THE TRANSITION TO A CIVILIAN-LED U.S. PRESENCE IN IRAQ. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES * * * * * * * US Stacks HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION NOVEMBER 18, 2010 Serial No. 111–135 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs USDEPOS ------- º º Hº Q 3 2011 GEl g#Asy - Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2010 2 us in the next Congress, Congressman Klein, who made a tremen- dous contribution to the product of this committee and to the Con- gress. I think all of us, and I know this is true of the ranking member from our earlier conversations over the years, shares the feeling. We will miss having you here very much, Congressman Klein. [Applause.] Chairman BERMAN. I will now begin the opening statement. This hearing will delve into a subject, and I apologize to the witnesses for the delay, a subject that, not too long ago, was at the very top of our foreign policy agenda: Iraq and the U.S. role there. U.S. military forces currently face a December 31, 2011, deadline for a complete withdrawal, in accordance with the 2008 agreement with the Iraqis. As a result, the primarily Defense Department-led military campaign is being transformed into a diplomacy, assist- ance, and advisory effort led by the State Department and USAID. This transition is unprecedented in terms of its sheer complexity, the resources required to do it right, and the likely consequences of failure. As part of this transition, the State Department will be expected to manage a number of specialized security-related tasks—often with the use of contractors—that in the past were handled exclu- sively by U.S. military forces. These include operating early-warn- ing radar systems that alert our personnel to incoming rocket fire, handling unexploded munitions that land inside of U.S. com- pounds, running unmanned aerial surveillance; and recovering downed vehicles. The State Department's largest program in Iraq is now—and will continue to be—police training, but the challenges facing the de- partment in this area will become even greater with the launch of a new advanced police training and reform program and with the handoff of some training responsibilities from DoD. In order to monitor political, economic, and security develop- ments in Iraq; identify potential threats to U.S. interests before they emerge; and effectively engage with key political players, the State Department also plans a significant expansion of the U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq. In addition to our Embassy in Bagh- dad—which is already by far the largest staff of any U.S. Embassy in the world—State is planning to open four other diplomatic posts: Consulates-general in Basra and Erbil and temporary posts, called “embassy branch offices” in Mosul and Kirkuk. The U.S. transition is proceeding in a difficult and dangerous set- ting. Iraq's failure to form a workable governing coalition promptly after the elections has complicated, and, at times, worsened the se- curity environment in which State is assuming the responsibilities once held by Defense. Our diplomats and development professionals in Iraq continue to face significant perils, with insurgent rocket fire sometimes tar- geting the Embassy compound. Movements of U.S. officials outside their facilities often require security details of up to 20 or 25 peo- ple. And with the host country currently unable to provide the se- curity and services routinely offered in most nations, the security environment may become even more treacherous after the with- drawal of U.S. forces. 6 curity applications and situations or the nature and the extent of the future U.S.-Iraqi relationship. We do have a strategic framework agreement with Iraq, but what is the administration's strategy for moving this effort for- ward? We must be both proactive and prospective. Iraq can play a critical role in limiting the Iranian influence, which, as all of us know, has been destabilizing in the region, and Iran's ability to threaten and intimidate its Gulf neighbors is well documented. So a stable, secure and friendly Iraq can help separate Iran and Syria, can provide Turkey with a key alternative to economic in- volvement with Iran, can demonstrate to the Gulf states that Iran cannot dominate the northern Gulf, nor can it expand to the south, and, finally, a friendly Iraq can help our key allies in the region. I would ask that our witnesses address this question: If they agree that greater U.S. leverage in Iraq can play a critical role in limiting Iran's influence and Iran's ability to threaten and intimi- date its neighbors, and what specifically is the United States' near and also far reaching and long-term strategy for addressing the Iranian threat in Iraq” Would you agree that a stable, sovereign and secure Iraq will show that Sunni and Shiite Muslims can co- operate and can diffuse the threat of Sunni extremism, as well as the kind of Shiite extremism backed by Iran? And going one step further, we have to recognize that Iran's ac- tivities in both Iraq and Afghanistan are components of a broader threat that it poses to U.S. interests and allies in the Middle East and beyond. The need for a sound, comprehensive strategy has never been more vital as we transition our presence to an over- whelmingly diplomatic one and as Iran seeks to exploit that transi- tion period to draw the recently formed Iraqi Government under its thumb. We may still be able to achieve a lasting, grand strategic victory, but not if we treat Iraq as if they were some sort of end state rather than the need for a continuing strategic focus. And finally, Mr. Chairman, given the need for full oversight of our Iraq policy, I am concerned about news that the State Depart- ment has failed to comply with repeated requests by the Special In- spector General for Iraq Reconstruction for contract data on the Iraqi police training program. Given the troubled history of our po- lice training efforts there, the need for oversight of this program is particularly important so that we do not repeat past mistakes. I share the concerns that were raised by Senators Grassley and Coburn in their October 6 letter to the Secretary of State about the continued failure of the Bureau to take immediate steps to address the lack of cooperation with the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. What guidance has been given employees of the Department of State in regards to responding to requests made by SIGIR to en- sure that the unanswered request for information does not con- tinue? What has been done by both State and DoD to implement the recommendations set forth by SIGIR2 And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to express concern re- garding the plight of the residents of Camp Ashraf. Mr. Chairman, last year you and I issued a joint statement urging the Iraqi Gov- ernment to live up to its commitment to ensure the continued well- being of all who live in Camp Ashraf. However, reports indicate 7 that denied medical care, including vital treatment for cancer pa- tients, are still being denied to the residents of Ashraf. Secretary Feltman, I would urge the Department of State to please intervene more proactively to ensure that the humanitarian protections to which Ashraf residents are entitled and were prom- ised are going to be upheld. Mr. Chairman, I thank the witnesses for their time and look for- ward to hearing from them about the administration's plans going forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time. Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Ms. Ros- Lehtinen. We are now—I hate to tell you—going to have a series of five votes. As soon as the fifth vote is cast I will come back here. Talk among yourselves or whatever. I just have one thing, though, since the ranking member raised it. I want to reaffirm the notion that the commitments on Camp Ashraf that were made by the Iraqi Government and all that, I share the concern that those are kept and that we not forget about that issue. With that, the committee will recess until we have finished the votes on the House Floor. Thank you. [Recess.] Chairman BERMAN. I see neither the chair nor the ranking mem- ber of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee and so does any member wish to—the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohr- abacher, is recognized for 1 minute. Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. I won’t be able to at- tend the whole hearing because of a speech on the Floor of the House that I am working on about 1 hour from now, but, Mr. Chairman, I just would like to note that as we go into this phase where American troops are withdrawing we cannot throw those people who are our friends, throw them out as if they meant noth- ing to us. Those people who are currently allied with us in the war against radical Islam, especially the mullah regime in Iran, should not be taken for granted and should not be put in a very dangerous situa- tion. I talk specifically about Camp Ashraf. These are protected persons by our own definition. We should not try to placate or let the Iraqis build some sort of cordial relationship with the mullah dictatorship in Iran by the sacrifice of these freedom loving people. Second of all, I would hope that the people in Iraq understand that we see it when churches are bombed. We feel it badly when, yes, Muslims are killing Muslims, but when Muslims there in Iraq start killing Christians it raises even greater alarm here in the United States. Just last week, 50 Christians were killed in a Syr- ian church as it was bombed by radical Muslims. We have got to make sure that the Government of Iraq knows that is unacceptable, all of the factions in Iraq know that is unac- ceptable. We need to have a consulate in Erbil to give the Kurds a little bit of protection so they will know that they aren't going to be so victimized, and perhaps the Christians, the Syrian Chris- tians, need a province of their own in Iraq that will give them some sort of safety in that type of environment. 14 of the police training mission to a State Department-run program is smooth and builds upon the progress the program has already made training thousands of Iraqi police. While current Defense Department-led police training efforts have already demonstrated success – the ISF's work protecting polling places during the national elections offers one example – our task now is to ensure that the GOI is able to sustain that progress in a civilian policing context. This program is being coordinated with the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security, who have coordinated programs in Iraq since 2004. A crucial area of our engagement with Iraq is economic growth and diversification. Iraq is actively re-engaging with the international economy after years of war, isolation, and economic mismanagement. Given the circumstances, remarkable progress is being made in a variety of key fields that are vital to the success of Iraq’s economy, including oil, electricity, and finance. Baghdad has stabilized the dinar and tamed inflation. Ministries are spending their own capital to improve infrastructure. International investors are beginning to look seriously at opportunities in Iraq. Much of this progress has been achieved through the assistance of our diplomats and partners in Iraq. Nevertheless, the Iraqi economy still faces significant challenges. Over-reliance on oil for government revenue subjects Iraq to swings in international oil prices. Even with additional oil production and exports, Iraq is likely to face fiscal difficulties in the near term. Expansion of Iraq’s oil sector could be hindered by infrastructural and political challenges. Unemployment remains high. Barriers to foreign investment including corruption, the security environment, and an under-developed banking system continue to dissuade investors from entering Iraq. Our development assistance programs, led by USAID, focus on traditional economic, political, and cultural cooperation. These programs help strengthen institutions, address ethnic and sectarian tensions, and provide economic opportunities for Iraq's people. A major focus of USAID’s development program is on improving health and education in Iraq. Furthermore, USAID and USDA focus on strengthening the agricultural sector – a major source of employment in Iraq. The programs in place will increase job opportunities for Iraq’s young people. State Department programming also provides basic humanitarian assistance, including support for the voluntary return and reintegration of Iraq’s displaced through shelter rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration, as well as protection and basic assistance for those who remain displaced. Our assistance programs are also focused on private sector development, anti-corruption, and legal and regulatory reform, essential to creating new jobs and economic growth. The Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture partner with Iraqis to help them transition from failed economic policies to the path of economic self-reliance. As Iraq develops its oil resources and increases net revenue, we expect it to augment the cost sharing that already takes place on a number of assistance programs. Recognizing the importance of “matching” as a tool for achieving Iraqi buy-in and long- term sustainability, Embassy Baghdad places considerable emphasis on receiving matching 4 15 funding or other support from the Government of Iraq as a core component of assistance planning, execution, and evaluation. As set forth in the April 2009 matching guidelines, all USG agencies in Baghdad are working closely with their Iraqi counterparts to secure cash or in-kind matching for bilateral assistance programs. We are using our bilateral assistance to Iraq, guided by the Strategic Framework Agreement, to help build Iraqi institutions, support sound macroeconomic policies, improve the livelihoods of Iraqi citizens, promote private sector growth, and encourage international economic engagement. U.S. assistance is vital at present to help consolidate hard-won gains and ensure a smooth transition from military- to civilian-led engagement in Iraq. We are working closely with Iraqi officials and entrepreneurs to cement mutually- beneficial economic ties between our two countries. Iraq has great potential as an export market for U.S. businesses, which will further strengthen long-term economic linkages with the potential to help create jobs here in the United States. Transition from U.S. Military to U.S. Civilian Lead Our FY 2010 and FY 2011 programs are all designed to advance Iraq on this trajectory towards self-reliance. The transition has been underway now for well over a year. Our Embassy and the U.S. military command began intensive work on transition under Ambassador Hill and General Odierno and continue close coordination under the leadership of Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin. Both USF-I and the Embassy are synchronized on the ground on a strategy coordinating all the elements of national power, and guiding the detailed planning of the military and civilian elements of the U.S. Government operating in Iraq. USF-1 identified 1,127 essential activities that they were performing in Iraq that needed to be transitioned to other bodies. USF-1 and the Embassy completed the process of canvassing, categorizing, and defining “handover” plans for these activities and functions, determining what would be turned over to Iraqi entities, to American civilian, multilateral or private institutions, and which activities would be terminated. The Embassy has already taken the lead on 150 of these tasks, and will assume control of another 310 as USF-I complete its drawdown. The remaining programs will be transferred to CENTCOM, the Government of Iraq, or phased out with program completion. On the operational side, there are seven key components to our transition: property, facilities, security, life support, aviation, medical, and contractor oversight. For property issues, the Embassy is aggressively pursuing property negotiations with the caretaker government. The timeline for securing agreement is tight as our goal is for each site to be fully operational by October 1, 2011. Regarding facilities, to the maximum extent possible we will repurpose existing Defense Department infrastructure and property for each of the Consulate General and Embassy Branch 16 Office site. The State Department's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) is finalizing site plans and coordinating site preparation and construction with USF-1 at each site now. The State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security will assume security responsibilities for all diplomatic personnel and facilities in Iraq, an unprecedented undertaking in a non-permissive environment without military support. In addition to static and movement security, this will include operating and maintaining 60 MRAPs, explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) teams, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle reconnaissance/surveillance, tactical communications, advance warning capabilities for indirect fire, tactical operations centers at each site, and tactical intelligence. For life support, the Defense Department has agreed to provide logistical support through LOGCAP IV on a reimbursable basis, and we are actively engaged in realizing that transition. The State Department will also take over responsibility for emergency medical care and casualty evacuation from the Defense Department. Medical support will be provided through a contract provider, separate from the LOGCAP contract. On aviation, the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau's Air Wing (INL/A) will manage and execute State's aviation operations in Iraq in support of INL, Diplomatic Security (DS), and the Embassy. Costs are tracked and allocated equitably to respective programs. Baghdad will serve as the main hub, with Erbil and Basra as supporting hubs. Operations and facilities will be coordinated and streamlined to ensure cost efficiency and standardization. For contractor oversight, we are taking a host of measures to ensure proper U.S. Government management and oversight over the increased number of contractors, including private security contractors, that are necessary to support our operations after the military’s withdrawal. Department-wide, we have instituted stronger qualification and conduct requirements for our security contractors, as well as mandatory cultural awareness training. A Diplomatic Security direct-hire must ride in every security convoy and additional personnel are deploying across the country to ensure we have the full range of officers with oversight responsibilities at every site in Iraq. These are just a few of the measures we are taking to ensure proper oversight of our security contractors. Oversight of the LOGCAP life support contract is also a challenge, and one in which we are benefiting greatly from the Defense Department’s assistance in continuing to provide contract oversight and administration experts from the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). We have a number of ways to mark the progress of this transition. To reach full operating capacity by October 1, 2011, there are a number of key milestones and intermediate objectives we must meet. We have already made significant progress. For example, down from 6 18 lead to the development of a strong, independent state that has a balanced and productive relationship with its neighbors, including Iran. The assistance provided by the United States to Iraq is not a substitute for Iraqi responsibility. Our assistance is not open-ended, rather it aims to help Iraq meet its needs, stand up its economy, and cement its democratic system over the next five to seven years, at which point Iraq will have meaningful new economic development and revenues to become more fully self-reliant. Our continued help during this critical window, however, is vital. The strategic importance of this moment cannot be overemphasized. In the last week, the broad outlines of Iraq's new government have become clear, and it will be an inclusive government, with full participation by Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. This agreement received broad support from important regional and international actors including Turkey, Egypt, the UAE, Kuwait, the Arab League, and the United Nations among others. The process leading to agreement on the new governing coalition was long and arduous, but the issues at stake were vital, and the fact that Iraq’s leaders were able to address their differences through negotiations, not force, was encouraging. The initiative of Kurdistan Regional Government President Masoud Barzani led to the breakthrough and brought leaders of Iraq’s political coalitions to address, in face to face meetings, the thorniest of the issues that divide them – issues like de-Baathification, hydrocarbons legislation, and the status of Kirkuk. The conversations that began in those meetings will need to continue as the new government takes shape and begins its work. Democratic governance – especially in a new democracy like Iraq – can be chaotic, and it would be a mistake to downplay the challenges that lie ahead. The unexpected walkout of Iraqiyya during the parliamentary session last week is an example of this. There will be times when the very inclusiveness of the new government will be a source of frustration, because a broad government is not the most efficient government. But the Iraqi people have chosen inclusivity and national reconciliation despite these challenges, and we strongly support their efforts. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, Members of the Committee, thank you, again, for allowing me the opportunity to address our evolving relationship with Iraq. I look forward to answering any questions you may have and to continuing to work with the Committee and the Congress to help secure our interests in a more stable, prosperous, and peaceful Middle East. 24 forward and assume responsibility; and the support the Department of Defense is providing to the State Department to help set them up for success. The Iraqis Are In The Lead I know members have concerns about the readiness of the Iraqi government to provide security in Iraq as U.S. forces draw down between now and December 2011, particularly as extremist groups, such as AQI, continue to wage attacks against innocent Iraqi civilians. Indeed, we continue to see evidence that extremists groups are capable of horrific attacks. Recent examples include: the October 31 attack on Sayidat al-Nejat Christian church members; the bombings in Shia areas of Baghdad, followed by attacks on pilgrims in Karbala and Najaf in the first week of November; attacks on Christians in Baghdad on November 9 and 10, and coordinated attacks on Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Diyala and Kirkuk. Nevertheless, these attacks have repeatedly failed to accomplish AQI's objective: to spark a return to widespread insurgency and communal civil war. Moreover, despite the often exaggerated media narrative that depicts Iraq on the verge of unraveling, the underlying security situation remains strong. Overall levels of attacks and Iraqi civilian casualties have remained relatively constant at their lowest levels of the post-2003 period for more than two years. This consistently low level is even more remarkable considering it has been maintained as the ISF 30 Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank both of you very much, and I will now yield myself 5 minutes to begin the questioning. Secretary Kahl, in the forthcoming Brookings study on Iraq that is about to be released, the authors say the U.S.’ top priority in Iraq should be to prevent the outbreak of another civil war. This is a quote from the draft: “By far, the most important U.S. military mission now is to support Iraq's internal stability by continuing to perform peace keeping functions, especially, but not exclusively, in Kirkuk and other territories disputed by Arabs and Kurds in northern Iraq.” The authors say that the U.S. troops can be a crucial substitute until trust is reestablished between contending Iraqi groups. Do you agree with that view? Do you foresee U.S. troops playing that role on an ongoing basis? What will the consequences be if they don’t 2 Mr. KAHL. Well, I have not read the draft Brookings report, al- though I am familiar with the arguments made by many of its au- thors and its general conclusions. I think the judgment of the Department of Defense, as well as other agencies and departments, to include the State Department, is that a return to the dark days of 2006 and 2007 where there was an all-out communal civil war is unlikely under most foreseeable circumstances, and I think it is our general assessment that the drawdown is completely compatible with consolidating the security gains that we have seen over the last 2 years. I think it is worth noting that we have pulled out almost 100,000 forces since January 2009, and yet those security trends have stayed relatively positive. That included us leaving the cities in June 2009, handing over formal security responsibility to the Iraqis for the first time and then of course drawing down and changing our mission this past September. So I think we have actually seen some evidence for the fact that the Iraqi Security Forces, which now number more than 660,000, are capable of beating back the extremists and preventing the kind of back sliding that that report mentions. I will say, though, that in the next year and beyond we will con- tinue to work with the Iraqi Security Forces to professionalize them, modernize them, and the State Department will be actively engaged precisely on some of those Arab-Kurd fault line areas that were mentioned in the report. I would defer to Assistant Secretary Feltman, but keep in mind that two of the embassy branch offices are in Kirkuk and Mosul for precisely the kind of conflict resolution and engagement efforts that will continue to be important in the coming years. Chairman BERMAN. Just to add that while there are a number of things for the State Department that are new in terms of secu- rity operations, they are still not going to be involved in peace- keeping operations in those areas. Secretary Feltman, real quickly. Sadr. He seems to have been a critical part of Maliki's ability to apparently become the next prime minister or continue in that job. He started out after the election vigorously opposed to Maliki. What do you think convinced Sadr to 31 throw his support to Maliki? To what extent will the Sadrists exert influence in the government that is being formed, and to what ex- tent is the Sadrist faction a threat to U.S. interests in Iraq'? A minute and 25 seconds. Ambassador FELTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think the question is even related to what you asked my colleague and friend, Colin, just a second ago because I think what the Iraqis have done is they have built an inclusive government. The Iraqis themselves have said they want everybody inside because they want the differences among them to be fought out on political grounds, through political means, through the constitutional organs, not on the street. And so, yes, the Sadrists are part of this equation, but the Sadrists are only one part of the equation. Everybody is inside. I think the little theatrics, the melodrama we saw in the Parliament on November 11, showed, as Vice President Biden said and as Colin quoted, “Politics has broken out in Iraq.” And so I think it is actually positive that everybody is inside. It may not be the most efficient way to do things, but— Chairman BERMAN. Let me just interject only because of the time. Taking your line, is Alawi, as a key part of the government, part of that sort of getting everybody inside and in the political process? Ambassador FELTMAN. Alawi himself played a critical role in bringing all of Iraqiya in. Alawi right now seems to be in a little bit of a huff off in London, but all of his Sunni leaders that are part of Iraqiya that are so important to Iraq's stability, to the re- gional integration, have agreed that they are part of the govern- ment. Chairman BERMAN. My time has expired. I recognize the gentlelady, the ranking member, for 5 minutes and ask Ambas- sador Watson if she would just take the chair for a moment while I have a quick meeting. I will be back. Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Sec- retary Feltman, Chairman Berman and I had asked about or had related to you our concerns about Camp Ashraf residents, their hu- manitarian problems, lack of protection. If you could elaborate on that? That is number one. Number two, I wanted to ask you about the reports that we have been hearing about hundreds of former Sunni sectarian fighters who had joined the Awakening or the Sons of Iraq, reconciled with the government, many of whom have gained extensive knowledge about the U.S. military, and they appear to have rejoined al-Qaeda. Reports indicate that many of these Awakening fighters are still on the Iraqi Government's payroll and are covertly aiding the in- surgency. If you could verify that and what vetting mechanisms we have in place to prevent covert assistance to the insurgency by Awakening fighters? And then lastly, sirs, what is the administration's strategy to ad- dress concerns surrounding the development fund for Iraq and the outstanding United Nations Security Council resolution that Iraq is still technically subjected to? Do you believe that we can utilize this leverage with the Iraqi Government as a means to hedge against the growing Iranian influence in the government? 41 man Berman for yielding the chair to the congresswoman and thank the chairman for this hearing. If I have had a moment of pleasure on this committee, it is be- cause of the very fine staff and diplomats of the United States De- partment of State, so I want to take this opportunity to personally thank you and the Secretary of State and the numbers of individ- uals that I have engaged with in a number of opportunities to rep- resent the United States in faraway places. We, I believe, have the moral compass of right. This is not a hearing about Haiti, but am I outraged about the failing govern- ment in Haiti, the suffering people with cholera? I am. Am I con- cerned about the Sudanese and the elections coming up? I am. And the hot spot that Pakistan has become, Burma and others? Yes, I alſT1. And I raise those particular countries because at one point or an- other we have stuck our nose in there, rightly so. I hope we will be sticking our nose back in Haiti because I believe that we are in a complete collapse there, but this is not a hearing on Haiti. But we have taken up the cause of human rights, and I want Mr. Feltman and your esteemed colleague here to comment on Iraq from this perspective. Let me give my bias. We went into Iraq look- ing for weapons of mass destruction, and all we did is destroy and make worse to a certain extent. I am not a fan of the present gov- ernment. I am not a fan of Maliki, a Shiite, and al-Alawi, who is a Sunni, whose name I may not have pronounced correctly, but I know him when I see him. It is a constant, continuous contact sport of who can have the upper hand, who can fill their pockets even more. So we have less troops there, but I don’t think the United States can abandon its responsibility concerning human rights. So let me pointedly ask a question about the people in Camp Ashraf. Not only do they have loud noises and torture and afraid for their life and the people in this country, Iranian-Americans whose families were left behind or whose families went to be able to save the lives of other family members living in utter fear. Can you tell me what humanitarian act is it to let sick and dying people die because they have no access to medical care? Elham, Mehdi, both suffering massively from cancer, being denied the op- portunity, one with thyroid cancer, one with acute kidney cancer in a critical state, already lost one of their kidneys, and they need to undergo an operation and they can't seem to get into a hospital. Where is our stance on human rights? We are continuing to plow investment into Iraq. Let me be very clear. I hope we have a path- way of economic opportunity. I hope there is a pathway for busi- nesses in the United States. After all, look at the enormous meas- ure of blood that we shed in that place. And what do we have to show for it? I believe if we do not leave behind a civilized society that in their own way—they don’t have to follow the American way. They don't have to have the Harris County Public Health System. But in their own way cannot treat people in a humanitarian way. If they cannot form a government in less than 100 years, which it appears to be, #. ſtill is not stable and still we have not agreed to then we have aIIeOI. 51 OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RUSS CARNAHAN (MO-03) COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Hearing on The Transition to Civilian-Led U.S. Presence in Iraq: Issues and Challenges Thursday November 18, 2010 1:00 P.M. 2172 Rayburn House Office Building Chairman Berman and Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, thank you for holding this hearing regarding the transition to civilian-led engagement in Iraq. I appreciate the attention that is being given to this timely and important topic, and I look forward to hearing an update on the transition of responsibilities from the Department of Defense to the State Department. Under the Status of Forces Agreement and the Strategic Framework Agreement between the U.S. and Iraqi governments, we are embarking on a new phase in Iraq, including a full removal of U.S. armed forces by December 31, 2011 and complete shift from a military-led operation to a State department-led diplomatic, development, and advisory effort. The size and scope of State's new role in Iraq is unprecedented and could significantly impact the effectiveness of the U.S. government’s civil-military relationship in years to come. The nature of the mission poses several significant challenges for our civilian leaders. In order to address dangerous security threats and protect its civilian personnel, the State Department and its diplomatic mission in Iraq must take on new responsibilities. While at the same time, the United State’s continuing assistance program will be among the largest aid efforts in which our country has ever been engaged. Earlier this year, I chaired an International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight Subcommittee hearing on reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Stuart Bowen's testimony raised serious concerns about U.S. management and oversight practices, estimating that at least $4 billion had been wasted in our stabilization and reconstruction programs alone. Moreover, in his recent testimony before the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Mr. Bowen emphasized that previous organizational transitions in Iraq have been the occasions of significant waste. Unless swiftly addressed in the coming months, the State Department's historically insufficient capacity for project, contract, and grant administration further foreshadows institutional challenges to come in the transition to civilian control in Iraq. I look forward to hearing testimony from today’s witnesses on the status of the State Department’s capacity building in anticipation of the transition, as well as how it plans to evaluate the effectiveness of this undertaking and apply lessons learned to our engagement in Afghanistan. In addition to agency capacity, past waste in Iraq has reportedly been due to insufficient interagency coordination. I hope the witnesses will also shed light on the effectiveness of DoD-State coordination in the planning stages of 53 QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD THE HONORABLE RUSS CARNAHAN (MO-03) COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Hearing on The Transition to Civilian-Led U.S. Presence in Iraq: Issues and Challenges Thursday November 18, 2010 1:00 P.M. 2172 Rayburn House Office Building Questions to Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey D. Feltman Question: We have seen significant challenges with respect to reconstruction efforts in Iraq due to a lack of sufficient interagency coordination, particularly between the Department of Defense and the State Department. Ever more concerning, this trend of poor DoD-State coordination has continued in planning for the transition to State control of the mission. In fact, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan has criticized the transition for failing to take a “whole of government” approach to the planning among the 14 agencies that are represented under the Chief of Mission’s authority. Major criticism cites a lack of transparency, visibility, and basic data resulting in potential waste, fraud, and abuse. Some analysis indicates recent improve in interagency planning for the transition, however. Please give me your assessment of agency coordination, particularly between DoD and State, as well as your recommendations for improving such coordination. Answer: The magnitude of this transition is unprecedented, and it is being conducted in a very challenging security environment. In anticipation of the planned U.S. military drawdown, we have sustained an intensive, two-year effort both within the State Department and with our partners across the U.S. government. This process has included daily involvement of both Deputy Secretaries of State and close coordination with USF-I and the Department of Defense (DoD). We continue to work daily with DoD and other agencies to implement and, as necessary, adjust our planning, and resolve any issues that may arise. We are on track to complete the transition successfully. We can point to a number of successes in the ongoing DoD-State partnership on Iraq transition. Beginning in 2009, the Embassy and USF-I together painstakingly broke down the breadth of U.S. military programmatic responsibilities in Iraq into over 1,127 specific tasks falling under rule of law, governance, economic development and security. During the past year, they have reviewed these tasks, and determined which will be 65 Congresswoman Barbara Lee, of California Questions for the Record The Transition to a Civilian-Led U.S. Presence in Iraq: Issues and Challenges November 18, 2010 Questions for Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey D. Feltman and Assistant Secretary of Defense Colin Kahl Responses were not available at the time of printing for the following questions: Status of Forces Agreement/2011 Withdrawal Deadline Q1: When President Obama was in the Senate, he supported legislation introduced by then-Senator Clinton, S.2426, requiring that any agreement between the United States and Iraq, including a status of forces agreement (SOFA) that involves “commitments or risks affecting the nation as a whole" to be approved in advance by the Congress. If the current SOFA or is amended, or the timeline for redeployment of U.S. military troops and contractors out of Iraq amended, will the agreement be brought to Congress for approval? Q2: Assistant Secretary Kahl, can you confirm the 2011 withdrawal deadline will apply to all U.S. troops and military (DOD) contractors? Q3: Can you foresee a scenario in which the U.S. could accelerate the pace of its military drawdown in Iraq and the transition to a civilian-led U.S.presence? DOD Accounting In July it was reported that the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction found the Department of Defense is unable to properly account for 96% of more than $9 billion provided for DOD reconstruction projects in Iraq. And just last month, the Special Inspector General for Reconstruction in Afghanistan released the results of a comprehensive audit of reconstruction activities in Afghanistan which revealed the four DOD contracting organizations managing reconstruction do not coordinate or share information with one another, and there is minimal sharing of information across government agencies. Q4: Have these findings altered in any way the Administration's budget request for DOD reconstruction activities in Iraq or Afghanistan in FY11, such as the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)? If not, how do you plan to address the lack of accountability within these programs prior to Congress appropriating additional funds?