U.S. MILITARY LEAVING IRAQ: IS THE STATE
DEPARTMENT READY?
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 2011
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, HOMELAND
DEFENSE AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Labrador, Platts, Turner,
Gosar, Farenthold, Tierney, Braley, Welch, Yarmuth, Lynch,
Quigley.
Also present: Representative Cummings.
Staff present: Ali Ahmad, Deputy Press Secretary; Thomas A. Al-
exander, Senior Counsel; Brien A. Beattie, Professional Staff Mem-
ber; Michael R. Bebeau, Assistant Clerk; Robert Borden, General
Counsel; Molly Boyl, Parliamentarian; John Cuaderes, Deputy
Staff Director; Gwen D'Luzansky, Assistant Clerk; Kate Dunbar,
Staff Assistant; Adam P. Fromm, Director of Member Liaison and
floor Operations; Linda Good, Chief Clerk; Justin LoPranco, Press
Assistant; Erin Alexander, Fellow; Carla Hultberg, minority Chief
Clerk; Scott Lindsay, minority Counsel; Dave Rapallo, minority
Staff Director; Cecelia Thomas, minority Counsel/Deputy Clerk.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. The committee will come to order.
I would like to begin this hearing by stating the Oversight Com-
mittee mission statement. We exist to secure two fundamental
principles. First, Americans have a right to know that the money
Washington takes from them is well spent. And second, Americans
deserve an efficient, effective government that works for them. Our
duty in the Oversight and Government Reform Committee is to
protect these rights.
Our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to
taxpayers, because taxpayers have a right to know what they get
from their government. We will work tirelessly in partnership with
citizen watchdogs to deliver the facts to the American people and
bring genuine reform to the Federal bureaucracy.
This is the mission of the Oversight and Government Reform
Committee.
I want to welcome everybody here today. This is an exciting time,
an exciting time for me, on a personal note. I appreciate the oppor-
tunity to serve in the U.S. Congress and to serve as the chairman
of this subcommittee. It is truly a thrill and an honor, and I hope
(1)


6
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations on
your new role. I think we will have an easy time working together
on this. Oversight is not a partisan matter. I think you can tell
that from the work we have done over the last 4 years, and the
number of projects that you and I have discussed and participated
in. So this is one of the functions of Congress, you are right, we
legislate, and then we try to make sure that legislative intent is
carried out and the moneys are spent in the most efficient and ef-
fective way possible.
With that in mind, I want to thank all of our witnesses here
today. Some of us are becoming old friends. This is a topic that has
been much discussed, but I think it is well worth continuing that
examination, particularly in light of the 2011–2012 budget discus-
sions that are going on right now.
We did agree to withdraw all of our troops from Iraq by the end
of 2011. We have been sticking to that agreement, and we are on
track to meet that deadline. There has been a heroic sacrifice over
8 years, that cost over 4,000 American lives and nearly $1 trillion.
The men and women of our armed forces are going to leave Iraq
with their heads held high.
But now the task is to make sure that all that hard work that
was done by the military, the gains are not squandered and Iraq's
fragile stability is not lost. So the President has charged the State
Department with the responsibility for supporting the stability and
development of Iraq once the military has left. That transition of
operations to the State Department marks a whole new role for
State. It has been asked to oversee functions traditionally under
the purview of the Department of Defense.
Of particular concern are the State Department's capabilities,
both operationally and financially, to undertake activities tradition-
ally managed by the Defense Department and to oversee the ex-
pected increase in contractors operating in theater. All on a budget
that is many orders of magnitude smaller than what the Depart-
ment of Defense has been working with.
Simply because the State Department is taking on these new
functions, we can't expect that contractors will entirely fill the void.
One of the primary objectives in establishing the Wartime Con-
tracting Commission, when Jim Leach and I put the legislation to-
gether, and when Congress passed the bill, I believe, was to ensure
that contractors were not performing functions that were properly
reserved for government personnel.
During previous Oversight Committee hearings on this subject,
I discussed at length with Mr. Thibault the fundamental necessity
of identifying inherently governmental functions leading up to this
transition. In spite of those concerns, in many respects, we are no
closer to identifying and staffing inherently governmental positions
than we were when the hostilities in Iraq began 8 years ago. And
the transition in Iraq is an effort led by the State Department that
threatens to make the situation even worse.
So not only do we have inherently governmental functions that
haven't been clearly defined, but according to reports, contracting
has often become the default option out of necessity for the State
Department. That doesn't give me much comfort that the State De-


7
partment is aware of the oversight and capacity problems, if it does
not have the time and financial resources to properly address them.
As Mr. Green and Mr. Thibault state in their written testimony,
“An expanded U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq will require State
to take on thousands of additional contract employees that it has
neither the funds to pay nor the resources to manage.” So yester-
day, the Commission on Wartime Contracting issued a report enti-
tled Iraq: A Forgotten Mission? The report states that without a
substantial increase in budgetary support from Congress, the post-
2011 prospects for Iraq and for the U.S. interest in that region will
be bleak.
It continues, “Without increases to sustain operations for fiscal
year 2011 and beyond, it is inevitable that some missions and capa-
bilities will be degraded or sacrificed altogether, and that large out-
lays of taxpayer funds will have been wasted.” In fact, the Commis-
sion's No. 1 recommendation is that Congress ensure adequate
funding to sustain State Department operations in critical areas in
Iraq. Unfortunately, today, Congress' willingness to ensure ade-
quate funding for the State Department's mission in Iraq is very
much in doubt.
H.R. 1, the Republican-led appropriations bill that passed the
House in February, dramatically cuts State Department funding
overall and makes specific cuts to the major programs that are crit-
ical to the mission in Iraq. According to Secretary Clinton, who tes-
tified yesterday in front of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
“The 16 percent for State and USAID that passed the House last
month would be devastating to our national security, and it would
force us to scale back dramatically on critical missions in Iraq, Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan.”
This is the definition of penny-wise and pound-foolish. After in-
vesting so much blood and nearly a trillion dollars in Iraq, we must
give the State Department the basic resources they need in order
to successfully relieve the military of their mission there, and help
ensure Iraq's stability and future prosperity.
Indeed, the State Department effort in Iraq is vastly more afford-
able than the operation led by the Defense Department. As Ambas-
sador Kennedy notes in his testimony, withdrawing the U.S. mili-
tary from Iraq will save $51 billion in fiscal year 2012, while the
State Department is only seeking a roughly $2% billion increase
in its budget to take over many of the same responsibilities. So for
about 4 percent of the funds that were being spent on the Depart-
ment of Defense, State believes it would be able to carry out its
mission.
It is important to this subcommittee to continue to scrutinize this
transition. But we must also look at the context of proposed budget
cuts that would fundamentally undermine the State Department's
ability to successfully achieve its new responsibilities. Mr. Chair-
man, we certainly have to watch every penny and where it goes,
and we have to make sure that money is wisely and efficiently
spent. On the other hand, we shouldn't be guaranteeing success by
so undermining their responsibility that we won’t give them at
least enough resources to get the job done, to move as many people
in State itself to the inherently governmental functions and have


9
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Participating with me in this joint state-
ment is Commission co-chairman, Michael Thibault. Our biog-
raphies are on the Commission Web site, so I will note just a few
points that bear on today's issues. I am a retired U.S. Army officer,
have served as Assistant Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of
State for Management and Executive Secretary of the National Se-
curity Council.
Mr. Thibault, who is also a U.S. Army veteran, served more than
35 years in the Department of Defense, the last 11 as Deputy Di-
rector of the Defense Contract Audit Agency. He has also worked
in the private sector as a consultant and as an executive for a For-
tune 500 company.
We are here on behalf of all eight commissioners, who yesterday
approved release of a fourth special report to the Congress, which
we have titled Iraq: A Forgotten Mission? We have brought printed
copies with us today and have also posted the report on the Com-
mission's Web site.
As with our appearance today, the report reflects bipartisan con-
sensus. We respectfully request that it be included in the commit-
tee's hearing record.
This hearing poses the question, U.S. military leaving Iraq, is the
State Department ready? I think the short reason is no, and the
short reason for that answer is that establishing and sustaining an
expanded U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq will require State to
take on thousands of additional contractor employees that it has
neither funds to pay for nor the resources to manage. We base our
findings and recommendations on the Commission's research hear-
ings, as well as two trips to theater to probe specifically the transi-
tion process.
Mr. Thibault and I led the first trip, which prompted our July
12, 2010 special report, entitled, “Better Planning for Defense to
State Transition in Iraq is Needed to Avoid Mistakes and Waste.”
Commission co-chair Christopher Shays and I led the second trip
to Iraq on this issue in December. We observed significant
progress, but our observations and subsequent research have led to
our follow-on special report, the one I brought with us today, “Iraq:
A Forgotten Mission?”
Teams at State and Department of Defense have been working
hard on identifying transition needs and dealing with hundreds of
tasks ranging from logistical support and medical care to air move-
ment and security. State's plan to establish two permanent and two
temporary locations in parts of Iraq away from Baghdad will also
require reconfiguring some property still occupied by the U.S. mili-
tary and undertaking some new construction.
All of these activities will require increased contracting as well
as additional funding and increased staffing for contract manage-
ment and oversight. This is particularly problematic, when you con-
sider that the State Department's recent quadrennial diplomacy
and development review acknowledges that, No. 1, contracts are
often State's default option, rather than an optimized choice; con-
tracts are often well into the performance phase before strategies
and resources for managing them is identified; third, its contract
Management and oversight capability has languished, even as con-


10
tracting has grown; and finally, State has a need to restore govern-
ment capacity in mission critical areas.
State deserves credit for recognizing these problems, which we
would note also occur in many other Federal departments and
agencies.
Besides the collaboration and contract Management challenges,
other looming problems for the DoD to State transition is time. As
you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, 10 months from today, all but a
handful of U.S. military personnel will be gone from Iraq. State
needs to have many new contracts in place with contractors at
work by October or even sooner to ensure a smooth transition. And
that means many contracts must be launched quickly, in fact,
should have already been launched.
As concerned citizens, we can all agree that the stakes in Iraq
and the region are high. We can all agree that as members of this
Commission, however, that we are confining our observation to the
implications of the contracting required for State's planned pres-
ence in Iraq after 2011. We are not opining on the merits of State's
plan or urging that Congress provide everything that the State De-
partment has requested. If anything, considering the extent of con-
tracting waste, fraud and abuse we have seen in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, we would encourage the Department and lawmakers to exam-
ine that plan closely to seek, where appropriate, more economies
and safeguards for taxpayer dollars.
We are simply pointing out here that the declared, coordinated
policy of our government to expand the Department of State's role
and visibility in Iraq after the U.S. military departs has large and
unavoidable consequences for contingency contracting, and must be
recognized and resolved. Our new special report, “Iraq: A Forgotten
Mission?,” spells out our concerns in more detail. We will close by
quoting the three recommendations in that report that the Com-
mission recommends.
No. 1, that Congress ensure adequate funding to sustain State
Department operations in critical areas of Iraq, including its great-
ly increased need for operational contract support. No. 2, the De-
partment of State expand its organic capability to meet heightened
needs for acquisition personnel, contract Management and contrac-
tor oversight. And three, the Secretaries of State and Defense ex-
tend and intensify their collaborative planning for the transition,
including execution of an agreement to establish a single senior
level coordinator and decisionmaker to guide progress and prompt-
ly address major issues whose resolution may exceed the authori-
ties of departmental working groups.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:


11
Page 1 of 5
Joint Statement of
Commissioners Grant S. Green and Michael Thibault
The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
Hearing:
U.S. Military Leaving Iraq:
Is The State Department Ready?
United States House of Representatives
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations
Washington, DC, March 1, 2011.
Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, and
Members of the Subcommittee.
I am Grant Green, a member and former acting co-chair of the
independent and bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Participating with me in this joint statement is
Commission Co-Chairman Michael Thibault.
Our biographies are on the Commission's website, so I will note
just a few points that bear on today's issues. I am a retired U.S. Army
officer and have served as Assistant Secretary of Defense, Under
Secretary of State for Management, and Executive Secretary of the
National Security Council. Mr. Thibault, who is also a U.S. Army
veteran, served more than 35 years with the Department of Defense,
the last 11 years as deputy director of the Defense Contract Audit


12
Page 2 of 5
Agency. He has also worked as a private-sector consultant and
executive for a Fortune 500 company.
We are here on behalf of all eight Commissioners, who yesterday
approved release of a fourth Special Report to Congress, which we
have titled, “Iraq–a forgotten mission?" We have brought printed
copies with us today, and have also posted the report on the
Commission's website, www.wartimecontracting.gov. As with our
appearance today, the report reflects bipartisan consensus. We
respectfully request that the report be included in the Committee's
hearing record.
This hearing poses the question, “U.S. Military Leaving Iraq: Is
The State Department Ready?" The short answer is "no," and the
short reason for that answer is that establishing and sustaining an
expanded U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq will require State to take
on thousands of additional contractor employees that it has neither
funds to pay nor resources to manage.
We base our findings and recommendations on the Commission's
research and hearings, as well as on two trips to theater to probe the
transition process. Mr. Thibault and I led the first trip, which prompted
our July 12, 2010, Special Report 3, titled “Better planning for
Defense-to-State transition in Iraq needed to avoid mistakes and
waste."
Commission Co-Chair Christopher Shays and I led the second trip
to Iraq on this issue in December. We observed progress, but our


19
Transition and the Need for Vigilant Oversight
State and Defense are now intensely engaged in the crucially important tasks of planning and
executing mission transition in Iraq. The impending departure of U.S. forces by December 31,
2011, is the shaping force of this dynamic. To succeed, the ongoing transition must quickly
move significant reconstruction and relief activities from Defense to State in an efficient and
effective manner — the departments must complete this process in less than ten months.
Achieving this challenging goal will ensure that the U.S. government continues to support the
Government of Iraq in a worthwhile way,
Our previous oversight work, which exposed some weaknesses in State's management of large
contracts in Iraq (in fact, the largest contracts it has ever let), provides the basis for some concern
about whether State’s current structure and resources provide a sufficient basis for managing
very large continuing contracts and programs. To accomplish its program goals and avoid
unacceptable waste, State must apply the hard lessons learned from previous Iraq experiences to
its current program management approach, correcting in particular the limited in-country
oversight that SIGIR previously identified.
Relevant to this point, a little under a year ago, Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick
Kennedy (in an April 7, 2010, letter to his counterpart at the Department of Defense) noted that
State “does not have within its Foreign Service cadre sufficient experience and expertise to
perform necessary contract oversight” with respect to logistical and life-support contracts in
Iraq.” This reality led to the Department of Defense agreeing to provide such logistical and life
support to State through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) until at least
June 2012. But Under Secretary Kennedy’s words echo a concern raised by previous SIGIR
audits of State over the past seven years – namely, the need for State to bolster its contract
oversight capacities.
Previous institutional transitions in Iraq have been difficult and fraught with vulnerabilities to
waste, fraud, and abuse, which have cut into and thus limited the achievement of important
national security goals. Applying those painful lessons to the present moment demands an
increased vigilance over program implementation. This means taking specific and extensive
steps toward ensuring effective oversight of the significant taxpayer dollars still being spent in
Iraq.
To meet this standard of vigilance, State must deploy sufficient numbers of experienced
management personnel to oversee the use of taxpayer dollars in country so as to minimize fraud,
waste, and abuse and maximize successful program outcomes. It is also critical that State and
Defense be transparent throughout the transition process – this will help ensure adequate
accountability. Finally, the overall capabilities of the U.S. government must be leveraged in the
most efficient and logical fashion, regardless of institutional stovepipes.


24
Grants Management: State has experienced similar problems in its management of grant
programs in Iraq. Of note, federal oversight requirements for grants are less stringent than those
for contracts. In several audits completed in 2010, SIGIR looked at State's efforts to manage
grants awarded by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) to the
International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute. We found that State did
not provide the level of oversight necessary to ensure that it was not paying for excessive charges
and to know exactly what was being achieved. SIGIR questioned some of the costs incurred by
these organizations. We can attribute some of these problems to an insufficient number of
skilled personnel to oversee the grants. DRL relies on State's Office of Acquisitions
Management to award, amend, and manage its grants. The grants officer in charge of the DRL
grants also managed up to 250 other grants.”
Other matters: SIGIR has previously reported on program problems in the Quick Response Fund,
which is an Economic Support Fund program managed by State and executed by State and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We reported initially on this program in
January 2009 and expect to have a new audit on the issue out very soon. 9
State will have significant responsibility for a continuing ISFF program in the short term and for
a new, large, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grant program, in addition to a continuing and
growing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. The FMF and FMS activities will be executed
by Defense personnel in the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), under the Embassy's
direction. We understand that OSC-I’s operating costs may be borne substantially by Defense.
A division of responsibility between an Embassy political-military section and a Defense-staffed
security cooperation office is commonplace, but OSC-I will be an uncommonly large office, the
largest such office in the world. It will also be one that is relatively “operational” and that may
revert to the relative independence seen in USF-I's assistance units. OSC-I will operate in a
dangerous security environment that will limit the Embassy’s day-to-day oversight. So will the
fact that Defense is paying for much of the operating expenses; in our experience, we have found
that Defense officials are loath to surrender control over “their” money to other agencies. Given
the inevitable problems of separating responsibility for program resources and management from
responsibility for program execution, we believe there is a significant risk of waste and
mismanagement here as well. Furthermore, SIGIR has been approached by representatives of
* Department of State Grant Management. Limited Oversight of Costs and Impact of International Republican
Institute and National Democratic Institute Democracy Grants, SIGIR 10-012, January 26, 2010, Improved
Oversight Needed for State Department Grant to the International Republican Institute, SIGIR 10-022, July 29,
2010; and National Democratic Institute Grant's Security Costs and Impact Generally Supported, but Department of
State Oversight Limited SIGIR 1 1-001, October 13, 2010.
q Opportunities to Improve Management of the Quick Response Fund SIGIR 09-01 l, January 29, 2009.
7


25
the Ministry of Interior (MOI) Inspector General, the MOI Director of Contracting, and the Iraq
Board of Supreme Audit with concerns about the functioning of the FMS program to date. 10
Consider Increasing Funding To Strengthen State Oversight
As noted, State has asked for $3 million to strengthen its acquisition capabilities, which could
well improve its contract oversight. But this is probably just a start. The Congress may wish to
provide more support to State to bolster its overall contract management capacity. Such funding
would, in all likelihood, pay for itself within a short time.
Conditions-based Contracting Authority
The Congress, as it makes funds available to be used by State for large-scale contracts and
grants, could consider allowing State to obligate the funds only after (1) State submits a plan
describing how it will manage large-scale programs and contracts going forward, and (2) State
provides a certification that it has the resources and personnel in place to manage the activities in
question.
In any event, given the increase in scope of State’s management responsibilities – an increase, by
the way, that is here to stay, given recent developments in Afghanistan – increasing attention to
its contract and oversight management capacities and performance is in order.
Matters Pertinent to SIGIR's Continuing Oversight
SIGIR has the statutory duty to conduct audits and criminal investigations of all funds
appropriated for Iraq's reconstruction. We are also required to report to the Congress every
quarter on “all” obligations, expenditures, and revenues “associated with reconstruction and
rehabilitation activities in Iraq.” Prompt and unfettered access to relevant individuals and data
has been crucial to the success of our audit and investigatory responsibilities, as well as to our
quarterly reporting.
As discussed in our January 2011 Quarterly Report to the Congress, State adopted last year an
overly restrictive definition of the word “reconstruction” and used it to deny SIGIR information
related to the activities of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the in-country representatives of
INL, and other matters we believe fall within our jurisdiction. The Congress expects SIGIR to
report on and conduct audits and investigations of all Iraq programs under our jurisdiction,
including PRT and INL activity in Iraq. One of SIGIR’s hallmarks has been timely and accurate
reporting on all Iraq reconstruction information. We hope that State will provide the transition
"At a meeting with Deputy inspector General held on January 29, 2011 various concerns about the FMS program
were discussed including the results of a BSA audit of $1.2 billion transferred to the program between 2007-2008
which indicated that tumover of equipment to the Iraqi government was not proceeding according to the terms of
agreements between the U.S. and the Government of Iraq.
8


28
gas stations or pharmacies. We are heavily dependent on contrac-
tors until security improves, and have developed a contracting
strategy for life support, security, transportation, communications
and facilities.
While it is most effective for State to use its own competitive
process to award contracts, we also will leverage DoD resources
where DOD has superior contracting capabilities in theater. One
example, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program [LOGCAP), is
a proven support mechanism with strong mandatory contract Man-
agement requirements. Interim use of LOGCAP will give us time
to put our own into place, and we will also be using the Defense
Logistics Agency for food and fuel.
I take our contracting oversight responsibility seriously. I led the
2007 Nisour Square Review Team, in that regard. I can assure you
that we will engage heavily.
Our contracting team in Washington draws on headquarters ex-
pertise, and while in Iraq, there are multiple levels of technical
oversight. Since 2008, when I reorganized the funding stream for
the Office of Logistics Acquisition Management, we have hired 102
additional staff for contract administration, and for security con-
tracting oversight in Iraq, we will have over 200 direct State De-
partment security professionals engaged. That is a 1 to 35 ratio,
which is very, very good.
We are not using contractors by default. It is a deliberately cho-
sen strategy to address a transitory need. It makes no sense to hire
that many individuals to become permanent U.S. Government em-
ployees when the need for those numbers will decrease over time.
Let me be clear: we will transition. In Erbil, in the north, already
92 percent of our guard force is locally engaged staff. And we have
robust efforts underway in real property, aviation facilities, infor-
mation technology and life support.
Finally, on February 14th, Secretary Clinton announced Patricia
Haslach as the coordinator for Iraqi transition assistance. This is
the largest effort underway in the State Department since the Mar-
shal plan in the 1940's. We will be ready.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]


30
As Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen have
emphasized, short-changing our civilian presence now would undercut our ability
to pursue our enduring national interests in Iraq. Vice President Biden stated
during his most recent visit to Iraq that it is vital that we leave behind an Iraq that
is worthy of the sacrifices that so many U.S. military personnel and civilians have
made.
Between 2010 and 2012, the U.S. military drawdown will save the U.S.
taxpayers $51 billion, while the State Department's total operating budget request
for Iraq will only increase $2.5 billion over the same period of time. So, although
the State Department's 2012 funding needs will naturally increase because of the
military-to-civilian transition, the overall cost to the U.S. taxpayer will decrease
dramatically. All this is to say: a stable Iraq is in the U.S. national interest. We
need to be fully funded for our Iraq program in both FY-1 and FY-12. Anything
less would severely affect the transition.
This is an overview of the larger policy issues we face in Iraq, and there are
many State Department and Department of Defense (DoD) staff working on the
policy issues, both large and small. Today, I would like to address the safe and
Secure management platforms we are establishing to support successful
implementation of our policy in Iraq, which is my responsibility as the Under
Secretary for Management. There are eight key components to launching these
2


36
local nationals. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement is
engaging with U.S. federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to obtain
subject matter experts to fill its Police Development Program positions – rather
than using contractors,
In addition, to strengthen the State Department's Iraq planning further, on
February 14, 2011, the Secretary of State announced the appointment of
Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach as Iraq Transition Coordinator. The Iraq
Transition Coordinator (S/ITC) will be responsible for coordinating all State
Department aspects of the U.S. transition from military to civilian operations in
Iraq.
In conclusion, as Vice President Biden has stated, not since the Marshall
Plan has there been a military-to-civilian transition on a scale such as this one. The
State Department and DoD have been collaborating on what are unprecedented
levels for more than two years, both in Washington, DC and in Iraq. We are
making very good progress.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be
happy to answer any questions the Subcommittee may have, and I look forward to
working hand-in-hand with the Congress on implementing platforms that will
-
-
enable us to advance the U.S. national interest in a free and stable Iraq.


41
Overall levels of attacks and Iraqi civilian casualties have remained
relatively constant at their lowest levels of the post-2003 period for more than two
years. This consistently low level is even more remarkable considering it has been
maintained as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have assumed primary responsibility
for security, and our force numbers have declined from roughly 144,000 in January
2009 to approximately 47,000 today.
Since January 1, 2009, the ISF have been in the lead on security operations,
a role they have more capably embraced with each passing month. On September
1, 2010, we made the transition to Operation New Dawn and drew down to below
50,000 U.S. troops, fulfilling the President’s commitment and further cementing
the Iraqis’ lead security role. While the U.S. continues to provide vital support to
the ISF – training, equipping, mentoring, advising, and providing critical technical
enablers – the Iraqis are in charge, and they simply no longer need such large
numbers of U.S. forces to help them keep the violence in check.
Transition
This transition includes four key components: 1) ensuring the ISF reach
minimum essential capabilities (MEC); 2) developing a State-led police
development program (PDP); 3) expanding the U.S. diplomatic presence; and 4)
establishing an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I). These programs,
implemented under the Strategic Framework Agreement, are the foundation for
building our continued strategic partnership with Iraq. This is a partnership that
includes robust diplomatic, political, economic, and security cooperation.
The ISF modernization program is designed to provide the ISF with the
MEC required to defend Iraq against internal threats, while creating foundational
capabilities to defend against external threats. The ISF modernization program
aims to promote ISF-Peshmerga integration, promote a culture of sustainment
within the ISF, and smooth the transition to a State-led PDP to set the Iraqi police
on a path toward police primacy. Funding Iraqi Security Forces Funding (ISFF) at
$1.5 billion in FY11 will allow U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) to realize strategic
objectives in Iraq, while still maintaining a manageable level of risk.
The State Department will assume leadership of the PDP. Over the past
seven years, the United States has helped Iraq's Ministry of the Interior and
Defense grow their security forces dramatically, to over six hundred thousand
people. Now we need to build upon that force generation to ensure these forces
have the training and capabilities to meet their basic policing responsibilities, to
2


54
Mr. BOWEN. Yes, I am. I was in Iraq 2 weeks ago, and I met with
a number of Senior officials, specifically a deputy prime minister
who indicated that there is openness at the very least to renego-
tiating a security agreement. And I think Secretary Gates has spo-
ken openly about that possibility as well.
But as Ambassador Vershbow noted, this is really something
that the Iraqis secured from us originally in security agreements,
and that they would really need to publicly reopen. That matter,
of course, doesn't have much time. December 31st will be here
SOOIl.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Are you aware of anybody within the adminis-
tration who is actually pursuing these discussions? Or is this some-
thing they just came up with over coffee somewhere, or I guess tea?
Mr. BOWEN. I am not involved in the policy matters related to
this issue.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. I am just about out of time, so I will yield back
my remaining 20 seconds.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. The gentleman yields back. We will now recognize
the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Quigley, for 5 minutes.
Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to your
new position.
I guess I am struck with something I heard someone from State
say when I was visiting Iraq. We were being briefed, and they kept
saying, we want to make sure we have this right, so we don't have
to come back. Finally, after about an hour of that, a few of the
Members said, we are not coming back.
But there was a sense within the people there at State, and some
of what I hear here, that we have to make things perfect. Let's
name a Middle East country that isn't at least facing some possibil-
ity of extraordinary instability. Are we going to embed ourselves to
that degree you are talking about in Iraq to maintain the stability
we would love for our own national security?
I just think perhaps we are talking about a bridge too far. Some-
one mentioned the corruption is as bad as it has ever been. I don't
know that the people of Iraq will ever get along to the extent that
you are talking about, or that corruption is going to change, or that
all the efforts that we have already done or that you have planned
for the next infinite number of years will achieve what you would
like it to do. It is almost, from my point of view, impossible.
So it is what stuck in my mind since I went there, and nothing
has changed, that I heard today. But let me ask Ambassador Ken-
nedy a question on this specific issue.
You wrote a letter, I believe, April 7, 2010, to DoD, the problems
that State Department will face in implementing the new life sup-
port system, any number of other agencies, entities have expressed
concerns as well. There are related issues.
Could you elaborate and make us feel a little better about how
that situation is going to play out?
Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. We have been receiving absolutely stellar
cooperation, both in Iraq and the United States, from the Depart-
ment of Defense. They are providing us surplus equipment, they
are providing us equipment on loan. They are permitting us, under
the Economy Act, to ride, utilize their contracts, for example, for
food, for fuel, for logistical activities.


57
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. The gentleman's time is expired.
We are actually going to go to a second round of questioning, if
the number of Members here would like to ask some questions. I
am going to recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Ambassador Kennedy, I was struck here, actually, as we thought
more about your answer to the 14 lost functionalities, that there
were 7, and I would be interested in your followup on which 7 stay
and which 7 don't, I was really struck by your comment, and I hope
I heard you right, we will have to go back and look at the record,
you said that State wasn't going to fire back. We may be actually
taking mortar rounds, we may be taking rocket fire, but you don't
plan to fire back. Is that right?
Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we have no intention of using
155 millimeter howitzers from the American embassy compound to
fire back into Iraq.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. So we are just going to keep taking the shells,
and just keep taking it?
Mr. KENNEDY. No, sir. We are already working very, very well
with the government of Iraq, providing them with the locations
that the material has been fired at us, and the Iraqi government
has been successful, not to the degree that I wish they were, in dis-
rupting those who would fire on our diplomatic and consular posi-
tions.
But it is not the function of a diplomatic entity to engage in a
defense engagement.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, that is the concern, at the end of the day,
that is the concern that on January 1st, we don't expect that sud-
denly it is going to be safe, safe place.
Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. We will have to continue to explore this.
Mr. KENNEDY. Could I finish?
Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yes.
Mr. KENNEDY. There are two parts to the counter-battery, sir.
There is the return fire. But the prelude to that is called sense and
warn, which we are retaining, which is a radar system that tracks
the incoming fire, then sounds a warning for our people to take
cover. And that we are retaining.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. I am familiar with it. This will obviously need to
be further explored.
In a Senate Foreign Relations report issued by Senator Kerry on
January 31st, of this year, he maintains that of December, land use
agreements had not been signed and construction had not begun on
satellite sites. With less than 10 months to go before the deadline,
could you please give us an update on this? It seems like a very
short amount of time in order to build a fairly significant facility.
You haven’t even acquired the land, is that correct?
Mr. KENNEDY. We are very, very close to signing agreements
with the government.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. What is that going to do to the time line?
Mr. KENNEDY. We believe at the moment, we are still within the
time line, because what we have done as part of our planning proc-
ess in coordination with our Defense Department colleagues, we
have identified the plots of land that we need. We have surveyed