee received a classified briefing from the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) earlier this afternoon after the hearing we just closed on Iraqi threats; and we will hear from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld next Wednesday morning, September 18, on many of these same matters. Our witnesses this afternoon, however, are Dr. David Kay, former United Nations chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq– and, Dr. Kay, thank you for being with us today; Dr. Richard O. Spertzel, former head of the biology section of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq–and, Doctor, thank you for being with us today. We welcome you and thank you for appearing on such short notice. The committee looks forward to your testimony. But before we ask you to give your opening remarks, I want to invite Mr. Skelton, the ranking Democrat on the committee, to offer any comments he might have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 57.] (1) 3 And, Dr. Kay, thank you for being with us. The floor is yours, SII’. STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID KAY, FORMER UNITED NATIONS CHIEF WEAPONS INSPECTOR IN IRAQ Dr. KAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of moving this along and getting to what I know you are interested in, I submitted a statement for the record and I propose to make just the briefest of comments to allow maximum time for you to ask your questions. I think that would probably be the way that would get us through this afternoon by the most effective means possible. Let me just start with a couple of very broad, general comments, because I think they are central to what you are going to be deal- ing with in your set of hearings. The first is to understand the wide extent of the Iraqi weapons program, and nuclear, which I will be talking about, that we found when we entered in 1991 and the ex- tent to which it was a surprise. I led the teams that went into Iraq initially after the war that discovered the enrichment procedure, the calutron, their initial cen- trifuge program, and eventually spent four days as a guest of Saddam's state in a Baghdad parking lot for my endeavors. The briefings we received prior to going in from national intelligence services both in the West and in the Middle East did not point to- ward any large Iraqi nuclear program. Indeed, what we found was a program that had employed over 20,000 people, had cost well OVer § billion, had gone on for longer than a decade, had 24 major sites, most of which were not known prior to the war, nor were they bombed during the course of the war. It was unknown. Now, the reason that is important is for two reasons, and it should warn you how much you can know from intelligence from the outside. But, second, it describes the task of understanding and unmasking such a program. For Iraq, by 1991 when we entered the program, their nuclear program was not a program of facilities that you could destroy. Iraq had understood, had conquered, all the secrets of producing a nuclear weapon. They had understood enrichment technology, and they were well on their way to very large enrichment facilities. I will never forget on the second mission at a facility called Al Furat, which would have been, if completed, if the war had not in- tervened, the largest centrifuge facility in the entire—larger than any one in Western Europe. Only the Soviet Union had a larger fa- cility. This facility was not known prior to the war. It was not de- stroyed, not attacked, even during the course of the war. The Iraq nuclear program is made up not of facilities. It is made up of a large technical group of experts who unraveled all of the science from enriching to fabricating the device, to getting a work- able—not a design that I would be happy to see the U.S. any longer employ, but not terribly different than our first nuclear weapons design. This is a program that is in the fabric of society. As long as the government wants to maintain it, it will maintain it, and it is too large to extract by simply destroying facilities. The second thing I think that experience has taught me is how one cannot—how difficult it is to put it in a positive sense for na- 4 tional intelligence, staring from the outside without human sources inside a program, to understand it. Now, this isn’t the first time we have learned that lesson. U.S. intelligence did not know of a very large Soviet biological weapons program conducted during the Cold War, which led to the Soviets putting smallpox on the ends of intercontinental missiles. The U.S. missed the size of the Soviet nuclear program by a factor of two- and-a-half. The program for producing enriched uranium in the So- viet Union was two-and-a-half times greater than the classified es- timate at the end of the Cold War. WMD programs are inherently hard to get evidence of where they are. And, the other point I would emphasize before stopping here is that in beginning to think about how one would describe Iraq's program—nuclear program—you have to recognize serious impediments that all of us faced in trying to unravel it. On-site inspection in Iraq carried out by UNSCOM faced a seri- ous, organized, and I would say world-class deception, denial, and clandestine hiding program by the Iraqis. This had started before the war, and it certainly got better during the inspections as they played against UNSCOM inspectors. Even when we penetrated the deception and clandestine nature of this program at the final stage, we would then be frustrated in carrying out the inspection. They would block physical access to us and invite us to spend four days in a parking lot or outside a facility and deny us entry. There is much about that program that we never successfully un- raveled. As long as there is a government in power in Iraq that wants to keep an inspection service away from its prohibited pro- grams, it will do it unless—tremendous resources, actually re- Sources beyond anything I can imagine. And, let me just tell you briefly some of the resources that we had available. During the period that I was there and Dr. Spertzel was there, UNSCOM had at its disposal two helicopters to move inspectors around the whole country. This is a country that is twice the size of the State of Idaho. There were many sites we didn’t visit more than once because we simply, logistically, couldn’t put inspectors out there or couldn't put them out there faster than the Iraqis could move material around there. We generally had no more than about 100 people at the max in country as inspectors. We had gaps between when the inspection teams were there. If you ask for evidence of where the nuclear program is today, there is a lack of physical evidence to exactly describe the state today, because the Iraqis have gone to great lengths to keep us from obtaining that physical evidence. But, what we can say with a great deal of certainty is, they have solved all the intellectual problems of producing nuclear weapons. They are facing some physical, technical production problems, but given time and money, which they have plenty of, I don’t think any of us who were there doubt that they will solve those problems eventually as long as there is a government in power committed to having those prob- lems. And that, for me, is the bottom line of where I come to, where should we go next? If you are concerned about Iraq, an Iraq that produces and has nuclear weapons, even though I can’t tell you—and I will be the first to tell you, I can't tell you at what exact point in time they 5 will have them—then you have to recognize, you have to deal with changing a regime. Saddam Hussein, for example, has forgone over $120 billion in oil revenue he could have had if he had simply com- plied with the inspection process and gotten sanctions off. To shield and protect that program, this is at the forefront of his desires for his political reasons in the region. So, it is a well-shielded and pro- tected problem. Let me share and conclude with my worry. We have spent—cer- tainly I have spent, almost entirely, my adult life worrying about threats to the United States that come primarily from states that have military regimes, size that looks very much like us, the Soviet Union and a few other countries. We are now facing, and 9/11 should have reminded us, a group of countries that do not have military regimes that look at us, that may decide to come at us in very novel ways if we give them enough time. Training pilots in the United States, seizing aircraft, crashing them into buildings is a novel delivery way. Believe me, I can tell you, although I would prefer not to do it in open session, novel ways of delivering nuclear and radiation disposal devices that we never thought of because that was not the type of military we wanted to build, nor was it the type of military the Soviet Union decided to build to oppose us. Iraq poses that tough problem of a country, if you give them enough time, the government remains extremely hostile to the United States and our allies and devotes tremendous amount of money to acquiring weapons of mass destruction. They will eventu- ally surprise us in ways that will be terribly painful. And, in the area that I am concerned with, that is, nuclear, that means a much larger number of people potentially killed than were killed a year ago tragically. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am prepared to answer questions. Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Kay can be found in the Appen- dix on page 68.] Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Spertzel. STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD O. SPERTZEL, FORMER HEAD OF THE BIOLOGY SECTION, UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMIS- SION ON IRAQ Dr. SPERTZEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also will attempt to be brief. I could simply say that I agree with everything that Dr. Kay has just said. Having done that, I will cite a few examples from the biological program. The biological or ex-biological warfare program was among the most secretive of the weapons of mass destruction programs. It began in the early 1970s. It would appear immediately after or cer- tainly within a few months of them signing the Biological Weapons Convention. It was organized initially under the Iraqi intelligence service, and except for a few brief years in the mid-1980s, it re- mained under the intelligence service and, later, the special secu- rity organization, including up through 1990-91, and probably pres- ently today. In 1991, Iraq's biological weapons (BW) program was in an accel- erating expansion phase; and it was not obliterated, as stated by 6 Iraq, and there is ample evidence that UNSCOM uncovered to sup- port that. Its bacterial BW capabilities were well established, in- cluding its ability for production, concentration, spray-drying, and delivery to produce a readily dispersible small-particle aerosol. Iraq had demonstrated an anticrop and mycotoxin capability and was developing a viral capability. It had developed both short- range and intermediate-range weapons delivery capability, and the agents included lethal, incapacitating, as well as agricultural and economic weapons, a well-balanced program. Interestingly, Iraq's aflatoxin was in its long-term carcinogenic and liver toxicity effect rather than any short-term effect. That is not something that a na- tion-state would develop for military purposes. Your guess is as good as mine of what they might have had in mind for the develop- ment of aflatoxin. Their program, from the very beginning, included both a military portion and what appeared to be a terrorist application. Iraq’s BW program, like the nuclear, was so well known by the intelligence service that not one of its production sites was hit by a single bomb in 1991. Iraq still maintains and retains the necessary personnel, equip- ment, and supplies to have an expanded capability. Even after the destruction in 1996 of its major bacterial production facility, Al Hakam complex, the production team, the key—what I would call “middle managers”—remained intact as a unit and began to work for the national monitoring director, which was the Iraqi equiva- lent to UNSCOM in Iraq. It is my opinion that Iraq's greatest threat to the U.S., and cer- tainly the U.S. homeland, is in the production of agents, bacterial agents, to be used by terrorists. They have the capability, they have the motive, and you know as well as I what their opportunity might be, because the terrorist delivery of biological weapons is something that, in my opinion, the U.S. Government cannot pre- vent from happening. All we can do is minimize the effects if and when such an event occurs. Like Dr. Kay, I don't care how good your inspectors are, if you have a regime that is determined to deny, to deceive, the inspectors don’t have a chance. Even when Iraq was allegedly forthcoming with their program in July and August of 1995, the first team in to collect details of their program and in support of things they were saying, they supplied falsified documents. In December of 1998, one of the last BW inspections in Iraq, they presented as evi- dence to us, for a point they were making, a document that had allegedly existed since 1992, but in point of fact, it didn’t take much analysis to indicate that it was probably written on the 9th or 10th of December of 1998. I am going to end my presentation with a little anecdote. I am not particularly noted for my tact, and on one occasion, I couldn't take the lying anymore and I said to the individual, I said, “you know that we know you are lying, so why are you doing it?” And the individual very huffily straightened himself up and said, “Dr. Spertzel, it is not a lie when you are ordered to lie.” Where do you go from there? I think with that, Mr. Chairman, let us get on with the ques- tions. 7 [The prepared statement of Dr. Spertzel can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 62.] Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Spertzel, thank you very much. Thank you for your testimony. And, Dr. Kay, you have indicated they have the team that can put together a nuclear weapon and that that team is intact in Iraq. In your opinion, just from your knowledge of the weapons program and our interruption of that program and the capability of the peo- ple that they have in Iraq, the technicians and the scientists, what do you think in terms of how far away they are from having a sys- tem? What is your best estimate? Give us a conservative look and a more liberal look. Dr. KAY. By training, I am taught to separate what I know from what I believe and from what I know, knowing it by methods that I would call part of the scientific tradition and my beliefs often from experience, so let me try to separate that out. The key missing component of the Iraqi nuclear weapons pro- gram is exactly what has been the key for everyone who has tried to develop nuclear weapons. Nature did not make it easy for us to get the fissile material that is the explosive part of a nuclear weap- on. There are two ways that Iraq has to do it, and there is ample evidence that they have explored both. The first is a straightforward way of trying to produce it yourself. And, that is what they were doing prior to 1991 as their principal means of doing it. The best estimate I have seen and which cor- responds with mine is one issued earlier this year by the German intelligence service, which said, based on the procurements that they had detected in Western Europe by Iraqi agents—and let me stress we are talking about those that have been detected, and what you don’t know is what you haven’t detected and that is what should probably worry you more—that on their bases it would take Iraq three to six years to produce enough nuclear material for one or two devices of the initial design that we had found. That, in many ways, is a conservative estimate because that initial design required a lot more nuclear material than the second or third de- sign would require if you knew what you were doing; and these were people who wouldn't learn what they were doing. The difficulty with giving you that estimate is, I don’t know when that three-to-six-year period started. Did it start when the in- spectors left in 1998 or is it starting, as some people would like to say, maybe not until today? And the bounding of that estimate is, we could be within that three-to-six-year period now, or it could start sometime later. I tend to view—and I stress this as a belief—there is evidence for it and there is evidence missing, which concerns me a great deal—when you look at their procurement activities, such as the recently reported aluminum tubes, but there have been others that have been detected. It strikes me that you are going after a pro- gram for which they are moving ahead already, so the three-to-six- year period has already started. The second way of obtaining nuclear material is by obtaining fissile material that someone else has produced. And, in this case, the most obvious way is the insecurity and corruption that sur- rounds the former program of the Soviet Union. 8 I indicated to you that we missed, or the U.S. intelligence service misunderstood, the size of the Soviet program. I have dealt directly with Russians since the fall of communism. Let me tell you, they don’t know how much they produced; and that is one reason that you have appropriated so much money for the threat reduction pro- gram to try to bring some security to that. The frightening thing about that statement—and we are talking roughly, let us say 20 to 40 pounds, if you want to use the English system of measurement, of highly enriched uranium, essentially less than a football size—I have, based on my experience, no reason to believe that our or any other intelligence service, would be able to tell you whether—when they have acquired that, if they have ac- quired that. That would require the type of resolution that you don’t get out of high altitude or satellite photography. The only way you would know it is if you had someone inside the program. So, that means they could have it at any time. Now, this would be a crude device. It would not be one that you would be happy to appropriate money for us having in our inven- tory. But believe me, in terms of the intimidation of one's neighbors and perhaps even an effective intimidation of the United States, the Iraqis might well be happy with one. How much would it take to have two, three and four? You are talking about amounts that depend on design. Mr. HUNTER. What would be the killing power of that device that you just described? Dr. KAY. Depends on where you put it and how you put it. A ground burst is the least effective way to employ a nuclear device. You would like an altitude that we had at Hiroshima and Naga- saki. But on the other hand, in a port area like the Port of Long Beach, Los Angeles, the Port of Newark or the New York Port Au- thority, Norfolk, any number of places, interface on a ship between water and ground, it would be in probably tens of thousands, de- pending on where you do it. You know, so much of this depends on the absolute employment technique. But let me tell you if you employed it in the Middle East, a single nuclear device going off in Saudi Arabia, the casual- ties would not just be in the crop dust from radiation from the de- vice, the societies could not stand up to that sort of destruction and political threat. So you would have a sea change of immense size, just the threat of doing it. As I said, there are innovative ways of delivering these that do not require ships, aircraft or missiles that one could imagine. So, that is what you are talking about. The essential element—I am sorry for being so long on this—is the imprecision of the estimate that you have to get used to dealing with. We have a government that is trying to deceive us and con- ceal the program they have and that places extraordinary stress on, whether it be inspectors or intelligence services, to try to pene- trate that concealment and deception. Based on our failure to do it prior to 1991, based on our numerous failures to penetrate a So- viet deception program, I have no confidence that we will know in advance of their declaration or use of a weapon, whether they have it. 9 Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Dr. Kay. And, I am going to go now to Mr. Skelton, the ranking member. After we do that, I am going to ask our members, any member that didn’t get a question in the last two-hour classified briefing, we are going to let them go and ask the next question before we move on. So, Mr. Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, gentlemen, for your very pointed testi- mony. You obviously had some success as inspectors. Can you very briefly tell us of the success and the destruction of any weapons of mass destruction or parts thereof that you found? Dr. SPERTZEL. In your question, there was success, to start with, with the biological program; the admission was forced onto Iraq by the efforts of a special commission. I sat across from the biological people that Iraq presented to us in February of 1995 and laid out the U.N. position, UNSCOM’s position, and that is that they had an offensive program that included weaponization and a lot more facilities than just a few that they had named. It took another five months of political pressure, if you like, through the Security Coun- cil, to get Iraq to acknowledge an offensive program on the first of July of 1995. And then, along comes Hussein Kamal's defection, and they ex- panded that and also, additional information on the other pro- grams. And, yes, we were able to destroy a few of their facilities, but that was offset, at least in a frustrating sense, by the information that we knew we had that they had imported critical material, in- cluding a 5,000 liter fermentation plant. And, with the names asso- ciated with that procurement action, it should have gone to the Al Hakam complex. It did not. It was and presumably still is somewhere in Iraq, but in spite of having solid evidence of its coming into Iraq, we couldn't force Iraq to acknowledge it; and regrettably, the support of the Se- curity Council by the time we obtained that information was wan- ing. And, when you have two members of the permanent five (P5) who are probably more interested in economic exchange with Iraq than they are with eliminating the weapons of mass destruction, you can’t have much success as a U.N. inspector. Mr. SKELTON. Let me ask, in your opinion and from your knowl- edge, what is different today in the nature or urgency of the threat than was true some, say, four years ago. Dr. SPERTZEL. Well, let me make a quick synopsis of four years ago. As I indicated in my opening statement, that they had retained the people as an intact unit, they had developed the indigenous ca- pability of making the necessary growth medium that they needed. And, when they were able to restore some of the mechanical shops that had been destroyed in December of 1998, they had the indige- nous capability of making the necessary fermenters, spray dryers, centrifuges and so on—in other words, everything they needed. Now, a number of things have happened, actually even before 1998, but certainly it would be expected to be continuing, and that is, in 1997 a couple of key people had some mysterious comings and goings. One of them was the dean of the College of Science at the 10 University of Baghdad, whose nameplate was still on the office door, but obviously a cleaned up office; and Iraq claimed that they had no idea where this individual was, where I knew where she was. She was outside of Iraq collecting state-of-the-art equipment for genetic engineering, including the necessary materials, re- agents, including restriction enzymes. Now, at the same time, Dr. Hazam Ali, the head of the virus por- tion, suddenly resigned his position at one location, the Razi Insti- tute, and was allegedly an instructor at the College of Veterinary Medicine, but when our team went there he wasn’t there; they never heard of him recently. And then, the Iraqis told us, “Oh, no, he was at the College of Medicine.” Then he was at the College of Science and then he was at the College of Medicine. We never really knew where the heck he was, but if we asked to interview him, they could easily produce him. At the same time, another individual, the head of the department of biotechnology at the University of Baghdad, also had some strange disappearance from his laboratory. This is rather ominous to me. You put a first-rate biologist together with a couple genetic engineers, you can only guess what may be the results of that. You couple that with what is rather good circumstantial evidence that Iraq was messing around with smallpox and maybe they were try- ing to duplicate some of the Soviet studies. Mr. SKELTON. Dr. Kay. Dr. KAY. Mr. Skelton, that is an extremely good question, and let me start with addressing what we destroyed because I shared with a number of other inspectors from UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a considerable pride with regard to the accomplishments: the physical destruction of what was de- stroyed, that is, two major uranium enrichment processes using electromagnetic isotope separation and centrifuge process in which we destroyed immense numbers of buildings and materials. I re- member two days, because I was worried that the Iraqis would steal the material after we left, of crushing centrifuge tubes and rings for doing that. A lot of physical facilities that then existed were destroyed. What we did not destroy—and, in fact, let me say we destroyed more physical facilities of the Iraqi nuclear program during the course of the inspection than were destroyed by coalition air power during the course of the war, and we destroyed many that were un- known to coalition air power during the course of the war. So, I have a great sense of accomplishment, and I share it with a lot of other people who played major roles in doing that. But, let me tell you what we didn’t do, and that is what worries me and gets to the second part of your question of why I am wor- ried today more than I was four years ago. We didn’t get the for- eign suppliers. We were not able to unravel, and they refused to make available the full list of the people who had provided them the technology. We now know partly, because of what has hap- pened in the last four years, some of those suppliers have been con- tinuing to provide them with supplies. We managed to capture in the document for which we spent four days in a parking lot, we captured their initial weapons design, which is a workable design. 11 Now, this was dated two years before the date of that inspection. No nuclear weapons program that we know about has ever stopped with its first design. You get a design you know will work and then you start making it smaller, more effective and hopefully more re- sistant to accidents. So my experience in Iraq leaves me somewhat dubious about their concern for safety. They refused to give up any additional de- sign documents saying very plausibly and contrary to some evi- dence we had, “Well, we didn’t do any more design work, you’ve got it.” Third, we captured some of the personnel records. They refused to give us a full list and to give us access to the people who had been involved in their program other than those that we discovered and knew about. So why am I worried? I am worried because we see indications that they have continued their foreign procurement. We know they have kept the teams together and working in the same physical fa- cilities. We know how good they are. And believe me, we had no authority—I would love to have had a stack of green cards to offer to Iraqi scientists and say, “Come to the United States; you will have a good life,” and hand them out. That would probably have been far more effective at dismantling the program than two days spent crushing centrifuge tubes. I didn't even have the authority. And, Dr. Spertzel can tell you about the even more severe restric- tions he followed, because I was lucky. I was in the early days and I could do some things he couldn't. I was limited in the interroga- tion I could carry out with Iraqi scientists, limited by international rules. I would love to have sweated them—read them the Miranda rights, but then legally sweated them to find out what they really knew. I didn't know that. And believe me, if you ever worked on a weapons program, you know human capital is what is important. Destroy machines, I will just buy better ones; there are better ones coming on the market every day. And if you take the U.S. enrichment program and compare that to that of our European allies; we have in two gas infused plants— I hope they are not in your districts—dinosaurs of plants. The Eu- ropeans came later and they developed centrifuge designs that are far better at producing uranium than ours. And let me conclude what really worries me. We did the Iraqis a tremendous favor by destroying what we found, in the sense we taught them what we could find, and they learned how to conceal, deceive and deny to us a program that is going to be probably a lot smaller, but a lot harder for us to ever have detailed knowledge of; and that is what worries me today more than it did 4 years ago. I hope that is responsive. Mr. SKELTON. My last question is one that is troubling and un- pleasant. In the news, we have seen the last few days, a fellow in- spector, Scott Ritter, that is saying that this is not a threat or a problem to the United States or our allies. Do you care to comment, both of you? Dr. KAY. I don’t know if “care” is the word I would use. Let me not—let me just say that if you go back and read the tes- timony that Scott Ritter gave before Congress in 1998 after he re- signed and compare it to what he is saying today, either he lied 12 to you then or he is lying now. It is your choice. But his testimony on the Hill was a detailed indictment of the Iraqi program not at all dissimilar from what Dr. Spertzel and I are telling you today. He has gone completely the other way. I cannot explain it on the basis of the known facts. Mr. SKELTON. Dr. Spertzel. Dr. SPERTZEL. Pretty much the same thing. I have heard Scott make statements about the Iraq's biological program saying it is 95 percent destroyed. Two questions come to mind; one is, how does he know what is 100 percent, because I don’t, and I don’t think— I don’t think any of the other biological inspectors knew. And second, how many biological sites did he visit? Certainly, prior to 1999, the answer is none. He hasn’t the foggiest idea of Iraq's biological, chemical, and nuclear program. That wasn't his forte; it wasn't what he was doing. Why he is doing what he is doing now, as Dr. Kay mentioned, compared to what he was saying four years ago and what he is say- ing now, he is either lying now or lied to an awful lot of us four and five years ago. Mr. SKELTON. You both have been very helpful. Thank you. Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask folks on the second row who didn’t get a chance in the last hearing to ask a question here. Mr. Graham, did you ask a question last time? Why don't you go head, and we will go down to Mr. Allen. Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you. Appreciate you both coming. In trying to absorb all this, you have a gentleman who served with you speaking in Baghdad today, and Mr. Skelton asked about that. And, if you listen to him, it is very foolish for us to put the world at risk by engaging Iraq in a decisive manner. If we listen to both of you, we are stupid to try and even inspect again. And in all honesty, if we re-entered Iraq tomorrow, knowing what you know based on your experience, what degree of con- fidence do you have that anything would change in terms of us knowing the threat that Saddam Hussein presents to this country? Dr. KAY. If I could start, if you entered tomorrow as an inspector, as long as the present regime is in power, he is determined to maintain its weapons program and engage in the deception and de- nial program, I have little confidence that we could find that pro- gram in its entirety. Mr. GRAHAM. Unless Saddam Hussein changes who he is and the way he believes, it is a fruitless effort? Dr. KAY. And that gets to my second point, in dealing with what seems to be a considerable difference between the testimony we have given and what Scott has said. The best evidence I would suggest you look at is Saddam Hus- sein. If he had no weapons of mass destruction, why would he not let the inspectors in with full rein? And yet, we can describe, in chapter and verse, the concealment, deception/denial techniques that were used that range from physical intimidation and force all the way up to much more subtle and technologically sophisticated methods to conceal. If you are not engaged in a prohibited activity, why would you forego $120 billion of oil revenue? I think the best evidence that 13 there is something there is the evidence of the perpetrator of the crime and his behavior. Mr. GRAHAM. Sharing technology and weapons of mass destruc- tion with terrorists, during your time in Iraq, did you find any evi- dence that there was a connection between Iraq and terrorist orga- nizations anywhere in the world in terms of sharing chemical bio- logical or nuclear materials? Dr. KAY. I was not looking for it. I was looking for the origins of the Iraqi program, where they got their technology. I know of no evidence during the period of the inspections on the nuclear side that would indicate that. But, I must say, don’t take absence of I don't take absence of evidence to be absence of their being some- thing there. What Dr. Spertzel referred to earlier—remember, when some of you were of the age when you have gone through with your chil- dren the answer, as they prepare for the Scholastic Aptitude Test, and it is hard to convince them that they ought to pay attention to “D, none of the above.” I don’t know what 100 percent of their activities were because they engaged in activities designed to keep me from knowing what 100 percent of their activities were. So, we didn't observe it. That is all I am telling you. Dr. SPERTZEL. I would like to respond a little bit on the biology side. We had suggestions, we were told categorically that that was not the mandate of 687 and that whatever information we got, we had to tread lightly and not make a point of having that be a primary purpose. However, in the case of wheat cover smut that program started, it was intended for what I would call “agriterrorism” against at least one of its neighbors with whom they were at war at the time. Mr. GRAHAM. Last question: President Bush says that in terms of Iraq, time is not on our side. Do you agree with that statement? Do you believe that if we do nothing, five years from now he is a bigger threat or lesser threat? Dr. KAY. I certainly agree that time is not on our side. When we talk about someone who is actively engaged in development of a nuclear program, time is not on our side. The acquisition of a nu- clear weapon in the hands of Saddam Hussein not only would pose a greater threat to the United States and our friends and allies in . region, it would change in ways that are really largely unknow- able. The political competition, for example, imagine—we tend to view the Iranians as a threat against ourselves. If you ever dealt with the Iranians after the Iran-Iraq war, more than 500,000 Iranian young men died defending their country against Saddam Hussein's attack. The Iranian weapons of mass destruction program is de- signed as much against the Iraqis as it is anything to do with us. If we allow it to continue, you are talking about a major arms race in the Middle East that I find it difficult to understand the con- sequence of Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Allen. 14 Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, gentlemen, thank you very much for being here. I appreciate your testimony, and I want to say at the outset, I do definitely share your concern about the Iraqi program—the various programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. It is clearly something we need to deal with. We have in Saddam Hussein, someone who can’t be trusted, who º play by the rules and causes problems in the region and for UlS all. But, I wanted to ask you in particular about what I regard as the evidence for your conclusion—particularly, I will pick on you, Dr. Kay, because it is in your testimony, and that has to do with the attribution to Saddam Hussein of an intention to use weapons of mass destruction in the next few years against the United States. And let me just point out why this is important. The question of how quickly we need to move is related not just to capability, but also to whether or not we can see it is in Saddam Hussein's interest to move against his allies or against the United States; and obviously that is a matter of judgment. We have to make a calculation, and there are risks involved in any judgment. But the amount of time is an important issue in deciding what the appropriate strategy is. And in your testimony, Dr. Kay, you said near the end, what is clear is that unless we take immediate steps to address the issue of removing Saddam's regime from power in Iraq, we will soon face a nuclear-armed and -emboldened Sad- dam. With time—and we can never be sure of how long that will be—Saddam will be able to intimidate his neighbors with nuclear weapons and find the means to use them against the United States. And you refer to the first use of these weapons against the United States and its friends in saying, you know, that is likely to COIne. As I put together the kinds of testimony we have heard here and what we have read in the newspapers, the Iraqi military is de- scribed as much weakened after the Gulf War. The morale of its regular troops, at least, is diminished. There isn’t the same kind of capability there was before. U.S. and British planes fly over the northern part of the country, over the southern part of the country periodically attacking defense installations. How do we get from a Saddam Hussein, as he is contained and hemmed in by U.S. and British air forces right now, to a Saddam Hussein who is likely within a short period of time not just to in- timidate, but to use, particularly, nuclear weapons against either allies or the United States? It is that leap that I have some trouble with, and I wonder if you could sort of give us any information, any evidence you have, to support the conclusion. Dr. KAY. Well, let me address that directly and let me say we are talking about willingness to run risks and judgments. First of all, I would suggest one should be careful about assum- ing that Saddam acts in a rational calculus that you and I would share. Quite frankly, I don’t think you or I would have invaded Ku- wait. It wasn’t worth it; it was an extraordinary risk. Having faced him and dealt with him on the ground, let me tell you, if you want to talk about evil, the way he has ruled his people with unconstraint—I mean, one of the ironies of Scott appearing 15 before the Iraqi parliament is that if there is ever an oxymoron that does not deserve to be in the same sentence, it is “parliament” with Iraq. He is not constrained by the normal political forces that you and I are. What worries me, and it is my—that reflects my belief that we should not run that sort of risk, that, in fact, once he obtains a weapon—and I think the evidence is overwhelming of his attempts to obtain all of these weapons—if he is successful—and I have, per- haps less than you, not a great deal of confidence in the security system around the former Soviet Union. I am amazed that someone hasn't penetrated it yet— Mr. ALLEN. Can I stop you for just a minute? I agree with what you are saying about him and the way he op- erates and certainly the way he operates in his own country. My question is, what evidence is there that Saddam Hussein is likely to make an offensive move against either his allies or the United States? Is there any evidence to support that kind of purpose? Dr. KAY. I read his statements about the destruction of the state of Israel, and his support in supporting suicide bombers as an indi- vidual who, if he had the weapon, would use it. I think if you ask the Iranians, “Do you believe if Saddam had nuclear weapons at the time of the Iran-Iraq war, would he have used them?” He used everything else he had. I just—and maybe I am reflecting 9/11; I mean, that is all burned into our consciousness. I would not run the risk of an indi- º with his track record having the ability to inflict tremendous arD1. You might be right. We might be able to deter him. I don’t think like “mights” when you are talking about nuclear weapons in the hands of people like Saddam Hussein. Dr. SPERTZEL. I would like to add one thing on the bio side. You have to have an understanding from the BW side that a country like Iraq could conduct a terrorist—a bioterrorist action in the U.S. and have complete, plausible deniability. Trying to pin it down, an agent, as coming from a laboratory or even a country is a virtually impossible task. We may have already been hit by something that was made in Baghdad, and I am referring to the anthrax letters last fall. We still don’t know who made the product. And I can tell you one country that had the full capability of making such a prod- uct is Iraq. Mr. ALLEN. Thank you both very much. Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Mr. Schrock. Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kay, Dr. Spertzel, thank you both for being here and enlight- ening us and giving us another side of the story and, quite frankly, scaring us to death. Maybe that is what we need. We have been consumed with this, it seems like, in this country for several weeks; you can't turn on the TV, pick up a magazine or newspaper without reading it. It is all we are hearing on TV. And clearly, we are dealing with a man who is a mad man and a .* that is mad, as well, and something is going to have to be OIle. 16 But, those of us sitting on this side of the room are really agoniz- ing because we are the ones that have to go to the floor and vote on some of these issues and vote on possibly a resolution support- ing the President if he decides to go in there. And clearly we know how the President feels; he has made that clear. The Vice Presi- dent is equally strong; he was on television all weekend doing that. And General Powell, who is a retired four-star Army general who has been a little more reserved. And then there are a lot of retired admirals and generals who are very concerned about this, and they are saying we should not do it right now—many of whom I know and worked with during my 24 years in the Navy, so I respect them in their beliefs. I believe in preemptive and not reactive. I think if you can be pre-emptive, it is sure a heck of a lot better than trying to react. Just look at 9/11. And I wonder, too, in my twisted mind, sometimes if we might not want to get the CIA to get a handful of people to go over there and take care of it for us because the thing that tears me the most is if we do this, we are going to be committing thousands and thou- sands and thousands of young men and women in uniform to fight this thing. Many of them are probably sitting right here in this room. I see a lot of students in here, and I look at them and think, will they be the next ones to go. And we are—and it is a huge commitment on our part. And I know I have to go vote. My question to both of you is, if you had this voting card and you had the ability to go across the street and vote, how would each of you vote and why? Dr. KAY. Well, as you intended it to be, it is a tough question because it gets to not my technical expertise, but to my obligation as a citizen. In many ways you are at the same heart of Mr. Allen's question, which were also equally fair and equally tough. But not to hem and haw around it, I think that, on balance, “re- gime change,” if you like that antiseptic term—that is, replacing the regime in Baghdad, and that is unlikely to be done by anything other than military force—is the only option we have for dealing with the weapons of mass destruction program. I genuinely believe time is not on our side. These problems get worse. You have already seen in the press—and this gets to the reasons why—something that we suspected in 1992, and we now have a little bit more proof that they proceeded in the way of a classic Soviet chemical weapons program and went to what is called “dusty VX,” a form of VX designed to penetrate high-protec- tive gear, and probably “novachuk”, agents which, in fact, you can produce with nonprescribed substances. That is an example of how they are progressing. We know they tested two radiological dispersion devices prior to the Gulf War. They discovered what everyone who has tested a classical one—if you are going to be killed by the devices, by the explosion, not by radiation—and I don’t want to go any further than this in open testimony—U.S. labs and others know that there are other ways to disperse radiation that is far more challenging than the classic way. Given enough time, the Iraqis will discover what those other ways are. 17 So, I just believe that when you are faced—and this is not—and I should have said this to Mr. Allen—it is not as if we are coming to the problem of Saddam for the first time in September of 2002. We have had 11 years of experience. And when he failed to live up to his obligation under Resolution 687 and 11 other resolutions of the U.N. to get rid of those weapons, I have absolutely no reason to believe he is going to change his spots. I simply believe—and what is so extraordinarily hard for democ- racies—that is, to protect themselves and risk the lives of their sons and daughters when they don’t have overwhelming proof in the form of having lost the first battle. And I just think the con- sequences are far too serious this time. But, look, I understand your agony, and I am glad I don't have that voting card. Mr. SCHROCK. So you would not tell me how you would vote? Dr. KAY. I would vote in favor. Dr. SPERTZEL. And I very much agree with that. If there was a way of getting that regime to truly want to get rid of their weapons of mass destruction and no longer deceive or conceal, and if there was a way of getting the complete unconditional backing of at least the P5 members so that inspectors would have a chance, then I would say, go that way. But that is not going to happen. You know, even the French pro- posal that has been made—already, China has indicated they are going to abstain and Russia hasn’t decided, but they think they might veto it. That tells you how much support the inspectors are going to have. And I can tell you right now that the last year-and- a-half that inspectors were in the country—when we went there as a chief inspector—we were on our own. We could not rely on being backed up by anybody, and yet we were there to face Iraq. And I don’t see anything at all that suggests that the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) will face a better situation. There is no alternative. Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Chairman, let me make one more personal comment. When I volunteered to go into the country of Vietnam and my mother was very upset—my dad understood, but he wasn't happy about it—I couldn’t understand their concern. And they said, some day, when you are a parent, you will understand. My son was commissioned as an ensign three weeks ago, and my wife and I are now my parents; we understand. And I take that seriously, and I don’t want to send those kids into harm's way un- less we are doing it for the absolute right reason. And if we go into it to win and we don’t play the Vietnam game that we played—be- cause we didn't go in that to win, and we lost 55,000 great Ameri- cans. If we send them in this time, we have got to go in to win and then get it over with. Dr. SPERTZEL. To me, the alternative is likely that you could have thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of American citizens— women, children, elderly—being killed by a terrorist weapon. And, frankly, if I were about 40 years younger, I would be on the line volunteering to go. Mr. SCHROCK. If I were younger, I would, too. I understand that, and I agree with that. Thank you very much. 18 Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Sanchez. Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, both gentlemen, for being here today. I am going to ask a couple of questions, and the first one has to do with the cat-and-mouse games that you saw played with Iraq. And I would assume also maybe your insight into the mentality of Saddam Hussein and the regime there—I guess he is the regime— in Iraq, because I think it plays importantly in the judgment we have to make. And second, to your expertise in particular on the nuclear side of things: I have no doubt that Saddam Hussein is a bad guy, that he kills his own people, that he has chemical and biological weap- ons, that he used them against his own and used them against Iran in the war. But my question goes back to something that— really what Mr. Allen was talking about, this whole issue of “Why now? Why so immediate? What has changed?” And one of the comments that you made, Doctor, was that we are not talking about a rational person. And my answer to that would be, yes, I would agree with you, except that when it came to self- preservation, i.e., when he was at the end of the war, he sat down and he agreed to terms that would preserve his ability to be there in Iraq, to be alive and to be doing what he is doing today. So as irrational as he is as a human being, there is this sense of self-preservation. So I look at him and I say, he is sitting there in Iraq, we have him contained. I have no doubt that he has weap- ons of mass destruction, chemical and biological. I am not sure about the nuclear. If I were he, and I was sitting there, I would say, well, if I launch a first attack with this, everybody is going to come at me and they are going to annihilate me. Because I believe our armed forces and our capabilities are enough that we can take him out and anything else in that region that we want to. I think he is more contained right now rather than if he thinks we are coming in to get him, or we actually come across the line to come in to get him. So why would you tell us to move, knowing what you know men- tally about the person we are dealing with? Dr. KAY. Those are very good questions. Let me tell you why I don’t think he is contained now, or if he is “contained,” we have changed the meaning of that word. We have gone from a period in 1991, when we had a fairly tight, sanctioned regime of keeping things out and controlling the amount of revenue he has, to an Iraq that sells illegally. I am not talking about the oil-for-food program, but illegally has greater oil income per day than it had prior to the Gulf War. Dr. KAY. And is progressively getting access—aluminum tubes are an example, but some examples are better than that—getting access to the technology that will make his programs even more ca- pable and competent than they are today. So as I see over time his weapon expertise—and let me say, I share and I hope I conveyed that, I share with all of you—I don't know where his nuclear program is today with a great deal of pre- cision because he invests a lot of resources to keep us from know- ing where his program is exactly. But, I am confident that having 19 solved those technical problems, and with money, it will only get worse and not get better. So, over time, I see it a harder problem to deal with. And quite frankly, I would suspect if his nuclear weapons program—once you have two, three or four, it becomes a shadow that allows you to do other things, use chemical and bio- logical against his neighbors and know that we won't go. But you put your finger on the heart of the issue, and that is what sort of person he is and what does he care about his survival. We have a hard time—let me be sure I am not held by the chair- man in contempt—we have a hard time believing that politicians mean what they say. If you read Saddam Hussein's statements about Israel, about the United States, about Saudi Arabia and all, this is an individual who, given—I am extraordinarily reluctant to believe we should give the awesome power and count on him being rational, to always believe his survival, and so he should threaten them and not use them. And also, he is surrounding neighbors that are of two types, that I find we are not paying enough attention to the risk we are run- ning. Most of his neighbors do not have enough military force to interfere in their own affairs. They are weak states. They depend on us for whatever security they have. There is one exception as an immediate neighbor, and that is Iran, which is engaged in a weapons of mass destruction program for which we have a hard time bringing any pressure to bear, be- cause I think in our hearts those of us who dealt with them in the region recognize that that program in part is designed against Sad- dam. I suspect if Saddam stays in power and his weapons program goes ahead, the Iranian program will go ahead, and that just be- comes a very, very dangerous region. The reverse of that, however, is true and we haven’t spelled that out. A replacement regime for Saddam Hussein that is committed to dealing peacefully with its neighbors is a tremendously attrac- tive proposition in the Middle East. Rich Spertzel and I can tell you in great detail about our appre- ciation of the middle class in Iraq, of the dedication of the scientific and technical learning they have. Imagine what would change if we had an Iraq that was committed to some form of democracy, such as it might as in the Middle East, and living peacefully with its neighbors. What a challenge that would pose for the Saudis, a chal- lenge to the Iranians. The reverse side is one that I would prefer to deal with: the optimistic, hopeful side of what it might be with- out Iraq. And let me say in my testimony—and Mr. Allen cited a point right below it—said Iraq is not Libya and that is why it is harder to eliminate the program. It is much more like post-Versailles, Ger- many. But, Iraq is also not Afghanistan in terms of a functioning soci- ety that can be recreated. The ratio of population to oil to two river valleys, that for centuries have been irrigated, is a tremendous pos- sibility for peace in a region that sadly needs it. So I guess it is a personal decision. I would prefer not to run the risk of greater weapons in the hands of an individual like Saddam that attracts his neighbors either to cut deals with him or to de- velop their own weapons of mass destruction and try to deal with 20 the future without him. I basically believe that is a lot better for our country and for his neighbors. Dr. SPERTZEL. And I would like to add, if I might, that I guess one of my frustrations is that it seems to me that the decision is we either do something to change that regime's mind—and if that means changing the regime, so be it—or we decide we don’t really care what he does and we are willing to live with it, because don't expect containment. It hasn't worked. Embargo hasn't worked. Those borders are as leaky as a sieve trying to hold water. We knew that. We saw ample evidence of prohibited items that we were finding in our routine inspection sites. And inspectors aren't going to do it for you without a change in attitude and without the unconditional support of the permanent five members, which you are not going to get. So the decision is either we do something about it, or we don’t do anything. But then let's stop talking about it. Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, will you indulge me? The second question, it is a very quick answer from both of them. Mr. HUNTER. All right. Very quick. Ms. SANCHEZ. Nuclear knowledge, because you have it and I don’t. An ability for Iraq to both have nuclear arms and a delivery system that comes here to the United States—I believe, not talking about walking in through terrorism. Terrorism I put in a different corner. It is something we are at war with right now. How far away, in your best estimate would that be for him? Dr. KAY. With regard to a weapon, a device that would work, go to a fissile yield if he had the material, my best guess is somewhere around six months. Months not years, I have said, to do it. If he has to develop the fissile material himself, I can do no better than the German estimate, which is three to six years, but doesn’t tell you when the clock started running on that three to six years. The delivery method—I am not talking about terrorism. A ship- ping container that has a global positioning system (GPS) device or a command device strikes me, if I send it here—I mean, we are locked into believing that the only way you can deliver weapons of mass destruction is ballistic missiles or high-performance aircraft. There are other ways to do it if you have a different model to do it. I think if he wanted to destroy Tel Aviv, if he had a missile he would certainly prefer to use it. But, I think he will think of other ways to do it, delivering other than a missile. I think in terms of his missile delivery program, the crucial in- gredient—that we don’t know enough about, but we have just got a little evidence—is foreign assistance. He has clearly gotten for- eign assistance on his solid missile fuel production facility. We don’t know exactly where that came from. If the sanctions come off the money runs. Could he get enough—I think that's end of the decade, next—somewhere in the next decade for missile delivery. But I would hate to see any policy based on that as the only way you can deliver a weapon of mass destruction. For biology, for ex- ample, as experts will tell you, a missile is a lousy way to deliver a biological weapon. Ms. SANCHEZ. I am not talking about biology. I am talking about nuclear. I am sure he has got the other and got a way to deliver it. But, to us here, not in a typical walk-across or the nuclear suit- 21 case or what I would call a terrorism-type of situation, you are say- ing a decade away. Dr. KAY. I am saying by missiles. But let me be clear. That was not the only way the Soviets intended to deliver it. And it is prob- ably not the only way that he would think of having to deliver it if he wanted to. I don't call that terrorism. I just call it an asym- metrical way of facing the United States. We happen to believe in mºles. There is no reason everyone else should believe in mis- S116S. Ms. SANCHEZ. And quickly, Doctor, because my chairman— Dr. SPERTZEL. Well, again, it might be a covert delivery system as opposed to overt. Whether you call that terrorism or not is some- thing else. But I could—again I would prefer not to in open session, but I could tell you ways that I suspect, even with our enhanced sensitivity to security, that a determined enemy could deliver an ef- fective biological weapon or agent, particularly to our coastal cities. Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Doctor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you very much. And I think when you reflect on the fact that we have got in excess of 6,000 cargo con- tainers coming into our ports daily and we inspect around three percent of them, there is a fairly large pool of candidate vehicles for that. Mrs. Davis. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here to testify before us. You know, right now, our country is in a war on terrorism. The American people are behind our President, I believe, on this war and they seem to be open to what we do. Our allies seem to be in agreement with us on the war on terrorism. With that in mind, Dr. Spertzel, in your opening statement, not your written, but in your opening statement, you made a comment that the greatest threat to the U.S. is in, “biological agents to be used by terrorists.” However, when the question was asked about terrorism, Dr. Kay, I believe you said we had no evidence that there was any real linkage between Iraq and the terrorists. Dr. KAY. On the nuclear; I was speaking only of nuclear. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Okay. Do we have any evidence then, Dr. Spertzel, that there is any linkage between Iraq and the terror- ists? Dr. SPERTZEL. Yes. Terrorist—terrorism was clearly an integral part of the Iraqi BW program from its very inception in the early 1970s. The nature of the agents, some of the studies that they were conducting clearly indicated that. The evidence is still not concrete yet, but I believe that doctor Christine Gosden is collecting pretty doggone good evidence that Iraq has used aflatoxin against the Kurds in the north and may be still using it. And I already men- tioned the case of wheat cover smut, or wheat bunt as we know it in the U.S., by clandestine delivery means. And they acknowledge that it was—that they envisioned it; they called it “secretive deliv- #. I think that was a euphemism for terrorists. So you have that. And then, as I say, I happen—and I don’t believe I am a lone in- dividual anymore because I think I have made a few converts who 23 Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you very much. Dr. Kay, I was interested to hear your comments that you made regarding our missile defense, the thought that that might be the worst way of delivering this system. I know that disproportionately we might—we kick in a good amount of resources into that area in which I, you know—maybe I know that this should go into other methods of fighting terrorism instead of our major national missile defense system. But thank you for that comment. Let me ask you, I have always applied the principle that if our national security is in danger and that we are directly in danger that we ought to act unilaterally and just strike, but that if it isn't, then every effort needs to be made to look at it from a multilateral perspective and to reach out to your friends and allies. I have been real concerned with what the Germans have—the chancellor has said ºut the lack of discussions with them, the French and every- One eISe. And I was wondering how you would—you know, make some comments as it relates to that. But also, if you would be willing to look at if you had a team of inspectors that could go in there and have full access, if you would feel comfortable under those settings. Dr. KAY. Well let me deal with the two-part question. With re- gard to having allies, look, I was a 97-pound kid who grew up on the east side of Houston. I always found it was useful to have friends. It insured my survival; that, and being able to run fast. So in principle, I think one would like to have it. I think during the period that started when I–about the time I left, it certainly was much worse during most of Dr. Spertzel's time—you had a number of Security Council members decide that if it were a serious prob- lem the U.S. would take care of it. If it is not a serious problem, why shouldn't we go ahead and make economic hay while we can? And so I think we have failed to convince the world that it is their problem as well, and not just our problem. This is one of the problems of being the last superpower. You know, why did the Eu- ropeans wait around for us to straighten out Kosovo'? It was in their back yard. So I mean, I think there is a large element of that. I think we lost the psychological war of trying to explain that and explaining that it was not sanctions and inspections that were hurting the Iraq people; it was Saddam's behavior. So on that i. I mean I am with you. I would rather have more, rather than— Your second question is the question that is an extraordinarily troubling question for me, because the question is if we had inspec- tors in again, wouldn't you feel that they could do it. The issue is not the insertion of inspectors; the issue is the behavior of the Iraqi Government. As long as Iraq can continue to engage in protecting its programs, concealing, denying, and deceiving about those pro- grams, the level of intrusiveness that would be necessary to over- come that, and the resources, wouldn’t look, quite frankly, any dif- ferent than an occupation. You know, we had two helicopters at our disposal. I came back to the U.S. and I found TV stations that had bigger and better heli- copters for traffic reporting. The amount of resources and inspec- tors you would have to put in to have confidence that you have eliminated a program that they spent two decades on, probably $40 24 billion if we were to sum all their programs, and 40,000 people, to be sure you really got that—and I don’t know what you mean by getting it when we are talking about people as much as things. I just don’t see that the mental image I have of that is very much like an occupation. So I don't have any confidence that you can get there by the inspection route. Mr. SPERTZEL. And what happens if inspectors are there, osten- sibly unlimited access, if they come along on a particularly sen- sitive site and so there is another standoff? What is going to hap- pen? What is the next step? Are we going to have a week-long de- bate among the permanent five members, and then two of them will abstain and the third one will make some modifications to the resolution to the point that it is not much better than distilled water? What have you accomplished? Dr. KAY. Very often when you get those standoffs, as Dick knows, you are at a point where you are asked the same questions you ask us. “What is the evidence that that is an important place?” And be- cause they are trying to conceal from you and mislead you—and let me give you, Mr. Rodriguez, an actual example that occurred to me. The second inspection I took in, we had a supposed defector who came in and said they had buried nuclear materials in the central Baghdad cemetery. Now, you know, I am from Texas. I am willing to do a lot of things. Digging up cemeteries is one of those things that I have got to have a lot of evidence on. It was, we later found out, and penetrated—thank goodness I had a little bit of my mother's common sense and didn’t carry out an inspection. It was a provocation they ran against the team, hoping we would dig up the central Baghdad cemetery, hunting for something that wasn't there, but would have meant great television footage not in favor of us. It was referred to as a cat-and-mouse game. I have never liked that term because when you are the mouse it is not much fun. The cat has a lot more fun, and the inspectors were the mouse. We are talking about disputes when we are going to be asked the same questions about evidence. There may in fact be nothing there, because they have carried out a successful provocation. As long as that government is not willing to give up its weapons of mass de- struction program, it just is not credible that inspectors, by them- selves, will be able to do that against their determined opponent. If Saddam changes his spots and becomes an enlightened leader of the Middle East— Mr. SPERTZEL. On another occasion, one of the things that didn't make the headlines was a team was stopped only for a few hours, and they sat there and they watched with binoculars two little fires on the roof of the building, which turned out to be an asphalt roof. And when they, Iraq, was asked about those fires, “oh, the janitor was just burning the trash for the day.” Yeah, right. We all go around doing that on asphalt roofs. Now, I have no idea what was in those documents that they burned, but I sure wish I did. And, that is what inspection teams are faced with when there is not a desire on the part of the country and when you cannot rely on having any backup. Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Let me—I just want to go throw it back to the analogy, Dr. Kay, that you mentioned. If you had been—that you were a 90-pound weakling and you needed support. 25 Dr. KAY. Ninety-four pounds. Mr. RODRIGUEZ. You know, that concerns me. And if you are a pretty healthy individual, does that mean that we should act like a big bully and not reach out? Dr. KAY. No, it means we should—I mean, my interpretation is I still believe in getting as many friends to go to a fight as I can, if I have to fight. But, I also believe in not bringing a knife to a knife fight. I like odds that are in my favor and not against. Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yeah. One of the struggles that we are having is that you are extremely knowledgeable, but a lot of us are not there yet in terms of deciding whether our sons and daughters should risk their lives, you know, despite the fact that—say that they do have, you know, what they—you know, in terms of working on nuclear and all the other stuff, despite that, you know, whether we should go to the extreme, despite the fact that we are also in a war right now with a terrorist which I see also very differently, although Iraq cannot be seen in isolation from what is happening in the Middle East. And my sincere concerns are that as a country we have been neg- ligent and not fully engaged in the Middle East; that we have been negligent in terms of comments in reference to Taiwan and China; that we have been negligent in our comments regarding Korea; and that some of that has been deliberate, and that this is part of all that process. And if it is, it is a game that we shouldn't be playing because it is a serious situation. And if we do want peace, we have to be directly engaged in, directly involved, and to send Colin Pow- ell for a weekend down there doesn’t cut it. And so I am real concerned with our foreign policy in terms of the way it has been operating. And for us to bring this forward, it also brings to question, is this dialogue just prior to the November election and then are we going to see it again prior to the 2004 election? Dr. KAY. Fortunately that is in your field, not mine, and you have those responsibilities. I think both of us understand the awe- some nature of those—and I wish we could share with you in a more effective way our experience. I think that is one of the limita- tions of the way we have communicated the results of the inspec- tion. I can tell you, you know, that occurs even among inspectors. We both served as chief inspectors and had teams that we took in and led. And I know Dick had the same experience I had. I took people in who didn't believe the Iraqi program was as bad as they had been told before they went in as inspectors, and came out much more rabid than I am. I had one who was a-well, this was a period when the Soviet Union still existed during the brief early days of inspection—who came out absolutely convinced, because he saw what we saw. Our failure is our ability to communicate the depth of their de- ception, denial, clandestine nature, concealment nature of their program and the evil around the regime. And I know, failing to communicate that, we leave men and women like you with an awe- some responsibility, and not much help we can provide. I accept it as a failing on my part. 26 Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you for testifying before us and thank you for your testimony and thank you for the work for our country. Thank you. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. And it is clear, that despite the fact that we are all running for reelection, Doctor Kay and Doc- tor Spertzel aren’t. We appreciate your candid remarks today. Mr. Kirk. Mr. KIRK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I am the only Mem- ber of Congress here who flew against the Iraqis in 2000. What we saw was a dramatically upgraded Iraqi defense. And in 1998, when my squadron flew against them, we saw a very limited ability to reach our altitudes. And by the time I was up against them in April of 2000, we had lead all over our altitude, new surface-to-air missiles. Around the intel shed, we said Iraq was back. We could feel it. We could see it at our altitudes. I have been in the intelligence community for quite a while. I didn't know that we had missed the target so badly. You describe 40,000 employees we didn't know about, a $10 billion program and 24 sites unhit by Operation Desert Storm. It sort of describes to me a nuclear Pearl Harbor in which the intelligence community simply didn’t get it. So, let's assume that if we can miss 40,000 employees, $10 billion, and 24 sites, we could miss 40 kilograms of fissile ma- terial. Tell me again, if the Iraqis had 40 kilograms of fissile material, what is your estimate of the time to a workable weapon? Dr. KAY. If it were a fissile material that is in a final stage, as- suming it is highly enriched uranium, ready to work, six months to using their initial device design, to have a single device that would work. Actually with 40, they could probably have two devices that would work. It would be roughly of the power—depends on how they do it—roughly of the power of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And there again, there are some physics things that affect that. But believe me, if you are underneath it, the difference between 10 kilotons and 17 kilotons is largely theoretical. Mr. KIRK. Thank you. My understanding is in September of 2000, Saddam Hussein gave a speech in which he called on his nu- clear mujahedeen to defeat the West. He also modified the Czech L–29 aircraft to be an unmanned aerial vehicle. I hate to be direct here, but you have been. Can you tell me how many people—say a 1,000-foot air burst of that crude weapon would be in an L-29, if it made it over Tel Aviv, how many people would be killed? Dr. KAY. Well, if you managed to get a weapon of that size over Tel Aviv at about 1,000 feet, you said, for the air burst, you prob- ably would be looking at prompt casualties—this is, from the im- mediate radiation over pressure fire—I used to do these things on a circular slide rule with a little bit more precision as I have gotten older—I would guess you are probably talking about somewhere on the order of between—and you understand, it depends on is it a clear day or a cloudy day, all of these things affect it—probably 50,000 reasonably prompt deaths. Could be much larger, depending on a couple of things. Mr. KIRK. But 50,000 Israelis, basically. Dr. KAY. Yes. 27 Mr. KIRK. You talked about these states being small states and not being able to hang together with casualties of that nature. It would seem that Israel could be one of those states that wouldn’t hang together, suffering. Dr. KAY. Actually, I would have more confidence that Israel would hang together, at least for longer than I would other states in the region which, trying to be a diplomat, maybe I won’t name. Mr. KIRK. Has Scott Ritter gone crazy? Dr. KAY. Fortunately, I avoided psychology as a profession. You know, I have given you the only explanation that you have got to think about. Either he lied to you or he is lying now. I don't know which. I don’t know why. Mr. KIRK. He told CNN that the Iraqis were not involved in a weapons of mass destruction program and had no intention. And yet the Iraqis in July of 1995 said that they had produced 19,000 liters of botulism, 84,000 liters of anthrax, 2,000 liters of aflatoxin, clostridium and ricin, had built 166 biological bombs, 25 missile warheads, and had 86 declared biological sites. But according to Mr. Ritter, that is not being involved in a weapons of mass destruc- tion program. Dr. KAY. That is true, and he has become an expert on nuclear, too. He is, you know, he is—I am as puzzled and upset as you are, Mr. Kirk. Mr. KIRK. Now we have managed to-you managed to help dis- mantle one biological site at Al Hakam, right? But the inspec- tions, I am told, officially ended in 1997 really. Dr. SPERTZEL. Effectively. Inspectors were still there to Decem- ber of 1998, but effectively, we were marching to Iraq's tune from October of 1997 onward. Mr. KIRK. We have had four years without inspections. I under- stand we have information that a defector from the Mutana state enterprise says there are several mobile factories— Mr. HUNTER. Will the gentleman suspend? Mr. KIRK. Yes. Mr. HUNTER. We may have some classified areas that the gen- tleman is moving into. Mr. KIRK. This is in the New York Times material that the com- mittee gave me. Dr. SPERTZEL. Let me comment on it. Mr. HUNTER. Gentlemen, we just had a classified briefing in which some of that information has been discussed. If the gen- tleman wants to quote a Mr. KIRK. I am quoting directly from the New York Times article that the committee staff gave us. According to the New York Times—and what I am exclusively using is the New York Times— that we have mobile nerve gas factories, microtoxin, bacterial toxin, and an anticrop toxin. In your estimation, would that be available? Dr. SPERTZEL. Yeah. I am not sure why they would have selected some of those agents. But the first—we actually had, in perhaps a weak moment by General Omar Asadi, when we were pressing him as to when Iraq–when Al Hakam was conceived, and he said that there was a delay because he first asked the bio group to consider mobile laboratories. We also know that Iraq actually imported a couple fully functional mobile labs. I don’t know what was inside 28 them in the mid-eighties. I think it was 1988, 1987, or 1988. Iraq was using mobile—filling laboratories, if you would like, or mobile, mounted on vans, for filling chemical agents. Mr. KIRK. And a mobile lab would be harder to find. Dr. SPERTZEL. A mobile lab would be extremely hard to find. Mr. KIRK. Well, I have worked with Doctor Christine Gosden, leading scientist in Britain, which is probably why Prime Minister Blair is so adamant on this. She documents 250 uses of chemical and biological weapons by Saddam Hussein. Is that about your un- derstanding? Dr. SPERTZEL. That is—we would be comfortable, yes. Mr. KIRK. And my colleague talked about how he does not have a weapon capable of reaching the Continental United States. But in your estimation, does he have a weapon able to reach the thou- sands of Americans stationed at Prince Sultan Air Base, Incirlik Air Base, or any Israeli city? Dr. SPERTZEL. No. I don’t think there is any question about that. The-inside—on the bases that are to the south, southeast of Iraq, because of the prevailing wind conditions, an airplane flying inside the Iraqi border, low altitude, releasing the biological agent, could have a devastating effect as far south as Yemen or Oman. Mr. KIRK. Which would include the American personnel at Prince Sultan Air Base. Dr. SPERTZEL. Absolutely. And that is with equipment that they have now. They produced them. They successfully tested it in 1988. They turned over to us the earlier version, the developmental model, but not the final one that was tested. Mr. KIRK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HUNTER. Appreciate the gentleman's comments. Ms. Tauscher. Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kay, Dr. Spertzel, thank you for your hard work. After the U.N. passed Resolution 687, you had a lot of success for a number of years. Dr. KAY. And a lot of frustration. Yes, both. Mrs. TAUSCHER. And a lot of frustration. But somewhere toward the middle of the nineties, Iraq's appeasers on the Security Coun- cil—China, Russia, and France—began to dissemble the resolution and effectively nullified all of the hard work that you did by put- ting up every barrier and obstacle that you could find. And nothing has really changed, has it, except that the President is going to the United Nations on Thursday. And obviously, in the context of the post-September 11 environment, what I find fascinating, and what I hope the President will talk about is that the President was very clear on the evening of September 11 and certainly on the day of September 12 about the definition of being an ally of the United States and on being on the side of good and evil. And I think, that he has got to put specifically the Security Council members—Rus- sia, China and France—their feet to the fire and ask them how they can honestly expect us, one year after this terrible tragedy, as they continue to appease and continue to allow Saddam Hussein to do clearly what everyone recognizes that he does—nobody is going to nominate him for a Nobel Peace Prize, nobody is going to invite him to join their country club, no one says he is a good guy, every- 29 body knows he is a bad guy. We all know that. We wish the actuar- ial tables would take over and rid him of being head of the regime. But clearly he is a lucky guy when it comes to that. But isn't this really about the fact that we are standing alone— with perhaps Great Britain at our side and some of our lesser al- lies—because he is standing on an oil field; and that we are the sole superpower, and that we have got allies who have, you know, warmed up to us in the post-September 11 environment and said some nice things and maybe done some nice things, but when push comes to shove and when it comes to the second-most-wanted man in the world, Saddam Hussein, because clearly we have a war on terrorism and the most-wanted man is still, I think, Osama Bin Laden. But when it comes to standing with us on what is clearly in the best interest of all of our allies, and frankly the world com- munity, of getting rid of a guy that we know, once he has the power and capability will use these weapons in a very negative way against the world community, they have chosen oil and appease- ment over us. Isn’t that true? Dr. SPERTZEL. Let me comment to this extent. There is no ques- tion that Iraq is sitting on what may be, or what some estimates have given, as the L Mrs. TAUSCHER. Richest. Mr. SPERTZEL. —richest oil field in the world, currently unex- plored. It has also been stated as early as 1996 that France, or French companies, had signed leases, at least six, to exploit those oil fields. And I have seen recently where Russia companies have also signed a number of leases also to exploit the same oil field. It is also worth recalling that up until March of this past year, that France was the leading trading partner of Iraq. And I said “was until March.” they were supplanted at that point in time by Russia. And that indeed is a big economic incentive. And whether that is what is driving their position, I can’t say. But, the suggestive infor- mation is there. Saddam is known for exploiting economic interests in the region and around the world. His awarding the contracts under the oil-for- food is based not on the quality of the product, not on necessarily the needs, but who his friends are. He lets that be known. And that is how he has been gaining friends around the world. So to that extent, yes, he is exploiting it and he is very, very good at it. I do want to add one other comment on here. The issue is not Saddam, because if he died tomorrow you wouldn't see a change. Mrs. TAUSCHER. Right. Dr. SPERTZEL. There is an inner-core there that not very kindly, I liken to an inner-city street gang, run by a chief or a head who is absolutely and totally amoral and ruthless, but if something hap- pens to that chief, there is somebody else to step in. And that, I think, describes appropriately the situation today in Iraq. Dr. KAY. I think I have just discovered a difference with Dick Spertzel, my friend. As a physicist, I would prefer to run the exper- iment. I would actually like to see him dead tomorrow and let's see what the results were. But basically, you know, I agree. Let me—you know, that is a very tough question and it is at the heart of what we have tried to get at. One thing that made the early inspections so extraordinarily successful as opposed to later 30 problems that developed in the mid nineties was this united Secu- rity Council. And it is easy to focus on the economic incentives of the French and others that had—and I certainly have done that in some writing. But I also think we forget the very special time that 1991 was. A, Saddam had attacked an Arab state. I mean, it is sometimes good to have a stupid opponent. I probably shouldn't have to tell you this. Some of you may have benefited from it. And a stupid opponent is sometimes as good as being good in helping. Second, it was at the end of the Cold War in which there was an era of feeling things had changed. I remember I had a private meeting with the Security Council— with only interpreters and assistants available—when I came back from the parking lot. The first two states to compliment me on the behavior of the time were Yemen and Cuba, neither known for being personally good friends of myself or—and I have no relatives in either—or of the United States. It was that period of feeling. It was also a period in which Russia, certainly in 1992 and 1993, Russia could be coerced or bribed into good behavior. It was a pe- riod in which Iran was marginalized. A lot of things changed in the mid-nineties. And the memory of what Saddam had done faded for a lot, compared to other things. So I think some of our allies—I think economics is a huge inter- pretive factor. But we also have to say we probably didn't do a very good job of explaining the threat, and we took too long. Saddam knew—and this goes to the argument of time on his side—Saddam knew, and we knew, if he strung out the inspections long enough, eventually people would get tired. The second time I came back from Iraq, I was in an elevator in New York in the Secretariat Building. Someone I didn't know cor- nered me in the elevator and said, you are responsible for children and women dying in Iraq. Her job was, in fact—and a very impor- tant job—taking care of feeding children and women around the world. And I tried to explain, “no, that was Saddam;” and she said, “no, because of you, the sanctions are continuing.” We did a very poor job of explaining and allowing Saddam to manipulate that. And that had impact among some of our European allies. It is a complicated issue but the important thing is what you started with. As long as the council is divided, inspections will never be effective. Mrs. TAUSCHER. Well I hope that when the President goes to the U.N. on Thursday that he is prepared to take them to George Bush's woodshed, because it was very, very easy for most people to be supportive of the American people after the catastrophic attacks of a year ago. It was a no-brainer there almost. It was very clear that we were unwarrantedly attacked without provocation, that many thousands of people died, innocent civilians just going to work in the morning. But I think the President should move toward making sure that people understand that we need them with us when it is not so easy and when it maybe takes a few minutes to think through the problem. And if you are not with us on this one, if you are not with us, understanding that we cannot as a peaceful world allow a man with this kind of record, a three-time loser, to have these kinds of weapons and expect that he is going to-what, not use them—then 31 you are not with us. And then I think we have got to start to make sure the people understand that we are going to start to count again, as we did a year ago, who is on our side and who is not. And if you are not with us on this, then you are an appeaser of him; and if you are an appeaser of him, then you are not going to be somebody that I am going to be supportive of. Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentlelady. Mr. Forbes. Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentle- men. And I am going to be very quick with my questions, because we are limited on time and I know you are tired. One of the questions that has been puzzling me, and a little bit troublesome, is I saw on television and I have read some experts where a number of individuals who are colleagues of mine, Mem- bers of Congress, were very adamant just four years ago that some sort of strong action needed to be taken against Saddam Hussein and Iraq for a regime change. And they seem to have flip-flopped in the last four years, and I have been trying to look to see the evi- dence for that. My question for you today, is there any evidence that you have at all to suggest that we should be more optimistic today regarding the success of weapons inspections or reducing Hussein's ability to develop and deploy weapons of mass destruction, short of a regime change, than existed in 1998, just four years ago? Dr. SPERTZEL. Quick answer. No. Mr. FORBES. Good. The second question I had is, we had some of the same debate that you heard today took place before the Persian Gulf War. And, Dr. Kay, I know you are probably the best expert we can bring in here on nuclear weapons. In your opinion, had we not gone into Iraq at that time, where would Saddam Hussein be today regard- ing the development of a nuclear weapon? Dr. KAY. He would have nuclear weapons. Mr. FORBES. He would have one in his possession. Dr. KAY. He would have more than one. By the end of the dec- ade, that is, the end of the 1990s, turn of the millennium, he would probably have had around a dozen weapons. Mr. FORBES. So, if the debate had ended differently before the Persian Gulf War, we would be staring at a Saddam Hussein today with probably at least a dozen nuclear weapons in his arsenal. The last two questions I have for you, one for Dr. Kay and one for Dr. Spertzel. Dr. Kay, if, in your best opinion, with everything you have seen, the likely nuclear weapon that Saddam Hussein could or would develop within that six-month period or six-year pe- riod that he was talking about, if he was successful in developing and deploying that weapon in the United States, what would your opinion be regarding the likely death toll that it would have? And I understand there are a number of variables, but your best opin- ion that you would have. Dr. KAY. I can’t imagine you would do it without the intent of causing maximum destruction. I have never been a fan of people who believe you set nuclear weapons off as demonstrations, be- cause you are not sure what the reaction of the people you are demonstrating to is. So, assuming that he was seeking maximum number of casualties, there is every reason to think, even if every- 32 thing doesn’t go right, you are in the 25- to 50,000 prompt fatalities or a larger number, depending on how you do it. And you know, there are places you can set off a weapon that would cause even more. I am not terribly happy to describe it, but there are ways you can magnify the casualties tremendously. Mr. FORBES. And, Dr. Spertzel, for you—and I don’t want you to describe the weapon, but the one that you think would most likely be used—if that weapon were developed and deployed, a biological weapon in the United States, what is your best estimate of what the death toll would be from that weapon? Dr. SPERTZEL. The most likely means of delivering it would be to have—when you are dealing with the weapons-grade material— is merely to have it released under the appropriate conditions. Sev- eral scenarios could be envisioned. This would be done in a covert means, not an overt, which would maximize casualties. I would en- vision maybe a multicity coordinated attack, not unlike the coordi- nated airplanes last fall. Then the number of casualties depends entirely on what the target is, but as few as maybe 20 grams of material would be enough, for example, properly released into a 14- , 16-story building, that would give you virtually 100 percent cas- ualties of everyone inside that building where it was done in a way that it wasn't known that it had been released. So you can fill in the numbers by picking which building you want. And the ability to do that requires nothing special other than knowing proper Scouting of the building and having the right quality material. That is what worries me with Iraq being involved with bioterror- ism, because he can have delivery boys without a great deal of spe- cific knowledge, but as long as the product is properly prepared ahead of time, i.e., made in Iraq, I could envision other scenarios. I could envision one scenario, quite honestly, that potentially could involve upwards to a million people with a relatively small quan- tity of material. Mr. FORBES. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Mr. McIntyre, do you have any questions? Mr. MCINTYRE. Not at this time. Mr. HUNTER. Okay. We will do a second round and, Ike and I had already had an opportunity to—oh, I am sorry. Mr. Andrews, yeah. Did you get a chance in the last panel? Mr. ANDREWS. Yes. Mr. HUNTER. Okay, go ahead. Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of our witnesses for their candor and their service to our country and for their very valuable testimony. In the last ten years, this Congress has voted to spend three trillion dollars to de- fend the United States. None of that did us much good at all a year ago tomorrow, when 19 people with box cutters and airline tickets decided to launch asymmetric warfare against us. I think that if we have done anything wrong in our national discussion about Iraq thus far, it is to discuss the threat of Saddam Hussein in terms of orthodox 20th century conventional warfare rather than in the con- text of the world we are actually living in. 33 Dr. Spertzel, if I read your testimony correctly, you have con- cluded that among the offensive bacterial agents the Iraqis pres- ently possess is smallpox; is that correct? Dr. SPERTZEL. That is correct. Mr. ANDREWS. If they were to choose to use smallpox to launch an attack on the United States, how would they do it? Dr. SPERTZEL. Again, if that is—just in dry form, in powdered form, smallpox is relatively stable so getting it into the U.S. is not an issue. Mr. ANDREWS. How much of a quantity would you need? How large would the box be? Dr. SPERTZEL. Twenty grams of material, which I just cited, would accomplish an awful lot. Mr. ANDREWS. And how large is that box? Dr. SPERTZEL. Well, if you envision—a friend of mine, Mr. Bill Patrick, used to carry around prior to September of last year, used to as part of his show and tell, he used to carry a Ziploc bag, 1- pint size, containing 200 grams. Mr. ANDREWS. So an airplane passenger who puts a 1-pint Ziploc bac in his suitcase could carry that quantity into the United States. Dr. SPERTZEL. Correct. Mr. ANDREWS. And once it came here, how would it be used as a weapon? Dr. SPERTZEL. If it is truly weapons-grade material, easily dis- persible, it again, is a series of scenarios. It could be—it could be released into a building, which would require nothing special ex- cept knowing how to do it. Mr. ANDREWS. So if individuals—would they pour this into the heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC) system of a building? Dr. SPERTZEL. Yes. - Mr. ANDREWS. Could climb through the HVAC system and leave—empty the powder into the HVAC system. Let us assume that this was a building like the building we are in now, the Ray- burn Building, which at any given time I suppose, has, I don't know, 2- or 3,000 people working in it. How many of those 3,000 people would likely survive that attack? Dr. SPERTZEL. Depending on the strain selected—but since you are using smallpox, generally considered to have a 30 percent lethality. But it wouldn’t just be the 200 because it is a covert at- tack. All of you are going out in your community Mr. ANDREWS. So if someone became infected with the smallpox and then went to the Pentagon City Mall tonight and walked around, they could conceivably infect people there. Dr. SPERTZEL. Not that fast, but somewhere in the incubation pe- riod. Mr. ANDREWS. How long is the incubation period? Dr. SPERTZEL. A period of 5 to 10 to 14 days. Mr. ANDREWS. So within 2 or 3 weeks, if 400 people were in- fected, what is your best estimate as to how many would be in- fected 2 or 3 weeks from now? Dr. SPERTZEL. I am going to now rely on a faulty memory, but I believe that it is something like ten to one; that is, ten people ex- posed to the one original. 34 Mr. ANDREWS. And of course, each of those 4,000 people would then become agents of the disease, and we have the classical defini- tion of an epidemic. Dr. SPERTZEL. Correct. And there are multiple discussions ongo- ing right now as to how fast that could be brought under control. Mr. ANDREWS. Now it seems to me—and I say this more to my colleagues than to the country—that we are left with only four ex- planations of Dr. Spertzel’s testimony. The first is that he is wrong when he concludes that the Iraqis have access to weapons-grade smallpox or that they won't have it soon. And I would simply say the burden of proof, in my judgment, on someone who chooses to dispute your contention is to show why you are wrong. The second option is to say that Saddam won't use it if he has it. Would either of you gentlemen like to comment on that proposition? Dr. KAY. I wouldn't bet the house on that one. Mr. ANDREWS. Nor would I bet my constitutional responsibility to defend the country on the assumption that he would not. The third theory is that, well, we can solve this problem by in- spection. Let us assume tomorrow that Saddam had a complete change of heart, agreed to a U.N. inspections regime in which peo- ple could in fact go anywhere in the country, anytime, and talk to anyone. If that were in place for a year, could you comfortably come back and assure us that the scenario I just laid out would not happen? Dr. SPERTZEL. No. Mr. ANDREWS. Why not? Dr. SPERTZEL. Because the quantity required for terrorist pur- poses is so low, I don’t think there is an inspection regime that you can put in that would—has much likelihood of finding it. You would have to know by human intelligence exactly where it was being produced, and I don't see that happening. Mr. ANDREWS. The only other choice would be for us to argue that you are overstating the risk. And I would invite anyone who believes that to go outside of this hearing and independently read the opinions of scientists and epidemiologists and others to study this question. Which leaves us with either you accept these awful options you have laid out or you remove the government that is permitting this kind of literal incubation for terrorism to exist. I think that is the debate. We can talk all we want about the degradation of the Iraqi military since 1991. If the question before us were whether or not a strike against Iraq is justified to prevent it from winning a conventional war against the United States or its allies, I am pretty sure I would oppose that because I don’t think it does justify it. That is not the issue. And for us to sit here on the anniversary of that terrorist attack and have a discussion as if it never happened, that we are still living in the comfortable world of symmetric warfare between nation states and their armed forces is to me very difficult to understand. So I thank you for illuminating these points and I hope that our colleagues hear what you had to say and the country hears what you had to say and our President articulates what you had to say. Thank you. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman, and we have now gone through the committee so that everyone has had a chance to ask 35 at least one question from both our—from either the first hearing, our classified hearing, or this open hearing and we will go back for a second round. I already have had plenty of time here at the mike and I think—Ike, are you okay? We will go to Mr. Spratt and then on down the line to Mr. Weldon and try to get a second round in. Mr. Spratt. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you both for your forbearance as well as your excellent testimony. We very much appreciate it and your forth- rightness. But let me ask you a minute just to suspend judgment about the efficacy of inspections and think hypothetically. Let us assume that after the President makes his speech to the United Nations on Thursday the Security Council gathers its resolve and decides that one last ultimatum will be made to Iraq and Saddam Hussein; that is, there must be thorough, rigorous inspections. If you were given the task of writing the charter, the bill of equip- ment, the table of operation and equipment (TO&E) as it were, for this inspection team, what would be necessary to have the kind of inspection force that could begin to do the job? Dr. KAY. If I can start with what my requirements would be, it is resources, personnel and intelligence; that is, it has got to have the resources to go at a lot of places at once. Mr. SPRATT. Give us an estimate of what you are talking about in terms of manpower. Dr. KAY. At our best, we were able to field around 100 inspectors in the field. I would want to have access to enough people to put teams and keep teams in the field, keep them at work on the order of at least ten times that. I would like to have teams of at least a thousand, not with two helicopters. Two helicopters for Iraq is a joke and it was always a joke, although I loved the helicopters when we had them—with the resources to go anywhere anytime in the country and get there fast. I would like—so that is the sort of resources you are talking about. That is a very large operation and the ability to get it. The second thing is, and the third thing because that covers real- ly resources and personnel, let me say on these personnel, these personnel are incredibly hard to get. Iraq has a very steep and de- manding learning curve. All of us have had experience with inspec- tors the first time in the country who aren't worth very much. It takes three and four times. You are going up against a country that is world class in deception, denial and concealment and intimi- dation. So it is a rigorous selection process. I am personally dis- turbed that if we are going that way we have to start doing it right now. You are not going to get these people easily and quickly. You need to provide them with intelligence that will allow them to have a chance of penetrating that program. In the early days, we were beneficial—and I will say teams I led were benefited from a general feeling on the Security Council that sharing intelligence was the appropriate and necessary thing to do. So it was just not the United States. It was other countries as well. That allowed those inspections to be serious and effective. That changed a great deal over time. I think the commitment is to provide them with the best intelligence of what you know your nationals have been supplying Iraq. Foreign purchases are a tremendous guide to it. Mr. SPRATT. Did you have access to Israeli intelligence? 36 Dr. KAY. I am trying to survive as we get close to things that are really sensitive. All U.N. members were requested to provide intel- ligence and a large number of U.N. members provided intelligence there. And let me tell you, the variability of the quality of that in- telligence was the same across every group. There is not one that stands out as always having been right. That has got to be there. For me it is resources, people, and intelligence. The final element is leadership that is determined to end that program, not play a U.N. game of keeping the Security Council happy, but it is a dedi- cation to really ending that program because you are going up against a regime that is determined to keep the program. So those are the four things, but Dick probably has some others. Dr. SPERTZEL. I think it is appropriate. The problem that you are going to have is the multiplicity of sites that he could be using, and I don't see how you are going to be able to get around to all of those in a timely fashion and not having things moved. I once said that the only way I could assure you that absolutely Iraq had no biological weapons or no program remaining was that if you essen- tially have inspectors lined up hand to hand from the eastern bor- der—southern border from the eastern side all the way out to Saudi Arabia and you began to march north and every time you got to a hole in the ground or a building you made a point of going in and looking. That is a gross exaggeration but that is what it amounts to, because his ability to move items is such that if you don’t get there in a hurry you might miss them. There is a committee with a noble sounding name of the Control of Biological and Chemical Materials. You know sort of sounds like our Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or something along that line. That committee had members in every ministry. Those mem- bers were all part of the intelligence service, and that committee actually functioned as a way for Iraq to immediately mobilize per- sonnel, materials and equipment. And they could do that within 24 to 48 hours. And that is what you are up against. So what it would take, lots of inspectors. I don’t know how you would sustain—and I believe Dr. Kay was talking about a thousand total for all the dis- ciplines—I don’t see how you can sustain them. Mr. SPRATT. Earlier in our previous witnesses, two other things were mentioned. One was the security backup that has been men- tioned by the Carnegie Foundation. Of course they estimated the size of it as 50,000 troops, which is several divisions. That in itself is a huge logistical undertaking, but, in addition, the right to take key suspected scientists out of the country for questioning and in- terrogation. Would you put that in your charter? Dr. KAY. I certainly would put the last in. Dr. SPERTZEL. Here, again, it takes—I agree. I think that would be magnificent, but you are talking about something that I seri- ously doubt would be done under the U.N. Mr. SPRATT. I am talking hypothetically. Dr. SPERTZEL. You could get a hold of a few key individuals. And unfortunately in biology, I can’t tell you who was head of that pro- gram. We knowingly did not ever talk to that person. It may have been somebody we talked to, but we didn't know it. Mr. SPRATT. Here is one thing that concerns me, Dr. Kay. I also posed this question earlier. I have this fear that other members 37 have expressed that we send young men and women into Iraq and Saddam Hussein, knowing that the jig is up, unleashes with full fury his chemical and biological weapons on them early on, not when he is in a corner but early on to try and daunt their invasion. If we could one last time get in, is there some possibility that we might find caches of these weapons if we have this kind of charter, that could at least diminish, if not eradicate his ability to counter- attack with these weapons when we send our young men and women in? Dr. KAY. You can certainly get lucky. I had inspections that got lucky and found things that the Iraqis thought we wouldn’t find and found them. Let me give you an example that describes the dif- ficulty of conducting inspections and moving with security people. UNSCOM during its total history from 1991 to 1998, conducted 280 inspections. This doesn’t count monitoring visits, but actual inspec- tions. Mr. SPRATT. That means facilities, sites? Dr. KAY. Facilities, sites, vary from large to small. Of those 280—and we recently have done a reanalysis of those, less than half a dozen were genuine surprises. The Iraqis penetrated where we were going, either through human intelligence (HUMINT), in- adequate communication security on the part of the teams, various means, and actually greeted us at those sites—actually fewer. The first surprise inspection that was a genuine surprise I conducted, I had six people that knew where we were going, only six. The rest of the team, it was “trust me, you are with me.” That was a genu- ine surprise because no one talked and we went to really fantastic lengths to keep a secret. If I have got to move around with—I mean I can’t imagine moving around with a thousand security personnel. The issue of keeping that a secret and them not knowing where you are going strikes me as just impossible. The number might be useful if you get there and they say “no.” But the issue is, if they know where you are going—and Dick Spertzel described it very well—if they know where you are going you can bet when you get there what you want is not going to be there. They have perfected over 11 years a deception, denial, concealment program based on mobility, prior knowledge, and quick movement. We made them better than they were in 1991. So that is why you are getting this pessimism. Would it be worth it if you could accomplish reducing the threat somewhat, getting more evidence that was physical that would convince allies to join you? I understand all those reasons. And my skepticism is, if your objective is to eliminate the WMD program, I don’t see it useful. It may well serve other purposes, although I would not underesti- mate the difficulty of doing that. Mr. SPRATT. The likelihood of accidentally finding it, if you look at what allegedly Iraq had done with their biological weapons— some of them were stored in a hole in the ground at the end of a dirt runway covered with a tarpaulin and then unearthed. Others were buried in pits, along the Tigris Canal, again covered with tar- paulin and sand. Others were inside railroad tunnels no longer being used for trains. The likelihood of inspectors finding those without good intelligence information that says they are there is somewhere between nil and none. It is just not going to happen. 38 Thank you very much. Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Mr. Weldon. Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for tes- tifying. I am sorry—I was watching your testimony from my office during other meetings, but I did read your statements and I was here for the classified portion. First of all, in response to Mr. An- drews’ questions we ought to put it on the record that in fact, rel- ative to the possibility of a smallpox incident, there was a war game conducted last May at Andrews Air Force base called Dark Winter. You are both probably familiar with that. That war game simulation was paid for by the Army and was conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Sam Nunn played the role of the President. Jim Woolsey played the role of the CIA Director and the incident—basically, the war game envisioned a deliberate outbreak of three cases of smallpox, individual cases in each of three states: Pennsylvania, Alabama and Arkansas. Within 2 weeks, 2 million Americans were afflicted with smallpox, not 2,000, 200,000 but 2 million. So we actually have a war game that has been conducted by our military that goes into very specific detail about the problems asso- ciated, and that was done, by the way before 9/11. It was done in May of 2001. One of my concerns is that the problem in Iraq was caused by lack of control of proliferation during the 1990s. It was a big concern that I raised consistently. In fact I had documented 38 times that we had evidence that Russian entities and Chinese entities illegally sent weapons of mass destruction and conven- tional technology into Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and North Korea. One of the most egregious violations was when we caught the Iraqis receiving not once, not twice, but three times, the accelerometers and gyroscopes. And what did the administration do at that time? Pretend that we didn't see it. We never imposed the required sanctions. That was in 1997, I believe. I was in Moscow a month after we found it and we didn’t even want to ask the Rus- sians about that because it would have embarrassed Boris Yeltsin. So my question to you, first of all, is—and I am not totally satis- fied that this administration has taken enough aggressive steps to stop proliferation into Iraq. There was a recent report that perhaps Ukraine has supplied some military technology into Iraq. So my first question to you is are you satisfied that proliferation controls are better today than they were in the past relative to this kind of technology going in that could enhance our capability in the area of weapons of mass destruction? Dr. SPERTZEL. I will give you a quick answer in biology because I think it is probably simpler than the nuclear side. The answer ba- sically is no, I am not because there was no—Iraq had no problem getting critical items, even while the inspectors were there, being imported through—ostensibly clandestinely across the border—I am not sure about that—from Jordan into Iraq as well as from Syria into Iraq. We know that there was direct evidence of that. We had one company that told us that, “oh, yeah, he sent his rep- resentative to Amman and ordered what he wanted.” And we saw the signed slips indicating that he had received it. And there is no indication that things have improved any since 1998. Sanctions are not working. The borders of Iraq are as porous as can be. 39 Dr. KAY. I share that view. I think it is in the areas of nuclear and ballistic missiles a somewhat similar problem. When you com- bine money with how far the Iraqis are and the way technology progresses it has become a much worse problem. Let me give you the case of the aluminum centrifuge rotors. The Iraqi centrifuge pieces that a team I was on discovered were made of marging steel. Marging steel is harder to get access to. It is a more specialized technology and not everyone can produce it. They were going to carbon fiber rotors, because carbon fiber winding machines, al- though controlled because they are relevant to missile technology, as you know, Mr. Weldon, in addition to centrifuges were still at that point where they were becoming generally available because of Callaway golf clubs, high performance fly rods, and a whole se- ries of other issues. So they were on the slope and they understood it. By going to carbon fiber, they were better off. Going to alu- minum is even easier because a number of countries that have the capabilities to extrude high performance aluminum tubes is almost in any country that has a machine tool industry. So the problem has become porous. We have not found an effec- tive way of dealing with it, but let me tell you, I am pessimistic that there is an easy way to deal with it other than replacing the regime. We are very much into talking about export controls and all, and I am certainly in favor of them relevant to Iraq. It is very much like putting your finger in the dike when in fact you ought to be examining the nature of the flood control system as a whole there and it is why you have the problem. It is much worse than it was in the 1990s. Mr. WELDON. One final question and this gets to the point you both made which I was going to ask and you have already an- swered it, and that is you are convinced that the only solution is a regime change, and I am coming to that conclusion very quickly myself. But knowing the kinds of considerations that our colleagues have to make on an up and coming vote, I think it is going to be- hoove us, whatever step we can, to convince overwhelmingly our members that that is the course of action we have to take. So therefore, I happen to believe that we have to put more pressure on Russia. Russia just signed a $40 billion energy deal with Iraq. They are hugely involved in Iraq and have had both political and economic ties to Iraq. We spend about a billion dollars a year in Russia, most of which I support, in the area of economic investment, cooperative threat reduction, agricultural and environmental assistance. So therefore, what I am trying to organize, and I talked to some of some my Russian colleagues in the Duma over the weekend as a follow-up to a trip you took with me, Mr. Saxton, to go to Vienna to negotiate a framework to end the Kosovo conflict, which they in- volved themselves in, to take to Russia a delegation that basically says to the Russians, “It is time for you to join the foray directly. You are getting our assistance and you have told us you don't want conflict. You are against us going into Iraq. Here is the set of cri- teria that we want with you with us to get Saddam to agree upon,” which I think is going to be impossible on the face because, one, they won’t want to do it and, two, Saddam won’t accept it. Can you help me and members of this body, and this will be both Democrats 40 and Republicans. In fact, there were two Democrats that asked me to do this—can you put together, not today but in the next couple of days a very short one-page of what would that scenario be, what would those conditions be? Obviously, uncontrolled access to any site, so that we can go and take this to the Russians, who we sup- port and help, and say, okay, here is what we expect you to do? You got leverage with Saddam. We need to end this. And so we can use that leverage to convince, if not the Russians that they can could do this, but to show our colleagues in the House before the vote that we will have taken every possible attempt that we could take to try to provide a mechanism to allow the process to move forward as was originally required by the U.N. resolutions? Could you help us define what those parameters would be? Dr. KAY. Sure. Would be happy to. Mr. WELDON. Do you also believe that Russia in fact, can and should be playing a much more aggressive role in getting Saddam to do what we want him to do, given our assistance to Russia? Dr. SPERTZEL. I don’t think there is any question that they should be, but I seriously question whether they will because the conditions that would be required are such that anybody wants— the French learned. The French started taking a tough line with Iraq about a year and a half ago. As a result, Iraq promptly signed several contracts with Moscow to exploit the oil field east of Kut, and now Russia is Iraq's leading trading partner and not the French. Dr. KAY. I am more optimistic and let me tell you, I think this is true of our European allies. I think the difficulty of convincing them to take the tough argument and overcome some economic costs is that they haven’t believed we are serious. Once they can believe that we are serious about regime replacement and the Iraqis can do it the easy way or they can do it the hard way, that changes the entire equation because they know they are not going to be dealing with the old Saddam. They may be dealing with ei- ther a new regime—and this exists in what a physicist calls imagi- nary space—a new Saddam, a kinder, gentler, honest Saddam. In either case they know they have to cut a different deal. The prob- lem is for literally—this goes back to 1991—they have not believed that we are serious about that issue. So in their own self-interest, they have cut the most logical, rational deal with the guy who has got the money. So I can be more optimistic if I believe we are in- deed serious and can convince our allies and our friends like the Russians that we are serious. Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Snyder. Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If it seems like you have been here for hours it is because you have been here for hours. So we appreciate you being here. The cooperative threat reduction that you mentioned earlier in your testimony, Dr. Kay, and I took from your comments that you have been supportive of the program. Senator Lugar has made the suggestion that we, Congress, ought to authorize and the adminis- tration be able to expand that to other countries. Now that we have some newer members of the nuclear club, do you agree with that concern that we ought to be looking perhaps at a country like Paki- stan or India, if we thought they needed some help, that we could 41 come up with appropriate contracts and support to protect their nuclear materials? Do you agree with that? Dr. KAY. I absolutely do and when I said that the six months, if they obtain fissile material, I used the easy answer of the insecu- rity of the former Soviet supply. We should be concerned about nu- clear material wherever it exists and it has the greatest possible security surrounding it. Mr. SNYDER. The issue of why we are here, and your comments have been very helpful, but earlier I think you made the comment that we have to make a decision about what kind of risk we are willing to run. I believe the lady phrased it, “Are we willing to run the risk of keeping Saddam Hussein in power?” To me it seems like it is not a question of are we willing to put up with the risk of Sad- dam Hussein being in power. To me it becomes a trade-off. There is not going to be a risk-free world, and I guess, as General Scow- croft has been making the point, his theory that we need to con- sider the possibility that a military action bringing about a regime change in Iraq may impede the ongoing activities we have against al Qaeda because it is so dependent on international cooperation. I don’t know what the number is now. We think al Qaeda cells are active in 50 to 60 countries. I mean, this is going to be a different kind of war because it is going to be like an international crime fighting operation. It really does depend on a lot on international cooperation. I was struck by your comments that you all had find- ing in Iraq, finding on the ground, finding the materials. And yet what we are trying to do in these 50 or 60 countries is find, what, 3 to 5,000 people who may have been hiding out there for several years working, having families and doing everything completely legal, and yet we are clearly going to be dependent on the host country. So to me, it is a complicated issue and it is a weighing versus, you know, the risk of Saddam Hussein being in power to age 65 versus how it impacts on other aspects of our national security. And then you have a whole issue of which concerns some mem- bers and certainly a lot of people and the American public about the effect of a war itself. Senator Lugar I think, brought up when they had a hearing about six weeks ago the issue of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq under a new regime, and you know brings up this issue, is it the geopolitical forces that are driving Iraq or is it Saddam Hus- sein? You make the comment in your statement, “As long as the government remains in Baghdad committed to acquiring weapons of mass destruction, that capability can be expected to become without much warning a reality.” Senator Lugar's question was, we spend five, six, eight years there, tremendous expense, have our first elections, we leave. The first state of the union address of the new regime in Baghdad, and they say because of the threats of Israel and Iran we need to develop a weapons of mass destruction program. I mean that is not an unreasonable possibility in that neck of the woods. So I appreciate your comments today. I think these really are dif- ficult and complicated issues. I was a bit disappointed to hear your description of the resources you had. Retrospectively that looks like a lot of, I don’t know, lack of foresight on the part of all of us of 42 the international community that as you described the golden pe- riod of Yemen and Cuba congratulating you would have been won- derful if you had 10 times or 50 times the resources for you right then. Now my recollection of the research is eight sports utility ve- hicles (SUVs) stopped somewhere for hours at a time and in the early days that wasn’t the case. Thank you. Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Dr. Snyder. Mr. Saxton. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with Dr. Snyder that this is an extremely complex and complicated subject, and I suspect from the comments that I have heard, not today nec- essarily, but over the past several months and during August in particular, lead me to believe that there is a lot of confusion in the country about this subject. And let me just ask this question. Let me say this first, I guess. The Secretary of Defense was here in June or July and he spoke of the need to have a discussion about whether and when it is ap- propriate to decide to have preemptive strikes, and I was taken with that question because I hadn't thought about it in that context before. And I have been struggling with that question, when is it appropriate to have preemptive strikes? And then during August, President Bush said—I guess it was while he was working at the ranch in Texas—that he was very con- cerned about the situation in Iraq. And I don’t remember exactly what he said, but his message was, it is time for a regime change and the regime change is necessary because of the development of weapons of mass destruction, particularly with nuclear weapons. And Dr. Kay, in your early remarks you said something like this. And I think I have the words about right, you said prior to 1991, which was over a dozen years ago, Iraq fully understood the proc- ess of building a nuclear device. Experts in Iraq have unraveled all of the science necessary. Can you tell us in helping us to decide these questions what led you to that conclusion? Dr. KAY. Well, we were extraordinarily fortunate on the third mission I took in of-because of a mistake the Iraqis made and that is where accidents play a role, seizing the records, the actual records of the Iraqi atomic energy program. So we have a bureau- cratic record of progress reports that they filed. We also in the first mission uncovered their major electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) enrichment process and then discovered their centrifuge process. So we actually had physical evidence plus documents. I mean, the ideal unraveling. And inspection is often like a white col- lar crime investigation. All too often you are dealing with people, you can’t really sweat the people as much as you would want to and you get some written records and then you search for physical evidence and put it together. In the nuclear area, much more so than in the biological area, we were lucky in that early on, we were able to combine physical records with actual physical evidence, buildings and devices with the actual written records of much of their programming, including design documents of the device. So that is a result of that sort of analysis. And I will say again, I was extraordinarily lucky and for- tunate in being able to go in immediately after the Gulf War. Iraq 43 was still a disorganized country in many ways. They hadn't learned—I had an Iraqi official tell me, “You don’t behave like the U.N. inspectors that we had prior to the Gulf War.” I took that as a compliment. No, we didn't. We had a different set of resolutions that we were marching to. They hadn’t quite caught on to how to deal with us. So we were able to construct what I think most of us—there is very little disagreement about what we–about what we decided they knew then, the area of uncertainty and the area many of you have focused on is where are they today and where will they be going tomorrow. And that is when you get to connecting dots and extrapolation. But that statement is based on hard physical evi- dence, interviews, people, and written documents. We seized—I think the final total was somewhere around 100,000 pages of docu- ments. I view myself as the grandfather of the full employment of Arabic translators because we are still going through those docu- ments today. Mr. SAXTON. And not to be redundant, but didn't you also say earlier that you found in your investigation of certain sites—didn't you find a diagram of a nuclear device? Dr. KAY. That is what I call the design documents. It is a dia- gram plus the scientific calculation. Mr. SAXTON. And from your expertise as a nuclear physicist, do you believe that that diagram, if converted into an actual device, had the capability of working as an atomic Dr. KAY. It is not my judgment. This was submitted to the U.S. and other national labs that have designed actual nuclear weapons. It is the combined judgment of at least three countries that have actually designed nuclear weapons. Mr. SAXTON. And through other testimony you gave here today, you indicated there is only one element remaining. Dr. KAY. Fissile material, yes. Mr. SAXTON. And we don’t know for sure if they have been able to acquire fissile material or not. Dr. KAY. That's correct. Mr. SAXTON. And if they do, how long would it take them to con- struct the device? Dr. KAY. The best estimate is somewhere—it is months rather than years and somewhere in the range of six months. Mr. SAXTON. And I suspect that the President had been briefed on this information before he made his statement in August? Dr. KAY. Yes, sir. We have not been quiet about it. Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman. It has been a very sobering hearing today. A lot of the questions that evidence and a lot of the ques- tions that I am sure other Americans have had have been ad- dressed today, and I am sure this discussion will continue to move forward, so we thank you even though this is information that some of us may not have wanted to hear, we greatly appreciate the several hours that you have spent here bringing us up to date on these issues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HUNTER. I want to thank the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey for asking again the key questions, and also, thank you Dr. Kay and Dr. Spertzel for the great contribution you have made to our country. And part of the strength of this country is individ- 44 uals like yourselves who have a lot of integrity and the great intel- lect and the desire to serve in what have been some pretty incon- venient circumstances. We appreciate the testimony you have brought us. We still have several members that have questions, and want to thank you for your endurance. And we still have a few members who have some questions, and we hope you would oblige us and let us continue. Mr. Larson. Mr. LARSON. Thank you very much, and thank you, gentlemen, as the chairman pointed out, for your endurance, and also for your insightful and thorough comments today, as well. I think it was Judge Leonard Hand who said that it is democracy and liberty that leaves you thinking, perhaps you are not too sure. And I think that this hearing has demonstrated that, and yet there has been several key points. I would like to ask three questions as they relate to weapons of mass destruction as it relates to, as we peel away the veneer and look at some of the economic underpinnings, the issue of oil, which was raised by Ms. Tauscher and others. And third, this notion of a regime change. Let me start first with the oil and say that I think, and I would like to associate myself with the remarks of Ms. Tauscher. I hope the President, when he goes to the U.N., does take to task the nations of Russia and France and China. My question is, are there international and global corporations that are also dealing in breaking the sanctions in dealing with Sad- dam Hussein? Do you have any knowledge of that or do you know of oil companies that are dealing with Saddam? Dr. KAY. I have no personal direct knowledge. It is not something I have devoted attention to. Dr. SPERTZEL. Likewise. I don’t know of any and I haven’t heard of any. Mr. LARSON. The upsetting thing when I go back home and I speak to many of our citizens, they feel a lot of what is going on in terms of our overall policy and rationale for being in the Middle East starts and ends with oil. And that is not the purpose of your mission here today, but it is something that comes up repeatedly, and I think there is more than a thread of truth to that and more of a connection that needs to be drawn out in subsequent hearings. With regard to weapons of mass destruction, and I appreciate the distinction that you were making with Saddam Hussein, and yet you said a couple of times about your affinity for Iran. And I believe you said something to the extent that “We under- stand why Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction, largely in response of and in fear of Saddam Hussein.” And yet the Presi- dent has said, in the axis of evil speech that we have Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Now both North Korea and Iran we already know have weapons of mass destruction. So in getting to drawing a line in the sand and differentiating in terms of policy, who is next? If we need a regime change in Iraq, do we also need regime changes in Iran and North Korea? Dr. KAY. Let me try. I will be clear that I don’t exactly have an affinity for Iran. What I meant to convey is the Iranians clearly have a concern which one must understand about Iraq. 45 Mr. LARSON. I didn’t mean, Dr. Kay, an affinity. It just seemed that way when you are dealing with their scientists and talking to their people. Dr. KAY. They have an original security problem, and partly that is there. I think, in fact, the Iranian regime is as much as rep- rehensible in terms of terrorism and what they have done. So that is an issue. I do believe that a change in Iraq with an Iraqi regime that, in fact, chose to deal with its neighbors differently and dealt with weapons of mass destruction is likely to have a positive im- pact that we have not generally focused on, and that is what I was trying to refer to. I think it is going to be very difficult to bring effective pressure on the Iranians to end their weapons of mass de- struction program as long as Iraq is pursuing one. As Americans, we tend to view everyone as to how they stand in relation to us. There is an historic issue of the Irish and English relationship, which we both know goes back, and there are other more com- plicating factors and Middle East is filled with these sorts of issues. Mr. LARSON. To that point, and I appreciate your comments, and I know how late it has been, but to move to my final point that I would like to make for today, the notion of a regime change. Sometimes words in and of themselves become antiseptic, and I said that in earlier meetings that to me, it seems like the choice is pretty clear here, that either we are going to go in and Saddam Hussein either gets the death sentence or he gets life imprison- ment. The death sentence is we go in and take him out with force, tactical, overwhelming, or whatever the case may be. There is, however, and we have dwelled a lot about the specifics as it relates to the danger of doing nothing, but the danger of that preemptive strike and what that means with a person who is willing to use his own people as human shields, where his defensible positions will be set up in school yards, in hospitals, and the marketplace. And the loss of life that will occur there has to give one pause. I was in Incirlik and saw a triage unit that was set up specifically to treat our soldiers, our kids who become inflicted with biological or chemical warfare. Notwithstanding the cost where we know we are spending about a billion dollars a week in Afghanistan to prosecute the war, I think the cost and expense of resources to go in and prosecute and having the our two distinguished doctors here, as was asked by Mr. Spratt, draw up the procedure however skeptical you might be, that that seems to be the first course that this nation should go down before we decide that we are going to have a preemptive strike, lest all the things we were talking about before, a chain of events is unleashed within a whole community, that our preemp- tive strike unintentionally and unwittingly sets off. Dr. KAY. I can’t disagree with anything you have said. All I would say is, the question I keep asking myself, and this is a ques- tion that reflects on me, is “Do I think the cost to Iraqi citizens and to the men and women of the U.S. five years from now when he has five more years to further develop his weapons of mass de- struction, would be less or greater than it would be if we took ac- tion now? And believe me, I am not foolish to believe it would be costless. I think it may not be as great as some people think it would be, but it clearly would not be costless. And I keep coming 46 back to the conclusion as I look to the nuclear program and I talk to Dr. Spertzel about the biology program and other colleagues we have in the chemical and missile area, that five years from now, he is going to be more capable and more able to do it, and we would have to use more force which would increase the damage, danger, and deaths in Iraq itself to Iraqis. So I mean, this is what I mean by the risk analysis. I think the question I am troubled with and have quite clearly come to the con- clusion that if given the voting card, I would vote to authorize is, I really believe this is one of those cusp-like questions for democ- racy where early action, while never costless and never riskless, is almost overwhelmingly demonstrable, less costly, less risky than action that might have to be taken five years from now. Mr. LARSON. I take it from that comment you have no faith in the ability to go in there, and given all the ample resources to thwart, to stop, to constrict, to prevent Saddam Hussein or his suc- cessors and no faith that, in that—in as much as sanctions, if they were truly enforced and that our allies, as Mrs. Tauscher points out, were brought to task as well as the corporations throughout this globe who are also-and running this whole process, it seems to me that we ought to take a shot at that first. But I appreciate the depth of your conviction and the clarity which you have made your points today. Dr. SPERTZEL. I would like to add a comment. To a degree, that is what we were doing from 1991 to 1998, and it didn't work. And with—you know, unless you are going to totally surround the bor- der of Iraq with people that you can rely on, you are not going to stop material getting across that border. And I don’t care who is behind it. Mr. LARSON. From 1991 to 1998, doctor, initially everyone has said earlier there was early success that was enjoined. And then, it broke down. And from 1991 to 1998, at least, to my knowledge, we haven’t seen his ability to do harm, “he” meaning that he hasn't been able to carry that out. Now from 1998 forward, and absent our being in there and being tough, that is an open-ended question, and certainly I would agree with you. But if we were there with the full force and commitment that people of your capability and intelligence could bring to bear, I think that is at least worth a shot. Dr. SPERTZEL. I would agree with you if you can get the backing. But, frankly, sir, I don’t see any way in the world that you are going to get that kind of backing out of the Security Council, and if the U.S. tries to go it alone, you are at war. But, to do this through the U.N., which would mean doing it through UNMOVIC and the conditions by which it has been set up with not only the council itself—I hate to use this word, but maybe “meddling” is an appropriate one and certainly the role that we have seen the sec- retary general of the U.N., who seriously undercut the inspectors in February of 1998, Iraq will twist everything. Mr. LARSON. Isn’t that the gauntlet that the President is going to hurl down at the U.N. And that is consistent with everything that he has put out in the past as well, and I think that is the mes- sage. And upon the United Nations and the world hearing those demands, then everybody has a responsibility to take all the infor- 47 mation and then act accordingly. And I think that will be helpful and instructive to Congress. Dr. KAY. Mr. Larson, I certainly accept your challenge to design a world that would accomplish the goals that we all would prefer as opposed to the use of military force, preemptive or otherwise. The skepticism that you are hearing from us relates to the issue of a belief that is, as long as Saddam maintains his desire to do it, that world is going to look so much like occupation, that what we are afraid of is that the U.N. will recoil in horror, and “We can’t do this to another member state,” and you cut back and com- promise to what is this ideal world to what will satisfy us, and I think the U.S. is a pretty large number of people, to a world that none of us can have confidence you are actually restricting his weapons of mass destruction role. It is the diplomatic process that occurs in any body as you try to reach a compromise that would include the most. So it literally is a slippery slope when you start out with a shared objective, that I would share with you, of a regime that would be capable of doing this in a cooperative fashion without military force, but I end up with a regime that won't accomplish our objectives, and, in fact, leaves us with almost an impossible sit- uation of ever then taking military action short of the weapon actu- ally being used, because you will be able to say “Well, we have got a U.N. inspection force here,” but it has been so neck down from the ideal, that in fact it's a shielding force. And many of us feel that by 1998, certainly 1997 and 1998, UNSCOM had almost become a shielding force for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction development program because we were so emasculated and unable to carry out the operation. Dr. SPERTZEL. Absolutely. I think one of the most worst things that I can recall happening was when they allowed the declaration of sensitive sites and for a sensitive site, only three inspectors were allowed to go inside at one time. Now you get a facility maybe the size of the Rayburn Building and you send three people in there and expect them to find anything, not going to happen. And that was the conditions that were imposed on us. Mr. LARSON. Your points have been salient. I appreciate it. And I appreciate the forbearance of the chairman as well, and thank you for your comments. And I hope that the point of views that we have expressed also can be brought to forbearance as well. Thank you. Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. And Mr. McIntyre hadn’t had a question for either session. Mr. MCINTYRE. I was here for the classified session and came back for this, and I appreciate you being here tonight. Just a cou- ple of questions; maybe you can help. Having just returned to a trip to Afghanistan and central Asia, I particularly noted your com- ments on page four, Dr. Kay, middle of the page where you say, even states such as Kuwait and Bahrain, which are much more de- pendent upon the U.S. for their security are resisting U.S. leader- ship when it threatens military confrontation. We had an oppor- tunity in our delegation of 11 Members of Congress to meet with the foreign minister of Bahrain, who expressed concern about Arab 48 states, our allies, and our historical allies being left out of any deci- sion by the U.S. to attack Iraq. According to the foreign minister, Bahrain and other Arab states are still concerned about being left out themselves of any decision- making by the U.S. with the unilateral decision by the U.S. to po- tentially strike, a lot of the Arab states start wondering who could be next, because they are not being included in the decision-mak- ing. Obviously, we need their air space, air bases, and use of the ports for our troops, which we know are doing such a good job over there now. In your opinion, would the U.S. be able to regain the confidence and trust of our Arab allies after any such potential attack or do you think our relationship would be permanently and detrimentally affected in terms of cooperation to help our military? Dr. KAY. My experience in the Middle East is that nothing suc- ceeds as much as success that once you are successful, assuming that the application of military force by the United States was suc- cessful in quickly eliminating Saddam Hussein. Saddam has no friends. We are lucky to have an opponent who has outraged most. It is not a love of Saddam to force this so much as two effects, a fear of the U.S. stirring up the hornet's nest and then not staying around, being happy with a couple of dozen cruise missiles and thinking it has accomplished something, and they still have to live with him. And the other quite frankly, is the issues— for them, Saddam is not number one in the streets or often in the palaces. What they view is a failure for us to deal with the Israeli Palestinian issue with equal seriousness. But I strongly believe that if we were successful, if we were to carry it out and were suc- cessful, we would find not resentment, we would find respect, ad- miration and “Thank God, he is gone”. And now would you deal with our number one issue? So I think it is not an easy transition, but I think it is one that is doable. Mr. MCINTYRE. Are you basically saying the other Arab countries that are in this position would just sit it out. Maybe they don't want to side with us or get involved because they were left out of the decision-making process, but at the same time, they are not going to get involved on Iraq's side either. They are just going to watch, wait, and see. Dr. KAY. I don’t think they will get involved on Iraq's side. I think collaboration takes many forms. And while we would often like to have you up front joining us in Kumbaya and saying you're with us, there are other forms of cooperation in the Middle East that you learn to live with. M; MCINTYRE. Do you feel you would have that type of coopera- tion? Dr. KAY. I certainly do. Mr. MCINTYRE. Second, on page six of your testimony, near the end, you say this statement, which is a quite powerful one. “As we consider possible action, absent the forceful removal of Saddam, unambiguous certainty as to the status of his weapons of mass de- struction program is likely to come only after the first use of these weapons against the United States and its friends”. Do we have— and perhaps this is a note to think about as we conclude today's hearings, but do we have a self-fulfilling prophecy of inviting the 49 use of chemical, biological, nuclear weapons by attacking Iraq pre- emptively. Are we convinced, and I want to know if you are convinced, the two of you, that Iraq is preparing to use these weapons against the United States, its assets, not just to develop them. I mean, so much of what we have heard, generally the last two or three weeks, has been they are close to developing, they are going to develop them, the word has been developed. The question is, do you believe they are preparing to use them against America or American interests, or they would only be used in response to an attack? Dr. SPERTZEL. If the U.S. does not agree not to stop bombing in the north and the south, frankly get out and stop interfering with the Iraqi regime's desires, whatever they happen to be, yes, I fully believe that Iraq is prepared to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. interests at home as well as abroad. I happen to be- lieve the one person that still believes we haven’t found out yet who was behind the anthrax spores last fall. And when we do, there may be a lot of people surprised. Dr. KAY. On the issue of whether Saddam—and I think you made a distinction between Saddam and Iraqi military forces—if we were to use military forces and come at him for regime change, his removal and replacement, I certainly think Saddam would at- tempt to use it, but I am actually more optimistic that you are dealing at that point with individual missile commanders who, if they know Saddam, and there is little doubt now they understand that if American military force is exercised to replace the regime, I think many of them will cut deals and will decide “I really shouldn't fire this weapon because I may be held personally respon- sible, and tomorrow morning may not be the best thing that hap- pens to my family and my life.” So I think the tactical deterrence and perhaps more so in a ter- rorist state, we may find a lot of those weapons not used. We are lucky that those weapons—the command and control system is not one like we would have, and even ours was never always that tight where the President could exercise and it was guaranteed to hap- pen. So I think we may actually escape large scale use of it if we are smart and go at the head of the snake and get the head early before he can do it because a lot of people in Iraq–I am absolutely convinced that probably no more than 250 or 350 at the very core, that if it is clear they are gone or they are in the process of going. It is going to be much like the end of the Second World War when we worried about the Nazis retreating to the Bavarian Alps. Where did they retreat to? The American zone. They didn’t re- treat to the Bavarian Alps. Everyone suddenly wanted a transition from a Nazi to a freedom fighter and being in the American as op- posed to the Soviet zone. I suspect if it is clear that we are going to exercise effective military force, we are going to discover a lot of people who always oppose Saddam and were only there because of the terrorism and would like to live a better life. Mr. MCINTYRE. So in essence—and you started out, Dr. Kay, by saying Saddam Hussein would attempt to use it. Do you agree with Dr. Spertzel that you believe he is preparing to use these, and he is not just developing them. 50 Dr. KAY. I am convinced that he is preparing to use them for po- litical effect. The use of a weapon doesn't involve necessarily going off particularly when you have weak neighbors. The intimidation is shadowing effect of showing, demonstrating that it has chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, at some point will change the poli- tics in the region and get the effect. I think if I were Israel, the possession of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein would be fundamentally disturbing because I think he has an animosity and desire to destroy the State of Israel. Dr. SPERTZEL. I don’t think there is any question about the lat- ter, because the one thing that we constantly heard was Israel's taking out the Osirak reactor back in 1981 and that is bitter at all levels. Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman and that was a very good line of questions. And now the distinguished ranking member, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. I want to say a special thanks. It has been one of the best hearings we have had in this room and your efforts are well appreciated. You also point out the old adage that you just can’t pit a snake. So we thank you for your comments and I hope a lot of folks heard exactly what you said. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. And I thank Mr. Spratt too, in supporting the idea that we have some pretty robust hearings. I think this has been good for the whole committee. Mr. SPRATT. I second what the chairman and Ike said. But let me end on an anecdote. We went to—Duncan, I believe you were with us when we went to the Persian Gulf and met Tariq Aziz at the Hotel Rashid. And he began the meeting by—this was before we reflagged the Kuwaiti tankers. It was during the Iran-Iraq war. And he began by chiding us by not giving Iraq greater support. We are fighting your fight for you because after all, you were severely embarrassed by the Iranians and they are certainly not your friend. You should be supporting us more openly and more vigor- ously. And Larry Hopkins, a Republican Member, spoke up and said, “Mr. Secretary, if your country was not openly and aggres- sively using chemical weapons in violation of Geneva conventions, we might be supporting you more openly and vigorously.” And Tarik Aziz said, “Well it is a policy, the official policy of my country, to deny that we are using chemical weapons, but I won't maintain that pretense. What I will tell you is that the Iranians are fanatics and if they were to prevail in this war they would take over our country and change it radically, and we cannot permit that to happen and you should appreciate why. And I will say this: Yes, we are using chemical weapons, and if we had nuclear weap- ons we would use them too.” Mr. HUNTER. And to note, Mr. Saxton, do you have any final thoughts or questions here? Gentlemen, once again, thank you very much. I want to thank the members of the committee. I think we have had a great hear- ing, and I hope you will be available because you have an insight that very few people in the world have because of your experiences in Iraq, attempting to make weapons inspection work. And we now 51 are in a country with millions of citizens and lots of leaders with a need to share in those insights, so you are going to be called upon, I know, a lot in the next several weeks and months, and we appreciate your service to the country. Thank you. And this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 7:21 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X SEPTEMBER 10, 2002 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD SEPTEMBER 10, 2002 OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. DUNCAN HUNTER HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING ON WEAPONS INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ September 10, 2002 Today, the Committee on Armed Services meets in open session to discuss weapons inspections in Iraq, with specific emphasis on the experiences of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq from 1991 through 1998. Today’s hearing marks the first of a number of planned public sessions designed to educate and inform the Committee, and the American people, on the various issues surrounding Iraq’s continued violation of numerous United Nation’s resolutions, its illicit development of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States, the Middle East, and the international community. In fact, the Committee received a classified briefing from the CIA and DIA earlier this afternoon on Iraqi threats, and will hear from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld next Wednesday morning, September 18, on many of these same matters. (57) 58 Our witnesses this afternoon, however, are • Dr. Dr. David A. Kay, former United Nations Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector in Iraq; and • Dr. Richard O. Spertzel, former Head of the Biology Section on the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq. Welcome gentlemen. Thank you for appearing on such short notice. The committee looks forward to your testimony. But before we ask you both for your opening remarks, I want to invite Mr. Skelton, the Ranking Democrat on the committee, to offer any comments he might have. ### Thank you Mr.Skelton. Dr. Kay, the floor is yours. 59 Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO), Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives Full Committee Hearing on Weapons Inspections in Iraq September 10, 2002 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening this hearing. In the last week, President Bush has made clear to the Congress and to the American people his determination to remove Saddam Hussein from power and to neutralize the threat posed by the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program. What the administration has not yet explained is the President’s plan for achieving this regime change and disarmament and how these actions will affect the United States’ ability to conduct the broader war on terrorism and its other interests around the world. Recent polls have shown that the majority of the American people support addressing the Iraqi threat, but that they prefer an approach that has congressional authorization and that works with the United Nations. The polls also show that the American people have questions about why we might have to use military force in Iraq, what the risks are of doing so, and what the United States must be prepared to do in the long-term to make sure that Iraq doesn’t threaten its neighbors or the United States 60 with its military or with weapons of mass destruction. I share their questions and have told the President this. We may well need to take steps—including military action—against Iraq in the near future, but we must ask the basic questions of why, why now, and how. The best way to get answers is through hearings like this one. Before the administration and the Congress can decide on the best course of action, we must clearly understand the threat. The witnesses before us, Dr. David Kay and Dr. Richard Spertzel, have both served on teams in Iraq as part of United Nations-sponsored inspections and have knowledge of Iraqi WMD programs through the withdrawal of UN inspectors in 1998. Gentlemen, I hope you will both be able to help this committee understand the likely state of the Iraqi weapons program. What do we know for sure about Iraqi capabilities at this point and what information do we have to infer based on imperfect knowledge? What would it take to know exactly what capabilities the Iraqis have? What approaches short of an invasion and regime change could help destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction? From your perspective working with international organizations, what are the benefits of a multilateral approach to addressing this problem? And critically, must we act now? What is 61 different from this moment in time than the last four years or the next year or two? Any decision to act against Iraq must begin with answers to basic questions about the nature of the danger and the immediacy of the threat. From there, Congress can exercise its constitutional responsibility by examining any administration plan and timetable for dealing with this threat. I thank both witnesses for being with us today and sharing their expertise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 62 Richard O. Spertzel, VMD Ph.D. 10 September 2002 Consultant House Armed Service Committee "State of the Iraqi WMD Program and History of UNSCOM Efforts in Iraq." STATE OF THE IRAQI WMD PROGRAM Iraq's Biological Weapons (BW) Program was among the most secretive of its weapons-of-mass- destruction (WMD) programs. Its existence was not acknowledged until July 1995. From 1991 to 1995, Iraq categorically denied it had a BW program and took active steps to conceal the program from the UN Special Commission. This pattern of denial and concealment continued through the termination of inspections by Iraq. These steps included fraudulent statements, false and forged documents, misrepresentation of the roles of people and facilities, and other specific acts of deception. The pattern of deception appears to continue even unto the present. The full extent and the objective of Iraq's BW program has never been disclosed by Iraq. Iraq's Biological Weapons Program, Then and Now: Iraq asserts that its BW program began in 1985 and dismisses the earlier BW investigations that began in late 1972/early 1973 as being insignificant. From its inception in the 1970s, Iraq’s BW program induded both military and terrorist applications. The program included bacteria, viruses, toxins, and agents causing plant diseases. The agents included lethal and incapacitating agents for humans and economic damaging agents. The program sought enhanced virulence, environmental and antibiotic resistance, and aerosol dispersion. In other words, this was a well planned, broadly encompassing program. The covert (terrorist and assassination) feature of Iraq's program was not actively pursued by UNSCOM. BW Program under Intelligence Service/Special Security Organization: The evidence suggests that Iraq's BW program was under the Intelligence Service/SSO. Much of this information came from senior Iraqi personnel, during the course of interviews. Hard evidence as might be expected is lacking. Iraq's BW program (and, initially, it appears its chemical weapons (CW) program as well) was founded and funded by Iraq's Intelligence Service with some limited technical input from Iraq's Ministry of Defense. A variety of cover organizations were used to conceal the program including the Ministries of Interior, Health, and Higher Education and Scientific Research. From its inception, there were two distinct interests for the program. One dealt with the pursuit of agents that had small scale, covert application and the other would have application to larger scale strategic/military purpose. Except for the period from 1979 to 1987 when the military portion of the BW program paralleled and was a part of the CW program under direct Ministry of Defense influence, the BW program remained (and probably remains) under the SSO (Amn al Khass). In 1987, the military relevant piece of the BW program was rejoined with the covert BW program. Iraq has repeatedly stated that the BW program was different than the other WMD programs in that it did not report to the staff of Military Industrial Commission (MIC), but rather reported directly to Hussein Kamal Hassan or his senior deputy, Dr. Amer Al Sa'adi (a similar reporting system existed for the SSO). Interview information clearly indicates that the BW-filled weapons remained under the control of the SSO up to and including whatever destruction of such weapons as might have occurred. It is likely that the BW program still remains under the SSO. Iraq asserts that the program was obliterated in 1991 but this is patently not true. On three separate occasions in 1997 and 1998 panels of international experts reviewed all the information available to UNSCOM. These panels concluded Iraq's BW program was far more complex and extensive than that which Iraq had acknowledged. 63 BWProgram End of 1990: By any definition, in 1990/1991, Iraq's BW program was in an accelerating expansion phase, Iraq's bacterial BW capabilities were reasonably well established, including its ability for production, concentration, spray drying, and delivery to produce a readily dispersable small partide aerosol. Iraq was well underway in establishing a virus research, development, and production capability, but had not reached weaponization potential. Iraq had demonstrated an anticrop capability. It had demonstrated a mycotoxin capability. Although there was no information on an anti-animal program, such agents were well within Iraq's capability. Along with its agent production, Iraq was developing a weapons delivery capability, apparently for both short range and intermediate range delivery. The agents included lethal, incapacitating, and agricultural biological warfare agents. There is a major disparity between the amount of agent declared as produced by Iraq and that estimated by UNSCOM experts. A serious issue concerns Iraq's interest in and weaponization of aflatoxin. It is apparent that Iraq's interest was in its long-term carcinogenic and liver toxicity effect rather than any short-term effects. One can only wonder what was the intended target population. Field tests encompassed point source releases, small area contamination, and large-scale line source release and were evaluated both for tactical and strategic use. The weapons and range of agents considered provided Iraq with a variety of options for their use, Iraq had deployed R400 aerial bombs to at least three locations in western and southern Iraq, and had also deployed Al Hussein (SCUD) missiles BW-filled warheads and at least one "droptank." Additionally Iraq had field-tested BW agents in 122mm rocket warheads and 155mm artillery shells. Iraq also had an interest in landmines, flechettes, fragmentation weapons, drones, missiles, thin-skinned aluminum weapons, fiberglass-coated weapons, and Supergun projectiles. No investigation of field testing is acknowledged for these weapon types although there are indications that interest had developed in such weapons for biological warfare purposes. Iraq’s BW program in 1998: Although Iraq claims that it "obliterated" the program in 1991 (without the supervision by the UN as was set out in the ceasefire resolution 687, April 1991), and in so doing it destroyed all weapons and bulk agents unilaterally without any further documentation. The evidence indicates rather that Iraq continued to expand its BW capabilities. UNSCOM monitoring, while useful in hindering Iraq's program, was not successful in preventing some degree of continuation of Iraq's BW investigations. Expert panels concluded that it was not certain that Iraq had indeed "obliterated" its BW program. Documentation recovered by UNSCOM indicated a continued build up of Iraq's BW program capability. The organizations associated with ts BW program continued to acquire and attempted to acquire equipment that would enhance its BW capability. Among the expansion plans were design and construction of 5,000 and 50,000 liter fermentation units for Al Hakam and Tuwaitha. Disturbingly, such procurement actions included a rather large production plant in association with external assistance. Joint negotiations centered on the design, construction, and operation of a 50,000 liter fermentation facility consisting, not of one 50,000 liter fermenter and associated lesser fermenters and tanks as might be expected for scale up of a SCP plant, but rather, five 10,000 liter fermenters and associated kesser fermenters and tanks. The key Iraqi players on the negotiating team were the head of botulinum toxin production in 1990, two BW facility engineers, and a MIC representative, Iraq has now developed the capability to produce critical equipment (fermenters, centrifuges, spray dryers, etc.) and to produce critical supplies, e.g., standardized growth media. Interestingly, Iraq only developed standardized media of direct importance to its BW program rather than media types that 64 would have more generalized medical/hospital applications. This effort continued at least through 1998. It is also noteworthy that Iraq's experienced senior personnel who were active in Iraq's BW program in the 1980s remained intact as a unit throughout the inspection period. In essence, Iraq retained the personnel for its BW program. It tried to retain equipment and supplies. When UNSCOM forced the acknowledgement of Iraq's BW program and subsequent destruction of equipment, facilities, and supplies, Iraq developed the indigenous capability to produce critical equipment and supplies. Although Al Hakam was completely destroyed, not all production capable equipment in Iraq was destroyed or rendered harmless. Iraq's reluctance to fully and openly declare the full extent of its BW program only enhances the perception that Iraq still maintains a BW program. UNITED NATIONs Bw INSPECTION AND MONITORING EFFORTs INIRAQ UNSCOM operated in Iraq from May 1991 until December 1998. Iraq was a defeated country and subject to the coercive disarmament measures of UN Resolution 687. This resolution compelled Iraq to give up its existing WMD capabilities and accept monitoring by UN inspectors to assure such activities were not reconstituted. Resolutions 687,707, 715 (and others) gave UNSCOM extraordinary rights to conduct intrusive no-notice inspections as well as access to any location, person, document, computer, etc., UNSCOM felt necessary to accomplish its task. The reality was far from this utopian ideal. UNSCOM experienced obstructions in Iraq from the beginning. Ultimately, UNSCOM was notable to accomplish fully either the task of accounting for Iraqi weapons programs nor monitoring to assure Iraq did not reconstitute prohibited programs. Iraq gradually gave up only what UNSCOM could prove Iraq still retained. UNSCOM could not prove Iraq had an offensive BW program. Nor did any country, including the United States, provide any intelligence for UNSCOM to act upon to catch the Iraqis. The key thread that UNSCOM followed to the Iraqi program was the record of Iraq importing vast quantities of biological growth media-totally out of scale with any legitimate civilian purposes. (Iraq can now produce such material indigenously.) By early 1995, with the accumulating evidence amassed by UNSCOM, most countries were rightly concerned about Iraq's BW capability. At the expert level (leading BW experts including personnel from all PS members of the UNSC) this level of concern continued through 1998, but at the political/diplomatic level, some countries experts' concern was not reflected in the verbiage and actions by the respective leaders and diplomats. I cite this disparity between the experts and the diplomats because I believe it has implications should inspections resume. Implementation of Monitoring: Only after Iraq, in November 1993, accepted SCR 715(1991), could UNSCOM begin the necessary steps to implement monitoring. While monitoring began for CW and missiles in October 1994, the monitoring for BW could not be fully implemented until April 1995. The system was designed following an extensive year-long effort to survey every site in Iraq with some potential for biological activity. This included detailed examinations of hospitals, university microbiology labs, breweries, vaccine plants, etc. For each site, UNSCOM collected extensive data on the facility, interviewed staff, searched documents, etc. Based on such data, inspection protocols were drawn up that prescribed how each site should be monitored. Over 80 sites were designated for regular monitoring in the BW area. Monitoring required each site subject to monitoring to submit on a semi-annual basis extensive formats requesting detailed information about the sites activities and personnel during preceding period. These data were analyzed and checked by resident teams based in Baghdad. In addition high priority sites were required to submit monthly monitoring parameters that were specifically designed for each site. A few sites were also selected for monitoring with video cameras capable of recording as well as 65 transmitting live to the UNSCOM offices. UNSCOM was able to generate a lot of evidence that Iraqi declarations were not accurate. As regards the accuracy and completeness of Iraq's declaration and the likelihood that it was continuing its BW program, nothing has occurred to change the opinion of the experts. Nor does it appear, in spite of the lip-service that is given to getting inspectors back into Iraq, that there has been any material change in the support that an inspection regime might expect from UNSC P5 members. It appears that most of the proposals for getting inspectors back into Iraq is based on the premise that "any inspectors are better than none." To be blunt, that is pure rubbish, just an illusion of inspections. Even while UNSCOM inspectors were still operable, Iraq was constantly trying to restrict monitoring inspectors activities, curb their access, and require notification of inspections, even to monitored sites. Such limitations to monitoring would make such a regime a farce; under such circumstances, monitoring inspectors would be worse than no inspectors because it would provide an inappropriate illusion of compliance to the world community. What countries really believe and what they will espouse are most likely two entirely different views. I was told by a senior diplomat in 1998 "it would not matter if you placed a BW-laden Al Hussein warhead that you found in Iraq on the UNSC table, it would not change opinions about lifting sanctions". He added "if the CW and missile files are closed, the world will not care about biology." It appears to me that this may still be the viewpoint of several nations. Monitoring: Monitoring teams, unlike popular misperception, are not set up for discovery, e.g., finding undeclared sites or completing unfinished proscribed program investigations. Rather these teams were designed to be a deterrent to reconstituting a proscribed program using dual-use equipment at declared sites. In UNSCOM terminology this meant the large-scale military relevant programs; it did not address the very low-scale required for terrorist purposes. Implementation of monitoring by UNSCOM was predicated on Iraq fully and willingly cooperating with UNSCOM; that did not happen. Iraq would only give up and can be expected to give up only what the inspectors can find and prove. It was also predicated on Iraq providing full and complete disclosure of its proscribed BW program; that did not happen. It was also predicated on Iraq making full and accurate disclosure of all facilities containing dual use equipment and capability; that did not happen. To be effective, the monitoring system must pose a reasonable risk to Iraq of the monitoring system detecting violations of a significant scale. Even under the best of circumstances it would be almost impossible to detect small-scale research, development, and production of BW agents by a State determined to conduct such activities. Without a sense of certainty by Iraq that there would be severe repercussions by a united UNSC, monitoring does not have a chance of true success. A fundamental requirement for monitoring to be effective depends not only on having highly qualified inspectors but equally important on full support by the UNSC. Past history indicates that Iraq can hinder and in some cases outright block inspectors with impunity and then attempt to blame the incidents on the inspectors. The UNSC does not seem able to equate failure to cooperate with failure to comply. Monitoring and Inspections - Prospects for Success: This is very difficult on which to comment. The success or failure depends too much on uncontrollable elements. What will be the conditions under which the inspectors return? What support will the inspection regime have, given Iraq's recalcitrance and the likely lack of unanimous support in the UNSCP Will Iraq truly cooperate and reveal or destroy all its BW activity? Or will Iraq continue its established pattern of deception, denial, and concealment? What would be required for success? The right, accepted again by Iraq and enforced by all members of the UNSC, for immediate, unconditional access to physical locations, personnel, and documents as determined necessary by the Inspectorate. Any limitations or conditions on access will produce large reductions in effectiveness and credibility of monitoring. The demand by the UNSC that Iraq provides a complete disclosure of its WMD with supporting evidence that can be verified and not accept the illusion 66 of cooperation as meaning Iraq is in compliance. There must be a harsh penalty for non-compliance that is supported in advance by all P5 members of the UNSC. Implicit in immediate and unconditional access to sites is a need for short travel times from base locations to sites to be visited. UNSCOM operated from a central site in Baghdad that provided Iraq with several hours unintended notice of inspections when such inspections were at locations in the far western, northern, or southern regions of Iraq. This should be changed for reliable monitoring. As such, additional satellite inspection teams should be established and located on a permanent basis in these outlying regions. This will have significant personnel, logistical, transportation, and financial implications that goes beyond that envisioned by UNMOVIC. Another factor of concern with a monitoring system that would have limitations or conditions imposed on it is Iraq's consideration for using mobile production facilities. This was considered (and allegedly discarded) in 1987/1988 when Iraq decided to establish the Al Hakam production facility. A determined Iraq even with a greatly reinforced monitoring system might (if it has not already) reconsider this option. Such a facility on a limited scale would be virtually impossible for monitors to identify; it need not have and is unlikely to have any signatures that would identify it from other transport vans, Finally, it must be recognized that Iraq has and uses the full resources of a nation state with its centrally directed military industry and security apparatus to deal with a limited number of international inspectors reporting to an international body with shifting goals and attention. Issue of Non-declared sites: Should Iraq consent to the return of inspectors, it is most unlikely that Iraq would then conduct overt BW activities at declared sites. It therefore follows that Iraq would do everything to prevent or hinder inspection of undeclared sites. Although UNMOVIC is on record as retaining options for undeclared site inspections, the degree that such inspection of an undedared site would need to go, through a series of review procedures, before such an inspection could occur may not bode well for its success. The ability for UNMOVIC to keep information from leaking to Iraq is presumed to be no better than UNSCOM, as such, an undeclared visit would be undedared in name only and only negative findings could be expected, What are the potential consequences? Should Iraq be allowed to retain its BW (and other WMD programs) it will remain a menace, not only to its neighbors, but to the world at large because of the concomitant instability it would create in the region. The Gulf States would need to judge all their actions in light of the Iraqi threat. The regime is unpredictable. It is already openly supplying support to the Palestinians. Would Iraq even more overtly risk using WMD on Israel? What would be the repercussions from such a foolhardy action? Others are better equipped than I to speak to these matters. Bioterrorism Threat: The world's press in recent weeks has cited the opposition of most nations in the Middle East and Europe to any action against Iraq. It is cited that Iraq is weakened and does not pose any immediate and significant threat. It seems to me this does not address the terrorist threat posed by Iraq's WMD programs. One would think after 9/11, a more realistic appraisal of Iraq's capability and willingness to use WMD as terrorist weapons would be forthcoming. As I cited above, Iraq’s BW program from its inception included a terrorist component. The threat that Iraq’s BW program poses as a bioterrorist weapon to any of its perceived enemies is enormous. While much attention is focused on bioterrorism against people, the economic devastation that could be wreaked on the food animal or food crop industry may be far greater in the long term effect. Clearly the greater danger for the US at home and abroad that is posed by Iraq's WMD activities is the potential for its use in terrorism, whether by Iraq directly or through support to terrorist organizations. Should Iraq be involved with using its BW expertise in bioterrorist activities, it may be impossible to find a "smoking gun" that would implicate Iraq. BW agents are unlikely to have a signature that will definitively pinpoint a laboratory or a country as the origin. 67 Concern for BW terrorism is not limited to immediate manifestation of such uses. It is worth recalling Iraq's developing and alleged weaponization of aflatoxin. Such an agent has no military relevant application and would only have relevance where an enemy did not know it was attacked or could not fight back. Iraq has shown a willingness to use CW agents on its neighbor and its own population, might it also have used or intended to use aflatoxin on such defenseless populations? It takes ten years or more for aflatoxin to manifest its carcinogenic and liver damaging effects. Iraq's BW program in 2002: I intentionally left this discussion to the end because much of the above discussions affect this response. In 1990, as stated above, Iraq's BW program was still in expansion and development. It probably had three bacterial agents, one bacterial toxin, one mycotoxin and one anticrop agent in its arsenal. Although Iraq denies it, Iraq had the equipment and know-how to dry BW agents in a small particle that would be highly dispersable into an aerosol. (Iraq acknowledges testing aflatoxin and Smutspores mixed with silica gel.) It still retains the necessary personnel, equipment (including spray dryer), and supplies to have an equal or expanded capability in this regard. It has had 12 years to advance its viral capability and, as I have cited elsewhere, this almost certainly includes smallpox as an agent. Even more ominous is Iraq's successful efforts to acquire the necessary equipment and reagents for adding genetic engineering to its BW repertoire. This was particularly alarming because, at the same time, key personnel in Iraq's virus and bioengineering BW program were no longer functional at their stated work locations. There is no doubt in my mind that Iraq has a much stronger BW program today than it had in 1990. Perhaps of most concern would be anthrax and tularemia bacteria and smallpox virus as well as antianimal and anticrop agents. 68 Testimony Delivered by David A. Kay' before the House Armed Services Committee September 10, 2002 For more than a decade, the international community has sought unsuccessfully a long- term solution to an Iraq led by Saddam and armed with WMD. Indeed, the start of any sensible long-term approach to Iraq is to understand why the United Nations arms inspections slid into irrelevance and four years ago came to and end. UNSCOM's efforts to eliminate Saddam's WMD capacity, which effectively ended in 1998 when the inspectors left Iraq, were based on four assumptions, all of which turned out to be false. These were: • Saddam's rule would not survive the disasters suffered by Iraq as a result of its invasion of Kuwait, • Iraq's WMD capabilities were not extensive nor significantly indigenous; A post-Saddam Iraq would declare to UNSCOM all of Iraq's WMD capabilities; UNSCOM would be able to "destroy, remove or render harmless" Iraq's WMD capabilities leaving an Iraq that would not have WMD capability as an enduring legacy. The reasoning of US Administration officials at the end of the Gulf War that no regime could survive a disaster as compelling as Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War was no doubt true for a democratic system. Saddam's endurance, however, stands as yet another stark reminder of the dangers of attempting to understand the world on the basis solely of our own values and experience. Saddam's Iraq was and is a brutal, totalitarian dictatorship that can survive as long as it maintains coercive power over its citizens. Once Saddam's survival became a fact, all hope of his voluntarily yielding up the very weapons that allow him to hope to dominate the region was lost. What is much less well understood is the impact that the discovery of the gigantic scope and indigenous nature of Saddam's weapons program had on the prospects of being able to eliminate this program by inspection alone. We now know that the Iraqi efforts to build an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction: • Spanned more than a decade; • Cost more than $20 Billion; • Involved more than 40,000 Iraqis and succeed in mastering all the technical and most of the productions steps necessary to acquire a devil's armory of nuclear, 'David A. Kay led for the International Atomic Energy Agency and UNSCOM, three arms inspection missions as chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq during 1991-92. Now a Senior Corporate vice president with San Diego- headquartered Science Applications International Corp., he is based in McLean, Va. The views expressed here are entirely his own and do not represent those of SAIC 69 chemical and biological weapons as well as the missiles necessary to deliver them over vast distances. The capability to produce weapons of mass destruction arising from a national program on the scale of that of Iraq's cannot be eliminated by simply destroying "weapons" facilities. And while we should credit the UN inspection process with destroying a substantial nuclear weapons establishment in Iraq that was largely unidentified at the time of the Gulf War and that had survived largely unscathed the coalition bombing campaign. The nuclear weapons secrets are now Iraqi secrets well understood by Iraq's technical elite, and the production capabilities necessary to turn these "secrets" into weapons are part and parcel of the domestic infrastructure of Iraq which will survive even the most draconian of sanctions regimes. Simply put, Iraq is not Libya, but very much like post-Versailles Germany in terms of its ability to maintain a weapons capability in the teeth of international inspections. As long as a government remains in Baghdad committed to acquiring WMD, that capability can be expected to become — and without much warning — a reality. To compress a lot of bitter history: In December 1998, the United States conducted military attacks against Iraq after UNSCOM reported that it could not achieve its mandated disarmament and monitoring tasks with the limited access and cooperation Iraq allowed. All UNSCOM activities in Iraq then ceased. UNSCOM, the first UN effort to eliminate Iraq's WMD program, passed out of existence and was replaced by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) through the adoption of Security Council resolution 1284 on 17 December 1999. UNMOVIC was to be more acceptable to Iraq, led by a Commissioner that Iraq and their sympathizers on the Security Council found more acceptable. Even under this more favorable inspection regime, however, Iraq has continued to refuse UN inspectors. In the nuclear area, there is a set of critical questions that need to be considered to understand Iraq's nuclear potential: • How has the Iraqi nuclear program changed from the Persian Gulf War and UNSCOM inspections to today? • What impact has UN sanctions had on the weapon program? • How has international opinion of the Iraqi nuclear threat changed during this time period? The point of beginning to think about how one would describe Iraq's nuclear program today is to recognize the serious impediments that we all face in trying to understand that program. On-site inspections in Iraq were never easy, and by 1995-96 Iraq had put in place a major deception and concealment effort designed to mislead inspections as to the intent, scope and continuing activities in the nuclear area. When UNSCOM inspections managed, as they often did, to penetrate this web of deceptions, Iraq 70 resorted to physical denial of access and threats of violence to neck down the scope of inspections. By 1997, effective, sustained inspections in Iraq had come to an end. The final ending of all inspections in 1998 was in fact an anti-climax. Lacking on-site inspections, with unfettered access to all of Iraq, for four years has meant that it is impossible to be sure where their nuclear program stands today. It also means that even if inspections were to begin tomorrow, it would be impossible to answer this question without a very long, sustained period of unfettered inspections. The baseline of Iraq's nuclear program is broken and it will be impossible to quickly re-establish it. It is very unlikely that national intelligence efforts can add much clarity to the exact status of Saddam's nuclear program. The same deception and concealment capabilities that were directed at the inspectors will have hindered national intelligence services. WMD programs have long been the hardest targets for intelligence service to unravel, even when they are very large. One should remember that the very large Soviet-era biological program, which included putting smallpox on long-range ballistic missiles aimed at the West, went undiscovered until after the end of the Cold War. The size of the Soviet uranium enrichment program was seriously underestimated and major nuclear production facilities unidentified until after the fall of the Soviets. Based on Iraq's activities before 1998 and sketchy insights available from defectors and exposure of continued Iraqi attempts to acquire nuclear related capabilities, one can say a few things with high confidence: • Iraq's pre-war nuclear accomplishments have ensured that if it can acquire fissionable nuclear material from any outside source it will be able to fabricate at least a crude, improvised nuclear device in months, not years. For Iraq, just like every other aspirant to nuclear status, the key obstacle is the acquisition of fissile material. Iraq had a viable weapon design and the capacity to produce all the elements of a weapon. If Iraq has to rely on its own efforts to produce nuclear material, one can do little better than the public estimate by German intelligence authorities last year which, citing major Iraqi procurement efforts that the Germans had knowledge of, determined that Iraq could, in the worst case, have a nuclear weapon in 3-6 years. Given the insecurity of nuclear stockpiles in the former Soviet Union, the direct acquisition of nuclear materials remains a serious possibility and one for which there is likely to be little warning with even the best of intelligence. • Iraq will have dispersed and shielded with elaborate deception arrangements its nuclear activities, requiring highly intrusive inspection techniques if there were to be any hope of discovering these activities. • Iraq understands the methods used by inspectors and will be ready to frustrate all efforts to get close to activities they are determined to shield. • Iraq has not abandoned its efforts to acquire WMD. A recent defector has stated that an explicit order to reconstitute the nuclear teams was promulgated in August 1998; at the time Iraq ceased cooperation with UN-led inspections. There should be no doubt that Iraq, under Saddam, continues to seek nuclear weapons 71 capability and that given the time it will devote the resources and technical manpower necessary to reach that goal. • Too little attention has been given to the advantage that time gives to Saddam to come up with novel ways of delivering his weapons of mass destruction that my be very difficult for the United States to anticipate and counter. Historically our intelligence and defense efforts have been directed at anticipating and countering the symmetrical forces of other roughly similar sized military powers. The events of a year ago should serve as a perpetual reminder that others may chose very asymmetrical means to carry out destruction. In the nuclear area, as in the biological and chemical area, there exist a very broad range of such novel means with no easy and cheap counters. To allow Saddam the time to develop his WMD weapons and to come up with novel means of delivery it to accept the almost certainty of a successful first attack against the US and its friends. • Economic sanctions no longer significantly restrict the financial resources that Iraq can devote to WMD programs, and over the last five years have been of declining value in restricting the flow of goods and technology. The attitude of states in the region and even many of our European allies toward Iraq's WMD program is harder to understand. By 1996 the real aim of the inspections, the elimination of Iraq's WMD weapons and production capacity and the establishment of a long-term monitoring process, began to slide away in the face of resolute Iraqi defiance and the desire of the Russians and the French for short-term economic gain. We should also credit a successful Iraqi propaganda campaign that has gone largely unanswered and has convinced many in Europe and in our own country that the US is responsible for keeping on economic sanctions that have devastated Iraq women and children. Major states in the region, certainly including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are no longer willing to let an automatic anti-Saddam reflex define their policy in the Gulf. Even states, such as Kuwait and Bahrain, which are much more dependent upon the US for their security, are resisting US leadership when it threatens military confrontation. Equally important, Iran is no longer the marginalized state that it was in 1990–91 and has learned to skillfully play each crisis to benefit its long-term goal of removing US influence from the Gulf. We are left with “allies' that lack sufficient military power to stand up to a rearmed Iraq, and that are increasingly unwilling to provide the US with the political support and operational bases that would allow the US to deal with Iraq even in its present weakened state. This same splintering of alliance ties can be seen in the non-regional allies that were a key part of Gulf coalition structure. The French are no longer willing partners, and the Russians can no longer be coerced or bribed into silent cooperation. if there were ever a psychological campaign that either was not fought or misfired, it has been the US effort to make the states of the Gulf and our European and Asian allies understand how much more dangerous the future is about to become as Iraq rebuilds its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the Iranians further accelerate 72 their own efforts, and the rest of the region scrambles for political and military protection. What choices are we left with? Few and mostly bad is the simple answer. The easy nostrums — support the opposition, containment as we did with the Soviets, or the UN Secretary General's 1998 statement “I can do business with Saddam" — seem expensive, risky and, at best, only partial answers. The re-introduction of UN inspectors, now called UNMOVIC, not UNSCOM, into Iraq may well result not in constraining Iraq's WMD ambitions, but freeing them of all restraint. UNMOVIC is a product of a successful effort to remove UNSCOM from Iraq and replace it with an inspection regime more acceptable to Iraq. The Iraqi complaints concerning UNSCOM related to UNSCOM's insistence on unrestricted access to anything in Iraq it deemed relevant to determining the scope of Iraq's WMD program, and an equal insistence that they would not accept any time limit on how long it might take to accomplish this objective. if UNMOVIC were to compromise on either of these, we might end up with Iraq being declared free of WMD, when if fact all that would be certain is that UNMOVIC could not find any evidence of WMD. The best hope of the opposition was in the chaos at the end of the Gulf War. This opportunity, however, was lost when the US decided to stand aside and let Saddam freely slaughter many brave Iraqis. In the intervening years US policy toward the opposition has grown to resemble nothing so much as the mating ritual of the female Back Widow – promising but quickly lethal to the male. I do not believe that it is true that supporting forces of democratic change is something that Americans are genetically unable to do. It is clear, however, that we generally have been so inept at it that it is likely to deplete the gene pool of promising opponents to tyrants before we are successful. Containment has a nice ring and the virtue of a clear success in the fall of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, one can only despair that those who urge containment of Saddam as an appropriate policy have not examined the preconditions of the Cold War case to see if they exist in the Gulf. The US maintained for 40 years more than a million troops in Europe as part of its effort to contain the Soviets and invested vast resources in the social, political and economic reconstruction of Europe into a bastion of democratic values. In the Gulf there is no simple overriding fear of Saddam that will dominate all politics the way the Soviet threat did. For example, the Iranians who have every reason to fear the Iraqis will not see a US presence that contains Saddam as serving their interest. Many holders in the region of traditional tribal societal and fundamentalist religious values worry more about the threat of democratic and modern influences that flow from US presence than they do the threat from Iraq. Some of the states in the region are more fearful of a rapid democratic modernization of their societies than they are of Saddam. 73 Iraq is of a class of problems where all the easy answers seem to have been in the past and all the low risk, near terms options are not answers. But that is the past and future of the Middle East. If it is of any comfort, we should all acknowledge there were never any easy answers in the past. What is clear is that unless we take immediate steps to address the issue of removing the Saddam's regime from power in Iraq, we will soon face a nuclear armed and embolden Saddam. With time, and we can never be sure of how long that will be, Saddam will be able to intimidate his neighbors with nuclear weapons and find the means to use them against the United States. Saddam's own actions to obstruct the efforts of the international community to carry out the removal of his WMD capacity as mandated by the UN Security Council at the end of the Gulf War accounts for the uncertainty as to the exact status of that program today. These same actions of obstruction, however, remove all doubt about his aim to acquire and enlarge his nuclear, biological and chemical weapons stockpiles. Absence the forceful removal of Saddam, unambiguous certainty as to the status of his WMD programs is likely to come only after the first use of these weapons against the United States and its friends. This is a very high price to pay-potentially many times over the human toll one year ago in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania — for clarity as to the exact status of any nuclear program. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 18, 2002. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter presid- 1ng. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNLA Mr. HUNTER. The committee will come to order. Today the Com- mittee on Armed Services continues its review of United States pol- icy toward Iraq. This morning's hearing marks a second of a num- ber of planned public sessions designed to educate and inform the committee and the American people on the various issues sur- rounding Iraq's continued violation of numerous United Nations (U.N.) resolutions, its illicit development of weapons of mass de- struction (WMD), and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States, the Middle East and the international community. And I might let my colleagues know that this hearing in this se- ries of hearings we have been having and will continue to have are being put forth at the direction of our chairman, Bob Stump. I talked to Bob just a little bit ago and Bob is doing well. He is still under the weather and undergoing some tests, but he gives his best to every member of the committee and every Member of the House and to you, Mr. Secretary, and wishes he could be with us. Last week the committee received a classified briefing from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In fact, we just concluded another briefing I think some 86 Members of the House attended just a few minutes ago. We also heard from former senior U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspectors, about Iraq's illicit weapons programs and Saddam Hussein's persistent efforts to thwart the efforts of the UN inspectors so that he might persevere and advance his weapons of mass destruction programs. Tomorrow the Armed Services Committee will hear how the Iraqis built and sustained their weapons of mass destructions pro- grams through the legal and illegal acquisition of Western tech- nology, and how the United States's own export control system may have contributed to the problems we are now facing with Iraq. We also continue to plan further hearings for the coming weeks that will examine in greater detail the various aspects of the policy op- tions before us. Today, however, we are honored to have Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld before the committee to discuss U.S. policy to- (75) 76 ward Iraq. He is the first cabinet-level official to appear on the Hill regarding Iraq, so we are all anxious to discuss these matters with him today. Secretary Rumsfeld is joined by General Richard Myers, Chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for being with us. Mr. Secretary, before we ask you for your opening remarks, I want to invite Mr. Skelton, the distinguished gentleman from Mis- souri, the ranking Democrat on the committee, to offer any com- ments he might have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 137.] STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary, general, we welcome you, and we look forward to your testimony today. This is certainly a critical time for us to be considering American action against Iraq. President Bush has made clear to Congress, to the United Nations and the American people his de- termination to remove Saddam Hussein from power and to neutral- ize the threat posed by the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and I applaud his realization that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is one that faces the United Nations as a whole, and I think all agree that Saddam Hussein is a despot who has violated the Secu- rity Council's resolutions for years. But having recognized the central role of the United Nations, we must take seriously its collective judgment about how to enforce these resolutions. I am not suggesting that Congress will or should only consider an option fully supported by the United Nations, but the administration must be able to answer fundamental questions about any decision to use force. Why must action be taken now? What is the threshold beyond which the United States can no longer wait for Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions or for UN action in the face of Iraqi defiance? The decision to act with or without the United Nations. I have wrestled with a series of questions which, I have shared with the President. Exercising our constitutional responsibilities requires Congress to take into ac- count not only these near-term considerations of how to act, but also the long-term implication for American security interests glob- ally of using military force against Iraq. Some of these questions have to do with waging the broader war on terrorism. How will the United States ensure that we continue to have international support for our efforts against al Qaeda? Even if the Administration seeks military action without Security Council approval, do we have the forces, fiscal resources, munitions and other military capabilities to wage both campaigns effectively? How is the United States preparing to deal with likely Iraqi efforts to draw Israel into the conflict by launching missiles, possibly with chemical or biological warheads? What type of planning is going into succeeding in sustaining an urban operation or operations on the battlefield made toxic by chemical weapons? 77 As members of the Armed Services Committee, we all share the commitment to making sure that our troops can succeed on the battlefield at the lowest possible level of risk should we decide to put them in harm's way. In considering the long-term aspects and the question of use of force, I am reminded of Karl von Clausewitz's maxim, which is in his book, “On War,” that in strategy it is imperative not to take the first step without considering the last. We must think through carefully and now, before we authorize military force, how the United States would manage Iraq after Saddam fell. Planning for the occupation of Germany and Japan took years before the end of the Second World War. In today’s dynamic battlefield, we don't have the luxury of years to prepare. How can we build a stable and a democratic Iraq that takes all major groups, Shia, Sunni, Kurd into account? How will we handle members of the Baath Party and those scientists and those engineers that design weapons of mass destruction for Iraq” What military commitment will be required from the United States at the time of our victory and in the years to come? Any decision to attack Iraq must begin with answers to these questions about the strategy for achieving victory and the long-term responsibilities that come with doing so. With answers to these questions, Mr. Secretary and General, I look forward to supporting the President in helping to craft a Con- gressional authorization to do so. I thank both witnesses for being with us today and for sharing your expertise and hopefully providing answers to these very dif- ficult, but very important, questions. Thank you so much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 139.] Mr. HUNTER. I thank the distinguished gentleman, and Mr. Sec- retary, our members on this Armed Services Committee have put in a lot of hours on this question, and we look forward to working with you and hearing your testimony. We thank you for being with us. The floor is yours, sir. STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Con- gressman Skelton, members of the committee. I have submitted a rather lengthy statement which I would like included in the record. It sets out— Mr. HUNTER. Without objection. Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you. It sets forth a number of the elements of the case that the President presented with respect to Iraq in some detail and also attempts to respond to a number of the questions that have been raised over recent days and weeks. What I would like to do is to hit some of the high points of that statement. As we all know, this is not an intelligence briefing. I un- derstand that the committee has very recently, in fact maybe this morning, received an intelligence briefing, and it is also an open hearing. So my remarks will reflect those two facts. Today I do want to discuss the task of preventing attacks of even greater magnitude than what was experienced on September 11th, 78 attacks that could conceivably kill not just thousands of Americans but potentially tens of thousands of our fellow citizens. As we meet, chemists and biologists and scientists are toiling in weapons lab and underground bunkers working to give the most dangerous dictators weapons of unprecedented power and lethality. The effect posed by those regimes is real, it is dangerous, and as the President pointed out, it is growing with each passing day. We have entered a new security environment in the 21st century, one where terrorist movements in terrorist states are developing capac- ities to cause unprecedented destruction. Today our margin of error is notably different than was the case previously, in the 20th century when we were dealing with conven- tional weapons for the most part. Today we are dealing with weap- ons of mass destruction that of course tend to be used not against combatants, but against innocent men, women and children, as well. We are in an age of little or no warning when threats can emerge suddenly to surprise us. Terrorist states are finding ways to gain access to these powerful weapons, and in word and deed, they have demonstrated a willingness to use those capabilities. Moreover, after September 11th, they have discovered a new means of delivering those weapons: terrorist networks. To the ex- tent that they might transfer weapons of mass destruction to ter- rorist groups—and we know terrorist groups are actively seeking those weapons—they could readily conceal their responsibility for attacks on our people. So we are on notice. An attack very likely will be attempted. The only question is when and by what tech- nique. It could be months, it could be a year, it could be years, but it will happen, and each of us needs to pause and think about that. If the worst were to happen, not one of us here today would be able to honestly say that it was a surprise, because it will not be a surprise. We have connected the dots, as much as as is humanly possible before the fact. Only by waiting until after the event could . have proof positive, and by then, needless to say, it will be too ate. The question facing us is this: What is the responsible course of action for our country? Do we believe it is our responsibility to wait for a weapon of mass destruction 9-11, or is it the responsibility of free people to do something, to take steps to deal with such a threat before such an attack occurs? [Disturbance in hearing room.] Mr. HUNTER. If we could ask the staff to see to it that our guest is escorted. Mr. Secretary, we will be with you in a minute. Mr. Secretary, we are going to put them down as undecided. Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, as I listen to those com- ments, it struck me what a wonderful thing free speech is, and of course the country that threw the inspectors out was not the United States. It was not the United Nations. It was Iraq that threw the inspectors out, and they have thrown them out, and they have rejected 16 resolutions of the United Nations and stipulations, but of course, people like that are not able to go into Iraq and make demonstrations like that because they don’t have free speech. I think one other point I would make before proceeding is that there is obviously a misunderstanding on the part of those who 79 think that the goal is inspections. The goal isn't inspections. The goal is disarmament. That is what was agreed to by Iraq. That is what was understood by the United Nations. The ease with which people can migrate over and suggest that the task before the world is inspections, you can only have inspections when a country is co- operating with you. They have to agree that that is—they have the same goal as those that are attempting to validate something. So one would hope that those thoughts could be a part of this dia- logue. There are a number of terrorist states pursuing weapons of mass destruction: Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, to name but a few. But no terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people and the stability of the world than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. These facts about the Saddam Hussein regime I think should be part of this record in our coun- try's considerations. He ordered the use of chemical weapons against his own people, in one case killing some 5,000 innocent civilians. His regime in- vaded two of its neighbors and launched ballistic missiles at four of its neighbors. He plays host to terrorist networks, assassinates his opponents, both in Iraq and abroad, and has attempted to as- sassinate a former President of the United States. He has executed members of his cabinet. He has ordered doctors to surgically re- move the ears of military deserters. His regime has committed genocide and ethnic cleansing in northern Iraq, ordering the extermination of over 50,000 people. His regime on an almost daily basis continues to fire missiles and artillery at U.S. and coalition aircraft as they fulfill the U.N. mis- sion with respect to Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch. His regime has amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons, including anthrax and botulism toxin and possibly smallpox. His regime has amassed large clandestine stock- piles of chemical weapons including VX and Sarin and mustard gas. His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nu- clear weapons. And let there be no doubt about it, his regime has dozens of ballistic missiles and is working to extend their range in violation of U.N. restrictions. His regime has in place an elaborate organized system of denial and deception to frustrate both inspectors and outside intelligence efforts. His regime has diverted funds from the U.N. Oil for Food Program, funds intended to help feed starving Iraqi civilians, to fund his weapons of mass destruction programs. And his regime has violated 16 U.N. resolutions, repeatedly defying the will of the international community without cost or consequence. As the President warned the United Nations last week, the Sad- dam Hussein regime is a grave and gathering danger. It is a dan- ger we do not have the option to ignore. In his U.N. address, the President explained why we should not allow the Iraqi regime to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and he issued a challenge to the international community to enforce the numerous resolutions that the U.N. passed and that the Iraqis have defied and to show that the U.N. is determined not to become irrelevant. President Bush has made clear that the United States wants to work with the U.N. Security Council, but he made clear the con- 80 sequences of Iraq's continued defiance. He said, “The purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council res- olutions will be enforced or action will be unavoidable, and a re- gime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.” The President has asked Members of the House and the Senate to support actions that may be necessary to deliver on that pledge. He urged that the Congress act before the recess. He asked that you send a clear signal to the world community and to the Iraqi regime that our country is united in purpose and prepared to act. It is important that Congress send that message before the U.N. Security Council votes. Delaying a vote in Congress would send a wrong message in my view, just as we are asking the international community to take a stand and as we are cautioning the Iraqi re- gime to respond and consider its options. It was Congress that changed the objective of U.S. policy from containment to regime change by the passage of the Iraqi Libera- tion Act in 1998. The President is now asking Congress to support that policy. A decision to use military force is never easy, and it is important that the issues surrounding this decision be discussed and debated. In recent weeks, a number of questions have been surfaced by Members of the Congress and others. Some of the arguments raised are truly important. And in my prepared testimony, I attempted to discuss in detail a whole series of those questions and what I be- lieve to be appropriate responses. Let me touch on a few this morn- 1I]9. Some have asked whether an attack on Iraq would disrupt and distract from the U.S. global war on terror. The answer is that Iraq is part of the global war on terror. Stopping terrorist regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective of that war, and we can fight all elements of the global war on terror si- multaneously. As the members of this committee know well, our strategy includes the ability to win decisively in one theater and be able to occupy a country, to near simultaneously swiftly defeat a country in another theater, to provide for homeland defense and a number of lesser contingencies such as Bosnia and Kosovo. That is what our force sizing construct is. That is what was briefed to this committee. So let there be no doubt but that we can do both at the same time. Our principal goal of the war on terror is to stop another 9/11 or a WMD attack that could make a 9/11 seem modest by compari- son, and to do it before it happens. Whether that threat comes from a terrorist regime or a terrorist network is beside the point. Our objective is to stop them regardless of the source. Another question that has been asked is where is the smoking gun? Well, the last thing we want to see is a smoking gun. A gun smokes after it has been fired, and the goal must be to stop such an action before it happens. As the President told the United Na- tions, “The first time we may be completely certain that a terrorist state has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid, they use one. And we owe it to our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming,”. If someone is waiting for a so-called smoking gun, it is certain that we will have waited too long. But the question raises another 81 issue that is usually discussed, and that is what kind of evidence ought we to consider as appropriate to act in the 21st century. In our country it has been customary to seek evidence that would prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. That ap- proach of course is appropriate when the objective is to protect the rights of the accused, but in the age of weapons of mass destruc- tion, the objective is not to protect the rights of a Saddam Hussein. It is to protect the lives of the American people and our friends and allies, and when there is that risk and we are trying to defend against closed societies and shadowy terrorist networks, expecting to find that standard of evidence before such a weapon has been used is really not realistic, and after such a weapon has been used it is too late. I suggest that any who insist on perfect evidence really are thinking back in the 20th century in a pre-9/11 context. On September 11th, we were awakened to the fact that America is now vulnerable to unprecedented destruction, and that aware- ness ought to be sufficient to change the way we think about our security and the type of certainty and evidence we consider appro- priate. We will not have, we do not have and cannot know every- thing that is going on in the world at any time. Over the years, despite the very best efforts of enormously expen- sive talented intelligence capabilities, we have repeatedly under- estimated the weapons capabilities in a variety of countries of major concern to us. We have had numerous gaps of two, four, six, eight, ten and in one case more years between the time a country developed a capability and the time that the United States of America became aware of it. We do know that the Iraqi regime currently has chemical and bi- ological weapons of mass destruction, and we do know they are cur- rently pursuing nuclear weapons, that they have a proven willing- ness to use those weapons at their disposal and that they have a proven aspiration to seize the territory of and threaten their neigh- bors, proven support for and cooperation with terrorist networks and proven record of declared hostility and venomous rhetoric against the United States. Those threats should be clear to all. Committees of Congress are interestingly—they are currently asking hundreds of questions and pouring over tens of thousands of documents, pages of documents, about September 11th, and they are asking the question, who knew what, when and why didn't we prevent that tragedy? Well, if one were to compare the scraps of information that the government had before September 11th to the volumes of informa- tion the government has today about Iraqi’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, his use of those weapons, his record of aggression and his consistent hostility towards the United States and then fac- tor in our country's demonstrated vulnerability after September 11th, the case the President made should be clear. If more time passes and the attacks we are concerned about were to come to pass, we would not want to have ignored those warning signs and then be required to explain why we failed to protect our fellow citizens. Some have argued that the nuclear threat from Iraq is not immi- nent, that Saddam Hussein is at least 5 to 7 years away from hav- 82 ing nuclear weapons. I would not be so certain. Before Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the best intelligence estimates were that Iraq was about 5 to 7 years away from having nuclear weapons. The experts were flat wrong. When the U.S. got on the ground, it found that the Iraqis were probably 6 months to a year to 18 months from having a nuclear weapon, not 5 to 7 years. We do know that he has been actively and persistently pursuing nuclear weapons for more than 20 years, but we should be just as concerned about the immediate threat from biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons. They are simpler to deliver and even more readily transferred to terrorist networks, who could allow Iraq to deliver them without Iraq's fingerprints. If you want an idea of the devastation Iraq could wreck on our country with a biological at- tack, consider the recent unclassified Dark Winter exercise con- ducted by Johns Hopkins University. It stimulated a biological WMD attack in which terrorists released smallpox in three sepa- rate locations in the U.S. Within two months the worst-case esti- mate indicated up to one million people could be dead and another two million infected. Cut it in half. Cut it in a quarter. It is not a nice picture. Some have argued that Iraq is unlikely to use weapons of mass destruction against us, because unlike terrorist networks, Saddam Hussein has a return address. That is to say, he is probably deterrable is the argument. Well, Mr. Chairman, there is no reason for confidence that if Iraq launched a WMD attack on the U.S. that it would necessarily have an obvious return address. There are ways Iraq could easily conceal responsibility for a WMD attack. For example, they could give biological weapons to terrorist networks to attack the United States from within and then deny any knowl- edge. Suicide bombers are not deterrable. We still do not know with certainty who was behind the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. We don’t know who is responsible for last year's anthrax attacks. Indeed our consistent failure over the past two decades to trace terrorist attacks to their ultimate source gives terrorist states the lesson that using terrorist networks is a very effective way of attacking the United States seemingly with impunity. Some argue that North Korea and Iran are more immediate threats than Iraq. Well, why not deal with them first, the question goes? Well, Iran and North Korea are indeed threats and problems. That is why President Bush named them specifically when he spoke about the axis of evil, and we do as a country have policies to address both, but Iraq is unique. No other living dictator matches Saddam Hussein's record of waging aggressive war against his neighbors, pursuing weapons of mass destruction, using them against his own people, launching missiles against his neigh- bors, brutalizing and torturing his own citizens, harboring terrorist networks, engaging in terrorist acts, including the attempted assas- sination of foreign officials, violating international commitments, lying and hiding his WMD programs from inspectors, deceiving and defying the express will of the United Nations over and over again. As the President told the United Nations in one place in one re- gime, we find all of these dangers in their most lethal and aggres- sive forms. Some have asked if containment worked on the Soviet 83 Union. Why not just contain Iraq” First, it is clear from the Iraqi regime's 11 years of defiance that containment has not led to their compliance. To the contrary, containment is breaking down. Second, with the Soviet Union we faced an adversary that al- ready possessed nuclear weapons, thousands of them. Our goal with Iraq is to prevent them from getting nuclear weapons. Third, with the Soviet Union we believed that time was on our side, and indeed we were correct. Time was on our side. With Iraq the opposite is true. Time is not on our side. Every month that goes by with his weapons of mass destruction programs, they are pro- gressing. Fourth, the containment worked in the long run. The Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal prevented the West from responding when they—while containment did work in the long run, the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal prevented the West from responding when they invaded their neighbor Afghanistan, if you think back. Does anyone really want Saddam Hussein to have the same deterrence so that he could invade his neighbors with impunity? Some have argued that if we do go to war the U.S. should first lay out details of a truly comprehensive inspection regime, which if Iraq failed to comply would provide a casus belli. Well, I would respond this way. If failure to comply with weap- ons of mass destruction inspections is a casus belli, the U.N. al- ready has it. It is preceded over a period of many, many years. The United States, as the President indicated, is not closed to the idea of inspections as an element of an effective response, but our goal can’t be inspections. It has to be disarmament. That is where the threat is. The purpose of inspections is to prove that Iraq has dis- armed, which would require that Iraq would reverse its decade-long policy of pursuing those weapons, and that is certainly something that Iraq is unlikely to do. Even the most intrusive inspection regime would have difficulty getting in all of his weapons of mass destruction. Many of his WMD capabilities are mobile. They can be hidden from inspectors no matter how intrusive. He has vast underground networks and facilities and sophisticated denial and deception techniques. There is a place in this world for inspections. They tend to be ef- fective if the target nation is actually willing to disarm and wants to prove to the world that they are doing so. They are looking for a way to prove to the world that they have in fact done what the world has asked them to do. They tend not to be as effective on cov- ering deceptions and violations when the target is determined not to disarm and to try to deceive. And Iraq's record of the past dec- ade shows that they want weapons of mass destruction and are de- termined to continue developing them. Some say that there is no international consensus behind ousting Saddam Hussein and that most of our key allies are opposed. First, the truth is to the contrary. There are a number of countries that want Saddam Hussein gone and increasing numbers are willing to say so publicly, and a quite large number are willing to say so pri- vately, although because a number of countries live in the neigh- borhood and he is not a nice neighbor, it is not surprising that some of them are reluctant to say so publicly. 84 The coalition we have fashioned in the global war on terror in- cludes 90 countries, literally half of the world. It was not there on September 11th. It was built one country at a time over a long pe- riod of time. During the Persian Gulf War, the coalition there even- tually included 36 nations when Iraq was attacked, but they were not there on August 5th when President George Herbert Walker Bush announced to the world that Saddam Hussein's aggression would not stand. That coalition was built over many months. With his U.N. speech, President Bush has begun the process of building international support for dealing with Iraq, and the reac- tion has been very positive. The President will continue to state our case, and I suspect that as he does so we will find that addi- tional countries in increasing numbers will cooperate and partici- pate. Certainly that has been our experience over the past days. Some have suggested that if the U.S. were to act, it might pro- voke Saddam Hussein's use of weapons of mass destruction. That is a useful point, and certainly there are ways to mitigate the risk of a chemical or biological attack, but it cannot be entirely elimi- nated. And it is true that that could be a risk of military action, were the President to make a decision for military action. But if Saddam Hussein is that dangerous today, then I would think it would only make the case for dealing with such a threat stronger, because the longer we wait, the more deadly his regime becomes. Moreover, consider the consequences if the world were to allow that risk to deter us from acting. We would then have sent a mes- sage to the world about the value of having weapons of mass de- struction that we would deeply regret having said. The message the world should want to send is the exact opposite: that Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction has not made it more se- cure but less secure, and that by pursuing those weapons they have attracted undesired attention to themselves. But I would suggest that even Saddam Hussein—that if he were to issue such an order to use a chemical or a biological attack, that that does not necessarily mean his orders would be carried out. He might not have anything to lose, but those beneath him in the chain of command most certainly would have a great deal to lose. Wise Iraqis will not obey orders to use weapons of mass destruc- tion. Some have asked what has changed to warrant action now. Well, what has changed is our experience on September 11th. What has changed is our appreciation of our vulnerability and the risks that this country faces from terrorist networks, terrorist states armed with weapons of mass destruction and the nexus between terrorist networks and weapons of mass destruction. What has not changed is Iraq's drive to acquire those weapons and the fact that every ap- É.” that the United Nations has taken to stop Iraq's drive has a11601. Mr. Chairman, as the President has made clear, this is a critical moment for our country and for the world. Our resolve is being put to the test. It is a test that unfortunately, the world's free nations have failed before in recent history with unfortunate consequences. Long before the Second World War, Hitler wrote in Mein Kamph indicating what he intended to do, but the hope was that maybe he would not do what he said, and between 35 and 60 million peo- 85 ple died because of the series of fatal miscalculations. He might have been stopped early at a minimum cost of lives had the vast majority of the world’s leaders not decided at the time that the risks of acting were greater than the risks of not acting. Today we must decide whether the risks of acting are greater than the risks of not acting. Saddam Hussein has made his inten- tions clear. He has used those weapons. He has demonstrated an intention to take the territory of his neighbor. He plays host to ter- rorist networks. He is hostile to our country. Because we have de- nied him the ability he has sought to impose his will on his neigh- bors. He has said in no uncertain terms that he would use weapons of mass destruction against the United States. He has at this mo- ment stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. If he dem- onstrates the capability to deliver those weapons to our shore, the world would be changed. Our people would be at risk. Our willing- ness to be engaged in the world and our willingness to project power to stop aggression and our ability to forge coalitions for mul- tilateral actions all could be put under question, and many lives could be lost. We need to decide as a people how we feel about that. Do the risks of taking action to stop that threat outweigh the risks of liv- ing in the world that we see, or is the risk of doing nothing greater than the risk of acting? The question comes down to this, how will the history of this era be recorded? When we look back on previous periods of history, we see there have been many books written about threats and attacks that were not anticipated. “At Dawn We Slept.” “The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.” “December 7th, 1941, the Day the Admiral Slept Late.” “Pearl Harbor, Final Judgment.” “From Munich to Pearl Harbor.” “Why England Slept.” “The Cost of Failure.” The list of such books is endless, and unfortunately, in the past year histo- rians have added to the body of literature. And there are already books out on September 11th wondering why those attacks weren't prevented. Each is an attempt by the authors to connect the dots, to determine what happened and why it was not possible before the fact to figure out what was going to happen. And our job today, the President's, the Congress and the United States is to connect the dots before the fact. It is to anticipate vast- ly more lethal attacks before they happen and to make the right decision as to whether or not it is appropriate for this country to take action before it is too late. We are on notice, each of us. Each of us has a responsibility to do everything in our power to ensure that when the history books of this period are written, the books won't ask why we slept, but to ensure that history would instead record that on September 11th, the American people were awak- ened to the impending dangers and that those entrusted with the safety of the American people made the right decisions for the country. President Bush is determined to do just that, and that is why he has come before the Congress and why he has come before the United Nations and why he has set forth his case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld can be found in the Appendix on page 149.] 86 Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, for your perspective of the security balance in the Mid- dle East when Saddam Hussein acquires the nuclear systems? Oh, excuse me, General Myers, did you have a statement also? General MYERS. I do. I have a short statement, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HUNTER. Well, why don’t you go ahead and then we will lead with questions. STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF General MYERS. Okay. Chairman Hunter and Congressman Skel- ton, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the op- portunity to appear before you today. Before I start I would like to take a minute and just thank Chairman Stump for his 26 years of service to our Nation as a Member of Congress. His service here and in the United States Navy of course, is an example for all of us in uniform, and we wish him and his family well in the days ahead and hope we can work again with him here in Congress. Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much, General. General MYERS. It is certainly an honor to appear before you to discuss the nature of the threat that Iraq represents to America and our interest and those of our allies and friends. Mr. Chairman, I request that my written statement be submitted for the record. Mr. HUNTER. Without objection. General MYERS. Thank you, sir. I will make some short introductory remarks, and then we will go right to questions. The first thing that I wanted to cover with you was the nature of the threat that Iraq presents to us and the capabilities of our Armed Forces today, but I don’t think there is anything I can add to Secretary Rumsfeld's remarks. I agree with those, and so I will leave that point and go on to my second point, and that is to tell you that our Nation's military forces are ready and able to do whatever the President asks of them. Our Armed Forces have made dramatic strides and capabilities over the past decade, and let me just highlight a few. As a result of support of Congress and the American public, our Armed Forces have improved intelligence, surveillance and recon- naissance capability. These capabilities together with an enhanced command and control network give our joint warfighters a faster, more agile decision cycle than the one that we had a decade ago. For our warfighters, this means that they have updated tactical in- formation that is minutes or hours old, not days old. We also enjoy much better power projection capability to move our joint warfighting team. The strong congressional support for programs such as the C–17 and the Large-Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ships have meant that we can deploy and sustain the force much, much better than in the past. And finally, our Nation's combat power has increased dramati- cally over the past decade. For example, the Joint Direct Attack Munition provides all of our bomber aircraft and a majority of our fighter aircraft a day-night, all-weather precision attack capability. Our ground forces have improved and have more accurate long- 87 range weapons with the improved Army Tactical Missile System and a faster Multiple Launch Rocket System. Today, we have sufficient forces to continue our ongoing oper- ations, meet our international commitments, and continue to pro- tect the American homeland. At the same time, of course, some key units are in high demand. Mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces have helped to reduce the stress on some of these key units, but any major combat operation will obviously require us to prioritize the tasks given to such units. While our military capabili- ties have improved over the past decade, the foundation of our suc- cess remains our Sailors, Soldiers, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen. Their superior training, discipline and leadership are the core of our effectiveness. In my view, these qualities are the reason that our men and women in uniform enjoy the respect and high regard of other pro- fessional militaries around the world. It is also for these reasons that our military forces are so effective partners in any potential coalition. Once again, I welcome the opportunity to be here today and make those two important points. First, Iraq remains a threat to our region, to the region, our interests and to Americans. And sec- ond, our Nation's joint force can accomplish any task that this Na- tion may ask them to do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of General Myers can be found in the Appendix on page 142.] Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General, and Mr. Secretary and Gen- eral Myers, you may wish to comment on this. I would just restate this question. How do you see the security balance in the region with respect to U.S. interests when Saddam Hussein acquires nu- clear systems? Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, Mr. Chairman, my personal view is that a biological threat and a chemical threat is of a kind with a nuclear threat, and he has biological and chemical weapons, and he is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. The region knows that. The region knows this man very, very well, and they are frightened of him. And I don’t know precisely what it would do to the balance in the region for it to be dem- onstrated that he has a nuclear capability and the ability to deliver it, not just to his neighbors but to others. In my view, the thing that is critical in the region is the role that the coalition forces have played since Desert Storm to dissuade him from invading his neighbors. He threatens the regimes of his neighboring countries frequently, and it is the United States and the United Kingdom and the fact that the U.N. resolutions have been a constraint on him in terms of the sanctions and the like, not a successful con- straint because his programs have gone forward, but probably a constraint against him invading his neighbors. My impression is that it is probably the most critical element of the balance of power in the region at the present time. General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, let me just add that when you think about Iraq developing nuclear weapons and the fact that they have an active ballistic missile production program, that when you put those two things together, you have to be very, very worried, like the Secretary says. And I would say that it makes a very bad 88 strategic situation. Given that he has chemical and biological weap- ons, it makes it a very, very bad strategic situation for his neigh- bors, much worse. Secretary RUMSFELD. One thing I would add, if you postulated that he had a nuclear weapon and the ability to deliver it, for ex- ample, some distances, which he is aggressively attempting to have, imagine trying to put together a coalition like was put to- gether for the global war on terrorism, and put together a coalition as was put together for the Gulf War. When countries know that by participating in such a coalition they and their cities and their populations could conceivably be targets, it would cause a—the purpose of a terror weapon is to terrorize, and it need not even be used to still be very effective, because it alters behavior. And in the hands of the likes of Saddam Hussein, that is a significant shift in capability and power. Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Secretary, I was going to ask you about the offer by Saddam Hussein and Iraq to have so-called unfettered in- spections, but I think you fully covered that in your earlier com- ments and your opening statement. Mr. Secretary, you made a reference to the Second World War, what led up to it, a, regarding Pearl Harbor, b, regarding the rise of Adolf Hitler. We must look ahead in this whole effort, and I use the Second World War as an example. What happens after we re- move Saddam Hussein from power, he and his regime, hopefully with a coalition? But after the decision is made and after that ac- tion is taken? We had a plan in place regarding Japan, the occupation thereof, and it worked. We had a plan in place in the occupation of Ger- many, and it worked, even despite the fact that the Soviet Union thwarted it for a while, and today we have, as you know, democ- racies in both Japan and Germany, and a great deal of that is be- cause of our foresight in putting together what we do after victory. And there is no question in my mind that the United States, either alone, hopefully with other coalition partners should this come to pass, could decisively defeat the Iraqi forces. But I pride myself being somewhat of a student of history and know that planning for the aftermath of a successful military action is very important. Clausewitz's maxim said that in strategy it is imperative not to take the first step without considering the last, so let me ask you these—really there is really one question, Mr. Secretary, but I will split it into two parts. What preparations are being made now for the administration of Iraq after Saddam falls and for the longer-term transition to a more permanent government? The second part of the question is what is the level of diplomatic and military commitment to be made to Iraq after Saddam falls and particularly, what is the esti- mate of American troops needed to ensure stability for the first year, or in the long term, or both? In other words, what does the future hold for us once victory is achieved? Secretary RUMSFELD. Congressman Skelton, that is, of course, an exceedingly important question, and it is one that the President and the National Security Council have given a good deal of thought to. If the President were to decide that some action were 89 necessary with respect to Iraq, there is no doubt in my mind but that the effort would be undertaken with partners, as in a coali- tion, as you raised in your question. I feel the same way about a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, that it would be clearly a coalition, conceivably a U.N. role, but it would require over a period of time some military forces while that coun- try transitioned from a repressive and vicious dictatorship to some- thing notably different from that. On the one hand, there is broad agreement with those that have been discussing this question that Iraq should be a single country and not be broken up into pieces; second, that it should be a coun- try that does not have weapons of mass destruction, a country that does not attempt to impose its will on its neighbors, a country that is respectful of the fact that it is ethnically diverse and is not a central government that would repress minorities in that country. The numbers of troops that it would take in the early period I don’t think it is probably useful to discuss in this forum. It is inter- esting to go back to the Gulf War. The Iraqi army demonstrated its attitude about Saddam Hussein when 70 or 80,000 members of the Iraqi army surrendered and changed sides almost instanta- neously within a matter of days, some hundreds surrendering to single soldiers because they have no great respect for their leader- ship in that country. The going to the next step and beginning to talk about democ- racy or things like that is a step I can’t go, because it seems to me that what is important is in that transition period it would be im- portant for the Iraqi people in Iraq and people—Iraqis from outside Iraq who have been persecuted to participate in fashioning what would follow, and clearly it has to be something that would be not a dictatorship and would be respectful of minority rights in the country and the rule of law and respect for his neighbors. What that template might be is beyond my task, and clearly it is something that the President and the Secretary of State, the De- partment of State and other countries in the coalition would be thinking through. But the answer to your last portion of your question as to wheth- er or not the United States would have to make a military in the short run and a diplomatic and humanitarian and reconstruction effort in the longer term, the answer is “Yes, one would.” One doesn't change what is without recommending something better. The difference between this and Afghanistan, however, is that this is a country that has large oil revenues. So from a financial standpoint, it is an easier problem for the international community than a country that has been devastated by decades of conflict and does not have oil revenues to help buoy it up and bolster its recov- ery. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. The distinguished gentleman from Utah, Mr. Hansen. Mr. HANSEN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the com- ments by the Secretary and the General. Mr. Skelton hit on a very tantalizing question there. What is going to happen if that does occur, who fills the void. It makes you wonder if there is someone in the wings there to do it like we saw 90 in Iran, back in that era. We have seen in other nations that some- body is waiting to do it. The question that I would kind of be curious about is also there is always a question there is another nation that feels that we brought her to her knees and now we can take over. You know, that is a very volatile area, and there has been some very tremen- dous battles between Iraq and Iran before, and I would wonder how the Administration would look at a situation, wondering if the southern nation of Iran would say, “No, well, now, here is our chance,” and how you would handle that? I guess you have possibly answered part of that when you said yes, it would require a military presence at that particular point just to make sure that didn’t occur. You know, a lot of us on this committee get awfully tired of our military being in Korea for 50 years and Kosovo and Bosnia, and it just seems how do you ever get out of these places, how do you do that? And the second thing I would be curious to know, having been to the Prince Sultan Air Base a couple of times, what would be the reaction of the Saudis? I have read a few things that they have kind of said they would be willing to let us use that base. I would kind of like to hear it from your mouth. Secretary RUMSFELD. First, with respect to Bosnia and Kosovo, we have been pulling our forces down over the past couple of years fairly significantly. We have been doing it with our NATO partners and partnership-for-peace countries that have been participating, and the way you end something is to decide you do not want to be there permanently, and we know that we covet no other country's land. We are not looking to occupy any country. Our goal is to be helpful and then go about our business. The way you do that in the case of Kosovo and Bosnia has been to help build up the civil side, and what we are going to have to do in Afghanistan is see a lot more international support on the humanitarian side and the civil works side so that the security situation will continue to improve. In the case of Iran, the small clique of clerics that are running that country I think have their hands full right now. They have a lot of foment in that country. People are unhappy, and women and young people are putting pressure on the leadership. And while one has to be attentive to all the things that could conceivably happen, I think that the likelihood of what you have suggested is somewhat less than modest. Saudi Arabia speaks for itself. They have said what they have said. Every utterance publicly and privately that I have heard in the last several weeks have been increasingly—what is the word?— friendly, supportive, measured. They live in the neighborhood. Sad- dam Hussein has a vastly more powerful army than Saudi Arabia does. He has weapons that Saudi Arabia does not have. He threat- ened Saudi Arabia when he was invading Kuwait, and so they have been measured, but I would characterize, in answer to your ques- tion, their public and private comments as recognizing a good num- ber of the things that I have characterized here today. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt. 91 Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, General Myers, thank you very much for your testimony. Mr. Secretary, you have described yourself as a skeptic on the efficacy of inspections. Let me make a case, though, for what inspections did achieve, at least in the first half of the 1990s, when UNSCOM was there. They uncovered and dis- mantled 40 nuclear research facilities, including three uranium en- richment facilities and a laboratory scale plutonium separation plant. That was in the mid-1990s. As late as May of 2000, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found and destroyed an Iraqi nuclear centrifuge which was stored in Jordan, and they also removed a lot of reactor fuel, fresh and irradiated. On the chemical weapons side, they uncovered and destroyed 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million li- ters of precursor chemicals and 426 pieces of production equipment. There is still a lot of stuff unaccounted for, but that is a pretty sub- stantial record there. It is at least worth the effort. As to biological weapons, the issues are more unresolved, but it is my understanding that they found about 19,000 liters of botulin, 8,400 liters of anthrax, 2,000 liters of aflatoxin. They monitored 86 sites. They dismantled one south of Baghdad. They destroyed some biological bombs and some biological missile warheads, and as to missiles, they were able to identify and account for 817 of 819 So- viet-delivered SCUDs, and they destroyed the SCUDs that they were still able to find in the inventory. They speculate that there may be anywhere from 40 and 80 additional SCUDs that they have been able to cobble together, but that is still a pretty substantial record of success, too. And with respect to other means of discovering these facilities, if you look at what happened in the Persian Gulf War, we launched 2,400 sorties looking for SCUD missiles. We saw 42 launched plumes. We launched eight preemptive strikes. We didn’t take out a single one in the boost phase. So we actually accomplished some- thing here with inspections that we weren't able to do with active combat means. If inspections are robust, if they are fully backed by the Security Council, unfettered, don’t you think there is still something to be accomplished? And in particular, this concerns me. We don’t know for sure what they have in the way of biological agents, and we aren't sure how robust their VX—their dusty VX, persistent VX might be. Wouldn’t it be worthwhile before we launch an attack and send our young men and women in harm's way if we could get into that country and ferret out and find some of these final stocks so that they won’t be used against us? Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, first, let me say that no one with any sense rushes into war. It is something that everyone thinks through very, very carefully. And that is why the President has not made a judgment as to precisely what he believes needs to be done. He has laid out the problem and he is looking for ways that it can be dealt with. You are right about inspections. There is no question but that the inspectors found large numbers of chemical and biological weapons and they found significant nuclear activities. It is also true that when they finished, they came up with a list of things that were unaccounted for that they had had reason to believe ex- 92 isted but they could not find, no matter how long they spent— years. And they tried. And it was a significant amount of chemical and biological capability they could not find. Now, the Iraqi nuclear program which exists today proceeded at a pace while the IAEA was actually doing their job. And it is a very difficult job to do because, as I said earlier, an inspection regime is designed to work with a cooperative country that has made a de- cision that they want to actually confess and have the things known, and they work with them. A good deal of what the inspec- tors found was not because the Iraqi regime was working with them; it was because defectors came outside the country and cued them as to places they could look. And, of course, a couple of the most important defectors who came outside the country were sons- in-laws who went back into the country and were later assas- sinated by Saddam Hussein. So it is—no one ought to think that inspections don’t have a role. And in my opening remarks I indi- cated I believe they could. The question is, under what cir- cumstances, with what countries, and after what kind of a decade- long record ought one to put their faith in those? Now, is it conceivable that someone could—of course, the goal is not inspections; the goal, as you point out, is disarmament. Is it possible that you could have a sufficiently intrusive inspection ap- proach that would enable you to disarm that country if the same regime was in there and was determined to try to prevent you from doing that? At that point it is something other than inspectors. It is so intrusive and so powerful that it has the ability to enforce itself. And, of course, that kind of force people generally call some- thing other than inspectors. But— Mr. SPRATT. I think it is important to note the UNSCOM inspec- tors not only discovered and uncovered, they did destroy what they came up with. Secretary RUMSFELD. Exactly. No question about it. As you know, the UNSCOM inspection regime is not what exists today. What exists today in UNMOVIC is a series of backtracking off of that because Saddam Hussein says well, you can’t go to—you could only inspect military installations, and that puts most of the coun- try off base—you can’t do that. And put in restrictions. You had to give notice. And furthermore, they have had another decade to- another period of years to bury under the ground. They now have massive tunneling systems. They have mobile biological capabili- ties. They have been developing unmanned aerial vehicles, which are worrisome. They have got all kinds of things that have hap- pened in the period when the inspectors had been out. So the prob- lem is greater today and the regime that exists today in the U.N. is one that has far fewer teeth than the one you were describing. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, sir. - Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Hefley. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Sec- retary. You did a wonderful job I think of anticipating a lot of our questions and laying it out. And I appreciate that. We know Sad- dam Hussein is a bad guy, a terrible guy, probably a psychopath, but I don't know that anyone has said he is stupid. Do you have any hope at all that if there is renewed pressure by the United States and the United Nations through resolutions or 93 whatever, that the guy is going to say—you know, it has been my sense that his bottom line is he wants to stay in power. He knows what we can do to him. Do you have any hope at all that he will say, well, I got to take another course if I am going to stay in power, this isn’t working?” Secretary RUMSFELD. As long as he has options, he will certainly take the best options he can find. And it seems to me that it is the task—and the President put it before the international commu- nity—that the task for the international community, if we want the United Nations to be relevant and their resolutions recognized as having some specific density, then what we have to do is to dem- onstrate to that regime that they don’t have a lot of options other than disarming. And you know, is it possible he could wake up one morning and decide he wants to go live with Baby Doc Duvalier or Idi Amin or one of the former dictators of the world or some coun- try of choice? Who knows? He clearly won't do that of choice. If his next best choice is to stay there and acquiesce in every- thing that is requested of him, he has certainly given no indication of that in his background. And you are quite right, he is not stupid. I have met him and talked to him and spent time with him. And he is a survivor, and he is a brutal, vicious dictator. Mr. HEFLEY. Would you comment as far as you can in an opening hearing on the strength of their military at this point? I guess I have—well, Bill Clinton said the other night on the Letterman show, he thought a couple weeks of bombing, a week of ground forces, and it would be over. I don’t know if we can be that optimis- tic. One of the things I had concern about is that the if we attack him, he showed in the Persian Gulf War that he will send missiles to Israel—if he sends dirty bombs to Israel, we know he has them, we know he has the capability of delivery. If he does that, I don’t think we restrain Israel this time and they will just back off and say, “Well, we will take it.” Maybe they will. And then what does that do to our situation there in the whole Middle East? Do we have the capability do you think of hitting him hard enough, fast enough, and in the right places to see that he is incapable of doing that kind of thing? How strong—I understand that the Republican Guards, that he fairly recently has purged their leadership, they are not too keen on him either, so that might not be a great strength for him this time. But we hear so many things that I don’t know what is true and what is not. Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, we have to begin questions like that, of course, with the fact that the President has made no rec- ommendation at this stage with respect to using military force in Iraq. He has said what he has said. There is no question but that Saddam Hussein's military capabil- ity today is less than it was during Desert Storm, and is also no question but that the capability of the United States is consider- ably greater than it was during Desert Storm in terms of lethality. And there is also no question but that, as General Myers said, the United States is capable of doing those things that the country de- cides it would like it to do. 95 come and testify before this committee because we have huge re- sponsibilities. Maybe, Mr. Secretary, you can elaborate a little bit on this. Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. It is an important question. And you can find generals and admirals on every side of these issues. You can find civilians on every side of these issues. Oversimplifying it, I think, is a disservice. And it seems to me that anyone with any sense at all would approach the subject of using military force with a great deal of caution, with a great deal of care to the things that can go wrong. And there are any number of things that can happen and go wrong. To go directly to your question, which was something like if we were to engage in a military effort in Iraq again, is it conceivable that that could stimulate terrorist attacks and suicide bombers and the like? I think we learned from September 11th that we don’t have to go to war with Iraq to stimulate suicide bombers. They are already there. They attacked us. They killed over 3,000 people. And it wasn't because we went to war with Iraq. It was because they decided that that is what they wanted to do. And that there are thousands of those people that were trained in Afghanistan and other countries spread across this globe who were financed by peo- ple who think it is good to finance people to kill Americans and other people. So I think that it would be fundamentally wrong to assume— that there would be a cause and effect, because we have already seen the effect without the cause. And there is no question free countries are vulnerable to people who are willing to give their lives to kill innocent men women and children. That is the world we are living in. The thing that is critically different today is this nexus between terrorist states that have weapons of mass destruc- tion and have relationships with terrorist networks. And suddenly the people who are not deterrable, the people who are suicide bombers, to use your phrase, only have not conventional capability potentially, but unconventional capability and the ability to pose enormous destruction on innocent people. So I would like to add one comment on Mr. Spratt's question on inspections if I might take this moment. There is no question but that Iraq went to school on the inspectors, and the longer they were there, the more they found how they worked and what they did, and developed the ability to use more underground, more tun- neling, burying more weapons in different locations, using many, many multiple locations, hundreds as opposed to one or two or three locations. And it is a moving target I think it is safe to say. I should also add to Mr. Skelton: Congressman, I am reminded that the Department of State has had a Future of Iraq Project ef- fort going forward, and they would be the Department that obvi- ously would be able to give you a greater granularity on that. General MYERS. Could I chime in a little bit for Congressman Spratt? I would like to tag along with what the Secretary said. I think another way of saying that is that Iraq over the last decade has become a master, a regime—a master of deception. As he said, they have gone underground, they have gone mobile, they combine their biological and chemical weapons production with legitimate 96 facilities, making it very difficult to sort out one from the other be- cause they can convert so quickly. I think we found out when we had U.N. inspectors over there that very often inspectors would come to the front door, and out the back door went the evidence. We know that as well. So it is going to make this problem of discovery just very, very difficult. Mr. SPRATT. I simply want to make two points. One is what they did accomplish shouldn't be diminished, particularly in the early part of their efforts. It is substantial. And second, they need to be backed up if they are going to be put back there. There might be some advantage to sending them back there robustly to try to fer- ret out, particularly the VX and the biological weapon agents that we might see thrown against us if we later invade. Secretary RUMSFELD. That is a fair comment. I mean, those are issues one has to put on the balance. The potential advantage is that you are characterizing that they are not nothing, they are something that isn't trivial, and balance it against the attitude of the regime and the determination of the regime, which is for us to not have knowledge of what it is they are doing. If there is any- thing that is clear, that is it. And second, the fact that time is pass- ing, and how much time, how many years, does one want to allow to pass given the progress that is being made with respect to their weapons programs? Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. And, Mr. Secretary, we had the inspectors in front of us. The essence of their testimony was in the early years, when we had a virtual occupation of the country, they were acquiescent, and that is when we made the fairly major finds. But then in the later years, the only person there when they got to these facilities, the vast majority, was the piano player. There was nobody else there. And that they were met by the Iraqi bureaucracy at over 1,200 of these facilities, with nothing inside. They were virtually hollow inspections. Nonetheless, I think this is an area that our members are very, very interested in. And the gentleman has spent a couple hundred hours on this issue, the fine gentleman from New Jersey Mr. Saxton. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to follow up on the Chairman's comments, Mr. Secretary, last week we hosted before the committee Dr. David Kay, who is the former United Nations chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq, and Dr. Richard Spertzel, who is the former head of the biology section of the inspection team. And the message was unmistakably one of frustration; of in- ability to get the cooperation of the Iraqis; of experiences like being made to wait in parking lots for days, and then to be turned away from a facility; and just a general notion that at least the inspec- tion effort that was made in the nineties was unsuccessful, to the point of finally being ejected from the country. So that is a frustration which we talked about at length with Dr. Kay and Dr. Spertzel, and then asked them what it would take to be successful in a future effort at such an inspection. And they said that without the total cooperation of the Iraqi Government, that it would be next to impossible to do; and with a team many times the size of the team that was previously in Iraq, with those two condi- tions, perhaps it would be successful. 98 tive strike on the part of the Iraqis, particularly an act of terror against our citizens for all the reasons that you outlined. To quote you, “We should anticipate vastly more lethal attacks before they happen.” With that in mind, there are two questions that I would like to hear you address. Number one, half of our forces were in the Guard Reserve for the Gulf War. One of the things President Bush, then-President Bush did, correctly, was almost a total mobilization of the Guard Reserve for the military factors that were involved, and also because in my opinion it made it clear to the American people that this is everybody's war. It is not the poor draftee from across town, like Vietnam. It is everybody's war. And I happen to—having served in Congress and saw the mood shift of the American people, that is when the signs went up in front of the city halls and the county courthouses, “The following people from St. Louis, the following people from Waveland, proudly served in the Gulf War.” I think if we are talking of war, I think there has to be a mobili- zation of the Guard Reserve prior to that vote, because we had best expect the Iraqis to act either prior to that vote or immediately after that vote. Second thing, Mr. Secretary, I just had a conversation with one of the senior chiefs from the New Orleans Fire Department. New Orleans, by southern regions, is a huge city, and yet that huge city by southern standards has only 18 people trained in chemical and hazardous material. I am talking about a huge city by southern standards. One of the things that this House voted very strongly on in just the past couple of weeks was the desire to have a weap- ons of mass destruction civil support team in every state. We now #. I believe only 30, in the process of 30. It is my understanding that— Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will suspend, we will accommo- date your question here. Let me just let colleagues know we have got a vote coming up, but we intend to continue the hearing through the vote. And, Mr. Hefley, if you could go vote early per- haps and come on back, we will continue to hold the hearing. We will have some continuity. I believe it is only one vote. Staff, cor- rect me if I am wrong. Go ahead, Mr. Taylor. Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding that the House voted almost unanimously for a weapons of mass destruction civil support team in the National Guard in every State to be the first responders, to have the training and the equipment to help out what are in many instances volunteer fire departments in this—almost every instance, underfunded fire and police depart- ments to respond to what we know is eventually going to happen, just as you laid out very well. My question to you is, sir, why is your legislative shop over on the Senate side telling them that we don’t need one of these in every state? And this comes from conversations that we have had with Senator Levin's staff and others. Secretary RUMSFELD. Two comments on your questions and your statements. My understanding is that a study was made and the number of these chemical-biological elements units that were need- 99 ed was calculated, and it was something less than 50. It was some- thing less than one for each state. And it was based not on histori- cal state lines, but it was based on population centers and geog- raphy and the ability to move these things around where needed. The counter to that was that some people said, well, every state ought to have one. And they did not have a similar study that said that the additional cost would provide a benefit that merited that cost. And when one is looking at the difference between shipbuild- ing and the difference between chemical-biological units and antiterrorists and force protection and all of those things, they tend to make calculations about where those funds can be best invested. Now, that is not to say that any state can’t have one themselves, if they want one themselves. They can do it. But at the moment, in terms of priorities, the plan, the study that went forward, I am advised, reflected the best judgment of the people who understand these things as to how the coverage of our country could be best employed. Second, with respect to Reserve forces and the National Guard, you are quite right, they represent an enormous fraction of our total capability. And you are also quite right that they were acti- vated in large numbers in the Gulf War. Clearly, all the discussion about the President coming to the Congress and seeking a resolution, the President going to the United Nations, helping them understand the circumstance, secu- rity circumstance we are in takes away any strategic surprise for Saddam Hussein. He is going to be watching what happens and making his calculations and his judgments. That does not mean that you have lost all tactical surprise, but you certainly have lost a strategic surprise, so to speak. I disagree completely that there should be a complete activation prior to a vote in the Congress. I mean, we already have 70,000 re- servists activated and we already have 20,000-plus people on stop losses who are not leaving the service. And we have got a very siz- able force. And there is no question but that we would have to acti- vate the Reserves for various functions and the National Guard, depending on what decisions are made. But I think it would be a fundamental mistake to think that it had to precede some kind of a vote. Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Secretary, if I could, you made allusion to the Dark Winter scenario study done by Senator Nunn and others. One of the things it talked about was simultaneous biological attacks on a number of cities. One of the things that my friend from New Jer- sey has pointed out as recently as September 11th of last year, when the attacks occurred in New York and his home State of New Jersey asked for one of those weapons of mass destruction teams from other states to participate, the answer from the Governors was “No, we are going to take care of our own.” As you so correctly pointed out, do we have to wait to be burned before we address this? Even if we started to, those teams aren't ramped up for at least 18 months to 2 years. But a journey of 61,000 miles starts with a single step. We have to start now. If you really believe that the Iraqis possess these weapons of mass destruction and have the intention to use them, why do we delay a single day in ramping up these teams so that every state 100 has some degree of protection and every state has some degree of training and we know that the responders don’t themselves die when they go to find out what happened? At least they have the equipment. Because I think it is safe to say that if there were only 18 chemical-biological suits in the city of New Orleans, I doubt there are 18 chemical-biological suits in the entire State of Mis- sissippi. Secretary RUMSFELD. Correct me if I am wrong, but is this a De- partment of Defense-controlled matter or is it Homeland Security? General MYERS. I think there are pieces in both places. If I–the only thing I recall for first responders I think is, as Governor Ridge has said, first responders should be the civilians, and then we fold in where they cannot handle the task. And I think that is the pol- 1cy. Mr. TAYLOR. General, with all due respect, this is an attack on the American people. It is not a flood, it is not a tornado. Second thing is, the cities are not equipped for this. The city of New Orleans has over 1 million people. They have got 18 hazard- ous material suits and the people who know how to respond to this, 18 out of 1 million. And they are better prepared than most cities in the South. This is a national defense priority. I would certainly hope that you all would make it a national defense priority. And let's not wait to be burned before we respond to it. General MYERS. I think, Congressman, one of the things that the Department has done that is going to be really important in this area is to stand up the new Northern Command, because that is exactly one of the things they have got to address, is the planning and the training and so forth. So those requirements could change over time, no question about that. Mr. TAYLOR. I ask that you keep an open mind on this, Mr. Sec- retary. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. I know this is an important issue and would have to-maybe a follow-up briefing for Mr. Taylor on this. But Mr. McHugh has been waiting to ask his question. We have a few minutes left before the vote. Secretary RUMSFELD. I will get back to you on that. Mr. HUNTER. I will get back to Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Secretary, welcome; and General Myers, thank you for your service. As has been men- tioned here a number of times, it is very difficult to talk about this issue in the open session. All of us have had the opportunity for briefings and I would hope all of us, or certainly most of us, have taken those. But I get a bit concerned when I hear about, as you noted, Mr. Secretary, the fact that somehow the public record does not in any way justify, legitimatize, or give cause for what we all hope never comes about, and that is military intervention. And I just want to say to those in the audience—and I hope the two active partici- pants in the hearing, in an informal nature earlier, as well take the chance to read your written testimony, Mr. Secretary; because in a very clear way, as you can do so well, it spells out things not off the record—not that we have to make conclusions about or guesses—but the things this regime has done, particularly vis-a-vis 101 the United Nations, that really gives, I think a rational person lit- tle reason to think that we have many options left. My father had a couple of sayings. One was, “Fool me once, shame on me; fool me twice, shame on you.” That is a popular one. I am not sure what the hell “Fool me 16 times” means, and I hope we don’t find out what “Fool me 17 times” means. The other saying he had—and he would use it towards Saddam Hussein if he were still with us—people like that have a motto: “Play ball with me, and I will stick the bat up your nose.” He wouldn’t say “Nose,” but I will clean that up. It just seems to me that, as I mentioned, the options are becom- ing less. But let me get off the editorial comment and go to a ques- tion. I would be interested, either Mr. Secretary or General Meyers, to the extent you can tell us—in Afghanistan, obviously, we had a very active surrogate army in the Northern Alliance involved there. There has been a lot of discussion about the dissident groups, whether they get along or do not get along; the Kurds, the Shiites, et cetera, in Iraq. To what extent would our military action, if it comes about, be predicated upon their involvement, relied upon, their advancement as it was in Afghanistan? Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, let me start by saying that the Iraqi people are repressed and are being subjugated by that regime. There is no doubt in my mind that the overwhelming majority are anxious to be liberated and be free of that regime. There are Iraqis inside that country by the thousands who feel that way. There are Iraqis outside that country by the thousands who feel that way. There are people in Iraq today who clearly would be helpful, not as well organized in many instances as in the case in Afghanistan, and there are people outside the country who are anxious to be helpful. I would prefer not to get into numbers, and it would be a notably different situation than Afghanistan, but there is no question but that there would be Iraqis who would be helping to liberate their own country. Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Just a follow-up. General Meyers, I want to make sure that I understand, because this is for the record, are you actually contending that this Northern Command is going to take over the responsibility for the Nation with respect to terrorist at- tacks in local communities and first response? General MYERS. No, absolutely not. That is not what I intended at all. I just said that the roles of the Department of Defense do not change with the stand-up of Northern Command. But for once we will have a command with a commander that will worry about the planning and training for support to lead federal agencies or civil agencies or state agencies in responding to disasters, be they natural or be they terrorist disasters. That is all I said. We will have a command to help find the balance that Congressman Taylor was talking about. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How is that going to be any different from what is required by the Joint Forces Command right now, other than the fact that you are going to spend $300 million to put it to- gether, just to get it started, so it can start worrying? 102 General MYERS. I think it is having one person in charge of it. Right now in the Department of Defense you have several people in charge of this. I think putting one person that says, that is my job, to protect the American people. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You are answering my question by saying that person is going to be in charge. Are they or are they not? The question here is the practical realities involved. Is the Department of Defense going to participate in some way other than consulting? Is the Northern Command supposed to consult with the 50 States? We are already on our way to doing this. The President has already said, or is in the process or has vetoed the supplemental bill that we put forward to try and fund some of these things. Now you have got to make a decision. I don’t think you need this Northern Com- mand. I would like to see the $300 million go into financing what Representative Taylor was talking about, so responders can do this under the National Guard all across the country. How is the setup of the Northern Command supposed to aid and assist in one iota what Representative Taylor was putting forward? General MYERS. I will go back to my original comments, Con- gressman. Right now in the Department of Defense there are sev- eral entities that are responsible for whatever it is the Department of Defense is going to be asked to do to respond to either, as I said, natural disasters or chemical or biological or nuclear attack. What we want to do—and we have one entity, then, that is responsible for their defense. What we want to do is put that responsibility under one com- mand. We think the situation has changed sufficiently; the strate- gic environment has changed sufficiently not just since September 11th. This is an issue that goes back, as you remember, Congressman Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are the local forces to be in charge, General, or is the Northern Command supposed to be in charge of I guess, national civil defense? General MYERS. As I said, the roles of the Department of Defense will not change; in most cases will be in support of lead Federal agencies or other civil agencies, be they State or even more local. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the Department of Defense does not intend to fund in any way, shape, or form all of these requirements at the local level. ºpera MYERS. I don't know what requirements you are talking about. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. You know, the requirements we are talking about is to be able to respond to a terrorist attack, which you contend has to have a Northern Command in order to respond. General MYERS. The Department is certainly going to fund the parts of that that are the responsibility of the Department and— Mr. ABERCROMBIE. It will fund the Northern Command so that you will have this gigantic new bureaucracy set up initially, draw- ing on apparently overstaffed other commands, because that is where you are getting the people from. So all the commands now must be overstaffed, because you are able to bring in apparently hundreds of people— General MYERS. Congressman, when we stand this new Northern Command up—I may have to correct this record—my recollection 103 is it will be the smallest command that we have in the United States Armed Forces. It will be the smallest. As you said, we are not adding people to this. We are taking people from other staff re- ductions that have been mandated by Congress. By the way, that 15 percent cut—we are going to take the manpower from those po- sitions and put some of those, not all of them, of course, but some of those in this new Northern Command headquarters. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What are they going to do? Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me leap in here, if I may, Mr. Con- gressman. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. By all means, Mr. Secretary. Secretary RUMSFELD. The Unified Command Plan allocates re- sponsibilities throughout the world. Heretofore, we have not had certain portions of the world covered by a unified or specified com- mander. They included Russia, the United States, Mexico, Canada, and some other portions, water portions of the world. As we pro- ceeded, we decided that given the changes in the world, we should allocate every portion of the globe to a commander and a command. The cost for this command is going to come out of other com- mands. And the idea that it is going to be $300 million and a bunch of people milling around wasting money is just not going to be the case. Second— Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Despite the fact—excuse me, Mr. Secretary— that is the way it is proposed right now in the Joint Forces Com- mand budget. Secretary RUMSFELD. What I said is correct. The change—the role of the Department of Defense will not change with respect to the United States of America in this important sense: We are not asking that posse comitatus be changed. We are not suggesting that we go into a role where we are the principal, and other states—state, federal, local agencies support us. We would be func- tioning as we have in the past, in a supporting role. The general was exactly correct when he said that at the present time we have got NORAD that functions in a supporting role to some extent. We have got DOMS. The Army manages a whole host of things. We had 5- or 6,000 people at Salt Lake City for the Olympics. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All of which exists, Mr. Secretary, without a Northern Command, and apparently functioned very well; unless you are saying they have not done a good job to this point. See, what I am trying to say, Mr. Secretary, is actually we are doing a good job. I can tell you, Hawaii is only one part of the 50- State picture which is doing an excellent job of preparing for this, and they have excellent relationships, like with General Smith and the 25th out in Hawaii. The Department of Defense is very well represented and the coordination is already there. What they need : ºpport And they don’t need another command to come in on top of this. And the question has yet to be answered whether this Northern Command will in any way, shape, or form support what is already being accomplished in all 50 states. How is it to support it other than by standing there nodding its head? 104 Secretary RUMSFELD. I guess I don’t know what you mean when you say how it will support all the things that are already being done so well by the 50 states. Any state can do what it wants. Any city can do what it wants. They can have their fire department. They can have chemical-biological outfits. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How are they going to pay for what is re- quired of them under the kinds of scenarios that are outlined, which are likely to occur if we go to war with Iraq'? Secretary RUMSFELD. Who pays is a function of what the Con- gress and the executive branch decide—whether it is a federal re- sponsibility. If so, which department or agency, which state or local governments have to do what? That is a mix the Congress and the executive branch sorts out every year as they make their decisions. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Fair enough. Thank you. Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for being here. Let me also thank you for what I consider a very clear and persuasive statement that effectively deals with a lot of the ques- tions that are on our minds, as well as issues that are swirling around there. As you were talking I was reminded of a story line in a television program, I don’t even know if it is still on, but the main character would get a newspaper delivered to his door at the beginning of the program, and in that newspaper it would have a story of a tragedy which was going to occur two or three days later, and the char- acter's job was to try to prevent the tragedy before the newspaper became reality. It seems to me that is kind of where we are. We know the end of the story; we note the tragedy if we do nothing. The question is how, when, we prevent it from occurring. I guess the primary question on my mind—and General Meyers, I may direct this to you—is if the President decides to take military action in Iraq, are we ready? And, in particular, are we ready to have forces in an environment where weapons of mass destruction may be used against them? Maybe not initially, but eventually if things all fall apart, as we think they will for that regime, des- perate people use desperate measures. I am concerned we have not given adequate consideration to our troops dealing in that environ- ment for the last decade—not under your watch—but I guess I would ask you, are we ready to deal with that environment and to do what the President orders you to do? General MYERS. Congressman Thornberry, let me first say that the short answer is “Yes”. The longer answer is over the past dec- ade, and I would admit earlier in the decade, our capability to deal with weapons of mass destruction for our soldiers and sailors and airmen, marines, coast guardmen was uneven. But, in the last part of this decade, for the majority of it, we have made very good im- provements in terms of sensors that detect attacks, in terms of being able to net those sensors together to provide area warning for collective protection, and in the kind of protective suits that our troops wear. So, we have made improvements in all those areas. And without getting into much more detail, obviously our forces are prepared for that, they train for that, and would be ready to deal with that type of environment. 105 Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me ask you one other question which goes to the issue of can we do both—or the existing war on terrorism as well as this other aspect of the war on terrorism? There are re- ports today that the command for the existing war on terrorism may be shifting to the special operations folks. Are you able to com- ment on that? Is that happening and, if so, why; and what you hope to gain by it? Secretary RUMSFELD. You are addressing that to me? Mr. THORNBERRY. Whoever wants to. General MYERS. I think what is being reflected in the paper— and I haven’t read the article, I read the headline and maybe a couple of paragraphs—is the fact that, and the realization, of course, that this is a global war on terrorism. And the combatant commanders, as they are organized today, most of them, the thea- ter ones, are organized on a regional basis. We have some that cross regional countries: U.S. Space Command, U.S. Transportation Command, the current Strategic Command and the new Strategic Command that is proposed to stand up or that will stand up here on 1 October. Another one of those commands that can look globally is Special Operations Command. It has a global view of things. And for some aspects of the war on terrorism it is useful to have that global view. And without getting to the operational details of that, that is I think what we are seeing. I don’t know that this reflects a great change in our strategy. And there are some elements—and again I haven’t read the article—but there are some elements that have not been finally decided yet that the Secretary and the rest of the National Security Council will have to decide on. But what we are trying to do is ensure that in a global war we have the kind of view—in some cases a global view is required, because these net- works—I mean they don't respect any boundaries, and as we know, they are in over 60 countries—is actually a network, and it has to be addressed kind of in this total. Secretary RUMSFELD. I skimmed the article and it is fairly typi- cal of articles that are reporting on something that hasn’t hap- pened. It wants to be first, not right. And my guess is that when it is sorted through by the Chairman and others and by me and the National Security Council, it will look somewhat different than that article characterized it. But the general is obviously quite right; you have got global problems, and having a global view of that is useful in some instances. But the idea that there is going to be a massive change, and the Special Operations people will in every instance be the supportive CINC or combatant commander is just not the case. They are going to be both, one would think, some- times supporting and sometimes supportive. Mr. HEFLEY [presiding]. Mr. Meehan. Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Sec- . and General, for your testimony. Appreciate it very, very IIlllCI1. Mr. Secretary, can you tell me what you envision a weapons in- spection, or perhaps I should call it a disarmament regime in Iraq, how would you envision that? I understand, and agree totally with the notion, that weapons inspections are really not the goal. The goal really is disarmament. How would you envision that? And 106 also, should that vision of disarmament be included in a U.N. Secu- rity Council resolution calling for such disarmament? Secretary RUMSFELD. Those are questions that the President and the Secretary of State have been addressing in the United Nations over the past period and are ongoing, and I have really no idea how what will evolve. There have been a whole series of thoughts about what the U.N. might do, and I know that Secretary Powell is dis- cussing those with people up there. So I guess I am really not in a position to know what either the U.N. will ultimately decide or what the President will ultimately decide with respect to what it looks like the U.N. might be marching toward. Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Secretary, could we accomplish disarmament, in your opinion, short of declaring war on Iraq” In other words, is there—is there a disarmament strategy that could be accomplished, short of declaring war? Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, sure. Saddam Hussein could decide that his future is limited and he would like to leave, and you would have a regime that decided it wished to cooperate with the United Nations with respect to those resolutions. And if you have a regime that does in fact want to disarm, which is what the stipulation is, what the U.N. has said, then obviously, you could have inspectors ºpate and assist in that project and an international coalition to do it. Another way to do it would be to persuade enough people in Iraq that the world would be a lot better world if that regime weren't there and they decided to change the regime. That is another op- tion. Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Secretary, how would we know we had a re- gime that really wants to disarm? Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, you would have to have enough peo- ple from the international community physically in there, disarm- ing them, to know. And you probably wouldn’t know for a period of time. But any idea that a regime like the current one would be sufficiently intrusive, which is much less intrusive than the one that existed previously, the one that is currently up there on the drawing boards. I mean you are not going to get people to defect and give you information about where these capabilities are if their families are in Iraq, for example. How could you have a person who has a family in Iraq and relatives walk up to U.N. inspectors, with this regime sitting on top of that power, and say, “Hey, fellows, here is where you ought to go look? I know this tunnel or that area is an area of opportunity for you.” They are going to be killed. Their families are going to get killed. It is a tough crowd. Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Secretary, to follow up on my friend from Texas, the comments that he made relative to the war against ter- rorism and the war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. And let me first of all congratulate you and the general on the tremendous job that our men and women in uniform have done in Afghanistan. I had an opportunity to travel there to see firsthand the outstanding job that they have done, getting rid of the Taliban and putting al Qaeda on the run. At the same time, I am troubled about reports of various terrorist cells that are still active in that country. Indeed, earlier this month, the attempted assassination of Presi- dent Karzai—terrorists have already killed two ministers. It seems 107 that in the past two or three months, there has been a marked in- crease in violence, in terrorist activity within Afghanistan. And clearly this terrorism and violence is going to have to be addressed if the new government is to succeed there. Do you see a need to increase our military presence within Af- ghanistan in response to this resurgent threat of violence and in- stability? And, if so, what sort of commitment would that be? Secretary RUMSFELD. It is not clear to me there has been a marked increase in violence in Afghanistan in recent weeks or months. It tends to be uneven. It spurts for a while, and then it declines. Second, it tends to be geographical. There has been more of it in Kabul, where the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is, interestingly. No correlation, but the point being that the existence of the ISAF in Kabul is not an assurance of no violence. But it has tended to be more in the northeast and southeast of Kabul where there has not been a stable set of warlords who have fººd down. There is competition, there is disagreement, it is local. Second, it is along the Pakistan border, and that is where a lot of al Qaeda and Taliban are. They want to go over the border, and we know that. So that is the worst area, the most difficult area, although even that has been improving and we have got some good news just in the last three or four days there where we are getting tipoffs and what have you. I regret to say this, but—thank goodness the assassination at- tempt against President Karzai failed—but I don’t know that in that part of the world we are going to end assassination attempts. I think they have been going on for decades. They went on before September 11th, and it is a dangerous part of the world. What has to happen over time is the security situation is going to be affected by reconstruction, and the countries of the world that promised money have got to step forward and help that country develop the kinds of infrastructure so that they can cope with the millions of displaced persons and refugees who are returning home. I think the indication that the security situation is not bad is that the refugees are voting with their feet. They are leaving where they were, going in there, and so are the internally displaced peo- ple. They are saying, pretty good, things are better than they were. They are better than they were where I was, so I am going to go back where I belong and that is a good thing. Now, numbers of troops. We are high right now. We are probably up over 9,000. We were averaging 46, 5, 4,600, 5,000, something like that, 5,500, 6,000. We are now in the process of transferring people in, getting people out. Some other coalition countries have been reducing some of their forces in some instances as their forces were stressed. Secretary RUMSFELD. The ISAF, the Turkish government, fortu- nately stepped forward and took over for the Brits, but their period comes to an end in December, and we ought not to be looking for someone for ISAF for another six months. We ought to look for somebody for a year, a year and a half, two years, and we would be delighted to have more coalition forces in the country helping. Do I think that the United States will have to make large in- creases? No, I don’t. I think that we have got to keep chasing after 108 the al Qaeda, the Taliban that exists in the country; we have got to make life uncomfortable for those in Iran and Pakistan who want to get back in the country; and we have got to support the Karzai government so that that reconstruction takes place and peo- ple begin to be convinced that their future is in that country and in that government and in the Loya Jirga process, rather than at the end of a rifle. Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Hostettler is going to be the next questioner. Mr. Secretary, I know you and General Myers have been receiv- ing some messages from your staff. Do you want to take about a five-minute administrative break here to see if there is anything you have to do with your—here? You all set? Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Mr. Hostettler. Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for your attendance. Mr. Secretary, I–in following up with Mr. Ortiz's comments, I did not serve in the United States military, but I have been elected by mothers and fathers of service personnel, and service personnel themselves who trust me to make the decision that we are now de- liberating upon based on an imminent threat to our national secu- rity. Selfishly, however, I do have young sons and daughters that may serve our country someday in the uniform of the U.S. military, and I hope that the person who is occupying the office that I occupy today will likewise be resolved that they will decide to send them into harm’s way only when they are convinced that our national se- curity is under an imminent threat. And to be quite honest, I hope the person who is occupying the office which you occupy today— that they will then realize their profound duty as much as I have concluded that you understand your duty, and for that, I thank you for your service. That being said, Mr. Secretary, I would like for you to respond to three points; and I will try to make them briefly. The first is I would hope that the administration would seek a declaration of war if it is our desire to change a regime that sits atop a government of a sovereign nation; and if the administration is so convinced and resolved, I think a declaration of war seems a constitutional fit. Secondarily, in June of 1981, Israeli jets destroyed the Osirak nuclear power plant that was under construction, and I am not meaning by this point that we necessarily have to follow, but I just wanted to have you comment on the fact that a very threatened neighbor at that particular time in the region felt that they were under an imminent threat by a foreign power, and I am not sure that Israel today feels as threatened—given that time they suffered U.N. condemnation and even condemnation by us, even though I understand they were a party to a nonproliferation agreement, and there were inspectors in the country at that time, I believe. Then, finally, as you, I believe, in comments in your opening statement pointed out, “Chemists, biologists and nuclear scientists are toiling in weapons labs and underground bunkers, working to give the world's most dangerous dictators weapons of unprece- dented power and lethality,”. And I believe that that statement 109 may apply to other nations than Iraq, some of whom were not named as part of the axis of evil, but have a vested interest in the demise of the West; and we may be desiring to send them a mes- sage with a strike against Iraq, but if I can offer a somewhat dif- ferent rationale for, once again, you to possibly comment on. In your statement you talk about what I think may be a case for military action against any foreign country that attempts to under- mine the most prominent political institutions of another country, and that is, as you pointed out in April of 1993, there was what we believe an assassination attempt of a former head of state of the United States of America by Iraq. I think it is undermining of our fundamental political arrangement in this country for other coun- tries to believe that they may frighten the United States as a whole, and officeholders specifically, into particular behavior once they leave office if they have not done something which a foreign power believes is in that foreign power's best interest. If we would like to send a message to any potential enemy that we will not abide by this type of attack against our most fundamental institu- tions of government, I can actually see a reason to do that; and I was puzzled why in 1993 we didn't send that message more pro- foundly than we did. So if you could address those three issues: the issues of the dec- laration of war, why some nations may not feel as threatened as they have in the past and then, finally, the idea of a different ra- tionale for changing the regime in a country that has undermined our political institutions. Thank you. Secretary RUMSFELD. Congressman, thank you so much. With respect to the declaration of war, I am trying to refresh my memory, but I don’t believe we have had a declaration of war in this country since World War II; and we have been through Korea, Vietnam, Haiti, you know, Panama, one thing and another, a whole series of things. There are a lot of I am no lawyer, and there are a lot of legal implications to a declaration of war and consider- ations that need to be taken into account. Clearly, over decades, the changes in our world circumstance have been such that succes- sive Presidents of both political parties and successive Congresses have made a judgment that a declaration of war was either not necessary or inappropriate or both; and I am most certainly not the best person to go into the reasons for all those. My recollection is that the reasons were different in different circumstances. So, I would just leave it there. With respect to Israel, thank goodness they did go in and take out the Iraqi nuclear capability when they did. Intelligence commu- nities of the world were flat wrong as to how advanced their capa- bilities were, and were dumbfounded when they got on the ground after Desert Storm and found out that their estimates were wrong by a great deal. Instead of multiples of years, it was less than one or less than two years before they would have had that capability. I don't know quite how to respond to your—oh, I should say, also, the neighbors are frightened of Saddam Hussein today. Let there be no doubt. And if one privately sat down with the leading Israelis, they would—they are concerned about the weapon of mass destruction capabilities of Iran, which are being developed as we sit 110 here; of Iraq; of Syria, that is engaged in testing chemical weapons on almost a quarterly basis; of Libya; and they are attentive—the neighbors in that region are attentive and deeply concerned, let there be no doubt. You are right. There is something about an assassination at- tempt that—or accomplished—that goes so fundamentally to a country's structure and the way it governs itself that it is some- thing that should be taken quite seriously. Thank you. Mr. HUNTER. The gentleman from Maine, Mr. Allen. Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, Mr. Sec- retary and General Myers, for being here today. Mr. Secretary, I agree with you that the disarmament is the goal and that inspections are just a means to that goal. But I want to explore a little bit further the issue that Mr. Meehan was rais- ing about—which is really ultimately comes down to whether the administration's goal is to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass de- struction or to replace Saddam Hussein; and let us test it this way. If you assume that a new, robust inspections regime is able to satisfy the administration that Iraq has effectively dismantled, given up its weapons of mass destruction, I don’t think that would happen without a change in position in the Iraqi–a change in posi- tion in the Iraqi regime, but let us assume you get there. Would that satisfy the administration's goals in Iraq.” Secretary RUMSFELD. Assuming you get where? Mr. ALLEN. Assume you get to a place where you are satisfied that, through a combination of Iraqi cooperation and a robust in- spections regime, that you get to a place where you are satisfied as an administration that Iraq has effectively dismantled and dis- armed its weapons of mass destruction, but Saddam Hussein is still in power, would that— Secretary RUMSFELD. Boy, that is a reach. Mr. ALLEN. It is a reach, I know. I grant you this is a hypo- thetical, but sometimes we get places by asking hypotheticals. Secretary RUMSFELD. Sure. Mr. ALLEN. If that happens, would that satisfy the administra- tion's goals? Secretary RUMSFELD. The Congress, of course, has adopted a pol- icy for the United States of America for regime change, and I don't know that—are you suggesting that if there was the certainty of disarmament because of a regime that was so incredibly intrusive, that notwithstanding a regime that was against disarmament you were able to achieve disarmament, would Congress then want to change the law and back away from a regime change? Well, the problems with the regime are, as you point out, weap- ons of mass destruction and the fact that they won't disarm. There is also a repression of their own people. They are also threatening their own neighbors and those other things that I suppose led the Congress to pass a statute favoring regime change. Mr. ALLEN. If I could make two points. My question was not about what Congress might or might not do. I grant you that is hard to determine. My question was really about the administra- tion and what the administration's policies would be. There are lots of dictators that we have allowed to continue in operation around the globe. We haven’t set a policy of replacing 111 them all, but it is really—I am trying to get at where the adminis- tration is with respect to weapons of mass destruction. I grant you it is a reach to assume that there is a change in position of the cur- rent Iraqi regime, but if there were, would that be enough? Secretary RUMSFELD. That, of course, is a judgment not for the Secretary of Defense of the United States. It is a judgment for the President and the Congress. Mr. ALLEN. Let me ask one follow-up, then. If Saddam Hussein believes that we are determined to take him out no matter what he does, what reason does he have to cooperate in any measure? Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, he always has the opportunity to flee. He always has the opportunity, as he has tried to, to persuade peo- ple that he is a changed leader. And he tries and he fails because he isn’t a changed leader. I guess you know the answer to that as well as I do. He can do what he will, and he does. What reason does he have to cooperate? Well, if I were he, I would have plenty of reasons to cooperate. I wouldn't want to be threatening my neighbors. I wouldn't want to be developing these weapons to threaten the world. I wouldn't want to be dealing with terrorist states. So he would have plenty of reasons for cooperating. But you are suggesting that I am supposed to answer for somebody who thinks so fundamentally different than you or I. It is hard. Mr. ALLEN. I grant you. Can I ask you one unrelated quick question— Mr. HUNTER. Let me just tell the gentleman, we have got about 45 minutes left with the Secretary, and we have about 15 members yet who have questions, so if the gentleman could make it very QulcK. Mr. ALLEN [continuing]. Very quick, because I think I know the answer. Has the administration given any thought of how to pay for the war? Larry Lindsey said it might be $100 to $200 billion. Have you had any conversations about how to pay for it? Secretary RUMSFELD. Sure, we have. Mr. ALLEN. Any that you can reveal? Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, needless to say, what one would do is—it is not knowable what a war or a conflict like that would cost. You don’t know if it is going to last two days or two weeks or two months. It certainly isn’t going to last two years, but it is going to cost money. And the cost compared to 9/11 is so insignificant com- pared to the loss of lives, compared to the billions of dollars that were lost in material things and in market values and in disrup- tions in people's lives and not being able to fly or go places or do things, in the concerns of families. And it would be modest, to be SUII'e. Mr. ALLEN. Thank you very much. Secretary RUMSFELD. Other countries undoubtedly would contrib- ute, just as other countries are contributing currently to the global war on terrorism. Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chambliss, the gentleman from Georgia. Mr. CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary and General Myers, unlike our earlier guests, I am not undecided. I know that you gentlemen care deeply about the men and women that serve under you, and you are not about to put those men and women in harm's way unless it is absolutely 112 necessary, unless there is a security interest of the United States at risk. I thank you for the great job you have done, the great job you are doing today; and I hope you will pass that on to all your troops out there, General. General MYERS. We will do that. Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Secretary, you alluded earlier to the fact that there are other nations that we know to be terrorist-sponsor- ing nations who have manufactured and stockpiled weapons of mass destruction. You referred to the other two countries in the axis of evil, Iran and North Korea. You also mentioned Syria and Libya. Is there ongoing conversation that we know of between hº countries and Iraq with respect to weapons of mass destruc- tion? Second, what would be your thought on citizens or nationals of those terrorist-sponsoring countries who have weapons of mass de- struction participating as members of an inspection team going into Iraq looking for weapons of mass destruction? Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, there is no question but that Iraq has relationships with countries that are on the terrorist list. They also have relations with terrorist networks. They also have al Qaeda currently in the country, among others. Abu Nidal—they say he committed suicide with four or five slugs to his head. That is a hard thing to do, but he was in Iraq. So there is no question about those relationships. As far as those people—the current so-called U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Regime (UNMOVIC), as I understand it and looked at it last time, does not have any people who are rep- resentatives of their own countries. It is currently to be—which is unlike UNSCOM, which did have people who were representing their countries serving on those teams. The people that are, I be- lieve, on the inspection team that is currently in place are all U.N. employees from a host of different countries, and we would have no control whatsoever over what countries they happen to be from, be- cause they are U.N. employees. That would be something that would be decided by the UN, not a happy prospect. Mr. CHAMBLISS. Does that give you cause for concern? Secretary RUMSFELD. Sure. Mr. CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder. Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you both for being here, not only for all your service the last couple years, but just for sitting through this ordeal. The committee keeps growing each year, and it just makes your ordeal longer each year. I just want to make one comment first about your goal of disar- mament. I think that that is the correct way to phrase it. When Dr. Kay was here the other day, he made the comment that in his first few years he wished he had the authority to issue green cards, that it would have made his work a lot easier. That may be something we need to consider now, perhaps even with military, that if a scientist and his family can get safely out of that country, not only will they not be contributing to that program, but they may have information to give. Because the reality is, if this U.N. thing should work, and I realize it is a long shot, disar- 114 very clearly the President has not yet made up his mind about military force, and yet we are being asked to. I would say—I know the President made this comment the other day, too, about why would any Member of Congress up for re-elec- tion defer to the UN, but it is a more complicated issue than that. As General Clark has pointed out in some of his writings recently, General Wesley Clark, the potential impact of the United States going alone, if we had to go alone, if we chose that route, on inter- national cooperation on our war against al Qaeda—so, I mean, it is a balancing of risks and looking at factors. I think for certain Members of Congress, I think probably a fair number and fair number of constituents back home, the issue of whether we go alone or not, it is more than just us going along and being a part of the UN. It is its impact on the international co- operation on the war on al Qaeda. As you stated earlier, we all get in trouble by oversimplifying. Thank you again for your service. Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you. You know, the coalition we have on the global war on terrorism of 90 countries I believe is the largest coalition in human history. That problem is real. Iraq is part of that problem, and the connec- tion between weapons of mass destruction and a global terrorist connection that works is the nexus that causes the problem. So I do not think that it would have in any way an adverse effect, nor do I believe for a second that in the event a decision is made to go forward that the United States would be alone. We already know for a fact that is not true. There are any number of countries who have already announced their support. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Graham. Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I do appreciate you being here. I know you have— I wouldn’t want to sit there and have to answer all these questions, but that is the hand you have been dealt, and you are doing well. But I am going to ask you some very specific questions. Do you view a regime change as a net of self-defense, a regime change in Iraq as an act of self-defense of this country? Secretary RUMSFELD. I have wrestled with what is self-defense; and when we are dealing with terrorism and the fact that they can attack at any time at any place against any technique and you want defend it every time and every place against every technique, the only way you can defend yourself is by going after the terrorist. In this case, it seems to me that when you use the phrase “regime change,” if one believes that it is possible to leave the regime and eliminate the threat, then clearly you don’t need to change the re- gime. But self-defense does require, I believe, the ability to prevent a terrible attack on our country. Mr. GRAHAM. You do view the Iraqi regime, obviously, as a threat. But that is a big question to me. If it is a matter of self- defense, you don’t need the U.N. to sanction Secretary RUMSFELD. Of course not. The U.N. charter provides for every country to provide for their own defense. Mr. GRAHAM. Well, why don’t we just be honest with people? Ev- erybody in the administration has been telling us that Saddam 115 Hussein has to go. That is what the gentleman's question was about. No matter what we do with inspections—we had two weap- ons inspectors in here said that it is really a joke. You will never find what you need to find. They are masters at deception. We just need to level with people here in this country and in the world. Post 9/11, we view Saddam Hussein as a threat to this coun- try, period. And if that is the case, when we go consult our allies and consult the U.N. we should tell them that is our view. I think there are some mixed messages going on here, and I think we need to be very clear with the American public and with our allies. In that regard, General Myers, you said early on that you could do whatever was asked of you by the President and the Congress. Do you need any allies that we don’t have today to accomplish a regime change by force if you were directed to do so? General MYERS. I think clearly for lots of reasons, but from a military standpoint, it is preferable to have those allies and friends that want to be with you. As the Secretary said, we have people that we know today would be with us if we were asked to do that. Mr. GRAHAM. So the answer is, if you were directed by the appro- priate authorities in this country to implement by force a regime change, you could do that? General MYERS. In that hypothetical case, absolutely. Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Secretary— Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me say just one word about this mixed message. I personally don’t think so. I think the President's speech was very straightforward. Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I understand, but here is the mixed message part of it. If we do believe it to be an act of self-defense, as I do, then the whole idea of going to the U.N. to get approval and pass a resolution to defend yourself is not necessary, legally or morally. Secretary RUMSFELD. It is not necessary, and the President in fact said that. Mr. GRAHAM. The fact that he is doing it I don't object to, but we are going to find ourselves in a situation here soon where the letter received from Iraq is going to create greet confusion over there. What I would like to hear from you, if possible, is that you will promise the American people we will not let U.N. politics pre- vent us from defending ourselves as we see fit. Secretary RUMSFELD. I think the President in his speech made very clear that the one choice we have—do not have is to do noth- ing. I would say that I agree completely that having other countries aboard is a help and it is desirable and it is worth trying to get them, and we are trying and we are being successful. Mr. GRAHAM. But make sure I have got this right, and I will shut up. There is no ally presently unavailable to us to accomplish the mission of regime change if directed by the President or the appro- priate authority. Is that still the case, General Myers? General MYERS. I will just stick with my statement. We are—the United States military armed forces is ready to respond to what- ever the Mr. GRAHAM. You don't know of anybody that we need waiting on the U.N. to bless this deal? General MYERS. I will just defer to the Secretary on the U.N. piece of that. 116 Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I would say this. We have already been advised that in the event that this country decides to—it is necessary to do something, by a number of countries, that they will cooperate in a variety of different ways. Mr. GRAHAM. Absent U.N. approval? Secretary RUMSFELD. Oh, sure, yes. There are other countries that are—that we would like to have cooperating in ways, and they have not made judgment. So the worst thing that the General could do would be to answer your question and say we don’t need any more help, because the more help you get, the easier it is. Mr. GRAHAM. I understand. God bless, and good luck. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. McIntyre. Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Mr. Secretary and General Myers, thank you very much for your commitment to our country and for the obvious time you have spent in going into great detail to help us in making our assess- ment. You keep referring to a number of countries that would help us. Can you tell us how many countries and who? Secretary RUMSFELD. I could, but I shouldn't. A lot of these coun- tries are frightened of Saddam Hussein. A number of other coun- tries are attempting to work with us in the United Nations to fash- ion a resolution, and it is not for me to do. It is for them to an- nounce what they decide. I don’t make it my business to go around and say that this country or that country has told us publicly or privately that they will do this, that or the other thing. Mr. MCINTYRE. And I respect that, and I appreciate your con- fidence, though, that we have other countries. Can you give us a ballpark? Are we talking about two or three? Are we talking about half a dozen? Are we talking about 15 or 20? Secretary RUMSFELD. I guess it depends on what you mean by help. If you are talking about Mr. MCINTYRE. They would be committed to this effort to change this regime. Secretary RUMSFELD. Overflight rights to help us do it or various types of port access or base access or money or troops? General MYERS. Fuel supplies. Secretary RUMSFELD. Fuel supplies. It varies. It is all across the spectrum. In some cases, it will be totally public. In some cases, it will be totally private. But, no, I would not be inclined to try to come up with a number in a public session. Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Would you address a couple other issues that have been raised today? What would be the potential number of American troops needed for such a military campaign against Iraq.” Secretary RUMSFELD. I am not inclined to talk about plans that conceivably could exist as to what one would do. I can say this, and the General can comment. We would not be short of troops. The numbers that would be needed—obviously, everyone likes belts and suspenders. So you don't know about how long something is going to last or what it will require. You can’t know that, be- cause the first thing that goes by the board is a plan in a conflict. But we would not have problems with numbers of people. 117 Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Well— General MYERS. I absolutely agree with that. The only thing I would say is it is very difficult if we were to sit here and talk about specific numbers. That would be, I think, of immense help to any fºntial adversary, so we have got to be careful of how we handle that. Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Well, within that realm, what percent- age—I have two quick follow-ups. What percentage do you think would have to be Reserve and Guard? Do you have a percentage idea? Because we talk about how important they are. You have mentioned that today. Secretary RUMSFELD. We already have 70,000 Guard and Re- serve activated, and we have got 20,000 stop-holds on people not getting out, and we would need some more. Mr. MCINTYRE. Some more would have to be called up. All right. And from being from an area in southeastern North Carolina and eastern North Carolina, which, of course, is home to Fort Bragg, Camp Lejeune, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, Cherry Point, the list goes on, that are in our area that Congressman Jones, Con- gressman Hayes and I all share in in terms of representing or rep- resenting their families, there is a concern about overdeployment of troops. Recently, I went to Afghanistan about 3 weeks ago with a CODEL of 11 Members of Congress on a bipartisan basis. Those troops are doing a great job; and I commend you, General Myers and Secretary Rumsfeld, for being about the mission and seeing the great success of our work in central Asia. The next question, though, is what about the overdeployment of these troops? General Myers, you have admirably said that our country would be willing and absolutely, as you said, be able to fol- low any command that our Commander in Chief may give with re- gard to what our mission might need to be, but what about over- deployment? I mean, do we wear our troops out? Yeah, they can do it, but then what else suffers? We are concerned about readiness, you know, making sure they have everything at their disposal to do their job top notch, because we want to support our troops. But, in turn, how does that affect the human factor? General MYERS. Let me take a stab at that. The human factor, obviously, is very important. I think the one thing that is—you know, as we used to discuss this topic before September 11th, it was how do we in peacetime ensure that our troops are—that their tempo or their operational tempo, the impact on the families, the impact on the employers of our reserve compo- nent forces that are called up from time to time, what steps can we take to mitigate that? And we put in lots of measures, and we looked at that very, very carefully of Obviously, now we are at war. We are at a global war, where the personnel tempo, the operational tempo, the impact on our fami- lies—we have, as the Secretary said, 70,000 plus Reserve compo- nent forces called up, which is tougher on their families, because they are generally geographically separated in most cases. Then, on top of that, you have the employers who lose the valid employees. I would only say that from the Secretary's viewpoint and the sen- ior leadership in the Pentagon, from the Secretary's level, from the 118 Joint Chiefs of Staff level, we are doing everything we can possibly do to mitigate the turbulence in these times. However, this threat is so serious to this country—9/11 is a great example, and the Sec- retary has talked, I think, eloquently about the potential with weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. The poten- tial for destruction to freedom-loving people anywhere, that this threat is so serious, that I think And you probably found this in Afghanistan. I bet I could ask you, did you find anybody that said, “Gee, when am I going to go home? When is this mission over?” More likely, the question you got is, “What more can we do?” Because I think our military men and women understand exactly what this threat is to their fami- lies, to the folks back home and to their friends and allies. So we have got to try to mitigate the impact on our forces, and we have taken many steps since 9/11. I mean, we started out, if you will, as if this were going to be a sprint. We understand this is going to be a marathon, and I think we have taken steps to try to mitigate the impact on our families. That will always be upper- most in our mind. At the same time, that must be balanced against the risk to our country and our allies and friends; and we are trying to do that. I think we have to expect our armed forces, much like they did in World War II, steel themselves for the long haul. This will not be an easy short victory against terrorism, and I think our armed forces are up to that task. Mr. MCINTYRE. In light of that, just in closing and not being able to give numbers or say how many troops you think would be in- volved, but yet being confident we can do this, do either of you ex- pect this would lead to a reinstitution of the draft? Secretary RUMSFELD. Not a chance. Mr. MCINTYRE. And would you like to say why? Secretary RUMSFELD. Because we are currently at, what, a coun- try of 281 million people, and we have got less than 2 million peo- ple in uniform. We are successful in attracting and retaining the force we need without using compulsion and without paying people 40 or 50 percent of what they would make in the civilian manpower market. Unless someone decides that there is some overall social good that is to be achieved by reinstituting the draft, it certainly would not be reinstituted for the purpose of attracting and retain- ing the people we need, because we are doing that. Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary RUMSFELD. I must say I have a bias on this subject. I was one of the original authors of the all-volunteer service back in the 1960s when I was in Congress. Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you very much. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman; and the gentleman from Il- linois, Mr. Kirk. Mr. KIRK. Mr. Secretary, thank you for that answer. You grew up in my district, and we on the North Shore are ter- ribly, terribly proud of you. I thank you also for your—the answer you just gave. I think the mothers and fathers of 19-year-old Amer- ican boys are a little nervous about this, and you have categorically 120 Secretary RUMSFELD. That is an interesting point. Mr. KIRK. I see your staff saying no, and I know that sometimes we have quiet days. I would hope that you would let us know the moment U.S. armed forces, who are enforcing a U.N. resolution are fired on by Iraq, even after the delivery of this letter. It is an im- portant point. Secretary RUMSFELD. That is a good one. Mr. KIRK. My last question is—let me just say something, be- cause my old squadron is in Incirlik right now, and obviously their mothers and fathers worry about them and they look at the news. When you get back home from a mission, you are pretty much glued to CNN. What would you say to the men and women in the armed forces right now about any potential operation? Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, there is no question but that these folks, as you point out, voluntarily put their lives at risk, and they do it day after day as a way of our country's contribution to peace and stability in the world, and it is a dangerous world. It is an un- tidy world, and the role they are playing is just enormously impor- tant, and they do it selflessly. I have been around, as Dick Myers has, visiting bases in this country and bases around the world, and in that part of the world, and I can say that these folks are ready to do that which this coun- try decides is appropriate to do and necessary to do to defend the American people. General MYERS. I might just add that being in Incirlik, it is a long way from home, and sometimes it is difficult for the folks there to feel the appreciation of the American people. It is easier here in Washington. Last week going through the anniversary events of September 11th and then traveling throughout the coun- try, as we both do universally, the American people very much ap- preciate what our Armed Forces do for them. And I think being a long way from home sometime that is hard to see, but if we could say one thing to them I would say that. Mr. KIRK. Mr. Secretary, the United States Navy is born in my district, the only boot camp, and I would say that I have never seen the Secretary held in such admiration by the men and women in uniform, and I thank you for your service. Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Andrews from New Jersey and then Mrs. Wilson. Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Sec- retary, General, for your very clear, very persuasive efforts this morning. I reflect something Mr. Hostettler said, that there is nothing we do around here more grave than the decision we are asked to engage in this morning, the decision you are engaging in, but I don’t think gravity should obscure clarity, and there are two arguments that I hear around the country and frankly here this morning that I think need to be disclaimed, as you have very effec- tively this morning. The first is that any effort to effect a regime change in Iraq is distinctive from the war against terrorism. I think they are part of the same thing. Secretary RUMSFELD. Exactly right. Mr. ANDREWS. You have said that so persuasively, but if I could offer some advice, I think that is something that has to be said to 121 the American people repeatedly and with the clarity that you both have done this morning. The second is this effort in the face of the record to carve out this position that somehow says that this regime in Iraq can cooperate with a robust weapons inspection and destruction program by an outside force. I find the proposition to be completely contradictory in terms when you look at a regime that by my count on 12 occa- sions since 1993 has made the same public promise that it made 36 hours ago and violated the promise each time. As we have heard just a few minutes ago, a regime that 2,300 times in recent years has attacked U.S. planes, that are there because they are enforcing a set of U.N. resolutions that are designed to obstruct this regime from murdering people living in its own country, I think that is in- disputable record, and this idea somehow that it is logically pos- sible to see this regime behave in a way that is consistent with the destruction of the weapons of mass destruction or facilities I find to be a non sequitur. Having said that, I am concerned that the Iraqis, who seem to be, if nothing else, skilled at manipulating American public opin- ion, may be in a position to make the case that they are doing so, and go through some elaborate ritual that will show that inspec- tions are increasing and stepping up. And let us suspend disbelief for a moment and assume that in fact there is some real progress in identifying the sites of weapons of mass destruction, destroying the weapons of mass destruction, finding the production capabili- ties. How long do you think it would take to complete such a pro- gram to the satisfaction of those of you entrusted with the respon- sibility? And let me tell you the reason I ask the question and then I will ask it. How much time do you think it would take the Iraqi regime to make a covert connection with the terrorist organization, convey to that terrorist organization a weapon of mass destruction, let that weapon be used against the people of the United States and dis- claim responsibility for it? That would be pretty logical strategy for Saddam, wouldn't it? He would get the benefit of distracting U.S. public opinion. He would get the collateral benefit of murdering tens of thousands of United States citizens, and he would claim no responsibility for it in world affairs. Is that a scenario that you find plausible? Secretary RUMSFELD. I find everything you have said plausible. First, you are exactly right that the United States has not nomi- nated Saddam Hussein's regime for this attention. It nominated itself, and the Iraqi people are really in many respects hostages to that regime. I think to suggest that all the Iraqi people are complicit is just certainly not the case, and I think we have to keep that in mind, because they have a terrible circumstance. They have been dealt a bad hand with that regime. The third point you made concerning misinspection and disinformation, you are exactly right. The Iraqi regime is enor- mously skillful. They make the United States and our friends and allies around the world look like rank amateurs in terms of manip- ulating the press. We are already seeing movements of military ca- pabilities into close proximity of hospitals, schools, mosques to be prepared in the event that the United States were to do something 122 so that they could then, either on the one hand hope that those tar- gets not be hit, and if they are hit, use disinformation about the damage that has taken place. They have used human shields on any number of occasions where they take prisoners and use them in the front as shields. And your last point is the problem. It is that nexus between ter- rorist networks, sleeper cells which exist around the world today, the openness of our country and other free people and therefore our vulnerability at the hands of those kinds of weapons. Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Secretary, you have said it as well as I have heard it said this morning, and I thank you for that service that you have done, but I think it needs to be said by a lot of us as often as possible. The notion that there needs to be Iraqi conduct—fur- ther Iraqi conduct to justify the conclusion that this is a risk with which we can no longer live is wrong. The capacity to enable such conduct by someone else is the risk that we face, and this idea somehow that the charade of governmental cooperation with weap- ons destruction is good enough I find to be a very dangerous mis- conception. I thank you for your time. Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you, sir. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Mrs. Wilson. Mrs. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did want to under- score, Mr. Secretary, something my colleague Mr. Snyder said and the need for clarity when the time comes for that clarity. I under- stand the collage that you and the President and the administra- tion face of laying out now what the threat is, what the challenge is, what the evidence is, building support for addressing that, building the coalition and putting it together and the support in the Congress, but at some point there will be a time for clarity, particularly because I believe that our political objectives should drive our military strategy and our military strategy will drive our forces and so forth. And I hear differing objectives, and maybe they are all part of this, but I think that there will come a time when there will need to be that clarity of objectives, whether it is stop- ping Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction or enforce- ment of the U.N. sanctions or a regime change. All of those objec- tives will require very different military strategies. They will have different risks and different probabilities for success, and at the ap- propriate point I hope we will hear exactly what the President wants, what the objective is with respect to Iraq. I did have some questions, probably principally for you, General, about our readiness to move forward. We have heard reports that the Army's 10 divisions are at low levels of readiness. They have been rotating in and out of different missions over the last year. Our U.S. fighters, reconnaissance and refueling capability and command and control are also not nec- essarily at high rates of readiness. Could you comment on that and how long and how you are going about getting them up to speed for what may be a new operation? General MYERS. You bet. Over the last several years, as you well understand, because Congress has been such a big part of it, there have been many resources put into the readiness equation, and that continues again in 2002. Part of that was in the 2002 supple- 123 mental. So, our forces, our Army divisions, our carrier battle groups, our wings, our Marine expeditionary forces, they are in a very high state of readiness, and they are ready for—again, for whatever they might be asked to do. Obviously, there are some resources that we just don't have enough of, and again, some of those have been addressed by Con- gress. Some of our intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. We know some issues we had with our tanker fleet. But taking all that into consideration—and we do, and we have to prioritize today. We had to prioritize it at peacetime. We had to prioritize, like I said, today in our war on terrorism. We are going to have to prioritize it in any future operation. Some of those issues have been ad- dressed by Congress. We have added more airplanes, more P-3s for the Navy, EP—3s. We have added more RC-135s. We have added some training and simulation capability to help mitigate the im- pact on the operational assets, but we are still going to have to prioritize those and work those very hard. Having said that, I will go back to my original statement. The units in our armed forces are prepared for whatever is asked of them, and their state of readiness right now is quite good. Mrs. WILSON. General, I get kind of that same answer of we will do what we are told to do; by God, we will go do it. At the same time I also get conflicting information about, yeah, we have done 20,000 sorties over the United States and there is a lot of flying hours but not necessarily the combat hours and the bomb-dropping hours and the hours for the guys in back of AWACS doing inter- cepts to keep their skills up. And I wonder if you could comment a little on that. General MYERS. Well, those are all valid comments, and I under- stand those in particular because I used to do that mission. Having said that, we have forces for the defense of this country. The air defense forces. We have other forces that are committed to deploy, and, again, without getting into a lot of detail here, I think we are ready—we are trying to mitigate that. That is what I talked about earlier. What we have to try to find is a rhythm that we can get into that mitigates those kind of impacts and ensures that our peo- ple are ready. For instance, in the Balkans, most of the forces going into the Balkans in the future will be from the reserve component. So, the active duty forces will be ready for other tasks perhaps, and that is a conscious decision. As you know, we have tried to mitigate the impact on our air defense here in the United States, and again, without going into a great deal of war-level detail, we have tried to reduce the times when we ask the AWACS to be present. And we have supplemented land-based radars with other radars to try to make up for that capability. So we are trying to take steps across the spectrum to ensure that we don’t run any particular as- pect of our force into the ground. Having said that, we have some forces that are working very, very hard, absolutely. Mrs. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from Con- necticut, Mr. Larson. 124 Mr. LARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me add to the chorus of those who have congratulated you both for your outstand- ing service, and Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, especially ‘.your moving and fitting tribute last week at the Pentagon, as Well. Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you. Mr. LARSON. My question, I think as Mo Udall said, most of what needs to be said has been said; it is just another one that has said it. But moving forward, we distinguish ourselves from other na- tions by the rule of law, and obviously the case that has been made by the President from in front of the United Nations I think war- rants us taking Saddam Hussein to the court of law and trying him as a war criminal. I would like to know your feelings about that. Second, General Myers, I am recently back from the Middle East as well, and having been to Incirlik and Prince Sultan and to Doha in Qatar, again, the men and women who were in the uniform in this country are outstanding, well equipped, well trained, a credit to this Nation. But one thing that came up in our discussions was the need for us to get out the humanitarian story about this Nation and all the things that we have been doing, and particularly, we talked about maybe even the need to embrace al-Jazeera and those in terms of the ongoing things that we are doing in a very positive nature. If you could comment on that. And my third and probably most poignant and salient question from my standpoint is this whole idea of the war on terrorism. We have been saying from the outset that we have got to dry up re- sources. And when you look at Saddam Hussein, it becomes clear to me that the great enabler for Saddam Hussein is oil. It becomes clear to, I think, many of us, some from different perspectives than others, that in order for us to ultimately be tactically successful, when you look at the very nations and those who have gotten around sanctions from what I have read and from what we have heard in committee, it has been that they have end-run the sanc- tions in their desire to get control of oil. And whether that is France, whether that is Russia, whether that is China, whether that is multinational corporations, at the end of the day it is all about oil. My question, then, is if in fact the President deems that with the Sword of Damocles hanging over the head and creating this regime change that has been sought in 1998 and is being pressed forward today, who will and what strategies—who will—once we take over Iraq, who will control oil in Iraq.” Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I will take a couple here real quickly. The subject of war crimes of course is something that has been dis- cussed. I don't know that there has been a resolution within the administration. With respect to the situation in Iraq and the fact that sanctions haven’t worked well, I think historically they tend not to work over time. They get relaxed. The borders are quite po- rous. There is an awful lot of military equipment that flows back and forth across Iraq's borders. And you are quite right, the money comes from oil. They have that capability. The answer is that, with respect to the last part, the President has obviously not made a decision. Those issues are not fully re- solved, but there is no question but that the circumstance of Iraq 125 were the regime to be changed would be that they do have reve- nues from oils, and it would be managed by whatever government, temporary in the first instance and permanent thereafter, would exist. And— Mr. LARSON. Could those revenues be used to pay for the human- itarian effort in the rebuilding of Afghanistan and actually getting the money directed at the people that have been denied that money from the outset? Secretary RUMSFELD. You would certainly think so and— Mr. LARSON. And that is the kind of thing that I think should be clarified. Secretary RUMSFELD. Absolutely, and needless to say, they wouldn't be being spent on weapons of mass destruction and con- ventional capabilities to threaten their neighbors. That is where that revenue is going right now, the oil revenues. It is going for things that are in direct violation of the U.N. resolutions. With respect to the humanitarian assistance, you might just Want to comment. General MYERS. You bet. I think first, we can do a better job of talking about what we have done in the humanitarian area. If you take Afghanistan, it was just after we started the conflict there that we had C-17s flying over the country dropping humanitarian rations. Now, these were not routine missions. We had F-15s and F-16s with them to protect them against the potential ground threat. They would slow down to a very slow air speed, making them very vulnerable to ground fire if they were to be engaged. So, I mean, it was not done without some risk, but it was thought to be so important to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe that we did that. And that is always part of any planning of any military oper- ations. That continues in Afghanistan today, as you are well aware, with humanitarian, civil affairs projects, trying to make the life better for the Afghan people. Have we communicated that perfectly? Probably not, and we need to do a lot better job of that. I totally agree with you. Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman, and the gentlelady from Vir- ginia, Mrs. Davis. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Mr. Secretary, I think we all know the war on Afghanistan, we couldn’t have done it without the car- riers out there, and that is—I have two questions. One is when can we expect to see the public release of the Defense Science Board study on the CVNX? I think it was due last March, and as of yet I don’t have any information that it has been released, and I would like the opportunity to review that. My biggest question to you is at the beginning of your statement you said, “Iraq is part of the war on terror.” Then later on you said, “Our job is to connect the dots before the fact.” I have heard a lot of testimony about Iraq being somehow involved as terrorists or in the war on terror. Could you give me any specifics to tie them to i. war on terror right now so that I can connect the dots back Ome: h Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I don't know what you can do back OIIle. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. With my constituents. 126 Secretary RUMSFELD. It is not clear to me what is public. There is no question but that there are—that Iraq has been listed as a terrorist state for many years. Iraq has engaged in terrorist acts. Iraq has—is currently offering rewards to the families of children who do the suicide bombings. I think it is 20–$25,000 per family. There are currently al Qaeda in Iraq. There are other terrorist groups in Iraq. The connection it seems to me, however, ought to be looked at slightly differently. There is no question but the Intelligence Com- munity can give you a good deal of detail if one is looking for it, and they would be happy to do so. But I don't know that. It seems to me the critical point is the one that Mr. Andrews raised, and it is that nexus between a coun- try that is actively developing weapons of mass destruction that is known as a terrorist state and the use of those weapons, whether by them or through a proxy terrorist network, and it is that that has changed the equation in the world in this 21st century. So even if they did not have terrorist connections, which indeed they do, the potential they have to use terrorist networks to dispense weapons of mass destruction is what is qualitatively different in our current circumstance. General MYERS. Could I add one thing? It is probably obvious, but I think it bears repeating, and that is, as you know, in Afghan- istan as we would recover documents from al Qaeda and equip- ment, it left no doubt of their quest for weapons of mass destruc- tion. I mean, there is absolutely no doubt that they have tried to make them. They have manuals on how to use them, how to dis- perse them, and it goes back to that nexus again. And I would say for one of the threats we are facing, al Qaeda, that they clearly— there is no doubt in anybody's mind that they want weapons of mass destruction and would use them. Secretary RUMSFELD. I will look into the Defense Science Board for you. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, gentlemen. Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, may I just make one com- ment to Congressman Kirk? Mr. HUNTER. Absolutely. Secretary RUMSFELD. Someone checked, and the answer is that today is September 18th, and this says that on September 17th, Operation Northern Watch aircraft reported receiving fire on three occasions at: 3:14, at 3:20 and at 3:30 a.m. eastern standard time on the 17th. Mr. KIRK. So after the arrival of letter, Iraqi armed forces fired on coalition aircraft implementing a U.N. resolution? Secretary RUMSFELD. I don't know what time the letter was de- livered. I do know what time we were fired on. Mr. KIRK. Thank you. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlemen, gentlewoman. Maybe the air defense folks in Iraq were at the Dairy Queen when the letter was sent out. They never got the word. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis. 127 Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Secretary, General Myers, for being here and for spending so much time. I appreciate it. I think the issue that you raised at the beginning of your testi- mony and my colleague has just mentioned it as well, I think the public is having difficulty connecting the dots with the war against terrorism, and in fact, what I hear in my district is that we haven’t completed that war yet. And knowing the effort that still has to be made in Afghanistan, I guess I would ask, you know, does it sur- prise you that people are concerned about that, and how do you ex- pect that we can continue to make that case if in fact you think that that is an important case to be made? And the other issue that I wanted to raise was the question that is being asked of me is basically what will this war look like? I think that the American people are used to fairly antiseptic wars, and yet we know that given the situation that you have talked about, if in fact the weapon of mass destruction and biological and chemical weapons are mobile, that they are underground, that we have even said that the inspectors would never find them, you know, then how do we address them in a war against the weapons of mass destruction rather than the people of Iraq2 Can you speak to this without obviously speaking in a classified fashion? Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you. Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. How can I answer my constituents on those issues? Secretary RUMSFELD. Sure. It is interesting. I noted that the Iraqi Liberation Act passed the House in 1998 by a vote of 360 to 38, I am told, just overwhelming; you know, 10 times the support. What has taken place since that act has passed has been nothing good and all bad. My guess is that these—first of all, it is—it ought not to be surprising—it is not surprising to me—and I don’t think it ought to be surprising that these are tough issues, that we are in a new security environment as a country, that it is important that the public engage these issues and think about them and dis- cuss them and analyze them, because they are enormously impor- tant questions, and we have seen a shift in how one defends one's self and it is just plain different today. And the American people will understand that as they think about it, and I think they have understood it, and increasingly. What would war look like? You are right. You are not going to deal from the air with weapons of mass destruction. That is to say, if the President and the Congress and the country and the world decided that something needed to be done and Iraq was uncoopera- tive, continued to be uncooperative, the idea that you could address their weapon of mass destruction capability from the air is just fac- tually not true. It would take deep penetrators, and it would re- quire capabilities that would not be pleasant to have to use. That means you would have to address the problem from the ground, and what it would look like and how long it would last is not knowable, but it is a country that has probably got military ca- pabilities, something like 40 percent of what it had 10 years ago, and ours are much more lethal. And it has got a population that is held hostage and is not enamored of the government, and it has a military that has a pattern of recognizing that it is better off not 128 fighting for terribly long. And yet, nonetheless, anyone who thinks it is easy or clean or antiseptic is wrong. It is a terribly difficult, dangerous business. Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Can you conceive of a situation where we really would not necessarily need to dismantle the under- ground network of weapons that they may have? Because I think the issue has been raised whether it is regime change or whether it is the disarmament, and in fact we may never be able to get to all the weapons of mass destruction. Secretary RUMSFELD. Oh, it is doable if the regime wanted to co- operate, it is imminently doable. I mean, there are people there who know where they are. There are people who are—if the regime said, look, enough of this nonsense, invading our neighbors and de- veloping nuclear and chemical and biological weapons and threat- ening the regimes of neighboring states, threatening public officials of other governments, we are not going to do that anymore. We are going to cooperate. We are going to change. It is perfectly possible to go in there and get rid of all that stuff. It takes time. It takes— you have to do it from the ground, but it can be done. Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And Mr. Chairman, one more quick second, just whether or not we can conduct effective operations against Iraq with the help of without the help of allies in the Mid- dle East. Could we do it without their help? General MYERS. I think we have—I mean, we have addressed that in a couple previous questions, that we expect to have some help, and I think our reluctance to talk about exactly how to char- acterize that is probably for good and sufficient reason, but we would expect to have some help, matter of fact. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary, Gen- eral Myers, thank you very much for being here today. I think the testimony that you have provided has been very convincing, the facts that you have presented which have been in the American media over and over again, but thank you for reiterating that. But also, I really enjoyed the logic that you presented today in answer- ing many of the questions and concerns, and I have a unique per- spective. I, personally, am a very proud member of the Army Na- tional Guard currently, the only one serving in Congress. Addition- ally, I have three sons who are in the military in uniform, and so I have a concern and interest as a parent, but I also have faith in both of you. And I know of your devotion to those of us and our children who are in the military, and I just feel so confident with both of you in charge. It means a lot. I also want to thank you, too, for your recognition of the role of the National Guard and Reserves. We are trained. We are commit- ted. There will be no need for a national draft. Our personnel are very enthusiastic. I had the privilege of serving annual training at Fort Stewart in May and Fort Jackson in August, and I saw first- hand the active Guard and Reserve. There is a deep commitment. I also appreciated the testimony about the economic con- sequences of September the 11th, the murder of over 3,000 Amer- ican citizens in New York, in Pennsylvania, at the Pentagon, but then the economic consequence that was itemized, Mr. Secretary, 129 of $250 billion. You then identified the Dark Winter exercise, where within two months a million Americans could be killed, and this would be spread out all over the United States. Did that report indicate the economic catastrophe that would be caused by such havoc? Secretary RUMSFELD. I don’t believe it did. I think it was more done from a medical standpoint. Mr. WILSON. And the reason I bring that up is I was elected to Congress nine months ago today. My role was a real estate attor- ney prior to coming here, and I don’t think people realize that aside from the loss of life, the economic consequence of, say, the collapse of the insurance industry, and then you wouldn't be able to have loan closings everywhere in the United States, not just where the attack occurred. Mr. WILSON. And I really do appreciate the comments of my col- league from New Jersey that he raised the situation of possibly a ploy. But this is just so far-reaching. And, again, I appreciate your recognition that the challenge we have is action or inaction. Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much for your very gener- ous comments. After serving on active duty as a Navy pilot, I also served in the Reserves for a number of years, and I quite agree with your assessment. I was just passed another note that from the National Command Center that Coalition aircraft were fired on today in Operation Nºhern Watch at 4:31, 4:33, and 4:40 eastern time on September 18th. Mr. HUNTER. Another exclamation point on their commitment to abide by the U.N. resolution. Mr. WILSON. There is a new Hitler that needs to be addressed. Thank you. No further questions. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin. Mr. LANGEVIN. I too want to join my colleagues in thanking you for being here and for your testimony and the job that you are doing. It is outstanding and today's hearing I think was very help- ful in allowing us to better understand your thinking and where we are headed and what we are proceeding to do. Not so much a question but really a comment if I could, an obser- vation: I, as many of my colleagues, withhold judgment as to whether we are going to support a resolution to authorize force, and of course it would depend on what that resolution would look like and such. But I would just say from my standpoint, I have ob- served—and I speak for many of my colleagues, I believe, as well— that we have seen a marked difference in the debate both before §President went to the U.N. and after the President went to the And clearly, he is building a stronger case against Iraq and doing it in the context of bringing the international community into the debate and into any proposed action that would be taken, and I think that it is important for us to keep our moral authority in the world as the world's sole remaining superpower. And I would just urge you and your colleagues to continue to urge the President to continue down that path. I think it is the 130 right thing to do and ultimately we will have a better outcome and will be most effective. I thank you again for the job that you do. Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much. I am sure the Presi- dent agrees with the comments you have made. Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, and thank you for having the endurance you have had, you and General Myers, to go throughout the entire committee. I think this has been worthwhile to listen to you and discuss this with you. Let me throw out one thing that is of concern. We are going to have a hearing tomorrow on the technological capability of Iraq and how it has been enhanced by illegal and in some cases, legal means by technology transfer from the West, including sadly, in some cases from the United States. Do you have any thoughts on how we–and this is a situation that recurs throughout the world, not just Iraq–but how we as the leaders of the Western World should attempt to stem this flow of technology which at some point may be used to kill our own uni- formed people on the battlefield? Secretary RUMSFELD. History suggests that it is a very difficult thing to do, that people—immediately after a tragedy, people step forth in other countries and agree to a set of sanctions, that let's prevent this hostile nation from having these capabilities. And so they end up with counterproliferation activities and consultations and meetings and a list of things that should be prohibited. But over time as things relax, we find that someone wants to cut a corner and someone wants to sell something they should not be selling. You are exactly right. You are going to have a very full hearing tomorrow because there is a great many things that are moving into that country that are increasing Iraq's military capa- bility every day. They are buying dump trucks, taking the tops off and putting artillery pieces on them. They are buying transporters that are too narrow for a tank and then expanding them 6, 8, 10, 12 inches so that they are perfectly capable of carrying a tank. It is a reality that for a period, the capability of Iraq after Desert Storm dropped, and it is also a reality that some recent years be- cause of dual use technologies, because of general relaxation of ten- sions, that they are able to go forward and have these capabilities. One thing that it seems to me is important is that in the event that a decision is made to use force with respect to Iraq, the United States will want to know from other countries what it is they have been selling Iraq that can be used militarily so we can know some of the kinds of technological capabilities that they may have that we may not know. And I know for a fact that before Desert Storm, some consultations were made by the United States to other coun- tries to try to determine if they had sold things to Iraq that could impose a dangerous threat that the United States was not aware of, and the answer was “yes,” and they were able to find out that information and save lives because of that information. So you can be certain we will be interested to know what coun- tries have been doing with Iraq. Mr. HUNTER. And Mr. Secretary, with respect to the Export Ad- ministration Act, which is often discussed and which we may see very shortly in terms of coming to the House floor, this committee has always stood very firmly on the side of having intensive review 131 and monitoring by your shop, by DOD, on the basis that the people that know what military potential is with respect to certain items is the military, not necessarily people in the Department of Com- ImlerCe. And I would hope that you would stand with us in ensuring that we have in our—in any Export Administration Act that is passed, that we have a strong DOD monitoring of American products and American technology. I hope you would stand with us on that point. Secretary RUMSFELD. I would have to see what proposals are made. I just do not know. But there is no question but that what a DOD role tends to be helpful in those deliberations. Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. General Myers? General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, if I may, can I go back a couple of hours to a comment, maybe it was an hour and a half ago, that Mr. Ortiz made? It had to do with the eagerness or reluctance of using force. And I would just like to say I don’t think there is any- one that considers the use of force seriously that is not reluctant to use force for the simple reason that Mr. Wilson said, “It puts our sons and our daughters at risk. On the other hand, if our Nation's freedom is at stake, which I think in this war on terrorism it clear- ly is, then I don’t think any of the folks that we are serving today are the least bit reluctant to risk their lives for our freedom.” And I just—it is not a question of being eager. I think everybody is reluctant for the reasons I said. But the threat here is very, very Ser1011S. Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much, General. I think that the committee would concur with that. And so thank you, again, Mr. Secretary, General Myers, for a very thorough analysis and discussion of this problem that is fore- most in the Nation's mind today. Appreciate it. And you know one thing the President said, we have talked about the President send- ing messages. Kofi Annan said that President Bush's speech galva- nized the world community to focus on Iraq and to bring some force to bear, and I think that is a good description of the American lead- ership that not only he has shown but that you have shown in the last several weeks. So we appreciate that, and we look forward to working with you. And this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X SEPTEMBER 18, 2002 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD SEPTEMBER 18, 2002 OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. DUNCAN HUNTER HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ September 18, 2002 Today, the Committee on Armed Services continues its review of United States policy toward Iraq. This morning’s hearing marks the second of a number of planned public sessions designed to educate and inform the Committee, and the American people, on the various issues surrounding Iraq’s continued violation of numerous United Nation’s resolutions, its illicit development of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States, the Middle East, and the international community. Last week, the Committee received a classified briefing from the CIA and DIA. We also heard from former, senior UNSCOM inspectors about Iraq’s illicit weapons programs, and Saddam Hussein’s persistent efforts to thwart the efforts of the U.N. inspectors so that he might preserve, and advance, his weapons of mass destruction programs. Tomorrow, the Armed Services Committee will hear how the Iraqis built and sustained their weapons of mass destruction programs (137) 138 through the legal, and illegal, acquisition of Western technology, and how the United States’ own export control system may have contributed to the problems we are now facing with Iraq. We also continue to plan further hearings for the coming weeks that will examine in greater detail the various aspects of the policy options before us. Today, however, we are honored to have Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld before the Committee to discuss U.S. policy toward Iraq. He is the first cabinet-level official to appear on the Hill regarding Iraq, so we are all anxious to discuss these matters with him today. Secretary Rumsfeld is joined by General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Welcome gentlemen. Mr. Secretary, before we ask you for your opening remarks, I want to invite Mr. Skelton, the Ranking Democrat on the committee, to offer any comments he might have. Thank you Mr.Skelton. Secretary Rumsfeld, the floor is yours. 139 Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO), Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives Full Committee Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward Iraq September 18, 2002 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers for being with us today to answer the many questions shared by our colleagues and the American people. This is a critical time for us to be considering U.S. action against Iraq. President Bush has made clear to the Congress, the United Nations, and the American people his determination to remove Saddam Hussein from power and to neutralize the threat posed by the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program. I applaud his realization that the threat posed by Saddam is one that faces the United Nations as a whole. I think we all agree that Saddam is a despot who has violated the Security Council’s resolutions for years. But having recognized the central role of the United Nations, we must take seriously its collective judgment about how to enforce these resolutions. I am not suggesting that Congress will or should only consider an option fully supported by the United Nations, but the administration must be able to answer fundamental questions about any decision to use force. Why must action be taken now? What is the threshold beyond which the United States can no longer wait for Iraqi 140 compliance with Security Council resolutions or for U.N. action in the face of Iraqi defiance? Beyond the decision to act with or without the United Nations, I have wrestled with a series of questions which I have shared with the President. Exercising our constitutional responsibilities requires Congress to take into account not only these near-term considerations of HOW to act, but also the longer-term implications for U.S. security interests globally of using military force against Iraq. Some of these questions have to do with waging the broader war on terrorism. How will the United States ensure that we continue to have international support for our efforts against al Qaeda, even if the administration seeks military action without Security Council approval? Do we have the forces, fiscal resources, munitions, and other military capabilities to wage both campaigns effectively? How is the United States preparing to deal with likely Iraqi efforts to draw Israel into the conflict by launching missiles, possibly with chemical or biological warheads? What type of planning is going into succeeding in sustained urban operations or on a battlefield made toxic by chemical weapons? As members of the Armed Services Committee, we all share the commitment to making sure that our troops can succeed on the battlefield at the lowest possible level of risk if we decide to put them in harm’s way. 141 In considering the long-term aspects of the question to use force, I am reminded of Carl von Clausewitz's maxim in On War: that in strategy it is “imperative...not to take the first step without considering the last.” We must think through carefully and NOW-before we authorize military force—how the United States would manage Iraq after Saddam fell. Planning for the occupation of Germany and Japan took years before the end of World War II. In today’s dynamic battlefield, we don’t have the luxury of years to prepare. How can we build a stable and democratic Iraq that takes all major groups—Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd—into account? How will we handle members of the Baath party and those scientists and engineers that designed Iraq’s WMD programs? What military commitment will be required from the United States at the time of our victory and in the years to come? Any decision to act against Iraq must begin with answers to these questions about the strategy for achieving victory and long-term responsibilities that come with doing so. With answers to these questions, I will look forward to supporting the President and in helping to craft a congressional authorization to do so. I thank both witnesses for being with us today, for sharing their expertise and hopefully for providing answers to the questions I have outlined. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 143 I welcome the opportunity to share with you the nature of the threat that the Iraqi regime presents to the United States, our forces and our allies, I also welcome this chance to share with you what you the improved capabilities our Armed Forces possess today. Iraq. Today As it has for the past decade, the Iraqi regime remains a significant threat to our interests and those of our allies. Despite the presence of UN sanctions, Iraq has repaired and sustained key elements of its offensive, conventional forces. Iraqi armed forces maintain over 2,000 main battle tanks, more than 3,500 armored personnel carriers and more than 2,000 pieces of artillery. Today, Iraqi ground forces have 23 divisions, to include 6 Republican Guard divisions. Its Air Force operates over 50 key air defense radars and has about 300 jet aircraft, to include a limited number of Mirage F-1s and MiG-29 Fulcrum aircraft. Since 2000, Iraq's air defense forces have engaged coalition forces enforcing the UN mandated No-Fly Zones over Northern and Southern Iraq more than 2,300 times. Since August of 2001, Iraqi hostile actions have downed 3 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. In the last 2 weeks, over 25 coalition aircraft enforcing the No-Fly Zones have been engaged by Iraqi anti-aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. Despite these hostile actions, in the aggregate, the regime's military forces are down by roughly 50 to 60 percent, compared to 1990. Poor morale is reportedly widespread in many units and the quality of training is low. Iraqi forces employ aging weapon systems. Nonetheless, Iraq continues to invest heavily in rebuilding its military, including air defense systems and command and control networks. The Iraqi army also has preserved some limited country- wide mobility for its armored forces. The nature and type of these military forces are similar to the offensive capability Iraq used to invade Iran, to invade Kuwait, to attack the Kurds, and to crush popular uprisings against Saddam's regime. At the same time, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program represents a greater threat to American lives, our interests and those of our allies and friends. When UN inspection teams were forced to leave Iraq in 1998, they documented that Iraq had failed to fulfill UN disarmament mandates and to accurately account for its most dangerous weapons. In response to ejecting those inspectors, the US and our coalition partners conducted Operation DESERT FOX in December 1998. In 70 hours, the coalition dealt a limited blow to Iraq's WMD and missile programs. At the time, we estimated that we set back its programs by six months to a year. In the four years since, Iraq has continued to develop chemical weapons, primarily mustard agent, the nerve agent Sarin, and VX – an extremely potent nerve 144 agent. Prior to 1991, Iraq produced at least 28,000 filled chemical munitions and almost certainly many more. Iraq has also invested heavily into developing biological agents. After years of denying it had any offensive biological weapons, in 1995, the Iraqi regime admitted to the UN that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of concentrated biological warfare agents. To put in comparison, a year ago, trace amounts of anthrax infected 22 persons in the US and killed 5 Americans. UNSCOM estimated that Iraqi officials were misleading and that Baghdad could have produced 2-4 times more agents. Moreover, the UN was unable to account for nearly 200 biological bombs and missile warheads Iraq claims it destroyed in 1991. Iraq retains the ability to deliver these chemical and biological weapons with aircraft, artillery shells or missiles. Two years ago, it displayed an array of new missiles and has begun fielding them with its military forces this year. These weapons, known as the Al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles, violate UN resolutions because they are capable of reaching beyond the 150-kilometer range limit imposed on Iraqi missiles and rockets. With regards to nuclear weapons, Iraq continues to vigorously pursue this capability. In 2000, the International Atomic Energy Agency estimated that Iraq could have a nuclear weapon within two years. We do not know definitively how long it will be until it creates an operational nuclear capability. With foreign assistance, Iraq could have such a weapon in a few years or much sooner if it is able to obtain sufficient fissile materials from a foreign source. But, we know, without any doubt, that Iraq values these clandestine programs. Iraq has developed elaborate deception and dispersal efforts aimed at preventing us and the rest of the world from learning about its WMD capabilities. As a result, we do not know the exact location of many of Iraq's WMD resources. We also know that Iraq has demonstrated a willingness to use such indiscriminate weapons. The regime has used WMD against the citizens of Iraq and Iran. It has used SCUD missiles against cities in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and tried to hit Bahrain. In fact, Iraq has used weapons of mass destruction more against civilians than against military forces. The Iraqi regime has also allowed its country to be a haven for terrorists. Since the 1970s, organizations such as the Abu Nidal Organization, Palestinian Liberation Front and Mujahadeen-e-Khalq have found sanctuary within Iraq's borders. Over the past few months, with the demise of their safe haven in Afghanistan, some al Qaida operatives have relocated to Iraq. Baghdad's support for international terrorist organizations ranges from explicit and overt support to implicit and passive acquiescence. 145 Iraq is governed by a terrorist regime. From a military perspective, Iraq's conventional forces and WMD programs represent a threat to the region, our allies and US interests. US Military Capabilities Today Our Nation's military forces enjoy the respect of the vast majority of countries and their armed forces. This respect stems from our forces' professional skills, superior intelligence assets, agile power projection capability, unique C2 networks and the lethal combat power that our Joint Team brings to the fight. As we have done in DESERT STORM, in Bosnia, in Kosovo and most recently in Afghanistan, our armed forces are always ready to integrate the military capabilities of our allies and partners into a decidedly superior, coalition force. In a contest between Iraq's military forces and our Nation's armed forces, the outcome is clear. Our joint warfighting team, in concert with our partners, can and will decisively defeat Iraqi military forces. Many will remember the results of the last encounter between our coalition forces and Iraq eleven years ago. Since then, US combat power has improved. Today, our nation's joint warfighting team enjoys improved intelligence, command and control, is more deployable and possesses greater combat power. Let me briefly address each of these areas. In terms of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability, our operations over Afghanistan demonstrated our improved ability to observe the enemy. Our network of sensors, combined with the improved flow of tactical information to commanders and warfighters at all levels, have allowed us to react faster to a fluid battlefield environment. In DESERT STORM, our only unmanned aerial vehicle, the Pioneer, was limited to a 5-hour sortie and restricted to line-of-sight from its command center. Today, Predator and Global Hawk provide our forces day and night surveillance capability for extended periods of time far over the horizon. In a similar manner, our warfighters have more updated intelligence for their mission. In DESERT STORM, pilots used target photos that were often 2–3 days old. Determining accurate coordinates often required 24 hours and was done exclusively in the rear echelon in the United States. This process was good, but not as responsive as it needed to be. Today, our aircrews have photos that are often only hours old and can determine coordinates for precision engagement in just 20 minutes. A critical component of the information needed by our warfighting commanders is to monitor and detect the presence of chemical and biological agents in the tactical environment. Today, our forces have an improved ability to detect suspected Iraqi chemical and biological agents. 146 Our command and control systems have also improved. Today, US Army ground commanders have vastly improved capabilities for tracking the real- time locations of their tactical units. Our air operations have undergone an improved ability to track key enemy forces, friendly units and to obtain faster assessment of the effects of our attacks. The Joint Force Air Component Commander in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM repeatedly demonstrated the ability to re-task all aircraft while airborne and strike emerging targets quickly, in some cases in as little as two hours. Also, our Maritime Component Commanders can now plan a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile mission in a matter of a few hours, when a decade ago it required at least two days. The Nation's ability to get to a crisis, with the right forces, to execute operations on our timeline, has improved over the past decade. With the strong support of the Congress, we invested in our deployment infrastructure and equipment to allow operational units to deploy faster and arrive better configured to fight. Since 1991, Congressional support of strategic power projection capabilities such as the C-17 aircraft, Large-Medium Speed Roll-On / Roll-Off (LMSR) ship program and both afloat and ground based, pre- positioned combat unit sets, contribute significantly to our combat capability. Additionally, we continue to work with the Nation's medical experts at the Health and Human Services Department to ensure every member of our armed forces will be fully prepared medically with immunizations against potential biological threats. This September, we resumed immunizations against anthrax for military personnel in select units. These improvements allow our Nation's military to gather intelligence, plan operations, deploy, and execute combat missions much faster than 11 years ago. These improvements ensure that we have a faster decision cycle than our opponent. These enhancements equate to flexibility and agility in combat, which directly translates into a superior force. Equally dramatic has been our improvement in the combat power of our forces. In DESERT STORM, only 18 percent of our force had the ability to employ laser guided bombs (LGBs). Of the more than 200,000 bombs employed, only 4 percent were LGBs. Today, all of our fixed-wing combat aircraft have a range of precision attack capability. In addition, all of our bombers and 5 of our 7 primary air-to-ground fighter weapon systems have all-weather precision attack capability with the Joint Direct Attack Munition. The results of these enhancements are measured in numerous ways. For example, on the first night of our combat operations in Afghanistan, we employed 38 fighter and bomber aircraft to attack 159 separate targets. All aircraft employed precision weapons. Had we relied on a DESERT STORM equipped force, we would have needed roughly 450 aircraft to gain the same level of destruction. In DESERT STORM, we could not have afforded this size 147 force against so few targets. So in 1991, we used selected precision weapons from F-111s, F-117s and A-6s on key targets that had to be destroyed. On the rest of the targets, we accepted a lower degree of damage. And, in 1991, our attacks required good weather between the aircraft and its target. In Afghanistan, weather was often not a major factor. The combat power of our Army and Marine forces has improved as well. We have significantly improved the quality and quantity of Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) with wide-area and GPS aided missiles. Our Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) has significantly improved its fire rate. Our M-1 tanks continue to have the ability to identify and destroy an Iraqi T-72 tank at twice the range that it can identify and fire at our tanks. Our Bradley Fighting Vehicles, equipped with upgraded fire control systems, now have the ability to fire accurately while on the move. The addition of the LONGBOW to Apache helicopter units has given those forces the ability to destroy twice as many enemy vehicles in roughly half the time—with improved survivability. Finally, some of our soldiers and Marines now have the JAVELIN fire-and-forget anti- tank system that adds a dramatic new weapon to their fight. Today, we have made similar improvements to virtually all aspects of our joint team. Through tough, realistic training, our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen are a ready, capable fighting force. Individually, these improvements are significant. Combined, they reflect an improved joint warfighting team. We still have much to do in regards to fully transforming our forces for the 21st Century, but there should be no doubt that, if called upon, our Armed Forces will prevail in any conflict. Our armed forces are capable of carrying out our defense strategy. We do have sufficient capability to conduct effective operations against Iraq while maintaining other aspects of the War on Terrorism, protecting the US homeland and keeping our commitments in other regions of the world. Our on-going operations require approximately 15 to 20 percent of our major combat units, such as carriers, fighter and bomber aircraft, and heavy and light Army divisions. The chart below reflects the major combat forces currently deployed to operations or committed overseas. 148 There are some unique units that are in high demand. Such capabilities mainly involve command and control assets, intelligence platforms, Special Operations Forces, Combat Rescue Forces and similar select units. Mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces has been key to mitigating the current stress on some of these units. If our operations on the war on terrorism are expanded, we will be required to prioritize the employment of these enabling units. In this regard, our coalition partners may facilitate our combined operations by having similar units or forces. Where possible, we will leverage the best available capability to the mission required. We also have sufficient resources to logistically support our combat operations. For example, our current stockpile of precision weapons has been increased in recent months, due to the solid support of Congress and the tremendous potential of our nation's industrial base. Along with the significant improvements in deployability I mentioned earlier, we continue to exploit the best of logistics information technologies to ensure we know what the combat commander in the field needs, where those supplies are located world-wide, and to track those supplies from the factory or depot to the troops at the front. Our military planning will include operations to facilitate humanitarian assistance and civil affairs. Our efforts in Afghanistan have demonstrated that these efforts can be as important as conventional operations on the battlefield.. Our ability to accomplish our current missions is predicated on the availability of funds for current operations. To continue Operation NOBLE EAGLE and to prosecute the War on Terrorism into FY03, it is imperative that our armed forces have access to the full $10 billion War Operational Contingency Reserve Fund that is part of the FY03 Defense Budget Request. Moreover, it is vital that these funds be made available strictly for warfighting as requested, so that our forces will have the maximum flexibility to react to dynamic operational requirements and to address emerging needs, as they arise. Conclusion For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs and I are confident that we can accomplish whatever mission the President asks of our Armed Forces. We are prepared to operate with our coalition partners. As before, we will be prepared to operate in a chemical or biological environment. Every day, our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen have dedicated their lives and their professional skill to protect American lives and our interests worldwide. The men and women wearing the uniform of our Nation have translated the technologies I described into combat power that will allow us to protect Nation and interests. With the support of the American public and Congress, we will prevail in any conflict. 149 PREPARED TESTIMONY BY U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON IRAO SEPTEMBER 18, 2002 Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today. Last week, we commemorated the one-year anniversary of the most devastating attack our nation has ever experienced—more than 3,000 innocent people killed in a single day. Today, I want to discuss the task of preventing even more devastating attacks— attacks that could kill not thousands, but potentially tens of thousands of our fellow citizens. As we meet, state sponsors of terror across the world are working to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction. As we speak, chemists, biologists, and nuclear scientists are toiling in weapons labs and underground bunkers, working to give the world's most dangerous dictators weapons of unprecedented power and lethality. The threat posed by those regimes is real. It is dangerous. And it is growing with each passing day. We cannot wish it away. We have entered a new security environment, one that is dramatically different than the one we grew accustomed to over the past half-century. We have entered a world in which terrorist movements and terrorists states are developing the capacity to cause unprecedented destruction. Today, our margin of error is notably different. In the 20" century, we were dealing, for the most part, with conventional weapons—weapons that could kill hundreds or thousands of people, generally combatants. In the 21* century, we are dealing with weapons of mass destruction that can kill potentially tens of thousands of people—innocent men, women and children. Further, because of the nature of these new threats, we are in an age of little or no warning, when threats can emerge suddenly—at any place or time—to surprise us. Terrorist states have enormous appetite for these powerful weapons—and active programs to develop them. They are finding ways to gain access to these capabilities. This is not a possibility—it is a certainty. In word and deed, they have demonstrated a willingness to use those capabilities. 150 Moreover, after September 11", they have discovered a new means of delivering these weapons—terrorist networks. To the extent that they might transfer WMD to terrorist groups, they could conceal their responsibility for attacks. And if they believe they can conceal their responsibility for an attack, then they would likely not be deterred. We are on notice. Let there be no doubt: an attack will be attempted. The only question is when and by what technique. It could be months, a year, or several years. But it will happen. It is in our future. Each of us needs to pause, and think about that for a moment—about what it would mean for our country, for our families—and indeed for the world. lf the worst were to happen, not one of us here today will be able to honestly say it was a surprise. Because it will not be a surprise. We have connected the dots as much as it is humanly possible -- before the fact. Only by waiting until after the event could we have proof positive. The dots are there for all to see. The dots are there for all to connect. If they aren't good enough, rest assured they will only be good enough after another disaster—a disaster of still greater proportions. And by then it will be too late. The question facing us is this: what is the responsible course of action for our country? Do you believe it is our responsibility to wait for a nuclear, chemical or biological 9/11? Or is it the responsibility of free people to do something now—to take steps to deal with the threat before we are attacked? The President has made his position clear: the one thing that is not an option is doing nothing. There are a number of terrorist states pursuing weapons of mass destruction—Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, to name but a few. But no terrorist state poses a greater and more immediate threat to the security of our people, and the stability of the world, than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. No living dictator has shown the murderous combination of intent and capability -- of aggression against his neighbors; oppression of his own people; genocide; support of terrorism; pursuit of weapons of mass destruction; the use of weapons of mass destruction; and the most threatening hostility to its neighbors and to the United States, than Saddam Hussein and his regime. Mr. Chairman, these facts about Saddam Hussein's regime should be part of this record and of our country's considerations: • Saddam Hussein has openly praised the attacks of September 11". 151 * Last week, on the anniversary of 9-11, his state-run press called the attacks “God’s punishment." • He has repeatedly threatened the U.S. and its allies with terror—once declaring that “every Iraqi [can] become a missile." He has ordered the use of chemical weapons—Sarin, Tabun, VX, and mustard agents—against his own people, in one case killing 5,000 innocent civilians in a single day. His regime has invaded two of its neighbors, and threatened others. • In 1980, they invaded Iran, and used chemical weapons against Iranian forces. • In 1990, they invaded Kuwait and are responsible for thousands of documented cases of torture, rape and murder of Kuwaiti civilians during their occupation. * In 1991, they were poised to march on and occupy other nations—and would have done so, had they not been stopped by the U.S. led coalition forces. His regime has launched ballistic missiles at four of their neighbors—Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. His regime plays host to terrorist networks, and has directly ordered acts of terror on foreign soil. His regime assassinates its opponents, both in Iraq and abroad, and has attempted to assassinate the former Israeli Ambassador to Great Britain, and a former U.S. President. He has executed members of their cabinet, including the Minister of Health, whom he personally shot and killed. His regime has committed genocide and ethnic cleansing in Northern Iraq, ordering the extermination of between 50,000 and 100,000 people and the destruction of over 4,000 villages. His attacks on the Kurds drove 2 million refugees into Turkey, Syria and Iran. His regime has brought the Marsh Arabs in Southern Iraq to the point of extinction, drying up the Iraqi marsh lands in order to move against their villages—one of the worst environmental crimes ever committed. His regime is responsible for catastrophic environmental damage, setting fire to over 1,100 Kuwaiti oil wells. His regime beat and tortured American POWs during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and used them as “human shields." His regime has still failed to account for hundreds of POWs, including Kuwaiti, Saudi, Indian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iranian, Egyptian, Bahraini and Omani nationals—and an American pilot shot down over Iraq during the Gulf War. His regime on almost a daily basis continues to fire missiles and artillery at U.S. and coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones in Northern and Southern Iraq, and has made clear its objective of shooting down coalition pilots enforcing UN 152 resolutions -- it is the only place in the world where U.S. forces are shot at with impunity. His regime has subjected tens of thousands of political prisoners and ordinary Iraqis to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary execution, torture, beatings, burnings, electric shocks, starvation and mutilation. He has ordered doctors to surgically remove the ears of military deserters, and the gang rape of Iraqi women, including political prisoners, the wives and daughters of their opposition and members of the regime suspected of disloyalty. His regime is actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and willing to pay a high price to get them—giving up tens of billions in oil revenue under economic sanctions by refusing inspections to preserve his WMD programs. His regime has amassed large, clandestine stockpiles of biological weapons— including anthrax and botulism toxin, and possibly smallpox. His regime has amassed large, clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons— including VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard gas. His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. * They have the knowledge of how to produce nuclear weapons, and designs for at least two different nuclear devices. * They have a team of scientists, technicians and engineers in place, as well as the infrastructure needed to build a weapon. * Very likely all they need to complete a weapon is fissile material—and they are, at this moment, seeking that material—both from foreign sources and the capability to produce it indigenously. His regime has dozens of ballistic missiles, and is working to extend their range in violation of UN restrictions. His regime is pursuing pilotless aircraft as a means of delivering chemical and biological weapons. His regime agreed after the Gulf War to give up weapons of mass destruction and submit to international inspections—then lied, cheated and hid their WMD programs for more than a decade. His regime has in place an elaborate, organized system of denial and deception to frustrate both inspectors and outside intelligence efforts. His regime has violated UN economic sanctions, using illicit oil revenues to fuel their WMD aspirations. His regime has diverted funds from the UN’s “oil for food" program—funds intended to help feed starving Iraqi civilians—to fund WMD programs. His regime violated 16 UN resolutions, repeatedly defying the will of the international community without cost or consequence. And his regime is determined to acquire the means to strike the U.S., its friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction, acquire the territory of their neighbors, and impose their control over the Persian Gulf region. 153 As the President warned the United Nations last week, “Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger." It is a danger to its neighbors, to the United States, to the Middle East, and to international peace and stability. It is a danger we do not have the option to ignore. The world has acquiesced in Saddam Hussein's aggression, abuses and defiance for more than a decade. In his UN address, the President explained why we should not allow the Iraqi regime to acquire weapons of mass destruction—and issued a challenge to the international community: to enforce the numerous resolutions the UN has passed and Saddam Hussein has defied; to show that Security Council's decisions will not to be cast aside without cost or consequence; to show that the UN is up to the challenge of dealing with a dictator like Saddam Hussein; to show that the UN is determined not to become irrelevant. President Bush has made clear that the United States wants to work with the UN Security Council to deal with the threat posed by the Iraqi regime. But he made clear the consequences of Iraq's continued defiance: “The purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced... or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power." The President has asked the Members of the House and the Senate to support the actions that may be necessary to deliver on that pledge. He urged that the Congress act before the Congressional recess. He asked that you send a clear signal—to the world community and the Iraqi regime—that our country is united in purpose and ready to act. Only certainty of U.S. and UN purposefulness can have even the prospect of affecting the Iraqi regime. It is important that Congress send that message as soon as possible—before the UN Security Council votes. The Security Council must act soon, and it is important that the U.S. Congress signal the world where the U.S. stands before the UN vote takes place. Delaying a vote in the Congress would send a message that the U.S. may be unprepared to take a stand, just as we are asking the international community to take a stand, and as Iraq will be considering its options. Delay would signal the Iraqi regime that they can continue their violations of the UN resolutions. It serves no U.S. or UN purpose to give Saddam Hussein excuses for further delay. His regime should recognize that the U.S. and the UN are purposeful. It was Congress that changed the objective of U.S. policy from containment to regime change, by the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. The President is now asking Congress to support that policy. 154 A decision to use military force is never easy. No one with any sense considers war a first choice—it is the last thing that any rational person wants to do. And it is important that the issues surrounding this decision be discussed and debated. In recent weeks, a number of questions have been surfaced by Senators, Members of Congress and former government officials. Some of the arguments raised are important. Just as there are risks in acting, so too there are risks in not acting. Those risks need to be balanced, and to do so it is critical to address a number of the issues that have been raised: Some have asked whether an attack on Iraq would disrupt and distract the U.S. from the Global War on Terror. The answer to that is: Iraq is a part of the Global War on Terror–stopping terrorist regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective of that war. We can fight all elements of this war simultaneously. Our principal goal in the war on terror is to stop another 9/11—or a WMD attack that could make 9/11 seem modest by comparison—before it happens. Whether that threat comes from a terrorist regime or a terrorist network is beside the point. Our objective is to stop them, regardless of the source. In his State of the Union address last January, President Bush made our objectives clear. He said: "by seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases the price of indifference would be catastrophic." Ultimately, history will judge us all by what we do now to deal with this danger. Another question that has been asked is this: The Administration argues Saddam Hussein poses a grave and growing danger. Where is the “smoking gun?” Mr. Chairman, the last thing we want is a smoking gun. A gun smokes after it has been fired. The goal must be to stop Saddam Hussein before he fires a weapon of mass destruction against our people. As the President told the United Nations last week, “The first time we may be completely certain he has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid, he uses one. We owe it to... our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming.” If the Congress or the world wait for a so-called “smoking gun," it is certain that we will have waited too long. But the question raises an issue that it is useful to discuss—about the kind of evidence we consider to be appropriate to act in the 21* century. 155 In our country, it has been customary to seek evidence that would prove guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" in a court of law. That approach is appropriate when the objective is to protect the rights of the accused. But in the age of WMD, the objective is not to protect the "rights" of dictators like Saddam Hussein–it is to protect the lives of our citizens. And when there is that risk, and we are trying to defend against the closed societies and shadowy networks that threaten us in the 21st century, expecting to find that standard of evidence, from thousands of miles away, and to do so before such a weapon has been used, is not realistic. And, after such weapons have been used it is too late. I suggest that any who insist on perfect evidence are back in the 20" century and still thinking in pre-9/11 terms. On September 11", we were awakened to the fact that America is now vulnerable to unprecedented destruction. That awareness ought to be sufficient to change the way we think about our security, how we defend our country—and the type of certainty and evidence we consider appropriate, In the 20" century, when we were dealing largely with conventional weapons, we could wait for perfect evidence. If we miscalculated, we could absorb an attack, recover, take a breath, mobilize, and go out and defeat our attackers. In the 21” century, that is no longer the case, unless we are willing and comfortable accepting the loss not of thousands of lives, but potentially tens of thousands of lives – a high price indeed. We have not, will not, and cannot know everything that is going on in the world. Over the years, even our best efforts, intelligence has repeatedly underestimated the weapons capabilities of a variety of countries of major concern to us. We have had numerous gaps of two, four, six or eight years between the time a country of concern first developed a WMD capability and the time we finally learned about it. We do know that the Iraqi regime has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction and is pursuing nuclear weapons; that they have a proven willingness to use the weapons at their disposal; that they have proven aspirations to seize the territory of, and threaten, their neighbors; proven support for and cooperation with terrorist networks; and proven record of declared hostility and venomous rhetoric against the United States. Those threats should be clear to all. In his UN address, the President said "we know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left?" To the contrary, knowing what we know about Iraq's history, no conclusion is possible except that they have and are accelerating their WMD programs. 156 Now, do we have perfect evidence that can tell us precisely the date Iraq will have a deliverable nuclear device, or when and where he might try to use it? That is not knowable. But it is strange that some seem to want to put the burden of proof on us—the burden of proof ought to be on him—to prove he has disarmed; to prove he no longer poses a threat to peace and security. And that he cannot do. Committees of Congress currently are asking hundreds of questions about what happened on September 11"—pouring over thousands of pages of documents, and asking who knew what, when and why they didn't prevent that tragedy. suspect, that in retrospect, most of those investigating 9/11 would have supported preventive action to pre-empt that threat, if it had been possible to see it coming. Well, if one were to compare the scraps of information the government had before September 11" to the volumes of information the government has today about Iraq’s pursuit of WMD, his use of those weapons, his record of aggression and his consistent hostility toward the United States—and then factor in our country's demonstrated vulnerability after September 11"—the case the President made should be clear. As the President said, time is not on our side. If more time passes, and the attacks we are concerned about come to pass, I would not want to have ignored all the warning signs and then be required to explain why our country failed to protect our fellow citizens. We cannot go back in time to stop the September 11" attack. But we can take actions now to prevent some future threats. Some have argued that the nuclear threat from Iraq is not imminent—that Saddam is at least 5-7 years away from having nuclear weapons. I would not be so certain. Before Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the best intelligence estimates were that traq was at least 5–7 years away from having nuclear weapons. The experts were flat wrong. When the U.S. got on the ground, it found the Iraqi's were probably six months to a year away from having a nuclear weapon – not 5 to 7 years. We do not know today precisely how close he is to having a deliverable nuclear weapon. What we do know is that he has a sizable appetite for them, that he has been actively and persistently pursuing them for more than 20 years, and that we allow him to get them at our peril. Moreover, let's say he is 5-7 years from a deliverable nuclear weapon. That raises the question: 5-7 years from when? From today? From 1998, when he kicked out the inspectors? Or from earlier, when inspectors were still in country? There is no way of knowing except from the ground, unless one believes what Saddam Hussein says. 157 But those who raise questions about the nuclear threat need to focus on the immediate threat from biological weapons. From 1991 to 1995, Iraq repeatedly insisted it did not have biological weapons. Then, in 1995, Saddam's son-in-law defected and told the inspectors some of the details of Iraq's biological weapons program. Only then did Iraq admit it had produced tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other biological weapons. But even then, they did not come clean. UN inspectors believe Iraq had in fact produced two to four-times the amount of biological agents it had declared. Those biological agents were never found. Iraq also refused to account for some three tons of materials that could be used to produce biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons. They are much simpler to deliver than nuclear weapons, and even more readily transferred to terrorist networks, who could allow Iraq to deliver them without fingerprints. If you want an idea of the devastation Iraq could wreak on our country with a biological attack, consider the recent “Dark Winter" exercise conducted by Johns Hopkins University. It simulated a biological WMD attack in which terrorists released smallpox in three separate locations in the U.S. Within 22 days, it is estimated it would have spread to 26 states, with an estimated 6000 new infections occurring daily. Within two months, the worst-case estimate indicated one million people could be dead and another 2 million infected. Not a nice picture. The point is this: we know Iraq possesses biological weapons, and chemical weapons, and is expanding and improving their capabilities to produce them. That should be of every bit as much concern as Iraq’s potential nuclear capability. Some have argued that even if Iraq has these weapons, Saddam Hussein does not intend to use WMD against the U.S. because he is a survivor, not a suicide bomber—that he would be unlikely to take actions that could lead to his own destruction. Then why is iraq pursuing WMD so aggressively? Why are they willing to pay such a high price for them—to suffer a decade of economic sanctions that have cost them tens of billions in oil revenues—sanctions they could get lifted simply by an agreement to disarm? One answer is that, as some critics have conceded, “he seeks weapons of mass destruction... to deter us from intervening to block his aggressive designs." This is no doubt a motivation. But consider the consequences if they were allowed to succeed. Imagine for a moment that Iraq demonstrated the capacity to attack U.S. or European populations centers with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Then imagine you are the President of the United States, trying to put together an 158 international coalition to stop their aggression, after Iraq had demonstrated that capability. It would be a daunting task. His regime believes that simply by possessing the capacity to deliver WMD to Western capitals, he will be able to prevent—terrorize—the free world from projecting force to stop his aggression— driving the West into a policy of forced isolationism. That said, it is far from clear that he would not necessarily restrain from taking actions that could result in his destruction. For example, that logic did not stop the Taliban from supporting and harboring al-Qaeda as they planned and executed repeated attacks on the U.S. And their miscalculation resulted in the destruction of their regime. Regimes without checks and balances are prone to grave miscalculations. Saddam Hussein has no checks whatsoever on his decision- making authority. Who among us really believes it would be wise or prudent for us to base our security on the hope that Saddam Hussein, or his sons who might succeed him, could not make the same fatal miscalculations as Mullah Omar and the Taliban? It is my view that we would be ill advised to stake our people's lives on Saddam Hussein's supposed “survival instinct." Some have argued Iraq is unlikely to use WMD against us because, unlike terrorist networks, Saddam has a “return address." Mr. Chairman, there is no reason for confidence that if Iraq launched a WMD attack on the U.S. it would necessarily have an obvious “return address." There are ways Iraq could easily conceal responsibility for a WMD attack. They could deploy “sleeper cells" armed with biological weapons to attack us from within—and then deny any knowledge or connection to the attacks. Or they could put a WMD- tipped missile on a “commercial" shipping vessel, sail it within range of our coast, fire it, and then melt back into the commercial shipping traffic before we knew what hit us. Finding that ship would be like searching for a needle in a haystack—a bit like locating a single terrorist. Or they could recruit and utilize a terrorist network with similar views and objectives, and pass on weapons of mass destruction to them. It is this nexus between a terrorist state like Iraq with WMD and terrorist networks that has so significantly changed the U.S. security environment. We still do not know with certainty who was behind the 1996 bombing the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia—an attack that killed 19 American service members. We still do not know who is responsible for last year's anthrax attacks. The nature of terrorist attacks is that it is often very difficult to identify who is ultimately responsible. Indeed, our consistent failure over the past two decades to trace terrorist attacks to their ultimate source gives terrorist states the lesson that using terrorist networks as proxies is an effective way of attacking the U.S. with impunity. 10 159 Some have opined there is scant evidence of Iraq's ties to terrorists, and he has ſittle incentive to make common cause with them. That is not correct. Iraq's ties to terrorist networks are long-standing. It is no coincidence that Abu Nidal was in Baghdad, when he died under mysterious circumstances. Iraq has also reportedly provided safe haven to Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of the FBI's most wanted terrorists, who was a key participant in the first World Trade Center bombing. We know that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq today, and that little happens in Iraq without the knowledge of the Saddam Hussein regime. We also know that there have been a number of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda over the years. We know Saddam has ordered acts of terror himself, including the attempted assassination of a former U.S. President. He has incentives to make common cause with terrorists. He shares many common objectives with groups like al-Qaeda, including an antipathy for the Saudi royal family and a desire to drive the U.S. out of the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, if he decided it was in his interest to conceal his responsibility for an attack on the U.S., providing WMD to terrorists would be an effective way of doing SO. Some have said that they would support action to remove Saddam if the U.S. could prove a connection to the attacks of September 11”—but there is no such proof. The question implies that the U.S. should have to prove that Iraq has already attacked us in order to deal with that threat. The objective is to stop him before he attacks us and kills thousands of our citizens. The case against Iraq does not depend on an Iraqi link to 9/11. The issue for the U.S. is not vengeance, retribution or retaliation—it is whether the Iraqi regime poses a growing danger to the safety and security of our people, and of the world. There is no question but that it does. Some argue that North Korea and Iran are more immediate threats than Iraq. North Korea almost certainly has nuclear weapons, and is developing missiles that will be able to reach most of the continental United States. Iran has stockpiles of chemical weapons, is developing ballistic missiles of increasing range, and is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. The question is asked: why not deal with them first? Iran and North Korea are indeed threats—problems we take seriously. That is why President Bush named them specifically, when he spoke about an "Axis of Evil." And we have policies to address both. 160 But Iraq is unique. No other living dictator matches Saddam Hussein's record of waging aggressive war against his neighbors; pursuing weapons of mass destruction; using WMD against his own people and other nations; launching ballistic missiles at his neighbors; brutalizing and torturing his own citizens; harboring terrorist networks; engaging in terrorist acts, including the attempted assassination of foreign officials; violating his international commitments; lying, cheating and hiding his WMD programs; deceiving and defying the express will of the United Nations over and over again. As the President told the UN, “in one place—in one regime—we find all these dangers in their most lethal and aggressive forms." Some respond by saying, OK, Iraq poses a threat we will eventually have to deal with—but now is not the time to do so. To that, I would ask: when? Will it be a better time when his regime is stronger? When its WMD programs are still further advanced? After he further builds his forces, which are stronger and deadlier with each passing day? Yes, there are risks in acting. The President understands those risks. But there are also risks in further delay. As the President has said: “I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." Others say that overthrowing the regime should be the last step, not the first. I would respond that for more than a decade now, the international community has tried every other step. They have tried diplomacy; they have tried sanctions and embargoes; they have tried positive inducements, such as the “oil for food." program; they have tried inspections; they have tried limited military strikes. Together, all these approaches have failed to accomplish the UN goals. If the President were to decide to take military action to overthrow the regime, it would be not the first step, it would be the last step, after a decade of failed diplomatic and economic steps to stop his drive for WMD. Some have asked: why not just contain him? The West lived for 40 years with the Soviet threat, and never felt the need to take pre-emptive action. If containment worked on the Soviet Union, why not Iraq2 First, it's clear from the Iraqi regimes 11 years of defiance that containment has not led to their compliance. To the contrary, containment is breaking down—the regime continues to receive funds from illegal oil sales and procure military hardware necessary to develop weapons of mass murder. So not only has containment failed to reduce the threat, it has allowed the threat to grow. 12 161 Second, with the Soviet Union we faced an adversary that already possessed nuclear weapons—thousands of them. Our goal with Iraq is to prevent them from getting nuclear weapons. We are not interested in establishing a balance of terror with the likes of Iraq, like the one that existed with the Soviet Union. We are interested in stopping a balance of terror from forming. Third, with the Soviet Union, we believed that time was on our side – and we were correct. With Iraq, the opposite is true—time is not our side. Every month that goes by, his WMD programs are progressing and he moves closer to his goal of possessing the capability to strike our population, and our allies, and hold them hostage to blackmail. Finally, while containment worked in the long run, the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal prevented the West from responding when they invaded their neighbor, Afghanistan. Does anyone really want Saddam to have that same deterrent, so he can invade his neighbors with impunity? Some ask: Why does he have to be overthrown? Can't we just take out the capabilities he has that threaten us? While the President has not made that decision, the problem with doing it piecemeal is this: First, we do not know where all of Iraq's WMD facilities are. We do know where a fraction of them are. Second, of the facilities we do know, not all are vulnerable to attack from the air. Some are underground. Some are mobile. Others are purposely located near population centers – schools, mosques, hospitals, etc. -- where an air strike could kill large numbers of innocent people. The Iraq problem cannot be solved with air strikes alone. Some have argued that, if we do have to go to war, the U.S. should first layout details of a truly comprehensive inspections regime, which, if Iraq failed to comply, would provide a casus belli. I would respond this way: if failure to comply with WMD inspections is a casus belli, the UN already has it—Iraq's non-compliance with UN inspection regimes has been going on for more than a decade. What else can one ask for? The U.S. is not close to inspections as an element of an effective response. But the goal is not inspections—it is disarmament. Any inspections would have to be notably different from the past. Given the history of this regime, the world community hase every right to be skeptical that it would be. And that is why, in 1998, the U.S. began to speak of regime change. 13 162 Our goal is disarmament. The only purpose of any inspections would be to prove that Iraq has disarmed, which would require Iraq to reverse its decades-long policy of pursuing these weapons. Something they are unlikely to do. There are serious concerns about whether an inspections regime could be effective. Even the most intrusive inspection regime would have difficultly getting at all his weapons of mass destruction. Many of his WMD capabilities are mobile and can be hidden to evade inspectors. He has vast underground networks and facilities to hide WMD, and sophisticated denial and deception techniques. It is simply impossible to "spot check" a country the size of Iraq. Unless we have people inside the Iraqi program who are willing to tell us what they have and where they have it—as we did in 1995 with the defection of Saddam's son in law, Hussein Kamel— it is easy for the Iraqi regime to hide its capabilities from us. Indeed, Hans Blix, the chief UN Weapons inspector, said as much in an interview with the New York Times last week. According to the Times, (quote) " (Mr. Blix) acknowledged that there were some limitations to what his team could accomplish even if it was allowed to return. Mr. Blix said his inspectors might not be able to detect mobile laboratories for producing biological weapons materials, or underground storehouses for weapons substances, if the inspectors did not have information about such sites from the last time they were in Iraq or have not seen traces of them in satellite surveillance photography." (Unquote). When UNSCOM inspectors were on the ground, they did an admirable job of uncovering many of Iraq's violations—which is undoubtedly why Iraq had them expelled. But despite the UN's best efforts, from 1991-1995 Saddam was able to conceal some of his nuclear program and his biological weapons program. Some aspects were uncovered after his son-in-law defected and provided information that allowed inspectors to find them. And even then, Iraq was able to hide many of those activities from inspectors—capabilities he most likely still has today, in addition to what he has developed in recent years. There is a place in this world for inspections. They tend to be effective if the target nation is cooperating—if they are actually willing to disarm and want to prove to the world that they are doing so. They tend not be as effective in uncovering deceptions and violations when the target is determined not to disarm. Iraq's record of the past decade shows the regime is not interested in disarming or cooperating. Their behavior demonstrates they want weapons of mass destruction and are determined to continue developing them. Some ask: now that Iraq has agreed to "unconditional inspections,” why does Congress need to act? Iraq has demonstrated great skill at playing the international community. When it's the right moment to lean forward, they lean forward. When it's a time to lean 163 back, they lean back. It's a dance. They can go on for months or years jerking the U.N. around. When they find that things are not going their way, they throw out a proposal like this. And hopeful people say: "There's our opportunity. They are finally being reasonable. Seize the moment. Let's give them another chance." And then we repeatedly find, at the last moment, that Iraq withdraws that carrot and goes back into their mode of rejecting the international community. And the dance starts all over again. The issue is not inspections. The issue is disarmament. The issue is compliance. As the President made clear in his UN address, we require Iraq’s compliance with all 16 UN resolutions that they have defied over the past decade. And, as the President said, the UN Security Council—not the Iraqi regime—needs to decide how to enforce its own resolutions. Congress's support for the President is what is needed to further generate international support. Some have asked whether military intervention in Iraq means the U.S. would have to go to war with every terrorist state that is pursuing WMD? The answer is: no. Taking military action in Iraq does not mean that it would be necessary or appropriate to take military action against other states that possess or are pursuing WMD. For one thing, preventive action in one situation may very well produce a deterrent effect on other states. After driving the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, we have already seen a change in behavior in certain regimes. Moreover, dealing with some states may not require military action. In some cases, such as Iran, change could conceivably come from within. The young people and the women in Iran are increasingly fed up with the tight clique of Mullahs—they want change, and may well rise up to change their leadership at some point. Some say that there is no international consensus behind ousting Saddam—and most of our key allies are opposed. First, the fact is that there are a number of countries that want Saddam Hussein gone. Some are reluctant to say publicly just yet. But, if the U.S. waited for a consensus before acting, we would never do anything. Obviously, one's first choice in life is to have everyone agree with you at the outset. In reality, that is seldom the case. It takes time, leadership and persuasion. Leadership is about deciding what is right, and then going out and persuading others. The coalition we have fashioned in the global war on terror today includes some 90 nations—literally half the world. It is the greatest coalition ever assembled in the 15 164 annals of human history. It was not there on September 11". It was built, one country at a time, over a long period of time. If we had waited for consensus, the Taliban would still be in power in Afghanistan today. The worldwide coalition was formed by leadership. During the Persian Gulf War, the coalition eventually included 36 nations. But they were not there on August 2, 1990 when Saddam invaded Kuwait. They were not there on August 5", when the President George H. W. Bush announced to the world that Saddam's aggression “will not stand.” That coalition was built over a period of many months. With his UN speech, President George W. Bush began the process of building international support for dealing with Iraq. The reaction has been positive. We will continue to state our case, as the President is doing, and I suspect that as he does so, you will find that other countries in increasing numbers will cooperate and participate. Will it be unanimous? No. Does anyone expect it to be unanimous? No. Does it matter that it will not be unanimous? No. But does the U.S. want all the support possible – you bet. Just as we have in the coalition supporting the Global War on Terrorism. The point is: if our nation's leaders do the right thing, others will follow and support the just cause—just they have in the global war against terror. Some say that our European allies may reluctantly go along in the end, but that U.S. intervention in Iraq would spark concern in the Arab world—that not one country in that regions supports us, and many are vocally opposed. That is not so. Saddam's neighbors are deathly afraid of him—and understandably so. He has invaded his neighbors, used weapons of mass destruction against them, and launched ballistic missiles at them. He aspires to dominate the region. The nations of the region would be greatly relieved to have him gone, and that if Saddam Hussein is removed from power, the reaction in the region will be not outrage, but great relief. And the reaction of the Iraqi people will most certainly be jubilation. Some ask, but will they help us? Will they give us access to bases and territory and airspace we need to conduct a military operation? The answer is that the President has not decided to take military action, but, if he does, we will have all the support we need to get the job done. You can be certain of it. Another argument is that military action in Iraq will be expensive, and will have high costs for the global economy. 16 165 That may be true. But there are also dollar costs to not acting—and those costs could well be far greater. Consider: the New York City Comptroller estimates that the economic costs of the Sept. 11 attacks to New York alone were between $83 and $95 billion. He further estimated that New York lost 83,000 existing jobs and some 63,000 jobs the city estimates would have been created had the attacks not happened. One institute puts the cost to the national economy at $191 billion— including 1.64 million jobs lost as a direct result of the 9/11 attacks. Other estimates are higher—as much as $250 billion in lost productivity, sales, jobs, advertising, airline revenue and the like. And that is not to mention the cost in human lives, and the suffering of those who lost fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, sisters and brothers that day. And we must not forget that the costs of a nuclear, chemical or biological weapons attack would be far worse. The price in lives would be not thousands, but tens of thousands. And the economic costs could make September 11" pale by comparison. Those are the costs that also must be weighed carefully. And this is not mention the cost to one's conscience of being wrong. Some have suggested that if the U.S. were to act it might provoke Saddam Hussein's use of WMD. Last time, the argument goes, he didn't use chemical weapons on U.S. troops and allies because he saw our goal was not to oust him, but to push back his aggression. This time, the argument goes, the opposite would be true, and he would have nothing to Jose by using WMD. That is an important point. And the President made clear on March 13, 2002 the consequences of such an attack. He said: "we’ve got all options on the table because we want to make it very clear to nations that you will not threaten the United States or use weapons of mass destruction against us, our allies, or our friends." There are ways to mitigate the risk of a chem-bio attack, but it cannot be entirely eliminated—it is true that could be a risk of military action. But consider the consequences if the world were to allow that risk to deter us from acting. We would then have sent a message to the world about the value of weapons of mass destruction that we would deeply regret having sent. A country thinking about acquiring WMD would conclude that the U.S. had been deterred by Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and they could then resolve to pursue those weapons to assure their impunity. The message the world should want to send is the exact opposite. The message should be that Iraq's pursuit of WMD has not only not made it more secure, it has made it less secure—that by pursuing those weapons, they have attracted undesired attention to themselves. But if he is that dangerous, then that only makes the case for action stronger— because the longer we wait, the more deadly his regime becomes. If the world community were to be deterred from acting today by the threat that Iraq might use 17 166 chemical or biological weapons, how will the UN feel when one day, when Iraq demonstrates it has a deliverable nuclear weapon? The risks will only grow worse. If we are deterred today, we could be deterred forever—and Iraq will have achieved its objective. Or will the world community be deterred until Iraq uses a weapon of mass destruction, and only then decide it is time to act. But I would suggest that even if Saddam Hussein were to issue an order for the use chemical or biological weapons, that does not mean his orders would necessarily be carried out. Saddam Hussein might not have anything to lose, but those beneath him in the chain of command most certainly would have a great deal to lose — let there be no doubt. He has maintained power by instilling fear in his subordinates. If he is on the verge of losing power, he may also lose his ability to impose that fear—and, thus, the blind obedience of those around him. Wise Iraqis will not obey orders to use WMD. If President Bush were to decide to take military action, the U.S. will execute his order and finish the job professionally—Saddam Hussein and his regime would be removed from power. Therefore, with that certain knowledge, those in the Iraqi military will need to think hard about whether it would be in their interest to follow his instructions to commit war crimes by using WMD-and then pay a severe price for that action. The United States will make clear at the outset that those who are not guilty of atrocities can play a role in the new Iraq. But if WMD is used all bets are off. | believe many in the Iraqi Armed Forces despise Saddam Hussein, and want to see him go as much as the rest of the world does. Those who may not despise him, but decide they would prefer to survive, may desert and try to blend into the civilian population or escape the country. This is what happened in Panama, when it became clear that Noriega was certain to be on his way out. Some say that Saddam might succeed in provoking an Israeli response this time — possibly a nuclear response—and that this would set the Middle East aflame. We are concerned about the Iraqi regime attacking a number of its neighbors, and with good reason: Saddam Hussein has a history of doing so. Iraq has attacked Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Iraq is a threat to its neighbors. We will consult with all of our allies and friends in the region on how to deal with this threat. But the fact that they have blackmailed their neighbors makes the case for action stronger. If we do nothing, that blackmail will eventually become blackmail with weapons of mass destruction—with significantly new consequences for the world. Some have said the U.S. could get bogged down in a long-term military occupation, and want to know what the plan is for a post-Saddam Iraq2 18 167 That is a fair question. It is likely that international forces would have to be in Iraq for a period of time, to help a new transitional Iraqi government get on its feet and create conditions where the Iraqi people would be able to choose a new government and achieve self-determination. But that burden is a small one, when balanced against the risks of not acting. in Afghanistan, our approach was that Afghanistan belongs to the Afghans—we did not and do not aspire to own it or run it. The same would be true of Iraq. In Afghanistan, the U.S. and coalition countries helped create conditions so that the Afghan people could exercise their right of self-government. Throughout the Bonn process and the Loya Jirga process, a new president was chosen, a new cabinet sworn-in, and a transitional government, representative of the Afghan people, was established to lead the nation. if the President were to make the decision to liberate Iraq, with coalition partners, it would help the Iraqi people establish a government that would be a single country, that did not threaten its neighbors, the United States, or the world with aggression and weapons of mass destruction, and that would respect the rights of its diverse population. Iraq has an educated population that has been brutally and viciously repressed by Saddam Hussein's regime. He has kept power not by building loyalty, but by instilling fear—in his people, his military and the government bureaucracy. I suspect that there would be substantial defections once it became clear that Saddam Hussein was finished. Moreover, there are numerous free Iraqi leaders— both inside Iraq and abroad—who would play a role in establishing that new free Iraqi government. So there is no shortage of talent available to lead and rehabilitate a free Iraq. In terms of economic rehabilitation, Iraq has an advantage over Afghanistan. A free Iraq would be less dependent on international assistance, and could conceivably get back on its feet faster, because Iraq has a marketable commodity— oil. Some have raised concerns that other countries elsewhere in the world might take advantage of the fact that the U.S. in tied up in fraq, and use that as an opportunity to invade neighbors or cause other mischief. There is certainly a risk that some countries might underestimate our capability to handle Iraq and stop their aggression at the same time. But let there be no doubt: we have that capability. 19 168 Last year, we fashioned a new defense strategy, which established that we will and do have the capability to near simultaneously: Defend the U.S. homeland; Undertake a major regional conflict and win decisively—including occupying a country and changing their regime; • If necessary, swiftly defeat another aggressor in another theater; and • Simultaneously conduct a number of lesser contingencies—such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. The United States can do the above, if called upon to do so. Another argument is that acting without provocation by Iraq would violate international law. That is untrue. The right to self-defense is a part of the UN Charter. Customary international law has long provided for the right of anticipatory self-defense—to stop an attack before it happens. In addition, he is in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. Those concerned about the integrity of international law should focus on their attention his brazen defiance of the UN. Some ask: What has changed to warrant action now? What has changed is our experience on September 11". What has changed is our appreciation of our vulnerability—and the risks the U.S. faces from terrorist networks and terrorist states armed with weapons of mass destruction. What has not changed is Saddam Hussein's drive to acquire these weapons. Every approach the UN has taken to stop Iraq's drive for WMD has failed. In 1998, after Iraq had again kicked out UN inspectors, President Clinton came to the Pentagon and said (quote): “If [Saddam] fails to comply, and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route which gives him yet more opportunities to develop his weapons of mass destruction... and continue to ignore the solemn commitment he made.... he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction.... The stakes could not be higher. Some day, some way, I guarantee you, he'll use that arsenal." (unduote) At the time, the U.S. massed forces in the Persian Gulf, ready to strike. At the last minute, Iraq relented and allowed UN inspectors to return. But predictably, they 20 169 kicked them out again ten months later. They have not been allowed to return since. He has not only paid a price for that defiance, he has been rewarded for his defiance of the UN by increased trade from a large group of UN member nations. If, in 1998, Saddam Hussein posed the grave threat that President Clinton correctly described, then he most certainly poses a vastly greater danger today, after four years without inspectors on the ground to challenge his WMD procurement and development efforts. To those who still ask—that is what has changed! Some have asked what are the incentives for Iraq to comply—is there is anything the Iraqi regime could do to forestall military action? Or is he finished either way? Our objective is gaining Iraq's compliance. Our objective is an Iraq that does not menace its neighbors, does not pursue WMD, does not oppress its people or threaten the United States. The President set forth in his speech what an Iraqi regime that wanted peace would do. Everything we know about the character and record of the current Iraqi regime indicates that it is highly unlikely to do the things the President has said it must do. So long as Saddam Hussein is leading that country, to expect otherwise is, as the President put it, to “hope against the evidence." If Saddam Hussein is in a corner, it is because he has put himself there. One choice he has is to take his family and key leaders and seek asylum elsewhere. Surely one of the one hundred and eighty plus counties would take his regime – possibly Belarus. Some ask does the U.S. needs UN support? The President has asked the UN Security Council to act because it is the UN Security Council that is being defied, disobeyed and made less relevant by the Iraqi regime's defiance. There have already been 16 UN resolutions, every one of which Saddam Hussein has ignored. There is no shortage of UN resolutions. What there is is a shortage of consequences for Saddam's ongoing defiance of those 16 UN resolutions. The President has made the case that it is dangerous for the United Nations to be made irrelevant by the Iraqi regime. As the President put it in his address last week, "All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?” But the President has also been clear that all options are on the table. The only option President Bush has ruled out is to do nothing. + + + 21 170 Mr. Chairman, as the President has made clear, this is a critical moment—for our country and for the world. Our resolve is being put to the test. It is a test that, unfortunately, the world's free nations have failed before in recent history—with terrible consequences. Long before the Second World War, Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf indicating what he intended to do. But the hope was that maybe he would not do what he said. Between 35 and 60 million people died because of a series of fatal miscalculations. He might have been stopped early—at a minimal cost of lives—had the vast majority of the world's leaders not decided at the time that the risks of acting were greater than the risks of not acting. Today, we must decide whether the risks of acting are greater than the risks of not acting. Saddam Hussein has made his intentions clear. He has used weapons of mass destruction against his own people and his neighbors. He has demonstrated an intention to take the territory of his neighbors. He has launched ballistic missiles against U.S. allies and others in the region. He plays host to terrorist networks. He pays rewards to the families of suicide bombers in Israel–like those who killed five Americans at the Hebrew University earlier this year. He is hostile to the United States, because we have denied him the ability he has sought to impose his will on his neighbors. He has said, in no uncertain terms, that he would use weapons of mass destruction against the United States. He has, at this moment, stockpiles chemical and biological weapons, and is pursuing nuclear weapons. If he demonstrates the capability to deliver them to our shores, the world would be changed. Our people would be at great risk. Our willingness to be engaged in the world, our willingness to project power to stop aggression, our ability to forge coalitions for multilateral action, could all be under question. And many lives could be lost. We need to decide as a people how we feel about that. Do the risks of taking action to stop that threat outweigh these risks of living in the world we see? Or is the risk of doing nothing greater than the risk of acting? That is the question President Bush has posed to the Congress, to the American people and to the world community. The question comes down to this: how will the history of this era be recorded? When we look back on previous periods of our history, we see there have been many books written about threats and attacks that were not anticipated: “At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor" “December 7, 1941: The Day the Admirals Slept Late" "Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment" “From Munich to Pearl Harbor" “While England Slept" 22 171 • “The Cost of Failure" The list of such books is endless. And, unfortunately, in the past year, historians have added to that body of literature—there are already books out on the September 11" attacks and why they were not prevented. As we meet today, Congressional committees are trying to determine why that tragic event was not prevented. Each is an attempt by the authors to “connect the dots"—to determine what happened, and why it was not possible to figure out that it was going to happen. Our job today — the President's, the Congress' and the UN's is to connect the dots before the fact—to anticipate vastly more lethal attacks before they happens—and to make the right decision as to whether we should take preventive action-- before it is too late. We are on notice—each of us. Each has a solemn responsibility to do everything in our power to ensure that, when the history of this period is written, the books won't ask why we slept—to ensure that history will instead record that on September 11" the American people were awakened to the impending dangers— and that those entrusted with the safety of the American people made the right decisions and saved our nation, and the world, from 21" century threats. President Bush is determined to do just that. ## 23 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD SEPTEMBER 18, 2002 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GRAHAM Mr. GRAHAM. On July 16 in the context of the Maritime Security Program, testi- mony was F. to this Committee indicating that the DoD has contracts for our national security with companies which are wholly owned and controlled by for- eign entities—entities which continue to do substantial business with nations like Iran and Iraq which we have designated as state sponsors of international terror- ism. I don’t know the extent of this practice, and I would hope that your Depart- ment would conduct a review of its frequency and its potential consequences. Testimony at the hearing showed that AP Moller/Maersk Sealand, a Danish com- pany, owns and controls Maersk Line, Ltd., its American subsidiary. The CEO of the American company acknowledged that the company does business in Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Libya. In fact, the business transactions with these countries can be found on the company's website. Should we award critical defense contracts to companies without them first cer- tifying that they have no potential conflicts with our national security goals—includ- ing not being affiliated with, or controlled by a foreign company which has substan- tial commercial relationships with terrorist sponsoring countries? Secretary RUMSFELD. As required by section 2327 of title 10, United States Code, DoD does not do business with contractors that are substantially owned or con- trolled by any country or government that has been determined by the Secretary of State under 50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A) to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Also, the United States does not procure products of countries or governments that support international terrorism. The Foreign As- sets Control Regulations (31 CFR Chapter V) of the Department of the Treasury prohibit persons and companies in the United States from conducting most business transactions for supplies or services originating from sources within, or that are lo- cated in or transported from or through, countries that support international terror- ism. Finally, section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 established the proc- ess whereby the inter-agency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) reviews national security issues that may be associated with foreign acquisition of U.S. defense contractors. Under this process, we have the opportunity to insist that foreign investments are structured in ways that address national secu- rity concerns. The provisions discussed above provide substantial safeguards against actions by terrorist governments and companies in terrorist countries. In addition, DoD compo- nents that propose to depend upon a contractor that is owned or controlled by a for- eign entity must assess, on a contract-by-contract basis, the risk to performance of their mission and take appropriate action to mitigate or eliminate such risks. Such ºns give us confidence in the dependability of our supplier base and lines of sup- ply. Mr. GRAHAM. Should we require those who would benefit from US defense con- tracts to comply with the economic sanctions regulations already applicable to US companies? Secretary RUMSFELD. Our present safeguards in defense procurement, with regard to those contractors and subcontractors that receive defense contracts and sub- contracts, deny financial support to countries that support international terrorism. (175) IRAQ'S WEAPONS MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM AND TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 19, 2002. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:20 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter presid- 1ng. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNLA Mr. HUNTER. Folks, today the Committee on Armed Services con- tinues its review of the Iraqi threat and United States policy to- ward Iraq with a specific focus on how the U.S. and the inter- national community should act in concert to restrain Saddam's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. This morning's hearing marks the third of a number of planned public sessions de- signed to inform the committee and the American people on the various issues surrounding Iraq's continued violation of numerous United Nation's resolutions, its illicit development of weapons of mass destruction and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States and the international community. In the past two weeks, the committee received classified briefings from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intel- ligence Agency (DIA), and I might add we had yesterday's briefing that we opened up to the full membership, some 83 members of the House beyond the Armed Services Committee membership, and we heard testimony from former senior United Nations Special Com- mission (UNSCOM) inspectors about Iraq's illicit weapons pro- grams; and we have also received the administration's position on Iraq yesterday from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Next week, the committee will hold another public hearing on U.S. policy toward Iraq, but will hear from private sector foreign and defense policy experts. Today the committee will learn how the Iraqis built and sus- tained their weapons of mass destruction programs through the il- legal and legal acquisition of technology on the world market, and how the United States' own export control system may have con- tributed to the problems we are now facing with Iraq. It is ironic that presently pending before the Congress is legisla- tion to reauthorize the Export Administration Act. The EAA, as it is more commonly known, is a primary legislative vehicle through which the United States exercises control over sensitive dual use items, those with both military and commercial application. (177) 178 These national security export controls are critical to ensuring that our adversaries and potential enemies don’t acquire the high technologies that will threaten the United States national security or reduce the qualitative advantages of our armed forces. The irony that rather than strengthening these systems of con- trol, the legislation that is being pushed through Congress dramati- cally liberalizes these key protections making it easier for Saddam Hussein and his ilk to continue their weapons of mass destruction programs. This morning our witnesses, who we hope will connect the dots between export controls technology transfers, and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program are, the gentleman who has been with us many times, and I think one of our most valuable citizens, Dr. Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Dr. Milhollin has been watching and documenting Iraq's WMD programs for years and is also an expert in national security export controls. And, I might point out to the members and to the American peo- ple, The New York Times op-ed written Friday, April 24th, 1992, by Dr. Milhollin entitled Iraq's Bomb, Chip by Chip, in which he traced back all of the contributors, including many Western cor- porations, of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. We are also pleased to have Dr.—Doctor, if I butcher your name here, you please correct me—Dr. Khidhir Hamza, is that close enough for government work? Dr. HAMZA. That is close. Mr. HUNTER. Who was a trained nuclear engineer who worked in various parts of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, both before and after the 1990, 1991 Gulf War. Dr. Hamza will tell us how Saddam Hussein acquired the technologies necessary for its weap- ons of mass destruction program, even while under the watchful eyes of the United Nations (U.N.) inspectors and the restriction of U.N. sanctions. Gentlemen, I want to thank you both for agreeing to appear be- fore the committee today, and before we begin, I want to invite the very distinguished gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, the ranking Democrat on the committee to offer any comments that he might have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 219.] STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I thank you for your leadership in quickly scheduling a range of hearings on the issues related to Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction pro- gram. We here in Congress, as well as the American people, need to understand clearly the nature of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein so that we can carefully consider what action the United States must take. The hearings we have had so far with former United Nations weapons inspectors and with Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, have presented valuable information about Iraq's weapons pro- 179 grams and the danger they may pose to our country and our allies. I hope that our witnesses today can add to the information we al- ready have by helping us understand just how Iraq built its chemi- cal, biological, nuclear and long-range missile programs, and how he got what he needed. We need to know what is there so we can know how to respond. Dr. Milhollin has tracked technology transfers to Iraq for quite some time, and Dr. Hamza brings the unique perspective of one who has been inside Saddam's weapons complex. Gentlemen, we thank you for being here today and we hope you can share some additional light on the threat we face. In consider- ing how Iraq got the weapons of mass destruction, we believe he has today, we must be willing to look at how United States actions may have, however unintentionally, contributed to his effort. Some American products and those of our friends may have gotten through our export control system into Saddam's hands, highlight- ing how easily technology can move in our global economy. But for me, it highlights too, the need to work hard to fashion an export control system that balances the competitiveness of U.S. industry with our security responsibility to prevent more critical tech- nologies and materials from reaching those who would develop weapons of mass destruction. This committee took a step in that regard when we approved a strengthened version of the Export Administration Act, one that seems more important now as we face the possibility of war to dis- mantle the proliferation we worked so hard to prevent. But in the near term, Mr. Chairman, the immediate challenge facing us is de- ciding how to proceed against Iraq. Doing that requires the best in- formation possible. That is what I hope our witnesses will focus on today, the detail of Saddam's weapons programs and their insight as to how they can be eliminated. We thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 221.] Mr. HUNTER. I want to thank the ranking member and remind our colleagues and those listening that I am just filling in for Bob Stump, who is the chairman of this committee, and who is a little under the weather right now, but nonetheless, told me the other day, make sure we had an aggressive schedule of briefings to edu- cate both our members and the American public on this very im- portant issue that is facing us. So, we all wish our chairman well º: look forward to him being back with us here in just a couple OI Olav.S. § Milhollin, you have been a very valuable resource for this committee, one of the guys that I think kind of people that make this country great and that is that you are an honest broker who is very candid and who tells it like it is in some fairly difficult de- bates we have historically had on technology control, and this tug of war between what the ranking member described as industrial competitiveness and security interests. But, we really appreciate the energy you expend and the intellect and evenhandedness that you bring to this issue. Thanks for ap- pearing before us for about the 50th time and, sir, the floor is yours. 180 STATEMENT OF GARY MILHOLLIN, DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL Dr. MILHOLLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope I can live up to that introduction. I am very pleased to appear today to discuss the challenge of Iraq and the relation between that challenge and the export of sensitive technology. I would like to begin by offering for the record some publications that my organization has produced on Iraq, and also, I would request permission to update my written remarks after the hearing if that is appropriate. Mr. HUNTER. Without objection. Dr. MILHOLLIN. First, I would like to offer an op-ed from The New York Times written this past Monday on inspections. I have a copy I will provide to the staff; second, an article from com- mentary magazine, the October issue which also discusses inspec- tions; third, a graphic from The New York Times Week In Review this past Sunday, which describes several dangerous nuclear im- ports and what we can learn from those imports, including the alu- minum tube episode that I think the committee has probably been briefed on. Then, I would like to also include in the record the article that you just referred to from 1992, which lists U.S. contributions to Saddam Hussein's missile and nuclear sites and, then a graphic, which I have put here on a board, which shows world wide con- tributions to Iraq's program, and then, finally, a report that my or- ganization prepared on Commerce Department licenses that, in my judgment, contributed very much to Iraq's mass destruction weap- on capabilities. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 241.] à HUNTER. Without objection, those will be included in the reCOrC1. Dr. MILHOLLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by just saying that there is no question that Iraq has an active weapon of mass destruction program. I know the committee has been briefed on this in detail, but I think perhaps I should just mention briefly that in the nuclear area, we know Saddam Hussein has a workable weapon design, lacks only the fissile material to fuel it, that the risk there is that this material is available many places in the world. We know that smugglers are after it, and we know we are not likely to get a phone call if on some unlucky day enough to make a few bombs winds up in Iraq. Second, we know that the Iraqis are working on short-range missiles which are permitted under U.N. resolutions, but at the same time, they are using this program to develop the technology for long-range missiles. We also know that Iraq has illicitly held back a few Scuds. We are not sure how many. E. . the event of hostilities, we have to expect that these may e U1SeCI. In the chemical weapon area, we know that Iraq has made nerve gas and mustard gas, has weaponized these agents, and I can tell you that in a round table we had recently with U.S. generals, there is a tremendous amount of concern about Iraq's chemical artillery. Finally, in the biological area, we know that Iraq has made an- thrax, and there are also rumors about Iraq's interest in smallpox. 181 So what we are looking at is a rather complete weapon of mass de- struction program that we know is possessed of a great capability that is not being carefully inspected or inspected at all, and that we have to assume is still operating. I must say that I might say that our organization maintains a web site in which we try to pro- vide a continuous update of Iraq's weapon of mass destruction sta- tus. It is www.Iraqwatch.org. It is an easy place to go to find up- to-date information on all of the programs. And, I have here a printout from today's version which I recommend to the committee. I would like to say a few words about how Iraq managed to build these programs. The short answer is with imports. Almost all from the West, and almost all legal. The article that Mr. Hunter held up a moment ago from the New York Times in 1992 was prepared by my organization from U.S. export control records. If you look at this document, you will see that it is entitled “Iraq's Bomb: Chip By Chip.” you can see that America's leading electronic companies sold sensitive equipment directly to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Com- mission where atomic bomb fuel was made, to sites where A-bomb detonators were made, and to the Ministry of Defence which oversaw Iraq's missile and A-bomb development. U.S. exports also went directly to a site called SOD–16, which was Iraq's main mis- sile building site. There is no question that virtually every nuclear and missile site in Iraq received high-speed American computers. And, these were all licensed by the U.S. Department of Commerce. You have to ask yourself, “Why?” There were investigations at the time, which this committee perhaps remembers, that revealed that the Commerce Department knew what the risks were, but ap- proved the exports anyway. Why did it do that? Because it was fol- lowing a policy of preferring trade to national security. I am going to suggest later that we are at risk of doing the same thing now. The United States was not alone in supplying Iraq. I have pro- duced a graphic here from The New York Times which my organi- zation produced that shows the worldwide contribution to Iraq's programs. You will notice by looking at this graphic that German firms sold as much to Iraq to its mass destruction weapon pro- grams as the rest of the world combined. We produced this pie chart, which is divided down the middle with Germany on one side and the rest of the world on the other. German firms help increase the range of Iraq's Scud missiles. Those increased-range Scuds killed our troops in Saudi Arabia and they also killed Israeli civil- ians in Tel Aviv. I must say, from my own part, I find it shocking that Germany did so much to create Iraq's weapon of mass destruction threat and seems to be the main country in the West today that is least will- ing to confront it. As far as I can tell, these exports, the ones that we have tracked, are still a problem today. They have never been fully accounted for. So, if we actually sent troops into Iraq, to counter the mass de- struction threat that Iraq poses, I think we have to accept the fact that these troops will be trying to undo what our own Western companies have created. I would like, also in my testimony, you will notice that I also cite the example of Huawei Technologies. That is a Chinese company that helped Iraq build its air defenses. Today we are sending pilots 182 in to try to destroy those air defenses. Those pilots are taking risks to knock out technology that U.S. exports have helped create. The fiberoptic technology, the switching equipment and other things, high-speed computers that went from Huawei Technologies, from the United States went from some of our leading companies. They made Huawei a big exporter out of a very small, rather insignifi- cant company. The effect is that by not being prudent in export control with re- spect to Huawei, we have enabled Iraq to build an air defense net- work that threatens our pilots. The lesson here is that when you decide on a policy of allowing sensitive exports to go out in order to increase export revenue, those exports don’t just go away. They can come back to bite you. So, this is not just a question of trade, it is a question of body bags. I would like to end my statement here by suggesting that we may be making the same mistake now that we made in the late 1980s, when we created the Iraqi threat that we are still trying to deal with. I am sure the committee has been briefed on the ques- tion of aluminum tubes, a shipment that was intercepted on its way to Iraq. Our government sources have been cited as saying they think the tubes were intended for centrifuge needs to process uranium to a nuclear weapons grade. As it turns out, these tubes and their equivalent that is maraging steel and carbon fibers, which can also be used to make the critical part of centrifuges, these are items for Iraq's weapons effort. All of these technologies fit the mass market criteria that are contained in the new Export Administration Act. And, that is why I have opposed this act before this committee. My staff— Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Milhollin, I hate to hold you up during the statement, but you are saying that the tubes that we are talking about, which some experts believe were to be used for the nuclear weapons program, would, in your opinion, be legalized for sale if we passed the proposed Export Administration Act? Dr. MILHOLLIN. That is right. I had my staff do a study this week. We called a number of aluminum suppliers in the United States to inquire whether aluminum tubes that meet the export control criteria in the present EAA would be available widely and the answer is “Yes.” My staff was able to order—well, they were invited to order thousands of these tubes from numerous suppliers in the United States. Now, if you look at the criteria in the new Export Administration Act for mass market items, those criteria would be met by this availability. So what we would be looking at here if we pass the current EAA is that we would be, with one hand, helping Iraq make nuclear weapons, and with the other hand, smashing Iraq for doing so with imports. I can't believe that this is a wise policy. I don’t think our country can have it both ways. We can't be telling the world that we are the leaders in export control, we can't be asking all the other coun- tries in the world to help us keep this material out of the hands of terrorist-supporting nations, and at the same time to facilitate our own industry decontrol it for export. I know that the members of the committee must be saying to themselves, “Well, we would never sell this to Iraq, but the fact is, 184 it has to be taken on a larger picture. For example, the U.S. re- fused to sell us satellite for our Arab sat. Arab sat is run by direc- tor general, who is an Iraqi. It is owned by percent by Iraq, 70 per- cent by Saudi Arabia, but they appointed an Iraqi director who was a friend of mine. And, he says the U.S. export controls were so tight that he tried to find other suppliers and he went to the French and they sold it with no condition. The U.S. concerns were military use. Is this satellite going to be used for military purposes or not. And nobody wanted to sign for that in the region for fear there might be war they might be using it for communication other purposes. So, the first Arab sat was French. The second Arab sat, when the U.S. saw that other suppliers are not as concerned as they are, they relaxed the controls and sold us the second Arab sat almost with no conditions. So, you see, I mean the thing is the ex- port controls has to be either global and with the U.S., also, and it make export control has to also some kind of enforcement from its partners on the other side. I try here to give also some sense of the size and the work built of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs. The fissile ma- terial, export fissile material acquisition work by Iraq is really a minor concern. It could happen. Iraq could change its policies under pressure and probably try to acquire fissile material the short way or the fast way, but Iraqi nuclear weapon program is a very serious one. It is built around making turning Iraq into a nu- clear power in the region. Buying materials in the black market is not a sure thing to do to carry this program through. So, Iraq built a large portion, 90 percent of its program, to actually manufactur- ing the fissile material locally that is enriching uranium locally. Iraq has a supply of uranium and also has local supplies of ura- nium from its own deposits. It is not viable as it is in the West but they are—for Iraq cost is not a major factor, and for Iraq they are of significant enough percentage to be possible to extract. So, Iraq has the local uranium resources, all it needs is enrichment to turn this uranium into weapon grade and use and produce as much as it wants nuclear weapon materials. To get a sense of this, after the Gulf War, Iraq turned its nuclear engineers and nuclear teams into the civilian sector for two rea- sons. First, to get a way out of the way of the inspectors, and as such, they are not available most of the time for inspectors to talk to; second, when it worked in the civilian sectors, it acquired the civilian sector capability as part of its resources. So, actually, Iraq incorporated all industries outside even atomic energy and all other resources engineering, scientific capabilities, universities, indus- trial infrastructure in its weapon program. In 1994, Saddam declared the program to make 1,000 Ph.D.s he called it. It is really a larger scale program to train, on a graduate level, scientists and engineers to be incorporated into the weapons of mass destruction program. It is very hard for the universities to accept this program because what it does, it grants degrees on work it will not see. The universities has to grant masters and Ph.D. For thesis of research it doesn’t know, hasn’t seen. So the law was promulgated forcing the universities to accept our word, the weapons of mass destruction branch's word that this is of this caliber, masters or Ph.D. What this does is incorporate the 185 university structure into the weapons of mass destruction, also. The university professors became unwitting partners to creating the staff needed for the weapons of mass destruction. So, what we are looking at is really a giant factory, a whole coun- try turned into a giant factory for weapons of mass destruction work on all its phases, whether research or production. So, you have the chemists, the biologists, the physicists, the engineers, all from universities being incorporated into the program. Also, inten- sive hiring under the umbrella that the atomic energy is now work- ing for the civilian sector, it could incorporate a large amounts of people in its ranks and it is really economically viable because they do take some civilian contracts. Now, just take the program for the inspectors they would go to atomic energy and they say what is this scientist, he is working in such and such civilian program, he is no longer working for us. They produce contracts and works and in that civilian sector and as such, become unavailable to the inspectors for future debriefing. Gradually Iraq, and Iraq understood from the beginning that its assets are not just pieces of equipment and facilities, but rather its scientists. Any equipment destroyed can be either built internally or imported later probably a better version and newer model. But, the scientists are its assets. So, it made it difficult for the inspec- tors to talk to the scientists right from the start. This gradually created tensions between the inspection teams and the Iraqi gov- ernment minders who make it available to scientists and engineers. When the Iraqi government woke up to the fact that the inspec- tors’ main concern after 1996 was the scientists and engineers, things started to going downhill. And, ended up in stopping the in- spection process in 1998, and the whole thing collapsed. Now here is the test: If Iraq is serious about allowing the inspec- tors back in to check its weapons of mass destruction program, should allow the inspectors to take the Iraqi scientists into a neu- tral territory and allow them, also, if it has nothing to hide, to take their families with them and the members designate as their im- mediate families and allow them in a neutral territory without Iraqi minders to be debriefed and talk to inspectors. My bet is Iraq will refuse this. It already refused when inspec- tors were talking about this. They called them human vampires, . want to suck Iraqi blood. They took it from the human rights angle. My guess any of these scientists they came to a neutral territory with his family would ask for asylum somewhere. 90 percent of them would. There are hundreds of millions in its share of Iraqi oil sources that can support those scientists abroad and it can cre- ate the equivalent of the U.S. witness protection program for these scientists. This is not new. In 1998, we asked for this and the American Federation of Science actually wrote a letter at the time and we got no answer from the Clinton administration. Another thing about the inspection regime, there is a defector en- gineer who was, I believe, interviewed in The New York Times, brought with him contracts of something like 20 sites he built, he is a civil engineer. They included underground small-scale labs with lead impregnated concrete and residents on top of the concrete layers which indicate radiation work. Small underground labora- 186 tories everywhere, under bunkers, under palaces, under their build- 1ngS. Now, this is what he tells us. The other part of the story, there is an organization created in 1995 headed by Saddam's younger son, Qussey. It is called the counter-monitoring group. What it does once inspectors are known where they are going to go, out of 270 inspectors, only 6 were surprise inspections. So, Iraq always knew it was happening. Once Iraq find out where the inspectors are going to go for every site there is a backup site. The monitoring group, the counter-monitoring organization, what it does, has its own technicians and its own engineers and its own transport system. They go to that site, remove all the relevant equipment, incriminating material, documents, and of course, the scientists and engineers, and take them to the backup site. And, under this system, and this is being divvied up, according to the information we are getting right now has been divvied up is there is a growing organization since 1995 until the inspectors left. This is not a very viable organization with lots of resources, and its business is to defeat the inspectors. It runs ahead of them, sani- tizes sites, removed scientists, removed documents, everywhere the government and this engineer confirmed this to us by telling us for every site, he built a second backup site with the exact same specs. So what we have here is a system that is functioning for a long time now since 1995, that is, is expert at removing equipment and people and materials from anywhere the inspectors want to go. Now, how the inspectors will find their way around in Iraq when they go back, and how would they be able to find any smoking gun, I don't know, and I don’t think they will. Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Hamza, thank you very much for a very impor- tant Statement. [The prepared statement of Dr. Hamza can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 230.] - Mr. HUNTER. And, what I would like to do is go now to questions, if we could. I had one just to start off with. You—I think the ques- tion that is on everyone's mind is, in your estimation, is there a nuclear weapon program going on in Iraq now that is getting close to maturity, and if not, how far away is it? Dr. HAMZA. Iraq resolved all its nuclear technology bottlenecks in the 1990s. In 1993, it resolved the technology bottleneck for enrich- ment by diffusion. In 1999, the Germans gave Iraq the complete technology, actually gave Iraq 130 classified reports and installed one complete centrifuge unit and one barshield installation and gave Iraq also all this for $30,000. And, gave Iraq also around 20 carbon fiber cylinders, which are state-of-the-art centrifuge cyl- inders for around $1 million. This is, according to his lawyer, who came here and talked about it a few years back. Now, this is something like one year of research given to Iraq up front. So, Iraq now has already the units which were later given to inspectors, but it has the videotapes of the units were installed, how the units were operating and videotapes of the lectures and demonstrations given to them, and they have 130 classified reports that cover all aspects of centrifuge. Iraq never puts all its eggs in one basket. It has another tech- nology for uranium enrichment which is called diffusion. The 187 switch from diffusion to centrifuge was held up by one critical part which is called the barrier which enriches uranium, the barrier al- lowed the light uranium to go through the fissile uranium, and the heavier isotope of uranium, less amount goes through so it enriches gradually every time it goes through the barrier. Iraq could not develop the barrier until 1987. So, it switched to centrifuge in 1988. In 1993, Iraq developed a fully working barrier. And, as such, declared it also in 1996 in its final declaration. As such, Iraq has two technologies with no bottlenecks into enriching uranium. The aluminum tubes, by the way, could be used for ei- ther. What you need aluminum for is aluminum can withstand UF–6, which is highly corrosive. Few materials can withstand that, including maraging steel and aluminum. They can withstand that. They could use them in ei- ther. So, if somebody can object that the specs are not high enough or this and that, they could be used in either system. Both systems are ready to go in Iraq. And, both systems require very little im- ports outside to get them going. My estimate is that Iraq, in two years of complete and putting together enough facilities for full- scale production and within three years, to have enough for two to three nuclear weapons. Mr. HUNTER. And how many weapons in two or three years? Dr. HAMZA. Two to three. Mr. HUNTER. Two to three. Okay. Thank you very much, Dr. Hamza. And Mr. Milhollin, I think the one question that I think came out very clearly from your testimony was a question about this—the now famous tubes that we are talking about, these alu- minum tubes that you say that your analysis of the EAA, the Ex- port Administration Act that is being proposed, would become basi- cally legal. And that the transfer of which would become legal. Is gºnder the so-called mass market provision that is in that EAA'. Dr. MILHOLLIN. Yes, it is. The mass market provision is found in section 211 of the bill, I believe. And, if you would like, I can just go through the criteria very quickly for you. The first—the criteria are very broad and, I must say, they are unprecedented. They have never been introduced in any law in the United States yet. The first criterion is that the item must be available for sale in large volume to multiple purchasers, and my staff certainly determined that that was true. Second, the item must be widely distributed through normal commercial channels. That is also true. There are at least a dozen, and probably scores of distributors in the United States. I would say scores of distributors in the United States and certainly many distributors in foreign countries that make this material and can sell it. The item must be conducive to shipment and delivery by generally accepted commercial meanings of transport, and these tubes can be delivered by truck. And then, finally, the items may be used for their normal in- tended purpose without substantial and specialized service pro- vided by the manufacturer. That is also true. So the problem we have is that these criteria are very broad and if you just do experi- ments with particular items, you will find that it would be very 188 easy to show that not only high strength aluminum, but also maraging steel and carbon fibers would also meet these criteria. Carbon fibers are used to make tennis rackets. Maraging steel is used to make lots of different things. I think that if this bill be- comes law, we are going to find demonstrations that any number of things that have been controlled for a long time will be mass market and therefore, under the bill, the Secretary of Commerce has no discretion. He must decontrol the item. So, what concerns me about this is that we are getting excited about something going into Iraq for making nuclear weapons and, at the same time, we seem to be on the verge of decontrolling the same technology. It just seems to me to make no sense. Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Mr. Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I have several questions, but I will reserve them and yield at this time to the gentleman from South Carolina. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Skelton. Mr. Milhollin, let's be clear. The Export Administration Act which you are describing, which is still pending, would not override would it, the specific import sanc- tions restrictions imposed upon Iraq” Those would still stand and they would still govern what imports could go to Iraq. Dr. MILHOLLIN. That is true from the United States. My point is that export controls like this are multilateral, and if the United States drops these controls, so will everybody else. And, we will have no hope of interdicting shipments from the rest of the world for products that no longer are controlled. Mr. SPRATT. But, every country under the United Nations would still be obliged, whether they were complying or not, to impose these restrictions, import restrictions upon Iraq, except for certain exceptions mostly for humanitarian purposes. Dr. MILHOLLIN. Well, if these are dropped from our export con- trol list, there would be no reason to retain them on the special list of goods that is—the special goods control list that has been drawn up for Iraq, because that control list for Iraq is taken from ours and other—is taken from multilateral export control laws. I mean, the wording is identical. So, if we dropped it from here, it is going to be dropped from the U.N. restrictions on Iraq and it will go under oil for food. Mr. SPRATT. Okay. Mr. Hamza, or Dr. Hamza, you described the futility of inspections. Were you in Iraq at the time that the U.N. inspectors, UNSCOM, uncovered four uranium-enriched, or four different nuclear plants, the centrifuge plant that was then par- tially constructed, the gaseous diffusion plant that I think you have done a pilot project of Were you there then, and if so, how is it that they were able to find and destroy these facilities? Dr. HAMZA. Iraq actually was not very determined to keep all the pieces of equipment. They wanted the controversy over with and the inspection—Iraq understood the inspection process as not a se- rious disarmament process in a sense. The whole inspection process was based on dismantling equipment and facilities, had nothing to do with the knowledge base or the scientists or the engineers. Mr. SPRATT. Now, how would you do that, though? How would you deal with the brain power base in order to- 189 Dr. HAMZA. For example, initially there was no demand or seri- ous demand by the inspectors to talk to the scientists. And, they accept it. The scientists Iraq offered as a front. They did not go try to get to the base, actual working base of the whole scientific and engineering enterprise. Mr. SPRATT. But, did they destroy the physical facilities? Dr. HAMZA. The physical facilities were destroyed. Iraq didn't care about that, because they can rebuild them. Iraq can rebuild now, a physical plant within months. What remains is the equip- ment. Equipment can be imported or rebuilt. Mr. SPRATT. Thus far, that has kept them from building appar- ently a centrifuge plant, an enrichment plant, has it not? Dr. HAMZA. How do we know? The order is in the tens of thou- sands. That tells you it is not a process in which you are trying to make one or two. What is given is two centrifuges. That is all that was given, and some tubes, something like a thousand tubes. That is all the inspectors got. What is imported now—and this is the order that was caught. I don’t know if there were others that were not intercepted, is tens of thousands of tubes. That tells you also on the other side that Iraq is now in the plant-building stage, not in the process of research and development. You don’t need that many tubes for research and development. You need that many tubes when you are putting together a huge plant for a huge facility. Mr. SPRATT. What would you do if you were given the authority to write the charter for the new inspectors so that they would have maximum effectiveness? Dr. HAMZA. That is what I did. That is, ask for the scientists out in a neutral territory and talk to them without minders. Iraq never allowed inspectors in the best of time to talk to the scientists with- out minders. And, as such, all the information extracted was defec- tive. Mr. SPRATT. What if they were authorized to take the scientists out of country, noncoercively but take them out of country for ques- tioning and interrogation? Dr. HAMZA. That happened once, but Iraq suggested which sci- entists go in 1993. They went to Vienna. Iraq sent three scientists. They were all party members. They were all loyal such and such. They were not the top scientists and the real active ones. They went to Vienna. The inspectors got nothing out of them and they went back. This is not the kind of debriefing I am talking about. It is actually—because now there is much better information on who did what inside Iraq. I mean the U.S. and the international atomic energy know in detail who did what in Iraq and they can precisely say who they want and who is important to talk to. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Hefley. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’ll try to be brief so that others can ask questions. But, Dr. Hamza, I am curi- ous as to what the thinking process was when—around the lab or around the facilities. What were you told or what did you discuss among yourself was the reason for developing what you were doing, the nuclear program or any other weapons of mass destruction? 190 What was the reasoning given for doing this and focusing on this particular type of program? Dr. HAMZA. I detail this in my book. The initial impetus for the whole nuclear enterprise in Iraq was a book by Paul Jarda, an American, called “The Israeli Bomb.” And, the book states that Israel, within a decade or two, will have something like 200 nu- clear weapons. When I went to Iraq in 1970, everybody was talking about that book. And, there were 50 copies of it in the atomic en- ergy library. Saddam read it, and within a year we got his envoys asking us what to do. So, the whole thing started as a strategic matter with Israel. Israel has three population centers, so the program was designed initially to produce something like three, four nuclear weapons. So, the reactor, which we bought from France, was more or less enough to do that within, say, a decade. So, it is very—it started as a very basic, a very simple weapon program with no large scale production in mind, just a few nuclear weapons, and that is that, just to coun- terbalance Israel. If, some day, we sit around a table with Israel, we have a card in our hands. Then the Iraqi-Iran War started and, thus, Saddam panicked and then he wanted a large arsenal to counter the Ira- nian hordes, who were coming into Iraq in droves and there was no stopping them. Later on, he found out that he can stop them with chemical weapons. But, all the same, the program was redi- rected into a larger scale of production possibly. But, the orders we got initially in 1982 is to design a program that could produce up to six nuclear weapons a year. That is a huge program by Iraq, by any small country standard. So, that is why the diffusion. We went into diffusion and later into centrifuge, which are a larger scale of production than the re- actor. The reactor is difficult to duplicate. It limits you by its size. When you make a centrifuge, it is up to your capacity on how many centrifuges you want to make. You make a factory to manufacture centrifuges, and as many you make, as much as you get more prod- uct. So a product is not limited in an enrichment facility as it is in our Riyadh facility. That is why we switched later after the Israelis bombed the reactor, the Saudis offered to buy us another one. Saddam accepted the offer in principle, took the money and switched it to an enrichment facility. So, enrichment is the Pakistani now what they chose and the new choice for this kind of program, and it would give Iraq–Iraq no longer wants two, three nuclear weapons. That is why I don't think Iraq is very aggressive even after I left. I left in 1994. I don’t think Iraq is very aggressive in trying to purchase this. I think Iraq is aggressive in trying to get enough equipment to produce it locally because this is the long-range prospect of having enough arsenal and a credible deterrence for Iraq for the region to be living under the immunity of this umbrella to do what it wants. To go more into terrorism, use its other options of chemical and biological weapons, menace the region. Do what it wants with total immunity. To do that it needs several nuclear weapons and a credi- ble deterrence for its system. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much. Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. 191 Mr. Ortiz. Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome both of our witnesses today and Dr. Hamza, let me ask you this ques- tion: Prior to the Iran War, and maybe you have touched on this, but I am sorry that I came in a little late, the Gulf War, where did Iraq obtain technology and materials for the different parts of items of mass destruction? And, the reason I ask you is because I See a parallel with what is happening in Afghanistan and what is— what has happened during the Gulf War in Iraq. Did anybody in- tentionally arm Iraq with this kind of materials that would develop materials of mass destruction? Dr. HAMZA. No. Actually, that is the problem. This thing is not controllable from the outside. There is no way you can control it from the outside because the system is intended to acquire weap- ons no matter what you do. That is why inspection would be point- less, because if you inspect now and take away what they have, what guarantee do you have in the future they don't put it together back again? The knowledge base is there. The scientists are there and the will is there, a very strong determination. One point on this is since 1995, we didn’t have a single person from the weapons of mass destruction leave the country or defect. Not one. After the defection of Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law, that was the last. Nobody from the core of the program, that is why we have no witnesses there. All the evidence is circumstantial. But also, one should notice that the evidence was circumstantial before the Gulf War that there was an Iraqi nuclear weapon program which was found to be true. Was circumstantial in the case of India and turned out to be true. So most nuclear weapons case all you can find about them is some indications where they are going and most of the time it is true. Now, Iraq was not supplied intentionally with weapon tech- nology, but the man who gave us the centrifuge technology, Qadeer, was tried in Germany. And, the judge found the German government so complicit and so knowing if what he is giving us and doing nothing about it, he sentenced him only to time served. He did not put him in jail for more than the time he already spent. And this is also another lesson. I mean, the only man caught giv- ing us weapons of mass destruction technology was sentenced to time served. Nobody ever went to jail for providing us with the technology for weapons of mass destruction. Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HUNTER. Okay. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Bartlett. Mr. BARTLETT. I want to thank our two witnesses very much. Ap- preciate your testimony. Mr. Milhollin, clearly we are on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, we do not want to sell material to Iraq that could be used in their weapons programs. On the other hand, we are having a very difficult time maintaining an adequate military industrial base in this country. Now, most of the materials that are listed in your two charts are dual-use materials and many of them are widely available for a number of other sources in the world. Now, how do we determine what we will export and what we will not when on the one hand, the material is dual use material, broadly available, could be used 192 for other programs, broadly available from other places in the world while on the other hand, we are trying very hard to main- taining an adequate military industrial base. Whichever way we make that decision, we are putting at some risk our national secu- rity, are we not, and how do we decide what is the right balance there? If we cannot maintain an adequate and military industrial base, are we not putting our national security at some risk? Dr. MILHOLLIN. You are correct. It is a decision and you are cor- rect that—but, I would say that there is an assumption which I would question and that is that export controls have a negative— have a significant negative impact on our military industrial base. I don't think the case for that can be made. The items that are con- trolled are only those items that can be—that if diverted can be specifically useful in making weapons of mass destruction. That slice of our economy is very tiny. Mr. BARTLETT. You think that is such a small percentage of what we export that we are not putting our industrial base at risk by denying those exports? Dr. MILHOLLIN. No question. I mean, the numbers prove it. Right now, first of all, we are approving over 90 percent of everything that even goes through the licensing process. So, the number of things that are actually denied is only a tiny fraction of that which goes through the process. And, that which goes through the process is only a tiny fraction of our economy. It is something like a frac- tion of, a small fraction of 1 percent. You—there is no sense or sen- sitive enough to measure any kind of economic and employment impact on the United States from export controls. Because they have such a slight impact. So for me, I think that prevention is much cheaper than cure. That is, Iraq gives you the case where you are going to have to cure a problem created by loose export controls and the cure is expen- sive. It is expensive in lives. It is expensive in money and expen- sive in just in the time it takes our government to figure out what to do about this. I think that far outweighs the small cost to our industry, to the small number of companies that actually make things that are controlled. Mr. BARTLETT. There is an old adage that says that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. We somehow forget that today when we have broken our ties with the common sense past, haven't we? Let me ask you a question about weaponizing these biological agents. I think that everybody recognizes that it is very much easi- er to produce these biological weapons than it is to weaponize them. And, until you are able to weaponize them, even though you may have very large quantities of these, you may be very ineffec- tive in using these. How robust is the Iraqi program at weaponizing these agents? Dr. MILHOLLIN. My expertise is primarily in nuclear and missile technology, and so I would like to use this as a preface to the an- swer I give. I think that from reports we have heard, that there is an estimation that Iraq did make progress in weaponizing an- thrax. But, whether that progress is sufficient so that it could today launch a successful anthrax attack, I am not so sure I know the answer to. But, it is an excellent question. Of course, the ab- sence of inspections makes it all the more difficult to answer with 194 made over the last decade under the understanding that the world had changed, threats were gone essentially because the Cold War was over and that we didn't need to worry about the spread of tech- nology that could help terrorists. I would look at things we decontrolled. I would also look at what terrorist nations, terrorist supporting nations and terrorist groups need most to make the kind of weaponry that we think is most likely to be made, and then I would try to identify the technologies necessary for that and draft a new set of export controls that are designed for the post September 11 world. I think we need to put our best experts to work on that and we need to do it. In the case of the pending bill, it was conceived and debated be- fore September 11. So I think the first thing we need to do is treat that bill as a piece of ancient history and agree among ourselves that we need to start over and we need to think through a new set of export controls specifically aimed at things that threaten us the most, which is international—one of which is international terror- ism. So that is what I would do. Mr. TAYLOR. Dr. Hamza. Dr. HAMZA. I am not very familiar with the exact rules so I will restrict myself to the following; that is Mr. TAYLOR. What troubles me, Dr. Hamza, is we make good rules and then we give either the Secretary of Defense or the sit- ting President the availability to waive them. Let's face it. How do you get to be President? You accept campaign contributions. Do those campaign contributors sometimes call the President, and say “Gee, I would like this rule waived.” It is not going to hurt Amer- ican security. It's my opinion they probably do. So, in addition to just taking that loophole out, what else would you do? Dr. HAMZA. Let me give another, the other side of the view here. Dr. Milhollin is very well versed in what is going on here. Let me just present the problems we have there and what would exports do for us. We had the electromagnetic enrichment of uranium. The electromagnetic is all unclassified. That is why it was chosen ini- tially. This is the largest program we had. The centrifuge was a minor program. Now, it is our main program because of technology exports. The program was hampered for simple things like vacuum parts, things that pump the air out of the equipment, high voltage sources, sparking, things like machining to a certain tolerance. So now, if you want to put exports, such that we will not do what we can do, then all these equipment has to be under some kind of restriction to a country like Iraq. This is very broad. This covers huge sectors, high voltage; I mean, how can you stop a country from importing high voltage equipment. Vacuum pumps. They are used everywhere in making liquid nitrogen and making oxygen and making all kinds of so—but these things stopped us. For ten years we could not get over them to a degree that we will have a production system. We stayed in the pilot plant stage with the few units trying to get resolve the problems of these units because we couldn't resolve the basic simple technologies involved. So if you are looking at a country like Iraq and want to stop it through technology controls, through export controls, I think it will be a very hard and very broad. I mean, after all, I mean 90 percent what have goes into a nuclear weapon is regular technologies, ma- 195 chining, casting, furnaces, equipment like this, fuses, some simple electronics and some complicated also, electronics. But, so, I don't know. I cannot help in this because what I look at is what we built is 90 percent of regular import. Some ten percent are the sensitive ones and these are probably the ones one should keep an eye on. Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I see the red light, but apparently we are all willing to miss this very important procedural vote. Mr. SAXTON. Actually Mr. Taylor, Ms. Davis is sitting anxiously waiting for her chance. Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. If I could, for the record, I would like both of you to tell me how many years do you think it will be, if it has not already occurred, before either a terrorist state or a terrorist organization purchases a working weapon of mass destruction from the former Soviet Union. Because, I am still dumbfounded why anyone tries to go to all the trouble of building a bomb when appar- ently there is so much material and so many weapons available in the former Soviet Union in apparently a nation that is in chaos. Mr. SAXTON. If you could Mr. TAYLOR. For the record. I understand Ms. Davis wants to get to her questions. Mr. SAXTON. Yeah, we are going to let you answer that perhaps in writing. Mr. TAYLOR. Unless you can say it in a word or two, I am sure she could forgive me that. Mr. SAXTON. Do you want to take 30 seconds? But, we really need to move on to Ms. Davis because of the situation we find our- self in with votes. Dr. MILHOLLIN. Do you want us to answer in 30 seconds or do you want us to just— Mr. SAXTON. I guess we prefer that you submit your answer to us in writing at this point. Is that all right, Mr. Taylor? Mr. TAYLOR. Sure. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 283.] Mr. SAXTON. Ms. Davis. Here's what—we are in a series of three votes. Mr. Hunter left to catch the first vote. He is going to come back so I can catch the second two votes and so we will try to ac- commodate your time by continuing to move forward. Ms. Davis. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I’d prefer not to miss the first vote, Mr. Chairman, but— Mr. SAXTON. You and I are going to run over there together. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I will do this as quickly as I can. Dr. Hamza, you made a statement earlier. You said in quotes that even if the, you know, the inspectors go over and they were to remove, you know, whatever Saddam has over there, that it wouldn’t make any difference because in your words, the will is there and a strong determination. Where is that will coming from? Is it just Saddam Hussein? If Saddam Hussein were to be removed, are you saying that that wouldn't matter either, that there is still the will and the strong determination by whom? Dr. HAMZA. It is not just Saddam. It is also the Bath Party, which came on the basic idea of revival of Iraq's power or our power and also as implemented by Saddam, this meant to him that is more weaponry and more militarization of the whole country. 197 we have in terms of controls, what we had before 1991 and what we put in place afterwards. The essence, I think of Mr. Spratt's questions, Mr. Milhollin, was the effect that we still—there are still ostensibly controls in place, for example, for the aluminum tubes, even if the tubes fit under this so-called classification of something that is mass marketed. And, your response was that you are still going to have a problem as a result of us essentially legalizing those sales. Could you explain that in a little more detail? Dr. MILHOLLIN. Right now, aluminum tubes are controlled for ex- port by all the countries in the nuclear suppliers group, which con- tain, which includes most of the countries in the world that can make aluminum tubes of this kind. That is also true for maraging steel and carbon fibers. So if we look around the world, we see our principal trading partners and allies controlling things in the same way we do. They control all of these technologies for export, which means that—it doesn't mean that there is a prohibition against the export. It means that if you want to sell it to somebody, you have to get a license and the reason for that is that these things are spe- cially—can be used to make nuclear weapons. Well, if we detect a shipment on the way somewhere of a con- trolled technology, the fact that it is controlled gives us a diplo- matic place to stand when we talk to the country that is supplying it. We can say to them, “Look, this is controlled. You have obliga- tions here. We don’t think you are meeting your obligations, there- fore we are asking you to stop this shipment.” If the if we change our law now and de-control these things, we will no longer have that platform. There will no longer be any basis for saying to an- other country, “Look, you are undermining world security by selling this, because there won't be any decision by the world or by multi-through a multilateral export control regime that these things are dangerous and should be restricted.” That is my point. Mr. HUNTER. You know, I thought that the one statement by Dr. Hamza was—reflected a tragedy in the way our system works in that you mentioned Hewlett-Packard having told you that they— you couldn’t buy a certain system from them directly, but you could buy it from their Singapore outlet. What was that system again, Dr. Hamza. Dr. HAMZA. Just at the time the 368 process for the desktop com- puter, which just came out, was restricted for a country like Iraq. Just a simple desktop computer. Mr. HUNTER. But nonetheless, simple things like that are impor- tant for your weapons programs, are they not? Dr. HAMZA. Yes. We bought a fax machine also this way from London, which was fast at the time for our weapon design program. Mr. HUNTER. But, Hewlett-Packard told you that they couldn't sell that to you directly from a U.S. outlet of Hewlett-Packard, but that you could go to their Singapore store and buy it. And, the rea- son I think that is such a tragedy is because David Packard was such a great American defense leader. At one time, I believe was head of Defense Research and Engi- neering for a U.S. administration. Was certainly a chairman of the Packard Commission on—and lent a great deal of expertise to our country in terms of trying to keep us strong and invulnerable. And yet, his company, ultimately playing by the rules, but nonetheless, 198 I think, disserving our country, was essentially allowing an end- run around American laws. And, I think that is one of the I think is one of the real problems and real tragedies with our export laws that they allow us, if you manipulate them correctly, or you cir- cumvent them, you can—you can, while complying with the letter of the law, certainly not comply with the spirit of the law and cer- tainly not with the requirements of being a good citizen and trying to protect national security. But, I want to go back to 1991 because I can recall that after the war, we had a number of statements to the effect, the same effect as Dr. Milhollin has given us now, that we helped to built that military apparatus, and you heard in Congress a lot of resounding “Never again shall that happen.” And yet, Dr. Hamza, in the 1990s, the mid 1990s after the war was over, you were involved in the continuing weapons program for Saddam Hussein, is that cor- rect? And, that weapons program continued even though we had inspectors in the country. Is that right? Dr. HAMZA. Yes, 1993, as I mentioned, for example, the diffusion process, the bottleneck which, in the diffusion process for uranium enrichment, was a barrier. It was completed in 1993 when the in- spectors were there. Mr. HUNTER. So again, now, it has been—the point has been made by several members. They have pulled out these charts that showed how much we seized, almost like the Mexican government showing how much cocaine has been stopped from delivery across the border, and what they don’t show us is how much activity con- tinued to go on. And so, what you are saying is the nuclear weap- ons program was continuing even while we were trotting out these seizures and announcing with great flourishes that certain facilities had been shut down. Obviously, other facilities that we didn't know about were being opened up and were operating; is that right? Dr. HAMZA. That is correct. Mr. HUNTER. Well, then would you basically agree with—when we had two inspectors in here last week who told about their frus- trations and their feeling that they made almost no progress. And, one of our members said, “Well, what depth of inspection do you need to be sure that you are really sanitizing that entire weapons complex.” And, the answer was, “You need virtually an occupation of the country to be able to know that.” Is that your— Dr. HAMZA. Yeah, that's correct, because in no other way can you really get around to know where things are and get your hand on them because somebody is carrying before you go there and picking things ahead of you. And, unless you have a force to really control this, what is going on, there is no way you can get your hand on serious. Mr. HUNTER. Yeah. I think the person who was told two weeks ahead of time that an inspection team was going to be at a certain facility, and when they arrived, there were lots of nuclear weapons materials lying around and then he had to go explain that to Sad- dam Hussein. I would hate to be in his shoes at that point. It would be an act of gross negligence on the part of one of their gov- ernmental officials not—after they got the tip-off that the inspec- tion team was coming, not to have moved the materials. So, it looks 199 like we are going through an exercise, which is totally symbolic in nature, to invite inspectors back in on the basis that somehow that is going to solve this problem. Dr. HAMZA. How would it solve in the future? Suppose we solve it. We agree. I don't agree we are going to solve it now even. What is there cannot be found now. It is already organized in such a way it is impossible to find. But, suppose you did find it. Suppose in- spectors can claim knowledge they don’t have and can go in and take what is there. What guarantee do you have it is not going to put together, put back together again in the future and the whole program won’t be rejuvenated and working in say two years from now, three years from now? So, the whole thing depends on the will of the government. If the government is not willing to give this up, and it is not, for obvious reasons, throughout all the time and all the problem going every- body is going through, it lost hundreds of billions—well, I don't know, 100, 120 billion in oil revenues to keep the system. So, what guarantee is there, with a government that accepted such a huge loss, not to allow the system to be dismantled, it will in the future somehow forget about it and drop this option and let everything go? What kind of guarantee anybody has? Would any- body be really ready to guarantee this? Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask you another question. It has been men- tioned that Saddam Hussein is—has, and you mentioned that he basically got his scientists together and said we must move out on a program and have a nuclear weapons program. Did he—did you regularly get communications from Saddam Hussein or from his of ſº, to the nuclear weapons community, to the scientists commu- nity? Dr. HAMZA. I have just to make a point that Saddam founded all the WMD programs and the missile. He took over atomic energy personally, as chairman in 1973. Mr. HUNTER. He took it over personally? Dr. HAMZA. Personally. He ran all the WMD programs person- ally. He chose the administrators, he chose the staff, most of the senior staff. He also took away the financing of the WMD from the general government budget and made it into the revolutionary council budget, which is separate. So, he personally, because he runs the revolutionary council even when he was Vice President. The President never attended the meetings of the revolutionary council, so automatically as vice president, he became the chair- man. So, the whole budget was appropriated by him. The actual personnel chosen was by him. The approval of the programs were by him from day one. I mean, I went as a head of the Iraqi delegation to France in 1974 to purchase a reactor through his orders. He was my chair- man then. And, we-when we suggested negotiating a nuclear co- operation treaty with the France, India, he went personally and signed them, in France and in India. So, you—this is his own cre- ation. The whole WMD program, in all its phases is his personal creation. And, he nurtured it personally and followed it personally. There is nothing in the world that would make him give it up. Mr. HUNTER. Did you have any conversations with him? Dr. HAMZA. Yes. 200 Mr. HUNTER. Tell me about the nuclear reactor that the Israelis destroyed in-was it 1982? Dr. HAMZA. In 1981, June 1981. Mr. HUNTER. Was that reactor devoted to the weapons program? Dr. HAMZA. That reactor was actually internationally supervised facility. We were-Dr. Jaffer and I, the head of the nuclear pro- gram now there. We were actually planning on using it in some kind of arrangement to irradiate some extra uranium, which we have, and extract the plutonium out of that in a facility provided to us by the Italians. So, it was a slow, long-range process because the French were there. Inspectors will come every six months to in- spect this facility. When the Israelis bombed out that reactor, true, it delayed our program for some time. But, it was a relief to Sad- dam. He just did not want everybody looking over our shoulder * we are doing and we are cheating with the extra time we can IIlOl. He wanted a totally secret program, totally at our control. So when the Saudis offered to buy us another reactor, he refused. He took the money and diverted it into the enrichment program. He asked what alternative can we have to build our own system, and we told him it is enrichment. He jumped the staff from 400 work- ing in the French reactor to 7,000 in 5 years. The budget raised from 400 million to 10 billion by the onset of the Gulf War. Mr. HUNTER. To ten billion? Dr. HAMZA. To ten billion, the cost of the program at the onset of the Gulf War. So, actually what we had, what we started with, which was a nuclear program to basically ongoing to make two or three nuclear weapons or four max, turned into a large entity, which is meant to produce a larger amount of nuclear weapons and turn Iraq into a serious nuclear power in the region. Mr. HUNTER. And, in your estimation, we have heard a lot of es- timates from U.N.—the U.N. analyses as to how close Iraq was to having a nuclear weapon at the time of the Gulf War. How far away were you at that time? Dr. HAMZA. Actually, Ambassador Butler gave a very accurate es- timate, which is six months. Mr. HUNTER. You were about six months away? Dr. HAMZA. Yeah, six months away. Mr. HUNTER. And yet, the Western analyses before we had the war, the projections were that you were three to five years away. Dr. HAMZA. Yeah, exactly. And, that is— Mr. HUNTER. To what do you attribute that, because we have a lot of people we send to college and send to intelligence schools and are supposed to be great analysts of intelligence information, and yet they were totally off, obviously, with that estimate. To what do you attribute that huge disparity between what we thought Saddam had and what you, as a member of his nuclear weapons program, say you really did have, which was a six month time table? I mean, that ended up making a lot of congressmen look like fools because the congressmen, some very prestigious con- gressmen, would get up on the Senate and House floor, and would talk about how we had three to five years and how we should have sanctions against Iraq and slowly they would come around. And yet when we got there, we had this six month timetable we were deal- 201 ing with. To what do you attribute the gap between what we thought Iraq had, three to five-year program, and what they really had, which was six months to a nuclear weapon. Dr. HAMZA. It is security, the huge security, which controlled the flow of information out of Iraq. The security was so tight and so brutal, even people who defected did not talk about the program. I heard a man who was in charge of the communication between the tests for the bomb, testing explosives, and the equipment in an underground facility. And, he defected. And, we were terrified that at the time because security was hov- ering around us, how did you let him go and everybody was bang- ing us all the time that actually Kamel said that is it. Everybody will know now. And, nobody knew because he didn’t talk. He was afraid for his family. So, the security was so tight and so brutal and retribution, that anybody, even those who left, did not talk. So, in the end, the flow of information is what deceived every- body. For example, during the Gulf War, you bombed only three se- riously out of seven sites doing nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon facility itself, of which this guy ran out, the one I just told you about, the communication engineer. Okay, this is the man who left, he knew this facility. The U.S. did not know about it. They did not bomb it. So, the main nuclear weapons site was unknown. Three other sites were unknown. Out of seven sites, the U.S. bombed only three seriously and one was hit incidentally. This is control of informa- tion. This is security. Human intelligence is just not there. And, when you don’t have it, there is no way you can tell what is going on down there. Mr. HUNTER. What happened to the fissile material that you had at the time of the Gulf War? Dr. HAMZA. It was French fuel actually, which was bomber grade. And, it was delivered to the inspectors. Some of the roads were chopped for an experimental reason, but—to experiment with extracting the uranium out of it. But most of it was—remained in- tact and all of it with the chopped pieces was delivered to the in- spectors. Mr. HUNTER. So, what you had at that time was confiscated and that is what set the Iraqi program back again was the war and the interruption of the program and the war. Dr. HAMZA. Yes. The war and the six months was to make that one weapon. That was the estimate. It is not that a production fa- cility would be on-line, no. It was not six months away. What sºld be in the six months is one nuclear weapon using the French U16'1. Mr. HUNTER. And, then you would have—the production line to make more weapons would have followed on after that. Dr. HAMZA. Yeah. That was down the road, something like two, three years. Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Milhollin, it is a great opportunity to have you here at the same time as Dr. Hamza, because you are able to-we are able to get some insight literally from the inside and also have your analytical capability at hand. What are your—do you have any observations having listened to Dr. Hamza and understand what was going on on the other side of this—of these technology 202 transfers and in any lessons for the United States that you think we should learn from this? Dr. MILHOLLIN. Well, first I would like to say that I believe the reason for the difference in the estimates is that the intelligence community, giving the estimates of three to five years, assumed that the French fuel and some Russian fuel also in Iraq would not be diverted from international safeguards because they were being inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Mr. HUNTER. But, how often were they being inspected? Dr. MILHOLLIN. Not often enough, obviously. Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Hamza, how often? Dr. HAMZA. Presumably every six months, but that is when it started. After the six months, we immediately got the order to— Mr. HUNTER. So, I mean, what do you have? You have Saddam Hussein's promise that he really, truly is not going to use it for a weapon. Dr. MILHOLLIN. Well, one of the problems was the IAEA's rules. They had rules for what they called material balance areas. And, if you didn't have enough for a bomb in a particular area, then you didn’t have to inspect it as often. So, we had these inspections every six months because the agen- cy took the position that you shouldn’t add all the amounts up in the country. We learned after the war began that, in fact, Iraq had enough material for one bomb, but it was spread out at different locations. But, because of the IAEA rules, they weren't inspecting every three weeks as they would have to do if it were all in one place. So, we had a problem with the IAEA's own rules, that was only discovered after the war began. But again, I think the difference for the estimates, the difference in the estimates is the assumption that it would not be the the material would not be diverted. I think if you asked the CIA how long it would take if the material was subverted, they would have had a different answer. Dr. HAMZA. I have some comment on this. Actually, it is worse than this. The International Atomic Energy Agency, despite reports in Der Spiegel and other journals about the Germans providing us with the technology for uranium enrichment, declared Iraq to be clean in the area of nuclear weapons. So, the whole structure that was built around a destroyed reactor basically, the French reactor was destroyed and atomic energy kept growing. And, inspectors were there. Nobody asked “What are these buildings doing here? There is no reactor. What are you working on?” So what was going on is a huge infrastructure built up to make nuclear weapons, and at the same time, the IAEA vouching for Iraq that Iraq is not working on nu- clear weapons despite all kinds of reports being in the media about Iraq purchases and Iraq acquisition of nuclear technology, which is meant for nuclear weapons. Mr. HUNTER. Is there a chance that there is right now an operat- ing centrifuge facility in Iraq that we simply don’t know about? Dr. HAMZA. I believe, yes. I believe Iraq is now in the pilot plant stage for centrifuge production. I mean, it has some several units of centrifuge together. Of course, you need thousands to be in the production stage. But, I believe Iraq has several centrifuges right 203 now in working order. The order for the aluminum tubes indicate that this is past. Mr. HUNTER. That this is what now? Dr. HAMZA. That this is done. This is past. What is coming on is a production system, and for the production system, you need a huge number of tubes. But, Iraq is already over the pilot plant stage. Mr. HUNTER. Well, when you say they are already over the pilot plant stage, you think there is a chance that they may have enough material now to make a bomb? Dr. HAMZA. No. In the pilot plant stage, you don't get enough material to make a bomb. You get probably few kilograms at most over several years. Pilot plant stage would be something like 50 units operating 20, 30, 40, 50 units. What you need for a bomb is 1,000 and over. Then you can have probably enough for a bomb in a couple of years. Several thousand you will have enough in one year for a bomb. Mr. HUNTER. Is there any—now you have seen, Dr. Hamza, the discussion about these tubes, and speculation about them. Is there any doubt in your mind but that these tubes were to be used for the nuclear weapons program. Dr. HAMZA. No. Not with the specifications that we have been hearing about. They are high technology quality, not usually used or intended for use in ordinary, mundane everyday things. These are technologically viable tubes for a nuclear weapon program. Mr. HUNTER. Did you ever order these tubes yourself? Dr. HAMZA. No, I am not part of the enrichment until later part. I stayed with the enrichment untill 1985, and then left it and be- came Advisor to Atomic Energy, and later on worked in the nuclear weapon. Enrichment is another group. But, I was aware of what was going on because I used the output as the head of the nuclear weapon program for a while. Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Mr. Milhollin, tell us a little bit about, from your perspective, what is the state of security with respect to tech- nology transfers going to countries like Iraq pre-’91 and post '91? Did we really improve things with respect to the flow of militarily useful technology out of the West? Dr. MILHOLLIN. Well, during the mid and late 1980s, we had a policy of building up Saddam Hussein as a counter to Iran. That policy resulted in sharing intelligence information. It also resulted in directions in effect from the White House to the Commerce De- partment to facilitate dual-use exports to Iraq. This policy resulted in—I guess, I have to be fair—it resulted in a bending of the rules. Things were being held up because our government knew that they were sensitive, they were going to places that we knew were mak- ing missiles, we knew were making nuclear weapons or at least we suspected were making nuclear weapons. But, political pressure from the White House caused the govern- ment to lower the barriers, and this technology went out. That hap- pened in the late 1980s. It is a sad story, but it is, nevertheless, undeniable. Did we learn anything from this? We did. There was an effort after the Gulf War to increase export controls. We—there was an effort to adopt what is called a catch-all clause, meaning if you 204 know something is going to a nuclear, chemical, biological or ad- vanced conventional weapon program, you have to apply for a li- cense. But, that was about it. At the same time that the Gulf War taught us that we had had inadequate controls with respect to Iraq, the Cold War was ending. And so, we had our industry demanding that since the Coordi- nating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) was directed at the Soviet empire, and since the Soviet empire was dis- solving or had dissolved, that we didn’t need COCOM anymore. And, COCOM was the bedrock for Western export controls. So, our government, on the one hand, was deciding that we needed to do better on things like Iraq or countries like Iraq, but on the other hand, was being pressured to reduce export controls to everybody else. So, what we did was, overall we cut the control list so that now we are only controlling about ten percent of what we con- trolled in 1989. Mr. HUNTER. In your estimation, is that dangerous? Dr. MILHOLLIN. I think it is very dangerous. We are just now controlling, because of industry pressure, the very top slice of dual use technology. That is, only the most highly performing machine tools and so forth, whereas you can do a lot with things that oper- ate under those levels. Mr. HUNTER. That is what, you know, the one thing that struck me when we looked at the nuclear tests in Pakistan and India, and correct me if I am wrong, because you gentlemen are experts. But, I heard a comment from the scientific community, that what kind of surprised us was, they got a lot of the technology right out of the open from the United States, because our people didn’t think that anybody would want to make a mid-grade nuclear weapon or a crude nuclear weapon. We all thought that the only thing that would be utilized would be high-end stuff. But, in the end, a lot of the stuff that they used was published information; is that accu- rate'. Dr. MILHOLLIN. Well, as Mr. Hamza has said, and he is quite right, almost every component of a nuclear weapon is made with dual-use equipment. Very few things in a nuclear weapon require specialized things, specialized equipment that is dedicated to nu- clear weapon manufacture. Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Now, on that point, let me go to something that is in the EAA or in the proposed EAA. This committee has al- ways required close scrutiny by the Department of Defense. We have got a provision that says that if the Secretary of Defense says that an item doesn't go, it doesn't go. That has always been opposed by industry, and they give a num- ber of reasons. They say that the Defense Department is too slow, and “We will take care of everything in Commerce.” But, the point is sometimes you need to have some insight into the military appli- cation of what ostensibly looks like a commercial technology or a benign technology to know what the real value of that technology is to a weapons system, and sometimes that is an insight that only a Department of Defense expert might have. So, if you show it to somebody who is from the Department of Commerce, who is used to checking out various grades of flour products, he may not understand, for example, as we didn't under- 205 stand—I believe it was 1972 when we sold the Bryant grinders to Russia that makes tiny ball bearings. We found out later they used these tiny ball bearings to accurize their SS-18 warheads aimed at the United States. We didn't realize those Bryant grinders had the dual-use of being potentially very dangerous in a military sense. So, the difference between the Armed Services’ version of an ex- port control regime and that that is preferred by other more com- merce-minded committees, is we require Department of Defense (DOD) to have scrutiny. So, I guess my question to you is, do you think that that DOD scrutiny will help to discover dual uses for certain technologies where they may not be altogether apparent to other agencies? Dr. MILHOLLIN. I think that the committee's changes in the bill as it came through were excellent. I think you also have to say to yourself, “Well, is this really a military question, is this a security question, or is it simply a trade question?” If you agree that it is at least as much of a security question as it is a trade question, then I think you have to conclude that you need a security point of view in the decision process; and that means the Secretary of Defense. Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Hamza, do you have any comment on that? Dr. HAMZA. It is always in the end the intelligence that will tell you what possible dual-use item will be used by a certain country. Because, for example, for a country like Iraq, many more dual-use items should be restricted than, say, a country like, right now, Egypt. Because, in the end the intelligence angle, that should take care of what is possible and what is the intent right now in that place and how would they use it. So—but, for example, I give one case. Pakistan came to us with an offer to do the waste disposal system for our petrochemicals very cheaply; and we agreed. They took the contract, went to Eng- land and bought maraging steel tubes for use in the centrifuge pro- gram based on the Iraqi contract. Now, this is dual-use item, which was bought under false pretenses, which is Iraq. They never sent it to Iraq. They took the first batch to Pakistan. The second batch was good. So, you have this system—in the end, it is a Pakistani company. The British know that Pakistan is doing centrifuge program. Now, they either should have made sure that this goes to Iraq or should not have accepted the Pakistani pretext of using it. In the end, intelligence is what decides what you are going to do with this. Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Milhollin—incidentally, Dr. Snyder, if you have any questions, you just jump right in. We are going to go—I have been monologuing here for quite a while and hogging the time. So, go ahead, Dr. Snyder. Take all the time you need. Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your lengthy time you put in these hearings the last couple days. Actually, it is better now that I am talking. Because, before the votes we had a Marine Corps gunnery sergeant sitting in the audi- ence, and they are the closest thing to God I have personally en- countered, and I am more relaxed now that he is not here. I want to ask a question. I had a comment I would like to make about the hearing schedule. My comment, Dr. Hamza, is I was 206 really appreciative of you bringing up the point about the families and the personnel. It reminds me, you know, if you destroy General Rommel's tank but General Rommel isn't in it, you haven't really helped yourself much at all. This issue came up yesterday with Secretary Rumsfeld because, very correctly so, he says, our goal should be disarmament. And, my question is, I made the comment that, even so, if we completely disarm them but the scientific base of knowledge is still there, we still have a problem. Dr. Kay, when he was here a week or two ago, said that he wished he had had the ability to issue green cards. And, my ques- tion of him was, “Well, I wonder why we didn't give him that issue, the ability to take a willing scientist and family members out of the country permanently if they choose not only to get more reliable in- formation but that would be one less scientist to work in the pro- gram.” So, I appreciate you saying something about it. Mr. Milhollin, today's Post—I don't know if you saw this article. It has got pictures of what is referred to as aluminum parts, but the headline is “Evidence on Iraq challenged. Experts question if tubes were meant for weapons program”. The only question I want to ask—the last line says, according to their source here, “Government experts on nuclear technology who dissented from the Bush administration's view told him they were expected to remain silent.” Now, as a scientist and coming out of an academic environ- ment—I am a family doctor, generally—if somebody reports infor- mation to me, I expect to hear if there is dissenting views. How do you respond to that general—I am not asking about these alu- minum tubes, but— Dr. MILHOLLIN. I think that— Mr. SNYDER. Does it concern you, if this is accurate, that experts in the area of nuclear technology, according to this press report, were advised to remain silent? When they say “remain silent”, that means don’t tell Members of Congress that you disagree with the majority view. Does that concern you if government is giving that kind of order to our nuclear experts? Dr. MILHOLLIN. I think certainly I have always recommended a transparency in all cases, and particularly with respect to export controls. I think our whole export control process should be trans- parent, and I should be able to find out what the Commerce De- partment is approving. The rest of the world doesn't agree with me. But, with respect to shutting people up, I mean, I am not an ex- pert in that, but I don’t see why the committee couldn’t require that more than one view be given to it. It seems to me only fair that, by the nature of these cases, you are looking at only a certain amount of evidence and you are being required to draw an infer- ence from that evidence. So, I think it is perfectly appropriate for the committee to want to know more about the evidence and want to know more about the analytical process so you can make up your own mind who is more credible. Mr. SNYDER. Seems like we should not have to read that there are dissenting views in the newspaper. Mr. Chair, if I might, I want to make a comment about the com- mittee hearings. I appreciate you scheduling these hearings. I ap- 207 preciate you stepping forward in the absence of Chairman Stump in his difficulty with his illness. But, I don’t remember if it was you or Mr. Skelton who referred to the aggressive schedule of briefings. In my view, we have not had an aggressive schedule of briefings. I mean, for several weeks prior to the August recess, you know, I was watching what happened on the Senate side because they were having briefings on this or reading press reports about it. We now are in, apparently, on about a two-day workweek here where we go home or are going home at 3:00 today, and I am going to stay around because Mr. Spratt is holding—has arranged an in- formal briefing tomorrow on Iraq, but then we are coming back Tuesday night for votes. We are now down to the last two or three weeks of the session. I think it is going to be very difficult to have, “An aggressive schedule of briefings.” I have great respect for these two men, and the topic of export controls is a very important one. But, that is not the question that is on Members’ minds right now. I had dinner with about ten Mem- bers last night. I ran into people. What I hear people say in meet- ings this morning, they are saying “We need more information.” My questions aren't being answered. You know, this morning at the hearing when we were at our maximum we had less than a third of the members here. The ma- jority of subcommittee chairs and ranking members were not here. It is not because this topic isn't important. It is an important topic, and I appreciate both of your work in it, but it is not the question that is on people's minds. We have a resolution apparently coming from the White House today that very likely will lead to men and women in uniform going into harm's way. That is the issue that is on people's minds, and I would hope that we will have an aggressive schedule of briefings. I know that I am told we have Richard Perle and Ms. Matthews scheduled for next week. I would like to see us have both open and closed briefings with some of the former high-ranking military offi- cials that are publicly saying things. Wes Clark has written in the op-eds in the London Times and made multiple speeches. General Zinni has had some very promi- nent comments. General Scowcroft—these are people who are patri- ots who are asking questions about the topic. I think it could be helpful to have people of their caliber who have differing views both in the closed session, but also in open session, so that the American people might hear these former officers and their ex- change with the Armed Services Committee; and, frankly, I think we are running out of time. But— Mr. HUNTER. Let me—I thank my friend. Let me just comment. First, if you wanted to hear the dissenting view, it has been on the tubes, it has been presented. The fact that there is one very candidly to the committee—and I will be happy to talk to you in a classified setting about that, those dissenting views. Mr. SNYDER. You are talking about the aluminum tubes. Mr. HUNTER. Also, what the Post has said, that people were told to shut up, either wasn't carried out because they didn't or it is not true. I would be the last person to say—malign the Washington Post, but I think you used the word—you said they were expected 208 to not voice their opinions, and you paraphrased that as “they were advised”. Mr. SNYDER. The line from the news I just read, the press report, told they were expected— Mr. HUNTER. Well, expected doesn’t say somebody told them not to say anything. Does that mean that they received—they didn't get the invitation to the golf game of the week or somebody didn't invite them to lunch or does it mean somebody actually said “Don’t say your opposing view.” But, if you want to be informed on the opposing view, the fact that opposing views existed that were briefed to this committee, talk to me a little later. Second, we have had—we are doing these hearings as often as we possibly can. We were the first committee to have the Secretary. We have now had two classified briefings. We are going to have an- other one. In fact, our goal is to have every single member of the House— Incidently, every single member of the House was invited to the last classified briefing, not just the committee. Eighty-three mem- bers appeared. Our goal is to see to it that every single member of the House has multiple opportunities to come and get a classi- fied briefing. Now, with respect to all the personalities that are out there who have views, we want to get as many of them in as possible. We have been working to get General Clark. That was recommended by the minority side, by Mr. Skelton and by Mr. Spratt, that we get General Clark in; and I think that is an excellent recommenda- tion. We are trying to get him. So—but, last, to go to the relevance of this testimony, this testi- mony may be more important in my mind than the classified testi- mony we have heard or even the testimony of the Secretary yester- day, because the real question of what we do is largely juxtaposed against the issue of the effectiveness of inspections. Do inspections work? And, that was obvious from Mr. Spratt's—the thrust of Mr. Spratt's questions. How intense would the inspections have to be? What kind of duration? How could you make them work? Because inspections, obviously, are an alternative to military action. So, Dr. Hamza—the insight of Dr. Hamza as a person who was helping to lead the nuclear weapon program of Iraq and his de- scription of how he and his colleagues successfully evaded and avoided detection and how they continued the nuclear weapons pro- gram even while our inspections were going on and while Mr. Spratt was holding up these trophies of what they found—again, I was reminded of what we see in the San Diego papers all the time, which is the trophies of the big cocaine busts that are made on the border, and then we get inside information that shows us that, actually, for every pound that was busted and held up for the news conference there were ten pounds that went through. His ex- planation of how these inspections were successfully derailed, I think, goes to the heart of whether we accept inspections as a via- ble alternative to military action. So, I mean, I think we all have a candid and a straightforward and a sincere interest in whether or not these things work. So, his 209 testimony has been right on point. I wish every Member of the House could hear it. I would be happy to yield to my friend. Mr. SNYDER. I think as I talk to members, Mr. Chairman—and I don’t want to belabor this—but in terms of the topics chosen, a lot of the testimony here today, the discussion was on the export controls, which I don’t think is on people's mind. I think there are other questions out there. You are absolutely correct. Do inspec- tions work or not, and how could they work, and will we achieve the goal of disarmament? We had Dr. Kay and his colleague here a couple weeks ago. But, I think more common questions I am hearing from members are issues about if there was military action what would it look like, what would be the ramifications on the war on terrorism, what would be the potential cost in American lives and lives of allies, those kinds of questions that we have not addressed yet. The other point I would make is while I, you know, watch the Senate hearings and I can read op eds, to this point we have not had anyone before this committee, I don't think, that has expressed some of the concerns as expressed by General Zinni and General Clark. I know you are doing the best you can with these very ab- breviated week schedules, but I think questions can be more fully aired if we have people who have differing views. I appreciate you. I don’t mean to belabor it. Mr. HUNTER. Understand, my friend, I am going to try to get General Clark to be here. If you would like to have General Zinni, maybe we can get them both at the same time. I like to hear dif- ferent points of view. I think it is necessary for this debate. There have been discussions in closed session about—that go to potential military operations, but I think that it was pretty wise of the secretary not to talk about proposed military operations in open SeSSIOI). At any rate, we really appreciate these two gentlemen being with us. I noticed our distinguished ranking member is here, Mr. Skel- ton. You have as much time as you wish, sir. Mr. SKELTON. Just a comment—two things. Number one, in some instances it has been difficult to get a mi- nority person to come in on the short notice that we have had. Number two, we have inquiries in today to far more than those you named to see if they will testify, and some of them have indicated willingness to do so in closed hearing. I think in some cases it would be excellent for the American peo- ple to hear them. But, we will do our best and continue to do our best. I am not sure if the gentleman knows of the extensive efforts we have made. But, as Harry Truman says, we have done our damnedest so far to get them; and we hope we can fulfill your ex- pectations with people thinking on all sorts of sides of this very, very important and complex issue. Mr. SNYDER. Thank you. Mr. HUNTER. And, Mr. Skelton, did you have any other questions that you wanted to ask the witnesses? Mr. SKELTON. The only other question—I think that Dr. Hamza did answer it, but assume, Doctor, that the Saddam Hussein re- 210 gime is removed. What do we do with the various scientists and en- gineers the day after? Dr. HAMZA. That is a very good question, sir. Actually, Saddam already found an outlet for them. As a cover, he had to let them in to do some civilian work. So that when the inspector comes after them, they say, “We are not working on a weapons program. We are doing oil exploration or we are doing—building a refinery or we are building a power station.” They built Iraq's power station, not the generators themselves, but the control rooms and such. They built telephone exchanges. Now, if you call Iraq in two rings, you get anybody you want in Iraq. Of course, this is to get Iraq ready, the communications sys- tem, in case of war so an order can go fast between towns and to the required personnel. You have a very professional and very proven groups now which can be really used to rebuild Iraq. They already rebuilt Iraq after the Gulf War. We had no communications system, no telephones, no power, no gas; and they got all that back in line. Get them back to do that. They could— The Iraq system is really right now run down. Iraq need huge effort to rebuild and reconstruct, and these people can do that. So, I think these scientists and engineers are already, because of the cover required for their work, are already in the civilian sector. They just can be made to do that full time instead of part time just for show and just to cover themselves against inspectors or against whoever comes looking for them. Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Skelton. Mr. Milhollin, is there any other—having looked—you have looked at the Export Administration Act, the proposal that was put forth by the House Armed Services Committee and also by the International Relations—did you look at the International Rela- tions Committee's product? Dr. MILHOLLIN. Yes, I did, but that has been some time ago. Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Are there any—is there any advice that you would like to give us on those pieces of legislation? I mean, we are moving into this—it is interesting we are moving into this at a time when we are contemplating the passage of an Export Administration Act. At the same time, we are poised to have to spend a lot of American resources and risk American lives, perhaps, to eliminate the product of Western technology, some of it American technology, that passed under a previous regime. So my question is, having learned this difficult lesson, is there any ad- vice that you would recommend with respect to this act? It can be general or specific. Dr. MILHOLLIN. Well, first, general. I think my question—my an- swer earlier was that this really is historically obsolete, the law we are looking at. It was framed—it was negotiated, framed, debated, drafted before September 11th. We need to go back and start over. It doesn’t fit the new period of history we are living in. I think that if people of good faith and goodwill put their heads together in the next session of Congress, we can come up with an export control law that would be specifically designed to combat terrorism and that a majority of Congress could support. 212 Dr. MILHOLLIN. My impression is that we are doing our best al- ready, given the intelligence that we are receiving. That is, we have, as you know, an ongoing program of trying to detect ship- ments, intervene, convince the manufacturer, the middleman, the shippers not to go through with it. I think the public in general doesn't recognize how important good intelligence is. Without good intelligence this process doesn’t work, and we also can’t even esti- mate what effect these imports are having in Iraq. One of our big problems now is that the administration is putting out lists of things, which are sourced to the open media. We would expect more than that for the amount of money we are spending for intelligence. So, these opportunities are going to continue to come up. I would say that the battleground is shifting to some extent from Western Europe, which was the big problem before the Gulf War, now to Eastern Europe. The newly free countries, former members of the east bloc, are the targets for Iraq’s procurement activities, at least in the missile domain. I, myself, know of several instances in which Iraq tried to buy missile parts that are prohibited to it by U.N. resolutions during the 1990s after the prohibition came into effect. I am not aware that these were picked up by our intelligence agencies. The U.N. inspectors found them because they were going through indict- ments in Iraq. I would also say that I think we, the United States, should not be reluctant to embarrass suppliers in the media who break the rules. One of our problems in Iraq before the war was that Ger- many was exporting a tremendous amount of technology and we were reluctant to embarrass the Germans in public. I think if we had decided to embarrass them sooner, Iraq would have received much less. Mr. SIMMONS. I thank you for that response. I guess my opinion on that subject is very clear: I would far pre- fer to embarrass a country engaged in activities that are adverse not only to us but to the peace and stability of the region than to have American sons and daughters die in a conflict where the weapons in many respects aimed against them have been pur- chased from our allies and from companies within our own United States of America. I mean, ultimately, as Americans, we commit our most precious resource to the defense of our Nation, and it is not money, and it is not technology. It is our sons and daughters. Dr. MILHOLLIN. I have spoken to companies about this over the years. What they fear most is being linked to the spilling of Amer- ican blood in the media. They don’t really fear our government or our government's investigators, our government as prosecutors as much as they fear public exposure. So, I think that is one of the great weapons we have that we should be willing to use more often. Mr. SIMMONS. I thank you for those responses. I would also like to publicly thank Dr. Hamza for the courage that he has shown in speaking out on these issues. I know from my own experience that that kind of courage can be risky, dan- gerous, in fact. I am sure that grows out of a deep conviction in his own heart and in his own mind, and I thank him for those con- victions and for that courage. 213 This is not an easy business. The stakes are high and sometimes sovereign nations look adversely at people who speak out on these issues. So, I thank him for his courage. I thank the chairman for having this hearing. I look forward to joining with the chairman on all of his recommendations so that we can begin the process of stopping some of the transactions that are taking place and we can begin to address this very critical aspect of this problem for which a military response is not necessary. A diplomatic response and maybe even a public media response could be very helpful. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman; and I think an excellent point pursuant to your testimony that came out was that this is an era, it is a new era. It is an era of terrorists with high technology, and we need to have a regime in place—an export control regime that addresses that challenge. And, right now, we have an anti- quated regime that doesn’t address the challenge and, basically, as a substitute, simply opens the floodgate for technology to spill out. So I look forward to working with the gentleman from Connecticut. Again, I think we all regard you as a real national asset here be- cause you are one of the few guys who has an intelligence back- ground, and on this committee I think that is a very important asset. I thank you. I want to thank the ranking member, too, Mr. Skelton, for his hard work. We are going to move forward and try to have more hearings on this very important issue as the weeks go by. We are going to run them back to back as often as we can, and our goal is to try to see to it that every single member of the House has at least one classi- fied briefing on this and has several opportunities to come to hear- ings at different times. Because everyone has a difficult schedule. But also, Mr. Milhollin and Dr. Hamza, thank you for your testi- mony today. I think we need to address this need for a new tech- nology control regime soon, and I hope the administration under- . that, that this is a new era, and, hopefully, we can work to- gether. So, don’t run out of here when we get finished with you here today, Mr. Milhollin. We need some more advice from you. We would like to talk to you a little bit more about your thoughts on where we go in the near future here. And, Dr. Hamza, thank you so much for giving us an insight which is invaluable. There is nothing like having somebody who was inside the program telling us what was happening. I think es- pecially on the issue of inspections, you have been very—your testi- mony very much complements that, the U.N. inspectors who ap- peared here a couple of days ago and also some of the information we received in our classified briefing. Thank you. Thanks to everyone and thanks to our great staff for helping to put this hearing on. With that the oh, I have to ask, also, unanimous consent that Senator Kyl's statement be included in the record. So without ob- jection we will include that statement in the records, also. He has some very cogent remarks on this issue. We appreciate that. [The prepared statement of Senator Kyl can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 234.] 214 Mr. HUNTER. So, thank you, and the hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X SEPTEMBER 19, 2002 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD SEPTEMBER 19, 2002 OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. DUNCAN HUNTER HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING ON IRAQ’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM AND TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS September 19, 2002 Today, the Committee on Armed Services continues its review of the Iraqi threat and United States policy toward Iraq, with a specific focus on how the U.S. and the international community should act in concert to restrain Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction programs. This morning’s hearing marks the third of a number of planned public sessions designed to inform the Committee, and the American people, on the various issues surrounding Iraq’s continued violation of numerous United Nation’s resolutions, its illicit development of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States and the international community. In the past two weeks, the Committee received classified briefings from the CIA and DIA; heard testimony from former, senior UNSCOM inspectors about Iraq's illicit weapons programs; and received the Administration’s position on Iraq yesterday from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Next week, the Committee will hold another public hearing on U.S. policy toward Iraq, but will hear from private sector foreign and defense policy experts. Today, he Committee will learn how the Iraqis built and sustained their weapons of mass destruction programs through the legal, and illegal, acquisition of technology on the world market, and how the United States’ own export control system may have contributed to the problems we are now facing with Iraq. (219) 220 It is ironic that presently pending before the Congress is legislation to reauthorize the Export Administration Act. The EAA, as it is more commonly known, is the primary legislative vehicle through which the United States exercises control over sensitive “dual-use” items---those with both military and commercial application. These national security export controls are critical to ensuring that our adversaries and potential enemies don’t acquire the high technologies that will threaten the United States national security, or reduce the qualitative advantages of our armed forces. The irony is that, rather than strengthening these systems of control, the legislation that is being pushed through Congress dramatically liberalizes these key protections, making it easier for Saddam Hussein and his ilk to continue their weapons of mass destruction programs. This morning our witnesses---who we hope will connect the dots between export controls, technology transfers, and Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program---are...... • Dr. Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Dr. Milhollin has been watching and documenting Iraq’s WMD programs for years, and is also an expert in national security export controls. • We are also pleased to have Dr. Khidir Hamza, a trained nuclear engineer who worked in various parts of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program both before and after the 1990–91 Gulf War. Dr. Hamza will tell us how Saddam Hussein acquired the technologies necessary for its weapons of mass destruction program, even while under the watchful eyes of U.N. inspectors and the restrictions of U.N. sanctions. 221 Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO), Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives Full Committee Hearing on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Program and Technology Exports September 19, 2002 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for your leadership in quickly scheduling a range of hearings on issues related to Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction program. We in Congress and the American people need to understand clearly the nature of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein so that we can carefully consider what action the United States must take. The hearings we have had so far—with former United Nations weapons inspectors and with Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers—have provided valuable information about Iraq’s weapons programs and the danger they may pose to the United States and our allies. I hope that our witnesses today can add to the information we already have by helping us understand just how Iraq built his chemical, biological, nuclear, and long-range missile programs and how he got what he needed. We need to know what is there so we can know how to respond. Dr. Milhollin has tracked technology transfers to Iraq for some time and Dr. Hamsa brings the unique insider perspective of one who 222 has been inside Saddam’s weapons complex. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. I hope you can shine some additional light on the threat we face from Iraq’s programs and what it will take to dismantle that threat. In considering how Iraq got the weapons of mass destruction we believe he has today, we must be willing to look at how U.S. actions may have—however unintentionally—contributed to his effort. Some American products and those of our friends may have gotten through our export control system and into Saddam’s hands, highlighting how easily technology can move in our globalized economy. But for me, it highlights too the need to work hard to fashion an export control system that balances the competitiveness of U.S. industry with our security responsibility to prevent more critical technologies and materials from reaching those who would develop weapons of mass destruction. This committee took a step in that regard when we approved a strengthened version of the Export Administration Act, one that seems more important now as we face the possibility of war to dismantle the proliferation we have worked so hard to prevent. But, in the near term, the immediate challenge facing us is deciding how to proceed against Iraq. Doing that requires the best information possible and lots of it. That is what I hope our witnesses will focus on today—the detail of Saddam’s weapons programs and their 223 insights into how they can be eliminated. This is our first priority and our duty to the American people. I thank the witnesses and I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 224 Testimony of Gary Milhollin Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School and Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control Before the Committee on Armed Services United States House of Representatives September 19, 2002 225 I am pleased to appear today to discuss the threat from Iraq's mass destruction weapon programs, and the relation between that threat and the export of sensitive technology. Before getting into the substance of my testimony I would like to offer some items for inclusion in the hearing record. First, there are two recent articles written by my organization on inspections in Iraq, one from the New York Times and the other from Commentary magazine, together with a graphic prepared by my organization for the New York Times Week in Review that describes a series of dangerous nuclear imports and what one can learn from them. Second, there is a list of addresses in the United States where one can buy high-strength aluminum tubing similar to that recently intercepted on its way to Iraq. I would like to begin by simply affirming that Iraq does have active programs for building weapons of mass destruction. We know that Iraq has a workable nuclear weapon design and lacks only the fissile material to fuel it. We also know that Iraq has recently tried to import high-strength aluminum tubing that our government says is suited to making centrifuge components which, in turn, are used to process uranium to nuclear weapon grade. Iraq also has an active program for making long-range missiles, and we know that Iraq has produced and weaponized nerve gas, mustard gas, and anthrax. In addition, we know that Iraq's procurement activities have continued throughout the 1990's despite the U.N. embargo. The current status of these programs is summarized in my organization's website: www.iraqwatch.org. I invite the Committee to consult this site to obtain a continuously updated report on what we know about Iraq's mass destruction weapon efforts. It is an unfortunate fact that Iraq has built these programs almost exclusively through imports. The great majority of these imports were from the West, and most of them were sent legally. Weak export controls were primarily to blame. In February of this year, I had the privilege of testifying before this Committee on the new Export Administration Act, which is now under consideration by Congress. I made the point that this bill was conceived in a bygone period of history—the days before September 11, 2001. In reaction to the attacks on September 11, one would expect the United States to search for ways to strengthen controls on the sales of dual-use items. These sensitive products are the ones that terrorists and terrorist-supporting nations need to make weapons of mass destruction. Instead, we are going in the opposite direction. The bill now being considered would authorize the Commerce Department to drop export controls on the very items that our enemies would most like to use against us. For example, I would like to draw the Committee’s attention to the shipment of high-strength aluminum tubes that was intercepted recently on its way to Iraq. According to administration sources that were quoted in the press, the tubes could have been used to make gas centrifuges, which can process uranium to nuclear weapon grade. President Bush cited the shipment as evidence that Saddam Hussein still has an active nuclear weapon program. If the bill now being advocated by the administration passes, however, these very tubes would be removed from export control. They meet the bill’s proposed criteria for “mass market” items as well as for “foreign availability.” For this reason, they could be decontrolled by the Secretary of Commerce acting alone. Such a decontrol would mean two things. First, the United States would no longer be able to interdict such shipments. We could never ask foreign countries to stop selling something that our exporters were entitled to sell without restriction. Thus, countries like Iraq would have a much easier time importing the means to make nuclear weapons. Second, the Bush administration would be preparing to go to war to prevent Iraq from importing an item that the administration had decided was not important. This would damage our international credibility just when we need it most. We can’t cite Iraq's appetite for aluminum tubes as justifying an attack or an ultimatum on inspections, and at the same time say that such tubes qualify for decontrol. This week, the staff at my organization investigated the commercial availability of high-strength aluminum tubes. The staff identified numerous U.S. sellers of these tubes who were ready to take our order for as many tubes 226 as we wanted to buy. It requires roughly a thousand of these tubes, made into centrifuge components, to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for one bomb per year. Our staff could have purchased several thousand of these tubes from a number of sellers here in the United States. I have attached a list of these outlets to my testimony. It is clear that this wide availability within the United States would qualify the tubes for “mass market” status under the proposed bill. As a result, the Secretary of Commerce would be required to free them from export control. The criteria for mass market status are as follows: • The item must be “available for sale in a large volume to multiple purchasers;” • The item must be “widely distributed through normal commercial channels;” • The item must be “conducive to shipment and delivery by generally accepted commercial means of transport;” • The items “may be used for their normal intended purpose without substantial and specialized service provided by the manufacturer.” High-strength aluminum tubes meet all of these criteria, which are listed in Section 211 of the bill. The bill says that the Secretary of Commerce shall determine that an item has mass market status if it meets them. The items would then be decontrolled automatically. There is something wrong with this picture. What is wrong is that the world has changed, and this bill does not reflect that fact. How can we free for export something we are accusing the Iraqis of importing to make atomic bombs? It is manifestly absurd to decontrol the same technologies that we are worried about Saddam Hussein importing. With one hand, we would be helping Iraq make nuclear weapons, and with the other we would be smashing Iraq for doing so. High-strength aluminum tubes are not the only items that are useful in making centrifuge parts. Maraging steel and carbon fibers are also employed for this purpose. Iraq experimented with both of these items when it tried to build centrifuges. As it turns out, both maraging steel and carbon fibers also meet the “mass market” criteria in Section 211. In addition to centrifuge components, maraging steel is used to make solid rocket motor cases, propellant tanks, and interstages for missiles. In 1986, a Pakistani-born Canadian businessman tried to smuggle 25 tons of this steel out of the United States to Pakistan's nuclear weapon program. He was sentenced to prison as a result. Maraging steel has been controlled for export since January 1981. This steel is produced by companies in France, Japan, Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, and it meets all the criteria for “mass market status.” Several steel companies list maraging steel on the Internet and can produce it in multi-ton quantities. Over the telephone, two American companies and one British company explained to my staff how to order 25 ton quantities with delivery in less than a month. Maraging steel is bundled and shipped much like stainless steel, which it closely resembles. In addition to maraging steel and high-strength aluminum, composites reinforced by carbon or glass fibers can be used to form the rotors of gas centrifuges. The fibers are also used in skis, tennis racquets, boats and golf clubs, and are produced in a number of countries. This availability would give the fibers “mass market status” under the bill, despite the fact that they too have been controlled for export since 1981. In addition to the “mass market” criteria in the bill, these three sensitive items would also meet the “foreign availability” criteria. These are equally sweeping. The include any item that is: • “Available to controlled countries from sources outside the United States;” • “Can be acquired at a price that is not excessive;” • Is “available in sufficient quantity so that the requirement of a license or other authorization with respect to the export of such item is or would be ineffective.” As I testified before this Committee in February, this language is so broad that it would appear to cover North Korean rocket motors. It would also cover the aluminum tubes we are worried about. We know that the tubes did not come from the United States; thus, they were obviously available abroad. 227 The only way to retain control over the sale of these items is for President Bush himself to make a special finding within 30 days, in which he would set aside the Commerce Department's decision. This is an authority that he is not allowed to delegate. In effect, the bill sets up a powerful new machine at the Commerce Department for decontrolling exports. As I testified in February, once that machine gets moving, it is going to chop big holes in the existing control list unless the President can find some hours in his schedule in which to undo the Commerce Department’s work. Do we really want the President of the United States to put aside his concern about Osama bin Laden, or about the economy, and spend his time thinking about aluminum tubes, maraging steel and carbon fibers? This is not an academic question. American lives are threatened by dangerous exports. We are now sending pilots, almost every day, to bomb Iraq's air defenses. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, speaking to the press on Monday, reminded us that those defenses use fiber optic technology installed by Chinese companies, one of which, Huawei Technologies, was virtually built with American technology. China’s assistance to Iraq was not approved by the United Nations, and thus violated the international embargo. The history of Huawei shows how sensitive American exports can wind up threatening our own armed forces. At about the time when this company’s help to Iraq was revealed last year, Motorola had an export license application pending for permission to teach Huawei how to build high-speed switching and routing equipment- ideal for an air defense network. The equipment allows communications to be shuttled quickly across multiple transmission lines, increasing efficiency and reducing the risk from air attack. Motorola is only the most recent example of American assistance. During the Clinton Administration, the Commerce Department allowed Huawei to buy high-performance computers worth $685,700 from Digital Equipment Corporation, worth $300,000 from IBM, worth $71,000 from Hewlett Packard and worth $38,200 from Sun Microsystems. In addition, Huawei got $500,000 worth of telecommunication equipment from Qualcomm. Still other American firms have transferred technology to Huawei through joint operations. These included Lucent Technologies, which agreed to set up a joint research laboratory with Huawei “as a window for technical exchange” in microelectronics; AT&T, which signed a series of contracts to “optimize” Huawei's products so Huawei could “become a serious global player;” and IBM, which agreed to sell Huawei switches, chips and processing technology. According to a Huawei spokesman, “collaborating with IBM will enable Huawei to...quickly deliver high-end telecommunications to our customers across the world.” Did IBM know that one of these customers might be Saddam Hussein? These exports no doubt make money for American companies, but they also threaten the lives of American pilots. Indeed, as we now contemplate military action against Iraq, we seem to see history repeating itself. During the Gulf War, the United States was forced to send pilots on missions to bomb plants filled with equipment that American and other Western companies had supplied. Some of those pilots did not come back alive. So, when we talk about export controls, we are not just talking about money. We are talking about body bags. I would like to submit for the record some articles I wrote for the New York Times back in the early 1990's, together with a report entitled “Licensing Mass Destruction.” These publications list the dangerous exports that American and Western companies sold to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq before the Gulf War. It is safe to assume that many of these products are still helping Iraq's mass destruction weapon efforts and have never been found by the U.N. inspectors. In the article in the New York Times from 1992, entitled “Iraq’s Bomb, Chip by Chip,” we see that America’s leading electronic companies sold sensitive equipment directly to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, to sites where atomic bomb fuel was made, and to a site where A-bomb detonators were made. American companies also shipped directly to Saad 16, Iraq's main missile building site, and to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, which oversaw Iraq’s missile and A-bomb development. Virtually every muclear and missile site in Iraq received high-speed American computers. These exports are set out in greater detail in our 1991 report “Licensing Mass Destruction.” The report shows that all of these exports were licensed by the U.S. Commerce Department and, in many cases, the Commerce Department knew full well that the exports were going to nuclear, missile and military installations. Why did the 228 Commerce Department approve such exports? Because the United States was following a policy of putting trade above national security. The bill now before Congress follows this same policy. That policy was wrong then, and it is just as wrong now. The second article in the New York Times is from 1993. It shows that America was not alone in supplying Iraq's mass destruction weapon effort. Its Western allies joined in. Germany (then West Germany) was far and away the leading culprit. German firms sold as much to Iraq's mass destruction weapon programs as the rest of the world combined. Not only were German firms the main suppliers of Iraq’s chemical weapon plants, German firms also sold components that helped increase the range of Iraq's Scud missiles. These longer-range Scuds were able to reach Tel Aviv, where they killed Israeli civilians, and Saudi Arabia, where they killed American troops. I must say that I find it shocking that Germany, whose companies have done more than any others to create the mass destruction weapon threat from Iraq, is apparently less willing than any other Western country to confront it. My point in this testimony is that since September 11, we can no longer afford to put trade above security. We must convince the rest of the world to keep the means to make weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists and the countries that support them. Yet, we can never do that if we free our own companies to sell these same technologies. We can’t have it both ways. Either we protect ourselves from terrorism, or we make a few more bucks from trade. 229 AVAILABILITY OF HIGH-STRENGTH ALUMINUM TUBING September 19, 2002 During the week of September 16, 2002, the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control conducted a study of the availability of high-strength aluminum tubing in the United States. The Wisconsin Project identified numerous suppliers of 7000 series tubing, in particular series 7075, which is one of the kinds needed for centrifuges and meets the criteria for dual-use export controls administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce. An export license is needed if the tubes fit two criteria: an outside diameter of at least 75 mm (three inches) and a tensile strength capable of 460 Mpa or more at 293K (20 degrees C). The Wisconsin Project identified the following suppliers, who offered to supply thousands of tubes meeting the control criteria within a period of roughly two months: 1. Alcoa Aluminum Company (Lafayette, Indiana; 800-443–4912 ext. 3007) 2. TW Metals (various locations throughout the United States; 800-545-5000) . Metals Unlimited (Longwood, Florida; 800-782-7867) . Metalsource (Chattanooga, Tennessee; 800-487-6382) . Specialized Metals (Coral Springs, Florida;954-340-9225) . Kaiser Chandler (Richland, Washington; 866-249-3421) : In addition to the above firms, which the Wisconsin Project contacted individually, a number of others advertise high-strength aluminum alloys on the web. Some of these firms specifically offer alloys that meet the control criteria in their product descriptions. The Wisconsin Project will supply the names of these firms upon the Committee’s request. 230 Introductory Remarks for the Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives Dr. Khidhir Hamza Director, Council On Middle Eastern Affairs New York, NY Thursday, September 19, 2002 Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, I will comment briefly on two points. 1) The status, goals, and extent of Iraq’s WMD programs specifically the nuclear. And 2) How Iraq acquired the technology necessary to sustain these programs. The Status, Goals, and extent of Iraq’s nuclear weapon program. I believe that the testimony of Richard Spertzel and David Kay covers well the biological weapons and the nuclear weapons angles. However I wish to add some observations relevant to the nuclear weapons program and the Iraqi system in dealing with weapons in general. The nuclear weapons program is now almost complete waiting for the enrichment sector, which makes 90% of the program to finish its job and put together a working production facility. The bottlenecks in the enrichment are already resolved. German sources provided Iraq with classified reports and a working unit in the centrifuge enrichment technology. This can reduce the time needed for research and development for a country like Iraq by at least ten years. The whole centrifuge technology was acquired for a little over a million dollars. This included state of the art carbon fiber cylinders. The recent announcement of interception of large orders for aluminum cylinders indicate that the process of putting together large enough units for full production is not complete yet. At the same time it also indicates that Iraq has already bypassed the initial testing and possibly pilot plant stage. Also Iraq always use duplicate sourcing of materials and supplies which may mean that it is already in possession of enough materials for a small 231 scale production facility. My estimate is that Iraq may be in actual production in two years with enough accumulated product for two to three nuclear weapons in three years. The problem however remains that we are dealing with a series of indicators but no first hand witness. This I will deal with later in this statement. Iraq never seriously attempted to acquire nuclear fissile materials from outside sources by smuggling or other means. Though this may have changed since I left in 1994 but my belief is that this is a serious program, and is designed to turn Iraq into a nuclear power with credible nuclear force and as such systematic build-up of its capability was embarked on for over twenty years with no change of goals or purpose. This make it one of the most intensive single-minded objectives of the Iraqi regime. It dwarfs many times over both the BW and CW programs combined. By the time I left hiring was intensive especially among college graduates in engineering and science. A program declared publicly by Saddam created a series of graduate groups trained in nuclear and other weapon technologies dedicated to working in the program after graduation. This step among others turns the university system which is forced to award degrees based on classified research unseen by its faculties into an integral part of the Iraqi WMD industry. On the other hand Atomic Energy Establishment (AEE) teams were turned into civilian contracting entities that actually engage in contract work for the civilian sector. They helped rebuild Iraq’s civilian infrastructure including power stations, oil refineries and telephone exchanges. This achieved two purposes. On the one hand Iraq can, and did claim that these are now civilian sector entities unrelated to the WMD program. On the other hand by working with other government establishments they can incorporate the best of these establishments into their work. There were complaints from the various sectors that AEE took away so many of their engineers that they had a hard time getting their work done. Even important sectors such as oil and power generation were not immune. One result of this is the unavailability of scientists and engineers that the Iraqi government can claim to be transferred from the military industry and as such not available to the inspectors. Also it means that Iraq has integrated its WMD into its civilian sector turning Iraq into one giant WMD factory. I wish to point here that Dr. Spertzel’s hunch about the role of Iraq's intelligence agency the Mukhabarat in the WMD program is right. Iraq’s BW program was started under an organization created by Mukhabarat called al- Hazen. In 1985 as an advisor to AEE I was asked to visit al-Hazen to check on their computer work and see if they need help in setting up their computer network. I was familiar with the early phase of al-Hazen and its late director Merwan al-Sateda. A Palestinian with Yasser Arafat connections he was a fellow physicist. The center started as a military research and development organization that have extensive cooperation with the U. of Arizona. It was run by the Iraqi Mukhabarat and as such was independent of any oversight by other government organs such as the Ministry of Finance. Later after being accused of pilfering 20 million dollars Merwan was jailed and later killed by Saddam and the center dissolved to be opened later with a new mission: development of Iraq’s BW program. 232 Iraq’s Mukhabarat is the creation of Saddam Hussein. It was founded on the premise that Iraq’s security starts abroad. As such it had units for assassination, terror, use of poisons and biological agents against Iraqi dissidents and an extensive experimental program in all means of terror and intelligence tools. Even Atomic Energy was not immune from their power. They infiltrated AE and took under their wings many of its staff at will. As such we were aware of some of the developments going inside this terrible organization. Later I acted as a liaison with this agency regarding their acquisition of proscribed nuclear materials and presumably classified reports. I found it to be corrupt, deceitful and totally without human values. Thus the BW program replaced the research in physics as priority for Mukhabarat because of its potential for terrorism. An angle rarely reported and I found extensive incidents regarding it when I left Iraq and worked in Libya from Iraqi expatriates was the use of humans as disease carriers. Dissidents living abroad with families in Iraq will suddenly get the news that their families are allowed to join them. Before they can obtain their passports they are usually “inoculated” against some of the standard infections. There were many incidents of whole families infected this way with HIV and other diseases. It should be noted that any Iraqi infected with HIV was transferred to a remote region in Western desert called Salman Hole presumably for treatment. However nobody ever came back and most were reported dead within a year of going there. Since HIV is rarely a cause of death this fast it was assumed that they were subject to many kinds of experiments. If smallpox is to be sent abroad from Iraq one should expect unwitting carriers being sent to the destination targets possibly not even Iraqis to achieve deniability. When I was transferred to the military industry some of my workers were questioned about the effects of radiation and how to cause disease and death by what kind of radiation sources. Later I heard of many incidents of people with radiation burns treated in Iraqi hospitals. Work on the Iraqi dirty bomb which was tested in 1988 in Muhammediyat had an Iraqi Mukhabarat angle. How Iraq acquired the technology necessary to sustain these programs. Iraq understood that the first step in acquiring technology is the human element. Thus a large scale program of government scholarships was launched that covered all areas of WMD in addition to other needs. The program was of such a scale that though most of scholarship holders never returned those who did were of large enough number to form the nucleus of its WMD. This is critical to understand if any use is to be made of the inspectors to uncover the Iraqi WMD. Comparison with Iran may explain this point. Iran acquired calutron technology for uranium enrichment from China. Iraq developed its own much larger program for calutrons from scratch. Iran attempted acquiring heavy water technologies from many countries including Argentina. Iraq did research and development for more than twenty years to develop its own heavy water technology. Thus the scientists are Iraq's main asset not equipment nor facilities. At the same time Iraq allowed weapons inspectors to destroy many pieces of equipments and facilities it refused to give them full unmonitored access to its scientists. Inspections became a 233 serious problem when inspectors in later years began to demand more access to the scientists. After several incidents some of which were described in earlier testimony Iraq began to get more and more difficult in providing access. Thus the demand for access to the scientists was the cause of the demise of the inspection process in Iraq. This points out a critical factor for inspections to be of any meaning. With little or no human intelligence about Iraq’s WMD inspectors have little to direct them to the whereabouts of the Iraqi programs. However if a condition is made that the scientists are to be made available outside Iraq together with their families the story could see an immediate turnaround. All Iraq’s pretexts of no WMD will collapse. Iraq will expose its hand immediately through flat refusal to cooperate. The names of all the relevant scientists are known to the US authorities. Unmovic already possesses huge financial resources from its share of Iraq’s oil revenues at its disposal to take care of all the important Iraqi scientists and engineers permanently. Iraq’s scientists if they chose to and my guess is that they will can go under the equivalent of the US witness protection program paid for by income already under Unmovic disposal if they agree to cooperate. This is the test. If Iraq has really no illegal WMD program it should agree. My bet would be that it will not. This is the smoking gun everybody is looking for. Iraq was reorganizing its concealment mechanism even before the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son in law. The resulting system took effect in 1995 by the creation of the Concealment Organization headed by Saddam's younger son Qussey within the Special Security Organization (SSO). The NY Times interview of the Iraqi civil engineer charged with building backup sites tell only part of the story. The defector who brought with him official Iraqi contracts reports duplicate sites built mostly underground with specifications that included lead impregnated concrete and resin covers that mean radioactive work. A back-up system of support do the rest. Any inspection process is monitored carefully as to its intentions. Once a possible target is identified a special team with its transport vehicles and technicians will descend on the target of inspection, dismantle all equipment and any possible incriminating evidence and carry it to the back- up site. This is the more sophisticated version of what inspectors already experienced through denial of access and standoffs. Good luck for any future inspection team that wants to beat this system. Thank you Mr. Chairman 234 Prepared Testimony of U.S. Senator Jon Kyl House Armed Services Committee Hearing Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Program and Technology Exports September 19, 2002 Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing. I appreciate your providing a forum to bring us up to date on issues relevant to the consideration of the Export Administration Act. As you know, the Senate passed its version of the bill, S. 149, on September 6, 2001. At the time, along with the ranking members of the Senate Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and Governmental Affairs Committees, I raised serious concerns about the bill's potential negative effects on U.S. security. Unfortunately, despite our efforts to negotiate meaningful changes to the bill, it passed with only a few slight alterations. Since then, there have been many developments that should cause us to be even more cautious in regulating the export of dual-use technologies, and should give us pause before passing a bill like S. 149. Five days after the Senate acted, thousands of innocent people were killed in the most horrific act of terrorism in our nation's history. We now fully recognize the stark reality of the world in which we live today – one in which people who hate freedom and democracy are willing to use all means possible to achieve mass casualties among civilian populations. And, as official government statements and press reports have warned over the past year, these terrorists would like nothing more than to obtain weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them to achieve that end. Also, since the Senate passed S. 149, the U.S. government has released several reports that document not only the danger of the proliferation of these weapons, but also, unfortunately, deficiencies in the U.S. export control system that only exacerbate the problem. In fact, the bipartisan U.S.-China Security Review Commission – created by the legislation that granted permanent normal trade status to China in 2000 — agreed with the conclusion of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission that, "The U.S. has been and is today a major, albeit unintentional, contributor to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [through] foreign student training in the U.S., by wide dissemination of technical information, by the illegal acquisition of U.S. designs and equipment, and by the relaxation of U.S. export control policies." The General Accounting Office has also released three reports that should be a cause for serious concern. The first, released in April, addressed China's success in closing the gap with the U.S. in semiconductor technology. The GAO stated that, in the past five years, U.S. officials in China responsible for monitoring the end-use of semiconductors have not conducted any of 235 these checks. The second, released in August, addressed the administration's January 2002 decision to raise the control threshold for high performance computers exported to tier-3 countries, such as China. The GAO concluded that the President's report justifying that change neglected to address several of the statutory requirements, including the potential military uses of the computers and the impact of those uses on U.S. national security. And it turns out that the one requirement that was addressed in the President's justification – the domestic and foreign availability of the computers – was based on false industry data. The GAO stated that, while the administration justified its decision based on the projected domestic and foreign availability of the computers by early 2002, only one of 10 companies cited now produces computers with that capability. The administration relied upon data from the very industry that wanted to relax the high performance computer controls for its own commercial benefit, rather than doing its own independent analyses. As Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control and one of the distinguished witnesses at today's hearing, noted with regard to the administration's most recent relaxation of computer controls in a recent op-ed in the Los Angeles Times, “... it sabotages our fight against terrorism. We can't ask our allies to keep dangerous equipment away from terrorists and the countries that support them if we don't control our own sales. “... As for Unisys [the only company cited that now produces computers with the new capability], it can't be expected to use restraint. Before the Gulf War, it sold Iraq's interior ministry an $8-million computer system specifically capable of tracking the Iraqi population, which could still be helping Saddam Hussein stay in power." The third GAO report dealt with the Commerce Departments controls over deemed exports – transfers of technology within the United States to foreign nationals. The GAO found a number of weaknesses in the current system to control deemed exports, and concluded that those vulnerabilities could help countries of concern to improve their military capabilities. The GAO also noted that more than 90 percent of the deemed export licenses that are approved by Commerce involved China and other countries of concern, yet there is no monitoring system in place to ensure compliance with the conditions of the licenses. The information contained in these reports is a clear indicator of the deficiencies in our current export control system and should prompt us to tighten controls over the export of dual- use technology, rather than to relax those controls. As this hearing takes place today, there is a very real possibility that this country will soon take military action against Iraq because of the threat posed by Saddam's Hussein's possession and continued development of weapons of mass destruction. 237 the Secretary of Commerce. Therefore, even if they were only available for sale in the U.S. (not from foreign sources), export controls could only be maintained if the president certified every six months that failure to regulate their export constituted a serious threat to U.S. national security. It is unrealistic to think that the President will use the authority in the bill – which cannot be delegated to other officials – to set aside a mass market determination on anything but rare occasions. Yet the number and scope of potentially dangerous items that will meet this criteria is quite alarming. (I should note that this Committee's version of the bill sets higher standards for a mass market determination.) Mr. Chairman, in closing, I appreciate the efforts of this committee and of the House International Relations Committee to make modifications to the Senate bill that would allow for greater control over the export of U.S. dual-use technology. I also agree with the administration that it is important that the United States find the proper balance between national security and trade and, to that end, that Congress pass a new Export Administration Act. But, particularly in light of developments over the past year, the bill currently pending before Congress is not the appropriate vehicle to address controls over the export of dual-use items. It is my hope that I and my colleagues in the Senate, the Members of this committee and other Members of the House can work with the administration during the next session of Congress to develop a new EAA that will better protect U.S. national security interests. Thank you again Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing. DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD SEPTEMBER 19, 2002 Čhe Neu!]orkčimes THE NEW YORK TIMES OP-ED MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2002 A21 By Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz Washing Ton any voices are now calling for renewed United critics of the Bush administration who are opposed to war. Others be- long to those who favor war but see inspections - which they fully ex- . A lying regime makes verification an endless chase. pect to fail — as the needed trigger- ing event for war. Still other Iraq experts believe that Saddam Hus- sein himself will invite the inspec- tors back as a means of fo invasion if troops begin to move in hi-direction whatever one's stance on how best to handle Saddam Hussein, it is crucial to understand one thing: United Nations inspections, as they are currently constituted, will never work. There are several reasons for this. consider the record of the United Nations Special Commission, an agency that was charged with in- specting Iraq's weapons programs from 1991 to 1998. While Unscom did Iraqi obfuscations prevented itſrom ever getting a full picture of the entire weapons production effort. The commission's replacement, the United Nations Monitoring, Verifica- tion and Inspection Commission, which has not yet been allowed to enter Iraq, will have even less suc- to the United Nations; Unmovic per- sonnel, on the other hand, are United Gary Milhollin is director of the Wis- consin Project on Nuclear Arms Cort- trol. Kelly Motz is the editor of Iraqwatch.org. º Nations employees who are likely to be hobbled by the United Nations' notoriously inefficient bureaucracy. ese inspectors are not set up to make effective use of intelligence information. In the 1990's, american intelligence officials supplied secret information to selected Unscom in- to uncover hidden Iraqi weapons fa- cilities. at Unmovic, however, no inspector will be allowed to receive intelligence information on a privi- leged basis, a policy that increases the risk of leaks to the Iraqis. Unmo- vic has also declared that it will not allow any information gathered from its inspections to flow back to intelligence sources to provide Un- movic with useful information in the first place. Even if it is allowed into Iraq, Unmovic will run up against obsta- cles at least as formidable as those that stymied Unscom. After years of practice, Unscom became adept at launching surprise visits to weapons sites, yet Iraq's intelligence opera- tives defeated it more often than not. It was a rare inspection when the Iraqis did not know what the inspec- have little experience in Iraq and even less in handling intelligence information. Compounding this handicap is the fact that Iraq has taken consider. able pains to make its weapons pro- grams mobile. Laboratories, compo- ments and materials are ready to hit the road at a moment's notice. Once, as an experiment, Unscom had pho- tos taken from a U2 spy plane of a site that it was about to inspect. First the photos showed no activity, then large numbers of Iraqi vehicles leaving the site, then no activity, then the inspectors' vehicles arriv- ing. Unmovic is also stuck with a deal the United Nations made in 1998 on "presidential sites." Iraq is allowed to designate vast swaths of land (big enough to contain entire factories) that the inspectors can visit only after announcing the visit in ad- vance, disclosing the composition of the inspection team (nuclear orbio- for mobile items and could defeat virtually any inspection effort New inspections will occur under the threat of imminent American military action. Any announcement that Iraq is not cooperating could be a casus belli. Such a risk might encourage Unmovic to monitor what is already known rather than ag- gressively try to find what is hidden. This could mean that the goal of inspections - the disarmament of Iraq - might never be achieved. one thing well: verify that a coun- try's declarations about a weapons program are honest and complete. It is feasible for inspectors to look at sites and equipment to see whether the official story about their use is accurate. Inspectors can rely on sci- entific principles, intelligence infor- mation and visits to known weapons production sites to test what they are told. It is a different been deliberately concealed. That is a task with no end. For inspectors to do their job, they have to have the truth, which can only come from the Iraqis. As Presi- dent Bush told the United Nations last week, the world needs an Iraqi government that will stop lying and surrender the weapons programs. That is not likely to happen as long as Saddam Hussein remains in *:: er. (241) 242 Commentary October 2002 Iraq: The Snare of Inspections Gary Milhollin & Kelly Motz very TIME war clouds gather over Baghdad, Saddam Hussein has a habit of hinting that he may allow UN arms inspectors to return. Similarly, every time war clouds gather over Baghdad, voices in the United States and elsewhere, including some in or near the Bush administration, can be heard urging a new and improved system of inspections. Today, some of those voices belong to critics of ad- ministration policy who are opposed to war with Iraq. Others É. war but think a provocation, or “triggering event,” is lacking, and they see inspec- tions (which they fully expect to fail) as providing the necessary trigger. The inspectors departed Iraq in 1998 after en- during more than seven years of tricks and obfus- cations, all aimed at protecting the country's pro- grams for building weapons of mass destruction. Since then, Saddam's interest in renewed inspec- tions has been aroused in direct proportion to the perceived risk that his country will be invaded. When things are quiet, he has refused even to con- sider letting the United Nations back—in egre- gious violation of his pledges under UN resolu- tions and therefore of international law. But now GARY MILHollin is the director of the Wisconsin Project wn Nuclear Arms Control in Washington, D.C., and KELLY Morz edits the Project’s Iraq Watch.org website. The pre- sent article is based in part on the conclusions of a panel offive former UN inspectors and a former intelligence official who met in june under the auspices of the Wisconsin Project to as- tes the prospects of a resumed inspections regime in Iraq. that Washington is seriously contemplating “regime change,” he may well announce that in- spectors are once again welcome. If he does, he can count on Russia and France, Iraq's allies on the Security Council, to rally the world in favor of giving peace a chance. Any delay on Saddam's part in admitting or cooperating wi inspectors will then still look better than war, and it will become that much harder to argue that Uncle Sam should use soldiers and bullets to do what international civil servants could do with blue helmets and notebooks. If inspectors go back in, said Jack Straw, Britain's Foreign Secretary, only last month, “plainly the case for military action re- cedes.” Whatever one's stance on the question of how best to handle Saddam Hussein, it is vital to under- stand one thing. Unless the Iraqi dictator should suddenly and totally reverse course on arms in- spection and everything that goes with it, or be forced into early retirement—in other words, un- less Saddam Hussein's Iraq ceases to be Saddam Hussein's Iraq–inspections will never work. Tº: ARE several reasons why this is so. Some of these reasons have to do with recent changes in the UN's own inspection apparatus. Oth- ers inhere in the nature of the man, and the regime, we are dealing with. Almost three years ago, a new UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) [50] 243 IRAQ: THE SNARE of INspections replaced the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). The latter, which for seven years had run the in- spection effort in Iraq, was a special-purpose en- terprise operated by officials on loan from nation- al governments. The former, which has yet to take the field, is modeled on the UN's notoriously inef- ficient bureaucracy. This change has a number of serious and debili- tating implications. Among other things, UN in- spectors are no longer set up to make effective use of intelligence information—an essential tool for determining whether Iraq is telling the truth. In the 1990's, when U.S. intelligence officials agreed to supply secret information to the UN inspectors, they did so only after becoming confident that the inspectors were themselves willing and able to use the information thereby received to uncover for- bidden Iraqi weapon efforts. The information went only to inspectors who were individually trusted to protect it; these inspectors obtained the informa- tion on a privileged basis, and could be counted on to use it aggressively. At UNMOVIC, which is split into a number of sep- arate divisions, no inspector will be allowed to re- ceive intelligence information on a privileged basis, and any and all information is liable to be shared. Not only does this make it more difficult to pre- vent information from leaking, thus undermining the confidence of governments thinking of supply- ing it, but no one can be sure that particular pieces of information will be acted upon. Unless and until national governments become convinced other- wise, not much of significant value is likely to be provided—an especially grave problem today when solid intelligence on Iraq has become scarcer and therefore more valuable. Other considerations are relevant here. The American, British, and Israeli officials who in the past provided information to UNSCOM benefited from the fact that their relationship with the com- mission was a “loop.” Evidence uncovered by UN- SCOM inspectors flowed back to those nations' in- telligence agencies for analysis, and this analysis produced new leads for UNSCOM in return. UN- Movic, however, has announced that there will be no loop. Information will flow only in, not out. This will be a crippling handicap. Even if, for ex- ample, an Iraqi defector should turn up and tell UNMOVIC to look in a certain building, the agency will need a means of evaluating his reliability be- fore it decides to act. Without a loop, it cannot ask the intelligence service of a national government to vet what it has learned. It will have to rely on its own resources, and if these are insufficient to prompt action, an important opportunity may thereby be lost. UNMovic's prohibition on dialogue apparently extends even to analysis. The agency recently re- fused an offer by a supporting Western government to help evaluate information UNMOVIC already had on hand. By thus depriving itself of access to friend- ly national governments, UNMOVIC has chosen ig- norance over knowledge and removed one of the greatest incentives for providing intelligence infor- mation in the first place. And without a return flow of information, the governments concerned can hardly place confidence in UNMovic's inspection reports, especially if they reflect favorably on Iraq's behavior. Nor is that all. Unlike their predecessors at UN- scom, UNMOVIC's inspectors have been required to sever all links with their national governments and to become UN employees. Although UNMovic does train its inspectors in security precautions, it has no process for security clearance perse—with- out which there is no way to assess an inspector's personal reliability, to guarantee that he is not an intelligence agent, or to punish him if he reveals se- cret information. Even if UNMOVIC had not already moved to sever the loop of reciprocal relations, this lack of security would probably be enough by itself to inhibit most national governments from provid- ing the agency with sensitive equipment or tech- niques of analysis. S’ MUCH for internal considerations. On the ground, in Iraq itself, UNMOVIC would soon run up against obstacles at least as formidable as those with which UNSCOM had to cope, and which UNMOVIC is far less equipped to handle. UNSCOM conducted some 260 inspections in Iraq over its seven years there. A fair number of these were surprise visits with no advance notice, an en- terprise at which UNSCOM had become particularly adept. Even so, Iraq's intelligence operatives de- feated it more often than not: only about a half- dozen of the surprise inspections actually succeed- ed. Saddam Hussein's agents were active in hotel rooms in both New York and Baghdad as well as at the UN building in New York. It was a rare inspec- tion when the Iraqis did not know what the in- spectors were looking for before they arrived at the site to be searched. Compounding the advantage held by Iraq in this regard is the success it has achieved, at considerable expense, in making its secret weapon efforts mo- bile. Laboratories, components, and materials are ready to hit the road at a moment's notice. During [51] 244 CoMMENTARY October 2002 the days when UNSCOM was conducting inspec- tions, this mobility was revealed graphically in U-2 photos of a suspect site. The pictures were taken in sequence as soon as an inspection team left its headquarters. The first photos show no activity at the site; a slightly later sequence reveals a large number of vehicles leaving the site; then there is again no activity; and then the vehicles of the in- spectors arrive. UNMOVIC has not yet indicated whether it will conduct surprise inspections, but it is hardly likely to do better at them than UNscom, and will almost certainly do worse. The same goes for regular, scheduled inspections. Most UNMovic inspectors have little or no experience in Iraq, and, worse, lit- tle or no experience in handling or evaluating in- telligence information. In effect, this will be a team of rookies going to bat against a world-class intelli- gence organization highly practiced at foiling in- spections. UNMovic's recruitment procedures do not help. In assembling staff for an inspection team, UNSCOM looked for experts who had actually worked on the specific technology it was targeting—not just, say, a person familiar with missile or rocket design but one who knew Scuds specifically. To accomplish this, UNSCOM recruited from countries that had already built advanced missiles, or whose expertise was de- rived from military programs. UNMovic, by con- trast, has chosen not to work this way. In order to achieve “geographic balance,” UN-style, it hires staff from around the world, including from coun- tries that do not themselves possess relevant weapon programs or expertise. The results are predictable, and are likely to re- verberate down the line, not just in planning and carrying out no-notice inspections (or inspections of any kind) but in generating new “baseline” in- formation on the numerous Iraqi sites and in set- ting up a proper monitoring regime. In one way or another, UNMovic's inexperience will make itself felt in the myriad small signals that will tip off the Iraqis to its intentions. Sº MoRE obstacles remain to be mentioned. UNMovic is stuck with a deal that UN Secre- tary General Kofi Annan made with Iraq in Febru- ary 1998, just before the UN inspectors left. Ac- cording to its terms, inspectors at certain sites—the so-called “presidential sites”—must be accompa- nied by members of a “Special Group” of diplo- mats, and must also notify Iraq in advance of any inspection, even disclosing the composition of the in- spection team. Such procedures contradict the [5 principle of immediate, unconditional, and unre- stricted access that is essential to effective inspec- tions, and render inspection of these sites virtually impossible. Iraq initially designated eight such presidential sites—each a swath of land large enough to conceal entire factories as well as mobile equipment or lab- oratories. It also retained the prerogative to desig- nate new sites at any time, and to decide just how many sites there are, where they are, how big they are, and what they include. All such locations, in ef- fect, create refuges for mobile items. If Iraq choos- es to use them aggressively, they could be a loop- hole large enough to defeat any inspection effort. Finally, one must consider that any new inspec- tions in Iraq will be occurring under the threat of imminent American military action. President Bush has emphasized that the United States is determined to use “all the tools at our disposal” to remove Sad- dam Hussein from power; under such conditions, any announcement by UN arms inspectors that Iraq is not cooperating is likely to be viewed as a casus belli. But UN organizations do not normally like to trigger wars. How can this not inhibit the readiness of UNMOVIC to issue any such damning report, re- gardless of Iraq's actual behavior? Besides, UNMovic's staff has spent more than two years in New York getting ready to return to Iraq, and will hardly be eager to admit that it has failed to secure Iraq's cooperation. Rather, there will be every incentive to define inspection tasks narrowly—thus making it easier for Iraq to comply, at least nominally—and to avoid any aggressive in- spection activity. UNMovic's executive chairman, Hans Blix, is fully empowered to set policy in this regard; in his previous career as director of the In- ternational Atomic Energy Agency, Blix usually avoided confrontation (except when dealing with North Korea) and also missed Iraq's vast clandes- tine effort to build nuclear weapons. What Blix would do now in Iraq is unknown— although, if he were to choose nonconfrontation, he would admittedly have one or two arguments on his side. Even nonconfrontational inspections are disruptive to a degree, and even when UNscom was not surprising the Iraqis, it was forcing them to mount a large concealment effort and move key equipment from one site to another, which made it harder to run illicit programs. Nonconfrontation- al inspections also yielded much essential informa- tion about Iraq's actual progress in making mass- destruction weapons. (This was mainly so in the case of the country's missile program; in the case of its biological program, which was and is easier to 245 IRAQ: THE SNARE of INSPECTIONs conceal, the nonconfrontational model was of far less benefit.) In the present instance, however, a policy of avoiding confrontation will be dangerous in the ex- treme. Inspections will then be aimed only at mon- itoring what is already known rather than at searching aggressively for what is still hidden. Moreover, the very failure to find anything new will feed the demand that the embargo against Iraq be lifted without the goal of inspections—namely, disarmament—ever being achieved. The price to be paid will be all the higher in view of the ele- mentary fact that, since the day inspections began in 1991, Iraq has consistently tried to defeat them. But that brings us to the heart of the matter. What is it that inspections are designed to do? They are designed to verify that a country's decla- rations about a weapon program are honest and Commentarv complete. And that sort of verification is indeed a feasible goal for an inspection team: to look at sites and equipment and see whether the official story about their use is accurate. To do this effectively, inspectors can rely both on scientific principles and on information gained through intelligence-gath- ering. It is a different proposition altogether to go ranging about a country in search of things that have been deliberately concealed; that is a task with no beginning and no end. In short, without a full and coherent description of the entire Iraqi weapon program, inspectors can never verify that it has been eliminated. The truth must come first, and it can come only from the Iraqis themselves. What the world needs is an Iraqi government that will stop lying and surrender those programs. That is hardly likely to happen as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. October 2002 165 East 56th Street New York, NY 10022 (212) 891-1400 editorial&commentarymagazine.com [53] § Week in Review Sunday, September 15, 2002 Psssst...Can I Get A Bomb Trigger? henit was revealed last week that I the shape which were much like those used inequip- ment to enrich uranium. Butkeeping track of all of the equip- ment and know-how that gointo making a nuclear bomb is rarely a simple task. suspicions regarding theirul- TOM zELLER mac stones. But they are also useful in detonating nuclear weapons. Iraq bought six machines for treating kid- neystones, each containing one switch, and ordered - 120 more switches as "spare parts." It is unclear how i many Iraq actually received Wanted: Enriched Uranium Attempts to acquire nuclear material around the world are on the fiee again. i "... Tº *3 gº g5 ve ºf 98 pe oo of Known incidents, by type of nuclear material involved, 1993-01. Putoniurn & High-enriched uranium iº Low-enriched uanium & Natural and depleted 1-20- - a Uranium is used in the peaceful production and thorium-113 of nuclear energy, but Iran's civilian power program doesn't require native digging. All of the country's uranium fuel will come from Russia, leading some experts to believe that uranium hunts by Iranian en- gineers (with experise provided by their Chinese counterparts) is in the service of bomb making wwºwer wºcomºnaroºcºon-cº-ams Controſ i Aluminum Tubes unknown Iraq 2002 High-strength aluminum can have benign ap- plications, including production of aircraft parts, but it is also one of the few materials that can withstand the high rotational speeds required of gas centrifug- es for uranium enrichment-a key step in nuclear bomb building India . al, which had originaled in - Heavy Water and Graphite Technology Russia ºran ises Heavy water in small amounts is used - to the tons, the only use can be in nuclear re- º, actors. Reactors using heavywaleſ, like this º onºminga are escºracºpo. ducing plutonium for nuclear weapons. iss4. Although the material is used in high-performance aircraft and spacecraft, it is also used to received the power of nu- clear weapons. India needed beryllium spheresto increase the yield of its ſission bombs; the United States fined the Get- man exporter for re-transferring the maleſi- Amerkºa. as Cºngºlº are specially ises. These magnets designed for gas centrifugee EARLY 1980's Benign reasons for sharing nuclear weapon designs are hard to magine, Experts say that Pakistan was able to shop for parts to fit an already- tested design provided by the Chinese. An Iraqiver- sion of the same design (above) was discovered later. 247 [Insert from the New York Times OP-ED Friday, April 24, 1992—A35.] IRAQ'S BOMB, CHIP BY CHIP The U.S. Commerce Department licensed the following strategic American exports for Saddam Hussein's atomic weapon programs between 1985 and 1990. Virtually all of the items were shipped to Iraq; all are useful for making atomic bombs or long-range missiles. United Nations inspectors in Iraq are still trying to find most of them. The list is based on Commerce Department export licensing records; the dollar amount of each transaction is as claimed by the exporting company. It was compiled by Gary Milhollin, a law professor at the University of Wisconsin and di- rector of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, and Diana Edensword, a research analyst at the project. º [EE- ºw. 3 ºr * * * * ATOMIC BOMB BUILDERS Sales to: Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, the main atomic research laboratory; Badr and Daura sites, where bomb fuel was made; Al Qaaaa site, where deto- nators were made. gº." Elektronik: computers for measuring gamma rays and fast neutrons— 30,000 Cerberus Ltd.: computers—$18,181 Hewlett Packard: computers; electronic testing, calibration and graphics equip- ment—$25,000 International Computer Systems: computers useful for graphic design of atomic bombs and missiles—$1,600,000 Perkin-Elmer: computers and instruments useful for quality control of bomb fuels—$280,000 TI Coating Inc.: equipment for coating metal parts, useful for bomb production— $373,708 - 248 ATOMIC BOMB AND MISSILE BUILDERS Sales to: Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, which ran the atomic bomb, missile and chemical weapon factories; Nassr state enterprise, where equipment for enriching atomic bomb fuel was made; Salah Al Din site, where electronic equipment for missiles and atomic bombs was made; Ministry of Defense, which oversaw missile and atomic bomb development. Axel Electronics: capacitors—$84,000 BDM Corporation: computers; computer-assisted design equipment—$52,000 Canberra Elektronik: computers for computer-assisted design—$21,552 Carl Zeiss: microcomputers for mapping—$104,545 Consarc Corporation: computers to run machine tools capable of manufacturing ;” parts (this sale was stopped by Presidential order in June 1990)— Data General Corporation: computers for mapping—$324,000 Gerber Systems: computers to run machine tools capable of manufacturing atomic bomb and missile parts—$367,428 Hewlett Packard: computers for making molds; frequency synthesizers and other ipment useful for operating secured military communications systems— $1,045,500 Honeywell Inc.: computers—$353,333 International Computer Systems: computers for manufacturing, tool design and graphics—$4,497,700 International Computers Ltd.: computers—$687,994 Leybold Vacuum Systems: computer controlled welder used by Iraqis to produce centrifuges for making atomic bomb fuel—$1,400,000 Lummus Crest: Radio spectrum analyzers; design computers; computers for fac- tories producing mustard gas ingredients—$250,000 Rockwell Collins International: equipment for navigation, directional finding, radar communications or airborne communications—$127,558 Sackman Associates: computers and instruments capable of analyzing metals and powders for atomic bomb and missile manufacture—$60,000 Siemens Corporation: computers and instruments capable of analyzing metals and powders for atomic bomb and missile manufacture—$78,000 Spectra Physics: lasers; detection and tracking equipment for lasers—$19,000 Unisys Corporation: computers—$2,600,000 Wild Magnavox Satellite Survey: computers for processing satellite images that are useful for military mapping and surveillance—$270,000 Zeta Laboratories: quartz crystals for military radar—$1,105,000 MISSILE BUILDERS Sales to: Saad 16, the main missile research site; State Organization for Tech- nical Industry, the procurement organization for missile sites that bought most Scud missile parts ºf equipment. BDM Corporation: computers; superconducting electronics—$29,405 Carl Schenck: computers—$10,228 EZ Logic Data: computers—$27,800 Finnigan MAT: computers that U.N. inspectors believe monitored uranium enrich- ment for atomic bomb fuel—$483,000 Hewlett Packard: electronic testing equipment; computers; frequency synthesizers; radio spectrum analyzers—$599,257 International Computer Systems: computers—$1,375,000 International Imaging Systems: computers for processing satellite data; infrared equipment capable of aerial reconaissance and military surveillance—$688,000 Lummus Crest: computers to aid factory design—$44,320 Perkin-Elmer: computers—$24,560 Scientific Atlanta: equipment for producing radar antennas—$820,000 249 Semetex Corporation: computers—$5,155,781 Spectral Data Corporation: satellite data processing equipment—$26,880 Tektronix: high-speed electronics useful in developing atomic bombs and missiles; radio spectrum analyzers for developing microwave equipment—$102,000 Thermo Jarrell Ash Corporation: computers for testing materials—$350,898 Unisys Corporation: computers for production control—$7,796 Veeco Instruments Inc.: computers for factory design—$4,640 Wiltron Company: equipment for making radar antennas—$49,510 250 [Insert from the New York Times, The Week in Review, Sunday, July 18, 1993– E5.] IRAQ'S PURCHASES IN THE A-BOMB SUPERMARKET The Number of Deals The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control has compiled a list of all the pub- licly known deals in which Iraq bought technology and equipment for its nuclear and missile programs before the Persian Gulf war in 1991. Some purchases were made from brokers rather than directly from the manufacturer. A deal can mean construction of an entire factory, or supplying the machine tools or training to operate it. The vast majority of these deals were approved by or made through the governments. - West Germany Austria Egypt Niger 102 deals 9 deals 2 deals 1 deal United States France Yugoslavia Poland 25 deals 6 deals 2 deals 1 deal Switzerland Belgium Argentina Portugal 22 deals 5 deals 1 deal 1 deal Britain Japan China Soviet Union 20 deals 5 deals 1 deal 1 deal Brazil Saudi Arabia Greece Spain 14 deals 3 deals 1 deal 1 deal Italy Chile Liechtenstein Sweden 13 deals 2 deals 1 deal 1 deal SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY Breakdown of Iraq's purchases, weighted for importance to its nuclear and missile programs, as estimated by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. One ex- ample: although France had only six transactions with the Iraqis, one was to build the Osirak nuclear reactor, which Israel destroyed by bombing in 1981. Switzerland United States Soviet Union Saudi Arabia 8 percent 3.5 percent 2 percent 1.5 percent Italy Austria Japan Other 5 percent 3 percent 1.5 percent 1.5 percent France Argentina Niger West Germany 5 percent 2.5 percent 1.5 percent 50 percent Brazil Egypt Portugal 4 percent 2.5 percent 1.5 percent Britain Belgium Yugoslavia 3.5 percent 2 percent 1.5 percent [Source on all charts: Gary Milhollin and Diana L. Edensword, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.] 251 A SAMPLING OF THE PURCHASES Types of technologies and equipment bought by Iraq from the five countries with the greatest share of responsibility WEST SWITZER- ITALY FRANCE BRAZIL. GERMANY LAND Missile develop- Missile develop- Scud improve- Equipment to in- Missile develop- ment ment ment crease Scud range ment Nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons Missile develop- Scud launchers Nuclear weapons development, no- development, no- ment Nuclear weapons development ..* . Osirak re- Nuclear weapons development Supergun oratories development Missile develop- ment Supergun Warhead develop- ment Supergun 252 BEEFING UPTHE SCUD MISSILE: WHO HELPED The Soviet Union supplied Iraq with Scud missiles that had a range of 180 miles. They were used to bombard Israeli cities and a military base in Saudi Arabia where 28 American sol- diers were killed after Saddam Hussein expanded the range to 380 miles. These companies and government agencies had roles: AUSTRIA AVL Designed rocket test tunnel for missile complex Consultco Designed missile complex Alfred Fenneberg Managed construction of missile fuel complex BRAZIL. H.O. Piva; Embraer; Orbita Trained Iraqis in rocket technology, supplied assistance BRITAIN International Computer Systems Supplied computers at missile site International Military Services Designed and supervised construction of a missile test- ing complex Matrix Churchill Supplied scores of sen- sitive machine tools MEED international Front company for missile procurement Technology Development Group Front company for missile procurement TMG Engineering Front company for mis- sile procurement SAUDI ARABLA Saudi Pump Factory Helped supply test stand for turbo pumps SOVIET UNION Soviet Government Supplied at least 819 Scuds SWITZERLAND Condor Projekt Supervised construction of missile fuel production site UNITED STATES Electronics Associates Supplied computer system for missile wind tunnel International Imaging Systems Supplied imaging enhancing equipment capable of mis- sile targeting Litton Industries Financed West German firm Gildemeister, which built Iraq's missile complex Scientific Atlanta Supplied antenna testers (through West German firms) for missile com- plex Tektronix Supplied measuring equipment (through West German firm MBB) to missile site Wiltron Supplied network analyzers used to develop missile guidance WEST GERMANY Anlagen Bau Contor Supplied laboratory equipment Aviatest Built wind tunnels, supplied engi- neers for missile complex Beaujean Developed and supplied test stands for missile propulsion BP; Carl Zeiss; Degussa; Tesa Supplied training in missile electronics, wind tunnels, test facilities Fritz Werner Subcontractor and supplier for missile complex Gildemeister Contractor for missile com- plex, blueprints, machine tools, furnaces, test stands, control facilities H & H Metalform Supplied rocketry equip- ment, cylindrical presses, testing plant for missile complex Havert Industrie Supplied material, equip- ment, fast-refueling pressure units Heinrich Mueller Supplied precision lathes Inwako Intermediary for delivery of compo- nents to install gyroscopes Leifeld Supplied cylindrical presses, rocket motor nozzles Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) Subcontractor for missile complex MBB and Gildemeister Transferred Amer- ican-made computers, electronic test equip- ment MBB and Transtechnica Helped build radar tracking station, rocket test stand for missile complex Nickel Supplied climate control technology for fuel stores at missile fuel production site Sauer Informatic Supplied computer plant for missile complex Schaeftelmaier Supplied electronic meas- urement and testing instruments for missile fuel production Siemens Supplied switching devices, trans- formers, electrical systems to control missile fuel production, equipped radio room at mis- sile complex Thyssen Contract for 305 turbopumps (sup- plied 35) Carl Zeiss Supplied computerized mapping equipment 253 WHO ARMED IRAQ? ANSWERS THE WEST DIDN'T WANT TO HEAR BY DOUGLAS JEHL WASHINGTON.—The terms of the F. : forced on Iraq since the Persian Gulf War may be most valuable for what they have taught. Rarely has a country de- feated in battle been so laid bare to outside scrutiny. To the victors, the answer to how Iraq gained its power is now dispiritingly clear: it was us—the West, and Ger- man companies in particular. That conclusion is documented in stark detail in a new study by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Based in part on the work of United Nations in- spectors, it identifies the Western companies who supplied the crucial parts in what was emerging as an extraordinary Iraqi arsenal. §. firms were by far the worst offenders, but others in Switzerland, Britain, France, Italy and the United States were also instrumental. Without Western help, the report's author, Gary Milhollin, shows, Iraq could never have come so close to producing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. The pattern is in some ways familiar. Countries *.*. power have long turned to foreign merchants for muskets and machine guns. at has changed has to do with what has changed about war. Rather than in vast shipments, even the smallest of acquisitions may prove decisive in an era in which nuclear, biological and chemical weapons can hold populations hostage. And the goods sought for mili- tary value may just as well be produced by a supercomputer manufacturer or bio- ology company as by a munitions maker. A Western bolt found in an Iraqi missile is not necessarily a sign of complicity. A bolt has many peaceful uses, too. But the picture provided by the Wisconsin Project suggests just how instrumental such dual-use trade can be. Italian tech- nology allowed Iraq to extract plutonium, and high-performance Swiss presses gave it the ability to make nuclear weapons parts. Most of what Iraq needed to extend the range of its Scud missiles came from Germany. American computers were used in virtually all Iraqi missile and nuclear sites. Of course, Iraq's most crucial ºl. had even clearer military purposes. The Soviet Union openly sold Baghdad hundreds of Scud missiles; Brazil helped secretly in an effort to build an atomic bomb. But it was the wider Western flood, aided by lax laws and porous borders, that helped Iraq to refine those tools, outfit secret fac- tories, and thereby to reach the verge of even more destructive force. ‘Dairy Plant’ Parts Just one example of that flow was first found in crates marked as dairy plant parts bound from Frankfurt for Baghdad. In fact the intercepted metal parts were a supplement to the 27,436 Scud missile parts worth $28.2 million that #. German company, H & H Metalform, had already delivered to Iraq. A separate compression device was to have helped Iraq test a new intermediate-range missile. There was little mystery to its purpose, German intelligence found: the company had sold the same kind of rocket-testing device to Brazil. With the most dangerous of the projects dismantled, the tension between Iraq and the West is mostly about the future. In refusing again last week to permit U.N. in- spectors to install cameras at a missile-test site, Iraq made clear its aversion to the next step of U.N. oversight, which under Security Council Resolution 715 calls upon the West to keep long-term watch as .# ins to build new weapons. An apparent agreement on a separate § plan calling for Iraq to sell oil to meet humanitarian needs *. that Baghdad might still be open to a last-minute compromise. But even a fence-mending visit by Rolf Ekeus, the chief U.N. weapons inspector, left unclear by Friday whether Iraq would back down or brave a Western threat of a retaliatory strike. The new U.N. focus on monitoring—with its fixation on products—nevertheless carries a danger of being too narrow. There are signs that Western equipment re- mains a key ingredient in secret weapons º not only in Iraq but elsewhere. A report to Congress last month concluded that Fº shipments by Western com- anies had helped Iraq repair or rebuild nearly all of the military production capac- ity it lost during the war. American . reports have similarly warned of newly #. efforts by Iran to acquire the technology needed to produce chemi- cal and biological weapons. 254 Iran has also ranged further afield, pressing both Russia and China for nuclear reactors that could halve the time needed to produce a nuclear weapon. North Korea has devoted its recent shopping to expertise, coming with-in minutes last fall of lur- ing a *. of Russian nuclear scientists to Pyongyang. Libya has tried to buy rocket fuel from a Russian concern. India and Pakistan have been similarly ener- etic. g In the American-led efforts to curb such commerce, the recriminations of the gulf war still echo. Under pressure from Washington, Germany in particular has taken steps to tighten its once-flaccid export controls. Britain has begun an inquiry to re- view what led its companies to assist in the Iraqi buildup, including the manufac- ture by Sheffield Forge-masters of 52 six-meter-long barrels for Iraq's never-com- pleted supergun. With the Iraqi lesson as a model, Congress last fall voted to sub- ject Iran to export restrictions as rigid as those that are in effect on Baghdad. Not even Iran has proven anywhere near as brazen as Iraq, however, making its quest harder to detect—and easier to minimize. In the absence of a ..º. villain like Saddam Hussein, a private company can find the temptation of big business abroad difficult to resist. “One major foreign order is enough incentive for some of these firms to turn a blind eye to the law,” said Anthony Cordesman, a Middle East expert who has advocated even more rigid restrictions. That problem is compounded when governments send mixed messages, as a law- yer for an Atlanta banker argued last week. The client, the local representative of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, is accused of granting nearly $5 billion in unau- thorized loans to finance Iraq's military buildup, and former President Bush was served with a subpoena after the lawyer said his testimony was needed to dem- onstrate that the client was just ing out unstated United States policy. Even the Clinton Administration, having vowed to subject Iran ºf Iraq to a new “dual containment,” has yet to reject an appeal by Boeing and General Electric for special permission to sell $750 million worth of commercial aircraft and engines to Iran. Boeing has warned that a White House refusal to approve the sale would effec- tively surrender thousands of jobs to Europe's Airbus Industries. SADDAM HUSSEIN COLLECTED NUTS AND BOLTS AND LETHALITY FOR HIS SCUDS FROM THE NATIONS THAT DEPLORED HIM Vague Pledges and New Pleadings Still more powerful pressures affect Germany and Japan, who rely far more heav- ily on the Iranian market. So it was no surprise that President &#. was able to win little more than a vague pledge from other leaders at the economic summit in Tokyo to hold Iran and other rogue countries accountable for their actions. As Mr. Milhollin warns, “Most of the # that sold to Iraq are still in business, and are still looking for sales in the Middle East.” And for governments increasingly preoccupied with job creation, it may be dif- ficult to reject new pleadings from those who insist that their chemical or computer can do no harm. Any sale looks less sinister when considered individually; but the lesson of Iraq might counter such complacency. As chronicled now, it shows millions of dollars in British and German machine tools used to make centrifuges; sleek new Swiss press- es designed to forge nuclear weapons parts; Mercedes-Benz tractors and flat-bed trailers fitted as mobile missile launching pads. Its message is that economic secu- rity, for all its importance, remains a subset of something more fundamental. 256 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 2 of 25 EXPORTS TO IRAQ: THE U.S. RECORD Dangerous technology Rocket casings "General military repair applications such as jet engines, rocketcases, etc." This was the declared purpose of two U.S. exports to Iraq, valued at $1.4 million and approved on January 20 and February 10, 1988. The first was for precision machine tools, the second for lasers. The Iraqi buyer was a procurement agent for the Iraqi SCUD missile program. With this equipment, Iraq would be able to make precision parts for missiles, and also be able to rework the cases of its short-range SCUD missiles, enabling them to carry more fuel and fly farther. Indeed, the stated use on the application was to work on "rocketcases." With the longer range, the new Iraqi SCUDS could hit Tel Aviv and kill U.S. soldiers in Saudi Arabia. The exporter was a German company, exporting from the United States. The company, whose name the Commerce Department refused to disclose, first came to the attention of German officials in early 1984, when German intelligence reported that the company was suspected of selling Pakistan equipment for making nuclear weapon fuel. In May 1987, the firm was cited in news reports, this time for trying to smuggle blueprints for uranium enrichment to Pakistan through Switzerland. To make matters worse, another German firm, Uranit, was suing this company for stealing the blueprints. According to a German official, the evidence against the company was "very incriminating."/2 The company was also suspected of hiring a Swiss firm to produce special equipment for Pakistan that could enrich uranium to nuclear weapon grade. The press reports appeared only six months before the company applied for its two U.S. export licenses on December 1 and 22, 1987. Despite the exporter's notoriety, the Commerce and Energy Departments took only two months to approve the first application (case B281441) and less than a month to approve the second (case B286904). Neither was referred to the State or Defense Departments for review. The importer was the "Nesser Establishment for Mechanical Industries," also known as the "Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries." One of Nassr's main jobs was to procure equipment for Project 1728, devoted to increasing the range of Iraq's SCUD missiles. Nassr was part of the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI), run by Saddam Hussein's son-in-law Hussein Kamil al-Majid. MIMI was generally in charge of Iraq's missile and chemical weapon efforts. Nassr also served as the procurement arm for Taji, a site used to produce chemical munitions http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 257 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 3 of 25 and, according to Western intelligence documents, "responsible for the development and manufacture of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment."/3 In addition, Nassr ran artillery ammunition plants, purchased "high-capacity driving nozzles" for missiles from a German company, 4 and was linked to the Condor II intermediate-range missile project. Thus the Commerce Department approved sensitive U.S. equipment that would go directly to Iraqi nuclear weapon, chemical weapon, and missile sites, despite the fact that the exporter was suspected of nuclear smuggling, and despite the fact that the importer declared an intention to work on rocket bodies. Commerce knew that the exporter was unreliable, and knew that the end use was improper, but approved the export anyway. This equipment may well have helped build the SCUD missile that killed American troops in Dhahran. The buyer represented the SCUD program, the equipment was used to rework rocket casings, and Iraq used a long-range SCUD with a reworked casing to reach the U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. Radar In January 1988, the Commerce Department approved more than two million dollars' worth of quartz crystals to the "Salah al Din Establishment" (case B290664) and the "Iraqi Trading Company" (case B346115), both of which frankly said that they wanted the crystals for "components in a ground radar system." Salah al Din was a military electronics factory built by the French company Thomson-CSF. It manufactured three-dimensional early warning radars and may have made components for missile guidance and radar jamming equipment. Quartz crystals perform a vital function in radar: they measure time accurately in small units. Because the position of an object is determined by the time it takes a radar pulse to reach the object and return, accurate time measurement is essential. Military-level quartz crystals are defined as those with high stability over a wide operating temperature, or with the ability to withstand acceleration forces up to 20 times gravity, or shock greater than 10,000 times gravity, or very high radiation. Lower grade crystals do not need a license. The crystals carried commodity control number 1587, identifying them as especially useful for missile production. All items on the U.S. Commodity Control List require an individual license for export, but some of the items, such as quartz crystals, are singled out as sensitive for missiles. In such cases, the State Department is supposed to be consulted because State chairs the Missile Technology Export Committee (MTEC), an interagency group that evaluates export applications subject to missile controls. This means that the Commerce Department should have referred the two applications to http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 258 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 4 of 25 State for interagency review. Instead, Commerce itself approved both in only ten days. Commerce claimed that the cases were "not restricted for MTCR [missile], chemical/biological, or nuclear non- proliferation." Salah al Din also needed advanced equipment to operate its radars. In late 1989, it bought American frequency synthesizers valued at $140,000 to "calibrate, adjust, and test surveillance radar" (case D055821). This would apparently include the radar used to shoot down U.S. aircraft in the Gulf War, and radar used as ground support for missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The frequency synthesizers carried commodity control number 1531, also on the missile technology control list when used for missile "launch and ground support equipment." Commerce did not refer this case to the State Department either, as it should have done for a missile technology item. It approved the application unilaterally in only nineteen days, claiming again that the export was "not restricted for MTCR [missile], chemical/biological, or nuclear non-proliferation." In fact, Commerce knew that Salah al Din was building military radar. When Commerce compiled its internal records on the frequency synthesizers, it noted that "according to our information, the end user [Salah al Din] is involved in military matters." Commerce then deleted this statement before it released the export list to the public. Thus, Commerce approved vital parts for a surveillance radar that Commerce knew was military. The effect was to provide ground support for Iraqi missiles, and to help Iraq detect and shoot down U.S. planes in the Gulf War. It is not surprising that Commerce concealed this knowledge from the public. Guilty knowledge Sa'ad 16 In November of 1986, the Defense Department sent an important letter to the Commerce Department./5 The letter informed Commerce that the Pentagon had intelligence information linking a giant Iraqi site called "Sa'ad 16" to missile development. Later, the Los Angeles Times reported that the exact date of the letter was November 6, and also said that according to government sources familiar with the letter, it revealed that Sa'ad 16 was working on other non-conventional weapons as well. Thus, by November 6, 1986, the Commerce Department should have stopped approving dual-use exports for Sa'ad 16. There is also compelling evidence that Commerce knew what was going on at Sa'ad 16 much earlier. In February 1985 the Director of the Sa'ad General Establishment sent a letter to Gildemeister Projecta, the German company in charge of buying equipment for Sa'ad 16./6 The letter, which described the Sa'ad 16 project in detail, was http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 259 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 5 of 25 reportedly sent to Commerce along with the first license requests from the Sa'ad organization in 1985. Indeed, on May 8, 1985, Gildemeister filed an application for a $60,000 computer for the Sa'ad General Establishment, which Commerce approved six weeks later (case A897641). The letter listed 78 laboratories, including four for testing "starting material and fuel mixtures," two for "calometric testing of fuels," two for developing "control systems and navigation" equipment and one for "measuring aerodynamic quantities on models." On May 3, 1986 a second letter from Sa'ad revealed that the Sa'ad General Establishment was a part of the "State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI)" and that another name for Sa'ad 16 was the "Research and Development Center." /7 Commerce undoubtedly received this second letter--an internal Commerce memo mentions it./8 These two letters from Sa'ad, combined with the November 1986 message from the Pentagon, should have barred any of the organizations named from receiving sensitive U.S. exports after November 6, 1986. But that was not the case. The Sa'ad General Establishment got over half a million dollars' worth of U.S. computers in eight cases, seven of which were approved after November 1986. These computers went directly to Sa'ad 16, Iraq's largest and most important missile research site. None of the cases was referred to the Department of Energy, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List such as computers. As explained below, the Nuclear Referral List consists of items that are especially useful for making nuclear weapons if diverted from their civilian purpose. Sa'ad also got $290,000 worth of precision electronic and photographic equipment, approved in February 1987, three months after Commerce received the Pentagon's letter and two years after the letter describing Sa'ad 16 was signed. SOTI, the second Iraqi organization mentioned in the Sa'ad letter, got high-speed U.S. oscilloscopes in March 1988, a year and a half after Commerce received the Pentagon's letter (case B259524). SOTI is part of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. It directed the construction and equipping of a solid rocket motor production plant called "DOT," and it also procured equipment for at least two SCUD missile enhancement projects. High-speed oscilloscopes are essential to maintain radar, computers and missile guidance systems, all of which have internal electronics that operate in short time frames. Oscilloscopes are also used to capture the brief signals from a nuclear weapon test, which occur in a microsecond or less. Only high-speed oscilloscopes need a license for export. The third organization mentioned in the Sa'ad letter was the "Research and Development Center," which the letter said was another name for Sa'ad 16. The "Center" was allowed to buy $850,000 worth of high- performance measuring, calibrating, and testing equipment (cases B060729 and B075876), all approved in January 1987, three months after the Pentagon's letter and almost two years after the Iraqi letter describing Sa'ad 16 was signed. These cases were not referred to the http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 260 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 6 of 25 Department of Energy either, despite the fact that the items exported were on the Nuclear Referral List. The Defense Department apparently objected at the staff level but did not escalate its objections to a higher level before Commerce approved the exports. The Center also got communicating and tracking equipment valued at $3,000 in 1989 (case B382561), again without referral to the Department of Energy as required for an item on the Nuclear Referral List. In addition to the letters from Sa'ad and the Pentagon, there were other warnings. According to U.S. officials, American intelligence began to brief other U.S. agencies on the Iraqi end user network at least as early as 1987. The briefings continued throughout 1988. By early 1989, the intelligence warnings had become clear and urgent. At that time the CIA called all the U.S. agencies concerned with exports together for a special meeting on Iraq. Commerce, however, refused to attend on the ground that its "judgment might be contaminated." In the open press, the earliest detailed accounts of Sa'ad 16 emerged in January 1989, when the German magazine Stern published a list of the Sa'ad 16 laboratories. Over the next several months, the German press published several stories linking Sa'ad 16 to Iraqi missile, nuclear and chemical weapon development. But even these press reports did not stop Commerce from approving the tracking equipment in June of 1989. Thus the Commerce Department continued to approve sales of sensitive American equipment to Iraqi front companies even after it knew that the equipment was likely to be diverted. Violations of procedures Commerce also failed to refer cases to other agencies for review, in violation of its own procedures. The quartz crystals mentioned above were on the missile technology list—the list of items deemed especially useful for missile production./9Both that list and a second one, known as the Nuclear Referral List, are subsets of the U.S. Commodity Control List (CCL). All items on the CCL require an individual validated license for export. Under Commerce Department regulations, quartz crystals are defined as missile items if "usable as launch and ground support equipment." This they clearly were, because the Iraqi buyer stated that they would be used as "components in a ground radar system." Ground radar is essential to support the launching, testing and tracking of missiles. The frequency synthesizers were also on the missile technology list if "usable as launch and ground support equipment." They clearly were also, because the buyer admitted that they would be used to "calibrate, adjust, and test surveillance radar." Thus, Commerce should have referred both of these cases to the State Department for review by the Missile Technology Export Committee, the interagency group responsible for licensing missile-related http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 261 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 7 of 25 exports. The Commerce Department also failed to refer millions of dollars' worth of compasses, gyroscopes and accelerometers to the State Department. Some of these items were sold to Iraqi Airways, which the U.S. Treasury identified in April 1991 as a "front company" in Iraq's "arms procurement network." Some also went to the Iraqi Air Force and some went to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense—both military organizations. All items in this category (ECCN 1485) are defined as missile-related because they can be used to make missile guidance systems.110 Commerce nevertheless approved them without consulting the State Department, as required by its own procedures. Thus when Commerce stated on March 11, 1991 in a press release that "no license applications for any MTCR [missile technology] items have been approved for export to Iraq," it contradicted its own export records. Commerce also violated its statutory obligation to refer nuclear cases to the Department of Energy. Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act of 1978 requires that the executive branch develop a special list of items that "could be of significance for nuclear explosive purposes" if diverted from civilian use. The list is known as the "Nuclear Referral List." All items on the list require export licenses, and all license applications must be "reviewed by the Department of Commerce in consultation with the Department of Energy."/11 In fact, Commerce licensed numerous items on the list without referring them to the Department of Energy. The most common item was computers, which carry CCL number 1565. Computers operating above a certain speed are regulated by the Nuclear Referral List, and some special computers are also on the missile technology list. Commerce approved the following 20 computer cases, with a total value of over $5 million, without referring any of them to the Department of Energy. The fact that these computers required licenses shows that the computing speed must have been high enough to be regulated by the list. Thus, in all 20 cases, Commerce violated its own procedures as well as Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Case A800390: Importer: State Organization of Post & Tel. Value: $3,600,000 Case A843654: Importer: Iraq Spare Parts Manufacturing Value: $13,000 Case A844783: Importer: Ministry of Industry Value: $488,000 http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 262 Licensing Mass Destruction Case A847302: Importer: Schlumberger Value: $500,000 Case A849514: Importer: Ministry of Irrigation Value: $389,000 Case A892228: Importer: State Organization for Tech Ind. Value: $11,000 Case B050974: Importer: Directorate of Mobilisation Value: $25,900 Case B061971: Importer: Central Statistics Value: $87,800 Case B069513: Importer: Iraq Nation Oil Value: $210,600 Case B072960: Importer: Economic Commission Value: $40,810 Case B073687: Importer: Schlumberger Value: $2,000 Case A853710: Importer: Saab Abbas Value: $40,700 Case A854382: Importer: Arab Petroleum Value: $37,500 Case A857954: Importer: State Organization for Phones Value: $48,000 Case A862229: Importer: Ministry of Education Value: $13,000 Case A862232: Importer: Ministry of Industry Value: $22,400 Case A866566: Importer: Scientific Council Value: $1,900 Case A866912: Importer: Mendes Jr. International Value: $32,000 Case A887265: Importer: University of Baghdad Value: $10,000 Case A887266: http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html Page 8 of 25 1 1/19/2002 263 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 9 of 25 Importer: University of Baghdad Value: $11,000 Commerce also approved several military items to military buyers without consulting the Department of Defense. These included the machine tools and lasers, discussed above, which are used to fabricate rocket casings, the quartz crystals discussed above which are used as components in ground radar, and the navigation, radar and airborne communication equipment sold to the Iraqi Air Force and Ministry of Defense. Exports of such clearly military items to military buyers should have been referred to U.S. security experts. The Defense Department, in fact, played only a minor role in the export approval process. The Pentagon saw an export case for only two reasons. First, it was consulted for its opinion whether an item was likely to be diverted to a Cocom-proscribed country (primarily the East Bloc). For these cases, the Pentagon had no power to decide whether the export might contribute to nuclear, missile or chemical weapon proliferation. Such a decision was outside the scope of its review. Second, the Pentagon saw a handful of nuclear cases because it participated in the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination (SNEC), the interagency group that evaluates nuclear-related exports. But the SNEC reviewed only 24 of the 771 cases approved from 1985 to August 1990--three percent of the total. Commerce essentially bypassed the SNEC by failing to refer cases to it. Thus, for the vast majority of the exports—roughly 97%--the Pentagon did not participate in judgments about the risk of proliferation. Neither did the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or the intelligence agencies. They had no role beyond their participation in the SNEC. Thus, in 97% of the cases, Commerce alone decided, or decided with the concurrence of Energy or State, whether an item increased the risk of nuclear or missile proliferation. Commerce did not follow a consistent pattern in selecting the few cases it did send to the SNEC. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, for example, bought a large computer, valued at $2.8 million (case B175217) which was not referred to the SNEC, and also bought $87,000 worth of precision electronic and photographic equipment (ECCN 6599) with no external review at all (case D042767). But a second computer, worth only $24,390 (case B1081.66), was referred to the SNEC, indicating that the SNEC may not have received the most important cases. Ten of the items approved for the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission were on the Nuclear Referral List, but only three were submitted to the SNEC. Commerce also approved $200,000 worth of computers for Al-Qaqaa, the Iraqi nuclear weapon design laboratory. Commerce did not refer the computers to either the Department of Energy or the SNEC. Violations of policies http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 264 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 10 of 25 The Commerce Department had full authority to reject every application discussed above. Under Commerce regulations, dual-use exports must satisfy specific criteria. The criteria include the following tests: whether the stated end use is acceptable, whether the item could aid nuclear weapon or missile development, whether the importing country has a nuclear or missile development effort, and whether the recipient country has good "non-proliferation credentials."/12 Iraq never came close to passing those tests. The "stated end use" of some of the items was explicitly to produce rockets and radar. The items exported, such as machine tools and radar components, were obviously powerful enough to aid missile and nuclear development. It was also clear that Iraq had nuclear and missile development programs. Iraq had been trying to build nuclear weapons since at least 1981, when Israel bombed the Osirak reactor near Baghdad, and Iraq had been known since the mid-1980s to be working with Argentina and Egypt on nuclear-capable missiles. In addition, U.S. intelligence knew by the mid-1980s that many of the importers listed on the licenses were fronting for Iraqi nuclear and missile sites. If the Commerce Department had applied its own criteria, it would have denied many of the Iraqi applications. Dangerous end users The annex to this report lists Iraq's known military and nuclear end users. The sixteen buyers listed either built, equipped or operated Iraq's nuclear, missile and chemical weapon sites. Given the centralized control of all important activity in Iraq, and the supreme importance of the Iraqi military, the true list of military users is surely longer. Any sensitive export to a buyer in Iraq must have been available to the military, regardless of what the export application said. Nevertheless, the sales to these sixteen buyers tell an important story. All sixteen imported U.S. computers, the indispensable tool of modern research and manufacture. These computers must have aided the work of virtually every Iraqi nuclear, missile and chemical weapon site. Altogether, about $25 million worth of U.S. computers went to the sixteen military or nuclear buyers identified in this report. Iraq's total purchases of U.S. computers amounted to more than $96 million, one fourth of all the Iraqi dual-use imports from the United States. Exports were also licensed that—for reasons known only to Commerce—did not appear on the list released to the public. In 1987, Electronic Associates of Long Branch, New Jersey sold Sa'ad 16 a "hybrid digital-analog computer," specially designed for wind tunnel experiments on missiles. The computer is reportedly identical to a computer now operating at the U.S. government's White Sands missile range in New Mexico. The sale went to MBB and Gildemeister, the two German companies that were Sa'ad 16's main missile technology http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 265 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 11 of 25 suppliers. The Department of Defense opposed the sale and had the license brought before the National Security Council in September 1987. Although the NSC decided to block the export, the computer had been shipped eight months earlier in January, without the Pentagon's knowledge. Commerce also approved exports informally that do not appear on the public list. In response to an exporter's request, Commerce can approve a shipment by stating that no license is required. Two of these cases have recently come to light. In 1989, the Consarc Corporation of New Jersey notified Commerce that it wanted to export a "skull" furnace to Iraq. Consarc explicitly told Commerce that the furnace could aid a nuclear program. The furnace could melt zirconium for nuclear fuel rods, could melt titanium for missile nose cones and other critical missile parts, and might be able to melt plutonium and uranium for nuclear bomb cores. The skull furnace was to be accompanied by three other furnaces: an electron beam furnace from Consarc, and furnaces for vacuum induction and heat treatment from Consarc's subsidiary in Scotland. Used together, the four furnaces would have far exceeded Iraq's stated purpose, which was to manufacture artificial limbs for victims of the Iran-Iraq War. According to U.S. officials, Iraq would have had a "Cadillac" production line for atomic bomb and ballistic missile parts, even better than the facilities at American nuclear weapons labs. Commerce nevertheless told Consarc that no export license was needed. In June 1990, a person outside the government told the Pentagon about the sale. This set off a chain of official reactions that led the White House to block the shipment. It turns out that equipment accompanying the furnaces needed export licenses. In June 1989, Commerce licensed special computing equipment to control the furnaces' operation (case D030956) and in January 1990, Commerce licensed numerical control equipment to make new crucibles for the furnaces (case D064342). This latter export was crucial. One of the main reasons for thinking that the original skull furnace might not be used to make A-bombs was that the original crucible was not suited for melting heavy metals such as uranium. But when Commerce licensed the equipment for making additional crucibles, Iraq got what it needed to make A-bomb cores. Also in 1989, another New Jersey company, Struthers, Dunn, Inc. of Pitman, contacted the same Commerce representative, Michael Manning, who had advised Consarc. Iraq wanted to buy "time-delay relays," devices that have civilian uses but are also used to separate the stages of ballistic missiles in flight. Iraq wanted a special model, "tested for shock and vibration" that would perform at 350,000 feet-- 66 miles above the earth. Ronald Waugaman, who handled the case http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 266 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 12 of 25 for Struthers, Dunn, said "when I heard 350,000 feet, I thought missile."/13 Waugaman said he told Manning about the high-altitude specifications, which were military grade. They contradicted Iraq's official claim that the relays were for "heavy industrial use." Waugaman said he told Manning that "they're not putting tractors 350,000 feet in the air."/14 Nevertheless, Waugaman said that U.S. officials told him that if a civilian end use was stated, there was no reason to bar the export. RECOMMENDATIONS Strengthening U.S. Export Controls The U.S. export control system has broken down for three reasons: the wrong people are in charge of it, Congress has ignored it, and it is Secret. Remove export control from the Commerce Department It has frequently been said that there is a conflict between the Commerce Department's duty to promote exports and its duty to regulate them--that Commerce has conflicting missions in the export field. The licenses to Iraq prove that this is true. Commerce licensed items that did not meet its export criteria, that it knew would be diverted from their supposed civilian purposes, and that it knew would help Iraq's nuclear and missile programs. Commerce even excluded the State and Energy Departments from the licensing process, in violation of its own procedures. The best known example of a federal agency that tried to promote and regulate at the same time is the old Atomic Energy Commission, which had the job of both promoting and regulating nuclear energy until 1974, when Congress decided to split the functions. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission now regulates; the Department of Energy promotes. Everyone agrees that nuclear regulation gained great credibility and effectiveness from this separation. Congress should now follow this precedent for dual-use licensing. It should take this function away from Commerce and give it to an independent regulatory agency such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or to some other department, such as Defense, that has no export promotion function. The Commerce Department, which specializes in trade, is not the place to decide strategic questions. An agency that specializes in national security should have that task. It is essential to recognize that the real significance of dual-use items is strategic, not economic. The number of items on the control list is small; well over 90% of the applications to export them are granted; and the value of the few applications denied is tiny compared to the http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 1 1/19/2002 267 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 13 of 25 overall value of U.S. foreign trade. It has been suggested that Congress should create a new agency to handle all export licensing. Such a move would be sound if Congress could insure that industrial interests would not take the agency over, as they have the Commerce Department. Industry would have a great incentive to pack such an agency with personnel loyal to its interests. It would be safer and more logical to make the Defense Department the "hub" for controlling all exports relevant to nuclear, chemical, biological and missile proliferation. Most of the expertise is already in the Pentagon, and any additional expertise could be transferred from other agencies and obtained through the national laboratories. Commerce, which has no substantive expertise on dual-use technology, should retain only a record keeping function. Commerce should refer applications to the Pentagon, which would make the final licensing decision in consultation with the Commerce, Energy, and State Departments, and with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the intelligence agencies. This change would put military experts in charge of exports with military applications. Impose Congressional oversight Congress essentially ignored export licensing to Iraq until the invasion of Kuwait. Oversight was entirely lacking during the period preceding the Gulf War. If Congress had looked into what the Commerce Department was doing, Congress would have learned quickly that Commerce was not following the rules. A Congressional reaction might have stopped some of the worst exports from going out. Congress should now impose an effective form of oversight. A Congressional committee with jurisdiction over national security matters should be given the task of overseeing and evaluating export licensing. That committee could be a subcommittee of one of the Armed Services committees, or of the Governmental Affairs or Government Operations committees, or of the Joint Economic Committee. The committee or subcommittee should receive complete reports on pending or approved licenses and should have sufficient staff to oversee export controls. If necessary, it could receive assistance from the General Accounting Office or the Office of Technology Assessment. Open export licensing to public view The other important lesson we can draw from nuclear regulation is the great benefit of making decisions in public. All of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's export licenses are granted on the public record and in the light of day. This is the main reason why there are no horror stories about U.S. nuclear exports to Iraq. Neither exporters nor regulators want to defend such transactions in public, so they do not happen. http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 268 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 14 of 25 The Commerce Department's process is secret. Neither Congress nor the public is permitted to examine Commerce licensing in the open. This is true despite the fact that dual-use licenses are supposed to be for civilian items restricted to peaceful use. Commerce refuses even to confirm the existence of an individual license application, and refuses to disclose which applications have been approved after the exports have gone out. Cases come into public view only when someone inside the government becomes angry enough to leak them to the press. This means that only the exporters know which cases are pending, and only the exporters' voices are heard by the licensing officers when decisions are made. The effects are to freeze the public and Congress out of the process and to open the door to the worst forms of private lobbying. The Commerce Department argues that secrecy is necessary to protect proprietary interests. But the U.S. nuclear industry competes well on the international market despite the openness of NRC regulation. Congress should now require the Commerce Department to publish quarterly summaries of all dual-use licensing actions. This information already exists in a database. It could be released by pushing a button. The resulting list would be the same as the one that Commerce released in March on Iraq, but would include countries such as Iran, Libya and Syria. The list would only cover licensing actions that have been completed. Pending sales would not be revealed. Congress could accomplish this by amending Section 12(c) of the Export Administration Act, which the Commerce Department now interprets as requiring complete secrecy for dual-use licenses. The list would also include the name of the exporter. If a company is ashamed of having sold one of its products to a developing country, the company should not have made the sale in the first place. Reputable companies do not object to telling the truth about their business. If the sales are legitimate, and satisfy the export criteria, there is no reason to keep them hidden. The decision to license them is an official government act paid for with tax dollars. Pushing export licensing into the light of day would encourage the exporters to be honest, encourage the government to be careful, and allow the public to find out whether U.S. exports are undermining national security. ANNEX: IRAQI END USERS Following is a list of the known Iraqi military and nuclear end users that imported sensitive American equipment from 1985 to August 2, 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait: Iraqi Airways: One of the "agents and front companies" that Iraq used for its "arms procurement network," according to the U.S. Treasury Department. In a press release on April 1, 1991, Treasury http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 269 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 15 of 25 termed these companies "Specially Designated Nationals," and said that "when you deal with them, you're dealing with Saddam." Total approvals to Iraqi Airways: over $50 million, including: 1. Compasses, gyroscopes, and accelerometers (ECCN 1485) valued at $13 million in seven cases. - The Commerce Department approved these sales without external review in four of the seven cases, despite the fact that these were missile items and were approved after the missile list came into effect. All items under category 1485 are controlled as missile items. 2. Navigation, radar and airborne communication equipment (ECCN 1501) valued at $5 million in five cases. - Approved without external review in four of the five cases. 3. Computers (ECCN 1565) valued at $5 million. 4. Aircraft, helicopters, engines and equipment valued at $23,000,000. 5. Aircraft parts, boats, diesel engines, underwater cameras, and submersible systems valued at $28 million. Many of the items approved for Iraqi Airways fell into categories that are listed, by their commodity control numbers, as useful in the development, testing, production and deployment of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Items such as compasses, gyroscopes, accelerometers, computers, radars and navigational equipment all fall into this category. It is possible that some of these items aided the Iraqi SCUD program. The procedures by which missile technology exports are approved are not available to the public. It is widely assumed that at least the Department of State reviews and approves these sensitive exports. However, the Department of Commerce approved at least six exports that appear to be on the missile technology list with no external review. In one case (B373514), the Commerce Department approved over a million dollars' worth of compasses, gyroscopes, and accelerometers without consulting either the State or Defense Departments. All items in category 1485 are missile items and should have been referred to the State Department. Iraqi Air Force: http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 270 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 16 of 25 • Total approvals: $57 million, including: 1. Navigational, radar, and air communication equipment (ECCN 1501) valued at more than $200,000 in nine cases. - No external review in five of the cases (A839273, A858162, A866417, B200489, B222433). - State Department approved three of the cases. 2. Compasses, gyroscopes, and accelerometers (ECCN 1485) valued at $957,500. - Commerce Department approved without external review in March 1989, despite the fact that these are missile technology items. 3. Oscilloscopes (ECCN 1584) valued at $12,391 (case A826888). - Approved by State Department in May 1985. 4. Computers (ECCN 1565) valued at $11,394 (case B236580). - No referral to Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. 5. Aircraft and helicopters (ECCN 6460) valued at $45.8 million. - Approved by the State and Energy Departments from April to June, 1988. Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission: Responsible for nuclear research in Iraq, including Iraqi work on nuclear weapons. • Total approvals: over $3 million, including: 1. Computers (ECCN 1565) valued at $2.9 million. - The largest computer export, valued at $2.8 million (case B175217) was approved by the Energy Department without referral to the SNEC, whereas a second computer, worth only $24,390 (B108166) was referred to the SNEC, indicating that the SNEC did not receive the most important cases. - A third computer was approved without referral to the Energy Department, which is required for a commodity on the Nuclear Referral List being exported to a nuclear end user for a nuclear end use. This violated export control procedures. http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 271 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 17 of 25 2. Precision electronic and photographic equipment (ECCN 6599) valued at $87,000 (case D042767). - No referral for external review. • Ten of the items approved for this end user were on the Nuclear Referral List, but only three were submitted to SNEC for interagency review. Ministry of Defense: In charge of Iraqi defense operations. Responsible for the State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI) and the Sa'ad General Establishment (both described below). • Total approvals: over $567 million, including: 1. Computers (ECCN 1565) in eighteen cases valued at $2.1 million. - Commerce referred only two of the eighteen cases to the Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. Of the two cases referred to Energy, only one was referred to the SNEC. 2. Compasses, gyroscopes and accelerometers (ECCN 1485) in three cases valued at over $1 million. - These items are subject to missile technology controls. - Commerce did not refer one case (B204774) valued at $60,136 for external review, although the approval was in May 1987 after the establishment of the missile control list in April 1987. 3. Navigation, radar, and airborne communication equipment (ECCN 1501) valued at $291,000. - These items may be subject to missile technology controls. - The bulk of the value of this approval was for case B353226, valued at $264,000, which Commerce did not refer for external review, despite the fact that the approval was in September 1988 after the establishment of the missile control list in April 1987. - Commerce licensed this sale of dual-use military equipment to a military end user without external review by the Defense Department. State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI): Subdivision of the Ministry of Defense. Commissioned the building and equipping of DOT, a solid rocket motor production plant built as part of the Condor II project. Also procured, according to U.S. officials, equipment for http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 272 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 18 of 25 the Al-Hillah and Al-Fallujah SCUD modification projects and the space launch facility at Karbala. • Total approvals: $1.4 million, including: 1. Oscilloscopes (ECCN 1584) valued at $20,000. - Commerce approved three applications, two without the external review required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. - One oscilloscope went to Mansour, a military site described below. 2. Computers (ECCN 1565) valued at $380,000 in five cases. - Only one of the five cases was reviewed by the Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. 3. Measuring, calibrating, and testing equipment (ECCN 1529) valued at over $143,000 in three cases (B052572, B156528, B311058). - Commerce licensed the largest approval (B052572), valued at over $132,000, without an end use statement. - Commerce referred only one of the three cases to the Energy Department, although all three were on the Nuclear Referral List. - Commerce made no referral to the State Department, despite the fact that this item appears to be on the missile technology control list, and one of the cases was approved in 1988 after the list went into effect. Sa'ad General Establishment: A division of SOTI. Self-described as "a state organization specialized in the planning and erection of large industrial complexes for the Government of Iraq," Sa'ad does not operate any of the contracted facilities itself./15 According to MidEast Markets, Sa'ad only does work on military projects. Contracted for the construction of Sa'ad 16 at Mosul. • Total approvals: $1.1 million, including: 1. Computers (ECCN 1565) valued at more than $450,000 in seven cases (B177669, B224682, B265627, B271629, B350736, E000057, E002881). - No referral to the Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 273 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 19 of 25 2. Precision electronic and photographic equipment (ECCN 6599) valued at $290,000. Monsour Factory (or Al Mansour): Linked to SOTI and served as a procurement agent, according to U.S. officials, for the SCUD enhancement facilities at Al-Fallujah and Al-Hillah, and the space launch center at Al-Anbar. According to press reports, purchased a high-speed oscilloscope from Tektronix. • Total approvals: $5.2 million, including: 1. Electronic manufacturing equipment (ECCN 1355) valued at $4.2 million. - No referral to the State or Energy Departments. - This equipment enables domestic production of transistors and diodes for use in computers and other electronics, including military systems such as communications and radar. 2. Electronic measuring, calibrating and testing equipment (ECCN 1529) valued at $644,000. - No referral to the Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. - No referral to the State Department, despite the fact that this item appears to be on the missile technology list and was approved in October 1989 after the list came into effect. 3. Computers (ECCN 1565) valued at $354,000 and $12,000. - No referral to the Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. 4. Superconductive electromagnets (ECCN 1574) valued at $8,280. - No referral for outside review. Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI), formerly Ministry of Industry and Minerals: Run by Saddam Hussein's son-in-law Hussein Kamil al-Majid, with overall responsibility for Iraq's nuclear, missile and chemical weapon programs. MIMI ordered furnaces, the sale of which was blocked by the White House in June 1990 because of Iraq's plan to divert the furnaces to nuclear weapon production. • Total approvals: $8.5 million, including: http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 274 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 20 of 25 1. Computers (ECCN 1565) in twenty cases valued at almost $8 million. - No referral of 19 of the cases to the Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. - Commerce referred one case, valued at $29,300, to the Departments of State and Energy, but approved another valued at $488,000 unilaterally. 2. Computer-controlled machine tools (ECCN 1091) valued at $525,000 (case D064342). - Departments of State and Energy approved in January 1990. Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries (or Nesser Establishment for Mechanical Industries): Part of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI), described above. Nassr procured equipment for Project 1728, a SCUD modification effort; was involved in Iraq's nuclear program; was the procurement arm for Taji, a site used to produce chemical munitions; and, according to Western intelligence documents, was "responsible for the development and manufacture of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment."/16 Nassr also ran artillery ammunition plants; purchased "high-capacity driving nozzles" for missiles from a German company; may have been a part of the European procurement network run by Iraqi front company TDG in London; was the main customer of Matrix Churchill, another Iraqi front company in England; and was linked to the Condor II intermediate-range missile project. • Total approvals: $1.8 million, including: 1. Computers (ECCN 1565) valued at $1 million. - State Department approved in mid-1988. - No referral to the Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. 2. Computer-controlled machine tools (ECCN 1091) valued at $888,000 (case B281441). - Energy Department approved in February 1988. Al-Qaqaa State Establishment: Part of MIMI. Responsible, at least in part, for Iraq's nuclear weapon program. According to Western intelligence, this center was "concerned with the development of the non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons."/17 The intelligence report also states that Al-Qaqaa had experience with modern high explosives and high-speed measurements, both of which are necessary http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 275 Licensing Mass Destruction to develop nuclear weapons. In March 1990, customs officers at Heathrow Airport in London seized a case of capacitors bound for Al- Qaqaa that were especially designed for detonating nuclear warheads. • Total approvals: over $200 thousand, including: 1. Computers (ECCN 1565) in three cases valued at $200,000. - No referral to the Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. Technical Corporation for Special Projects (Techcorp): Also part of MIMI. Operated Sa'ad 16. Responsible for the SCUD modification project and development of the Condor II missile. Also purchased parts for the Iraqi supergun. • Total approvals: $61,300, including: 1. Two computers (ECCN 1565) valued at $16,980 and $44,320. - No referral to the Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. University of Mosul: Site of and procurement agent for Sa'ad 16 (also referred to as "Research & Development Center"), Iraq's major missile research and development center, where work was done on the Condor II and SCUD modification as well as research on chemical and nuclear weapons. According to European news reports, the German company that supplied Sa'ad 16 described the project as a "laboratory and workshop complex [that] will be run in cooperation with Mosul University."(18 • Total approvals: over $1.8 million, including: 1. Equipment for enhancing satellite images, including computers (ECCN 1565) valued at $1 million and related equipment (ECCN 4590) valued at $27,800. - Commerce Department approved the related equipment (ECCN 4590) in June 1985 without external review. - This equipment enhances photographs taken by satellites. The enhanced photos can be used to improve targeting by missiles or aircraft, or for other reconnaissance objectives. The licensee, International Imaging Systems of Milpitas, California, did not ship the equipment approved in 1990. However, on two previous occasions, International Imaging sent shipments to Iraq. In 1981, an image processing system went to the Iraqi Directorate General for Geological Survey and Mineral http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html Page 21 of 25 11/19/2002 276 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 22 of 25 Investigation, and in 1987 a similar system went to the Space and Astronomy Research Center in Baghdad./19 2. Viruses and viroids (ECCN 4997) valued at $1. - Commerce Department approved in December 1987 without external review. 3. Computer (ECCN 1565) valued at $483,000. - Approved (case B062253) without referral to the Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. Research and Development Center: Another name for Sa'ad 16, Iraq's main missile research and development site at Mosul. • Total approvals: $927,000, including: 1. Measuring, calibrating, and testing equipment (ECCN 1529) valued at $870,000 in two cases (B060729 and B075875). - No referral to the Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. - The Defense Department objected at the staff level but did not escalate its objections before Commerce approval. - This equipment can be used to test and develop microwave circuits for missile guidance radars and microwave communications. One licensee, Wiltron of Morgan Hill, California, sold a scalar network analyzer using a radio frequency of up to 40 GHz to test and develop these circuits. According to one report, the Department of Defense tried to stop an approval valued at $49,510 in November 1986, but the Commerce Department licensed the export the following January. 2. Communicating and tracking equipment (ECCN 1502) valued at $3,000. - No referral to the Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. 3. Radio spectrum analyzer (ECCN 1533) valued at $45,664. 4. Computers (ECCN 1565) valued at $10,228. Hutteen General Establishment: Iraqi government organization that purchased large-caliber artillery shell cases from Spain and Germany that could be filled with chemical payloads. http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 277 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 23 of 25 • Total approvals: over $1 million, including: 1. Computers (ECCN 1565) in four cases (B249146, B322679, D030887, D014317) valued at over $1 million. - No referral to the Energy Department, as required for items on the Nuclear Referral List. Badar Establishment of Mechanical Engineering (or Bader General Establishment): A military enterprise responsible for producing aerial bombs. • Total approvals: $2 million, including: 1. Computer (ECCN 1565) valued at $1.6 million. - Departments of Energy and State approved from March 1988 to June 1988. 2. Technical model (ECCN 9999) valued at $373,708. - No referral for external review. Salah al Din Establishment (originally called Saad 13; apparently also called University of Salahaddin): A military electronics factory built by the French company Thomson-CSF. Manufactures three- dimensional early warning radars under license from Thomson as well as other Thomson military telecommunications equipment. Some electronic countermeasures and inertial guidance components were also made here. • Total approvals: over $1.6 million, including: 1. Quartz crystals and assemblies (ECCN 1587) valued at $1.1 million (case B290664). - Commerce approved without external review, despite the fact that this item is on the missile technology control list and was approved in January 1988 after the list went into effect. The stated end use was components for a radar system. 2. Frequency synthesizers and equipment (ECCN 1531) valued at $140,000 (case D055821). - Approved without external review, despite the fact that this item is on the missile technology control list and was approved in November 1989 after the list went into effect. - The stated end use of this item was for "calibrating, adjusting and testing of a surveillance radar," which could function as a g http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 279 Licensing Mass Destruction Page 25 of 25 laboratories at the Sa'ad 16 Research and Development Center. 7. Sa'ad General Establishment, letter of May 3, 1986 from H. A. Al- Dahan to Gildemeister Projecta. 8. U.S. Department of Commerce, Memorandum to John Knofala from Willard A. Workman, August 12, 1986. 9. Quartz crystals are missile technology items if "usable as launch and ground support equipment" under commodity control number (ECCNNo.) 1587. See Part 779, Supplement Four, U.S. Export Administration Regulations (April, 1987). 10. See Part 779, Supplement Four, U.S. Export Administration Regulations (April, 1987). 11. U.S. Export Administration Regulations, Supplement No. 1 to Part 778, p. 1. 12. U.S. Export Administration Regulations, Sections 776.18 (missile technology) and 778.4 (nuclear technology). 13. Henry Weinstein, "Despite Warning, U.S. Okd Sale of Missile Part to Iraq," Los Angeles Times, April 9, 1991. p. A7. 14. Id. 15. Sa'ad General Establishment, letter of May 3, 1986 from H. A. Al- Dahan to Gildemeister Projecta. 16. Mark Hibbs, "Intelligence Reports Identify Two Sites As Key to Iraqi Weapons Program," Nuclear Fuel, January 21, 1991, p. 3. 17. Mark Hibbs, "Intelligence Reports Identify Two Sites As Key to Iraqi Weapons Program," Nuclear Fuel, January 21, 1991, p. 3. 18. "A Civilian Project of Mosul University," Stern (Hamburg), January 26, 1989. See also Alan George and Herbert Lansinger, "Rocket Merry-Go-Round," Profil (Vienna), March 20, 1989, pp. 36- 38, translated in.JPRSTND, May 5, 1989, pp. 31-34. 19. International Imaging Systems, press statement, January 29, 1991. back to top http://www.wisconsingroject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html 11/19/2002 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR Mr. TAYLOR. How many years do you think it will be, if it has not already oc- curred, before either a terrorist state or a terrorist organization purchases a work- ing weapon of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union? Dr. MILHOLLIN. It is by no means inevitable that a nuclear weapon could one day be sold from the former Soviet Union to a terrorist organization—even though the possibility cannot be ruled out. In my opinion, it is more likely that the means to make a nuclear weapon will be sold. The former Soviet Union is already being used as the source for nuclear-related items purchased by countries such as Iran, which has ties to terrorist organizations. There is also the risk that nuclear weapon fuel could be stolen from the many locations in the former Soviet Union where it is kept under less-than-secure conditions. (283) U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 26, 2002. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNLA Mr. HUNTER. The committee will come to order. Today the Com- mittee on Armed Services continues its review of United States pol- icy toward Iraq. This morning's hearing marks the fourth in a number of planned public sessions designed to educate and inform the committee and the American people on the various issues sur- rounding Iraq's continued violation of numerous United Nations resolutions, its illicit development of weapons of mass destruction and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States, the Middle East, and the international community. The committee has received a classified briefing from the intel- ligence community in each of the last three weeks, which we also opened to all members of the House in the last several weeks. We also heard from former United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspectors about Iraq's weapons programs and Saddam Hussein's persistent efforts to thwart United Nations (U.N.) inspec- tions, and we heard from an Iraqi defector who was a leader in Saddam's nuclear weapons program. He told us how the Iraqis built and sustained their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pro- grams through the acquisition of western technology, and how the United States’ own export control system may have contributed to the problems we are now facing with Iraq. And I thought, most in- terestingly, he told about how even as our inspectors were on the ground in 1993, a few miles away, they were moving the weapons program with great efficiency. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld appeared before the committee last week to discuss and defend the administration's policy toward Iraq. And yesterday morning, the committee met behind closed doors with several retired generals to hear their views on this criti- cal issue with a special focus on military options. The committee is planning on holding another hearing next week, next Wednesday, on the topic of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Today, however, we will hear from two well-known gentlemen who have distinguished themselves in the world of foreign and defense policy: The honorable Richard Perle, who is a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and Chairman of the Defense Policy Board; and General Wesley Clark, United States Army, Re- (285) 286 tired, and Managing Director, Merchant Banking, of the Stephens Group, Incorporated, and a former Commander in Chief of the United States European Command. And, gentlemen, we greatly appreciate you being with us this morning and sharing your wisdom and your viewpoints. We want to thank you for being with us. And, I also want to inform the full committee that this very robust schedule of hearings, both public hearings and classified hearings, are being done at the direction of the chairman of the full committee, Bob Stump. It was his feeling that we needed to educate not only members of the committee, but as many members of the House that it possibly could on this issue, so they can make an informed judgment when it comes time to vote. And, I might let folks know that I think we have had about 120 non-committee members appear and listen in on the classified briefings that we have been holding. So, we are going to continue with these hearings and our goal is to see to it that every single member of the House who desires to have a classified briefing on this issue before this vote has an opportunity to do it, as well, of course, to attend our public hearings. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 329.] Before we begin, I want to turn to my good friend the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, the Ranking Member and offer any comments he might have. STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I welcome Mr. Perle, General Clark. We look forward to your testimony. And, Mr. Chairman, to shorten the hearing just a bit, I ask that my pre- pared statement be entered in the record— Mr. HUNTER. Without objection. Mr. SKELTON [continuing]. And state this is a very crucial and critical time for us in this country regarding proposed action against Iraq. The President has made it clear to Congress and the United Nations and the American people that he has the deter- mination to remove Saddam Hussein from power. And, there are a number of questions that need to be answered, in my opinion, such as what can still be done before we must compel Iraq with use of force; what is the threshold beyond which the United States can no longer wait for Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolu- tions? To me, the aftermath—and all of us know and understand and appreciate the high capability of the American fighting force— what do we do in the aftermath that in my opinion looms as the Damocles sword over whatever might be successful de- weaponization of the Iraqi regime? So, where do we go from here? And, I hope our witnesses can give us the benefit of their wisdom on these and the other issues that come forth surrounding this very, very important issue that we in America face. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 332.] 288 self-defense capabilities for the inspectors so they can overcome ef- forts to impede them, and the like. And, let me just observe in passing that the inspection team that is being readied has significantly downgraded the presence and the role of Americans. The senior-most American, as I understand it, is in charge of training. The critical function of activity evalua- tion—that is to say, what to make of the bits and pieces of evidence that may fall into the hands of the inspector—is in the hands of a Chinese official. So one has, I think, good reason to worry about whether an inspection arrangement, even if it is put in place, will in itself have the capability and the integrity that one would asso- ciate with a robust inspection arrangement. Iraq is a very large country. My own view, and I am speaking personally throughout, but especially in this, my own view is even with a large and intrusive force, it is simply not possible to devise an inspection regime on territory controlled by Saddam Hussein that could be effective in locating, much less eliminating, his weap- ons of mass destruction. In any case, the inspection regime known as the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) doesn’t even come close. Its size, organization, and management and resources are all hopelessly inadequate for the daunting task of inspecting a country the size of France against Saddam's deter- mined program of concealment, deception, and lying. The simple truth is that the inspectors will never find anything, the location of which has not been discovered through intelligence operations. Unless we can obtain information from defectors or by technical means that point the inspectors to specific sites, we are most un- likely to find what we are looking for. We know, Mr. Chairman, that Saddam lies about his program to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. We know that he has used the years during which no inspectors were in Iraq to move everything of interest, with the result that the database he once possessed, inadequate though it was, has been destroyed. We know all this, yet, I sometimes think there are those at the United Nations who treat the issue not as a matter of life and death, but rather more like a game like pin the tail on the donkey or an Easter egg hunt on a Sunday afternoon. The bottom line is this: Saddam is better at hiding than we are at finding, and this is not a game. If he eludes us and continues to refine, perfect, and expand his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, the danger to us, which is already great, will only grow. If he achieves his holy grail and acquires one or more nuclear weapons, there is no way of knowing what predatory policies he will pursue. Let us suppose that in the end, a robust inspection arrangement is put in place, and after a year or two it has found nothing. Could we conclude from the failure to unearth illegal activity that none existed? Of course not. All we would know is that we had failed to find what we were looking for, not that it was not there to be found. And, where would that leave us? Would we be safer or even more gravely imperiled? There would be a predictable clamor to end the inspection regime, and if they were still in place, to lift the sanctions. Saddam would claim not only that he was in compliance 289 with the U.N. resolutions concerning inspections, but that he had been truthful all along. There are those who would believe him. Given what we now know about Saddam's weaponry, his lies, his concealment, we would be fools to accept inspections, even an in- spection regime far more ambitious than anything the U.N. con- templates, as a substitute for disarmament. That is why, Mr. Chairman, the President is right to demand that the United Nations promptly resolve that Saddam comply with the full range of United Nations resolutions concerning Iraq or face an American-led enforcement action. I returned last night from Europe where the issues before you were being widely discussed. Perhaps the most frequently asked question put to me by various Europeans is, “Why now? What is it about the current situation that has made action to deal with Saddam urgent? He has been there for a decade. My answer is that we are already perilously late. We should have acted long ago, and we should certainly have acted when Sad- dam expelled the inspectors in 1998. Our myopic forbearance has given him four years to expand his arsenal without interference, four years to hide things and make them mobile, four years to render the international community feckless, and its principal in- stitution, the United Nations, all but irrelevant. We can, of course, choose to defer action. Some counsel that. To wait and hope for the best. That is what Tony Blair's predecessors did in the 1930s. That is what we did with respect to Osama bin Laden. We waited. We watched. We knew about the training camps, the fanatical incitement and the history of acts of terror. We knew about the Cole and the embassies in Africa. We waited too long and 3,000 innocent civilians were murdered. If we wait, if we play hide-and-seek with Saddam Hussein, there is every reason to expect that he will expand his arsenal further, that he will cross the nuclear divide and become a nuclear power. I urge this committee, Mr. Chairman, to support the President's determination to act before it is too late. Thank you. Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Perle. I appreciate your statement. [The prepared statement of Mr. Perle can be found in the Appen- dix on page 335.] Mr. HUNTER. And General Clark, you have been a very well-re- spected leader of the U.S. military through some difficult times for the United States, and we appreciate your service and thank you very much for being with us on this very challenging issue. The floor is yours, sir. STATEMENT OF GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED) General CLARK. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, Represent- ative Skelton, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. This is a committee that has been very strongly supportive of the men and women in uniform, and I want to thank you personally for the support that so many of you have given to me during some very, very tough times when I was in uniform. And, on behalf of all the men and women and their families, we really appreciate this committee, your commitment, your willingness to give up your own time to come out and visit with the troops, your determination 291 simply strike directly at Israel; or Israel, weighing the possibilities of blackmail or aggression, might feel compelled to strike Iraq first. Now, Saddam has been pursuing nuclear weapons and we have been living with this risk for over 20 years. He does not have the weapons now as best we can determine. He might have the weap- ons in a year or two if the control for the highly enriched uranium and other materials broke down. I think his best opportunity would have been to go to his friend Slobodon Milosevic and ask for those materials during the Kosovo campaign, since there was active col- lusion between the Serbs and the Iraqis; but apparently, if he asked for them, he didn’t get them, because the Serbs have turned them over for us. If he can’t get the highly enriched uranium, then it might take him five years or more to go through a centrifuge process or gaseous diffusion process to enrich the uranium. But, the situation is not stable. The U.N. weapons inspectors, however ineffective they might have been—and there is some de- gree of difference of opinion on that—nevertheless provided assist- ance in impeding his development programs. They have been ab- sent for four years. And, the sanction regime designed to restrict his weapons materials and resources has been continuously eroded and therefore the situation is not stable. The problem of Iraq is not a problem that can be postponed in- definitely. And of course, Saddam's current efforts themselves are violations of international law as expressed in U.N. resolutions. Our President has emphasized the urgency of eliminating these weapons and weapons programs. I strongly support his efforts to encourage the United Nations to act on this problem. And, in tak- ing this to the United Nations the President's clear determination to act if the United Nations can't, provides strong leverage for un- dergirding ongoing diplomatic efforts. But, the problem of Iraq is only one element of the broader secu- rity challenges facing our country. We have an unfinished world- wide war against al Qaeda, a war that has to be won in conjunction with friends and allies, and that ultimately will be won as much by persuasion as by the use of force. We have got to turn off the al Qaeda recruiting machine. Now some 3,000 deaths on September 11 testified to the real danger from al Qaeda. And, I think everyone acknowledges that al Qaeda has not yet been defeated. As far as I know, I haven’t seen any substantial evidence linking Saddam's regime to the al Qaeda network, though such evidence may emerge. But nevertheless, winning the war against al Qaeda and taking actions against the weapons program in Iraq, those are two different problems that may require two different sets of solu- tions. In other words, to put it back in the military parlance, Iraq– they are an operational-level problem. We have got other oper- ational-level problems in the Middle East, like the ongoing conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Al Qaeda and the foun- dation of radical extremist fundamentalist Islam, that is the strate- gic problem. We have got to make sure that in addressing the oper- ational problem, we are effective in going after the larger strategic problem. So, the critical issue facing the United States right now is how to force action against Saddam Hussein and his weapons programs 295 galvanize a community of nations to rally behind the United States? General CLARK. I think you have to have an echelon series of in- spections. I think you start small and I think you expand the intru- siveness, the scope and scale of the inspections. And, I think you do that until you are either satisfied, and the nation which brings the complaint to the United Nations, i.e. The United States, is sat- isfied; or you cross- and triple-red-line, which Saddam says no, and then you move to the next stage. But, I am not presuming that inspections will be successful. What I am asking you to consider is the United States' overall leadership responsibilities in the world and how we move ahead collectively with our allies and friends around the world to deal with this problem. What inspections are useful in doing, they are useful in highlighting the nature of the Iraqi regime, and we may deter him, impede him, undercut him, get warning, establish a trigger, and build our legitimacy from this. And, this is one way of proceeding. Mr. HUNTER. Would you recommend very aggressive, very intru- sive inspections, which would be accompanied by forces which could, in cases where inspectors are denied entry, literally force their way into Iraqi facilities? General CLARK. I would like to see a program like that estab- lished, but it may not be the initial program. Mr. HUNTER. What if the United Nations does not end up order- ing those inspections, but nonetheless—but instead orders inspec- tions which to some degree replicate those that were in the past, those that were not successful in removing this program. What would you recommend at that point? General CLARK. I think we need to give the President the strong- est possible leverage to get the right program put in place at the United Nations. Mr. HUNTER. That is going to require consensus from other mem- bers of the United Nations. That is not a unilateral instrument for the United States. General CLARK. That is correct. Mr. HUNTER. Let me finish my question. Don't you think that it is not reasonable to expect that the United Nations is going to prºduce an extremely aggressive backed-by-force inspection re- gime: General CLARK. I think that the President's determination has given us strong leverage to get the kind of commitment from the United Nations that we need. But, every country has its own do- mestic problems and this requires the energy and imagination of our diplomats to work through this. I don’t consider this case lost at this point. I think it is very much up in the air. I think the ac- tions of this body are very important to determining the outcome. But, I will say this: The administration has not proceeded here- tofore in a way that would encourage its friends and allies to sup- port it. One of the problems we have is the overhang from a num- ber of decisions taken by the administration, which have undercut its friends and allies around the world and given the impression that the United States doesn’t respect the opinions of others. So, we are swimming a little bit upstream on this. But, I think a 296 strong resolution from this body, set up promptly, with broad sup- port and narrowed focus on the problems of weapons of mass de- struction, would give additional leverage. And, I would urge that it be adopted. Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. Thank, both of you, for your excellent testimony. We do appreciate it. As I see it, there are four basic elements to this whole issue. Number one is diplomacy, which you have discussed; the United Nations exhausting that all the way, if at all possible. Number two, establishing a real goal, and that goal in my opinion is the disar- mament of that country, and I am convinced along with that, the Saddam Hussein regime will fold. Third is how we fight and get it done should that happen. And, fourth is the one that personally troubles me the most, because that is what we have to live with. General in your prepared statement, you said that force should not be used until the personnel and organizations to be involved in post-conflict Iraq are identified and ready to assume their respon- sibilities. And, I couldn't agree with you more. You further say this includes requirements for humanitarian assistance, police and judi- cial capabilities, emergency medical and reconstruction assistance, preparation for a transitional governing body, eventual elections, perhaps even including a new constitution. Suppose everything works out smoothly, including the military action—and we do have a first rate military, we all agree on that. Tell us more than what you have here of the potential dangers that are out there. The Kurds are sitting up there in the north. Iranians are not going to be idle bystanders. The country is made up of 60 percent Shiite and we know the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein are Sunnis. What chances are there for anarchy? What do you do with the henchmen that would be on the secondary tier of the regime that have carried out the unspeakable orders of Saddam Hussein and his people, scientists and engineers? Or, is there a possibility of a true, peaceful transition to a responsible state in addition thereto? What about the other countries like Syria, and I mentioned Iran and their influence on this whole post-conflict Iraq” And, I would also ask the same question of Mr. Perle. General. General CLARK. This is a very important question and particu- larly because we are trying to not only eliminate the weapons of mass destruction, but end up with a situation in which we are net better off than we are today. We have to look at this question very seriously. I think much depends on the circumstances of the mili- tary operation itself as to what the impact will be, how long it will take. The broader the coalition, the stronger the preparations in advance, the smoother the operation is likely to be, the more rapid Saddam's army will collapse, and the less humanitarian hardship is likely to be imposed. That having been said, once we move into the area, what we can expect is a complete breakdown of governmental authority. It is not only Saddam Hussein, but it is the people who, as you suggested, the henchmen and all the people who are complicit in that regime, who have illegally confiscated land, carried out his orders for exe- 297 cutions and torture, and forced name changes and identity changes. Revenge will be exacted. We have already seen this in what hap- pened in 1991 with the Shia rebellion in southern Iraq, when they thought we were coming to help them liberate Iraq. So we have to imagine a complete breakdown of order. That will be accompanied no doubt by a breakdown in the dis- tribution of services, water, food. It is possible that Saddam Hus- sein may use biological weapons. If so, it is very possible he will use it against his own people. In an effort to impede our advance, he may try to solve the problem of the Shias in the south through the use of biological weapons. So, we really don’t know what we are going to face. So, in the immediate aftermath, there is going to be the possibility of a cha- otic environment that is going to require a substantial American presence as well as a vast humanitarian governmental structure to meet the needs of the 23 million Iraqi people. Then we are dealing with the longer midterm—or the midterm problems: Will Iraq be able to establish a government that holds it together or will it fragment? There are strong fractionary forces at work in Iraq, and they will continue to be exacerbated by re- gional tensions in the area. The Shia in the south will be pulled by the Iranians. The Kurds want their own organization. The Kurds will be hemmed in by the Turks. The Iraqis also. The Ira- nians also are nervous of the Kurds. But nevertheless, the Kurds have a certain mass and momentum that they built up. They will have to work to establish their participation in the government or their own identity. There is a question of the nature of a successor regime. If it is a strong man, will it be any better? Will we get rid of weapons of mass destruction or will someone emerge in this chaos who says, “Look, I have overthrown Saddam. You Americans can deal with me. I am the guy in charge right now. Here, you can have your weapons of mass destruction; we are not interested”. Then how do we really know we really got all the weapons of mass destruction out of there? Or, he is—knowing this is the Mid- dle East—he is dealing with an Iranian neighbor who has weapons of mass destruction. He is dealing with Syria, who has weapons of mass destruction. Does he decide to hang onto a nuclear and chem- ical last-resort capability as a trump card? So you have the question of the successor regime. And, then you have the problem of the long-term presence of the American forces in the region. And one of the things we have seen is that when you put American forces into a region, we tend to be a lightning rod. In the case of Kosovo, we are the strongest element there, and the Albanians looked to us for protection. In the case of Iraq, we are going to be infidels in a Muslim land. And one of the things that is going to happen when you break the authority of Saddam Hus- sein is that you are going to have a resurgence of support for Mus- lims in the region by the radical elements of both Wahabi and Shia, and they will be in there and they will be preaching anti- Americanism. And, as we take the necessary actions with our force in the occu- pation, or, some have termed it, the liberation of Iraq, we are going to put Americans in a position where they are going to have to ex- 298 ercise authority. We are not going to enforce Islamic law. There are a number of issues that are troublesome in the long run. We need to put the right people together to think through these issues and be ready to deal with them, because you could look at a potential requirement to implement this plan less than two weeks after the initiation of hostilities. Thank you. Mr. PERLE. Did you want my comment on that? Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Perle. Mr. PERLE. Let me first observe that when it comes to inspec- tions that are so obviously flawed, my friend and colleague is wild- ly optimistic. When it comes to dealing with problems that we are quite right to anticipate, he is wholly pessimistic. And, I think the only conclusion you can draw is that he has come down on the side of waiting, of resorting to the dream that inspections will solve this problem. It is absolutely right to be concerned about what follows the re- moval of Saddam Hussein's regime from power. On this, I am rath- er more optimistic than General Clark, first of all, because Iraq– unlike Afghanistan, for example, or some other countries in the re- gion—has a highly educated and sophisticated population that has suffered horribly under Saddam Hussein, that is in my view des- perate to be liberated from Saddam Hussein, and that has begun to show quite remarkable unity among the opponents of Saddam Hºein as the prospect of action to remove him has become more I'eal. Sure, there are lots of potential divisions. I was in London the other day and dropped in on a meeting of some of the Iraqi opposi- tion, and around that table in serious discussions were representa- tives of all the groups that General Clark referred to as in conflict with one another. That doesn’t guarantee that there won't be some confusion. It doesn’t guarantee that individual groups will not de- part from what they now say they pledged themselves to. But, I have been impressed with the ability of the Iraqi National Con- gress to bring together around the table representatives of the Shia in the south, the Kurds in the north, even the Sunnis in the center of the country. I think nearly 30 years of Saddam Hussein's rule will inspire in the Iraqi people a desire for a decent, humane government. And, with help from us, I see no reason to assume a priori that that can’t be done. I think it can be done. And, I think the chances of success in that regard are infinitely greater than the likelihood that we will find the weapons of mass destruction that even a good inspection regime would be incompetent to unearth. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Saxton. Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Perle, General Clark indicated a few minutes ago he wasn’t sure—I am sorry, I don’t want to mischaracterize what General Clark said, but something to the effect that we don’t have information that al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime are connected. Is that a fair characterization, General Clark? General CLARK. I am saying there hasn't been any substantiation of the linkage of the Iraqi regime to the events of 9/11 or the fact * are giving weapons of mass destruction capability to al aeCla. 299 Mr. SAXTON. That has been a widely held view, at least in some quarters, and I suspect that one of the difficulties that we have had in addressing this subject comes because of the difficulty of collect- ing intelligence in that region of the world, for all the reasons that we know. However, yesterday, the President's National Security Adviser began to talk about this subject in a different light. She said we clearly know that there were in the past and have been contacts between senior Iraqi officials and members of al Qaeda going back for a long time. We know, too, that several of the al Qaeda detainees, in particular, some high-ranking detainees, have said that Iraq provided some training to al Qaeda in chemical weapons development. Now, I suspect that it would be difficult for someone to say that if they didn't have information to back it up. And, she also suggested that the details of the contacts would be released at a later date, and from my knowledge of intelligence work—which is sketchy, but from what I know—it is difficult some- times to disclose details because you endanger sources. And, so I think this is a subject that certainly there are begin- ning to be indications that there are—as a matter of fact, other bad guys have gone to Iraq. Abu Nidal died there recently. And, when you couple all this with the notion that Saddam has been very de- termined to act out against his neighbors in the West, and seems to stop at nothing, to draw the conclusion based on evidence that is beginning to emerge that there is no contact and no general theme of cooperation between Saddam and officials of al Qaeda is a stretch and, I think, a dangerous conclusion to come to. Mr. Perle, would you give us your opinion? Mr. PERLE. I think you have identified an important issue and a serious problem. It is true it is difficult to collect intelligence in these areas. But, the bigger problem in my view has been a stun- ning lack of competence among our own intelligence agencies. They simply proved incompetent in this area and I have testified on this theme several times over the last 10 or 15 years. What we are now beginning to see is evidence that was there all along. It simply wasn't properly assessed. And the reason why it wasn't assessed, in my view, is that a point of view dominated the intelligence community, the CIA in particular, and that point of view held that a secular Ba'athist regime like that of Saddam Hus- sein would not cooperate with religious fanatics like al Qaeda. This was a theory. There was nothing to support it except the specula- tion of the intelligence officials who held that view. And as a result, they simply didn't look for evidence that there might be a connec- tion. Now that we are aware of the strange ways in which terror- ists cooperate all over the world, we are beginning to find signifi- cant evidence. You know, there is no logical basis for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) cooperating with terrorists in Colombia, and yet we have caught them red-handed doing it. There is a kind of professional trade craft involved in which people engaged in the business of ter- rorism work with one another for mutual convenience, sometimes for exchanges of money and the like. So, there is in fact evidence of relations between Saddam and al Qaeda. And, I believe that the more intensively we scrutinize databases of information available to us in the past, the more evidence of that we are going to find. 300 General CLARK. Representative Saxton, if I could just tag along on that, I think there is no question that even though we may not have the evidence, as Richard says, that there have been such con- tacts, it is normal, it is natural. These are a lot of bad actors in the same region together. They are going to bump into each other. They are going to exchange information. They are going to feel each other out and see if there are opportunities to cooperate. That is inevitable in this region. And, I think it is clear that, regardless of whether or not such evidence is produced of these connections, that Saddam Hussein is a threat. So, I think the key issue is how we move from here and what do we need to do to deal with this threat? But, I think what is also clear is the way you deal with the threat from Iraq is dif- ferent than the way you deal with the threat from al Qaeda. My contention is we need to look at different means for dealing with these threats. We need to take advantage of all the resources at our disposal, not just the military. If I could just say with respect to the inspections issue, as well, and the comments of my friend and colleague Richard Perle, I am not either optimistic or pessimistic. I practiced weapons inspection. I have been involved in diplomacy at the United Nations and I have been involved in setting up the plans for a number of post- conflict situations, including Bosnia, Haiti and Kosovo, so I am only §§ you the best judgment from my own perspective. I don’t label it. So Richard, if I can just in a friendly way say if you won't label me, I won't label you. Mr. PERLE. What I was labeling was the unavoidable conclusion that you think inspections can work, and I think the overwhelming evidence is that they can’t. General CLARK. I have been very clear. I don’t have any expecta- tion, ultimately, that the inspections will work in the sense of find- ing and eliminating every weapons of mass destruction program. What I am suggesting is that the inspections are useful in pursu- ing America's security concerns, and we should be endeavoring to pursue those concerns with every means at our disposal, one of which is inspections. Mr. PERLE. If I may say so, if the inspections fail to achieve their purpose, that is, finding Saddam's weapons, then I think they are not only helpful, they are quite damaging; because, the failure to find those weapons will make it very difficult to sustain the inspec- tions regime itself beyond a certain point to keep sanctions in place and to take action that might actually be effective in removing those weapons of mass destruction. Mr. SAXTON. If I may reclaim my time for 30 seconds. Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Saxton, if you want back into this conversation, you go right ahead. Mr. SAXTON. I wanted to thank General Clark for clarifying his position. I thought you had said there had been no contacts. And, now you do know, as we do, that there have been contacts between Saddam and al Qaeda. So, thank you. General CLARK. I say no substantiation of it. It has to be going on. It has to be. 301 Mr. SAXTON. I am glad you and Condoleezza Rice are on the same track. I was worried there for a while but, General Clark, maybe you could respond to that last point in your interchange, which was if we find—if the inspectors find a bunch of empty rooms or are shown a bunch of empty rooms in this next inspection regime, how does that rally the world then to the United States' goal of disarming Iraq.” General CLARK. I think this goes into the design and inspections program itself. And, as I indicated earlier, I have not sketched this out in great detail. I could present something in writing to the com- mittee if you would like, but there can be an inspection program set up which is echeloned in the sense of starting narrow and going broader and broader and more intrusive, until the concerns of the state which brings forward this requirement, i.e. The United States, are satisfied. And in the process, we are either going to push this far enough that we gain some other ends or we are going to hit a red line in which we will get the trigger. What I want to make clear is the difference I think between— Mr. SAXTON. Maybe you could explain how you get the trigger if they absorb us and they allow enough inspections to find empty rooms but nothing else, and at that point you want to see a galva- nized world community behind the United States. Why would they galvanize behind an America which has gotten inspections, been absorbed by Iraq, and found nothing? General CLARK. I think we need to look carefully at the composi- tion of the inspection team, its authorities and information sources it uses, and that is why I say it is echeloned. It may start narrow and go broader. Second, I think the experience of the inspection team is as they begin to work, they do find some levels of information. And, as we put people in there more and more on the ground, they will eventu- ally find things. But, I think the fundamental question is this: Is the purpose of the inspection team, is the value of it only in finding the weapons of mass instruction, or does it not also have value in impeding Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program, undercutting his authority, providing warning, establishing a trigger, and I think it has these broader impacts. So, I think we should not be driven by excessive fear at this point that the inspections may come up dry from trying to work an inspection program that meets the broader purposes that serve the United States and our goals. Mr. SAXTON. The stated goal is none of the above. It is to disarm Iraq, at least according to the administration. General CLARK. This is one of the difficulties, and we are in open session and I don’t mean to be anything other than direct and straightforward, but I think we know that programs like inspec- tions have consequences that are beyond their stated purpose. And, certainly Saddam Hussein recognizes this and this is why he didn't want the inspectors there. Not that he couldn't fool them, but he couldn’t be sure he could fool them all the time, with enough en- ergy left over to pursue his aims and still do everything else. Even though the inspections may have been of not full usefulness in terms of stopping his program, they provided other benefits, and 302 we should pursue those benefits within the time available as a way of building legitimacy for the United States and our concerns. Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Allen. Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for being here. We have had a lot of conversation about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and where we are going. I am con- cerned about what we are doing right now as a country, and I wanted to focus on a couple of things. If our goal is to win allies for dealing with Saddam Hussein, both here at home and abroad, it seems to me we have made some mistakes. And, let me call attention to a couple of things. First of all, it seems to me that we can deal with Iraq without making into doc- trines applicable to other countries and other times, you know, whatever it is we plan to do here. Example number one, regime change. It hasn’t been enough for this administration to say we need to replace Saddam Hussein; we have to create a doctrine of regime change that for what are now called—the phrases keep changing, but they are now called terrorist states—we have the right to change those regimes. The second component is preemptive strikes. It is not enough to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, which is real. It may not be immediate, but it is not that far in the future. It is very serious. But instead, we have a new doctrine put down on paper that says we claim the right to strike preemptively at other coun- tries. We have developed a theory, I think—the administration has a theory of unilateralism as a fundamental approach to the world. All of this, I can tell you back home just in my district, creates un- necessary anxiety and hostility to what the administration is trying to do, and that is nothing compared to the reaction overseas. And, I think that the question you posed, General Clark, about how do we move from here in a way that takes into account not only the military challenges, but the political challenges, is impor- tant. And, I want to begin with Mr. Perle and then have you re- spond, too. Mr. Perle, on September 10, there was an article in the Boston Globe, and basically there was the suggestion that—we are used to the hawks-and-the-doves kind of language now, but there was a suggestion in the piece that according to the hawks in the adminis- tration, Iraq is just the first piece of the puzzle. And I quote: “After an ouster of Hussein, they say, the United States will have more leverage to act against Syria and Iran, and we will be in a better position to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian, conflict and we will be able to rely less on Saudi oil”. And, then there was another comment in here that among the more extreme version was a view elaborated in a briefing in July by a RAND Corporation researcher to the Defense Policy Board which you chair, Mr. Perle. That briefing urged the United States to deliver an ultimatum to the Saudi Government to cut its ties to militant Islam or risk seizure of its oil fields and overseas assets. It called Iraq the “tactical pivot”, and Saudi Arabia the “strategic pivot”. My question to you, Mr. Perle, first if you could comment both on the doctrines of preemption and regime change and then on the briefing that either you or your policy board heard. And, with re- 303 spect to that component, I would be interested in whether you think that kind of threat against Saudi Arabia is the way the ad- ministration ought to move. And then I would like General Clark to respond. Mr. PERLE. Well, thank you, Mr. Allen. First, on the question of doctrines, I think we sometimes do ourselves a disservice by dis- cussing in doctrinal terms the specifics of a situation that may be unique. And, indeed in these matters there are almost never two situations that are exactly alike. So, I am not in favor of developing a doctrine of regime change. I am in favor of removing Saddam Hussein from power. And, I can imagine others posing a similar threat where one would also wish to see them removed. But, I don’t think that doctrine is necessarily helpful, and I agree with you on that. With respect to preemptive strikes, again, I don’t think it makes much sense to develop this into a doctrine, although I think it is important to point out that waiting until one is struck first is not always the best way to protect ourselves. And in this instance, I happen to think that idea applies. And as for the theory of unilateralism, I haven’t heard that advocated as such. I have never known any official of this or any other administration that would not much prefer to have broad support internationally for anything that we attempt to do. What I think is an issue here is the question of how prepared we should be to act alone when, for whatever reason, we are unable to gather the support of other countries. And, I think what you are seeing here is a reaction to some years in the previous administra- tion where there was a great emphasis placed on multilateral activ- ity, on negotiating multilateral agreements, and acting in a multi- lateral context, and I think there is a sense that we went too far in that direction and maybe we need to assert the particularism that that is appropriate for a country that is unique and perhaps uniquely a target and therefore is bound to differ from time to time with other countries. But, I certainly share your thought we shouldn't make things more difficult for ourselves by elevating specific contingencies to broad general principles. With respect to the briefing on Saudi Ara- bia, let me say, first, that the Defense Policy Board is an unusual institution. It is a group of people who come together from time to time, receive briefings, discuss the context of those briefings, and eventually, discuss their reflections with the Secretary of Defense. This usually takes place over two days. We have encouraged a very broad approach in the sense that we want all points of view. And, there is no censorship. Nobody exam- ines the briefer beforehand what he is going to say. An expert who is working hard to understand the complex issue that the board is trying to understand may well be invited to come and present to us. And, that particular briefing was a very interesting briefing. It was not as portrayed in the press. Whoever thought it was a good idea to turn over the slides from that briefing and the speakers notes, I think, was probably not present when the briefing was given, and therefore, assumed that everything in the speaking notes was said in the meeting. 304 That isn’t the case. And, some of the more inflammatory quotations from the speaker's notes were, in fact, never presented. Different members of the board had different reactions to that, but—to that briefing. But, I don't know anyone who stood up and said, now we have found an appropriate policy for dealing with Saudi Arabia. But, it was a provocative briefing and produced an interesting discussion among members of the board. My own view is that we are quite right to say to the Saudi gov- ernment, “The substantial amount of money that you have been distributing through extremist organizations is producing around the world a number of people, often young people, who are being driven to hatred of the United States and the West in general, and they pose a threat to us. They are the breeding grounds for the re- cruitment of al Qaeda and other terrorists, and we would be very grateful if you would stop that. We would not foment that sort of attitude against you, and we would be grateful if you wouldn't fo- ment it against us.” In my view, we can deal with the Saudi government, government to government. We have a mixed relationship with them. There are some positive elements. There is a negative element, and I think we ought to be discussing it with them and not threatening them in º: way that it was wrongly reported that briefing proposed that We CIO. General CLARK. I think your questions about doctrine are very important questions. But, as you observe, and I agree, there is no requirement to have any doctrine here. I mean this is simply a longstanding right of the United States and other nations to take the actions they deem necessary in their self-defense. Every presi- dent has deployed forces as necessary to take action. He has done so without multi lateral support, if necessary. He has done so in advance of conflict, if necessary. In my experience, I was the commander of the European forces in NATO when we took action in Kosovo. We did not have the United Nations' approval to do this, and we did so in a way that was designed to preempt Serb ethnic cleansing and regional desta- bilization there. There were some people who didn't agree with that decision. The United Nations was not able to agree to support it with the resolution. Nevertheless, we did go to the United Nations and, as Ambas- sador Holbrook so well explained in an op-ed piece I think three weeks ago, going to the United Nations was a very important part of building legitimacy for the action that we ultimately had to take. But, the responsibility to deploy forces is ultimately the respon- sibility for the United States and its leaders alone, for no one else. So, I think in this case that the doctrines of preemption and re- gime change have been actually counterproductive in trying to make the case against Saddam Hussein, because they tend to be misinterpreted. We have always talked within the military circles about the possibility of preemption. We have always worried about it. We worried about how you would get the specific information you needed. We worried about whether the action could be effective or not. We worried about what the consequences of that would be. But, it was discussed behind closed doors in a number of cases, I aIn SUIT e. 305 And, nevertheless, we never felt a reason to publish a doctrine on it because the doctrine itself become as fact and an element in international relations. We saw the headlines in The Washington Post a few days ago that said the United States replaces deterrence with domination. And, I immediately began to get phone calls from European journalists who say what is an American domination. This is what we have been worried about. And so, in that sense, I think it is we are much better off if we will focus on the problem at hand, which is the war against al Qaeda and the problem of Iraq . and deal with those as specific problems which we must deal with. With respect to the case of Saudi Arabia and a strategy in the area, I think it is very important that we have a strategy in this region. And, one of the things that is perplexing is that we have not seen an articulation of a strategy other than the occasional leakages like The Boston Globe article that you gave reference to. So, we don't really know if there is strategy or what we are specifi- cally pointing to. I would simply observe that in 1973, a few years after you and I were out of college, I was in the Pentagon for a summer as an intern and I wrote a paper on the possibility of some day deploying U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf. And, I was warned by an old colonel at the time. He said, Captain, if you write a paper like that, that Senator Fulbright's going to have you over testifying before the Congress, and us too, and we are all going to get fired. And there were no U.S. forces in that region in 1973. Since then we have encouraged Saddam Hussein and supported him as he attacked against Iran in an effort to prevent Iranian de- stabilization of the Gulf. That came back and bit us when Saddam Hussein then moved against Kuwait. We encouraged the Saudis and the Pakistanis to work with the Afghans and build an Army of God, the Mujahedin, to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan. Now we have released tens of thousands of these holy warriors, some of whom have turned against us and formed al Qaeda. My French friends constantly remind me that these are problems that we had a hand in creating. So when it comes to creating an- other strategy which is built around the intrusion into the region by U.S. forces, all the warning signs should be flashing. There are unintended consequences when force is used. Use it as a last re- sort. Use it multilaterally if you can. Use it unilaterally only if you must. Mr. ALLEN. Thank you. Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Clark, it seems to me the crux of the judgments you make is that time is on our side in the near term. I mean, that is really a bottom line. And, with a calculated risk. You went through the six months and so you are willing, I guess, to take the risk that time in the short- term may not be on our side in exchange for the benefit that comes from having more international support. I guess my bottom-line question is how long would you mess around with that? How long is time on our side? What is the near-term during which time is on our side? 307 mare regime, assist the Iraqis in developing a decent and humane government, make sure that their resources are devoted to the re- building of that country. And, I think under those circumstances, the world will see that the United States has acted not simply in its own behalf, but to the benefit of the people of Iraq. And, I have no doubt that once Iraq is liberated, we will learn what a brutal, brutal without prece- dent regime, the regime of Saddam Hussein has been. We will hear the stories from the survivors, from the sons and daughters and sisters and brothers and mothers and fathers about the murders, about the surgical mutilation of people who have crossed Saddam Hussein, about the use of rape as an instrument of policy and the like. And, I think, in those circumstances, things will change. We faced this when we went into Grenada in the Reagan admin- istration. And as it happens, the American forces were treated as liberators in Grenada. We saw much of the same thing in Afghani- stan, which is a more complicated situation. But, a great many peo- ple were relieved to see the end of the Taliban regime. So, I think everything depends on our purpose and our steadiness of purpose. And, on the way in which that action is received by the people who are affected by it most directly. Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Snyder. Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentle- men, for being here. Mr. Perle, if you don't mind, I am going to di- rect my questions to General Clark, since he is one of my constitu- ents and I feel some obligation to report to his wonderful wife, Gert, how he does here today. And, I am sure he will feel an obliga- tion to do the same with me. General, if you don’t mind, I am going to just summarize kind of where my thinking is on this, and you and I have talked pri- vately before and I have found it the most, I guess, visceral issue in my six years here in terms of its potential impact on not only a lot of people's lives, but on our foreign policy. And a lot of what you have written and spoken about has shaped my thinking be- cause you talk about military forces being the last resort. In fact, you had a London Times piece at the end of August, “Why war should be America's last resort,” which is another way of saying, we have got to exhaust diplomatic resources before we pursue the war. I have looked on a way of saying to a balancing of risks, comparing the risks now, versus what risk we might incur by going ahead A, with a particularly unilateral military action against Iraq. And, as I look at the reasons that people have outlined for why we should move ahead, even if we have to move ahead alone, we heard the term “drain the swamp,” meaning drain the swamp of terrorists after September 11. General Boyd had the comment in The New York Times of last week that he talks about if we go alone, that the near certainty of creating legions of new terrorists. I am not a military historian. I don’t know what a legion is, but I think it means a lot of people. And, yet we look at how much en- ergy was put into finding just one small cell we think in New York, and yet we are talking about potentially creating legions. In your London Times piece, you also say attacking Iraq would detract from our primary mission against al Qaeda, supercharging 308 anti-American sentiment in the Arab street, boosting al Qaeda's re- cruiting and causing difficulty for modern Arab regimes. You go on to say our overriding priority must be to bring greater inter- national resolve and cooperation into the war on al Qaeda to cut the support for Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, and to harmonize in- telligence sharing and law enforcement in Europe and North Amer- ica. This will take months and years of sustained effort. The President is quoted today in the Post as saying the war on terror, you can’t distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror. They are both equally as bad, and equally as evil and equally as destructive. I think I agree on the degree of evilness, but in terms of the prioritization, I have come down on your side; that the priority ought to be al Qaeda. The other arguments we have heard that this is a guy who has at- tacked his own neighbors. And, yet, as you have discussed, one po- tential sequel of a unilateral attack would be to motivate him to attack Israel. We have heard the argument he has attacked his own people, which has been unfortunately terribly true. But a military attack, if it is not absolutely necessary, may unnecessarily motivate him to attack the Kurds and avoid a Northern Alliance type situation that occurred in Afghanistan. And then, of course, our overriding goal and the overriding goal of every American is to protect Ameri- cans and reduce the risks of damage and of harm to Americans. I have been meeting with, you know, retired military people. And, this is not from any classified briefing, but I just throw out a term. Well, if things don't go quite as smoothly as we think, could we incur as much as 10,000 U.S. casualties? And I get the head nod, yeah that could happen if we had them, as General Boyd says con- gregated in a staging area and a chemical weapons attack. And then, I have heard terms of numbers of 70 to 80 to 100,000 troops that may have—U.S., that may have to be stationed in Iraq for up to 10 years, I would think at high risk at some point after being there for that length of time. And then the your comment about time. You very clearly stated we cannot postpone indefinitely, but on the other hand, that in the near term, time is on our side. And I-that is what comes down to me is, or why it comes down to me is that if time is on our side in this range, in the near term as Mack was asking about, this should be the time when we exhaust the diplomatic efforts and be sure that we don't incur the risks of going to war before we have done everything we can to avoid them. And, one other factor in this in my thinking is to me the number one strategic priority in the Middle East is dealing with Israel and Palestine. And, you know, I had a conversation with Condoleezza Rice, I think in the second or third month of the administration, you know, please be more involved in this. And, I think now if we had all these resources and even the potential commitment of troops to enforce an Israeli Palestinian agreement what that might do and how it might change. And if we avoid going to war for 6 months or 1 year or 18 months, who knows what may happen for the good. And there certainly could be things for the bad. But, that boy may drop dead. 309 I mean, we just don't know what may happen. The one question I wanted to ask from your written statement. You have—there has been a lot of effort put in on the resolution and the language. You state this one sentence; the resolution need not, at this point, au- thorize the use of force, but simply agree on the intent to authorize the use of force if other measures fail. And this, to me, is a key question because, you know, I want our President to feel like he has got all the support of the American people he needs to work this out dealing with the international community. But, I am not, I don’t think, willing to vote at this time to say, and here you have got my card to go to war six months, eight months down the line if in your mind it hasn't worked out well. I think that is a decision the American people want the Congress to make. What do you mean by that language? General CLARK. I think that what you have to do is—first, the card has been laid on the table about the intent of the United States to take unilateral action. So, we have moved past the point we were at in mid-August, when there was a discussion and the President was saying he hadn’t made up his mind what to do, and so forth. So the President, our commander-in-chief, has committed himself. I think it is wise to narrow the resolution that was submit- ted. I think it will be more effective and more useful, and I think it is more in keeping with the checks and balances that are the ºrk of the American government if that resolution is nar- r0Weol. And on the other hand, I think you have to narrow it in such a way that you don't remove the resort to force as a last option con- sideration in this case. So, not giving a blank check, but expressing an intent to sign the check when all other alternatives are ex- hausted. I think, in dealing with men like Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, that diplomacy has to be leveraged by discussions, the threat, or in the last instance, the use of force. I think it is not time yet to use force against Iraq, but it is certainly time to put that card on the table, to turn it face up and to wave it. And the Presi- dent is doing that, and I think that the United States Congress has to indicate after due consideration and consulting our people and building our resolve, that yes, this is a significant security problem for the United States of America, and all options are on the table, including the use of force as necessary to solve this problem. I think that is what is required to leverage any hope of solving this problem short of war. Mr. SNYDER. Thank you both. Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Schrock. Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, General, your-time-is-on-our-side comment has certainly generated a lot of interest Mr. HUNTER. And I might mention, Mr. Schrock, we are going to try to keep this hearing going because General Clark has to leave at what time General 11:30? General CLARK. 11:30. 20 to 12. It is really hard to get out of here, Mr. Chairman. This is a very interesting hearing. 311 work with it, and we have got to twist some arms and bend some elbows and do all the kinds of things in international politics that, I guess, domestic political leaders do in their home constituencies and in their races. I mean, this is about leadership. It is not just about a threat. So, that is why I say time is on our side. Your second question was about the exit strategy. And, what I try to portray is if you are going to have an exit strategy and you are going to have a turn- over, you have to anticipate some of the worst things that might happen. You hope they won't happen and they may not. It may be, just as Richard Perle has suggested, it may be a laydown. This thing may turn out they do have an educated popu- lation. They are one of the most Western-oriented countries in the region. There has also been a lot of psychological trauma inflicted on them. So, you don’t know. But, you have to prepare for the worst. I hope that we are starting to do that in a very, very serious way. But, there are a number of steps that have to be taken first, like engaging international organizations in the U.N., and trying to build a framework, because we don’t want to put the United States armed forces if it takes, I don’t know how many, 50,000, 70,000 ini- tially. We don't want a bunch of young men in battle dress uni- forms out there indefinitely trying to perform humanitarian assist- ance. That is not our job. We are not very good at it. We are also not any good at police work. Now, we are doing a lot of it in places like Kosovo and Bosnia, and we have and it has been unfortunate. So, we should try to do better in this case. Mr. HUNTER. Let me tell the gentleman we have one minute left on this vote. I think they are going to hold it for a little bit. But, I am inclined, if you want to pursue the last of this question, the chair is going to run over and make this vote. I am going to come back in five minutes. Mr. SCHROCK. So am I. Mr. HUNTER. And, Ed will be back, too, so let's take a five, ten minute break. We will be right back. And Ms. Davis, too. Excuse Iſle. [Recess.] Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Folks, we will resume here. And, we may get a few more members back in a couple of minutes. General CLARK. I had one more question that was about new in- spections. Can I answer, Mr. Chairman, for the record? Mr. HUNTER. Sure. Absolutely. General CLARK. From the gentleman who asked me the question, the third part of it when we broke was about why do the inspec- tions, and what if they don’t work? I think the answer is that we have to set up an inspection regime, and that is what should be going on here in the course of the discussions at the United Na- tions, which has enough trip wires and bells and whistles on it that we can intensify it to accomplish our broader purposes, even if the inspection comes up dry. And, maybe it will find something. And, as one person reminded me at the break, if you find one warhead and one weapon, you have accomplished something more and taken one more asset away from him that could be used against us or our 312 friends. So I think that we do have time and we should use that time to promote and exhaust all of the non-force of arms remedies. Mr. HUNTER. Let me just follow up on that question, General. If you thought that the if you had evidence that Saddam Hussein was going to have a nuclear device in four months, would you rec- ommend taking American action to destroy that capability. General CLARK. Yes, I would. Mr. HUNTER. How do you know that you don’t have four months? General CLARK. You don’t. Mr. HUNTER. Then how can you say with any certainty that time is on your side? General CLARK. You can say that in the near-term, based on the information available, that we should exhaust all diplomatic means because you don’t have the hard information if he has a single nu- clear device. Mr. HUNTER. But my point is, my question to you is, let me get back to the question. You said and you went through all of the dif- ferent estimates as to when he is going to have one. You also con- cur, I take it, with the fact that when we went in in 1991, our pro- jection was that he was three to five years away. And we found out he was six months away. So we were wrong, weren't we, at that time? General CLARK. You know, I have never seen all of the details on which that projection was based. I think it assumed that if he had fissionable material, he could have a crude nuclear device, not a nuclear weapon, but something like a dirty bomb in six months. Mr. HUNTER. Okay. But, I would hope you would accept the facts that have come before this committee over the last numerous hear- ings that that is what basically is stated in opening testimony that we said it was three to five years, and in fact, six months is accu- rate. And, that is what we do know because we went in and we found and we did deprive him then of his facilities, or some of his facilities when we went in. Now, if that is so, and you have said there are estimates all over the lot, and nobody is sure what he has, how can you then say that you know. You didn’t say, “Maybe that time is on our side.” You said, “Time is on our side.” How do you know, how can you say with certainty “Time is on our side” if the basic facts underlying that statement are, in your words, uncer- tain? General CLARK. Well, I don’t want to answer this in an epistemo- logical sense. I want to answer it just in a sense of practical states- manship. Mr. HUNTER. That is the way I am trying to ask it. General CLARK. I think you have to balance risks. And, I think that in balancing the risks, it is better to take the time now to line up a strong-as-possible diplomatic support and a military coalition before you have to take what looks like will probably be inevitable action, rather than rushing into something on the presumption that your intelligence is faulty and you don't have the time to pre- pare it because in the last course, if we had the information that you are suggesting that he was going to have a nuclear device, pre- sumably we would have some idea of where it was. And, we have the means to strike Saddam Hussein literally on a moment's notice 324 issues. And hopefully, through the media, you will have helped the American people do the same thing. Mr. Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. Let me add my special thanks. It is good to see you again, and thank you for your excellent testimony. [Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X SEPTEMBER 26, 2002 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD SEPTEMBER 26, 2002 OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. DUNCAN HUNTER HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ September 26, 2002 Today, the Committee on Armed Services continues its review of United States policy toward Iraq. This morning’s hearing marks the fourth in a number of planned public sessions designed to educate and inform the Committee, and the American people, on the various issues surrounding Iraq’s continued violation of numerous United Nation’s resolutions, its illicit development of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States, the Middle East, and the international community. The Committee has received a classified briefing from the Intelligence Community in each of the last three weeks, which we also opened up to all Members of the House in the last couple weeks. We also heard from former UNSCOM inspectors about Iraq’s illicit weapons programs and Saddam Hussein’s persistent efforts to thwart U.N. inspections. (329) 330 And we heard from an Iraqi defector who ran Saddam’s nuclear weapons program; he told us how the Iraqis built and sustained their weapons of mass destruction programs through the acquisition of Western technology, and how the United States’ own export control system may have contributed to the problems we are now facing with Iraq. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld appeared before the Committee last week to discuss and defend the Administration's policy toward Iraq. And yesterday morning the Committee met behind closed doors with several retired generals to hear their views on this critical issue, with a special focus on military options. The Committee is planning on holding another hearing next Wednesday on the topic of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Today, however, we will hear from two well-known gentlemen who have distinguished themselves in the world of foreign and defense policy--- • The Honorable Richard Perle is a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and Chairman of the Defense Policy Board; and, 331 • General Wesley Clark, USA (ret.), is Managing Director, Merchant Banking at the Stephens Group, Inc., and a former Commander in Chief of U.S. European Command. Gentlemen, thank you both for agreeing to appear today. We look forward to your testimony. But before we begin, I want to invite Mr. Skelton, the Ranking Democrat on the Committee, to offer any comments he might have. Thank you Mr.Skelton. Mr. Perle, the floor is yours. 332 Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO), Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives Full Committee Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward Iraq September 26, 2002 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding the series of hearings on U.S. Policy Toward Iraq. This is a critical time for us to be considering U.S. action against Iraq. President Bush has made clear to the Congress, the United Nations, and the American people his determination to remove Saddam Hussein from power and to neutralize the threat posed by the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program. I applaud his realization that the threat posed by Saddam is one that faces the United Nations as a whole. I think we all agree that Saddam is a despot who has violated the Security Council’s resolutions for years. But we here in Congress now face a serious responsibility—to craft a resolution that will empower the administration to disarm Iraq and bring that nation into compliance with the requirements of many UN resolutions. The hearing today can help us in this effort by helping us consider whether force is now the only option. I believe that all diplomatic efforts must be exhausted before we send American troops 333 into harm’s way. Any resolution Congress passes must recognize that. So the question for our witnesses is, what can still be done before we must compel Iraq with the use of the American military? What is the threshold beyond which the United States can no longer wait for Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions or for U.N. action in the face of Iraqi defiance? This, to me, is the fundamental question. But there are others that the Congress must ask and which the president must be able to answer before force can be used. How will the United States ensure that we continue to have international support for our efforts against al Qaeda, even if the administration seeks military action without Security Council approval? Do we have the forces, fiscal resources, munitions, and other military capabilities to wage both campaigns effectively? How do we minimize the risk of casualties from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction or from sustained urban combat operations? As members of the Armed Services Committee, we all share the commitment to making sure that our troops can succeed on the battlefield at the lowest possible level of risk if we decide to put them in harm’s way. The president should be able to answer these questions before he uses force. Once he does, I have no doubt that American troops will succeed in disarming Iraq. But the question then becomes what happens 334 next? Like the proverbial dog chasing the car, what will we do when we catch it? I am reminded of Carl von Clausewitz’s maxim in On War: that in strategy it is “imperative...not to take the first step without considering the last.” We must think through carefully and NOW-before we authorize military force—how the United States would manage Iraq after Saddam fell. Planning for the occupation of Germany and Japan took years before the end of World War II. In today’s dynamic battlefield, we don’t have the luxury of years to prepare. How can we build a stable and democratic Iraq that takes all major groups—Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd—into account? How will we handle members of the Baath party and those Scientists and engineers that designed Iraq’s WMD programs? What military commitment will be required from the United States at the time of our victory and in the years to come? Any decision to act against Iraq must begin with answers to these questions about the strategy for achieving victory and long-term responsibilities that come with doing so. To my mind, any resolution authorizing the use of force must require these answers. I thank both witnesses for being with us today, for sharing their expertise and hopefully for providing answers to the questions I have outlined. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 335 STATEMENT OF RICHARD PERLE FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEPTEMBER 26, 2002 Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you for including me in today's hearing. As we confront issues of war and peace, our country is strongest when the Congress and the executive branch act in concert. In all the talk of the need for a coalition to confront Saddam Hussein, the coalition that matters most is to be found here in Washington, at opposite ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. The President, Secretary Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld and British Prime Minister Blair have all spoken in recent days about the urgency of dealing with the threat posed to the American people, and others, by Saddam Husseln. In what may well be the most important speech of his presidency, President Bush has argued eloquently and persuasively to the United Nations in New York that Saddam's open defiance of the United Nations, and his scornful refusal to heed its many injunctions, is a challenge to the credibility of the U.N. itself. And he has rightly asked the United Nations to approve a Security Council Resolution that would force Saddam to choose between full compliance with the many resolutions he has scorned and violated and action to remove his regime from power. Saddam's, response—calculating, deceitful and disingenuous—moves only slightly in the direction of U.N. inspections of Iraqi territory—and not at all toward the disarmament that is what really matters. The statement issued in his name that he will accept inspections unconditionally is anything but unconditional: it is hedged as to the allowable types of inspection and the rules under which inspections would be conducted. As I understand it, Saddam is demanding an inspection regime in which advance notification is required and in which certain places are off limits to the inspectors, who would be limited in number, mobility and armament. Even from a government whose cooperation we could count on, these conditions would be unacceptable. But from Saddam Hussein, who has gone to enormous lengths to conceal his weapons program from previous internationai inspectors and continues to lie about them now, the sort of inspection regime that Kofi Annan has negotiated with Saddam would be a farce. What would a robust inspection regime look like? It would, at a minimum, include tens of thousand inspectors with Americans in key leadership and decision-making roles distributed throughout Iraq, possessing an independent capability to move anywhere from dispersed bases to any site in the country without prior notification or approval, the right to interview any Iraqi or Iraqi resident together with his family at safe locations outside Iraq, appropriate 337 interference, four years to hide things and make them mobile, four years to render the international community feckless and its principal institution, the United Nations, irrelevant. We can, of course, choose to defer action, to wait—and hope for the best. That is what Tony Blair's predecessors did in the 1930's. That is what we did with respect to Osama Bin Laden. We waited. We watched. We knew about the training camps, the fanatical incitement, and the history of acts of terror. We knew about the Cole and the embassies in Africa. We waited too long and 3,000 innocent civilians were murdered. If we wait, if we play hide-and-seek with Saddam Hussein, there is every reason to expect that he will expand his arsenal further, that he will cross the nuclear divide and become a nuclear power. I urge this committee, Mr. Chairman, to support the President's determination to act before it is too late. - 338 STATEMENT OF GENERAL (RETIRED) WESLEY K. CLARK U.S. ARMY BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEPTEMBER 26, 2002 Mr. Chairman, Representative Skelton, Distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. This is a Committee that has been strongly supportive of the men and women in uniform, and I want to thank you personally for the assistance and support that you gave me, and have given so many others. In October 1994, Saddam Hussein moved several Republican Guards divisions back into the attack positions just north of the Kuwaiti border, the same attack positions that had been occupied just prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It was a foolish and to our minds unexpected and threatening move. We quickly deployed additional military forces to the region, preparing to enter a full-fledged battle against Iraq to defend Kuwait, and we also went to the United Nations. After a few tense days Saddam backed off, the divisions were removed, and we acted through the United Nations to further tighten the no-fly zone and regulate Iraqi troop movements. But it was a signal warning about Saddam Hussein: he is not only malevolent and violent, but also unpredictable. He retains his chemical and biological warfare capabilities and is actively pursuing nuclear capabilities. Were he to acquire such capabilities, we and our friends in the region would face greatly increased risks. Saddam might use such weapons as a deterrent while launching attacks against Israel or his neighbors, he might threaten American forces in the region, he might strike directly against Israel, or Israel, weighing the possibilities of nuclear blackmail or aggression, might feel compelled to strike Iraq first. Saddam has been pursuing nuclear weapons for over twenty years. According to all estimates made available he does not now have these weapons. The best public assessment is that if he were to acquire fissionable material he might field some type of weapon within two years. If he has to enrich the uranium ore itself, then a period of perhaps five years might be required. But what makes the situation relatively more dangerous today is that the UN weapons inspectors, who provided some assistance in impeding his development programs, have been absent from Iraq for over four years. And the sanctions regime, designed to restrict his access to weapons materials and the resources needed to procure them, has continuously eroded. At some point, it may become possible for Saddam to acquire the fissionable materials or uranium ore that he needs. And therefore, Iraq is not a problem that can be indefinitely postponed. In addition, Saddam Hussein's current retention of chemical and biological weapons and their respective delivery systems violates the UN resolutions themselves, which carry the weight of international law. 339 Our President has emphasized the urgency of eliminating these weapons and weapons programs. I strongly support his efforts to encourage the United Nations to act on this problem. And in taking this to the United Nations, the President's clear determination to act if the United Nations can't provides strong leverage undergirding further diplomatic efforts. But the problem of Iraq is only an element of the broader security challenges facing our country. We have an unfinished, world-wide war against Al Qaeda, a war that has to be won in conjunction with friends and allies, and that ultimately be won by persuasion as much as by force, when we turn off the Al Qaeda recruiting machine. Some three thousand deaths on September 11" testify to the real danger from Al Qaeda, and as all acknowledge, Al Qaeda has not yet been defeated. Thus far, substantial evidence has not been made available to link Saddam's regime to the Al Qaeda network. And while such linkages may emerge, winning the war against Al Qaeda may well require different actions than ending the weapons programs in Iraq. The critical issue facing the Unites States now is how to force action against Saddam Hussein and his weapons programs without detracting from our focus on Al Qaeda or efforts to deal with other immediate, mid and long-term security problems. In this regard, I would offer the following considerations: - The United States diplomacy in the United Nations will be further strengthened if the Congress can adopt a resolution expressing US determination to act if the United Nations will not. The use of force must remain a US option under active consideration. The resolution need not at this point authorize the use of force, but simply agree on the intent to authorize the use of force, if other measures fail. The more focused the resolution on Iraq and the problem of weapons of mass destruction, the greater its utility in the United Nations. The more nearly unanimous the resolution, the greater its impact in the diplomatic efforts underway. - The President and his national security team must deploy imagination, ſeverage, and patience in crafting UN engagement. In the near term, time is on our side, and we should endeavor to use the UN if at all possible. This may require a period of time for inspections or even the development of a more intrusive inspection program, if necessary backed by force. This is foremost an effort to gain world-wide legitimacy for US concerns and possible later action, but it may also impede Saddam's weapons programs and further constrain his freedom of action. Yes, there is a risk that Inspections would fail to provide the evidence of his weapons programs, but the difficulties of dealing with this outcome are more than offset by opportunity to gain allies and support in the campaign against Saddam. If efforts to resolve the problem by using the United Nations fail, either initially or ultimately, the US should form the broadest possible coalition, including its NATO allies and the North Atlantic Council if possible, to bring force to bear. Force should not be used until the personnel and organizations to be involved in post- conflict Iraq are identified and readied to assume their responsibilities. This includes requirements for humanitarian assistance, police and judicial capabilities, emergency medical and reconstruction assistance, and preparations for a transitional governing body and eventual elections, perhaps including a new constitution. Ideally, international and multinational organizations will participate in the readying of such post-conflict operations, including the UN, NATO, and other regional and Islamic organizations. 340 Force should be used as the last resort; after all diplomatic means have been exhausted, unless information indicates that further delay would present an immediate risk to the assembled forces and organizations. This action should not be categorized as "preemptive." Once initiated, any military operation should aim for the most rapid accomplishment of its operational aims and prompt turnover to follow-on organizations and agencies. If we proceed as outlined above, we may be able to minimize the disruption to the ongoing campaign against Al Qaeda, reduce the impact on friendly governments in the region, and even contribute to the resolution of other regional issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iranian efforts to develop nuclear capabilities, and Saudi funding for terrorism. But there are no guarantees. The war is unpredictable and could be difficult and costly. And what is at risk in the aftermath is an open-ended American ground commitment in Iraq and an even deeper sense of humiliation in the Arab world, which could intensify our problems In the region and elsewhere. I look forward to answering questions and helping the Committee assess the costs and risks of the alternatives before us. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 2, 2002. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Curt Weldon. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CURTWELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANLA Mr. WELDON [presiding]. The hearing will come to order. Today the Committee on Armed Services continues its review of United States policy toward Iraq. . This morning's hearing marks the fifth in a number of planned public sessions designed to educate and inform the committee and the American people on the various issues surrounding Iraq's con- tinued violation of numerous United Nations resolutions, its illicit development of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States, the Middle East, and the international community. The committee has received a series of classified briefings from the intelligence community on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and conventional military capabilities. We also have heard from former United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in- spectors about Iraq's illicit weapons programs and Saddam Hus- sein's persistent efforts to thwart United Nations (U.N.) inspec- tions. The committee also received testimony from an Iraqi defector who was a key player in Saddam's nuclear weapons program. He told us how the Iraqis built and sustained their weapons of mass destruction programs through the acquisition of sensitive Western technology, including items from U.S. firms. In separate hearings the committee also discussed U.S. policy to- ward Iraq, with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, several retired U.S. generals and two distinguished foreign and defense policy experts. Today, however, we will hear from two individuals who are foreign and defense policy experts in their own right, have published wide- ly, and are well known for their policy ideas and insights: Dr. Eliot Cohen, professor and Director of Strategic Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University; and Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Gentlemen, thank you both for agreeing to appear today. We look forward again to your testimony. And before we begin, I wanted to give Mr. Skelton, the Ranking Democrat on the committee, the opportunity to make any com- (341) 343 never get our Senators over here, Mikhael, so we have to go over to Russia to get a Russian Chairman of the Senate Committee to come over and testify. STATEMENT OF MIKHAEL MARGELOV, CHAIRMAN, INTER- NATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, RUSSIAN FEDERATION COUNCIL Mr. MARGELOV. Well, first of all, thank you, Curt, for such gener- ous introduction. It is a great honor for me to be invited for such hearings. Actually I also was invited tomorrow for the hearings at the International Affairs Committee of the House, which are called Russia and the Axis of Evil, and unfortunately I got to know this morning that these hearings are postponed. So I would like to take this advantage to address you, dear colleagues, and say that I think that such a practice of Russian parliamentarians taking part in the hearings here in the U.S., and American parliamentarians taking part in hearings in Russia is quite unique, and I think we have to continue with such practice. We agreed with Senator Trent Lott on Monday that in the begin- ning of the year 2003, a senatorial delegation will come to the Council Federation to Moscow to take part in the hearings on Rus- sian-American relations there. So I think that we have to continue such a practice. Thank you very much. Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mikhael. I know that our committee would welcome any comments in writing that you would have on our current discussion about the Iraqi situation and relative to your country's concerns as you outlined to me this morning, about the oil interests that you have in Iraq, the financial obligation that Iraq has to you as a nation, and so I would invite you to provide that information in writing on the record for us to be a part of the proceedings. Mr. WELDON. With that, I want to thank you for stopping by. And we will now turn to our witnesses. We do have to break for a series of votes. Would you like to begin now and go as far as we can, and then we have to break for one 15-minute vote and two 5-minute votes? So, Dr. Cohen, what is your choice? P., COHEN. How long would we have before the vote would begin? Mr. WELDON. I would say probably ten minutes before—probably eight minutes before we have to leave to go over and vote. Dr. COHEN. If you would like. Mr. WELDON. The floor is yours. Your statement will be entered as a part of the record. You are free to make whatever comments you would like to make. STATEMENT OF DR. ELIOT A. COHEN, PROFESSOR AND DIREC- TOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY Dr. COHEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me to testify today before you on the question of American policy toward Iraq. 345 the southern and northern no-fly zones put in place with U.N. sup- port. If repeated and brazen attempts to shoot down American air- craft and kill American pilots are not acts of war, I don't know what is. If we have escaped without loss, it is a tribute to our skill and his bad luck. The United States then has been at war with Iraq since 1991. Only the level of violence has changed, not the substance of the re- lationship or the intentions of the Iraqi regime. Since the middle of the 1990s, moreover, Iraq has been winning the war. It has done so despite the best efforts of American diplomats and soldiers to in- clude short campaigns such as Desert Fox in 1998. Iraq has violated Security Council resolutions and injunctions with impunity. It has dismantled the U.N. inspections regime, which was only partly effective at the best of times. It has slipped out from under sanctions as well. Today Iraq produces something like 2.4 million barrels of oil a day, up from a postwar low of 300,000 barrel a day, and not far short of its pre-1991 production rates. The stark facts are that inspections are dead, and sanctions are dead, and they cannot be resurrected. There are too many countries that will assist Saddam in preventing us from really bringing them back to life. They have many motives: greed, desire to curry favor with Bagdad, anxiety about domestic opinion, a principled horror of war, a desire to take the United States down a peg or two, fear of the precedent set by the overthrow of this kind of regime or the consequences that would flow from it. The international argument about inspections is, therefore, a sham, a mask for other concerns and intentions. There can be no question of Iraqi's good faith. It does not exist. Everything, every- thing that a decade's worth of experience can teach us is that we have only two choices, deterrence of the regime or its overthrow. Is Saddam Hussein in the long run deterrable? He has twice launched ruinous, unprovoked wars of aggression against his neighbors. He has attempted to assassinate a former American President. He has evinced an unshakable determination to acquire the most lethal weapons devised by man. He has shown a willing- ness to use them, on civilians first and foremost, beginning with his countrymen. He is a man who swam to power in a pool of blood and has exer- cised power not merely with brutality, but with a sadism that is notable even by the standards of the last century. His daily dis- course is that of slaughter, and his deeds match his words. An argument in favor of deterrence is a declaration of faith in the rationality of Saddam Hussein. It is an argument that he will not fulfill his repeated specific and bloody threats directed against us, his neighbors in Israel. It is an assertion that he will refrain from the use of biological weapons that have no return address. It is a contention that he understands power, justice, prestige, and above all revenge, more or less as we do. It is a belief that is con- tradicted by his career, which is one of ferocity, miscalculation and destruction. That leaves us the choice of war, as problematic as that may be. What are our prospects in such a case? Mr. Chairman, would you like me to pause now? 346 Mr. WELDON. If you don’t mind, Dr. Cohen, we have to go over for these votes. So if that is a good point for you to stop, we will come back as soon as we are finished. And, my colleagues, if you would like to say hello to Chairman Margelov before you leave, I would appreciate you stopping down at the front and have a chance to say hello to him before he has to leave. The committee stands in recess until these votes are over. [Recess.] Mr. WELDON. The committee will resume now that we have fin- ished our votes and our witnesses have replenished their bodies. We will begin—continue our testimony. Dr. Cohen, the floor is yours, and you may continue with your statement, and then we will move on to Dr. O'Hanlon. Dr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to recap very briefly. I had made the case that really there are only two policy options before us. One is to attempt to deter Saddam Hussein; the second one is war. And I made the case as well that it seems to me that deterrence was, as I put it, a declara- tion of faith in the rationality of Saddam Hussein, and that I thought that was both implausible and dangerous. That leaves us the choice of war, as problematic as that surely is. What are our prospects in such a case? I think it is unwise to try to forecast costs and casualties. I recall very well the debate be- fore the Gulf War of 1991, and how completely wrong such esti- mates turned out to be, even those made by the government. And I am even more reluctant to try to forecast war plans, because it seems to me if one is wrong in doing that, one is foolish, and if one is right, one is something considerably worse than foolish. Nonetheless, there are four important points to note: First, that the Iraqi military today is a shadow of its former self, a third the size it was in 1991, poorly equipped, demoralized, perhaps most im- portantly of all haunted by memories of its last encounter with the United States. It simply cannot be a machine like the one we faced in 1991, and that, of course, crumbled under our attack. Second, in recent times the American military has consistently surprised both observers and indeed itself. Before the Gulf, Yugo- slav, and Afghan Wars, we were told that our forces faced unprece- dented challenges that they could meet only at great cost, if at all. In each case they achieved their objectives more effectively and more creatively and with greater economy in the expenditure of blood than anyone could have imagined. In the future resumption of outright hostilities with Iraq, the same is likely to be true, and in ways that no outside observer can, I hope, predict. Thirdly, the lesson of recent wars is that coalitions are not ends, but means, and that a fixation on international consensus leads to a feeble strategy. In the current context the United States would certainly like the support of many countries, but it needs the active cooperation of a handful: Kuwait, some of the Gulf States, and one would hope Turkey, Jordan and possibly Saudi Arabia. Our British and Australian allies provide valuable military as- sistance and confirmation of the view that Saddam Hussein is in- deed an implacable menace. Beyond this, the chances are very good that once our intention to act becomes clear, other states will find 347 ways of signing on with us for a variety of motives, some more and some less worthy. Fourth, the Baathist regime is held together solely by fear. When the time comes that Iraqi officers and soldiers, secret police and functionaries no longer anticipate retribution by the regime, there is a good chance that they will cease to operate on its behalf. As the American military confronts the challenges of chemical and bio- logical weapons and urban warfare, which are surely the most dif- ficult challenges in such a campaign, we must remember that fact. If individual Iraqi officers know that they will suffer harm only if they obey Saddam's orders, they are unlikely to do so. Surely American military planners know this fact and will make use of it. Saddam Hussein has been given many last chances. Indeed, an- nouncing the beginning of Operation Desert Fox in December of 1998, President Clinton said that he had given Saddam Hussein his last chance. Some may persuade themselves that Saddam Hus- sein should have more last chances. Some will even suggest that the United States should defer action until next year, and the year after that, and the year after that. And if we follow such a course, one day it will be too late, and as regional nuclear war erupts, or as plague rages in our cities, we will wonder why we did not act. The real question is not why now, but why not years ago? Almost as important as regime change is what follows; almost as important, because the truth is that even if Saddam is succeeded by a brute, we can expect him to be a chastened brute, one who knows the consequences of confronting the United States. But America can and should aspire to more. To be sure, we are not by temperament or preparation well suited to exercise the kind of colonial administration, or at least certainly not for long periods of time, in the Arab World, and it would be absurd to expect transi- tion in Iraq from totalitarian rule to Jeffersonian democracy. But it should be possible to establish a regime that would be authori- tarian perhaps, but moderate; a regime that would safeguard basic civil and religious rights, that would free the Iraqi people from fear, and would maintain the unity of the country without threat- ening its neighbors, and that might pave the way in the long-run for a modern limited state. Such an achievement would have beneficial consequences well beyond Iraq, including in our war against Islamic extremism. By itself, the United States cannot remake the Middle East, but it can do much to help the peoples of that part of the world do so. It can- not force Arab societies to come to terms with modernity, but it can aid those embarked on that enterprise. The United States can support with its prestige and power lib- erals of all stripes, secular and religious alike, and foster decent, if not entirely free, governments. In this indirect but crucial way, the overthrow of Saddam will contribute to the larger contest against Islamic extremist violence. There are other connections between September 11th and our war with Iraq. There are some ties between Baghdad and al Qaeda that have become more apparent in recent days, and in all likeli- hood there is more that the intelligence community either does not yet understand or that it has buried in secrecy. There is a deeper link as well. After September 11th, Americans now have a visceral 348 rather than a theoretical understanding of what a massive assault on American civilians in the heart of our great cities feels like. We know what it smells like. The horrors of that day have made Amer- icans more realistic than others around the world, who like so many well-meaning people in the century just passed, would prefer to close their eyes and pretend that a mortal threat does not exist. Americans have paid a terrible price for seeing things more clearly than once they did. I therefore urge you to support a resolu- tion giving the President the authority to conduct a campaign aimed at the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime; that you not tie it to U.N. resolutions, and that you not condition our action on the acquiescence of countries that may wish to prevent us from acting. We have lost strategic surprise. At this point, Saddam has to know that we are coming. By granting the President discretion to help him achieve some measure of operational surprise, which will contribute to our forces' chances of early and complete success, you will also, more importantly, reduce the casualties that our young men and women in uniform are likely to suffer. Let me conclude with one last thought. It is in the nature of par- tisan politics to sharpen differences between parties even on mat- ters of foreign policy. Yet for a variety of reasons there has been a common policy on Iraq for a full decade, from the end of the first Gulf War to the present. Both Democratic and Republican adminis- trations put a wary reliance on containment and deterrence. That policy has finally failed, but throughout, American leaders have shared an understanding of the ultimate issues. Again, let me quote President Clinton: “The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world. The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government, a gov- ernment ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people”. However, one judges the success of his administration's policies, it seems to me that President Clinton had the assessment right, and that the time has come to act on his words. Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Dr. Cohen. [The prepared statement of Dr. Cohen can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 409.] Mr. WELDON. Dr. O'Hanlon, welcome. Your statement will be en- tered in the record. And you may take whatever time you would like for your public comments. STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL O'HANLON, SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION Dr. O'HANLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor to be here before the committee and to be appearing with Eliot Cohen, who has made a lot of excellent points. I would like to agree with some of what he said, much of what he said, but also emphasize the possibility that I think a strategy of containment can work if we get rigorous inspections and disarmament going again inside of Iraq. And in that spirit I would like to support strongly the Sep- tember 12th U.N. speech, which I think had the tone and the strat- 349 egy just right, even though I am not convinced that the resolution suggested by the President thereafter had the same tone. And I hope the Congress will hold the President to the Septem- ber 12th speech strategy not necessarily with binding stipulations, but with a strong sense of encouragement that a multilateral ulti- matum with tough deadlines and trying to use inspections and dis- armament if possible first is the right way to go, for a number of reasons, and I will get into those. But, a. I think it can work. I think a toughened up and tightened up containment strategy can work; and, b. if we go to war, we need to go to war with as many allies as possible. It does not make sense, for example, to essentially say we can do this without the Saudis, let's not worry too much about getting them aboard. When you look at the political and military realities of that region, doing this war without Saudi infrastructure and Saudi support is such a way of fighting with one arm behind your back that I think we need to craft a strategy that will maximize the odds of countries like that one being with us, if and when we need to go to war. So, I strongly support the President's September 12th strategy, because I think that is the way you get the Saudis on board, and others like that, if you need to ultimately use force. Let me say, I do believe—and I agree with Eliot Cohen—I do be- lieve that we can overthrow Saddam Hussein if necessary at the same time that we continue the operations against al Qaeda. There may be some political strains with certain key allies and maybe some political dangers with countries like Pakistan trying to overcrowd the agenda, but in military terms I strongly agree with that assessment, and I do not believe that we need to wait. In fact, let me agree further with Eliot on the point that it is very hard to develop a national consensus to go to war. We have all seen that in the recent debate, and this body has been very in- strumental in conducting that debate. We know this is not the sort of thing you can turn on and turn off, based on when you decide it is politically opportune. So, even though I am not convinced that Saddam's overthrow is absolutely as urgent as Eliot has argued, I do believe that now that we are having this debate, let's have it now. We have the military wherewithal to force this to an issue, force this to a head right now if necessary, so for better or worse, let's have it now. Finally, I think that we also need to remember, however, that even if war might be easy, it also might not be. And the last thing you can assume as an American military planner or a President or a Member of Congress is that this war will be easy. And in this sense I strongly take issue with the tone of several members of the Defense Policy Board, who in almost a quasi-official capacity have been suggesting this war would be a cakewalk, a walk in the park. These are their words, not mine. I think this is an irresponsible way to prepare the country for conflict, and I actually don’t believe people associated with the Secretary of Defense should be using this sort of language. I think if we are going to go into this, we need to recognize this could be tough. Eliot has pointed out how the Iraqi military has de- teriorated and also how its morale may be very weak, and how it is essentially a house of cards held together by fear. But there is 350 another side to the same set of equations, which is the following: If you are going to do this war, for a number of reasons this is going to be a big war. This has to be a couple hundred thousand Americans, in my judgment, for a number of reasons. First of all, to maximize the chances that the Iraqis will crumble, you want to have them realize our victory is inevitable. You don’t want there to be any doubt about this. You don’t want to try some new, inno- vative concept of warfare with 30,000 or 40,000 Americans that might work and might fail, because Saddam is going to tell his troops under those circumstances, remember Mogadishu. If we just hang in there, extract some casualties and buy time, we can make the Americans change their mind. He is wrong if he makes that ar- gument, but his commanders may not know that he is wrong. You want to intimidate them. You want to overwhelm them. If you do this operation, you want to do it the way we invaded Pan- ama in 1989 with overwhelming shock from multiple axes simulta- neously. You don’t want to be doing overly creative small oper- ations here and there. So you have to do it as a big operation. That is point number one. Point number two. If the Iraqis use the weaponry they have, even for a few days, and they use it reasonably competently—I am not talking about stellar military performance; if they simply use this weaponry reasonably competently—they can extract many hundreds of American combat deaths, and perhaps even a couple thousand. I agree with Eliot that predictions are dangerous, but we also need to have some sense of what we are talking here, and a very good study that he-as we all know that he was one of the directors of the Gulf War Air Power Study—pointed out, for exam- ple, that in the first three days of Desert Storm—the first five days, I am sorry, we actually had one-third of all of our aircraft losses in that time period because we were flying low, going after targets that were difficult to find, and we were vulnerable there to shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery. The Iraqis still have a lot of that. If you are fighting in the city, you have got to fly low unless you have a Special Forces person who happens to be in position to lase a target and you get lucky. In general, you are going to have to fly low to be accurate and to find targets. What that means is the couple of thousand shoulder- launched surface-to-air missiles, several thousand antiaircraft weapons that the Iraqis have can be effective. They can be much more effective than the Somalis' rocket-propelled grenades, which brought down a couple of Black Hawk helicopters on that fateful night in October of 1993. So, I would simply argue, if we are not ready for some more of that kind of fighting, we are not yet serious. That would be an additional point. Finally, we are going to kill a lot of Iraqi civilians, and Saddam Hussein is going to be the first person to make sure that happens. We are not so good at warfare that we can fight in an urban set- ting and avoid civilian casualties. If you look at the Panama experi- ence, for example, or the Mogadishu experience, when we fight in cities to go after people and take down military, we generally kill more civilians of the other side than military, and that is using the most careful techniques that we have. 352 deterrable. I do share his concern, especially about the 1993 at- tempted assassination of former President Bush, which, as we, I think, would both agree, if that attempt had succeeded, imagine the consequences for Saddam Hussein. And yet he tried anyway, and that tells you something about his sense of vengeance. And, I do acknowledge that is a point that works against my broader argument, but everything else we have seen from Saddam Hussein since 1991 suggests that he knows we are watching, we are vigilant, we are containing him, and if he moves against Ku- wait again, if he moves against the Kurds, if he uses weapons of mass destruction, if he ever is tied in a documentable way to al Qaeda in a way that, in my judgment, he has not yet been, if any of those things happen, we will overthrow him, and he knows it. And, there is a bipartisan consensus in this country in favor of doing that. And, I think you have seen the consequences that he has not moved against Kuwait. For example, in 1994, he moved a couple of brigades south. And then Secretary Perry announced Operation Vigilant Warrior to send 50,000 Americans back to that region. Saddam immediately backed off. He has not attacked the Kurds, except in that one moment in 1996 when they were actually fight- ing each other, and he took sides in that war temporarily. In other words, he is opportunistic, he is dangerous, he is ruthless, but he also wants to survive. And most of his actions, especially since Desert Storm, prove that he cares more about survival than about anything else. Now, I acknowledge all of the caveats. It is not a perfect case. There is room for debate and for worry here, and I do think that Saddam is not—you cannot make a slam dunk case that he is al- ways deterrable. But the overall body of evidence suggests that if we can take his weapons of mass destruction away from him, pre- vent him from getting a nuclear weapon, and keep our military presence in that region robust, I believe that containment can con- tinue to work. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Dr. O'Hanlon can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 390.] Mr. WELDON. Thank you both. You made some excellent points. I am sure that we will have some engaging questions for you. I would like to start out with two questions, and then defer to my colleague and ranking member. Frank Anderson, former Near East Division Chief for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), said recently, and I quote, “What he is going to do,” referring to Saddam, “is what he has always done: push us right to the edge,” meaning that Saddam Hussein will play this game holding out the fact that he is going to be open to inspec- tions, but then when you get into the details, as we have just seen recently in a discussion by Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan— he told reporters just several days ago, “Well, they are not going to come in and disrupt our country, they are not going to inspect our presidential facilities, which means we are not going to have the kind of aggressive, capable inspections that the President is calling for.” 353 So, do you agree with Frank Anderson? Do you think this is going to continue as an attempt by Saddam to split the coalition, as he is trying to do with the French and the Germans and some of the other nations that have not gone along with our President's request? Dr. COHEN. I absolutely agree with that, and I think the difficult thing we have to do is admit that he is better at that game than we are. He is a pro. He has been winning. If you just look at where we have been since—where we were, early on, when we had UNSCOM that was effectively ripping apart his nuclear program. As Mike mentioned, I ran the Air Force's study of the Gulf War. One of the things that sobered us was what really took down that nuclear program was review and inspections, not bombing. If you looked, though, at the progression since then, he has just gotten better and better. They were able to thwart the end of the UNSCOM inspections. They have been out from under the inspec- tions now for four years. They have also been able to thwart sanc- tions. So, I think we have to accept that fact. He is really good at this. He has got friends overseas, or countries that at least have enough of a common interest that they will work with him and help him to thwart us. So if we go down this path, I think we are going to play a losing game. Dr. O'HANLON. Mr. Chairman, I agree with this concern. That is why I think you have to front-load the inspection process. I agree very much with Secretary Powell's point that we need a new reso- lution, because you need to demand results in the first couple of months while our military lever is poised and ready to strike with- in a time frame that is soon enough that we could have a war be- fore the summer heat. So, you need to demand some results, essentially this fall, and I think you can do that by telling Saddam, “listen, we are very con- fident. We can’t tell you exactly how many liters of anthrax that you have. We are very confident that you have this many liters of preparatory agent or constituents and this many liters of sarin. And we know how many artillery shells we have seen in your docu- ments that you have developed and have not yet been accounted for.” You need to see some of those things, presented and de- stroyed, in the first couple of months. In addition to that, and an important point that I would add, I believe the nuclear program is easier for us to essentially contain than the chemical and biological programs, because it is—even though they have gone underground with the basement bomb pro- gram, usually you need fairly large infrastructures, centrifuges, that sort of thing, to enrich uranium, unless they get lucky and buy fissile material on the black market. Therefore, I think that we have a pretty good chance of making the inspections work to keep the nuclear program in check, and to me that is the single most important thing. So, if we have an inspection process that demands results in the first two or three months, keeps a lid on the nuclear program, and even if there are small infractions and violations on the chemical and biological front, I still think that is a fairly robust containment policy. But we have got to see results in the next few months. 354 Mr. WELDON. Second question. Dr. Cohen, in your testimony you mentioned that the Iraqi military is far less capable than it was ten years ago, and I would agree with that. And you mentioned that there would be no problem in ultimately achieving victory, and I also agree with that. Dr. O'Hanlon, in your testimony you basically acknowledged the same, but you do say that a greater strategic threat to U.S. forces is the likelihood that large numbers of Iraqi civilians could perish, and that Saddam Hussein will make sure of that. And I think that is perhaps one of the greatest risks we face strategically, because Saddam, knowing that his military is far less capable, knows that he can't in any way stand up against a coalition force or the U.S. alone. Therefore, he has got to win this on the TV sets and in those groups in this country that are just against war under any cir- cumstances, and I think that is already beginning to happen. I saw an article yesterday in the Christian Science Monitor that a group in Alexandria, Virginia said that they are now recruiting volunteers to act as human shields. These are U.S. citizens. And I quote, “They are trying to recruit old people”. “It is more com- fortable to ask someone who is nearing the end of their lives to do this,”. So American groups, planning to take American citizens into Iraq to place them in urban areas and inner-city areas where the likelihood of them being killed is very high. What are your comments on that, and what are your sugges- tions? I mean, Saddam obviously knows this. He has used this ploy in the past. So it is not just now a problem of the Iraqis and the collateral damage to innocent civilians, but now what appears to be a deliberate attempt by American-based groups to take Americans over to Iraq so that they, in fact, can become human targets. Dr. COHEN. Well, let me, if I could, try to respond at a number of levels. First, just in terms of the law of war, what we are obliged to do is to make every reasonable effort to safeguard civilian lives. But, in war civilians do get hurt, and I have complete confidence that the American military will do everything that it can do. If it fails and civilians are killed and hurt, as is quite likely, we are not culpable in any—certainly in any legal or, I would argue, in a moral sense. You know, I agree with a basic point that Michael made, which seems to me central. We should not be talking about cakewalks, we shouldn't be talking about something that will be effortless. I think where we may disagree a little bit is I can imagine a range of out- comes. I can imagine something that is very sudden, and really very cheap in terms of loss of life on our side and Iraqi civilians. And, I can imagine some of the darker scenarios that he sketched out, and I think when you make your decision, you have to accept that that is the case. But, I just think that it is very, very unpredictable. I think in that context we have to walk into this with our eyes open and ac- cept that. I think part of the challenge of leadership is going to be to prepare people for that. One final point that I hate to make, but I think I have to make it, it is one of the ways in which our determination will be under- stood, particularly in that part of the world, is if we make it clear that we are going to do this anyhow. 355 Dr. O'HANLON. Mr. Chairman, I do agree with Eliot Cohen, first of all, that there is a range of possible outcomes. I hope very much this is very quick. I think there is a decent chance, if we put 200,000 forces in Kuwait and in surrounding countries, the Iraqi military will take this matter into its own hands. But one of the reasons I think you don’t want to think in terms of cakewalks, because putting 200,000 forces in Kuwait is by itself not a cakewalk, and, therefore, to generate the very kind of out- come that we most want, we have to be braced for and prepared for the actual big conflict. On the issue of casualties, I do worry. I didn’t know this particu- lar case that you mentioned. I do worry about the general issue of Westerners in Baghdad when this war begins, whether they are in- spectors that Saddam decides not to let go, whether they are jour- nalists. I think that we do have to face—this is more of a question for down the road if we get into this war, but I think this is an idea that won't go over well in many quarters, but I think it is ac- tually worth raising right now—there may be certain cir- cumstances under which we want to negotiate an asylum arrange- ment for Saddam if that is the way to get him not to use his weap- ons of mass destruction and not to kill hostages. I don't know how many countries in the world would want him. I think Belarus comes to mind as one of the few places I could imagine, and maybe one or two others. But that kind of a thing, as politically delicate of an issue as it may be to raise in a country where Saddam has been our nemesis for a decade, I think it is the sort of thing that we may have to consider, because there are going to be these issues of hostages. It may not be the human shield peo- ple, but it may be the journalists and others who are covering the War. Dr. COHEN. If I could just add two things, one to maybe counter- balance things a little bit. The Serbs tried the human shield tech- nique a little bit, and they pretty soon fell off of it. People's sense of self-preservation, it seems to me, eventually is going to kick in. I think the other thing, though, that we have to be prepared for is in the aftermath of a successful military operation, there is prob- ably going to be a lot of Iraqi-on-Iraqi bloodshed. There have been a lot of people who have suffered under this regime. If we think back to the Shi'ite revolts against the Iraqi regime immediately after the Gulf War, there was a lot of ugly stuff. That is going to happen actually in the aftermath of this kind of conflict as well. Mr. WELDON. Mr. Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. That is one of the items that concerns me a great deal, what happens after. At end of the day, I think history will be written about what happened after the de-weaponizing and the changing of the guard in Iraq. Mr. O'Hanlon talked about some 50- to 100,000 American troops. Look on the dark side each of you and then again on the bright side as to what could happen. I am deeply concerned about this. I have been pushing. We finally got some language in the proposed resolution making reference to the aftermath, but I am not sure that there is a plan in force now. There was a plan for Bosnia that has worked pretty well, a plan for Kosovo that is beginning to 356 work, I think, and there were plans after the two—after defeating Japan and Germany. Tell us what your best thoughts are. Dr. COHEN. Shall I take a crack at that? I am not a Middle East expert, I hasten to say. I think there are two very different schools of thought among people I respect who have devoted their lives to studying that part of the world. There are those who say, “Look, the culture that you are dealing with is, and the particular history of Iraq is such that you cannot hope for anything other than some kind of dictatorship. I mean, anything else just isn't going to work.” There are others who say, “Well, this is actually one of the most educated populations in the Middle East. You have a large and im- portant and influential diaspora of Iraqis who can make a contribu- tion.” The world has changed, and so perhaps our prospects are better, and, again, I think there is a range of outcomes. In the absolute worst scenario, it seems to me, we end up with a general in charge of Iraq who is something of a thug, but he is not Saddam. He is not Saddam for two reasons. One is he has seen what has happened to Saddam and doesn’t want to have that hap- pen to him. And, second, he probably doesn’t match Saddam in his extraordinary ferocity. Saddam really is, I think, off the charts. He has not had the re- sources of a Hitler, or a Stalin or a Mao, but he is in that category of world leader. In some ways he is a little bit beyond them, be- cause this is a man who, after all, has periodically beaten people to death with his bare fists for the sheer pleasure of it and clearly has a personal sadistic streak as well as a larger collective one. In the worst circumstance then, if you have a regime that is sim- ply replaced by a thuggish general, we are still ahead. And in some ways the Iraqi people are still somewhat ahead of where they were. that is, I think, the kind of low end of what our expectations would e. The higher end is the kind of thing that Michael was talking about, where there is an American presence for some time, and you have what I would argue would probably be a moderate authoritar- ian regime. The numbers that he cited seem to me to be roughly right. So much depends on which allies would be willing to be in- volved, say the Jordanians, for example. I think—I agree with you, we should be doing a lot of planning for it. I also agree in the long run we may well be looking at an increase in end strength, not just because of Iraq, but because of everything that we are doing in Afghanistan and Central Asia and will continue to do there. One final point I would raise, just in terms of what you might encourage the Defense Department to think about, or the adminis- tration to think about, is whether we might not want to move as soon as possible to civilian rather than military administration, where the military is in support, where you had a figure like— something like Ambassador Oakley was in Somalia, or someone of the character of the Deputy Secretary of State would be the right kind of person to try to take Iraq through a period of something like five to ten years. Dr. O'HANLON. Congressman, thanks for the question. It is a tough one. 357 I think that the worst case, the worst case is not this level of military effort from the United States, because we can do that, and it will cost us. It may require at least a temporary increase in end strength. We know how to do an occupation, and we–as you say, we are pretty good at it. Even in modern times we seem to have begun to find our touch again, at least to a limited extent in the Balkans. The real worst case, I think, is if we win the war and pull out quickly, and then Iraq descends into civil conflict, which has—and Eliot has mentioned that there is at least the tinderbox potential for that. There are a number of potential consequences of that. The worst case of those is not all of the chemical and biological agent being destroyed in the war, and then al Qaeda getting its hands on that agent in the aftermath. It is the sort of chemical- biological equivalent of the Pakistan decay or deterioration scenario that we all worry about where Pakistan falls apart and its nuclear weapons get in the hands of Islamic extremists. In Iraq, if you leave that country without having destroyed all of its weapons of mass destruction and allow civil conflict to ensue, then you actually make the problem worse, and the likelihood of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction getting in the hands of terrorists is actually much greater than it is today, I would argue. So, that to me is the worst case, that the administration, which has opposed anything sounding like nation-building, takes that phi- losophy to an unfortunate extreme and pulls back quickly after this war, allowing not just for what I just said, but also possibly for the Kurds to try to secede, which could bring the Turks into Iraq as they try to clamp down on the Kurds, could even lead to some kind of a quasi-legitimization for an Iranian movement into southeast- ern Iraq, and I think we could have a real mess. And I worry about it because this administration, as well as it conducted the overall war in terrorism, in my judgment, it has been so adamantly against U.S. participation in state-building that I worry that they would extend the philosophy here to a postwar Iraq, and that would be a huge mistake. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much. I have another question regarding support of the United Nations, but I will postpone it to the end of the hearing. Thank you. Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman. And we will now go to members. We will follow the five-minute rule in the order that members appeared, starting with the gentlelady from Virginia, Mrs. Davis for five minutes. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I just have one question for Dr. Cohen. What do you think should be our adequate response to Iraq were they to use biological and chemical weapons on our servicemen? Dr. COHEN. Well, if we assume the operation is intended to over- throw the regime, then, you know, we will—we would intensify our efforts, but they should be pretty intense as it is. I do think that one of the things that we should do, very early on, is make it clear that we will hold individual Iraqi officers responsible for the use of those weapons, and make a strenuous effort to communicate that fact to quite junior Iraqi officers so they understand that if they turn those things loose on us, they will be held personally account- 358 ; and if they refuse to follow orders to do so, they will be all right. And, I would suspect that we have a fair amount of credibility, or we will have a fair amount of credibility, in the context of a war in which it is very clear that we intend to get rid of that regime. So, it seems to me that is going to be the centerpiece of that effort. So, the issue of holding individuals accountable and having a tre- mendous effort to communicate that probably is the most likely way to prevent it from happening, or to make sure that it happens only in a limited way. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. The gentleman that we had here testify- ing. I believe it was in this committee, I am also on the Committee on International Relations, so I get them mixed up, so excuse me— stated, when I asked him the question, what did he think Saddam Hussein would do were he backed into a corner if we were to at- tack, and he was very adamant that he felt that he would unleash everything that he has. Do you agree with that? Dr. COHEN. Saddam is a survivor. In that way he is unlike Hit- ler. This is not a man who is going to commit suicide. He will go down trying to get somebody else. He is a very vengeful man, but I think he wants to stick around. At some point is he capable of doing this? Obviously. But the thing to remember, it is not Saddam who is going to be firing the rocket or opening the canister, it is going to be—he has to have other people, in the bureaucratic con- text, do that, and they will not do that until they get authoritative direction from him. You know, one thing, during the Iran-Iraq war, Mirage pilots did not fly without personal orders from Saddam Hussein. It is that kind of system. This is an extremely centralized system, which also makes it a very vulnerable system in some important ways. So what we have to focus on is the operators, the people who would actually have to press the buttons or open the canisters or do what- ever has to be done. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Dr. O’Hanlon. Dr. O'HANLON. Congresswoman, I think it is a very important question. I think there is good news and bad news that I would add to what Eliot has said. I agree with what he has already stated. In terms of the chemical and biological threat, I believe that we are pretty well prepared militarily. In some ways I am worried more about what Saddam might be able to do against the United States homeland. Although the good news there is he has devoted his intelligence operatives in the last years to try to acquire tech- nology to build weapons of mass destruction, he has not infiltrated Western countries as much, for example, as Hezbollah may have cased certain Western targets. So, I think there is reason to hope that that worst-case scenario of an attack on the homeland would not happen, but we have to be braced for the possibility. I also think I am relatively optimistic about the Scud missile threat. I actually think that even if Saddam has a couple dozen of these, the technology is probably not much better than it was back in 1991, when these rockets broke up in descent, and I think if he tried to deliver a chemical or biological agent against Israel, Saudi Arabia or Kuwait with those rockets, I think he would not do very 362 It is hard to say. There are a couple of pointers that I think we can look at. One is let's think about chemical and biological weap- ons. Historically, chemical weapons tend to wound rather than kill. Even in the war with Iran as best as we can determine—I think this is in the British dossier that was released recently—the Ira- nians were said to have suffered several thousand deaths from quite large-scale use of chemical weapons with very little protec- tion. The Iranians did not have anything like our kind of gear, and couldn't operate against the forces that were using them. They caused all kinds of other problems, including long-term illness, and I do not mean to underestimate it, but in terms of being lethal, that tended not to be the case. And, in the kind of environment that we are talking about, I would tend to think that would be so. Urban warfare is traditionally, of course, very, very costly. There too, you know, I try to follow fairly closely Israeli operations in the West Bank, which was urban warfare against kind of a sophisti- cated opponent who thought about how they would fight it. And, the Israelis took remarkably few military casualties, and, more re- markably, inflicted relatively few civilian casualties. So, that makes me very cautiously optimistic in hoping that we are looking at something that is probably similar to the first Gulf War in terms of very rough orders of magnitude. Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, one of my personal concerns is I have come to believe that with all the talk of the regime change in Iraq, that Saddam Hussein could well be of the mind that he has absolutely nothing to lose by releasing a weapon of mass destruction here in America. Seeing the kind of grief that 3,000 casualties caused, what if he could cause 30,000 casualties or 300,000 casualties? I was just curi- ous if either of you or your organizations have given much thought to the probability of that happening, because I have very grave con- cerns about that. Dr. COHEN. If I could just respond, I would just say I share those concerns. My concerns are greater if we do not do this. And, I would go back to a point that Michael made, and I think very accu- rately. The intent to assassinate the first President Bush was com- pletely irrational. It was purely a quest for revenge. It could do him no good. It could actually only do him harm. If it succeeded, I think there was a good chance that we then would have done what per- haps we are about to do. And, it seems to me that opened the win- dow into who he is. So, I very much share your feelings, particularly living in this city, I have to say. But in a way, I think if we do not do this we are actually increasing the likelihood that it will happen some day. Dr. O'HANLON. A couple of points. On this last one I am a little more optimistic than Eliot, though not completely so; because one thing I would note, since 1993, Saddam as far as we can tell has not tried to assassinate anyone else in the American sort of Gulf War hero community. And, what that tells me is that now he real- izes that we are pretty good at intelligence, he is not going to try it again because he wouldn't get away with it. In 1993, he made the mistake of thinking he could get away with it using intelligence operatives to sneak into Kuwait. 363 What that tells me, you have to worry most about those things that he is not sure we will figure out that he was behind. So, if he gives a biological agent to al Qaeda, maybe he thinks that he could get away with it. And, that is the kind of thing that I worry more about a lot more, rather than a deliberate act of aggression where he is aware that we will overthrow him because we know who caused that aggression. On the biological weapon issue, I believe in the end he has pow- erful reasons not to give the weapons to al Qaeda. For one thing, he knows that we have some ability to do DNA analysis of biologi- cal agents and figure out the general possible universe of places from which they may have come. We are not perfect at that, but we are fairly good at it. We can also analyze the way the agent was prepared or milled and figure out—this is obviously what we were doing last fall as the country was trying to figure out where the anthrax came from. And, of course, we still do not know, so that tells Saddam some- thing that may encourage him. But, we were able to rule out a lot of possibilities and narrow down the set of possible origin points of that agent. So, what that tells me, I don't know how well deterrence is going to work against Saddam for that particular threat. There is a case to be made that he will be too nervous to try. And, there is also a case to be made that he will decide he can get away with it and he will take the same kind of chance he took in 1993 trying to kill former President Bush. It is a tough call. I think it is probably the single-most difficult thing, to make a prediction about knowing this man's past behavior. On the issues that you raised, I have tried to do some work on casualty estimates. The problem is, as Eliot said, the models can be so far off. And I went back and I have got a 10,000-word paper I will be happy to burden you with if you like. But in the end, I ultimately conclude it is very hard to specify the range narrowly, and we could lose anywhere from 100 people if this war is basically over before it begins, to as many as 5,000 people if most of the Re- publican Guard fights hard and we have to essentially have a Panama- or Mogadishu-style infantry urban-combat engagement until much of the Republican Guard has been defeated. I think the 5,000 Americans killed-in-action estimate is quite pessimistic. I would think that a more plausible pessimistic sce- nario—still pessimistic—is a couple-thousand killed Americans. But, if this becomes urban warfare even for a few weeks, it will be- come much more lethal for us than Operation Desert Storm, de- spite the deterioration of the Iraqi military. So, that is why so much of this hinges on convincing them not to fight. I am sorry to go on at such length. One final point is that on the issue of homeland security and the possible attacks by chemical or biological agents here, I think you are right to raise the possibility of the 30,000/300,000, but I think that Iraq would have a hard time being that effective given what we know about its infiltration of special agents today. I think that, for example, if they tried to put anthrax into the Empire State Building or something like that, or even into three skyscrapers, first of all in wartime we are going to 365 are dealing with a biological weapons convention or the global warming, it is true around the world in a number of other ways. How can we do what needs to be done to deal with Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, while minimizing the resentment that is going to be out there in the Middle East and elsewhere if it is, as you said Mr. O'Hanlon, going to be seen as America's war? Either one, in either order. Thank you. Dr. COHEN. I do not carry a brief for the administration. It is one of the great things about being an academic. So I won't try to de- fend the way they have presented the issue. I think just one—on the record, it seems to me American policy has been regime change. That is consistent. That was the Clinton administration, too. And, to get to a point I made in my testimony, I think there frequently is more continuity in American policy than either party would like to really acknowledge. And, just as an American citizen, I think that is a very good thing. I think the problem of Saddam was bound to come up in the next administration, no matter what. The election cycle was taking over as it was coming to a pitch. Sooner or later, we would have come to it. I think September 11th and a bunch of other things have brought it to salience. I think that phrase, “managing resentment” is a good one. There may be things you can do from just the kinds of conversation you have to what gestures you make. At the end of the day, this will be seen as America's war. It will be America's war. And, we will be resented and there will be people who will try to control us or thwart us or stymie us in some way for all kinds of reasons, some # which I spoke about. Within limits, we just have to live with that. I agree with you, one should do everything possible to try to miti- gate that and prevent it and so on. I think we should not deceive ourselves about the nature of the reaction to September 11th. That was a reaction of pity. As long as we were pitiable, we would be pitied. When we begin to do things, we are not going to be pitied and people's attitudes will be different. Dr. O'HANLON. Congressman, it is a very tough question and a huge challenge that is going to be with us for a long time. Let me say two specific things that are positive to the administration, and two that are critical to the administration on that front, and then hº leave it at that, because it is too big a topic to begin to ex- aust. I was pleased again by the U.N. speech of the President of Sep- tember 12th. I think it struck the right balance. This is an urgent problem that we have to deal with now, but we are going to try to do it multilaterally. I thought his tone was actually much dif- ferent—now moving to one of my criticisms—than what his own Vice President and Secretary of Defense had been using the entire summer up until then. And frankly, I think that even though there is a certain argument for a good-cop/bad-cop approach toward di- plomacy, I thought Mr. Cheney and Mr. Rumsfeld went too far in a number of points. In an August 26th speech, for example, the Vice President said that Saddam uses whatever weapons of mass destruction—he can- not be stopped from using whatever weapons of mass destruction 367 extremely aggressive weapons of mass destruction programs. We can deter them from attacking Kuwait, which is a very straight- forward thing to do. There are a lot of things we do not deter. I also-and here I disagree with Michael. I think, actually, the Secretary and the Vice President were doing a service by telling the truth about inspections, which is it is really a no-hope strategy, because the Iraqis will thwart us the way they have thwarted in- spections over a full decade. I do not see how one can reasonably think that there could be an inspection regime that works. The odds are so overwhelmingly against it that we have to look that one in the face. And, a lot of our friends overseas do not want to believe that; and good people frequently do not want to believe unpleasant facts but they remain facts. Mr. WELDON. Thank you. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis, for five minutes. Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. I appreciate you all for being here as well. I think we have had some good give and take. I really do appreciate, Mr. Chairman, as well the fact that we have had a number of hearings. I wonder if I could just go beyond the issue of what happens afterwards a little bit, because I think there are concerns we could easily win the battle—I do not have any question that that would happen—but lose the war in the long-run. One of the questions that we raised the other day was around the policy of preemption, whether or not this sets a precedent for others around the world. Could you address that? I would suggest Mr. Perle had said that this is a unique situation here. And, I think we would all accept that fact. But I suspect uniqueness is also like beauty: in the eyes of the beholder. And I wonder if you could speak to that. What else are we putting in place through these actions and how do you think we would mitigate against that for the future? Dr. COHEN. You know, I don’t know whether the administration was wise to highlight the word “preemption”. It seems to me it has always been implicit in any serious defense analysis if we saw a serious threat directed against us that was imminent, that we would act against it. And, if the French saw a bunch of nuclear missiles showing up in Libya and the Libyans were talking about the need for a preemptive strike on Paris, the French would do something about it, whether or not they would announce it as the doctrine of preemption or not. I think it would be wise to highlight how extraordinary this re- gime is and how different it is. Your point about winning the battle and losing the war is right, and I think it is right for you to ask lots of questions about what follows. I think as cautious as one should appropriately be about the use of force, we should also bear in mind that there are some possibilities that some good things may come out of this; obviously, the good things for the people of Iraq not living under that regime. But, other good things. We could reduce our dependence on mili- tary basing in Saudi Arabia. One of the hidden costs of the way the first Gulf War ended was a long-term military presence in Saudi Arabia. And, as we now know from, among other things, the 370 he said the problem is, you put American troops in a situation like this and they become lightning rods. I saw it graphically 20 years ago in Beirut. A month before the marines were bombed at the Bei- rut International Airport, a congressional delegation (CODEL) from this committee was there, and we came back and the senior mem- bers of that CODEL went to see Casper Weinberger and said, “For God’s sake move those marines. They are in a totally untenable military situation.” That was a Thursday before the Sunday when 243 were blasted into oblivion. When General Vessey came before us a week later, we said, “Whatever you are going to do, we know you do not want to cut and run, but for goodness sakes, move the men.” And he said, “It does not matter where they are, it is who they are that causes them to draw fire”. So a couple of lessons from that: we are likely to run into big trouble unless we have help from other countries in handling this. And, you should not feel empty-handed, Dr. Cohen, in not having a ready prescription. Neither has anyone else that we have talked to. We have probed them for answers to give us some depth and assurance that some of this planning is going on and they can see how it works out. It isn’t there yet, and that is a major concern that we have; namely, that we will be there. And Mike O'Hanlon, CBO, for better or worse, they took a stab at it. You are talking 15-, $20 billion. They are talking for a sizable force over 2 years, $91 billion, and for a small force, $33.6 billion. Big change, particularly if you run it out over 10 years. It is a sub- stantial chunk of change that comes out of the defense budget, to what end we are not really sure. If it works, so much the better. But, I can see a situation where we get Iraq back on its feet, a pro-western leader, somewhat, you might call it, by relative stand- ards a democracy. And, they look to the east flank and say “The Iranians are building long-range ballistic missiles capable of reach- ing any point in this country. They also are building nuclear weap- ons, we believe. They will soon have the capacity to unleash those against us. We need to have a deterrent.” So you get an India-Paki- stan situation right there in the heart of the Middle East. Is that unrealistic to picture as a possibility? Dr. COHEN. If I could try a couple of responses. I think your con- cern about American forces being a lightning rod is true. Of course, people did say the same thing before we went into Kosovo and also into Bosnia. And, in some ways, yes, but in other ways, no. As you know, I am sure, better than I, when we went into Beirut, we went in with rules of engagement that were excruciatingly bad. We went in as a small contingent of peacekeepers. Mr. SPRATT. Twelve hundred marines. It was a fairly sizable unit. Dr. COHEN. In a way, that I think was unforgivable, among other things, because they were peacekeepers. They were not even going to have their M-16s locked and loaded. And I think there is a les- son to be learned there, that when we do go in—and I think the lesson has been learned in today's Yugoslavia, where today people realize that the American forces mean business, it is a different set of circumstances. And, our performance in Afghanistan with all of 371 its problems indicates it is a different set of circumstances. It is certainly a very serious set of concerns. Mr. SPRATT. What Beirut suggests to me is you have to have a lot of forces, not a small force, or they will be vulnerable, as they were spread out over that whole country. So, 50,000 troops is prob- ably a minimal estimate of what it would take. Dr. COHEN. Probably, but it is very contingent on how this falls. If Saddam is overthrown in a military coup, as it looks like we are about to do something, and you have a well-established regime, that may be a world in which you have no American forces there whatsoever. If it is a world in which Iraq has fallen apart in the course of the conflict, then we may need numbers that are even larger. Again, this is just a big, big spectrum. At the end of the day, I don’t think that should be—it is something to take very seri- ously, but not the ultimate deterrent. On expense, one thing that does need to be pointed out, there is going to be a lot more Iraqi oil on the market, and I don’t think it would be unreasonable to ask for— Mr. SPRATT. Whenever we should talk about it in those terms, the opposition immediately moves to the conclusion that that is all this is about. Dr. COHEN. There are going to be people in that part of the world that think that is all this is about anyhow. But, I don’t think it is unreasonable for us to think about those issues. On Iraqi-Iranian relations, there I think the critical issue is not so much the Iraqi- Iranian standoff in the future, it is the future of Iran. Iran has probably the most pro-American population in that part of the world, as well as the government that is most hostile to us. I think we should not be surprised if there are dramatic internal develop- ments in Iran. I am not talking about invasion or anything like that, but dramatic internal developments in Iran which would be very favorable to the United States over the next five or ten years. So, I think what we may be looking toward is some very different kinds of changes which may completely restructure international relations in that part of the world. Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman. I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Weldon, for having this hearing. These are both excellent folks here today. I have four or five or six questions, and if you all will be brief with your answers, then we can see what exciting things we can get to on the list. I want to read a quote and have you respond. I want you to re- spond to the message, not the messenger, so I am not going to tell you who it is from, other than it is from a prominent U.S. Senator from Massachusetts in a speech that was made last week. One of the things he said was, “We also know that it is an open secret in Washington that the Nation's uniformed military leadership is skeptical about the wisdom of a war with Iraq. They share the con- cern that it may adversely affect the ongoing war against al Qaeda and the continuing effort in Afghanistan by draining resources and armed forces already stretched so thin that many reservists have been called for a second year of duty and record number of 83-011 D-13 372 servicemembers have been kept on active duty beyond their obli- gated service”. My question is—you may want to say that you have no knowl- edge about it—but with your think-tank intelligence network out there, do you agree with the statement that the Nation's uniformed ºlºry leadership is skeptical about the wisdom of a war with raq: Dr. O'HANLON. Do you want to go through all the questions or one at a time? My sense is the Nation's uniformed leadership was nervous about the kind of rhetoric we heard a lot of last winter, not so much from the administration as from independent spokes- men, pundits and some people from the Defense Policy Board speaking in a mostly unofficial way, but with that slight trapping of Pentagon blessing, or at least implied. And I think the uni- formed military did not like the talk of a cakewalk, and I think they were right. However, I also think they are also right to say we are working awfully hard, and this is going to be a big added burden. But, I do not go to the extent of saying that we can't do this, or that the uni- formed military opposes it. I don’t think that is accurate. Dr. COHEN. I would say, just to tell you about the general officers I know, some are anxious, some are more anxious, some are less so. I would also say just speaking as an historian, generals—good generals are always cautious about going to war. Dr. SNYDER. Let me ask you another history question, if I might. I am going to read another quote. “A conflict involving Americans killing Arabs will have a strong impact on Arab populations throughout the region. Anti-Americanism will rise, terrorism will increase, and radical Islamic forces will be strengthened. Even if we are victorious in battle, we will not will the psychological war. We may devastate Iraq but we will have sown the seeds of resent- ment that are likely to come back to haunt us in the future.” That was Lee Hamilton's floor speech during the 1991 debate, and he told me the other day that he still believes his vote against É. into Kuwait was the right vote, but that is for historians to eC1Cle. What triggered my looking at that was in the New York Times a couple of days ago, Daniel Benjamin had a piece and the last statement he says is, “It is also a concern how a war in Iraq might further Jihadists’ cause. With his regime threatened, Mr. Hussein might break the taboo of giving terrorists weapons of mass destruc- tion. Moreover, as images of the U.S. attacking another Muslim na- tion are beamed throughout the Middle East and South Asia, many will take it as confirmation of Mr. Bin Laden's argument that America is at war with Islam.” And then he said this: “The last war against Iraq was a catalytic event for the Islamists who formed al Qaeda”. My question is this: You may not have looked at this, but do you agree with the implication that, while we had a great military op- eration in 1991, it may well have contributed to the term “resent- ment” among the Arab world and may have contributed to recruit- ing for al Qaeda? Dr. COHEN. I would say the operation did not, the aftermath did. And, in fact, I would say it was the success—one way of thinking 373 about it is the way—the road to Oslo and such advances in Arab- Israeli peace was mainly through Kuwait. We came out of that con- flict with enhanced prestige in the Arab world able to do more. The aftermath, to include the sanctions regime, trying to keep our boot planted on the Iraqi neck, which failed, did cause a lot of resent- §: So, I think there is a world of difference between those two things. Dr. O'HANLON. I agree. The only point I would add is simply the nature of that war was much less harmful to Iraqi civilians than the next war is likely to be. In fact, citing the same excellent Gulf War Air Power Survey, that report estimated, and Bill Arkin esti- mated, that perhaps a couple thousand Iraqi civilians died in Desert Storm, a remarkably low tally by any kind of wartime standard. I think it could be ten times more, even if we fight as carefully as we can in an urban-combat setting in Baghdad. Dr. SNYDER. I am preparing a letter to go to Secretary Rumsfeld how much we have looked at-how much we have looked at in po- tential cost, et cetera, of, I guess for want of a better phrase, a sec- ond generation of Gulf War Syndrome. We are talking about sub- stantial numbers of troops in Iraq, but this time potentially in Iraq for up to ten years, Dr. O'Hanlon, by your words. Is that something that you all have looked at, about the potential health monitoring, health effects, costs on veterans' health services? And, my second question, on a totally unrelated topic, one of the lingering issues for the defense authorization bill is Senator Lugar's proposal to give the President the discretion to use the Co- operative Threat Reduction monies for countries other than the old Soviet Union. I think he is specifically thinking of Pakistan. Do you agree or disagree with Senator Lugar on that issue? Dr. O'HANLON. I certainly agree with the Senator on that issue. And, on the issue of health of American troops, we are all befud- dled by Gulf War Syndrome and continue to try to understand it. I do not have any answers for you, but I am relatively optimistic that once the combat phase of this operation is over, things will get better for everyone—Iraqis and Americans. So, I think casualties could be substantial, not Korea- or Vietnam-like, but substantial if things go in a difficult way in those first few weeks. But, I believe after hat even in an occupation, things will be better for all con- CerneCI. Dr. COHEN. I have no expertise on health issues, and Senator Lugar's proposal sounds good to me. Mr. WELDON. I now yield five minutes to our friend from Con- necticut, Mr. Simmons. Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, congratulations on a very informative free-ranging discussion. Two brief points. If anybody has any questions about what it is like to operate in Military Operational Protective Posture (MOPP) gear or gear that the military uses in chemical/biological environ- ments, try it in your normal civilian life for half a day and then imagine what it is like in a desert environment over 112 degrees. I see a few nodding heads. It is not easy. It is very difficult and very challenging. And, I would also remark from my own experience that inspec- tions can be very useful. I know Iraq complains that they have an 376 Is this it? I mean, if something flares up somewhere else, are we going to be in a tough situation? And, what is your comment about the stretching of the troops and the deployment? Dr. COHEN. I guess I think it is a serious concern. The thing ac- tually I am immediately most concerned by are the reserve call-ups and what are going to be some of the long-term consequences for our reservists and national guard folks who are being stretched pretty thin. I do think that the long-term force structure issue— but I also don’t think—it makes sense to certainly not to make an issue of this magnitude. This decision that is before you right now hinges on a sense that we are overstretched. We are overstretched, but this is well within the limits of feasibility. Dr. O'HANLON. I agree with that point by Eliot, but I am not sure this is quite your question. But, if I go through different parts of the world where I think we might have to fight, I would tend to assess the probability as pretty low in most places. I feel some- what more reassured in that sense. Even though I am not a big proponent of overthrow of Saddam unless absolutely necessary, and I have been the most skeptical voice in this hearing, I still think now is the time to force the issue because I do not see anything else likely to be a competing demand on our forces in the near fu- ture. I can go through the litany, but in Korea I believe the North Ko- reans in their own unique way are trying to gradually engage. It is still a ruthless regime, it is still not a good regime, but it seems to recognize that war is not its future. Going down southward, the China-Taiwan situation, I still worry about the dynamics there and the probability of a conflict. But, I think both sides recognize the undesirability of that war happen- ing, and I think they will do what is needed ultimately to avoid it, although I am nervous. Indo-Pakistani problems would probably not involve us, although there are some scenarios where I could imagine an international stabilization force trying to keep order in Kashmir as an alter- native to nuclear war. But, that is a separate hearing, I suppose. I ºk the odds of that kind of U.S. deployment are relatively SIIla II. If we ever attacked Iran, I don’t think it would be for regime change. Personally, I think what is a much more likely scenario is the preemptive action again its nuclear reactors five, seven, ten years from now. By the way, if we are going to do that, the less we talk about it, the better between now and then. So I will stop myself. But that is not going to be a regime change operation. And, Syria has already made a decision to gradually disentangle itself from the worst kinds of terrorism. It still does way too much, and we would want to see much better behavior out of Syria and Libya and Sudan than we have seen. But, those three countries are moving toward getting out of the terrorism business, I believe, and they are not linked with al Qaeda any way that I know. Therefore I don’t think we are going to have to target them. So, in the end, I think that we can have the Iraq debate, know- ing that this will be, in all likelihood, the only big operation we might undertake in the next few years. Obviously, you have to be 377 nervous when you make that kind of a prediction, but I feel rel- atively confident. Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. And the question on Arab coopera- tion. Many of us who recently have been over to Central Asia have heard the concerns. I know you have discussed several of them today. Do you gentlemen feel like we are getting the cooperation we need from our friends and allies in other Arab countries in the region? It has been said previously by testimony from that very table that—by Secretary Rumsfeld a couple of weeks ago, that they will be with us at the proper time, and that a lot of them don't want to say much right now. Is that your sense, that we will have the help we need for fly-over rights, for air bases, for use of ports, and the other support facilities and measures? Dr. COHEN. I guess I tend to think so. I mean, I think if—it all really hinges on whether or not they think we are going to do this no matter what. If they think that we are going to do it, they will not want to be left out at odds with us. I think that is just the way that part of the world works. They are not going to be taking stands on principle. They will be concerned about their domestic population, so you may not see the kind of visible, overt support that we got in 1991. But we didn't need—frankly, we didn't need all of that support back then, and we certainly don’t need it now. Dr. O'HANLON. I generally agree, Congressman, but I still think the Saudis are the big issue here that we need to think about, be- cause if we went to war tomorrow based on—let's just say, we have had enough of this diplomacy, we have enough trying the inspec- tions route, we are going to war, I am not sure that the Saudis would provide bases and facilities, and going to war without the Saudi infrastructure, I think, would be very regrettable. In the end, if it is necessary, so be it, but if you just do a simple calculation, for example, on airfields, let's say we need to use 1,000 combat aircraft. There was a very good study just done by Chris Buoy published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess- ments that basically said you can put about fifty combat jets on a given airfield in wartime. So, if you have 1,000 airplanes, we need 20 airfields. Now, if you add up all of the airfields in Turkey and in Kuwait, and Qatar, and in Bahrain, and in the United Arab Emirates you are probably up around 14, 12, somewhere in that general vicinity. And, if you throw in aircraft carriers, okay, we are starting to get into the ballpark. But, that is at a maximum, if everybody else says yes; we can just barely get up to the general vicinity of where we want to be. And, some of those airfields are not that well devel- oped. And, moreover, to send Army forces in through just the one port in Kuwait City is going to basically mean you are going to have ten ships in line waiting to unload. You are going to be un- loading about one ship a day, and you have got to unload some- where between, conservatively speaking, 30 and 50 ships to really be ready for that kind of a war. So, you are talking just a month and a half of unloading a ship a day in Kuwait City harbor. We don’t want to do that. We want the Saudis, and we want not just their airspace, which is almost necessary, but we want their 379 ternally, and there are some people who really support the Septem- ber 12th strategy and others who really don’t, and I think Congress needs to find some way to push the administration to continue to try the firm multilateral ultimatum approach, and also the first time that someone gets a flat tire in Baghdad at an inspection, not to assume that that was done by Saddam; therefore, it becomes cause for war. We need to have some sense of judgment about what is a suffi- cient breach or impediment. I don’t want to give Saddam any kind of green light to start playing games, but I also don't—I am a little bit nervous that Mr. Cheney and Mr. Rumsfeld will use any pretext that they can to say the inspections have failed, because we know from their public statements in the summer they don’t like the President’s current strategy. Therefore, I think Congress needs to make it clear that what it supports is the President's current strat- egy, the September 12th U.N. speech concept, but without binding him to come back. So it is—in the event that the U.N. fails to act. So I don't know how you put that into language, a strong encouragement of a mul- tilateral approach, without insisting on a U.N. Security Council resolution. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. Mr. WELDON. I thank the distinguished member. I thank both of you for outstanding testimony and for your candid response to our questions. You have given us some intellectual disagreement to chew on, but I think in the end your positions are much, much in sync, and we appreciate that. You have played a very important role for us as we have to advise our colleagues on what our position should be relative to the vote, I assume, next week. And, I think in that regard, you have been very helpful, and we appreciate your time. Thank you very much. This hearing stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X OCTOBER 2, 2002 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD OCTOBER 2, 2002 386 The committee also received testimony from an Iraqi defector who was a key player in Saddam’s nuclear weapons program. He told us how the Iraqis built and sustained their weapons of mass destruction programs through the acquisition of sensitive Western technology, including items from U.S. firms. In separate hearings, the Committee also discussed U.S. policy toward Iraq with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, several retired U.S. generals, and two distinguished foreign and defense policy experts. Today, however, we will hear from two individuals who are foreign and defense policy experts in their own right, have published widely, and are well known for their policy ideas and insights--- • Dr. Eliot Cohen, Professor and Director of Strategic Studies at The School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; and, • Dr. Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Gentlemen, thank you both for agreeing to appear today. We look forward to your testimony. 388 Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO), Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives Full Committee Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward Iraq October 2, 2002 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding the series of hearings on U.S. Policy Toward Iraq. I would also like to join you in welcoming Dr. Cohen and Dr. O’Hanlon. Both of your insights on the subject of U.S. policy toward Iraq are greatly appreciated. This committee has now held a series of hearings considering the policy options for dealing with Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction program. I, like many members, began these hearings with some serious questions. I have asked these questions to the administration, to foreign policy experts, and to retired senior military officers. Yet I don’t feel that many of the questions yet have satisfactory answers but I hope today’s testimony will help in that regard. At a basic level, if the goal of our efforts is Iraq’s disarmament of its weapons of mass destruction, are there other credible alternatives short of invasion and regime change that can accomplish that goal? What are the implications of any U.S. decision to take military action against Iraq without the support of the United Nations and the 390 “War Against Saddam's Regime: Winnable but No Cakewalk” Testimony of Michael O’Hanlon before the House Armed Services Committee October 2, 2002 Thank you Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and other members of the Armed Services Committee for the opportunity to testify today on the critical issue of future U.S. policy towards Iraq, particularly its military dimensions. I will summarize my thoughts briefly in the first pages of my prepared statement and opening remarks, and include more detailed analysis in the following pages of my statement. Among the main subjects I examine in this testimony are postwar challenges after a possible invasion of Iraq, estimates of U.S. and Iraqi casualties during combat itself, and the military feasibility of overthrowing Saddam while continuing the war against al Qaeda. ! support the strategy laid out in the president's September 12 U.N. speech. By that strategy, Saddam is to be presented with a final, tough, multilateral ultimatum on the need to accept U.N. inspectors and disarm; only if he refuses the ultimatum or fails to comply with his disarmament obligations would war then be undertaken. The historical track record suggests strongly that such a policy of containment would protect American national security interests. However, it is a strategy that Congress needs to remind the administration to sustain, since both Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld have appeared to question its basic conceptual underpinnings over the past two months, and since the administration's proposal for a Congressional resolution authorizing force did not reiterate the basic 9/12 approach. It is also a strategy that requires straight talk to the American people about what war against Iraq could be like. Much of the public debate of the last year has been driven by those who believe such a war would surely be easy. I believe such talk is not only unfortunate, but irresponsible, especially since much of it has been carried out by members of the quasi-official Defense Policy Board. The broad themes of my remarks include the following: - There is no plausible way by which, militarily speaking, Iraqi forces can prevent the United States from quickly seizing control of the country away from Saddam Hussein's Tikrit-based/Ba'ath Party regime. In That said, such an operation would surely require well over 100,000 U.S. troops and probably twice that number or more, given the difficulties of fighting in cities and the desirability of intimidating and quickly overwhelming Iraqi forces so that their resistance is as limited as possible. Although such an operation would be demanding, and place strains on certain military capabilities such as special operations forces and intelligence assets, there is no military reason it cannot be done even as we continue operations against al Qaeda. In If they fight hard, Iraqi Republican Guard forces in particular could make the military operation difficult and rather lethal. U.S. combat losses could exceed 1,000, and 392 Europe and Japan after World War II, using large forces during the occupations of Germany and Japan, but its more recent track record is to want to use its powerful military forces for combat and then leave the reconstruction job to others. U.S. staying power and willingness to remain on the ground is being tested right now in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and the Bush administration's inclination is to reduce U.S. engagement as soon as possible in both places. But no one should underestimate the difficulty of putting a stable regime in place in Iraq once Saddam Hussein is gone, especially at a time when U.S. attention and resources will already be burdened by nation-building efforts in these other places (and possibly Palestine as well). And to fail to meet that challenge would not only be irresponsible but could lead to the same sort of instability and hatred of the United States that produced the Taliban. If President Bush starts the job of transforming iraq, he will owe it to America's strategic interests to finish it as well. - The first challenge is to prepare the ground for a post-Saddam government in Baghdad. Trying to organize the Iraqi opposition-in-exile into a credible government-in-waiting is proving as daunting to the Bush administration as it was to the Clinton administration. The Iraqi dissidents who have gathered in London over the past decade have lost touch with the Iraqi people and cannot agree amongst themselves. And Saddam has made sure to execute any potential rivals who stayed in Iraq. The Iraqi military is likely to be quick to put forward a candidate and any generals who have turned against Saddam and helped the American effort to remove him will naturally be first in line. Arab leaders are also likely to support a Sunni general as the candidate for Saddam's replacement fearing the consequences of greater Shiite and Kurdish representation in Baghdad as well as the potential influence on their own authoritarian systems of a more pluralistic government in one of the most important regional capitals. The United States will need to resist these pressures while distinguishing between self- promoters and leaders with genuine credibility among the Iraqi people. By definition these leaders will not be identifiable in advance, since anyone courageous enough to stand up under Saddam's regime would have been immediately eliminated. But the United States can take a number of other steps in advance: to articulate a clear vision of a democratic Iraq that will ensure fair representation for all ethnic/religious groups, autonomy for the Iraqi Kurds, respect for the rule of law and protection of civil rights, including women's rights; to support the drawing up by Iraqis of a new constitution; and to train a cadre of Iraqi professionals who can work with the U.S. Army to lay the groundwork for a functioning interim administration. This is a complicated undertaking but by no means impossible. Unlike much of the Arab world, Iraqis are secular and have an educated middle class that has suffered greatly under Saddam and sanctions. Iraq also has considerable economic resources, a consequence of its abundant oil reserves, which would make a large-scale donors' effort unnecessary. There is good reason to believe the Iraqi people would welcome the lifting of Saddam's oppressive yoke if it also resulted in an improvement in their material conditions and their personal security. An American-led peacekeeping force will be an essential element in providing that personal security because without it there will be considerable risk of ethnic, religious or 393 tribal strife in the wake of the collapse of a totalitarian regime that has ruled the country with an iron fist for so long. Some neighboring governments will want to participate in this endeavor the better to influence the outcome of the internal struggle for power. Although Arab and Turkish peacekeepers will help legitimize the operation, this advantage must be weighed against the dangers of creating opportunities for meddling. The Iraqi people are likely to want to jealously guard their newfound independence and, like the Afghan people, will probably prefer American peacekeepers to those from neighboring countries. Why does such a peacekeeping force have to be large, and why must it be led by Americans? After all, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan has neither of these characteristics. There are several reasons. First, ISAF is not going very well in Afghanistan, so this is a poor model for comparison. Indeed, the Bush administration admits as much at present, but still imprudently hopes that other countries will simply volunteer to beef up and expand the mission. Second, Iraq's Kurds in particular might well be tempted to try to secede absent a strong unifying national security force. Third, Iraq is in a region where cross-border aggression is more common than is the case for Afghanistan. Iraq's neighbors might well make trouble in a destabilized Iraq. Fourth, Iraq has a much larger army than did the Taliban, and the United States hopes to spare much of it in any future war, partly to avoid creation of the very type of security vacuum just noted. But we do not know who within that army is dependable and who may be bent on seeking vengeance against U.S. forces or internal foes. Weeding out bad actors, while also improving training and discipline, within the Iraqi military will take time and effort. Fifth, and relatedly, the overall importance of the Persian Gulf region may exceed that of Afghanistan (though that is open to some debate, to the extent that Afghanistan could again become a sanctuary for Islamic extremists). Helping create a stable, democratic Iraq could have immense benefits for U.S. interests in general, justifying a substantial effort. How many forces would be needed to occupy Iraq” Various studies have been done, based on military history and the population, military capabilities, territorial size, and other characteristics of the country to be occupied. For example, work done by the Army's Center of Military History suggests that 100,000 occupying forces could be needed.” Indeed, if anything that estimate seems low: NATO's stabilization mission in Bosnia, a country less than one-fifth the size of Iraq by population or territorial size (and also a country with three main ethnic groups), began with 50,000 forces and is still about 20,000-strong. Simply scaling those numbers for a bigger country, the standard practice when estimating policing and occupying needs, suggests that an initial force might have to number more than 200,000 and that a residual force seven years later might still total 100,000. Assume for the sake of planning a force that is composed 100,000 to 250,000 occupying forces in its first year, and then 50,000 to 125,000 troops by its fifth year. Assume further that 15 percent to 25 percent of the total strength is American. Those estimates translate into possible U.S. requirements of roughly 15,000 to 60,000 troops the first year and anywhere from 7,500 to about 30,000 U.S. troops half a decade later. 394 The gradual drawdown would presumably continue thereafter, and the mission might last a decade or so once all was said and done. How could such a large U.S. effort be sustained? For a military of 1.4 million, that may not appear difficult, but as the Armed Services Committee knows well, today's military is already working very hard to maintain more than 250,000 personnel abroad, including more than 100,000 at a time deployed away from permanent bases and families. Given rotation base issues, moreover, sustaining a deployment of say 20,000 troops tends to require about 100,000 in the force structure. To be sure, some rather drastic measures could be adopted to ease the problem. For example, U.S. troops might leave Bosnia, and reduce their presence on Okinawa—two other places where forces deploy away from families—in order to facilitate a deployment in postwar Iraq. But it would be hard to free up more than 10,000 personnel in that way. This added demand would be onerous. It could require a combination of sustained reserve activation and even more difficult work for active-duty U.S. personnel, leading to poor quality of life and renewed problems with recruiting and retention (just after those problems have been largely solved by the work of the Congress and the last two administrations over the past half decade). It would not require a draft. But it could require other creative approaches, such as an alternative approach to joining the military involving shorter enlistments for those willing to put in 18 to 24 months of service (as suggested by Charles Moskos and others). In short, this mission could require some unusual and potentially rather expensive policy options. Annual costs could plausibly range from $5 billion to $20 billion. I should not dwell only on the negatives. Occupying Iraq would be hard, but could have real benefits. Even the possibility of a U.S.-Iraq alliance, or a collective security structure involving the region's democratically inclined countries, could be given serious attention. This is not the place for an elaborate discussion, but suffice it to say that the process could remake the region's basic security dynamics as much as the aftermath of World War II and the Korean War reshaped Europe and East Asia. Such a possibility is a definite and major plus in favor of the argument for overthrowing Saddam—provided, of course, that the long-term work to stabilize and rebuild the country follows the military victory. Nation building would be needed, plain and simple, II. ESTIMATING CASUALTIES IN A WAR TO OVERTHROW SADDAM How many casualties might result if the United States and any coalition partners invade Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime? How important is this issue for policymaking purposes over the coming weeks and months? Prior to Operation Desert Storm, several military experts estimaed that U.S. losses might wind up in the range of 5,000 to 10,000, and the Pentagon expected even higher numbers of killed. In contrast, actual American losses were just under 400 (of whom about 150 were killed by direct enemy action, the others being lost in accidents or friendly-fire episodes). Is it possible to make more accurate predictions this time around? The following develops two central themes. First, the likely numbers of U.S. military personnel killed in a future war to overthrow Saddam could plausibly range from roughly 395 100 to 5,000, with total numbers of wounded about three to four times as great. This range is wide. But it is important to recognize that, based on available methodologies for predicting combat outcomes, anything in this range is plausible. Those in the public policy debate who insist that any war would be a walkover have the onus on them to explain why. At the same time, there would appear to be little chance of any war against Iraq bogging down into the type of quagmire in which combat could last years and entail many many thousands of American deaths. Invading Iraq would not be another Korea or Vietnam. The second main theme is that Iraqi civilian casualties could be substantial in such a war, given the assumption that it would unfold largely in Iraq's cities. In approximate terms, casualties might be ten times as great as those of the U.S. military, if not more. This fact could pose pressures and problems for any Arab governments supporting the United States in such a war. Among its other implications, this is a strong argument for trying to defeat Iraq rapidly and with overwhelming force, so that the pressure of the "Arab street" can be contained. Civilian casualties due to clandestine or terrorist attacks are also possible in places such as Kuwait, Israel, and the United States, with plausible mortality ranges in the high hundreds of individuals. The War Scenario Consistent with military and strategic logic, and with leaked Pentagon war plans from the Summer of 2002, l assume that a war to overthrow Saddam would involve about 250,000 American forces. The Afghanistan model of warfare, in which small numbers of U.S. special forces and American airpower work with indigenous opposition groups to fight government forces, would almost surely not work in Iraq, as discussed further below. That is due to relative weakness of the Iraqi opposition as well as the Iraqi military's ability to hole up in cities, where American airpower is far less effective than in open terrain. Modest-sized operations, involving perhaps 50,000 to 75,000 U.S. troops, are somewhat more promising. But they would run the risk of encountering serious difficulties in the urban centers of Iraq. Relatedly, Iraqi forces would be less likely to capitulate quickly if they sensed they had a chance to prevail, increasing the chances of a prolonged urban battle under such circumstances. This is not to say that a larger operation would have to mirror Desert Storm in its basic concept. The invasion might involve rapid airborne or commando strikes against Iraqi command and control assets as well as weapons of mass destruction sites in the earliest hours of combat, even as main invasion forces march more slowly through Iraq towards Baghdad and other cities. It might also use relatively small teams of American ground forces—perhaps brigade-sized units of several thousand troops each—to try to lure Iraqi forces out of the cities into regions where they would be more vulnerable to American airpower (and to lure out defectors to join U.S. forces). These sorts of “inside- out" tactics would try to avoid the delays inherent in a mechanized march from Kuwait and other neighboring countries to Baghdad. But they would be gambles, and the United States would need backup forces in place in case the gambles did not pay off. 396 Forecasting Casualties in Infantry and Urban Combat Operation Desert Storm and, more recently, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan probably do not provide much insight into the likely nature of a future war in Iraq. Saddam seems unlikely to place many of its forces in the open in a future war. Because Iraq knows its weaknesses against the U.S. military in open settings, and because it is Saddam Hussein's regime and weapons of mass destruction capabilities that would be at issue in a future war, one has to assume that the combat would be primarily urban. This fact immediately changes the calculus of a future war by comparison with Desert Storm. To begin, airpower would be much more difficult to employ against Iraqi forces that could intersperse themselves with civilian vehicles and populations. This type of tactic was employed near Basra during Desert Storm, and has been employed in the subsequent eleven years as Iraqis have sought to place valued military assets near civilian populations to make it harder for the United States to bomb them. Iraqi forces have much better cover within cities, or even forested regions, than in open desert. As one further demonstration of this rather obvious fact, recall that even after eight years of further modernization after Desert Storm, NATO airpower was of quite limited effectiveness against small groups of Serb forces operating within forests, towns, and civilian populations in the Kosovo war. If U.S.-led forces tried to fly low to find enemy forces against this complex backdrop, they would have to contend with an Iraqi air defense network consisting, among other things, of some 6,000 air defense guns and 1,500 surface-to-air missile launchers (including man-portable SAMs).” Nothing about new technology and new warfighting concepts associated with the so- called revolution in military affairs seems likely to radically change the challenge of urban warfare anytime soon. For example, recent Marine Corps experiments incorporating such new concepts suggested that U.S. troops could still suffer quite high casualties in urban combat. Historical Parallels Two recent conflicts may provide better indicators of the likely nature of a future U.S.- Iraq war: the 1989 invasion of Panama and the 1993 U.S. experience in Mogadishu, Somalia. In December, 1989, U.S. forces overthrew Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega and defeated his armed forces. About 22,500 American personnel participated. The operation involved simultaneous nighttime airborne operations against 27 objectives throughout the country. Special forces infiltrated key sites shortly before the airborne assaults to take down Panamanian communications and oppose any attempts by Panama to reinforce its forces under attack. The massive, simultaneous assault against Panama's 4,400-strong defense forces and its paramilitary forces of several thousand more personnel overwhelmed the latter, surprising them with its ferocity and coordination in the opening hours of battle. Twenty-three Americans died, as did about 397 125 Panamanian military personnel. Perhaps 200 to 600 Panamanian civilians died as well. In the Somalia experience, U.S. forces faced ragtag militia opposition. Somali fighters had access to plentiful automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and mines, but not much more than that, and they were not trained in combined-arms or coordinated military operations. As is well known, the United States had 18 soldiers killed in action on the night of October 3–4, 1993 in the course of a raid on a building where leaders of the Aideed faction were meeting. The tragedy occurred when two helicopters were shot down by rocket-propelled grenades; additional American casualties were suffered in the effort to rescue any of the crew members that might have survived those crashes. Only about 2,000 U.S. forces were deployed for conducting and supporting such raids at the time they occurred; only 160 participated in the October raid. Estimates of Somali militia strength were in the many thousands, with losses on October 3–4 alone estimated at 300 or more combatants. Often forgotten is that a number of other American troops died in Somalia. In fact, total losses reached 29 from hostile action and 14 from "nonhostile" action such as accidents. What do past cases tell us about how a future war conducted largely in the streets of Baghdad might play out? As discussed in the link, two useful parallels are the U.S. experience in Mogadishu in 1993 and the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989. Iraqi forces are almost surely better armed and better trained than the military or paramilitary organizations we fought in those cases. Thankfully, they are probably also far less motivated. That said, it is important to remember that the Iraqi Republican Guard forces fought reasonably hard in Desert Storm. They also enjoy a number of benefits from Saddam's regime—and they are rather heavily implicated in his rule. They would probably fear retribution from an alternative regime or from western occupying forces much more than they would fear Iraqi opposition forces and American airpower on the battlefield. How much they would fear American invasion forces, and thus when they would choose to surrender, is difficult to determine. Whether they could be convinced to desert Saddam by an amnesty offer or a promise of protection and inclusion in a post-Saddam regime is an open question. Whether Saddam's commanders could be deterred from using weapons of mass destruction by threatening to hold them personally responsible should they do so is also unclear. Simply scaling the results of Panama for the size of the Iraqi military leads to an estimate of about 2,000 killed Americans, more than 10,000 dead Iraqi military personnel, and tens of thousands of dead Iraqi citizens. If however it is only the elite Iraqi forces that fight hard, numbering somewhat more than 100,000 Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, and palace guard forces, extrapolation from the Panama case suggests that losses on all sides might be only one-fourth as great. The Somalia analogy is also worth invoking. The firefight on the night of October 3–4 can be used as a way to generate pessimistic estimates of how war in Baghdad might 398 go. As noted, that operation involved about 160 Americans against a single objective, together with roughly a dozen ground vehicles, and more than a dozen helicopters. Overall operations in Baghdad might be 50 to 100 times as large, in any initial assault wave to secure key facilities (recall that 27 objectives were attacked in much-smaller Panama). With comparable casualty rates on a per person basis, U.S. losses could number 1,000 or more just in this phase of the fighting. The Likely implications of Weapons of Mass Destruction One major wild card remains: the likely consequences of any Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction. Consider first SCUD attacks against Iraq's neighbors. Even if using chemical or biological agent, they seem a relatively minor threat, given the general difficulty of delivering such agents via missile and the specific limitations of the SCUD. Iraq may still have up to two dozen such missiles. But it often broke up in flight during Desert Storm and has clearly not benefited from extensive flight testing to improve its performance since then. Delivering chemical or biological agent is best done at a steady altitude by an aircraft that spreads the agent over a large area, not by a rapidly descending ballistic missile that may disperse the agent too soon or too late—and in any case, probably in far too concentrated a dose in one place. Should that one place be a sports stadium or other congregating place, results could be disastrous. But given the SCUD's inaccuracy, that would require extreme luck on the part of Iraq. Second, Iraqi attacks against civilian populations in places such as the United States could be serious, especially if they involved biological agents, in which case plausible casualties could reach into the hundreds or even the thousands. Iraqi special forces have not focused on preparing for such attacks in the past; they have reportedly been devoted to efforts to acquire technologies for producing weapons of mass destruction. It is also unlikely that Iraq has access to the most dangerous pathogens such as smallpox. On the other hand, Saddam may be willing to provide such agents to Hezbollah or al Qaeda operatives under certain circumstances. On balance, the threat from such weapons is rather finite—but also quite real. Third, Iraq could increase casualty levels of coalition forces by using WMD against them, particularly its thousands of chemical-filled artillery shells and rockets. But it would probably increase casualties by no more than 10 to 20 percent, given historical precedent in conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war; indeed, U.S. forces are much better equipped to protect themselves from such attacks than most militaries have been in the past. However, Iraq might gain some advantages nonetheless, if at a huge cost to its own civilian populations (and perhaps to its own troops, should winds shift). It could oblige coalition forces to fight in protective gear, slowing operations and generally complicating the mission. If the effects of fighting in such gear were comparable to those of fighting in bad weather or difficult terrain, for example, the pace of coalition fighting and the effectiveness of coalition forces might decline 25 to 50 percent, and casualties might mount by a comparable percentage. 402 provide air bases and permit deployment of the main armored forces for their northward march on Baghdad, the latter for enough airfields to help protect Kurdish populations and forces during the war. Ideally, Bahrain would also allow the United States to continue to use its 5" fleet headquarters based there. But the requirements would also include air bases in at least one or two other Gulfsheikdoms. More air bases would be needed due to the need to field up to 1,000 combat jets in the region (the Kosovo war, by way of comparison, required nearly that many against a much smaller country and enemy military). In rough terms, fielding 1,000 combat jets, plus associated support aircraft such as refueling and electronic warfare planes, as well as airlifters, would require at least 15 airfields and quite possibly 20 or more.” Were Saudi Arabia to provide its facilities, the problem would be essentially solved. Absent Saudi access, however, the United States would have to find that number of airfields in Turkey, Kuwait, other small Gulf countries, and its own aircraft carriers. Even if the United States used 4 to 6 carriers, and even factoring in two to three bases in both Kuwait and Turkey, the United States would still need at least half a dozen other facilities and perhaps a dozen. Most of the smaller Gulf states have two to four long, paved runways, though the United Arab Emirates possesses eight (for comparison's sake, Saudi Arabia owns 31).’ So if Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates each provided two airfields, or if a subset of those countries each provided three to four, the problem should be solvable—especially if Saudi Arabia would permit overflights of its territory, since otherwise bottlenecks in air traffic could occur at the northern end of the Persian Gulf. But the operation would still be difficult, since most of these bases are not nearly as well developed or stocked with fuel, munitions, and spare parts as are Saudi facilities. Clearly, Riyadh’s active support for an invasion of Iraq, while not absolutely indispensable, would be enormously desirable on both political and military grounds. This is one more reason why the president's 9/12 strategy of working through the United Nations if possible is So Sound, since it wastly improves the odds of Saudi assistance should we have to go to war. IV. CAN WE FIGHT IRAQ WHILE PURSUING AL QAEDA2 An important policy question in regard to a possible war to overthrow Saddam Hussein concerns the timing of any such effort. Some suggest that, while they might be willing to support an invasion of Iraq under certain conditions, now is not the time given the urgent priority of defeating the terrorist organization that attacked the United States on September 11. There may be international political reasons not to go to war against Iraq anytime soon. For example, countries unhappy about a war against Iraq may reduce intelligence cooperation with the United States for the war on terror. However, in military terms at least, I do not believe that the U.S. military would have great difficulty in waging both wars at once. The U.S. military, we have been told for a decade, is sized and structured to fight two major wars at once. Each conflict has been expected to require up to 500,000 American troops. The Bush administration has recently determined such a goal may have been 13 403 impractical, but still claims the capability to wage one such all-out war and a second major operation perhaps half as big. In all, that could involve about 750,000 U.S. troops in combat. By comparison, today's demands are modest, and they would remain well within our capabilities even if we went to war against Saddam. Operations in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf together now require about 60,000 American personnel; the ongoing commitments in the Balkans involve another 10,000; smaller missions of various types in the Philippines, Georgia, Yemen and the Sinai add fewer than another 10,000. Post- 9/11 security measures at military bases around the world might involve 50,000 more troops. Adding in 250,000 Gls to overthrow Saddam, all war-related deployments combined would involve about 400,000 troops—a substantial number, to be sure, but only about half the total we are supposed to be able to deploy at once. A more detailed military analysis leads to the same conclusion. Consider: Main Combat Forces We have enough to deploy 250,000 troops, including four to five ground combat divisions and 12 to 15 air combat wings, to the Persian Gulf. Today's U.S. military has 13 active-duty divisions (10 in the Army, three in the Marine Corps). Less than one full division is presently involved in the Afghanistan campaign; less than one is in the Balkans; small pieces of other divisions are deployed elsewhere. That leaves more than 10 divisions available. Even after excluding the Army's Second Infantry Division in South Korea, the Korea-oriented 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, and the Pacific- oriented Third Marine Force in Okinawa, we would have more than ample ground troops to overthrow Saddam and occupy Iraq. A similar conclusion holds for air power. There are 20 tactical fighter wings in the Air Force, 11 in the Navy, and three in the Marine Corps. Of that grand total, only about 10 would be unavailable based on existing commitments in the Western Pacific and Afghanistan. And the dozen bombers that have typically flown over Afghanistan constitute just 10% of total U.S. capability. Key Support Forces Certain critical forces, ranging from aerial tankers to transport aircraft to special operations units to unmanned aerial vehicles, have been heavily used in Afghanistan. But even at its peak, Afghanistan did not place higher demands on most of these support capabilities than would a so-called major theater war. And today the tempo of operations is less than half what it once was, while allied combat forces are providing considerable help in the ongoing search for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. The U.S. military today owns some 600 refueling aircraft, of which more than 400 are airworthy at present. They have been heavily used in Afghanistan. But they are presently flying fewer than 50 sorties a day in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Most would be available should the bell toll for Saddam. 406 conducted within Iraq” Some say no, noting his aggressiveness in attacking Iran and Kuwait as well as his own civilian populations. But even aggressive, evil rulers such as Joseph Stalin and Kim Il-Sung, the former North Korean leader, can often be deterred when faced with a credible threat that any aggression they attempt will meet a firm response. Moreover, those who argue that Saddam is not deterrable should remember Ambassador April Glaspie's famous statement to him before the invasion of Kuwait— that the United States did not take a position on his border disputes with neighboring countries. The United States did not exactly give him a green light to invade Kuwait, but it gave him little more than a yellow light. Its failure to oppose that aggression before the fact ranks with Acheson's famous 1949 statement that Korea was outside the zone of U.S. security interests as among the worst examples of deterrence failure in American history. And once Saddam had already taken Kuwait, it was no great surprise that he refused to vacate it in the face of American threats. Political scientists have recognized for decades that compellence, or getting a country to undo an action already taken, is much harder than deterrence, or persuading it not to do something it may be contemplating.” Today, there is no such ambiguity in American willingness to respond to any aggression by Saddam. The only small uncertainty relates to what we would do if he again attacked his own populations, notably the Kurds in the north and Shia in the south. But even there, Saddam now knows he would be taking huge risks. As threatening and dangerous as Saddam Hussein may be, the recent track record suggests that he can be dissuaded from undertaking actions that he believes would likely lead to his overthrow. During the Gulf War, he desisted from using the weapons of mass destruction we now know he had, realizing (following explicit threats from U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney) that to do so would almost surely lead to his downfall. He moved brigades southward towards Kuwait again in 1994, only to pull back once the Clinton administration mounted Operation "Vigilant Warrior," a deployment of tens of thousands of troops). He interfered with the work of foreign weapons inspectors frequently, and ultimately expelled them, but never killed or harmed them. He brutally attacked Shia resistance forces in southern Iraq in 1991, after it became clear that the first Bush administration would not interfere to stop such operations, but generally avoided brutality against Kurds in the north once the United States made clear its commitment to their security. In 1996, he did direct an incursion into Kurdish parts of Iraq–but only after internecine warfare among Kurds, and an explicit invitation to him to intervene by one of the Kurdish factions, made it unlikely that the United States would be in a position to oppose him. There is counterevidence. Saddam tried to kill former President George Bush in 1993, an action that, if successful, might very well have led to a U.S. operation to assassinate him. Saddam might also think he could assist al Qaeda or a similar organization, providing it with biological agents or other material support, and not be caught doing so. But he also knows that we have a proven ability to track meetings between his agents and potential terrorists and that we can often trace the origins of chemical or biological agents based on their genetic content, particle size, chemical coating, or other 17 407 attributes. Thus while there is a chance his cooperation with terrorists could succeed in escaping detection, there is a better chance that we would figure out what he was up to. For a person like Saddam who cherishes his hold on power, the odds would probably not seem favorable. And as for the attempted assassination, now that Saddam recognizes our intelligence capabilities, he appears to have thought better of his vendetta against the former American president, and has not again tried to have him or any other American heroes from the 1991 Gulf War killed. Deterrence could fail in the future nonetheless, at least in a limited way. In particular, if Saddam had a nuclear weapon, he would still almost surely be deterred from directly attacking the United States or its NATO allies. But he might take greater risks in the Middle East and Persian Gulf in the belief that his new weapon effectively guaranteed his regime's survival, making U.S.-led intervention to thwart his regional ambitions less likely except in the most extreme of circumstances. What might Saddam do under such circumstances? Perhaps he would seize the oil field on his border with Kuwait that was the purported original cause of the 1990 Iraq-Kuwait crisis. Or he might violate the safe haven in his country's Kurd region and seek to reestablish brutal Ba'ath party rule over that minority population. He might escalate his support for anti-Israeliterrorism, stoking radicals and suicide bombers and trying to provoke Israel into an overreaction. Given his propensity for miscalculation, he might think he could get away with actions that we would in fact find unacceptable, causing a failure of deterrence and a much greater risk of war. In a worst case, on his deathbed he might decide to attacklsrael with nuclear weapons for purposes of simple vengeance, and to ensure his mark upon Arab history books. This situation would be at least somewhat risky, even if not mortally perilous to the United States, so the case for preventing Saddam from getting nuclear weapons is strong. But the argument that he can be deterred, and has been deterred, from taking most types of dangerous actions is also strong. That situation could clearly change in the event of a war targeting his regime, however. "As noted, this section as well as several others draw in part on my recent article with Philip H. Gordon and Martin Indyk, “Getting Serious About Iraq.” Survival (Autumn 2002), available at www.brookings.edu. *See Vernon Loeb, “Study: New Demands Could Tax Military,” Washington Post, September 23, 2002, p. 13. *See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001/2002 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 134–135. * See, for example, Patrick Clawson, “Why Saddam is Ripe for a Fall,” Washington Post, January 1, 2002; Ken Adelman, “Cakewalk In Iraq,” Washington Post, February 13, 2002; Richard Perle, “Should Iraq Be Next?,” speech to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, distributed by Copley News Service, December 17, 2001; Michael Dobbs, “Old Strategy on Iraq Sparks New Debate: Backers Say Plan Proven in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, December 27, 2001; and James M. Woolsey, “Should the United States Go to War with Iraq” CATO Institute Forum, Washington, D.C., December 13, 2001. *For methods of estimating how large invading and occupying combat forces must be, see Michael O’Hanlon, Saving Lives with Force (Brookings, 1997). *See Christopher J. Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002), p. 17. ’See Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Fact Book 2001 http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html]. 408 *This section draws on my January 2002 Brookings policy brief with Philip Gordon, “Should the War on Terrorism Target Iraq” It is available at www.brookings.edu. 19 410 Testimony of Eliot A. Cohen page 2 American and British pilots maintaining the southern and northern no-fly zones, put in place with UN support. If repeated and brazen attempts to shoot down American aircraft are not acts of war, I do not know what is. If we have escaped without loss it is a tribute to our skill, and his bad luck. The United States has been at war with Iraq since 1991. Only the level of violence has changed, not the substance of the relationship or the intentions of the Iraqi regime. Since the middle of the 1990’s Iraq has been winning this phase of the war. It has done so despite the best efforts of American diplomats and soldiers, to include short campaigns such as operation DESERT FOX in 1998. Iraq has violated numerous Security Council resolutions and injunctions with impunity; it has successfully dismantled the UN inspections regime, which, unfortunately, was only partly effective in the best of times. It has slipped out from under sanctions as well. Today Iraq produces something on the order of 2.4 million barrels of oil a day, up from a postwar low of 300,000 barrels, and not far short of pre-1991 rates. The stark facts are that inspections are dead, and sanctions are dead. They cannot be resurrected. There are too many countries that will assist Saddam in preventing us from bringing them back to life. They have multiple motives: greed, desire to curry favor with Baghdad, anxiety about domestic opinion, a principled horror of war, a desire to take the United States down a peg or two, fear of the precedent set by the overthrow of this kind of regime or the consequences that could flow from it. The international argument about inspections is therefore a sham, a mask for other concerns and intentions. There can be no question of Iraqi good faith. It does not exist. Everything—everything—that a decade's worth of experience can teach us is that we have only two choices: deterrence of the regime or its overthrow. But is Saddam Hussein, in the long run, deterrable? He has twice launched ruinous, unprovoked wars of aggression against his neighbors; he has attempted to assassinate a former American president; he has evinced an unshakeable determination to acquire the most lethal weapons devised by man; he has shown a willingness to use them, on civilians first and foremost, beginning with his countrymen. He is a man who swam to power in a pool of blood, and who has exercised power not merely with brutality, but with a sadism notable even by the standards of the last century. His daily discourse is that of slaughter, and his deeds match his words. An argument from deterrence is a declaration of faith in the rationality of Saddam Hussein. It is an argument that he will not fulfill his repeated, specific, and bloody threats directed against us, his neighbors, and Israel. It is an assertion that he will refrain from the use of biological weapons that have no “return address.” It is a contention that he understands power, justice, prestige, and above all revenge more or less as we do. It is a belief that is contradicted by his career, which is one offerocity, miscalculation, and destruction. That leaves us the choice of war, as problematic as that may be. What are our prospects in such a case? It is unwise to forecast costs and casualties: I recall the debate before the Gulf War of 1991, and how completely wrong such estimates turned out to be — even those made by printed 12/18/02 - 1:10 PM 411 Testimony of Eliot A. Cohen page 3 the government. To forecast war plans is even more misguided: if one is wrong one is foolish; if one is right, one is something considerably worse than foolish. Nonetheless, there are some relevant points to be note. First, the Iraqi military is today a shadow of its former self. A third the size it was in 1991, poorly equipped, demoralized, haunted by memories of its last encounter with the United States, it cannot be anything like the machine we faced in 1991 — which, of course, crumbled under our attack. Second, in recent times, the United States military has consistently surprised observers and indeed itself. Before the Gulf, Yugoslav, and Afghan wars we were told that our armed forces faced unprecedented challenges that they could meet only at great cost if at all. In each case, they achieved their objectives more effectively and and creatively, and with greater economy in the expenditure of blood than anyone could have imagined. In a future resumption of intense hostilities with Iraq, the same is likely to be true, in ways in that no outside obsserver can predict. Third, the lesson of recent wars is that coalitions are not ends but means, and a fixation with international consensus leads to feeble strategy. In the current context, the United States would like the support of many countries, but needs the active cooperation of a handful –Kuwait, some of the Gulf States, and one would hope Turkey, Jordan, and possibly Saudi Arabia. Our British and Australian allies provide valuable military assistance, and confirmation of the view that Saddam is indeed an implacable menace. Beyond this, the chances are very good that once our intention to act becomes clear, other states will find ways of signing on with us, for a variety of more and less worthy motives. Fourth, the Ba'athist state is a regime held together solely by fear. When the time comes that Iraqi officers and soldiers, secret police and functionaries no longer anticipate retribution by the regime, they will cease to operate on its behalf. As the American military confronts the threat of chemical and biological weapons and urban warfare – the most difficult challenges in such a campaign – we must remember that fact. If individual Iraqi officers know that they will suffer harm only if they obey Saddam’s orders, they are unlikely to do so. Surely, military planners know this fact and will make use of it. Saddam Hussein has been given many last chances. Indeed, announcing the beginning of operation DESERT FOX in December 1998 President Clinton said that he had given Saddam his “last chance.” Some may persuade themselves that Saddam should have more “last chances.” Some will even suggest that the United States should defer action until next year—and the year after that, and the year after that. And if we follow such a course, one day it will be too late, and as a regional nuclear war erupts, or as plague rages in our cities, we will wonder why we did not act. The real question is not “why now?” but “why not years ago?” Almost as important as regime change is what follows. Almost as important, because the truth is that even if Saddam is succeeded by a brute, we can expect him to be a chastened brute, who knows the consequence of confronting the United States. But America can and should aspire to more. To be sure, we are not by temperament or preparation well suited to exercise a kind of colonial administration for long periods of time in the Arab world. It would be absurd to expect transition in Iraq from totalitarian rule to Jeffersonian democracy. But it should be possible to establish a regime that would be printed 12/18/02 - 1:10 PM 412 Testimony of Eliot A. Cohen page 4 authoritarian, perhaps, but moderate, a regime that would safeguard basic civil and religious rights, that would free the Iraqi people from fear, that would maintain the unity of the country without threatening its neighbors, and that might pave the way, in the long run, for a modern, limited state. Such an achievement would have beneficial consequences well beyond Iraq, including in our war against Islamic extremism. By itself, the United States cannot remake the Middle East; but it can do much to help the peoples of that part of the world to do so. It cannot force Arab societies to come to terms with modernity, but it can aid those embarked on that enterprise. The United States can support with its prestige and power liberals of all stripes, secular and religious alike, and foster decent, even if not entirely free governments. In this indirect but crucial way the overthrow of Saddam will contribute to the larger American contest against Islamic extremist violence. There are other connections between September 1 1" and our war with Iraq. There are some ties between Baghdad and al-Qaeda that have become more apparent in recent days, and in all likelihood more that the intelligence community does not yet understand or that it has buried in secrecy. There is a deeper link as well. After September 11"Americans now have a visceral, rather than a theoretical understanding of what a massive assault on American civilians in the heart of our great cities feels like. We know what it smells like. The horrors of that day have made Americans more realistic than others around the world who — like so many well-meaning people in the century just past—would prefer to close their eyes and pretend that a mortal threat does not exist. Americans have paid a terrible price for seeing things more clearly than once we did. I therefore urge you to support a resolution giving the President the authority to conduct a campaign aimed at the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime; that you not tie it to UN resolutions; and that you not condition our action on the acquiescence of countries that may wish to preventus from acting. We have lost strategic surprise: at this point Saddam has to know that we are coming. By granting the President discretion you may help him to retain some measure of operational surprise, which will contribute to our forces’ chances of early and complete success. You will, most importantly, thereby reduce the casualties these young men and women may suffer. Let me conclude with one last thought. It is the nature of partisan politics to sharpen the differences between parties, even on matters of foreign policy. Yet for a variety of reasons, there has been a common policy on Iraq for a full decade from the end of the first Gulf War. Both Republican and Democratic administrations put a wary reliance on containment. That policy has, finally, failed. Butthroughout, American leaders have shared an understanding of the ultimate issues. Again, in the words of President Clinton: “The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world. The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government, a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people.” However one judges the success of his administration’s policies, President Clinton had the assessment right. The time has come to act on his words. printed 12/18/02 - 1:10 PM