COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director
RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director
(II)


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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
RON PAUL, Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DAVID RIVERA, Florida
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York DENNIS CARDOZA, California
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
ROBERT TURNER, New York
(III)





CAMP ASHRAF. IRAQI OBLIGATIONS AND
STATE DEPARTMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2011
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,
AND THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:55 p.m., in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations)
presiding.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. This joint hearing of both the Oversight and
Investigations and Middle East and South Asia Subcommittees will
come to order.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for coming today. I
want to thank my colleagues for joining us.
We are going to open up this hearing with an introduction to the
subject matter with a video shot earlier this year showing the
events just before and during and after the April 8 attack on Camp
Ashraf by Iraqi soldiers operating under the orders of the Baghdad
government of Prime Minister Maliki. It is a short video, about 1
minute. It was filmed by a resident of Camp Ashraf and edited
from a much larger collection of film recorded during those days.
The narrative is that while U.S. military personnel were present
the Iraqi forces were held in check, but when the U.S. soldiers were
ordered to leave the area, the Iraqi troops attacked. Later con-
firming the casualties of the attack, U.S. personnel did return to
give aid to the wounded and take witness of those who had been
killed.
And, again, this hearing is a hearing of two subcommittees. We
will be giving opening remarks after this short video.
[Video shown.]
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would like to draw attention also to the
posters underneath the monitors. If you noticed during the video,
you saw that gentleman aiming his rifle and shooting. That was
what we call premeditated murder. The people who were being tar-
geted by that individual, who was aiming his gun, were unarmed
civilians. This, in itself, is—I guess when they kill one or two peo-
ple, it is murder; when you kill tens of people, it becomes an atroc-
ity and perhaps even a war crime. And the fact that this was being
done by—at least with the approval of the Iraqi Government is
something that is of great concern to the United States, especially
(1)


2
when the beginning of the video shows U.S. troops exiting the area
just prior to this atrocity.
This hearing is the last chance for Congress to impress upon the
State Department the gravity of the crisis that we face and the
stain on American honor that will result if action is not taken to
avert another massacre of unarmed civilians in Camp Ashraf. If
that bloodletting happens, it will be a crime perpetrated by a con-
spiracy between Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and the Iranian theoc-
racy which is pulling the strings.
Whatever has been going on for two decades, since the arrival of
U.S. forces in 2003, Camp Ashraf has been a peaceful community
of political dissidents and refugees which is certainly a commu-
nity—since we have arrived there in 2003—which does not deserve
the label of terrorist, as we have been told by the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees that the U.S. terrorist designation—and
this is representatives of the U.N. High Commissioner, I might
say—have in the past told us that the terrorist designation is a
major obstacle to finding safe places to relocate Camp Ashraf's resi-
dents outside of Iraq.
If these people in Camp Ashraf are forced to stay in Iraq, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees believes the
Maliki regime may pull 50 to 60 individuals out of Ashraf and de-
port them to Iran. This because the mullahs in Tehran have listed
them as a terrorist organization and these people that they would
pull out have been designated by Tehran as terrorists with
Interpol. And the United States' listing of the MEK as terrorists
will be used by Maliki to justify his murderous cooperation with
Iran.
Why are we, the United States, being an accomplice to this
crime? If they are deported or subjected to another massacre, the
blood in the sand will also stain the Gucci shoes of our U.S. State
Department.
At the end of the year, which is only 24 days away, all American
military personnel will have left Iraq. On that same day, the Bagh-
dad government of Prime Minister Maliki has decreed that Camp
Ashraf is to be closed. For more than 20 years this camp has been
home to 3,400 members of the People's Mojahedin Organization of
Iran, also known as the MEK, a secular opposition group in exile
working against the bloody Islamic mullah dictatorship in Iran.
Maliki will disperse the residents to new camps which may, in
reality, be prisons. His objective is to deport the Iranian dissidents
or at least their leaders to Iran where they will be imprisoned and,
it is easy to predict, imprisoned, tortured, and killed.
Maliki's alignment with the vicious Iranian theocracy is clear. To
please his Tehran masters, he has already inflicted violence and
death on the Camp Ashraf population. As we have just seen, in the
early hours of April 8 this year, units of the Iraqi Army numbering
2,500, including armored vehicles, assaulted unarmed Iranian civil-
ians at Camp Ashraf, murdering at least 34 residents and wound-
ing hundreds more. As we saw in the video, this wasn’t just ran-
dom shooting. There were individuals who were picking out tar-
gets, unarmed people, and shooting them, as if they were deer in
a deer hunt, as we just saw.


3
We also just saw that American military personnel were pulled
out of the camp just hours before that attack. What does that tell
us? What does that tell us? Someone made that decision. This was
an atrocity and a crime against humanity.
Some media outlets have noted that the attacking troops were
“armed and trained by the United States.” And when you see that
and you see that group of dead bodies and you notice that all of
these people were unarmed, this is a shame on them and a shame
OIl U1S.
Camp Ashraf residents had been promised protection under the
Fourth Geneva Convention by senior U.S. commanders in Iraq.
There is a poster right there that is showing an ID card that was
issued to a camp resident and the agreement—I guess that is what
this one is that I was pointing to before we started. This poster
shows the agreement between the camp and the United States,
trading a pledge of peace and disarmament for American protec-
tion.
The reason the camp was disarmed, the reason these people had
no means of defending themselves was that they had made an
agreement with the United States Government to disarm and,
thus, they were shot down as if they were deer being hunted by
hunters, no way to defend themselves.
When sovereignty was turned over to Iraq, the transfer of re-
sponsibility for Camp Ashraf to the Baghdad government was con-
ditioned on a direct promise that the residents would continue to
be protected. In April, the United States utterly and completely
failed its responsibilities after making that promise to the people
of Camp Ashraf.
After the attack, the State Department asserted that a “crisis
and loss of life was initiated by the Government of Iraq and the
Iraqi military.” But what about before the attack, as I just men-
tioned? The U.S. Embassy and the commander of U.S. forces un-
doubtedly knew of the Iraqi military build-up outside the camp.
Was the Iraqi Government then contacted? We need to know that.
If so, what was the Iraqi response when we contacted them?
And as I mentioned before as well, the U.S. military unit de-
ployed near Camp Ashraf was ordered away just before the attack.
Well, obviously—if not obviously, perhaps on the face of it, it ap-
pears to be that there was a conspiracy, including our Government
and the Maliki government, to commit murder, to take the lives of
unarmed people.
So who in our Government knew about this? What type of agree-
ment was made? And why was nothing done to prevent it if we did
know about it? We wanted to ask the State Department officials
these questions but were told no one was available to testify at the
hearing of this subcommittee on July 7.
Late yesterday, we finally received a letter in partial response to
the questions we have sent to the State Department over 5 months
ago. We will consider the response and may ask for more clarifica-
tion and information after today's hearing.
Our priority is now to learn what will happen in the future. Will
we be turning away again? What can people expect? Will we turn
away? And what happens if there is another massacre in the mak-
ing? We are just going to walk away then? What will be our posi-


4
tion if there is another massacre? And will the residents just end
up in concentration camps or in jail or being tortured in Iran or
Iraq itself? Will we and can we, are we even trying to evacuate the
residents of Camp Ashraf in the next 3 weeks?
America has spent its blood and treasure, $1 trillion, the blood
of thousands of our young men and women, only to allow a govern-
ment to come to power in Baghdad that is the puppet of the Ira-
nian mullah dictatorship, the most dangerous enemy of America
and threat to peace and stability in the Middle East; and the gov-
ernment that we have fought and paid for and bled for in order to
bring into existence has now become their ally.
In his recent op-ed in The Washington Post, Prime Minister
Maliki cited the U.S. listing of the MEK as a terrorist group and
called them “insurgents,” using this justification for his intran-
sigence toward Camp Ashraf. So if the Iraqi Prime Minister cannot
discuss U.S.-Iraqi relations without mentioning Ashraf and cannot
mention Ashraf without mentioning the terrorist listing, how can
we deal with this issue without talking about our Government's
listing of the residents of Camp Ashraf as being terrorists?
In 1997, Iran persuaded the Clinton administration to put the
MEK on the State Department's Foreign Terrorist Organization
List. This naive gesture was supposed to improve relations with
Tehran. But the relations did not improve, and Iran continues to
support violence across the region and crush dissent at home and
develop nuclear weapons capabilities that we have no idea whether
we are the target or Israel or some of the other countries which the
mullah dictatorship doesn't like.
We have been told that the State Department is re-evaluating
the MEK’s designation as terrorists. In her appearance before the
Foreign Affairs Committee on October 27, Secretary of State Clin-
ton acknowledged that the European Union has taken the MEK off
its terrorist list, which it did in 2009. The State Department hasn’t
taken them off the list. But the Europeans have done so. And the
clock is running out.
The U.S. should continue to insist that the promise given by the
United States to the residents of Camp Ashraf and the promise
then given by the Iraqi Government to us must be respected and
upheld. This is not just a matter of decency but of the credibility
of the Maliki government and the honor of the people of the United
States. The Iraqi Government must allow the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees to fulfill his mission in moving the residents of
Camp Ashraf out of Iraq to safe havens in other countries with the
full support of the United States.
But as I mentioned before, I have been personally told by
UNHCR officials that this terrorist designation maintained by the
United States is an impediment to finding places to relocate the
residents of Camp Ashraf outside of Iraq.
I hope that our State Department witnesses can assure us today
that these objectives will be accomplished before the end of Decem-
ber when the absence of U.S. troops will change the reality and
that the residents of Camp Ashraf will be at the mercy of Iraqi
forces under the command of a political leader who is in cahoots
with the Iranian mullah dictatorship.


5
All of our other members will be given time for opening state-
ments. But, Mr. Carnahan, would you like to proceed with your
opening statement?
Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for
your dedicated work on this issue. Thank you for having this fol-
low-up hearing, as promised.
In light of recent events, the trip you led to Iraq a few months
back and the scheduled departure of the U.S. military in just a few
short weeks, this hearing provides a timely opportunity for us to
once again assess not only the precarious humanitarian situation
at Camp Ashraf but also to consider the broader issues of the U.S.-
Iraq policy going forward.
I am fortunate to represent an active Iranian American commu-
nity back home in St. Louis who care deeply about family members
and residents at Camp Ashraf. I am glad to have some of them
here today. Welcome again and thank you for your advocacy and
being part of this effort.
In 2003, the residents of Camp Ashraf were granted protected
status under the Geneva Convention. Pursuant to the status of
forces agreement between the U.S. and Iraqi Governments, how-
ever, jurisdiction of the camp has been under Iraqi jurisdiction
since 2009. With the draw-down of U.S. forces in Iraq and the Iraqi
Government's repeated calls for the residents to leave Iraq, there
is a serious concern about the safety and welfare of the residents.
The administration has raised concerns about their safety, and I
will be interested to hear what progress has been made through
our bilateral and multilateral efforts.
In addition to ensuring that the rights of the residents are main-
tained, I am also interested in an update from our last hearing on
relocation efforts. Several hundred have returned to Iran with the
help of the international Red Cross, and the U.S. has offered to
help relocate residents prior to internationally coordinated closure
of the base.
I would like to hear the witnesses discuss what options are avail-
able moving forward, what implications those options have on U.S.
policy to Iraq as well as Iran. Specifically, would it be beneficial to
ºwhat other countries have shown a willingness to admit resi-
ents'
Turning to the broader issues of U.S. policy toward Iraq following
the troop withdrawal at the end of this month, I would like to hear
each witness discuss the challenges ahead as our policy in Iraq
shifts to becoming a State Department- and USAID-led effort, fo-
cusing on diplomacy and development.
The safety of residents at Camp Ashraf poses immediate concern,
but I am also interested to hear what our continued efforts in the
country will look like. I look forward to the hearing today. Again,
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your continued efforts to champion a
humanitarian solution for this issue.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just note that these humanitarian
and human rights challenges that we face are confronted by a
united Congress in the United States, and the bipartisanship that
has been demonstrated by Mr. Carnahan and my fellow colleagues
is an example to the rest of the world where people who believe in
freedom can work together.


6
And I would like to ask for unanimous consent that Mr. Filner,
Congressman Filner from San Diego who is not a member of this
committee but has been very active on the issue, be permitted to
th in with us and be treated as a member of the committee for
today.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
We now would like to call on Representative Chabot, the chair-
man of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, who is offi-
cially the cosponsor or is cochairing this event. And we appreciate
hearing your opening statement, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. Good afternoon.
Let me begin by thanking my colleague, the gentleman from
California, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and In-
vestigations, Mr. Rohrabacher, for calling this timely and impor-
tant joint hearing with the Subcommittee on the Middle East and
South Asia that I happen to chair.
This hearing was scheduled to begin at 2:30. We got started a
little bit late, and I have another meeting that I have to be at at
4 o'clock. So I am going to have to leave then, but my staff will be
here and remain and make sure that we hear everything that has
been said here today.
In January 2009, the Iraqi Government took the sovereign con-
trol of Camp Ashraf and responsibility for the 3,400 residents liv-
ing in it. Since then, there have been several extremely disturbing
incidents, one of which we just saw, which resulted in the deaths
of Camp Ashraf residents. I am particularly disturbed by the
deaths of as many as 35 residents of Camp Ashraf, resulting from
clashes with Iraqi forces on April 8, 2011, again.
Reports of shortages of food, fuel, and medical supplies are also
very concerning. This is simply unacceptable. The Iraqi Govern-
ment must take all necessary and appropriate steps to prevent the
loss of life.
Although the status of the individuals residing at Camp Ashraf
continues to pose a deeply problematic challenge, it is incumbent
on all parties to ensure that no harm comes to its residents. Ac-
cordingly, the overriding objective of the Obama administration's
dialogue with Iraq on the matter of Camp Ashraf should first and
foremost be to encourage the protection of the camp residents, en-
sure appropriate humanitarian aid is provided for the residents,
and ensure that the Iraqi Government lives up to the obligations
which underlie the transfer agreement. As the international com-
munity works to resolve the difficult dilemma, no further harm
must come to the camp residents.
As we work to resolve this situation, however, it is incumbent on
all parties to remember that the 3,400 residents are not just words
on a page but people, human beings. The status of the residents
of Camp Ashraf is a complex issue and one that requires an inter-
national solution which takes into account the desires of the actual
residents.
Correspondingly, I would like to echo recent calls to push back
the December 31 deadline to close Camp Ashraf. I fear that trying
to rush a solution only risks further harm to the camp residents.
Although permanent homes for these residents will certainly take
time to find and, as such, patience will be required on the part of


7
all concerned parties, it is critical that the international community
understand the urgency of the situation and proceed expeditiously.
I want to again thank Chairman Rohrabacher for calling this
hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses.
I yield back my time.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.
Ms. Chu, do you have an opening statement?
Ms. CHU. Well, I would like to ask unanimous consent to be a
guest and to be able to—
Mr. ROHRABACHER. To be last? Yes, no problem. To ask unani-
mous consent to be first is a difficult one.
I would like to recognize Congressman Poe.
Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have a crisis that is taking place halfway around the world,
and the United States should be aware of this crisis and the im-
pending deadline. December 31st in the United States comes with
fireworks, New Year's Day, but there also may be fireworks and
fire in Camp Ashraf unless the United States intervenes to make
sure something bad does not happen.
In 24 days, the Iraqi Government has promised to close down
Camp Ashraf. Where the residents will be forced to go, we really
don’t know. They could be expelled to Iran, where many of them
will face death, in my opinion. The little tyrant from the desert
Ahmadinejad and his Iranian regime have already murdered hun-
dreds of their family members. Those people in Camp Ashraf could
be located to another place in Iraq.
And why would the Iraqi Government want to close down a camp
and just move them to another camp in Iraq” Well, because the
Iraqi Government knows that the phrase “Camp Ashraf" is known
throughout the world as a place of refuge for Iranian freedom fight-
ers. Iraq knows if it attacks the residents while they are in Camp
Ashraf they will face worldwide condemnation, like they did in
2009 and 2011 when they massacred over 40 unarmed civilians. As
related by my colleagues, those were people that were killed. They
are not statistics. They were real people. And these 47 people are
dead because the Iraqi Government killed them. Two times, two as-
saults on the camp.
Is this what is going to happen on January 1 unless the United
States intervenes? We don’t know. But do we allow this to occur?
I hope not. And it is unfortunate—or maybe fortunate—that some
of the family members of these 47 people are here with us today,
pleading that Congress act to prevent another massacre of citizens
in the camp.
The residents of Camp Ashraf said they don’t trust the Iraqi
Government. I don’t blame them. They have invaded their camp
twice. I have a letter here to a member of the European Parliament
by members of the camp who believe that on January 1, unless
something occurs, they will face certain death, and they will not go
away voluntarily. They won't resist, but they will not go away vol-
untarily. They do not want to be moved because they think it is
certain death.
What the residents want is to be moved to another country be-
sides Iran. The residents of Camp Ashraf have applied to be recog-
nized as political refugees by the United Nations. Iraq knows that


8
if the residents get refugee status, they won't be able to violate
their human rights without more serious consequences. So with
strong pressure from the Iranians, Maliki and his thugs are closing
* camp on December 31 before the U.N. refugee process can fin-
1SIſl.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, I went with you on June 11 to Iraq,
along with the ranking member and others from this committee,
and you asked Maliki if we could go to Camp Ashraf and see what
happened, get the residents' point of view of what is taking place.
He was indignant. He refused to let us go to Camp Ashraf. In fact,
the reason he used was because our Government has labeled the
MEK as a foreign terrorist organization. Therefore, he closed the
camp to us.
He was so incensed that what occurred later made the inter-
national press—primarily in Europe; it wasn't mentioned in the
United States—but while we were flying to another portion of Iraq,
we found out through the State Department that we had been
evicted from Iraq for asking the question to go to Camp Ashraf.
And of course we stayed as long as we wanted to. But that is
Maliki's point of view and his reaction to the question that was
asked, if we could visit the camp.
On December 12, Maliki will be in the United States. He will be
in Washington, DC. I am gathering a letter with signatures to the
President urging him to raise the Camp Ashraf issue during this
meeting. We have 47 signatures. We hope to have more.
The clock is ticking. The days are numbered. I hope the wit-
nesses today can exactly outline specifically what will be done by
this administration to protect the residents of Camp Ashraf. I hope
we don't hear, as in my opinion we have heard in the past, more
comments about why our Government continues to side with the
Maliki government and the interests of Iran over the freedom fight-
ers in Camp Ashraf. And I yield back.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Your Honor. And I al-
ways appreciate the members of my committee following my lead
and taking a soft-spoken approach to these challenges.
Congressman Rivera.
Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. But I believe just pre-
viously Congresswoman Chu was asking unanimous consent to be
a guest, not to be last.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Was that last or a guest?
Ms. CHU. It was a guest.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. How about both?
Mr. RIVERA. I will certainly yield to the gentlewoman from Cali-
fornia. Ladies first.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Please continue, Mr. Rivera, with your open-
ing statement, and then our two guests will be permitted to have
opening statements as well.
Mr. RIVERA. Perfect. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will ad-
here to your 2-minute admonition as well.
My main question I would like answered during this hearing,
Mr. Chairman, particularly from Ambassador Fried, is this issue of
the arbitrary December 31 deadline and what is the United States
doing to avoid what can only be referred to as a New Year's Eve
massacre occurring at Camp Ashraf2


9
Because we know what is coming. In this particular case, the
past is prologue. We have seen previously psychological torture
around the camp, utilizing noise-making mechanisms to try and
provide an ambiance that can only be described as torture there for
the residents. Physical deprivation. We saw the videotape at the
beginning of this hearing.
We know what is coming. What is the United States doing to
avoid that massacre that we know is coming?
The December 31 deadline I believe is simply a pretense to carry
out the forced repatriation of these residents, forced repatriation to
brutality, to torture, and to an environment of death. So we must
do all in our power to avoid this New Year's Eve massacre. And
I want to know and I hope this hearing will shed light and provide
answers to this important question.
And I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and I apologize for
mishearing my colleague. Let me just note, I have what you call
a surfer's ear. It is in this ear from jumping into the cold water
too many times.
º, Mr. Filner, would you like to proceed with an opening state-
ment':
l Mr. FILNER. I am glad to hear that you can only hear from the
eft.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the honor of being a
part of the committee today.
What is happening, by the way, is rare in committee meetings
that are going on around the Hill today; and I hope, Ambassador
and Ms. Leaf, you will report this back to Mrs. Clinton. Usually,
you see the two sides just fighting each other, rather than coming
to any agreement or consensus. And I think we are all together on
this side, and I appreciate the chairman's leadership on it.
I would associate myself—God may strike me down for this—but
with all the remarks that Chairman Rohrabacher said. And rather
than try to interrupt Ambassador Fried's testimony, because I was
a little upset by it, I will just say some things now about it. I found
your testimony a little bit troubling.
You start off by saying, “a common understanding of the facts is
important.” I agree with you. I am not sure your statement has led
to that or helped us toward that common understanding.
In your paragraph to try to destroy the credibility of the MEK,
you said, “by 1980, Iraq dictator Saddam Hussein had established
a relationship with the MEK, cooperating with it to advance his ef-
forts to undermine the Iranian Government.” How evil. The dic-
tator Hussein established—just substitute “the United States Gov-
ernment” for “the MEK.”
I mean, come on. Who was there supporting Hussein in all his
efforts during this period of time? It was the United States. But
now it is because he worked with the MEK they are the bad guys?
There has been credible reporting—and there has also been cred-
ible reporting on the reverse—that the MEK militarily supported
Hussein's violent suppression of groups in Iraq which opposed his
regime. Well, so did the United States.
You are looking at me rather strangely, as if we did not partici-
pate in the Hussein regime. He was our ally against Iran. I am not


11
diers shot indiscriminately at people as if though they were just ob-
jects that they were looking at through target practice.
I am here today to be a voice for the families who worry about
their loved ones. The U.S. will leave Iraq at the end of the year
on the same timeline that President Maliki is planning to close
Camp Ashraf. Once U.S. forces leave, there will be no way to pro-
tect these residents. After these two attacks, and with Iraqi forces
continuing to surround these camps, I cannot have it on my con-
science or the conscience of the United States for these 3,400 resi-
dents to be harmed when we could have stopped it.
I believe that the State Department and the President should
use its position and influence to extend the December 31 deadline
for the closure of Camp Ashraf, that we should push the Iraqi Gov-
ernment not to relocate Camp Ashraf residents to places all over
inside Iraq, and we need to urge the Iraqi Government to allow the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to do its work in helping the
residents of Camp Ashraf find a safe place to go when the camp
is closed. That is the least that they deserve.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and let me just make
one correction for my colleague. That was not “indiscriminate”
shooting. That was worse. That was very discriminate. That was
very pointed and very aimed shooting at the specific individuals
who were murdered that day, including women and minors who
were unarmed. They were targeted. They went through the sites.
It wasn't just somebody shooting into the air and accidentally hit-
ting somebody. This is premeditated murder, and that is one of the
reasons that we are here today.
Now that we have all had our say, it is time to hear some expla-
nations and hopefully have some questions and answers and some
dialogue to shed some light on what you can see is legitimate out-
rage on the part of the Members of Congress who understand what
is going on here.
So first let me note we have two fine witnesses from the State
Department, two professionals who have dedicated their lives to
serving their country and to serving the interests of the United
States of America overseas and developing an expertise on how to
deal with foreign governments and with such situations.
Daniel Fried is a career Foreign Service Officer. He started in
1997. And over his career our paths have crossed many times in
many different locations, and he is a pro. And that is why he is
here today, because the State Department felt they needed some-
one to be here and to discuss this issue who had the depth of
knowledge and the ability to look at this and to enlighten the Con-
gress. Because he has got in-depth knowledge of this incident, this
situation as well as America's dealings in that part of the world,
in the Balkans and everywhere else.
Barbara Leaf is currently the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Iraq in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs; and she has
actually taken this post as of August, 2011. However, prior to that,
she has been very deeply involved in her career in that part of the
world, including Iran and Iraq and the Balkans.
So, again, we have two State Department pros, professionals, and
we are anxious to hear your testimony and to conduct a dialogue
with you afterwards.


12
So who would like to go first?
Mr. Fried.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL FRIED, SPECIAL AD-
VISOR ON ASHRAF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOM-
PANIED BY MRS. BARBARA LEAF, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC-
RETARY FOR IRAQ, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador FRIED. Chairmen Rohrabacher and Chabot, Ranking
Member Carnahan, thank you for the opportunity to testify and to
report to you on the substantial ongoing efforts of the United
States to address this serious humanitarian issue.
The Government of Iraq has announced that Camp Ashraf must
be closed by the end of this year, and arrangements for the security
and humane treatment of the residents have not been finalized.
With time short, all parties must cooperate and accept the credible
proposals being put forward by the United Nations for a humane,
secure, and mutually agreed relocation of the residents.
Vice President Biden stressed during his recent trip to Baghdad
the importance the United States places on a peaceful and secure
resolution of the situation at Camp Ashraf. The Secretary has
tasked me to ensure that the U.S. Government is taking every re-
sponsible action possible, working with the Government of Iraq, the
United Nations, and our allies and partners and in contact with
the residents of Camp Ashraf and those who speak for them to
achieve a safe and secure relocation of the residents of Camp
Ashraf. We are working urgently.
Still, it is important to be clear about the history of Camp
Ashraf. Camp Ashraf is operated by, and its residents led by, mem-
bers of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq , the MEK. The MEK sought the
violent overthrow of the Shah of Iran and during the 1970s used
terrorist tactics, including the assassination of six Americans,
among them three U.S. military officers. And the MEK supported
the occupation of, and hostage taking at, the U.S. Embassy in
Tehran.
Shortly after the Iranian Revolution, the MEK shifted its tactics
toward the new Iranian regime. By 1980, Iraqi dictator Saddam
Hussein had established a relationship with the MEK; and, in
1986, Hussein invited the MEK to Iraq. Approximately 7,000 MEK
members resettled in camps in Iraq, including Camp Ashraf. Sad-
dam Hussein's government provided funding, training, and military
equipment to the MEK; and, in exchange, the MEK served as a pri-
vate paramilitary group for the Saddam Hussein regime.
There has indeed been credible reporting that the MEK mili-
tarily supported Hussein's violent suppression of groups in Iraq
which opposed his regime, including shortly after the first Gulf
war. This explains how the U.S. military came across this armed
group in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom, some of the reasons
why the MEK was added to the Foreign Terrorist Organization List
in 1997 and the animosity felt toward the MEK by many Iraqis.
In 2003, U.S. military forces negotiated a ceasefire and disar-
mament with the MEK leadership in Iraq. MEK camps and bases
were consolidated to Camp Ashraf. U.S. commanders stated that
they considered Camp Ashraf residents as protected persons under


13
the Fourth Geneva Convention. This does not mean that the resi-
dents were considered refugees, but the United States afforded the
residents of Camp Ashraf their rights under the Geneva Conven-
tion as protected persons and ensured to the extent possible that
they were protected from hostilities. The U.S. military did this at
great risk.
Once a sovereign Iraqi Government was established in June,
2004, Camp Ashraf's residents were no longer protected persons as
a legal matter. Nevertheless, for the duration of the authorities
under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 and subsequent reso-
lutions, U.S. forces continued to treat the residents of Ashraf as
protected persons as a matter of policy, the right call, given the un-
settled and violent conditions in Iraq and the hostility of many
. toward the MEK. And we conveyed this to the camp's resi-
ents.
When our U.N. mandate expired on January 1, 2009, U.S. mili-
tary remained in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi Government. It
had no authority to provide protection for the residents of Camp
Ashraf and accordingly transferred security responsibility for the
camp to the Iraqi Government.
The leadership at Camp Ashraf was informed that the U.S. mili-
tary would no longer play a role in the camp's physical protection.
Concurrently, at the U.S. Government's request, the Iraqi Govern-
ment provided assurances of humane treatment. In addition, the
Iraqi Government allowed U.N. and U.S. officials to monitor the
well-being of the camp's residents.
As everyone here knows, the Iraqi Government has probably ex-
pressed its decision to close Camp Ashraf by the end of this year.
Yet the exercise of a sovereign right does not obviate the need for
care and restraint.
We have seen and condemned the terrible loss of life as a result
of past attempts, including last April, by Iraqi police and security
forces to enter the camp. The United States has stated publicly—
and I want to reiterate now—that we expect the Iraqi Government
to refrain from the use of violence.
In addition, the United States has been consistent in urging the
Iraqi Government to resolve the humanitarian and security issues
at Camp Ashraf expeditiously and before the closure of the camp.
This in particular was part of the Vice President's message to the
Iraqi leadership in Baghdad during his latest visit. At the same
time, the camp leadership must respect and recognize Iraqi sov-
ereignty as we seek to resolve this matter.
In addition, as we have conveyed and continue to convey to the
leaders of Camp Ashraf and to those who communicate with the
MEK’s Paris-based leadership, the MEK must act responsibly and
not put any Ashraf residents or ask any Ashraf residents to place
themselves in harm's way.
A humane and secure relocation is possible, but it will take in-
tense and serious efforts by all parties. The Iraqi Government has
been working with the U.N. on a resolution of the situation at
Camp Ashraf. Some encouraging progress has been made. We wel-
come this. We hope that the MEK and Camp Ashraf leaders will
engage constructively as well and work with the U.N. on its ap-
proach. A solution is possible if all work seriously to reach agree-


14
ment on proposals that allow for the safe and mutual determina-
tion of each resident's individual legal status and his or her desire
to leave Iraq while respecting individual rights and all in a context
of security and humane treatment.
The State Department has, is, and will continue to work closely
with the U.N., its assistance mission in Iraq led by Ambassador
Martin Kobler and the UNHCR to help achieve a humanitarian
resolution. These U.N. organizations are playing a serious and con-
structive role in the urgent efforts to craft a solution. The Euro-
pean Union is supporting these efforts as well.
Our goal is to help find an expeditious and humane resolution to
the closure of Camp Ashraf. We will continue to engage intensively
at the highest levels to head off any actions that could result in vio-
lence and will continue to encourage the residents to accept the
reasonable, humane, and secure proposals crafted by the U.N. to
relocate them from Ashraf.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about this
urgent issue, and I welcome your questions. And, Mr. Chairman,
I would also welcome the dialogue that you suggested.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fried follows:


16
humanely, with our principal concern being the safety and well-being of the
residents.
We are working urgently. Nevertheless, in this setting, it is important
to be clear about the history of Camp Ashraf. A common understanding of
the facts is important to promoting an informed public dialogue and sound
policy.
Camp Ashraf is operated by, and its residents led by, members of the
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). The MEK, founded by students in Tehran in
1965, originally espoused Marxist and Islamist ideologies and sought the
violent overthrow of the then-leader of Iran, Shah Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi, whose government was supported by the U.S. During the 1970's,
the MEKused terrorist tactics against the Shah's government and those
whom they associated with it. MEKactions included the assassination of
six Americans, including three U.S. military officers, and the bombing of
U.S. companies in Iran.
The Shah's government fell in 1979. The occupation of, and hostage-
taking at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, which was supported by the MEK,
took place later that year. Shortly after the Iranian revolution, the MEK
shifted its violent tactics towards the new regime in Iran. By 1980, Iraq
dictator Saddam Hussein had established a relationship with the MEK,
cooperating with it to advance his efforts to undermine the Iranian
government. In 1986, Hussein invited the MEK to formally relocate to Iraq.
MEKleadership accepted and, as a result, approximately 7,000 MEK
members resettled in camps in Iraq, including Camp Ashraf. Saddam
Hussein's government provided funding, training, and military equipment
to the MEK and, in exchange, the MEK served as a private paramilitary
group for Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. Thousands of MEK members'
lives were reportedly lost in combat with the Iranian military. Over the
years, there has been credible reporting that the MEK militarily supported
Hussein's violent suppression of groups in Iraq which opposed his regime,
including shortly after the first Gulf War. In April 1992 the MEK became
one of the few groups to attempt an attack on U.S. soil when it launched
2


18
At this time, hundreds of Ashraf residents chose to leave the Camp,
some receiving refugee status from the office of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and finding their own solution inside or outside
Iraq, and others voluntarily returning to Iran. The U.S. military and the
State Department also learned more about the Camp leadership and its
relationship with the residents. International observers visiting the Camp
published reports that the leadership was using various systems of control,
such as forced divorce and family separation, and group pressure to
manage residents' lives. This of course raises important questions about
the means by which some individuals found themselves at Camp Ashraf,
and the circumstances under which they currently reside. Mindful of this
and of the MEK's history, we regard the residents there not simply as
uniform members of a group, but as individuals, and this informs both our
own approach and our discussions with partners as we seek solutions to the
current problem.
When the UNSCR mandate expired on January 1, 2009, the U.S.
military was permitted to remain in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi
government. It had no authority to provide protection for the residents of
Camp Ashraf and accordingly transferred security responsibility for the
Camp to the Iraqi government. In 2008, prior to that transfer, the United
States joined the Iraqi government, the UN, and other nongovernmental
parties in meetings with Camp Ashraf leadership to ensure that the
handover of the Camp to the Iraqi government was conducted in a
responsible and humane manner. The leadership at Camp Ashraf was
informed that the U.S. military would no longer play a role in the Camp's
physical protection. In addition, the Camp leadership was informed that
although individual residents maintained rights under Iraqi and
international law, the residents, as a group, possessed no status or
collective rights.
Concurrently, at the U.S. government's request, the Iraqi government
provided assurances of humane treatment in accordance with Iraqi and
international laws, including that it will not transfer residents of Ashraf to a
4


19
country where they may have reason to fear persecution for their religious
or political beliefs, and it will not expel, return, or extradite any resident to
any country where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she
would be tortured. In addition, the Iraqi government allowed UN and U.S.
officials to monitor the well-being of the Camp's residents.
The Iraqi government has publicly expressed its decision to close
Camp Ashraf — a decision it regards as a legitimate exercise of its
sovereignty – by December 31, 2011. Yet the exercise of a sovereign right
does not obviate the need for care and restraint. We have seen and
condemned the terrible loss of life as a result of past attempts, including
last April, by Iraqi police and security forces to enter the Camp; these
attempts have consistently been met with resistance by the Camp residents
who reject the Iraqi government's right to do so. The United States has
stated publicly -- and I want to reiterate now -- that we expect the Iraqi
government to refrain from the use of violence. In addition, the United
States has been consistent in urging the Iraqi government to resolve the
humanitarian and security issues expeditiously and before the closure of
the Camp. This, in particular, was part of the Vice President's message to
the Iraqi leadership in Baghdad during his latest visit.
At the same time, the Camp leadership must respect Iraqi sovereignty
and refrain from acts of provocation, as we seek to resolve this matter. In
addition, as we have conveyed and continue to convey to the leaders of
Camp and to those who communicate with the MEK's Paris-based
leadership the MEK must act responsibly and not put any Ashraf residents,
or ask any Ashraf residents to place themselves, in harm's way.
A humane and secure relocation is possible, but it will take intense
and serious efforts by all parties.
Since the transfer of Camp Ashraf to the Iraqi government, we have
consistently engaged with the Camp's leadership to find a peaceful and
durable solution for the residents. We have repeatedly seen, and regret,
intransigence by Camp Ashraf leadership to agree to any relocation plan
5


20
other than en masse relocation outside Iraq as refugees. This would
require a foreign government to take them, and thus far none has agreed to
do so. To resettle them in the United States as a group would require an act
of Congress; immigration prohibitions would likely prevent many Ashraf
residents from being admitted to the United States, regardless of the MEK's
designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
While we recognize Iraq's sovereignty, we press them to exercise their
authority responsibly. The Iraqi government has been working with the
U.N. on a resolution of the situation at Camp Ashraf, and progress has been
made. We welcome this. We hope that the MEK and Camp Ashraf leaders
will engage constructively as well. A solution is possible if all sides display
the necessary level of seriousness about proposals that allow for the safe
and neutral determination of each resident's individual legal status, and his
or her desire to leave Iraq, while respecting individual rights, and all in a
context of security and humane treatment for the people now resident at
Camp Ashraf.
The Department has and will continue to work closely with the UN,
its Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), and the UNHCR to prepare the
way for a humanitarian resolution. These UN organizations, especially
UNAMI, are playing a leading role in the urgent and ongoing efforts to craft
a solution. The European Union is supporting these efforts, as well. There
is wide recognition on all sides that this is a serious situation requiring full
attention and support at the highest levels.
Our goal is to find an expeditious and humane resolution to the
closure of Camp Ashraf. We will continue to engage intensively at the
highest-levels to avoid any actions that could result in violence, and
encourage the residents to accept reasonable, humane, and secure
proposals to relocate them from Ashraf.
Thankyou for the opportunity to speak to you today about this urgent
issue, and I welcome your questions.


22
didn't he and his organization become a very positive democratic
force in Kenya after the British colonialists left?
Mr. FILNER. Thomas Jefferson.
Ambassador FRIED. There is ample evidence in history of exactly
the kind of transformation you are referring to. Certainly. No ques-
tion about that.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. So we know it has happened in his-
tory, and we know that our European allies have already redesig-
nated the MEK as a nonterrorist organization. So what is it with
the State Department? They don’t know history? Or they just
aren't as intense as our friends in Europe?
Ambassador FRIED. I know that the process is continuing. The
Secretary's decision will be made on the basis of the facts and the
law. I know that we are working hard for the interagency process
to get this done. And more than that, because it is in process, I
can’t say. With your permission, I will carry back your views and
what the views of this committee are.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would like you to carry back another mes-
sage; and that is if, indeed, you are correct and what I am seeing
is not an accurate picture—what I am seeing is roadblocks and not
an intense commitment. But my observation—I hope I am wrong.
Please carry back the word that I will apologize to you and to the
State Department for thinking the worst of you, for just believing
that the reason why the Secretary of State has not come through
with the documents that she has promised to come through with
about Camp Ashraf, that you know I have just been actually not
giving her the benefit of the doubt and thinking that maybe there
is something wrong here that she is trying to cover up.
But if you are able to succeed in a peaceful evacuation of Camp
Ashraf, saving the lives of these people, I will then go back to al-
ways giving our friends at the State Department the benefit of the
doubt. You can carry that message. I don’t know what kind of in-
centive that is.
But let me just note, I recognize the work that you do. Both of
you have worked all your lives and have worked really hard for our
country. But I happen to believe the State Department is an orga-
nism that quite often does not know one end of the organism from
the other, frankly; and, in this case, it seems to be a closed loop
where we ask for information and we don’t get it.
I mean, we asked—Secretary Clinton sat right where you are sit-
ting and told us we would have the documents about Camp Ashraf.
Now can you tell me, whereas you are representing the State De-
partment, why we don’t have those documents yet? Or was it a lit-
tle difficult to get over to the file and take them out and send them
over to Congress because you were too busy being intensified in
something else?
Ambassador FRIED. If I understand the request that you have
made, the letter which you have just received answers some of your
questions, as you said. I believe that that letter contains an offer
of a classified briefing to give you more information in addition to
the classified briefing you received at our Embassy. So I believe
that offer is on the record, and I repeat it now.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Let me for the record note that over
the years—in the 1990s, I was on this committee. I have been on


23
this committee for 20 years. And I remember asking then-Secretary
of State Albright for the documents that would pertain to American
policy toward the Taliban. And at that time, which we have
learned since, the United States Government had cut a deal with
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia that we were basically supporting the
Taliban. And none of those documents were ever made available to
this committee, even though the Secretary of State made a commit-
ment to make those documents available. Is it the policy of the
State Department to make commitments for providing documents
to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House of
Representatives but to do so with an intent of not fulfilling that
pledge?
I thought you would say that, thank you.
Okay. What I am going to do is let me colleague, Mr. Carnahan,
proceed with his questions. We have about 15 minutes to go and
then we will break for votes on the floor and come back for the sec-
ond panel. Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for
being here, I guess I want to get back to this redesignation issue,
Ambassador, and describe for the committee that process, where
exactly the process stands, let's start with that.
Ambassador FRIED. I appreciate and accept the chairman's com-
ment that I am representing the whole Department, so I take that
on board. With that said, I am not an expert in the process but I
will do my best to answer your question straightforward as I can.
The process involves interagency input that is nearly complete,
then exhaustive and comprehensive package goes up to the Sec-
retary for her consideration, I believe. I believe this will happen
soon. I can’t promise you a timeline and I don’t believe in making
promises I can't keep, but I can tell you that the issue of redesig-
nation is one that is much on the Secretary's mind, and she knows
this is coming.
Mr. CARNAHAN. And is it anticipated that will be done before or
after the December 31st deadline?
Ambassador FRIED. I can’t say. I can’t say and I can’t give a
promise—
Mr. CARNAHAN. I am not asking for that, I am just asking for
your best knowledge and information.
Ambassador FRIED. Um
Mr. CARNAHAN. You can’t say, I understand.
Ambassador FRIED. There are—because this is not—this is based
on the facts and the law and I can't—to make a promise that I
couldn't keep is something I am loath to do or commit.
Mr. CARNAHAN. I am not asking you that. So let's move on, the
other timeframe I want to ask you about, and maybe you can elabo-
rate more on is this December 31st deadline with regard to the ef-
forts that you describe are underway, and again, I would appre-
ciate those efforts. I think they are urgent and I certainly want to
be sure. I think everybody here wants to be assured that there is
not another humanitarian crisis or massacre because of inaction or
delay. So my question is with regard to that timeframe, do you
foresee us being able to process those 3,000-plus people who have
applied to get that process completed before that deadline?


24
Ambassador FRIED. As a practical matter, unfortunately no, that
is not. Now, yesterday—but if you want, I can elaborate on the
issue of the timeline and the problem it poses.
Mr. CARNAHAN. Please do, in an additional follow-up. So within
that process, is part of the effort that you are undertaking now,
discussions to extend that deadline to allow proper time for this to
happen? And if you would talk about that as well.
Ambassador FRIED. Certainly. Yesterday, the U.N. Security
Council had a session on Iraq, and a large portion of it was devoted
to exactly this issue. Afterwards, the head of the U.N. mission in
Iraq, Martin Cobler, who is leading these efforts with the Govern-
ment of Iraq had flown in from Iraq for this session. Told the press
that he believes the Government of Iraq should extend the dead-
line. He also said that the leaders at Camp Ashraf and the leaders
of MEK in Paris should fully participate—I am not quoting, but I
am paraphrasing—fully participate in his efforts, and he also re-
minded the world that the responsibility for a peaceful resolution
lies with the country whose sovereign in Iraq, that is, the Iraqi
Government.
We are working—the State Department is working very closely
with Ambassador Cobler. It is true as I said simply practical and
factual matter that all of the refugee processing cannot be com-
pleted by December 31st.
Mr. CARNAHAN. Can you give an estimate of what would be an
amount of time when that processing could be done?
Ambassador FRIED. I will do that, but I should say first that we
will be in a far, far stronger position urging the Iraqi Government
to take Cobler's advice and extend the deadline, if, in fact, there
is an active, if the MEK comes to the table, figuratively, I mean,
and helps work out arrangements for secure relocation. Time is
needed, but the question is time for what? And it has got to be—
the answer to that ought to be time for arrangements to be made
so that the people at Camp Ashraf can be moved in conditions that
are safe rather than chaotic. And that cannot happen unless they
agree to it, because if it is forcible, it ends very badly. I am sorry
about the long answer but I wanted you to know.
Mr. CARNAHAN. I see my time is about up. If we are negotiating
what that time needs to be to do that, what should that request
be in terms of do we need 2 months? Six months? If they are talk-
ing about an extension, what kind of extension are we really need-
ing to request?
Ambassador FRIED. My colleague may have something to say, but
it would be—I suspect it would be a matter of months, but our abil-
ity to get that extension is far stronger if there is an active process
underway.
Ms. LEAF. Sir, if I could add, since I have been working this ac-
count a bit longer than Ambassador Fried, to underline what he
said earlier about the intensity of efforts and sort of across the
board, we have several people at our Embassy in Baghdad who
make regular visits out to the camp. And in addition to the Ambas-
sador's interventions and discussions over the course of the last
couple months, there has been great intensity of discussions with
the U.N. agencies about how they might approach this so that we
might best buttress their efforts.


25
I wouldn't be willing of course to speak in lieu of them in terms
of what time frame they need, but we have been very encouraged
in this most recent period with the discussions that Ambassador
Cobler has had with the Government of Iraq and very operational,
practical discussions. So we are, of course, letting him lead in
terms of the mechanics of it, and we are coming full bore in behind
in a political sense, both here in Washington in discussions at high
level with Iraqi officials as well as out there on the ground.
As Ambassador Fried said, what will be useful now to take it to
another stage is for the leadership of the camp to engage in that
vein. We took a variety of attacks on this issue over the course of
the spring and summer on the U.S. basis as opposed to following
U.N. lead. And we were stymied in a sense in being able to move
forward because the residents of the campus existed on sort of a
block approach to resettlement. And we are simply not aware of
any country that is willing to take on that responsibility. And in-
deed, UNHCR's approach is on this matter, I am paraphrasing
here, is that they will not accord group status.
Finally there was a breakthrough on this some weeks back, and
residents began forwarding individual applications, but time is of
the essence here for the residents of the camp and leadership of the
camp to engage forthrightly with Ambassador Cobler so we can
make good headway on this. Thank you.
Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And Judge Poe will be
our next questioner. But just one more question from the chair,
how much aid are we providing Iraq this year and next year? Mili-
tary and development aid?
Ms. LEAF. I don’t have the figures right at hand, I will get those
to you. The aid request in terms of economic support funds that we
requested this year were, I think, in the range of $325 million. The
FMS amounts are considerably higher. Iraq has put its own money
toward that as well, but I would be happy to get you those.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. And the military?
Ms. LEAF. On the FMS, it is in the range, I want to say $4 bil-
lion, but I will get you the exact figure, sir.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Over $1 billion?
Ms. LEAF. Yes, well over, sir.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well over $1 billion. Just know that there
with a program just here in our committee about training the Iraqi
police, which was going to be a $900 million program over a certain
number of years. And I would suggest that if we are so intense in
our efforts to get to see a solution to this, that maybe we should
suggest that they are not going to get some of our money. Maybe
they doubt our sincerity when we don’t make a threat like this.
And I would now yield to Judge Poe.
Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As far as I know I have
seen all the classified briefings that the State Department has
shown us on the issue of the designation of the MEK. I have read
everything that has come to our attention about the designation.
I am not convinced that the MEK ought to stay in the Foreign
Terrorist Organization by the United States. Ambassador, you al-
luded to another classified briefing. Is there more information that
this committee hasn’t seen regarding why the MEK is still on the


27
Ambassador FRIED. We have made very clear our deep unhappi-
ness at those killings.
Mr. POE. I am sure—excuse me, I am sure that the people whose
family members are present and if they were killed in Camp
Ashraf are glad that we are deeply concerned. My question is, has
anybody in the Iraqi Government or anybody anywhere been held
accountable for the deaths of those people by our Government?
That is all my question is. -
Ambassador FRIED. Our Government? I am not aware of it.
Mr. POE. We haven’t.
The concern is the deadline, December 31st as people on this
committee have alluded to and has stated, that is the day of reck-
oning, people at Camp Ashraf are afraid for their lives. Does the
United States, our Government, the State Department, support re-
location of the residents to another camp in Iraq'?
Ambassador FRIED. Yes, we do.
Mr. POE. How do we know it is going to be safe for the people
of Camp Ashraf to be moved to another place?
Ambassador FRIED. That is exactly the subject of the detailed ne-
gotiations underway. Trust but verify is a good principle to have.
Mr. POE. Do you think they will, in the next 24 days, we will be
able to assure some kind of agreement with the Malaki government
that whatever happens to these folks, they will be safe?
Ambassador FRIED. I very much hope so, and it is our intention
to work with Ambassador Cobler, who has got the lead. To support
the conclusion of such an agreement, that cannot happen if the
U.N. is working only with the Government of Iraq. The leaders at
Ashraf and people at Camp Ashraf have to be part of this process,
and we encourage them to step forward and work so that there can
be a mutually-agreed arrangement rather than something that is
unilateral. Unilateral doesn’t work, it can end very badly, so we are
pushing hard for exactly this, and it is our view that if either an
agreement can be reached or enough progress can be made, that
we could get the time we need to get that kind of agreement. We,
in this case, is the U.N., they have the lead, but we are working
actively.
Mr. POE. I see my time has expired. I will ask unanimous con-
sent to submit other questions to the Ambassador and Ms. Leaf.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. And I would, at this point, suggest if there
are other questions that members have will be submitted in writ-
ing, we would hope that you would answer them forthwith. We still
have a few minutes left. It is the intention of the chair to have Mr.
Rivera and the other members of the committee have their ques-
tions as much time as we have got. Non members of the committee
who are sitting in are welcome to join us. As soon as the full mem-
bers of the committee are done with their questions, will be given
a chance if we have time. We will break, however, just before the
next vote, meaning the votes will happen, we have 15 minutes to
get down there, we will take 10 minutes to finish up this business,
give our colleagues hopefully a chance to ask questions. And then
our two witnesses from the State Department will be dismissed
and we will have a second panel starting right after the last of the
votes in this series.


28
I want to take this opportunity to thank both of you. I am very
aggressive in my questioning, and I do not mean that to be in dis-
respect, because I do want to you know that down deep, I know you
folks work really hard and I am very grateful and appreciative to
the work you have done in your life to make things work overseas.
This is an important issue and so we get a little passionate about
it too. Mr. Rivera you may proceed.
Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for hav-
ing, we had our weekly meeting with the Speaker that we had to
attend for just a few moments. If I am repeating a question that
was asked previously, again, I apologize. But before I left I had
said the main answer I want to get from this hearing is what is
the Obama administration doing? What is this government doing
to prevent the massacre on December 31st?
Ambassador FRIED. There was some discussion of this in the
back and forth, but I will repeat it. It is the critical question, of
course. We are focused now on the process of negotiations being led
by the United Nations with the Government of Iraq for a mutually-
agreed departure of the residents from Camp Ashraf and their safe,
secure humane relocation inside Iraq in a way that will allow the
UNHCR process them.
Mr. RIVERA. Have we made it clear to the Iraqi Government or
to the officials at the United Nations that such a repatriation upon
the December 31st deadline is unacceptable?
Ambassador FRIED. Repatriate?
Mr. RIVERA. Have we made it clear that the December 31st dead-
line of what the Iraqi Government has announced that that is un-
acceptable to this government?
Ambassador FRIED. It is the U.N.—I was saying earlier, but I
will repeat it. Ambassador Cobler, heading the efforts for the U.N.
yesterday after a Security Council session devoted to this issue,
said that the deadline needs to be extended, but he also said that
the leaders at Camp Ashraf and the MEK leaders in Paris need to
participate in the process, they need to step up and help come to
a mutually-agreed solution.
Mr. RIVERA. So the deadlines needs to be extended, that means
the deadline must be extended. That is our position, the position
of the Obama administration, that deadline must be extended; is
that correct?
Ambassador FRIED. It is impossible to get everything done before
the deadline. However, our ability to get an extension of the dead-
line, to convince the Iraqi Government to extend the deadline is
going to depend on whether there is a serious process underway
and that is why we call on the leaders at Camp Ashraf to get into
this process so that we have the best chance of a peaceful outcome,
which is what we all seek.
Ms. LEAF. Congressman, if I could just add something, we had
been engaged in some months earlier in efforts to work out ar-
rangements facilitated by the U.S. Government, the U.S. military
while it still existed in some numbers there, to do a safe and secure
relocation of the residents with assistance from UNHCR so that
UNHCR could begin processing. There were a number of impedi-
ments to doing so, one of the which was the insistence of the resi-
dence that UNHCR do all of its refugee interviewing at Camp


29
Ashraf, and UNHCR took the stance it could not do so for a num-
ber of reasons, among which it viewed it as a coercive environment.
So we were engaged in very intensive discussions throughout the
course of months, however, when the new head of UNAMI Martin
Cobler arrived in Iraq in early fall, he really took this issue over
and in a very activist way and began discussions with all parties.
And this is an effort, as Ambassador Fried said, that we fully sup-
port. We have made very clear that to the Iraqis in discussions
here and out there in Baghdad that the U.N. is the best and nec-
essary partner on this effort and that it is incumbent on the gov-
ernment to work
Mr. RIVERA. With respect to our Government, there is no doubt
from our Government that the fate of the residents of Ashraf is
dire, unless we intervene and make it clear that their fate is our
concern. Do we have any doubt about that?
Ambassador FRIED. No. There is no doubt that this situation is
serious, we are worried about the possibility of violence, and work-
ing flat out to ward it off.
Mr. RIVERA. Thank you. I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. We may even be serious enough to cut off
certain funds if we are still giving them billions of dollars to people
who won’t commit to us if they are not going to murder unarmed
people in a refugee camp.
Mr. Turner, do you have some questions?
Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A question for Ambas-
sador Fried, what, in your opinion, is the biggest obstacle to the
State Department listing the delisting MEK as a terrorist organi-
zation.
Ambassador FRIED. It is not a question of obstacles, it is a ques-
tion of a review of the facts and the law in this case. And that deci-
sion will be made by the Secretary, the memo is in preparation,
will be a long package of documents. It will be sent to her, she will
have to make that decision, that is all I can say at this time, sir.
Mi.Tº. When did the EU delist this organization, do you
TeCa.11:
Ambassador FRIED. I would have to get—
Mr. TURNER. It has been quite awhile.
Ambassador FRIED. Over a year, I believe.
Mr. TURNER. Are there any different facts that—
Ambassador FRIED. We have our own data and we have own
legal standards. We are, of course, aware of what the EU has done,
and it is obviously timely to review that. The Clinton administra-
tion, the Bush administration decided this one way, and this ad-
ministration is looking at the issue now.
Mr. TURNER. Thank you, I yield back.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And Mr. Filner.
Mr. FILNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just briefly if I may, I
know we have to adjourn. The absurdity of the listing of the MEK
as a terrorist organization is shown by your testimony. On the one
hand, we are treating them as terrorists. Then you are saying they
have to engage and sit at the table, and they have to take a role.
You are treating them in a way that says oh, yeah, there are legiti-
mate parties here. If they are legitimate parties, delist them. I
don't know why you think you can have it both ways, you are call-


30
ing someone a terrorist and saying please be engaged in this proc-
ess, you terrorists, we don’t trust you at the table, because you may
take out a gun and shoot us, but please sit down. That is absurd.
The whole thing of-you talk about urgency, all your stuff is on
process, you can't promise time lines. I mean, you are presently
now, if I understand, your official position is envoy about the clos-
ing of Guantanamo? Is that your title?
Ambassador FRIED. Special envoy for closure of Guantanamo,
yes, Sir.
Mr. FILNER. Oh, good. I hope we don't move as slow as we did
on that one in this case. Look you 25 days, we haven’t closed it,
right?
Ambassador FRIED. We can get into the reasons.
Mr. FILNER. We haven’t closed it, have we?
Ambassador FRIED. No.
Mr. FILNER. Okay. So 2 years from now, I hope you say well, we
were trying to deal with Ashraf, but they were complexities there.
You have 25 days. I don't hear from you the assurance that many
of these people would like to hear, because they have relatives
there, and they have close friends there, that somehow the United
States is going to take action that does not depend on all these
other complexities. If you just recommended today, half dozen
troops stay there at Camp Ashraf or recommend today that the Se-
curity Council take this action or recommend today that the U.N.
take some specific action, you are not doing that. You keep talking
about the complexities and the timelines and you can’t comment on
this and there's this and that. Give us some assurance that what
you just said, you think the situation is dire. I don’t see any evi-
dence that you think the situation is dire. It takes months for us
to get a letter from the Secretary on these issues. We tried to visit
Camp Ashraf, they won’t let us. How do we know the situation is
dire?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Give the Ambassador a chance to answer the
question.
Mr. FILNER. I yield back.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. And hopefully we will give Ms. Jackson Lee
a chance to ask a question. Mr. Ambassador, would you like to an-
swer that?
Ambassador FRIED. It is hard to know where to begin, but we do
regard the situation as serious, and the word “dire” is appropriate.
Mr. FILNER. Then do something today which shows that. What
can you tell us today that the United States is going to do to pro-
tect those people?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. If you want him to answer your question.
Mr. FILNER. He goes on with bureaucratic baloney.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. We got a couple of minutes. Mr. Ambassador,
you have 15 seconds, we are going to give Jackson Lee a minute
and then we have run off and vote.
Ambassador FRIED. The best way to resolve this peacefully is to
work with the U.N. to get a negotiated solution quickly so that the
people there can leave the camp in safety and security, that is
what we are aiming at, and we are indeed working intensely every
single day.


31
M; ROHRABACHER. Okay, Ms. Jackson Lee, did you have a ques-
tion?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I have to take a second to
thank you and Mr. Carnahan. This is a miracle to believe that we
have a full hearing on Camp Ashraf is absolutely a miracle and a
tribute to the Iranian Americans that are sitting in this room. But
let me say on April 8th, the Iraqi arm and police under the com-
mand of Mr. Malaki attacked Camp Ashraf with ammunition and
weapons, I believe, from the United States. At least 34 people were
killed and 8 women were killed. At the end of this month, Mr.
Malaki determines to close this. Ambassador Fried, and to Ms. Leaf
I thank you for your service, I have this question for you imme-
diately. Just what is the United States intending to do? I want you
to cut off funds from Malaki, I want Malaki, as he comes, I appre-
ciate the sovereignty and I appreciate the dignity of his office, but
I believe he should not have an oval office meeting with the Presi-
dent until he agrees before he walks into that oval office that he
will not murder, kill and maim the people of Camp Ashraf. He does
not deserve a seat with our President if he is not going to agree
before that meeting.
What are you prepared to do to stop the bloodshed? Are our sol-
diers going to be there? Are you going to insist that if there is an
extension? What are you intending to do, if I may have that an-
SWer:
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Ms. Jackson Lee asked a really important
question. Will you take that message back and give us an answer,
will this President meet with Prime Minister Maliki even if he
hasn’t made an agreement on this issue, come to an under-
standing?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Can I just add, will you have soldiers there,
are you going to absolutely stop them from closing it?
Ambassador FRIED. After many years and the expense of blood
and treasure, our soldiers are leaving Iraq. We are working flat out
to support arrangements for the safe and secure humane relocation
of the residents of Camp Ashraf. We are doing so on an urgent
basis, very mindful of the calendar and the ticking clock. That is
where our efforts are focused.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Could you go to address Ms. Jackson Lee's
original question, is the President of the United States going to be
meeting with Prime Minister Maliki, even if he has not reached an
understanding on this issue and if you do not know the answer,
will you take that to the State Department and let them know how
concerned we are about it?
Ambassador FRIED. First, I will certainly take back the concern
of this committee, absolutely, sir. And secondly, I will say that in
my judgment, the best way to convey the gravity of the situation
and the concerns of this committee is to have that meeting and go
forward with it.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. With that said, this hearing will be ad-
journed in one moment when I just leave the thought, actions
speak louder than words. You are talking to somebody, whose going
to hºrstand that that is weakness, rather than if you don't talk
to him.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. It is a human rights issue, Mr. Chairman.


32
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee, this part of the
hearing is in recess until after the next vote. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will assume that our friends on the other
side of the aisle think it is okay for us to proceed and talk to Rank-
ing Member Carnahan. Prior to the break he said he was inun-
dated with some things, so I am sure he will be here. So this hear-
ing will come to order again.
For our second panel we have with us three fine witnesses, and
I think the first panel certainly gave us a lot of things to think
about, and I think we have a now shed light on a very serious
issue. And just doing that hopefully will help us find a solution be-
fore another tragedy occurs.
Our first witness is Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield who has a
long, long history of being active professionally and helping the
United States in its diplomatic efforts. Assistant Secretary of State,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary State Po-
litical Military Affairs you name it, it is that long. We are very
happy to have you. And today he is chairman of the Henry
Stimpson Center here in Washington, DC.
We have Wes Martin who is a retired Army Colonel. In combat
he served as a senior antiterrorism force protection officer for all
coalition forces in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and has a
long history in the area of National defense. We also have with us
one of those prose from the academics from the think tanks here
in Washington, Elizabeth Ferris from the Brookings Institution.
We welcome all of you and what we would—perhaps, move for-
ward if you could summarize your testimony in 5 minutes, that
would be great then we will go on for some dialogue and hopefully
some other members will be joining us, but also, if members are
not joining us you should be aware that they are available. We
hope you are available for questions that we could send you in
writing that you could answer back in writing. So Ambassador
Bloomfield, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD,
JR., CHAIRMAN, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER
Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good after-
noon. I have prepared a statement and would ask it be entered for
the record.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. So ordered.
Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. I would be pleased to discuss it in re-
sponse to your questions. By way of introduction, I will make three
brief points. I will start with the last point I discussed in my pre-
pared statement. You will be aware that many retired military
leaders have publicly called for the U.S. Government to ensure that
the residents of Camp Ashraf are unharmed as U.N. agencies try
to process them for onward disposition. The motives of these senior
leaders have been publicly questioned.
Having worked as a civilian in the Pentagon, White House the
State Department on defense and security issues for many years,
I know most of these officers, and believe the criticism of them to
be misguided. Their sole concern is the honor of the U.S. military,
which extended a promise of protection to the residents of Camp


33
Ashraf 8 years ago. That promise has twice been violated by Iraq's
º forces, and a third attack could occur by the end of this
month.
U.S. laws governing arms transfers and security assistance, the
Arms Expert Control Act and the Leahy Law enforcing human
rights standards, would appear to have been violated and must be
upheld. Above all, our military forces, who, along with their fami-
lies, have paid such a high price for their service in Iraq must be
permitted to exit Iraq with honor. That is the bottom line American
interest at stake in the Camp Ashraf situation. And if some Amer-
ican journalists have been slow to grasp it, I have no doubt that
Iran's leaders see a strategic opportunity here to harm our reputa-
tion and credibility as a superpower at a time when the future the
Middle East is being contested.
Second, you will find in my prepared remarks reference to an
independent assessment I wrote in August which will, I hope, be
part of the electronic record of this hearing. For much of this year,
I have been critically examining the factual record that commonly
attaches to the Mujahedin-e Khalq, the entity listed since 1997 as
a Foreign Terrorist Organization with which the residents of are
Camp Ashraf are affiliated.
In the interest of time, I will leave it to the members to pursue
any questions from my research, which relies on the most credible
sources I could find and calls into question many of the most dam-
aging allegations commonly made against the MEK. I offer the
members my prepared testimony as an alternative narrative of re-
cent history that has major implications for U.S. policy. And I re-
spectfully recommend that the Congress formally seek a cleared in-
telligence community assessment of my findings to confirm or
credibly rebut them item by item with hard facts, and to report
back to Congress.
Why is this important? And this is my final point. I am per-
suaded that three decades of history involving the MEK which
Americans have viewed exclusively through the specialized prism
of terrorism is, in fact, a deadly war between two groups over polit-
ical rights in Iran. Americans have had little interest in this story
mainly because we are told that these people were the ones respon-
sible for killing American officers and contractors in Tehran in the
1970s. If I still thought these were the people who killed Ameri-
cans, I probably would not have looked much further myself. But
my research indicates that the Americans were killed by a different
group than the MEK of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.
So I have pursued this story further, and what I see is a contest
for Iran's future that Ayatollah Khomeini won in 1981 by jailing
and executing tens of thousands of people who opposed dictator-
ship. The European court cases dismissing terrorism charges
against the MEK did not say that the MEK had repented and
ceased its terrorist behavior. They said that the MEK’s violent ac-
tions over two decades from 1981 to 2001, all aimed at the regime
in Tehran, had never been terrorism.
What do we miss when we look at the actions of only one party
in a conflict? Obviously, the other side's actions. Whether or not the
MEK and its political affiliate have any prospect of being a player
in Iran's future, and you won't find a single Washington expert


35
Testimony of Amb. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr. before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
“Camp Ashraf. Iraqi Obligations and State Department Accountability," December 7, 2011
My thanks to the Committee on Foreign Affairs for inviting me to testify today, and to the Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member of each subcommittee for welcoming me to this hearing. It is an honor to be
invited to testify to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcommittee on the
Middle East and South Asia.
The focus of today's hearing is the fate of 3,400 unarmed persons at Camp Ashraf, Iraq who may face
imminent danger from Iraqi and Iranian forces. UN officials are working hard to uphold protocols and
guidelines in seeking to resolve the status and future of these Iranian exiles as they would help any at-
risk population. But the United States' role is more complicated. For this is not a group of people
without any connection to the US. Rather, it is a group of people belonging to an organization – the
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)—that our government lists as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and has long
accused of heinous actions against America and patterns of behavior deemed despicable by civilized
standards.
At the same time, it is a group of people who were targeted in 2003 by American forces in fulfillment of
an assurance explicitly sought and received from US diplomats by the Iranian government at the
negotiating table in Geneva prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. I have been told that about 120 bombs
were fired by the US on Camp Ashraf, killing 50 MEK personnel, even though, as the US Government
later confirmed, the MEK were not belligerents in that conflict. US forces negotiated and signed a cease-
fire agreement with MEK representatives at Camp Ashraf, removed all their weapons, facilitated
individual investigative interviews with each resident by US law enforcement and intelligence personnel,
collected signed contracts from each resident forswearing violence, and granted each resident a
protected personsidentity card. When the US handed control of Camp Ashraf over to Iraqi authorities
in January 2009, the Commander of the US/Coalition Force, General Petraeus, sought and received
assurances from the Iraqi government that the security of Camp Ashraf residents would continue to be
be guaranteed.
Nearly three years later, the readiness of the US to honor the pledge it made to uphold the security of
Camp Ashraf's residents is in serious doubt, as fatal attacks on Camp Ashraf's residents by Iraqi armed
forces trained and equipped by the United States have already occurred, in July 2009 and April 2011.
Leaders and ministers of Iraq and Iran have made a very public bilateral agreement under which Iraq has
committed to close Camp Ashraf by the end of 2011. Some in the US have questioned the legal
judgments in Washington that formed the basis for the US military's promise of security to Camp Ashraf
residents in 2003; there have been suggestions that "protected persons" status is nothing more than a
standard caution that military forces in combat should take care not to target civilians, including the
entire population of Iraq. Still others have suggested that in any case, any such US obligation had its full
effect only when the US was the occupying power in Iraq, and certainly did not carry over past the
turnover of sovereign control to Iraq at the end of 2008.


36
I am here today to place these issues, and the related subject of Iran and the MEK, in a substantially
different light than the narratives offered by the government and the American media. I do this with
one purpose in mind: to help ensure that America's reputation and standing are enhanced, not
diminished, by our handling of the drawdown of forces in Iraq and our posture toward Iran going
forward.
I do not claim professional expertise on Iran, having never traveled to Iran and not having the ability to
speak or read Farsi. However, Iran's actions have continuously touched my career, from the 1979
revolution itself to the 1983 Marine bombing, hostage-taking and similar terrorist actions in Lebanon in
the 1980s, to the arms-for-hostages scandal, to the Argentina terror bombings, the mining of the Persian
Gulf by Iran and reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers by the US, the accidental US shoot-down of the Iran Air
flight, the role of Iranian irregular forces in helping Saddam Hussein smuggle oil out of Iraq in violation of
UN resolutions, the rise of Hizballah and the facilitating role of Syria, the growing missile and rocket
threat to Israel from Lebanon and Gaza, Iran's support to elements feeding instability in Iraq, Bahrain
and Yemen, and of course its provocative quest for a nuclear weapons capability in violation of its
international obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Like many Middle East experts, I have always had some awareness of the MEK-an entity that has been
around for nearly 50 years and been on the US list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations for the past 14
years. But I only began to develop real knowledge about the MEK this year, when Akin Gump Strauss
Hauer & Feld LLP, a law firm where I serve as a part-time consultant, began representing an American
citizens' group seeking to have the MEKremoved from the terrorism list. I am not a lobbyist and have
not advocated a policy position relative to the MEK.
Instead, beginning this past spring, I have examined what the government, the press and outside
commentators were saying about this group, and investigated the factual basis for those claims. For
many years, very negative things have been said over and over again about the MEK-that it killed
Americans in Iran in the 1970s and participated in the prolonged seizure of the American Embassy; that
it was a combatant against American forces in Iraq, and helped Saddam Hussein's forces with their
bloody suppression of the 1991 Kurdish and Shi'a uprisings; that it is a serial abuser of its own members'
human rights – a secretive cult; and that it is committed to violent, anti-American, anti-democratic
beliefs, no matter what it says. The two main themes are that the MEK has always been, and remains, a
terrorist group by nature; and that it is universally rejected and even despised by the Iranian people, and
thus should have no place in the conversation about Iran's political future.
My independent assessment of these allegations, dated August 16, which I have provided to the
Committee, cited the most credible official and unofficial information sources I could find on these
subjects; and in virtually every case, the allegations do not align with the facts. Moreover, my report
cited repeated instances in which Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security was found to be secretly
placing many of these allegations into trusted information outlets in Europe, Canada, the US and Iraq-
to say nothing of the state-controlled media portrayal of the MEK within Iran since 1980. Additionally
my assessment showed that since the mid-1980s the government of Iran has been explicitly negotiating


37
with the US and other Western governments to have the MEK labeled as a terrorist group and restricted
accordingly.
My August report did not claim perfect knowledge about the MEK and its activities. I took care to note
that there might be classified information clearly implicating the MEK in recent or planned terrorist
activities. But the report was a challenge to anyone giving voice to these allegations about the MEK to
back up their claims. If credible proof exists and my inquiry missed it, I fully expected the MEK's critics
to point out gaps in my research and offer unimpeachable sources to the contrary, in which case I would
stand corrected. That offer still holds.
Last month I spent five days in France, witnessing a public event regarding the circumstances of the
3,400 MEK individuals at Camp Ashraf. I was invited by the French National Assembly to discuss my
report at a hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee. I met many Iranian exiles and heard their
individual stories, and also French officials including the former head of the DST, the French counter-
intelligence service. I conducted an extended conversation with Mrs. Maryam Rajavi. I visited the
broadcast studios of Iran National Television, which is sympathetic to the National Council of Resistance
of Iran. And I brought back notes, books, articles and videos that together with my earlier assessment
point to a materially different picture of reality than what one receives here in Washington from trusted
sources such as the current State Department terrorism Country Report on the MEK, the recent New
York Times front-page feature article on the MEK, and the common portrayal of the MEK by Iran
experts' in the Washington policy community.
So one conclusion I offer to the Congress today is that there is a major untold story here. My experience
with Iranian exiles sympathetic to the MEK, after asking literally hundreds of questions in recent
months, is that no question has been too sensitive or off-limits, people welcome the scrutiny, and the
MEK has a substantial database of information to support its answers. Am I saying that all of the MEK's
claims are true? No, that is not for me to judge. If information offered by the MEK is fabricated or
fraudulent, that should not be too hard to prove; and one of my purposes here is to put some of that
information to the test of official and public examination. The same goes for revelations on this subject
by French journalists and ex-officials. One could only speculate as to why our network television
correspondents, mainstream journalists, and leading strategic analysts of Iranian affairs have not
critically examined this issue. But they have not.
Why does this matter? Some say that it makes no difference whether or not the MEK are terrorists,
killers of American citizens, and human rights abusers: no matter who they are or what they may have
done, the people at Camp Ashraf are still a population at risk, just like any population at risk, and the
proper agencies of the UN are working to resolve their situation, with cooperation from the US
Government. Further, US officials have said that the inability of the US to offer refuge and asylum to
any of these people due to the MEK's status as a listed Foreign Terrorist Organization and related
restrictions, has no bearing on the willingness of other governments to take in greater or lesser numbers
of Camp Ashraf residents. When one considers the larger backdrop of US-Iran relations and the
deepening concern about Iran's nuclear program, with political turmoil rampant in neighboring Arab
countries, it is understandable that US policymakers want to avoid further friction points and
3


38
provocations with Tehran, and focus our diplomatic efforts on the sanctions aimed at curbing Iran's
nuclear program.
The problem with this cautious perspective is that it obscures the full scope of Iran's thirty-year
campaign to eliminate the MEK, and the significance of a failure by the United States in particular to
protect Camp Ashraf's residents from harm at the hands of either Iraqi forces or the Iranian regime.
Consider, even theoretically, an alternative reality to what Americans have been told formany years.
What if an objective, unfiltered examination of the conflict between Iran's successive rulers and those
who opposed repressive monarchy and religious dictatorship yielded a significantly different explanation
of recent Iranian history? To wit:
> What if the organization today known as the MEK (and its political umbrella group the National
Council of Resistance), including Massoud and Maryam Rajavi, had no involvement in the killing
of Americans in the 1970s? (see below)
* What if the MEK record of violence against the Tehran regime from 1981-2001 that the US in
1997 termed "terrorism" was but oneside of a two-way war that began in earnest in June
1981, with a half-million supporters of democracy rallying in Tehran alone, when Ayatollah
Khomeini sent his forces out to conduct mass arrests and executions of all suspected MEK
sympathizers? (As my assessment noted, the French Investigative Magistrate's decision in
April 2011 dismissing all charges against the National Council of Resistance of Iran said, "The
dossier does not contain any evidence indicating an armed activity that would intentionally
target civilians. If such evidence were available it would confirm terrorism and would annul any
reference to resistance against tyranny....")
> What if the regime in Tehran has always feared the MEK/NCRI more than any other opposition
party or movement because the MEK undermines the regime's ability to leverage Islam to
retain power? (The MEK's rights-based program incorporating religious tolerance, separation
of church and state, and -most significantly-gender equality, poses a direct challenge to the
core principle, hence the legitimacy, of Iran's fundamentalist dictatorship—the doctrine called
veloyatefaqih – which reposes unchallengeable authority over executive, legislative, judicial,
social and religious affairs in the person of the Supreme Leader.)
> What if the devotion of MEK members at Camp Ashraf and elsewhere that many view as
evidence of a brainwashed cult, is instead the sacrifice and commitment of mostly educated
exiles whose family members were executed for their political beliefs by the Iranian regime,
and whose families in many cases are today separated inside and outside Iran for as long as the
current regime is in power? (Estimates of MEK members and suspected sympathizers killed by
the regime in 1981 and the ensuing decade number in the many tens of thousands, possibly as
many as 120,000; Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, initially a student movement leader who ran for
Parliament in Tehran in 1980 and received a quarter-million votes, lost two sisters: one was


39
executed by the Shah's secret police, and a second sister who was pregnant at the time was
tortured to death in jail by the Khomeini regime.)
> What if no western government has ever labeled or imposed restrictions on the MEK as a
terrorist group as a counter-terrorism policy response to MEK terror acts, but rather without
exception these labels and restrictions have been imposed as diplomatic concessions in
response to continuous demands from the government in Tehran? (Details below)
> What if the MEK in Iraq never fired on US forces? (The April 15, 2003 Cease-Fire Agreement
co-signed by the local US/Coalition unit commander—the final text of which was negotiated
between the US and MEK-includes the statement “The NLA/PMOI IMFK) state that they have
not fired even a single bullet against US/Coalition forces in the war because their only enemy is
the religious dictatorship in Iran. NLA/PMOI also state that they have never been involved in
the woror any act of hostility with U.S./Coalition forces." On July 26, 2004, the State
Department spokesman said of the MEK: "[W]e have determined that they were not
belligerents in this conflict....")
> What if the commonly repeated allegation that the MEK in Iraq was an integral part of Saddam
Hussein's forces that brutally suppressed the northern Kurdish and southern Shi'a uprisings in
Iraq is false? (Eight years after the US intervention cleaned out the entire database of Saddam
Hussein's regime, not one item of confirming evidence from DoD or the Intelligence
Community has yet surfaced in public, and the State Department does not stand on this
allegation, citing only press reporting.)
What if, in other words, the leading state sponsor of terrorism, Iran, has successfully persuaded Western
governments including the US that it is in their interest to perpetuate institutionalized disdain, and
accept only perfunctory responsibility, for the safety and security of the MEK personnel at Camp Ashraf,
largely on the basis that these people have brought their predicament upon themselves and are
undeserving of more consideration? This is not to minimize the difficulty of arranging for the protection,
orderly processing and onward placement in third countries of these exiled Iranian regime opponents.
But one wonders, if a population of dissident Syrian civilians fleeing the Assad regime in Damascus were
holed up at Camp Ashraf, unarmed, having been promised by the US that we would assure their
security, with the strong possibility of being attack by Iraqi forces by year's end – would our national
effort be the same?
To be clear, I support my government and want elected leaders on both sides of the political aisle to
represent America's interests with strategic vision and resolve. The sensitive questions I am raising are
intended not to demean or embarrass, but to give the Administration and Congress some "top cover" to
expand and reassess the body of information and analysis that form the basis for US policy.
While I lack the resources to verify or rebut important aspects of this tragic, violent chapter in recent
Iranian history, I offer the following as a potentially more accurate rendering of what has led our
government and others to the current dangerous impasse at Camp Ashraf. If true, these conclusions
5


40
have larger implications for US policy. Perhaps others have proof to the contrary, but finding no such
proof in the open sources available to me, I urge the Congress to request the intelligence community to
confirm or credibly disprove the following points:
- From its inception in the mid-1960s the MEK was a political movement of students seeking an
Iran freed from external coercion and dependencies. The MEK today and its umbrella
organization the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) are the followers of Massoud
Rajavi (the one original top organizer of the MEK not killed by the Shah's regime) and his wife
Maryam Rajavi. The MEK's base of support from the start was university students sharing
strong nationalist and post-colonial liberationist aspirations that had been frustrated when
Prime Minister Mossadeq was deposed in a CIA-led coup in August 1953 that restored the Shah
to power. While the antagonism between the MEK student movement and the Shah's regime
turned repressive and violent, the fight was over political rights and an end to authoritarian rule.
- Massoud Rajavi and the original MEK were not behind the killing of Americans in Lehran in the
1970s. While Massoud Rajavi and surviving followers were imprisoned in the 1970s under the
Shah, a splinter organization with ties to Marxist groups in Cuba and Oman as well as George
Habash's PFLP-GC appropriated and modified the MEK name and symbols, clashing with original
MEK members, and killed Americans in Tehran. They were caught, confessed and were
executed. (The 2005 State Department Country Report on the MEK correctly attributed the
killings, as did reporting by the Washington Post at the time of the killings.)
- Ayatollah Khomeini met once with Massoud Rajavito explore political collaboration but the
latter would not accept Khomeini's terms for the Iranian Revolution. Not until Khomeini took
power after his return to Iran in 1979 did he make clear that there would be no democracy or
individual rights in Iran. Massoud Rajavi, once freed from prison, attracted thousands to his
rallies in Tehran preaching democratic philosophy. Ayatollah Khomeini at first disqualified
Rajavi from seeking elected office, then issued a secret fatwa ordering his execution. Pro-
fundamentalist armed groups (the predecessor to the bassij militias that enforce social and
religious restrictions) attacked MEK publication houses throughout Iran and harassed large MEK
rallies. When in June 1981 it became clear that Massoud Rajavi's message of individual rights
was popular and posed a threat to consolidating the revolution, Khomeini's regime engaged in
mass arrests and executions, driving the MEK into hiding initially in Iranian Kurdistan, then
France, later Iraq.
- Th 's brutal securi ice. SAVAK. was not disband t rath - bv Avatolla
Khomeini's regime after the 1979 revolution. Veteran intelligence professionals with worldwide
liaison relationships were given a choice to keep their properties and wealth in Iran under the
new leadership in return for working as the foundation of the mullahs' Ministry of Intelligence
and Security, known as VEVAK. Yves Bonnet, former head of the French counter-intelligence
service (DST), has written a book, VEVAK-Au Service des Ayatollahs (2009) detailing this
history. (Note—I have met with Mr. Bonnet, and only read portions of his book given the
6


41
limitations of my French language capacity.) This raises legitimate counter-intelligence
questions of possible regime influence over outspoken Iranian experts resident in the west
whose backgrounds might not otherwise suggest any affinity for the fundamentalist regime-
particularly those who travel regularly to Iran without difficulty.
In 1986, Massoud Rajavi and MEK personnel were expelled from France to Iraq not because of
terrorist activity, but rather as a quid-pro-quo with the regime in Tehran in which France hoped
to free 6 hostages in Lebanon. In the end, only two of the six French hostages were freed. This
occurred not long after the US-Israel-Iran arms-for-hostages affair during which correspondence
cited in the Iower Commission report included American compliance with Iran's request that
Washington denounce the MEK as terrorists, which the State Department did in 1985. France
made a second effort to recover hostages in Lebanon in 1987, exiling a number of MEK
personnel to Gabon; this effort came undone as MEK supporters staged public hunger strikes,
and France enlisted Saddam Hussein's intervention with Massoud Rajavi to quiet the
controversy as the exiles were returned to France.
The 2003 police round-up and arrest of 160 MEK (National Council of Resistance) individuals in
France was not a French law enforcement response to terror activity, but rather was a
diplomatic concession by France to Iran linked to the Total oil concession, the nuclear issue, and
a planned visit to Iran by President Chirac. Jean-Claude Maurice, former senior reporter and
editor of the Journal du Dimanche, accompanied French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin
on a visit to Iran in 2003. As chronicled in his 2009 memoir, Sivous le repetez, ie
dementirai.Chirac, Sarkozy, Villepin ("If you repeat it, I will deny it"), after the press was
dismissed at the outset of Minister Villepin's meeting with Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal
Kharrazi, Mr. Maurice went back into the meeting room to retrieve his briefcase but was locked
in as the doors were closed. His account of the conversation includes Foreign Minister Kharrazi
explicitly requesting that France take action against the MEK, and asking that Iran's Ambassador
to France coordinate with then-Interior Minister Sarkozy. Shortly thereafter, as Mr. Maurice
recounts the story, French authorities staged a spectacular raid on the National Council of
Resistance (MEK), arresting Mrs. Maryam Rajavi and many others in their homes. (The most
recent US State Department report on the MEK says of this event: "In 2003, French authorities
arrested 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate
financing and planning for terrorist attacks." The final verdict on France's 8-year counter-
terrorism investigation of the MEK, quoted above, dismissing all charges, is not mentioned.)
The EU-3 (British, French and German) di atic effort in 2003-2004 to negotiate solution
of Iran's nuclear activities accommodated Iranian demands that these governments take action
against the MEK. Details are discussed in Mr. Maurice's book (previous item); the IAEA
Information Circular of November 26, 2004 (INFCIRC/637), entitled “Communication dated 26
November 2004 received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic
Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom concerning the agreement signed in Paris on 15
November 2004" and signed by Ambassadors of the four governments, contains this sentence:
7


42
"irrespective of progress on the nuclear issue, the E3/EU and Iran confirm their determination to
combot terrorism, including the activities of Al Qa’ida and other terrorist groups such as the
Mek."
- Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security has for years conducted an extensive and continuous
campaign in foreign countries through agents and financial inducements, to introduce
defamatory portrayals of the MEK's beliefs, organizational culture and alleged activities with the
goal that journalists and non-governmental entities outside Iran will condemn the MEK as a
serial abuser of human rights and a cult. My August 16 assessment contains several references,
including from allied security and intelligence services, court documents, UN reports and
mainstream press reporting, in support of this conclusion.
If each of the above points is substantially correct, Americans should at a minimum recognize that the
Ashraf issue is not isolated from larger equities. Whatever else one thinks of them, these people are
survivors of a long, violent and tragic conflict between one group that successfully consolidated power
in Iran and another group that suffered grievous losses and fought back against a religious dictatorship
that continued to execute sympathizers at home while pursuing their supporters worldwide. Since
2001, sources seem to agree, the MEK has not engaged in violent tactics. As noted, the residents of
Camp Ashraf voluntarily disarmed and accepted the protection of US forces in 2003.
Eight years later, US forces are exiting Iraq as the final act in an eight-year military intervention. Our
President will receive the elected Prime Minister of Iraq in Washington in the coming week. US
policymakers are working hard to manage an array of sensitive issues with Iran, foremost the effort to
curb the latter's nuclear weapons program.
It is, on the surface, a respectable and correct scenario. I repeat my abiding regard for all who serve the
American people in the executive and legislative branches of our government, and respectfully cite the
following concerns in the hope that leaders in the Administration and Congress will support-indeed
demand with urgency—a deeper look at Iran's campaign for regional influence, its strategies for regime
maintenance, and the significance of Iran's intelligence, informational and diplomatic activities to US
and allied interests.
> As stated in my August assessment, the lethal Iraqi military attacks on unarmed residents of
Camp Ashraf in July 2009 and April 2011 require the Administration to report to Congress under
Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act as to whether US weapons were utilized for purposes
other than those authorized by the terms of transfer to the Iraq Armed Forces. Upholding US
law governing armstransfers is essential to America's reputation as a superpower.
> Further, the so-called Leahy Law requires that the State Department and the US Embassy in
Baghdad investigate these attacks and judge whetherany Iraqi military personnel have engaged
in gross violations of human rights, and if so those personnel must be prohibited from ever
receiving training and education from the US military. Here again our reputation is implicated.


43
> Beyond the legal requirements triggered by the two previous Ashraf attacks, I wish to associate
myself with the many retired senior military leaders who have forcefully urged that the
residents of Camp Ashraf be protected. The motives of these senior leaders in taking this
stance, including three former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have been publicly
questioned. I respect these officers and believe their sole motive is to preserve the honor of the
United States, by living up to the commitments made by US military forces in a theater of
combat. Any harm that would befall a single resident of Camp Ashraf at the hands of Iraqi or
Iranian government forces, either within Camp Ashraf or elsewhere in Iraq, would constitute a
promise not kept by America as our forces depart the country. Having paid such a heavy price
for their service in Iraq, our military must be allowed to exit Iraq with honor.
Some Americans may not grasp the weight of these propositions, the spectacle of the US soft-
pedaling its legal requirements on arms transfers, trying to extricate itself from a sense of duty to an
unloved group of at-risk civilians, hoping that these and related inconveniences do not mar the
tableau of the President's welcoming of the Iraqi Prime Minister next week to signal a new era. But I
have no doubt that the leaders of Iran fully understand the symbolism of America's exit from Iraq
and will miss no opportunity to degrade America's reputation and diminish our influence in Iraq and
the region. Operation Iraqi Freedom may be over, but the future of the Middle East is being shaped
right now. Iran is advancing its political and security agenda in many ways, in many places – are we
connecting the dots?
I have obtained photographs, maps and videos of 300 loudspeakers arrayed around Camp Ashraf
broadcasting death threats in Farsi 24 hours a day (except when international representatives visit),
and yet I see no mention of this in the public domain. Can we not confirm the MEK's claims that 200
of the Camp's residents are wounded and yet medical supplies are not allowed in by Iraqi forces?
That computer equipment for internet service has similarly been blocked from entry? That infrared
jamming devices manufactured in Tehran are posted outside the Camp to block transmission of
signals to the residents? The MEK alone is accused of human rights abuses against its own members
there, including blocking access to information as a form of mind control.
Beyond the circumstances at Camp Ashraf, I am further mystified that so much information relating
to this issue is so readily accessible in Europe, from credentialed French sources as well as Iranian
exiles, and is common knowledge in French political circles, yet so little of this has surfaced in the
US. Perhaps our correspondents and analysts are concerned that their ability to travel to Iran will
end if they report this information and give a voice to the families of the Ayatollahs' many victims.
As with all the questions raised in this statement, I do not wish to see Americans divided against
themselves or set against their government on this issue. Without doubt, Americans in and out of
government want to know as much as possible about Iran's activities, particularly those aimed at
influencing our policies to its advantage through indirect means. I thank the Committee and
Subcommittees for the opportunity to participate in our national conversation about US policy and
American interests, and I look forward to the Members' comments and questions.


46
A K I N G U M P
S T R A U S S H A U E R & F E L D LLP
Attorneys at Law
August 16, 2011
Subject: MEK/PMOI and the Search for Ground Truth about its Activities and Nature
From: Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield Jr., Senior Advisor/Consultant -
(NOTE: As Akin Gump is representing an American citizens association interested in influ US policy relative to
MEK/PMO, permit me to clarify here that my role as a part-time consultant advisor to the firm is not to participate in
lobbying activities but rather to provide the firm what I judge to be the most reliable information and insight on foreign
policy issues important to the credibility of its work. My compensation from the firm has for years been fixed annually
and in 2011 accounts for approximately 20 percent of my professional time. I was invited by the firm to examine this
issue, and as a foreign policy and national security generalist who claims no special expertise on Iran, I welcomed the
opportunity to research an important and sensitive foreign policy issue in depth, an effort that continues. The views in
this memorandum are mine alone.)
The Challenge: Separating Fact from Falsehood in a Long-Running. Deadly and Deceptive Fight
The entity known variously as the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), People's Mojahedin Organization
of Iran (PMOI), and by some detractors as Mujahedin al-Khalq Organization (MKO), as part of the
umbrella coalition known as the National Council of Resistance (NCR), has its roots in the Iranian
nationalist movement led by Prime Minister Mossadeq, who was deposed by US and British intelligence
in 1953 two years after he nationalized Iran's oil. The MEK was formed in the mid-1960s by Muslim
university intellectuals inspired by the anti- and post-colonial movements arising throughout the
developing world. Energized by the intense, polarizing ideological debates of the 20" century, the MEK
opposed the Shah's repressive regime, at times violently, and most of the original MEK leaders had been
executed or imprisoned by 1972. After welcoming the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 and being
released from prison, the surviving MEK leadership turned sharply critical of Ayatollah Khomeini's
doctrine of theocratic dictatorship. The new regime violently targeted large public gatherings of the
MEK, which in turn conducted acts of deadly violence against the leading mullahs. The MEK formally
launched a political arm before being driven into exile in 1981, initially in France, and later in Iraq.
From the 1960s until the late 1980s at least, violent actions can be attributed to the MEK
against, first, the Shah's regime and then the theocratic regime, including attacks from MEK bases in Iraq
against Iranian regime forces after Iran had regained its territory seized by Iraq's 1980 invasion, as
Khomeini continued prosecuting the conflict. Throughout, Iran targeted MEK leaders and followers for
arrest, execution or assassination. The revolutionary Islamic regime used force on a far greater scale
against domestic political opponents than had the Shah. As estimates of MEK (or presumed pro-MEK)
personnel executed by the theocratic regime beginning in 1980 run in the tens of thousands-by some
accounts in excess of 100,000 killed-there is today a not inconsiderable population of surviving
relatives and sympathizers dedicated to deposing the ruling mullahs in Iran and establishing a rights-
based secular democracy in its place.
No less noteworthy than the enduring enmity of this conflict between a brutal regime and its
committed enemies in exile has been the role of a sustained and sophisticated "information" war, if one
may use that term. This refers to elaborate efforts by the Tehran regime, without attribution, to inject
specificallegations relating to the MEK into the international community's trusted information sphere.


47
A K iN G U M P
S T R A U S S H A U E Hº & H E i. 1) LL tº
Attornays at Law
The essence of Iran's "information operations" activity has been to derogate from the MEK's image and
influence with western governments by seeking to tie the MEK to actions highly prejudicial to the MEK's
image with target audiences in Iran, Europe and the United States. This is not to say that all these
potentially damaging claims about the MEK are false, only to report that the Iranian government's hand
has repeatedly been exposed placing such information without attribution into the public realm abroad.
For its part, the MEK/PMOI and its supporters have been no less vigorous in contesting the
Tehran regime's version of reality and similar criticisms emanating from respected voices in the West.
MEK supporters have issued book-length rebuttals and fastidiously documented histories in an effort to
persuade western audiences that the truth about the MEK's beliefs, nature and past actions is at odds
with the ‘damning portrayal that is often accepted and repeated as fact.
One focus of this review, accordingly, is to note that some of the derogatory and prejudicial
perceptions that commonly surface in discussions of the MEK-by experts in the media, think tanks,
academia, and government-match themes and portrayals discovered to have been actively promoted
by Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), as will be detailed. To be clear, this intersection of
content proves neither that the information secretly promoted by Iranian intelligence is false, nor that
western individuals and entities citing comparable facts' lack independent and credible sources for their
assertions. But the burden of proof on all sides becomes much heavier in this arena rife with
propaganda and deception, claim and counter-claim. For anyone purporting to offer a "true" portrayal
of MEK actions from the 1960s until today, the bar is high.
There is, furthermore, a longstanding pattern of Western governments being privately
pressured by Tehran to constrain and sanction the MEK as a terrorist group. This connects counter-
terrorism policy to wider foreign policy considerations, leaving unclear whether governments including
the US would have designated the MEK/PMOI as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) solely on the
basis of confirmed “terrorist’ activity, unconnected to other bilateral equities with Iran. The MEK/PMOI
has challenged in court and overturned terrorist designations and charges by the EU, UK and France
respectively, as the judicial process has exposed flaws and deficiencies in the information relied upon by
these governmententities for their designations. The existing US designations of MEK and NCR as
Foreign Terrorist Organizations - which by law can also be overturned judicially - are similarly being
challenged, and the court has obliged the Secretary of State to clarify the factual basis for its policy.
Ten Issues Reviewed
With such externalities at play, there is merit in revisiting core issues relating to the MEK/PMOI
with an eye to seeking the most reliable information as the basis for assessments and conclusions. In
the attachments to this memorandum, ten allegations are examined, preceded by my introduction and
followed by my concluding commentary (refer to corresponding tabs):
Introduction
Allegations (1-10):
1. MEKKilled American officials, contractors and an executive in Iran during the 1970s
2. MEK participated in the US Embassy siege and conducted terrorist attacks against Iran for nearly
20 years dating from early 1980s


48
A K i N G U M P
S T R A U S S H A U E Hº & F E L I) LLP
- Attornays at Law
(Allegations:-cont'd)
3.
5.
9.
MEK sided with Saddam Hussein and fought against Iran from 1980, hence is hated by the
Iranian people (with no chance of governing if the mullahs were to fall from power)
MEK opposed the US military in the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 intervention, using its own
military weaponry to fire on US forces
MEK participated in Saddam's crushing of southern Shi'ites after Gulf War
MEK participated in Saddam's crushing of northern Kurds after Gulf War and hid Iraqi-supplied
chemical and biological WMD which were used against Kurdish villagers in Halabja
MEK brainwashed, imprisoned and tortured members who wanted to leave Camp Ashraf
starting in the 1990s
MFK operates as a cult, separating married couples after 1991 and sending their children away,
prohibiting single women from marrying, and self-immolating
MEK is deeply committed to a hardened leftist, anti-democratic and anti-American set of beliefs,
and its claims to support democratic principles are simply lip service for western ears
10. MEK continues to have the capability and intent to conduct terrorist activities
Concluding Commentary
Attachments: aſs


49
Introduction


50
INTRODUCTION
FIO Designation, Foreign Policy Considerations, intensity of Conflict, Role of Deception and Propaganda
Basics of FTO Designation’ – The Secretary of State exercises authority under Section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, to designate a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in
support of the USG's "fight against terrorism." Two purposes are cited: "curtailing support for terrorist
activities," and "pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business." Until 2004, FTO designations
lapsed after 2 years absent a redesignation. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of
2004 “provides that an FTO may file a petition for revocation 2 years after its designation date (or...
redesignation date) or 2 years after the determination date on its most recent petition for revocation. In
order to provide a basis for revocation, the petitioning FTO must provide evidence that the circumstances
forming the basis for the designation are sufficiently different as to warrant revocation." The Secretary
of State must review any FTO designation that has not been reviewed in the previous 5-year period. "A
designation may be revoked by an Act of Congress, or set aside by a Court order." There are three legal
criteria for designation (repeated in full, footnote below), according to which an FTO must be a "foreign
organization," must "engage in terrorist activity...or terrorism...or retain the capability and intent" to do
so, and its terrorist activity "must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national
defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States."
Role of Foreign Policy Considerations—While the principal focus of this inquiry is the (open source)
factual record of alleged MEK/PMOI terrorist actions and activities that underlie its current designation
as an FTO, one cannot say that the US Government made this designation, and has since sustained it,
purely on the basis of the factual record on MEK terrorist actions, activities, capabilities and intent, with
no consideration of US-Iran relations. The record indicates otherwise. Iran has actively sought MEK
terrorist designation by the US and other governments, linking this demand to other issues of
importance to Washington; and these USG designation decisions have been taken with evident linkage
in mind to hoped-for action by Teheran on other issues.
!"
An early indication of this issue linkage was the 1986 list of nine "goodwill” gestures toward Iran
that were said to have been taken over the previous year by the US, cited in a letter obtained by the CIA
and authored by the "arms-for-hostages" intermediary Manucher Ghorbanifar in conjunction with
efforts to free American hostages in Lebanon.” Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, in his July
'Excerpted and summarized from Forcign Temoristorganizations. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, May 19, 2011,
http://www.state.gov/s/ctºrisºther/dev/23085 him. Legal criteria:
1. It must be a foreign organization.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)).” or
terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. §
2656f(d)(2).” or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism
3. Ine organization's terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national deſense.
forcign relations, or the cronomic interests) of the United States.
* Report of the President's Special Review Board. I'druary 26, 1987. pp. B-131-135 (nex under to this papa). A this same time, it is alleged
that Iran was using hostages in Lebanon as leverage against the MEK in Hrance: “In 1986, the French governincut forced the MEK out of Paris
Ito Iraqi in order to securelranian helpin freeing lºrench hostages in Lebanon.” Globaloptions. Inc.. “Independent Assessment of the
Mujahedin-e-Khalq and National Council of Resistance of Iran." in Iran. Foreign Policy Challenges and Choices (DIA Piper J.I.P, 2006), p. 114.
1


52
Ms. Mann: Then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs! Ryan Crocker assured [the
Iranians during a January 2003 meeting] that the MEK was a group that we had on our list,...and the Iranians
didn't need to worry about that. And I remember the senior Iranian who had joined the talks was concerned
that they'd been hearing mixed messages..., and we tried to alloy his concerns.
PBS: During the meeting Ryan Crocker said what to allay those concerns?
Ms. Mann: That the United States viewed the MEK as a terroristorganization, and we had designated it assuch,
and that we saw it as part of Saddam's military.
PBS: And that it would be on the target list?
Ms. Mann: That's what I recall....
Intensity of Conflict—The MEK has been the avowed enemy of both the Shah and the revolutionary
government in Iran, and with each it has a history of both employing violence and being targeted for
incarceration, torture and death. MEK/PMOI members have devoted three decades now to opposing
the mullahs in Iran, in many cases forgoing pursuit of other career goals and a comfortable existence in
exile despite the advantages of the Western high education that many have received. The devotion of
MEK members, the choice many have made to remain for years inside Camp Ashraf near Iraq's border
with Iran, and the authority wielded by women in the organization, are uncommon. Derogatory
descriptions of the MEK/PMOI including describing the bonds of commitment between its leaders and
members as 'cult’-like, are widespread. On this point the author offers two observations.
The first relates to the number of MEK/PMOI imprisoned, assassinated and executed at the
hands of the ruling regime in Tehran, particularly in 1980-81 after MEK broke ranks with Ayatollah
Khomeini regarding the shape of Iranian politics after the Shah's overthrow, and both sides clashed
violently. Estimates of MEK/PMOI supporters, including casual and suspected supporters, killed at the
hands of the Iranian government exceed 100,000, and the mullahs have since targeted MEK figures in
exile abroad. This conflict has bred deep and enduring enmity.
The second observation concerns the prevalence of sophisticated, unattributed information
operations in the West generated by the Iranian government, mentioned in the cover memorandum.
Role of Iranian Deception and Propaganda-Respected Western personages, including credentialed
Washington policy analysts, have asserted that the MEK/PMOI is, by nature, inclined to violence,
extremist in outlook, socially perverse and deeply hostile to the U.S. and its democratic ideals.
MEK/PMOI members, supporters and sympathizers reject these characterizations, and summon
considerable detail to support their versions of events spanning several decades. Anyone weighing
these competing views will be challenged to separate the unseen influences of family histories and
factional loyalties on exiled Iranians and their progeny, or other factors shaping the views of Western
commentators on this issue.
the Bush Administration when the designation was reviewed the determination was made to keep it on the list foressentially the same reason.
that it might help to convince the regime in Tehran that the time for negotiation had come...”


53
There is a school of thought that evidently regards the MEK/PMOI as a foreign policy distraction,
an inconvenience best kept marginalized via continued FTO listing. Some who claim that the MEK/PMOI
enjoys no popular support inside Iran appear to be concerned that the US Government may divert its
policy focus from the longstanding effort to encourage reform from inside Iran, such as via the Green
movement that mobilized impressive public support during and after the flawed 2009 Iranian elections.
The unhappy Iraq precedent in which US policy from the late 1990s onward was guided by London-
based Iraqi exiles who later proved to be far less accepted inside Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein
than they and their supporters had promised, is cited as a cautionary tale for the US as it weighs the
political potential of the MEK's umbrella organization, the National Council of Resistance, in a reformed
Iran. If indeed the MEK/PMOI has no political traction inside Iran as its critics assert, the potential
impact on US foreign relations of de-listing the MEK as a terrorist group (per the legal criteria for FTO
designation, see above), would presumably be modest if not inconsequential.
And yet, the actions of the Iranian regime itself belie the notion that the MEK/PMOI is of no
consequence to their ability to remain in power. This inquiry has found that the Iranian government has
since 1979 gone to extraordinary lengths to shape the international perception and narrative attached
to the MEK/PMOI and its leaders in Europe, Canada, the U.S. and elsewhere. In contrast to Soviet
intelligence operations during the Cold War, which were aimed at obtaining nuclear and military secrets,
or Chinese activities aimed at acquiring the most advanced industrial and security technologies from the
West, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has for years conducted an 'information
operations' campaign in the West aimed at discrediting and defaming the MEK/PMOI. This has occurred
as Iran's diplomatic efforts (noted above) have explicitly sought to pressure the US and other
governments to isolate the MEK as a terrorist group. Details follow in the attached papers.
Rt. Hon. Lord Peter Fraser, former Solicitor-General and Lord Advocate for Scotland, now a
member of the UK House of Lords (and an MEK supporter who co-sponsored the successful UK court
challenge that de-listed the MEK), has recently written:’
"In the court, at first we were told that the evidence is classified. But when the documents finally became public
by the court's ruling after a long battle, all we found in the MFK's dossier was fabricated...disinformation
provided by the mullahs and their Ministry of intelligence, none of which was admissible to the court....While we
were at the final stages of winning the case, we were bombarded by negative publicity against the group saying
among other things, that the PMOI(MEK) was a personality sect which is unpopular among the Iranions inside
the country....What causes me to write this is because I regret that I see the same trends developing in the
united States.”
Repeated discovery of an MOS provenance' attached to specific anti-MEK allegations begs the
question of which of the allegations advanced by reputable people outside Iran are indeed supported by
fact. In other words, after factoring in MOIS deception and propaganda (such as Western governments
and courts have uncovered it), one must ask what independently verifiable 'charges' remain that may
bear on the legal, regulatory and policy questions central to the Foreign Terrorist Organization
designation of the MEK/PMOI. The brief issue papers that follow are an attempt to add clarity to that
question.
'R. Iſon. Lord Peter Fraser, “Terror Tagging the Iranian MEK is Wrong." The Irill. Congress Blog. March 29, 2011.
4


54
(introduction) attachment
excerpt from Tower Commission Report








57


58





61
Tab 1


62
Allegation 1: MEK Killed American Officials, Contractors and an Executive in Iran during the 1970s
Even if events 35 years ago fall outside the 2- to 5-year timeframe for relevant activity embodied
in the legal framework for US designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, there is a different
standard applied by US national security practitioners to any person or entity that has killed Americans.
For example, the author, who was the Country Director for Lebanon in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense when 241 US Marines were killed by a truck bombing in October 1983, will always bear in mind
the responsibility of Hizballah and Iran, among others.
The State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 document says that the MEK killed
the deputy chief of the US Military Mission in Tehran in 1973, two members of the US Military
Assistance Advisory Group in 1975, and two employees of Rockwell International in 1976, and that it
claimed responsibility for killing an American Texaco executive in 1979. Journalistic and analytical
references to the MEK to this day unfailingly refer to the MEK's responsibility for the murder of these six
Americans in Iran during the 1970s. This legacy matters to top decisionmakers in Washington. Former
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told NPR after leaving office, "I actually served in Iran; I lived
there for a year, and it was during that time that our people were killed by the MEK, assassinated....So
from my point of view they were terrorists....”
There is a deeper story to the “MEK" killings of Americans in Iran during the 1970s. Some might
not be moved to alter their judgments of this allegation against the MEK. Simply stated, the MEKof
today, revitalized under the leadership of Massoud Rajavi after 1979 and now publicly led by his wife,
Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, does not consider itself the heir to the killers of those six Americans in Iran during
the 1970s. Almost the entire leadership of the MEK had been killed and most of the key members were
incarcerated by the Shah's regime in by May of 1972. Massoud Rajavi, the youngest original MEK
Central Committee member, evaded execution and was sentenced to life in prison due to international
advocacy on his behalf from François Mitterrand, Jean Paul Sartre and Amnesty International.
With the founding leaders dead or jailed, a group with more doctrinaire secular Marxist views
(some described it as ‘Marxist Leninist' and the group reportedly referred to itself as the "Mujahidin
‘M.L”) appropriated the movement's public profile. Mr. Rajavi's writings from prison, and the
'Mujahidin M.L. in their own declarations, again according to supporters of the MEK, reflect that this
"splinter” faction had undertaken a bloody purge, committing violence against key members of the
more ‘Islamic’ faction of the MEK. Referred to in the Iranian press as the “Iranian People's Strugglers"
(IPS), and later known as “Peykar", this group led by Taghi Shahram, Vahid Afrakhteh and Bahram Aram
was one of several underground groups waging a covert war against the Shah's secret police, SAVAK.
MEK supporters say tape recordings implicate Shahram in planning the purge and takeover within the
MEK. Afrakhteh, who later confessed to the killings of Americans, was executed, as were the other two,
one by the Shah's regime and the other later by the mullahs. Next under to this attachment are two
contemporaneous newspaper reports reflecting these events,
"U.S. Department of State. OfficcofthcCoordinator for Counter-ſcrotism, Country Reports on Tomorism 2009. Chapter 6. "Icmorist
Organizations," dated August 5, 2010 http:www.stlºvisºrs crºſºliº.htm
* PBS analysis "Showdown with Iran". October 23, 2007 http:www.pb. itwºhlt; - inexhowdºwn fºcumesničk.html (quoted as it
appears on the NTR sitc). Ambassador Lawrence Butler, the US diplomat currently negotiating the firture of an estimated 3,400 MFK personncl
at Camp Ashraſ. Iraq, told the New York Times. “These people slaughtered Americans. They have blood on their hands." Tim Arango. “Iranian
Fxile Group Poscs Voxing Issuc for U.S. in Iraq."New York Times, July 22, 2011,
tºpºwww.nytimes.cºm:2011:07:23:wºrld middleºstºs.stºralliamlºcagewtºniº:-13. I-12011.http:www.nytimes sºm:2011.97°3′ºddai"
- *.*.* *__i.


63
Supporters of the MEKsay this group essentially "hijacked" the name of the "Mojehedin' in the
mid-1970s, using a facsimile of the MEK’s logo minus the Koranic verse (or no MEK logo at all), using
language and tone in its pronouncements that they say was clearly distinguishable from that of the MEK,
and later commemorating key dates that held no meaning for the original (and, from 1979 on, revived)
MEK.’ Supporters of the MEK also point to three public statements issued by the IPS taking credit for
killing the Americans, the aforementioned incriminating IPS tape recordings, as well as statements
issued by Massoud Rajavi from prison condemning the assassinations."
While the 2005 version of the State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism said, "A Marxist
element of the MEK murdered several of the Shah's U.S. security advisers prior to the Islamic
Revolution,” the current version of the State Department's terrorism report regarding the MEK reflects
no such distinctions, attributing all of the 1970s murders of Americans in Iran to "the MEK.”
*MFK supporters cite an article from The Middle East Journal, Vol.41, No. 2, Spring 87 (an original version of which the author has not
located as of this writing). The artick says in part, “During 1974-76, one group within the Afgaludin leadership denounced the Islamic
orientation of the organization in favor ºf a Marxist-Leninist line and expelled those members who did not adhere to it. The Marxist-Leninist
/action went so ſar as to use terroristic methods such as setting ſire to... a leader of the Islamic faction, in order to gain control of the
organization...{1/n 1975 the Mujahidin "Af.L." carried out several terroristic actions, among them the assassination of Colonel Turner. Colonel
Shaefer, and later General Price...."
t Oncreporter. Sam DCalcy, writing in the National Review in 2002 about the claim by MEK supporters that thcMEK organization had beco
taken over by radicals at the time the Americans were inaled, slaled calegorically but without elaboration."[1/n fact, U.S. intelligence
indicates that Massoud Rajavi, the group's leader, was in firm control at the time." Sam Dºaky, “A Wory. Very Bad Bunch'," Nati
2002 htm#oºd ccºm 2xmar02 dealevo.325.02 shtml
*us. Department of Slale, Oſlice of the Coordinator ſor Counter-Terrorism. Cºuntry Reports ºn Terrorism 2005. daled April 2006. p. 212
state.gović cºntsoroan: ass462 ºf
to:-ºw".
*U.S. Departmentorsiale, onice of the Coordinator for Counter-Temurism, country Reportson Terrorism 2009, Chapla 6, "Tarorist
Organizations." dated August 5, 2010 http:www.slais coviscºſis: 2009.40% ºntºu.

2


3.
Iran Says Guerrilla Trained in Cuba
By William BraniginSpecial to The Washington Post
The Washington Post (1974–Current file); May 11, 1976,
pg. A9
Iran Says Guerrilla Trained incuba
By William Branigin
Special to The Washington Post
TEHRAN – Iranian all-
thorities say that two al-
leged terrorists killed re-
cently in a gun battle with
police were Communists
who had received guerrilla
training in Cuba and two
other unnamed countries.
The "terrorists," identl.
ficti as Garsivaz Broumand
and Khosrow Safaic, were
fatally shot May 4 when
polite raided their hideout
in Tehran, according to a
government communique,
Their deaths bring to at
lcast 31 the, number of al-
leged terrorists executed or
slain in shootouts with po-
licſ ill Jrull illis year.
The government statement
said Broumand had taken a
six-month course in Cuba
nine years ago and that
,’
Safale, a member of Iran's
'outlawed Tudeh Communist
Party, had been trained in
two foreign countrics,
Most of the terrorists
killed previously in Iran
have becn identlſied by
Iranian authorities as be:
longing to .am "Islamic
Marxist" organization re.
sponsible for killing at least
30 persons, including three
American colonels, and
wounding more than 70
others in assassinations,
gun battles and hombings
over the past three years,
According to a confession
by a gang member before
he was GxcCutcd recently,
the Iranian leaders of the
Islamic Marxists received
training and instructions
from the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine,
led by George Habash.
Iranian authorities say the
latest casualtics in the
Islamic, Marxist gang in.
cludes a man killed by a
grenade he tried to throw
at police and three persons,
including a woman, who
were slain in a shootout
with security forces last
month.
In January, nine terrorists
convicted of murdering the
three American colonels and
five Iranians, including a
general, were executed by
firing squad.
The leader of the group,
Wahid Afrākhten, told a
Westerncr allowed to See
him shortly before his exe-
cution that the gang had
plotted to kill U.S. Ambas-
sador and former CIA dir.
cctor Richard Helms and the
Shah of Iran. Afrakhteh
said security surrounding
both men was too tight,
Afrakhteh said he person.
ally killed Col. Lewis Haw.
kins in Tehran in 1973 and
led the cell that gunned
down Col. Paul Shaffer and
Lt. Col. Jack Turner after
stopping their chauffeur.
driven car in 1975,
He said most of his im.
mediate superlors were
Iranians who still at large
and who have close links
with the Marxist Habash
grºup, º
Iranian authorities recent.
ly publicized a pamphlet
that thcy said showed the
connection between the
Habash group and Iranian
"subversives." They said it
contalmed pictures of exe.
cuted Iranian terrorists and
an article signed by Habash
supporting guerrilla activlt.
tes in Iran and Oman, where
the Shah's troops have been
helping local forces fight
Marxist rebels,


66
Iran Kills Man Accused In Slaying of 3 Americans
The Washington Post (1974-Current file); Nov 18, 1976;
pg. A42
Iran Kills Man Accused
In Slaying of 3 Americans
TEHRAN, Iran, Nov. 17 (UP!).-Se.
curity police have shot and killed the
man who masterminded the August
slayings of three American civiliat's
on a Tehran street, officials au.
nounced today.
The announcement said Rahratt
Aram was killed in a police shootout
on a downtown Tehran street yester,
day. Two other guerrillas also were
killed in an intensified 10-day cam.
paign to rid Tehran of terrorists, the
announcement said. Seven suspected
guerrillas were arrested and a large
amount of arms and explosives conſis.
cated during the campaign, police
said.
According to police, Aram directed
the murning rush-hour attack on an
tutomobile carrying three U.S. em-
ployees of Rockwell International.
“The three Americans killed — Wil-
liam ("uttrell, 48, Robert Kronpard, 44,
and Uunald Smith, 43—were all Cali-
furnians.
Since the attack, Americans in lºan,
particularly those working on sensi-
tive defense contracts, have taken spe-
cial precautions while traveling in the
city.
. The three dead Americans had been
working on Project Ibex, an electron-
ics system capable of surveillance of |
neighboring countries, including parts
of the Soviet Union.


68
Allegation 2: MEK participated in the US Embassy siege and
conducted attacks against Iran for nearly 20 years dating from early 1980s
The MEK that emerged from prison and hiding after the Shah was deposed in 1979 remained
ideologically committed to the struggle for political participation in Iran. MEK leader Massoud Rajavi
initially welcomed the Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Khomeini as portending a change from the
undemocratic and repressive monarchy. Many analysts and journalists have said that the MEK
participated in the prolonged seizure (if not the takeover) of the American Embassy in Tehran that
began in November 1979. While under occupation, the US Embassy reported that a number of
‘Moujahedin' (MEK) were participating in the siege, providing 'security’ around the Embassy with
weapons some of which US officials believed had been taken from the Embassy.
The MEK has long denied any involvement in the takeover or holding of the American Embassy.
The group cites MEK publications at the time analyzing how hard-line elements of the Khomeini regime
had engineered the crisis to strengthen their positions internally, to the detriment of the MEK. MEK
leader Massoud Rajavi, in a 1984 interview with ABC News, denounced the regime's “violation of
diplomatic immunity" as a manifestation of the "warmongering policy of Khomeini....” The State
Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, in the section on the MEK, does not mention an MEK
role in the Embassy takeover.”
Mr. Rajavi and his MEK supporters held a flexible view of Islam's role in society and soon came
to oppose the rigid and dictatorial approach to governance imposed by Ayatollah Khomeini and the
leading clerics. Mr. Rajavi's alternative political vision for Iran was reflected in the MEK journal
Mojahed and in public rallies after he regained his freedom. These activities were taken as a challenge
to the power and legitimacy of the revolutionary Islamic regime. There does not appear to be any
dispute of the following key elements, widely reported internationally at the time and recorded in
scholarly histories, of the regime's activities against the MEK.
Massoud Rajavi's candidacy for President was reportedly vetoed personally by Ayatollah
Khomeini in January 1980. Starting in early 1980, the mullahs spurred their faithful to attack MEK
offices in many cities, reportedly injuring hundreds if not thousands, and to burn copies of their
publications, as a result of which many MEK offices closed. The head of the judiciary reportedly
revealed in May 1980 that Ayatollah Khomeini had issued a hand-written fatwa months earlier, ordering
the judiciary to execute all members of the MEK. Regime security forces openly espoused the slogan,
“Death to the Mojahedin." On June 20, 1981, a "march for peace and human rights" in Tehran,
estimated’ to have drawn over half a million people, was fired upon by Islamic regime security forces,
with substantial MEK casualties. What followed was a very violent period of regime repression and
armed resistance. The MEK figure for members and suspected members executed by the revolutionary
Islamic regime during this period is 120,000, and there is no credible dispute that they numbered in the
tens of thousands.
*ABCNews Nightline. October 20, 1984
*us Departncut of State, Country Reports on Torrorisºn 2009. “Chapter 6. Torrorist Organizations", dated August 5, 2010,
::Awww.state.gov.scºtlºcrºixxº‘l-4, htm.
"For cample, in alctor from US Senator Fdward Kennedy to Mr. Rajavidated June 27, 1984. Senator Kennedy said in part, “The willingness
of more than 500,000 people in Tehran alone - to risk their lives by openly opposing the policies of the Khomeini regime testified to the world
that the tranian people are ready for a change." Sympathetic crowds also convened in at least 13 other cities in Iran on June 20 according to
academic studics of this period


69
The State Department's most recent (2009) report on terrorist organizations reflects a
materially different timeline and sequence than the above summary of events that respected journalist
Eric Rouleau of Le Monde, among others, had reported contemporaneously from Iran throughout 1980:
"In 1981, MEK leadership attempted to overthrow the newly installed islamic regime; Iranian security forces
subsequently initiated a crackdown on the group. The MEK instigated a bombing campaign, including an attack
against the head office of the islamic Republic Party and the Prime Minister's office..which killed some 70 high-
ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali
Rojaei, and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. These attacks resulted in a popular uprising against the
MEkandon expanded iranian government crackdown that forced MEK leaders to flee to France."
Next under to this attachment is an Eric Rouleau dispatch from Tehran in the New York Times
dated June 14, 1980, describing "pitched battles" between the MEK and regime elements, and recording
the message being articulated at the time by MEK leader Massoud Rajavi to his supporters as they came
under attack. The reader can judge how this comports with the above-quoted excerpt from the current
State Department report. Leaving aside the omission of context in which one party's actions are being
judged, including anti-MEK regime actions throughout 1980, there does not appear to be any dispute
that the MEK conducted attacks against high regime officials after June 1981, when all peaceful political
activity was banned by Khomeini, as described in this and previous State Department reports.
The State Department report further states that the MEK"continued to wage its terrorist
campaign" from exile in Paris before being expelled in 1986, following which it conducted attacks from
bases in Iraq against Iran (and, in 1991, "reportedly" against Iraqi Kurds and Shi'ites—see attachments 5
and 6). The report cites further specific MEK attacks, all against Iranian government targets, in 1998,
1999, 2000 and 2001. No specificalleged terrorist acts are cited beyond 2001.* The State Department
report describes the MEK's present capabilities and intentions as follows: "The MEK's global support
structure remains in place, with associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe and North
America. Operations target Iranian government elements across the globe, including in Europe and
Iran.”
Based upon the above, certain factual conclusions are reasonable:
• MEK members may or may not have had a role during US Embassy hostage crisis but the
organization was not the instigator and saw it as benefiting hard-line political foes
• The MEK, during approximately two-decades after the 1979 revolution in Iran,
committed acts of targeted violence against Iranian revolutionary government forces,
property and officials, although not indiscriminate violence against innocent civilians
• There do not appear to have been MEK acts of violence since 2001 or 2002
"FXccrpt from Us Department of state, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. “Chapter 6. Tomorist Organizations", dated August 5, 2010
"While not infallible as a source of information. The Economist wrote in 2009 that the MFK"is now known to have carried out any acts of terror
since, aſ the latest, 2002....", "Iranian Dissidents in Iraq Where will They All Go?". The Economist (print cdition), April 8, 2009.
*us Department of Siak, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. “Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations", dated August 5, 2010,
httºwww.statº.gºv.sgºrisſcrt2tºsíliº').htm. The issue of MFK's current capabilitics and intentions is cyanincó in attachment 10bclow
2


70
Judgments about how the US Government should regard the MEK in 2011 involve subjective
factors. Some will be unmoved by the context of an Iranian regime-characterized in the same State
Department report as "the most active state sponsor of terrorism"—that pursued the MEKabroad,
throughout the same period, with deadly force including assassins, special forces and even fighter
aircraft (after Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War). The view that “terrorism is terrorism" irrespective of
context is defensible so long as the integrity of counter-terrorism assessments is protected from
external policy and political influences. The fact that US Government actions to list the MEK as an FTO
under at least three Presidents reflected the influence of unrelated US-Iran bilateral desiderata (see
Introduction, above) complicates the government's ability to cite a counter-terrorism metric as the basis
of its designation actions.
That said, we are still left with a history of violent attacks conducted by the MEK. A further
subjective factor on which reasonable people will disagree is whether the MEK attacks were
indiscriminate, aimed at creating public fear (as per usual definitions of terrorism), and further, whether
the MEK's armed struggle against the Tehran regime was by any standard politically justifiable. Again,
these elements are controversial as they introduce the sensitive issue of whether non-state actor
violence is justified under any circumstances. MEK supporters claim to have documented
contemporaneous internal policy guidance from Mr. Massoud Rajavi from 1979 on in which the MEK
first sought to pursue a non-violent path of protest, and then as attacks were staged, directed that harm
to uninvolved civilians was to be avoided. The State Department report cited above does not describe
MEK violence against targets other than Iranian officials and official entities, civilian and military.”
Consensus regarding the MEK's nature and activities after decades of polarizing debate will
likely remain elusive. However, as the most recent—hence, operative-State Department report on the
MEK draws reference to a then-pending judicial action against the MEK in France, the following will
update readers of the State Department report, which says: "In 2003, French authorities arrested 160
MEK members at operational bases they believed the MFK was using to coordinate financing and
planning for terrorist attacks.”
On May 11, 2011, following eight years of investigation and prosecution, the Investigative
Magistrate of Paris antiterrorism department issued a Decision dismissing all charges against the 24
MEK-affiliated individuals against whom charges remained. The Magistrate's Decision speaks to both
the nature of the MEK’s previous actions and the question of its current activities:
"it must be said that the National Council of Resistance of Iran, People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, the
National Liberation Army of Iran, they all form one collective which aims to overthrow the regime ruling in
Iran....On the otherhand it was not proven that this important activity originated from France could relate to
any terrorist organization."
‘U.S Department of Slale, Country Repºrts ºn Tºrºſism 2002. “Chapler3. Stale Sponsors of Terrorism", dated August 5, 2010
*A Congressional Roscarch Scrwicc report in 2007 stated that thc 1997 and 1999 FTO designations of the MEKPMOI were "prompted by PAſſy
attacks in tram that sometimes killed or injured civilians although the group does not appear to purposely target civilians..." Kºunc
Katzman. “Iran. U.S. Concems and Policy Responses. CRS Repºrt ſº Cºngress, Congressional ResearchService, Oclober 9, 2007, p. CRS-11.
This report made no reference to forcign policy issues potentially influoncing these designation actions, sco introduction above
* US Department of Stalc, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. “Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations", dated August 5, 2010
- - 900.htra.

3


73
The New York Times
Jime 14, 1980, Saturday
*SECTION: Section 1; Page2
LENGTH: 927 words
IRANIAN LEFTAND RIGHT SLUGGFNGIT ()úTiN cHAotic FIGHTING-
BODY: -
The following dispatch, by the Middle East specialist of Lc Maade, was translated hy. ...
The New York Times from the French º
By ERICROijff AU£e Monde, Paris
akin to civil war.
Pitched battles were ſought here yesterday between members ofthe People's Mujahideen, -
ºran's largest leftist opposition group, and fundamentalist Moslem supporters of
yatºliah Ruhollah Khomeini, and further violence was feared as the leader of Friday
prayers denounced the leftists as counterrevolutionaries.
Down with the deviationists" Khomeini suppºrters shouted yesterday sas they tried to
force their way into the stadium where the People's Mujahideen and the Leſist Moslem
Movement were holding arally. º ºr
stadium. which is near the occupied United St.
the Parly of God, known as the Hezbollahi, app.
Rajavi"the leftisticader."There is only onep
Police peeline to Act
The demonsumors charged forward repean - stones, causing
thousands among thoscattacked to lift their hands about ads to protect themselves
as policemen and islamic revolutionary guards stood :-º
---
fºrces, which appeared to beiotozo
said the guards fired into the crowds, -


“What are ::::::::::::::::::: #by:


75
the people and he warned
Mr. Rajnissidiegovement
"Treedom is not granted," he cried asth
offic lord, it is as indispensable asexygen.
-
he has been living a ----------------- slaying: yen.
resºners fºliºsºsºsidents
cordial relationship, that the Beheshtiparty is


76
an Left and Rightslugginghoutin chaotic fighting
ºpºrchºw the ºidae - º The c sººthm. *we wºu
raw: - -
“Yes," answereº-Rºjavi, “The
strugglewºiástºtºvºctºry, whatever
ºurmartyrs --
-- - -- -
**ERIeRoutzav - rº - ems,
.**** and wearetoºd that were irismºsºmic
Tºtºxan, June 13–violence Republic. But we are being besiege: tº
hºsteºweevils: Iran increasingly in tºoligasi-autº-terrºrisis. Theºsiaioie
ºut weeks. a murders- cºnstituti anter-ad-hinerties in
:* cºatinº.sºclimate main icº ;: :::::::::::::::::::::
- - eneºspa - radio, elevision
- Partiamentº ---
. A Figa -
- treat?” Mr. Rajavasked asse
- *::::::::::::::::: *we:
-- wº her cºmtºirºtºndrpm Savºas
ºraried united States Embassy claim.ºwe are tighting fºr the tºtal
º: ºpporters from the Party ºf iran
*a-asºuia-bºrºuahir-ºp- rºsents whº ºrder
calling for “Death ºn Missºuri N-ºvº ions thrºwrºtus
wit”ºne ºftiº-earter-" ---> N- of accusatiºns *:::::::::
ºuy-one-party.”-tirey, ºtiunted, "the
FPºrty ºf Gºd, and ºthief, Ayatºllah
ºxºeing."
º
Have we not heard that you preter the
** - thousand tirees rare
- º republic, even thºugh
-- -
prote: - º º
seeirºyforces; whath appeared to be ºf
trº ºº::::::::::::::::::
tackers. The He tried to separate
an -- Bººk.
teader ºf the huxtamentatist Islamic
tire
Rºº.
can Party: theºna !---ºut-f
º:
sh
yesterday thºtanic gards
ºrs º:
*akening -
leftists, a
tº was. - - -
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address, in which he said tºrters wºn -
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her was killed the day heſtrºyºstº-
*** weeping young wºmfºr west:


77
Tab 3


78
Allegation 3: MEK sided with Saddam Hussein and fought against Iran from 1980, hence is hated by
the Iranian people (with no chance of governing if the mullahs were to fall from power)
It is a common theme among analysts writing critically about the MEK that they became an
integral part of Saddam Hussein's security forces and waged war on Iraq's behalf in the very destructive
Iran-Iraq war. This historical portrayal matters for two reasons.
First, Western governments are warned against investing their energies and hopes in the MEK's
umbrella National Council of Resistance as a potential successor to the revolutionary Islamic regime in
Tehran. The argument here is that the MEK members are universally seen as traitors inside Iran even
among those who would welcome regime change. Better, these analysts have consistently argued, for
the US and others to work either for an entente with the existing regime or to encourage reform
brought about through the efforts of politically active factions inside the country such as the Iranian
Green movement,
The second consequence of portraying the MEK as having been an active and committed branch
of Saddam Hussein's forces is that today, with the Shi'ite-led government of post-Saddam Iraq
apparently having condoned or even directed deadly attacks by Iraqi military forces on unarmed MEK
personnel in Camp Ashraf, on July 28, 2009 and again on April 8, 2011, many MEK critics portray this
aggression as understandable, if unwelcome – i.e., “payback" to the MEK population at Camp Ashraf for
their alleged history of violence against both the Iraqi Shi'ites now governing the country and the Iranian
people alike.
As with other adverse characterizations of the MEK, there is some basis in fact, namely that the
MEK maintained mostly cooperative relations with Saddam Hussein's government through the 1980s as
it took refuge in Iraq and continued to prosecute its political and military campaign against the
theocratic regime in Tehran. The question is whether the truth has been stretched by opponents of the
MEK to turn a more complex circumstance into a highly prejudicial caricature. Attachments 5 and 6 will
address the issues of alleged MEK attacks in 1991 against Iraq's Shi'ite and Kurdish populations,
respectively. The focus here is the Iran-Iraq war, begun in October 1980 when Saddam Hussein's ground
and air forces attacked across the Shatt al-'Arab waterway bordering the two countries and seized
Iranian territory.
The MEK, its supporters say, immediately declared its readiness to defend Iran and sent fighters
to the front. Some were taken captive by the Iraqi forces and held, with captured Iranian fighters, as
prisoners of war by Iraq until 1989, when POWs were exchanged. The MEK-affiliated National Council of
Resistance in 1993 issued a detailed history of the movement called Democracy Betrayed, stating that
"the National Liberation Army of Iran (MEK’s military organization based in Iraq) has never fought in any
front alongside the lºaqi army." This narrative says that Massoud Rajavi repeatedly criticized the tactics
of both Iran and Iraq during the conflict, and quotes Saddam Hussein in 1988 expressing respect for the
"Mojahedin' combatants and stating that they had "complete independence in their decisions,”
including a decision not to share tactically sensitive information about Iran that Iraq had requested.
Supporters of the MEKsay the organization turned against Iran's war effort only after the latter
had regained the sovereign Iranian territory seized by Iraq, in June 1982. From that point on, they
contend, the MEK took the view that Ayatollah Khomeini had no further reason to wage war, and was
1


80
Talb 4


82
The 2005 State Department Country Reports on Ierrorism said: "The MEK leadership ordered its
members not to resist Coalition forces at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and they surrendered
their arms to Coalition forces in May 2003.”
* 1:s. Department of State, Oſlice of the Coordinator for Counteriemorism, Country Repºrts on Terrorism 2005, p. 213
http: ¥3tete gºv/dºcumamtsorganizatiºn:65462.pdf


83
Talb 5


84
Allegation 5: MEK participated in Saddam's crushing of southern Shi'ites after the Gulf War
As the BBC summary of the events known as the 1991 Iraq revolt (next under to this paper)
recounts, in March 1991, after Operation Desert Storm defeated, destroyed and evicted Iraq's military
occupation force from Kuwait, President Bush (41) anticipated the collapse of the Saddam Hussein
regime and broadcast a call for the Iraqi people to rise against the regime. In southern Iraq, home to the
long-repressed Shi'a majority in Iraq, and in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq (discussed in attachment
6), people did so, taking over 14 of the country' 18 provinces from regime control. The regime did not
fall, however. Security forces loyal to Saddam Hussein's regime responded with a brutal crackdown in
southern Iraq, massacring civilians and driving as many as two million people from their homes.
Today, many analysts and journalists include in their accounts of past MEK actions the
allegation, often but not always with caveats, that MEK forces participated in Saddam Hussein's massive
suppression of the 1991 Shi'a uprising." However, supporters of the MEK state categorically that the
MEK did not participate in Saddam Hussein's campaign against the Iraqi Shi'a. They explain that MEK
had no presence in southern Iraq at this time other than one logistical site with some trailers and tents
overseen by a dozen or so people, who moved northward to Camp Ashraf, out of the anticipated war
zone in southern Iraq, as US and Coalition forces massed in Saudi Arabia (the phase known as Operation
Desert Shield).
While this historical question from twenty years ago may not hold much relevance to the issue
of whether the designations of the MEK and NCR as Foreign Terrorist Organizations are still merited, it
has significant consequences for the safety of approximately 3,400 unarmed MEK personnel living at
Camp Ashraf north of Baghdad, who are now dependent on the goodwill of the Shi'a-led Iraqi
government of Prime Minister Maliki. One credentialed analyst of Iranian affairs, Council on Foreign
Relations Senior Fellow Ray Takeyh, repeated this allegation (without caveat) in prepared testimony for
a congressional hearing in July 2011, and further explained its implications:
“The MEK would go on to behave as Saddam's Praetorian Guard, as they were employed by him to repress the
Iraqi Shia uprising of 1991. Given the fact that the Shia community is having a leading role in the future of Iraq,
such miscalculation has alienated the MEK from the rulers of Iraq. The Baghdad regime's hostility to the MEK
cannot be seen as a function of its ties with Tehran, but as a legacy of MEK's alliance with Saddam.”
Mr. Takeyh appears to be correct that Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and some other Iraqi Shi'a
leaders are unsympathetic, hostile even, toward the MEK (see Concluding Commentary regarding Ashraf
residents). It is likely as well that some among Iraq's Shi'ite population today believe the allegation,
widely circulated over the past twenty years, about MEK participation with Saddam's Forces in the 1991
I Ancxamplc is thcfollowing from an oditorial in the Economist: "[The MEK1 is also said to have spearheaded Saddam's attacks on rebellious
Iraq, Kurds and Shias in 1991, after the first Cuff war, a charge it strongly denies.” “Iranian Dissidents in Iraq-Where Will They All Go?,"
April 8, 2009.http:www.econoſuist.cºmkuodºlºdºi.12.É. Another ºxamplc appearcd recently in thc New Yºrk Times: "[.1/fter being given
refuge by Saddam Hussein ſaffky members were suspected of serving as a mercenary unit that look part in his violen suppression of the Kurds
in the north of Iraq and the Shiites in the south.” Tim Arango. "Iranian Exile Group l’oscs Vºxing Issue for U.S. in Iraq.” Nºw York Times. July
22, 2011, hiſp;#www.nytimes ra Hº! raſhiml?pagewhilºl. Józ__1. A third examplc is ſound on the
informational website GlobalSecurity.org. 4ssistanc addam Hussein's suppression ºf the 1991 Iraqi Shiite and Kurdish
uprisings" among “incidents linked to the group", sochip:www.glºbalsºurity of ginniſºry wºrld naſantºkhin.
“Massacre at Camp Ashraf limplications for U.S. Policy." preparcd statenicut by Ray Iakchk beforctic Committcc on Forcign Affairs.
Subcommittoc on Oversight and Investigations, Us House of Represcntatives, July 7, 2011.



1


85
suppression of the uprising. The question left unresolved is whether this allegation is true—did the MEK
participate in killing the southern Iraqi Shi'a, or not?
The MEK says no, and indeed says (see attachment 3) that it "never fought in any front” along
with Iraqi military forces. The State Department's most recent terrorism report does not claim certain
knowledge that the MEK had a hand in this brutal campaign of aggression, saying instead only that the
MEK"reportedly assisted" the Iraqi crackdown.”
*t- S Department of Stale, Cºuntry Reports in Terrorism 2009, "Chapter 6. Temorist Organizations". daled August 5, 2010
http:www.state gºsºr's crºzººlºº.htri
2


86
(Tab 5) - BBC summary


88
a chaos and underpressure from Iraq's n
that controversially did not han the
jūppress the rebellion…:” ". . . . . -
Some were shot in their homes and houses, a
rom the streets and later executed en masse -
others still were gunned down by helicopter gunships
iards as they tried to flee: Women and children's
Asina
and Shiashi -
the massacres turther scarred the country's collects
mass graves continue to be uncovered. . .
tºry from EE: News, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … .
tºpºnews.bbc.co.tx.go/prº-ºttºndée east 2538989.stm.
ished: 2037;&#21 (3:43:15 Gºrt.


90
Allegation 6: MEK participated in Saddam's crushing of northern Kurds after Gulf War and hid Iraqi-
supplied chemical and biological WMD which were used against Kurdish villagers in Halabja
The popular uprising in Iraq in the spring of 1991 that followed the military rout and expulsion from
Kuwait of Saddam Hussein's army included the Kurdish population in northern Iraq as well as the Shi'a in the
south. In both regions the forces loyal to Saddam Hussein's regime responded with overwhelming military
force to quell the rebellion (see BBC summary, next under to attachment 5).
As with the allegation that MEK forces abetted Saddam's brutal reprisals in southern Iraq
(attachment 5), analysts and media reports have alleged that the MEK attacked the Kurds in northern Iraq.
MEK supporters deny this allegation with equal vigor. In support of their claim, they offer a 1999 letter (next
under to this attachment) sent to the Netherlands for use in a court proceeding, by Hoshyar Zebari, head of
International Relations of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)—and, since 2003, Iraq's Minister of Foreign
Affairs. The letter states, in part:
“The KDP as a major Kurdish political party has led and participated in the Kurdish spring uprising of 1991
in Iraqi Kurdistan. The uprising caused the collapse of Iraqi government military, security and administrative
structure in the region....When the Iraqi troops counter-attacked and regained control of Kirkuk and other major
cities there were rumors of Mujahedin units assisting the Iraqi troops....However...these rumors happen to be
untrue....The KDP can confirm that the Mujahedin were not involved in suppressing the Kurdish people neither during
the uprising nor its aftermath.
"We have not come across any evidence to suggest that the Mujahedin have exercised any hostility
towards the people of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Mujahedin-e Khalq has its own political agendo in iron and its members
do not interfere in Iraqi internal affairs.”
Potentially shedding light on the MEK's general orientation toward the Kurdish peoples, one of the
resolutions and plans issued over the years by the National Council of Resistance (reprinted by the NCR in
English) was a “Plan of National Council of Resistance for Autonomy of Iranian Kurdistan,” “ratified" on
November 8, 1983. This 12-point plan expresses the NCR's intent in a democratic Iran to bestow autonomy
and local rights of self-government on the ethnic Kurdish areas of Iran, including official recognition of the
Kurdish language and authorization for its use in schools, -
Not all Kurdish leaders have echoed the fraternal sentiments of the KDP. The Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) has in recent years contradicted the KDP's assurance that there was no MEK action against
the Kurds in 1991. For example, the PUK's Washington representative, Qubad Talabani, said of the MEK in
2005, "Up until the fall of the [Saddam Hussein] regime, they were part and parcel of the Iraqi military, and
they were heavily involved in suppressing the Kurdish uprising of 1991.” This negative view contrasts with
that expressed in 1984 by Mr. Talabani's father, Jalal Talabani, who at that time was General Secretary of
the PUK. MEK publications feature a letter from Jalal Talabani to Massoud Rajavi, dated March 3, 1984,
conveying "my greetings and very best wishes to you and other Mojahedin brothers in your just struggle
against the reactionary gang of zealots who rule Iran," and further stating that the PUK members "are
always ready to strengthen our good relationship with the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran.”
1 Hoshyar Zebari. Kurdistan Democratic Party. letter to M. F. Wijingaarden, July 14, 1999 (enclosed next under).
Fli Lake. “Iranian Group Asks State ſo I iſl Temor Designation."New York Sun. April 15, 2005 hupººwww.nysul.cºm.iºgnitºrian-grºup—asks
state-tº-lift-terrºriz299.


91
What changed? One explanation could be that the allegation is true—that in 1991 the MEK brutally
attacked the Kurdish population in league with the Saddam Hussein regime. In that case, Mr. Zebari and the
KDP would have submitted a false testimony” to the Dutch court (see above), shielding the MEK from
culpability for aggression committed against his own constituency.
An alternative explanation, consistent with Mr. Zebari's letter, is that the allegation of MEKarmed
attacks on the Kurds of Iraq is untrue, and that the PUK and Mr. Qubad Talabani are repeating a spurious
charge for other reasons. MEK supporters say that in the mid-1980s, Mr. Jalal Talabani reversed his
allegiance and pledged support and cooperation to the regime in Tehran, via a letter to Khomeini's
designated successor, Hossein Ali Montazeri. This letter, say MEK supporters, was followed by a series of
armed attacks by PUK forces against the MEK, in 1986 and thereafter-attacks to which the MEK never
responded in kind. Years later, with the demise of Saddam Hussein's rule in Baghdad, the elected Iraqi
government led by Shi'a Prime Minister Nourial Maliki ushered in a new, cooperative bilateral Iraq-Iran
relationship. Since 2005 the President of Iraq has been Jalal Talabani.
There are several indications that the regime in Iran has actively spread misinformation
internationally, placing MEK fighters in the middle of the 1991 military attacks on the Kurds. Indeed, Iran
appears to have tried even to blame the MEK for the infamous chemical munitions attack in March 1988
that killed as many as 5,000 Kurdish residents of Halabja, an atrocity for which Saddam Hussein was widely
condemned. The second enclosure to this attachment is a transcript (in French) from a September 2005
interview with Emmanuel Ludot, one of the lawyers who had defended Saddam in his Baghdad court trial, by
the Franco-German television network 'ARTE. Mr Ludot said he had been approached by Iran's Ambassador
to Iraq and offered a bribe if he would collaborate with Iran in falsely implicating the MEK in the chemical
attacks against the Kurds—a version of events that would presumably exonerate Mr. Ludot’s ‘client'Saddam
Hussein.
In August 1995, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), in support of the
Commission on Human Rights, distributed a report prepared for the UN Secretary General by International
Educational Development, a UN-accredited non-governmental organization based in the US." The focus of
this investigative report (provided in full as the third enclosure to this attachment) was the security of the
Kurdish people of Iraq, and the violence between the Iranian regime and the MEK, respectively. The report
refers to “certain misrepresentations of events in the area, particularly allegations made that the (MEK1 has
collaborated with the armed forces of the Government of Iraq, inter alia, by participating in attacks against
Kurdish people in Kirkuk, Qara Hanjeer, Kifri and Aſtun Kopir in April 1991. There are also allegations that
(MFK) troops took part in the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish villages...." The report goes on to
state, in part:
3. In this regard. Colonel Wesley M. Martin, USA (Ret.), who had served two combat tours in Iraq including as Commander of Ashraf Forward
Operating Base, testific to a congressional subcommittee on July 7, 2011 that, "Upon my return to the Penºgon I assisted State Department official,
addressing the PMO issue. This included providing a translated letterfrom Hoslyer (sic). Zebari, head of Kurdistan Democratic Party International
Relations, slating the Pafoſ did not autack the Kurds. Mr. Zºhari subsequently confirmed the letter to be true" (from prepared testimony as submitted
to U.S. Ilouse of Representalives, Committee on Foreign Allairs, Subcommittee on Oversight and havestigations)
"The following website describes the IIumanitarian Law Project run by this NGO, itipºh.g.uºnziº.o.º.
2


95
…ti-ºxº~|~1.
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATICPARTY
14 July 1999
Mr M.F. Wijingaarden
Van Den Bics.cn Prakken Hohle,
Nicuwa lisrengracht 51, 1011 RN Amesterdam
Netherlants
PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAſ. TūſīEuSEQ (NCQURTAS EY!!}ENCE
Dear Mr Wijingaarden,
Thank you ſor your letter of 4 July 1999 regarding your request of information on
Mujahedin-E Khalq organization's activity in Iraqi Kurdistan. I ain pleased to
answeryuus questions on this matter
The KDP as a major Kurdish political party has led and participalcd in the Kurdish
spring uprising of 1991 in Iraqi Kurdistan. The uprising caused the collapse of hagi
government military, scCurity and administrative structure in the region.
The oil-city of Kirkuk was liberated by the pcople and Kurdish forces (pcshmerga}
Whcn the Iraqi troops countcr attacked and regained control of Kirkuk and other
major cities There were rumors of Mujahedin units assisting the Iraqi troops. But due
10 disorder of events and deviclopment it was difficult tº cstablish thc truth. Ilowcºcº
when the leadership of Kurdisian Front engaged in negotiation with the Government
of Iraq (GOI) from April – September 1991 and the situation was stabilized these
tumors happen to be uniruc.
The KDP can confirm that the Mujahcdin were not involved in suppressing the
Kurdish poople noither during the uprising nor in its aftermath.
We have not come across any evidence to suggest that the Mujahedin have excrcised
any inostility towards the people of Iraqi Kumhsinn The Mujahedim-F. Khalq has
its own political-agenda in Iran and its members do not uterſcle in lºaqi internal
affairs.
Warm regards
Sanvercly.
Hoshyar Zebari
llcad of KDP International Rciations


96
(Tab 6b)- Ludot interview with TV ARTE'


98
(Tab 6c)- 2 UN ECOSOC reports


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102
ºATIONS E
Economic and Social
Council
Distr.
GENERAL
E/CN.4/2001/NGO/5:
23 January 2001
Original: ENGLISH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifty-seventh session
Item 9 of the provisional agenda
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
iN ANY PART OF THE WORLD
Written */submitted by International Ed ional Devel Inc.
a Iloil-ſºo Lorganization on the Roster
The Secretary-General has received the following written statement which is circulated in
accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31.
[19 January 2001]
*/This written statement is issued, unedited, as received from the submitting non-governmental
organization(s).
GE.01-10491


103
HUMAN RIGHTS in IRAN
1. In 1995 International Educational Development submitted a written statement
(United Nations Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/55) to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (now the Sub-Commission on Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights) in which we provided information about a person named Jamshid
Tafishi-Enginee. In our statement we pointed out that while Mr. Tafishi-Enginee had spent
about 18 months with the National Liberation Amy (NLA) of the National Council of
Resistance of Iran, we believed that he was in fact an agent of the regime in lºan with an
assignment to gatherintelligence on Iranian exiles, to seek ways and means for discrediting
them and all opponents of the regime, and to camy out misinformation campaigns against them.
Mr. Tafrishi now freely admits that we were correct.
2. Mr. Tafishi has recently written letters in which he reveals that the Intelligence
Ministry of thc Iranian regime hired him (apparently paying him $72,000 in addition to travel
and other expenses) especially to carry out a misinformation campaign about the NLA, with
false accusations that the NLAbad itself engaged in violations of human rights or intimidation
orexiortion of the Iranian exile community. A mumber of human rights organizations were
trealed to false testimony and govemment-orchestrated letter writing campaigns.
Unfortunately, some of these organizations may have believed this misinformation. Sadly, this
campaign appears to have succeeded in shifting attention away from the serious violations of
humanitarian law being committed by the Irani military forces as well as the continuing gross
pattem of human rights violations taking place throughout the country. Perhaps if the
international community has responded to Mr. Tafrishi as we did—we thought Mr. Tafishi
was so clearly inept for his job anyone could see him for what he was—there would still be
strong intemational action regarding Iran.
3. In other work on the situation in Iran, we have cypressed outrage over the
staggering number of political prisoners executed in the regime's jails. Now it appears we were
conservative in our tally of thºse cºccutions: Mr. Hossein Ali Montazeri, former designated
successor to Khomeini, Iran's Supreme Leader at the time, recently made public shocking
documents indicating that as many as 30,000 political prisoners were killed in 1988 alone.
Iran's current leaders, including Mr. Khamenei, Mr. Khatami and Mr. Rafsanjani, as well as
the officials still in charge of the Judiciary, played the primary role in this massacre.'
4. The documents made public by Mr. Montazeri include the text of Khomeini's fatwa
in Summer 1988, which read in part
"Thosc who arc in prisons throughout the country and remain steadfast in their support
for thcMonaſcqin [Mojahedin), are waging war on God and are condemned to
execution.... Annihilate the enemies of Islam immediately. As regards the cases, use
whichever criterion that speeds up the implementation of the [execution] verdict."
Other documents made public by Mr. Montazeri show that on July 31, 1988 alone, about
3,800 persons were killed, only three days after the beginning of this bloody massacre. On the
same day, in a letter to Khomeini, Mr. Montazcri wrote:
"At least order to spare women who have children and finally, the execution of several
thousand prisoners in a ſcw days will not have positive repercussions and will not be
mistake-free.... A large number of prisoners have been killed undertorture by their
interrogators.... In some prisons of the Islamic Republic young girds are being raped
by force.... As a result of unruly torture, many prisoners have become deafor
paralyzed or afflicted with chronic diseases."


104
3
5. Gross human rights violations in Iran did not end in 1988. In his latest report to the
General Assembly, Maurice Copithome, the Commission's Special Representative on Iran
attests to high rates executions and of particularly gruesome torture, continued discrimination of
women and religious minorities, and curtailment of freedom of the press under conditions that
he calls “truly draconian."
6. The continuing flagrant violations of human rights in Iran and the shocking massacres
of 1988 are irrefutable cases of crimes against humanity. These violations took place and
continue in the course of an on-going civil war and are related to that war. Accordingly, the
international community is, under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other
instruments of humanitarian law, under an obligation to seek out and try those responsible.
Such a trial is not himited to a special intemational tribunal, but may take place in the courts of
any party to the Geneva Conventions."
7. International Educational Devckpment/Humanitarian Law Project urges the
Commission as a whole as well as its individual members to undertake appropriate action in
light of gravc breaches of humanitarian law committed by the Irani regime. We also urge the
Commission to continue the mandate of its Special Representative.
‘The state-run daily Iran News, made a reference to this musacre on April 9, 2000:"The decrec was issued
at a time when Presidentkhatami, was the deputy to the Commander of the Armed Forces Suffin
ideological and cultural affairs. He implemented the Imam (Khomeini)'s decrecmost decisively."
*United Nations Document A/55/363 at para. 13.
"See, for example, Geneva Convention TV of 1949, United Nations Treaty Scries Vol. 75, p.267: "Each High
Contracting Party shall be under an obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to have committed, ...grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their
nationality, before its own courts.


105
Talb 7


106
Allegation 7: MEK brainwashed, imprisoned and tortured members who wanted to leave
Camp Ashraf starting in the 1990s
While not a criterion for being labeled a terror group, the revelation that an organization may
have engaged in the abuse of human rights is cause for investigation, opprobrium and action by
governments and private watchdog groups alike. The reputation of an entity, once exposed as an
abuser of human rights, is not easily, if ever, rehabilitated.
It was therefore a major reputational blow to the MEK when, in May 2005, Human Rights Watch
(HRW) released a 28-page reportentitled N -H n Ri Abuses Insi Mojahedin Khal
Camps, in which serious alleged human rights abuses by the MEK (referred to as 'MKO'in the HRW
report) were described in detail, based on lengthy telephone interviews with twelve persons offering
first-hand accounts. The report said of these witnesses that "[t]heir testimonies...paint a grim picture of
how the organization treated its members, particularly those who held dissenting opinions or expressed
an intent to leave the organization. The former MKO members reported abuses ranging from detention
and persecution of ordinary members wishing to leave the organization, to lengthy solitary
confinements, severe beatings, and torture of dissident members. The MKO held political dissidents in its
internal prisons during the 1990s and later turned over many of them to Iraqi authorities, who held them
in Abu Ghraib.”
Coming from one of the world's most respected humanitarian NGOs - some of whose senior
leadership the author knows and greatly admires—this report dealt a severe blow to the image and
reputation of the MEK, in America, Europe, and undoubtedly elsewhere. The MEK, for its part, denied
all of the human rights abuse allegations, called into question the truthfulness and affiliations of the
witnesses who had supplied the material for the HRW report, and invited scrutiny of its sites, operations
and people to debunk the report's conclusions.
A group of four Members of the European Parliament who were supporters of the MEK formed
a delegation and conducted an investigation of the HRW charges, including private interviews at Camp
Ashraf with MEK members and officials, and what it called “impromptu inspections of the sites of alleged
abuses." The result was a book-length rebuttal of the HRW report which, by its account, exposed the
falsity of testimonials in the HRW report, witness by witness, often quoting ex-spouses or siblings of the
HRW witnesses and introducing, with some if not all the witnesses, the hand of Iranian government
influence over their testimony.” Their rebuttal sharply criticized the HRW report's authors for, among
other alleged shortcomings, failing to meet with these telephone witnesses or take other prudential
steps such as visiting MEKsites, to verify their stories.
The credibility and quality of its staff's work thus challenged, HRW issued a statement on
February 14, 2006 in which it said, in part: "We have investigated with care the criticisms we received
1.-- - - -
littp:iiwww.hrw.orgiºsport&ºlºilºit.
2 André Brie and Paulo Casaca assisted by Azadeh Zahelion behalf of the Friends of a Free Iran Furopean Parliament, “People's Mojahedin of Iran"
- Mission Report (L'Ilammalian publishers, September 2005)http:www.editious-harmaſºn.iiiºdºkasp?navig-calºgue&ºi-livreºus:-2.2363 (there
arc versions published in French and English)
- IIuman Rights Walch, May 2005


107
concerning the substance and methodology of the report, and find those criticisms to be unwarranted...."
Directly responding to the rebuttal by the members of the European Parliament-known as the Friends
of a Free Iran (FOFI)—the HRW statement continued, “The FOFT document disputed the testimonies and
challenged the credibility of the witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, saying, among other
things, that their allegations were widely believed to be orchestrated by Iran's Ministry of
Intelligence'....Neither FOFI nor any of the other critics of the Human Rights Wotch report have provided
any credible evidence to support this charge.”
Without wishing to relitigate the 2005-06 HRW report controversy, or claiming superior
knowledge regarding these and similar contradictory claims, the author would direct the reader's
attention to the following information if only to provide context to any search for 'ground truth"
regarding the MEK's human rights practices.
To begin, one individual who did claim superior knowledge to that of HRW regarding the
activities and practices inside Camp Ashraf was Colonel David Phillips, USA, who commanded the 89"
Military Policy Brigade responsible for Camp Ashraf from January-December 2004. Colonel Phillips, who
was subsequently promoted to general officer rank, wrote a letter dated May 27, 2005 to Kenneth Roth,
Executive Director of HRW. The letter, which was read into the Congressional Record on June 21, 2005
by Rep. Thomas Tancredo, said in part:
"...was responsible for the safety and security of Camp Ashraffrom January-December 2004. Over the year
long period 1 was apprised of numerous reports of torture, concealed weapons and people being held against
their will by the leadership of the Mujahedine-Khalq. f directed my subordinate units to investigate each
allegation [and] in many cases 1 personally led inspection teams on unannounced visits to the MEK/PMOI
facilities where the alleged abuses were reported to occur. At no time over the 12 month period did we ever
discover any credible evidence supporting the allegations raised in your recent support. I would not have
tolerated the abuses outlined in your report....Each report of torture, kidnapping and psychological deprivation
turned out to be unsubstantiated.....To my knowledge, as the senior officer responsible for safeguarding and
securing Camp Ashraf throughout 2004, there was never a single substantiated incident as outlined in your
report....
"I believe that your recentreport was based on unsubstantiated information from individuals without firsthand
knowledge or for reasons of personal gain...iraq was very dangerous throughout 2004. In myopinion, Camp
Ashraf was the safest place within my area of responsibility."
The next year, on August 24, 2006, Lieutenant Colonel Julie S. Norman, USA, Military Police
Commander of TF134, JIATF at Camp Ashraf, wrotein a Memorandum for the Record regarding the
JIATF's agreements with the PMOI during her tenure beginning in September 2005: "For the past three
years,...US Forces have been in charge of security outside of Ashraf, and the PMOI has been responsible
3 Human Rights Watch. “Statementon Responses to Hunan Rights Watch Report on Abuses by the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO).”
February 14, 2006.
“causinaikºod-Examinornamuks An-21.2005, p. Eizº.
2


108
for internal discipline of Ashraf, which has been fulfilled in the best manner....There exists no prison or
any obligation to stay in Ashroft everyone is free to leave PMOI anytime he/she wishes to.”
Numerous testimonials along similar lines have issued from US, European, and Iraqi as well as
MEK parties, some claiming to have evidence that named witnesses in the HRW report had ties to
Iranian intelligence.” There is an evident pattern of activity in Europe and the US involving Iranian
intelligence, with a primary objective being to defame the MEK. The individual discussed in the previous
attachment who had admitted fabricating stories about MEK aggression against the Kurds, Jamshid
Tafrishi, had a broader mission, as reported to the UN Secretary General by an American NGO
accredited to UN ECOSOC(third enclosure to attachment 6 above):
"Mr. Tofishi has recently written letters in which he reveals that the Intelligence Ministry of the Iranion regime
hired him (apparently paying him $72,000 in addition to travel and other expenses) especially to carry out a
misinformation compaign about the IMEK), with folse accusations that the IMEK1 had itself engaged in
violations of human rights or intimidation or extortion of the Iranion exile community.”
Mr. Tafrishi, a political refugee in Denmark, submitted an affidavit dated August 30, 2001 for use
in the US Court of Appeals reviewing the FTO designation of the MEK/PMOI. (The full text and original
affidavit are enclosed next under.) In it, Tafrishisays, "Alleging human rights abuses against the PMOI
was one of the most serious projects the [Iranian intelligence] Ministry was pursuing outside Iran with
me and a number of other agents....In 1994, we were engaged in an extensive campaign to convince
Human Rights Watch that PMOI is engaged in human rights abuses and encouraged them to prepare a
report in this regard. The information was also being sent to the United States Department of State who
was preparing a report on the Mojahedin at the time.”
Allied governments describe in similar terms the activities of Iranian intelligence within their
territory. Germany's Federal Ministry of Interior said this in its 1999 Annual Report:
"As before, the priority aim of the Ironion Intelligence Service VEVAK (Ministry for Intelligence and Security) is to
combot Iranian dissidents living in Germany....VEVAK activities were, as in the previous years, focused on the
political neutralization of opposition groups and their anti-regime octivities. The IMEK1 continued to be the focus
of the intelligence interest of the Iranian intelligence service. h its fight against the Iranion opposition-in-exile,
VfVAK makes use of so-called "culture associations". These are cover organizotions founded as directed by
VEvak and acting in accordance with Iran's interests and wishes,
"In addition, the Iranion service initiotes anti-MEK publications which in port are published by former MEK
activists and have the aim of persuading the readers of these publications to turn their backs upon this
organization. For spying on the MEX, the Iranian intelligence service also recruits supporters of that
organization and otherltonian nationals. Recruitment mostly takes plore during visits by exiled hºanions to Iron.
When in that country, they will be approached by VEVAK and, in instances, under threat of massive horassment
against themselves or their relatives in Iran, are compelled to co-operate with the intelligenceservice.”
The Dutch National Security Service (then still known as ‘BVD') wrote this in its 2001 Annual
Report:
*"Memorandum ºr ºc Record, Subject Understood Agreenwonts Bctween JIATF and PMOIDuring ITC Norman's TemurcC22 SFP05 24
Alk;06)." Department of the Amy, TF-134, JIATT, Camp Ashraſ, lºaq.24AUG06.
6 ForcNamplc, following the visit to Canup Ashraf by a Norwegian Parliamentary Dolcgation onc member. Lars Risc, wrote alcticſ to HRW
Fxccutive Dircctor Konnch Roth to this cffoct. quoted in the FOFI Mission Report citcdahowc.
7. Report of the Oſlice ſor
intºnyhmi Bundic S iMº

3


109
"One of the tasks of the Iranion intelligence service MOS is to track down and register persons abroad who are
in contact with opposition groups. Special attention is paid to members and former members of the principal
opposition group, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MKO)...The Iranian authorities see the MKO as a terrorist
organisation and urge western countries to ban it....Agents of the Iranian intelligence service also receive
instructions to spread adverse information about the MKO or its members. The MOS thus tries to destabilise the
organisation and to discredit it in the host country, which affects political and social support for the movement.
The MKO... reports each (olleged) attempt by the Iranian intelligence service to infiltrate the organisation or to
_l inate negative inf on to the authorities in the host country.”
As described in general terms by the German and Dutch services, there is a considerable body of
information in circulation regarding the loyalties, sponsorship and thus credibility of specific individuals
and their public assertions about the MEK.”
Is the MEK an organization that abuses the human rights of its followers? Before reaching a
verdict on this allegation one must note the repeated specter of claim and counter-claim on basic facts
playing out in the public domain; siblings and formerspouses disputing in detail the public claims of
their own family members; US military eyewitnesses raising warnings about the credibility of allegations
relating to the periods of their service at Camp Ashrafin Iraq; and allied governments reporting that
Iran's intelligence services promote falsehoods in an effort to color international opinion regarding the
MEK on this score. Nothing is ever conclusive on such an issue. But an objective observer will want to
exercise an extraordinarily high level of diligence before claiming to know whether the constant tainting
of the MEK's reputation as an abuser of human rights is justified.
"Annulkºuzºu saianuscuritysswise-island)." 33-scºmbs 6.2002 Inc.www.aix. - -
As one possible example of MEKeſſorts to expose MOIS operatives. supporters of the MEK have what they say is a police photograph of one
ITRW witness upon being arrested in Parison June 17, 2007 aſler allegedly participating in the attempled assassination of pro-MFK individuals
who had arrived aſ a meeting with the inlent Wopublicize and protest histies to the Iranian MOIS. MEK supporters say the ils and
background werc subscqucutty made public.
9 Sce, for cºmplc. thc signed "Witncss Statomcut of Winston Janics Griffiths” arctired Lahor MP.bcforctic U.K. Proscribed Organisations
Appeal Commission (the court case that overturned the UK's listing of the MFK as a lemurist organization, see Altachment 10) which names
several “front organizations ſor the Iranian regime" that he says frequently approached him and ſellow UK Members of Parliament, ſiſteen
websites"uscd to spread misinformation against the lºſol" and detailed allegations regarding onc Massoud Khodabandch and his wife Aulic
Singleton, who together run the “kan-Interlink" website (http:www.iral-injedink.ºrg). A second signed witness statement to the Commission
from Abrahim Khodahandch, brothcrof Massoud Khodabandch, provides a detailed narrative consistcut with Mr. Griffiths' submission

4


110
(Tab 7) - Tafrishi affidavit


111
Affidavit of Jamshid Tafrishi,
Personal background
1. I, Jamshid Tafrishi, was born on April 13, 1955, in the city of Tabriz, Iran. I currently
live in Denmark as a political refugee.
2. I am divorced and have 2 children.
3. Until last year, I pretended that I was an opponent of the Iranian regime, while I was
in fact advancing the assignments given by the Iranian regime's Intelligence Ministry. In
these years, I actively participated in the Iranian regime conspiracy to accuse PMOI of
human rights violations. I was also engaged in other plans such as providing false
information about PMOI to foreign governments, particularly alleging that PMOI is
supported by the Iraqi government to tarnish the image of the organization.
4. In these years, the Intelligence Ministry invited me to Singapore four times to meet
the most senior officials of the Intelligence Ministry. Singapore is one of the locations
the Intelligence Ministry uses to meet its agents. Once it became clear that I was
meeting with Intelligence Ministry's officials, my divorced wife pressured me to go to
Iran for further meetings with Intelligence Ministry officials. I traveled secretly to Iran
in a trip arranged by the Intelligence Ministry and met with the Ministry's officials in
Tehran and Shiraz. From 1995 until 1999, I received a total of 72,000 dollars from the
Intelligence Ministry as payment for my work on their behalf
5. I met Saeed Emami (AKA Shamshiri), the number-2 man in the Intelligence Ministry
for eight years, who was behind the murder of at least 100 dissidents in Iran. The latest
of these serial killings was exposed in November 1998, when Dariush Forouhar and his
wife Parvaneh were brutally murdered in their home. Emami was also responsible for
the assassination of dozens of dissidents abroad. I also met Mostafa Kazemi (AKA
Sanjari, Emami's deputy), Amir Hossein Taqavi (responsible for the PMOI case in the
Intelligence Ministry, also involved in the political killings) and Hossein Shariatmadari
(a deputy Intelligence Minister and the current editor of the government-controlled
Kayhan newspaper). My contact with the Ministry was a man by the name of Reza who
happened to be an assistant to Saeed Emami. It was revealed later that his name was
Morteza Qobbeh. He was Emami's other deputy and had the task of recruiting those who
dropped out of the Mojahedin Organization.
6. After escaping from the Iranian regime's prisons, I joined the National Liberation
Army of Iran in Spring 1989 to fight against the ruling dictatorship in my country.
During the Persian Gulf war, when the situation became difficult and intolerable, I was
no longer able to continue to fight against the clerical regime and made a written request
to be transferred to Hillah refugee camp in Iraq, where I was introduced to the United
Nations for departure. Consequently I went to Jordan and Turkey and was eventually
relocated to Denmark as a political refugee


113
12. In 1996, using the same story against the PMOI, we met in Geneva with Professor
Maurice Danby Copithome, UN Human Rights Commission's Special Representative
on human rights situation in Iran. The Intelligence Ministry organized everything
regarding this meeting. The contact person with professor Copithorne was Nasser
Khajeh-nouri who operated from US but regularly visited Europe.
13. A similar attempt was made at Amnesty International in 1996, when a number of
Intelligence Ministry agents met with the representative of the human rights
organization in Germany.
14. Despite all our efforts, we were not able to convince human rights organizations or
the UN Special Representative to denounce the PMOI. As a result, we were asked to
concentrate more on governments
False information to foreign governments
15. One of our tasks was to discredit the PMOI among members of parliaments and
governments in Europe and the United States. In this respect we were asked to claim
that the PMOI is cooperating or being helped with the Iraqi government
16. As part of this plan, I was assigned to inform international organizations as well as
foreign governments that PMOI was involved in suppressing the Kurdish rebellion in
Iraq. This plan was conducted under the supervision of Nasser Khajeh-Nouri, who was
the regime's agent in the United States. He organized interview for me and other agents
with an Iranian radio station in Los Angeles to tell our story that PMOI suppressed the
Kurdish people along the Iraqi forces. Khajeh-Nouri consequently prepared a report
under my name on this issue and sent it to US intelligence and government agencies as
well as the United Nations. Consequently, a US Non-Governmental Organization,
International Educational Development [organization], prepared a report of their
investigation on this issue refuting our allegations against the Mojahedin, which was
published as UN document on August 22, 1995.
17. In a similar move, Nasser Khajeh-Nouri once told me that he has received reliable
information that PMOI is helping the Iraqi government to buy chemical weapons and
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. He asked me to expose the information and
said we would then make it an international issue, by sending it to US government as
well as European governments and international organizations. He said he would
personally provide this information to US officials. To this end a public meeting was
organized in June 1995, in Hamburg, Germany where I disclosed the information that .
had been given to me.
18. In this respect not only we were providing false information on the PMOI, but we
were also claiming to have been threatened by PMOI members. In one occasion, on
February 16, 1996, when I was living in Germany, I wrote to Chancellor Helmut Kohl
and claimed that PMOI intended to assassinate me.
19. I am aware of several other cases where other agents were told to approach the law
enforcement agencies in European countries including Germany, Denmark and
Netherlands claiming that PMOI members have threatened them.
20. I am aware that this affidavit will be proffered as evidence in an administrative
proceeding being conducted by the United States Department of State.


114
JD-06-01
11:21 +0.04575771440 JAMSHID TAFRISHI->0012023932602 ECM
-
Affidavit of Jasnahid Taºishi,
Personni backgrºund
!. I, Jamshid Tuſrishi, was burn un April 13, 1955, in the city of Tahrir. Iml. 1
currently live in Dunmurk as a political rvlugwe.
2. I am divorced and huve 2 childnin.
3. Until lawyvar, I pretended that I was an opponent qfth Innian rushme, while ! was
in ſhut advulcinº: thu Roignments given by the Iranium ºvuimo's Inulliyuuce Ministry. In
ſhºw years. I getively participatial in the Innian regime conspiracy to accuse PMül of
hunun rights violations. I was alsº unungcd h othºr plans such us providing false
information ahnut PMOI u foreign gºvernments, pºrticulurly alluging that PMM is
suppºrtud by the Iraqi government to lamish the i of the organization.
4. In these years, the intelligence MiniMry invited mºto Singapore tºur times in moot
the must schiur oſſluiuls of the Intelligenoc Ministry, Hingapore is one nfühe locations
the Intelligence Ministry unus wo meet its Agonts. c it became clear that I was
mooting with intulligence Ministry's oſſicials, my d *d wife pressured me to go to
Imn for ſurther meeting with Intelligunce Ministry officials, I truveled secretly to tran
in a trip arrangul by the Intelligence Ministry and mºi with the Ministry's officials in
Tehran and Shiraz, From 1995 until 1990. Preueived ºntul of 72,000 dºllars from the
Intelligence Ministry as payment for my work ºn theiſbehnlſ.
5. I met Succd Emami (AKA Shamſhirl), the number-8 mun in the intelligencu Ministry
for sight years, who was bºthind the murder of at lenſ 100 diasidents in lºan. The lates:
uſ these serial killings was expaved in November 1998, when Dariush Formuhar and his
wifu Parvaneh were hrutally murdered in their hunne; tımmmi was also ruspensible ſor
the assumuination uſ dozenn aſ dissidents ahroad, I lau men Mnniaſh Kºrsmi (AKA
Sanjari, limpril's deputy), Amir Ilomoln'ſaqavi (
Intelligence Ministry. alsu invºlved in thupalitical killings) and liunwin Mharialmadari
(a deputy Intelligencu Mlalster and the current editºr ºf the government-contralled
Kayhun newspapur). My cuntact with the Ministry n man by the nºunc of Renº,
who huppuncil to be un assisium w Sneed limami. It was revealed bict that his name
wux Moricza Qobbch. Ile wus Kmuni's othur and had the task of recruiting
those who drupped out of the Mojahedin Organizuli,
6. Aſtur eacuping from the limnian fullime's pri Tjºined the Nutional Liberation
Army ºf Iran in Spring 1989 to fight against the rºllmg distulorship in my truntry.
l]uring the Persian Gulf war, when the situation beeuine difficult and intolerable, I was
no longcrahluiu continue to ſight against the clerical Hºgſme and mude a writium request
to he iransferred to lllllah reſugee eamp in truſt, I was introduced to the limited
Natinna for depururu. Cunacqucruly 1 went to Jordağ and Turkey and was eventually
relaualed to Ikºnmark as a political reſuyue.
Side 01


116
30-00-01
11:22 +0.04575771440
-
report in this regard. The informatian was also
Bepartment uſ 8thic who was preparing a repart on
JAMSHID tapRISHI->001202393.2602 ECM
ing sent to the United Munics
Mujahudin at the time.
-
12. In 1996, using the name story against the PMOI. !. mctlu (Jeneva with Professor
Maurice Danby Cnpithrºne, UN ilumun Righu Cum
tin human rights situation in Iran. The Intelligenve
mission's Special Representative
Ministry organized averything
regarding this mesting. The contact pennn with º: Cupithernu was Nasser
Khajeh-mouri who operated from US hungularly visit
13. A similar attempt was made in Aamesſy lutumal
ſiurope,
in 1996, when a number nſ'
intelligence Ministry agents met with the rupruſcntative uſ thu human rights
mºntºutim in Germany,
14. Deſpite all uur eſſorts, w were not able to convi
human rights organizations or
the UN Special Representative to denounce the PMO). As a rusult, we wwre wºked in
cnn.cºntrale mºre ºn guvernmentº,
False infºrmation to Pereign ºats
governm
13. One of our tasks was io discredli the FMſ) among members uſ parliaments and
governments in Rurope and the United ºutes. In this respect we were asked lo claim
that the PMOI in compenſing mrheing helped with the
government.
16. As part of this plan, 1 was unsigned to inform international organizations as well as
forcign governments that PMOI was involved in suppreming the Kurdish rebellion in
Iraq. This plan was conducted under the supervision o
Nassor Khajeh-Nouri, who was
the regime's agent in thu United Siuta. Henrganized tervicw for incand otherapent
with an Iranian radio station in Lus Angelum in tell out
Kurdish penple ulnng the Iraqi ſorces. Khajeh-Nouri
under my name ºwn this issuu and ment illu US intellinº
well as the United Nations. Consequently, a 118 N
Intermeliomul Hiducational Development organizatk
story that PMOI supprwººd the
cºnsequently prepared a report
mec and government agencies tº
ºn-ſkivernmental Organization,
in), prepared a repuri of their
inwatigation on this issus reſuting our alkºutiunn ºinal thu Mujahedin, which was
published an UN ducumcm on August 22, 1995.
17. In u similar move, Nassar Khajeh-Nouri ones lukd
inſomnation that PMOI in helping the traqi governme.
other kinds of wºmpons of mans destruction. Ile asked :
nak, wu would then make it an inwºmational imme, by
well as Furupuun grwormmunts and international or
personally provide this information w tº aſſicial T
mu that he has received reliable
|t to buy shemisul weapunn and
Me to expese the laſomalled ºld
ºnling it in us wovernment as
intiuns. Ile said he would
this enu u public meeting was
organized in June 1993, in Hamburg. Germany when
had beat giventume,
18. In this respecimni only we were providing ſºles
I disclºud the mºſºfºilfin that
ſomation on thu PMCM, but we
were also claiming in have been thrwaned by PMOI members. In one ºccasion, ºn
February 16, 1996, when I was living in Gorºnºmy, I
undelained that PMOI intended to asa-sinate T-8.
to m chancellor lielmut Kohl
Side 03


117
09/09/2002 11:37 FAI
J0-00-01 11:22 +0.04575771440 JAMSHID TAFRISHI->0012023952602 ECM Side 04
19. I urn aware erseveral uther casus where ºther he were told to apprºach the law
enforcement agencies in European cauntries inelºlº "?" Uenmark and
Netherlands claiming that PMOI mumbershave th ºcci thºrn. w
2n. I am aware that thi, amdavit will be pruiſeral ºf ºvideº in * *
proceeding being conducted by the thiºdºukº Pº mºnſ nſ State.
welle, den 30. august 2001
Janská Tālāk
Po. Bo K23? -
'#/oo Vejle z Dawnark
Til witterlighed on underskriftems agthed, datºringens rigtighed sumt underskriverens
myndighed:
Nawn: % W 4 Nawnt 44-->
sºilſſºl Jø/471- - -
Mºhºe . Still ing: ºn laureen
Bopal: :- Bopal: ºr
wºe Wºls


118
Tab 3


119
Allegation 8: MEK operates as a cult, separating married couples after 1991 and sending
their children away, prohibiting single women from marrying, and self-immolating
Critics of the MEK, many journalists', and some governments’ include in their descriptions of
the MEK a characterization that it is a "cult" or engages in cult-like behavior. Such a description is out of
the ordinary when discussing entities listed as foreign terrorist organizations—even when discussing the
most dangerous terror groups such as Al Qaeda, which many believe would nothesitate to use weapons
of mass destruction on large civilian populations were it to obtain such weapons.
In the American public's experience with groups alleged to be “cults,” these have not generally
been associated with terrorism. There may have been other domestic laws at issue (such as homicide,
tax evasion, fraud, weapons violations, child abuse, and land use) with the past activities of the Ku Klux
Clan, the followers of the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh in Oregon, the suicide Jonestown Cult in Guyana and
later Heaven's Gate in San Diego, deranged murderer Charles Manson and his female followers, the
Branch Davidians in Texas, etc. All have been viewed by the public with disdain and revulsion. None, at
least in America, have been linked to the pursuit of political power.
There is therefore little frame of reference in the foreign policy and international security
domain with which to factor the persistent negative commentary about the MEK's alleged "cult"-like
behavior over the years into a judgment on the how the MEK's activities over the past 2-5 years align
with the standing criteria for either listing or de-listing an entity as an FTO. If a group is already guilty of
committing, abetting, or planning to commit acts of terrorism, the further attribution of abnormal
personal and social proclivities that may offend the sensibilities of Americans or Europeans—even if
proven true-would seem to be extraneous. If a group is not guilty of actions meriting continuing
designation as an FTO, it is even less clear where the issue of undesirable social practices finds its place
in such a decision process.
And yet, the "cult" label almost invariably surfaces in policy commentaries urging that the MEK
be kept on the list of FTOs. The author's best explanation for this is that critics of the MEK are far more
interested in the strategic issue of US foreign policy toward Iran than the quasi-technical matter of
whether the MEK now qualifies to have its designation removed as an FTO (much less whether social
mores within the MEK are alien to westernsensibilities). Their fear seems to be that a de-listing of the
MEK by the US would betantamount to a major policy reversal toward the government in Tehran—a
signal that Washington has given up not only its pursuit of negotiations with Tehran, but also the hope
that forces for reform inside Iran hold out any prospect of moderating the revolutionary Islamic regime's
pursuit of its nuclear program and continued state support for terrorism.
To question the relevance of these disturbing characterizations is not to say they are either true
or untrue. As there is no empirical unit of measure that renders one actor's behavior pattern cult-like
and another's not, the judgment to be made is in the eye of the beholder. The criticisms of the MEK
include that its historic leader, Massoud Rajavi, and current leading figure, wife Maryam Rajavi, have
1 Elizabeth Rubin identified as a contributor to the New York Times Magazine recently wrote of her visit to Camp Ashrafeight years earlier.
likoning it to "a ſaclory in Maois China" in a commentary ſhal asserts as fact many of the allegations examined in this study. Flizabeth Rubin.
“An Iranian Cult and its American Friends.” New York Times. August 14, 2011, Sunday Review. pp. 5, 8.
upºwastinºs ºn 2014:08.14 opinior studsxian-irraien-cult-and-its-àmerican-ſiiends.html?pagevunied-1&_r=1.
l'or example, see p. 28 of the Dutch National Security Service Annual Report for 2001.

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long demanded and received total obedience and submission from the rank and file; that information
reaching MEK members is very limited, and its content sanitized; and that marriages were broken up in
the early 1990s, and their children sent overseas to be raised by relatives, friends or arranged host
families, since which time men and women have been kept mostly separated and celibate. Some have
portrayed the superior authority of Madame Rajavi and a large echelon of ranking female aides over the
MEK's male population as bizarre, overreaching presumably even feminist standards of women's
empowerment. It is certainly a reversal of the gender politics in most of the Middle East.
MEK supporters deny the implication that they are in the excessive 'thrall of their leaders'
influence, and contend that the 'cult’ characterizations are either false or exaggerated. As with other
allegations, they can point to the hand of Iranian intelligence, promoting this unflattering profile of their
organization.” They point out that the Gulf war and its aftermath in Iraq made the MEK's security in
Iraq very tenuous, with (see previous attachments) a nationwide Shi'a-Kurdish uprising followed by a
crushing ground campaign by Saddam Hussein's forces, cross-border insertion of large numbers of
Iranian Revolutionary Guards, aerial bombardment from Iran,“ and a US-imposed no-fly zone over much
of the country. Residents of Camp Ashraf believed that, as they were surrounded by dangers from
several quarters, this was no place for children to be growing up.
They say that, even during Operation Desert Storm, an overland convoy by road westward into
Jordan was set up using small vans that would hopefully not attract the kind of precision airstrikes made
famous by GEN Schwartzkopf's televised debriefings during the Gulf War. Children were initially taken
to a hotel in Amman provided by the late King Hussein, and then escorted onward to Europe and
Canada for safekeeping with supportive families; many returned after 2000. MEK supporters make no
attempt to deny that their committed members stayed behind in Iraq and sustained their activities
against the Tehran regime,
One other MEK activity branded as 'cult’-like that western audiences find quite alien to their
own cultural framework is self-immolation as an act of protest, such as that performed by several MEK
sympathizers in 2003 when Maryam Rajavi was arrested by French authorities.” The only comment here
is to note that virtually nowhere in the American reaction to the 2011 so-called "Arab Spring" has one
seen a cultural disdain for the act of the man who started it. Tunisian fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi's
fatal self-immolation has been respectfully portrayed by the western media and expert analysts alike as
a legitimate, if desperate, act of protest. With this perhaps more than the other allegations, people will
be guided by their own personal views. The point here is that interested parties with variousagendas
have tried hard to influence them.
*A July 2010 article in the Toronto Sun reported the following: “John Thompson, who heads up the Mackenzie hºstitute, a security minded
think-tank, says...he was offered $80,000 by a man tied to Iran's mission in Canada. They wanted me to publish apiece on the Mujahedin-e
Ahalq.”he said Iran is trying to get other countries to label it as a terrorist cult." Thompson says he turned down the offer." Brian Liller.
“Activists say spychicf is right, China is spying. Torºnto Sun. July 5, 2010
http:www.tgoatºuil.com.fewssinads:010ºrfºlklºl.26.html.
4 Supporters of the MEksay that iranian fightcrplancs bombed MEkbascs in Iraq in April 1992, targcting but missing Massoud and Maryam
Rajavi. and that this is rarely iſ ever mentioned as context in government reports thal. they add, exaggerale the severity of allacks against Iranian
embassies in thirteen capitals in their narratives of alleged MLKtemorist acts.
*In a public gesture of solidarity, others pledged their willingness to undertake self-immolation iſ the MFK determined it would serve the cause.
For her part. Mrs.Rajavi was recognized by the French judicial authoritics for having tricd to stop these spontancous actions by others
2


123
study, dated June 13, 1980, quotes Mr. Rajavi addressing an even larger crowd, but this time facing the
threat of imminent attack from 'Hezbollahi'supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini. Rouleau quotes Rajavi's
words from the podium: “What are we being attacked for? We are good Moslems, and we are told we
live in an Islamic Republic. But we are being besieged by hooligans and terrorists. The Islamic
Constitution guarantees all liberties in principle. But we are forbidden occess to the newspapers, to the
radio, to television and to Parliament."
MEK supporters produce documents from the Communist Tudeh Party of Iran in France, dated
July 30, 1981, denouncing and calling for the execution of Mr. Rajavi for the “unjustifiable deviation" of
"alliance with liberals," and calling on the Mojahedin faithful to “wake up" and understand that "Rajavi
the traitor" is one and the same with "America.” To date, MEK supporters say, there has never been an
MEK office in a Communist country. From 1982, when the National Council of Resistance established its
Constitution, through the 1980s, MEK histories chronicle a series of NCR Resolutions and Declarations
planning for a constitutional process and free elections post-Khomeini, granting autonomy to the
Kurdish areas as previously noted, and setting forth the “Freedoms and Rights of Iranian Women."
While the author has not been able to authenticate the historical record of the MEK’s doctrinal activity
provided by its supporters, critics have not suggested that these events and actions did not occur.
On June 29, 1993, Dr. Joshua Muravchik of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies, who at the time was a scholar at AEI, spoke about the MEK at the International Club in
Washington. His remarks, which were read into the Congressional Record by Rep. Helen Delich Bentley,
included these:
"One warning about this group is that they don't really mean what they say, and are not being straightforward
about what they believe. I have no way of knowing if this isso, but I was heartened by the fact that they do not
jusr have a slogan democracy; they give a lot of the right answers....
"let's suppose that the fears of their critics are well founded, and they do not mean what they soy about
democracy. The fact that they are talking obout democracy, and not sloganeering, is still very important. They
are talking about the values of religious tolerance, free speech, and contested elections. They are talking about
the values of tolerance as opposed to cruelty, which seems to me to be the fundamental issue. They are
spreading this message among the Iranian people and in their part of the world. This is a very valuable message
to have spread, whether the people who are spreading it are sincere or not. We have often seen that people
start spreading a message and eventually they convince theniselves. From this perspective, even the objection
that they are insincere is nor a decisive objection, because the Majahedin say the right things obout democracy,
and 1 am eagerto see people in this part of the world talking about democracy....
"I want to talk to them about what they say to the world at large about politica; events in their part of the
world. especially want to talk about what are saying about democracy to their own people in their radio
broadcasts. What message are they bringing to the Iranian people, and is it the same as the message they bring
to us?”
Eighteen years later, thanks to the information revolution that has begun to transform the
Middle East, we need not wonder what message the MEK and NCR is broadcasting to Iran. At a rally
outside Paris on June 18, 2011, marking thirty years since the Khomeini regime had instituted a wave of
s “Panel Discussion on Islamic Fundamentalism," by Dr. Joshua Muravchik, Congressional Record FXiension of Remarks, Ilon. Irelen Delich
Hcutley, p. E2203, Scºtcmber 21, 1993 http:ithºmas Loggºvicgi-binºguery:Cºlº: tempº-rlºokacyj;


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mass arrests and executions against the MEK, Maryam Rajavi had a communications opportunity
afforded to few if any Iranians. She addressed a crowd inside and outside a large exhibition center
estimated in the many tens of thousands, joined by French and international dignitaries, among them
parliamentary delegations from 31 countries, each presenting a majority resolution of support for the
safeguarding of the 3,400 residents at Camp Ashraf, Iraq. The proceedings were broadcast into Iran and
other countries carrying Persian television programming, and camera crews filmed the entire
proceeding for dissemination via the internet, DVD, etc.
With such a platform, the NCR President-elect might have faced some agonizing choices, if the
above-quoted Washington experts on Iranian affairs are correct, between communicating the MEK's
"true" ideology to such a significant Iranian audience versus themes that would be more palatable to
her international audience. If so, Madame Rajavi seemed to have no difficulty finding her voice:
constitution, and no to the totality of religious fascism. On the contrary, we sayyes to freedom, democracy and
equality, yes to the separation of church and state....
"[T]he right of the Iranian people to bring down this brutal dictatorship should not be trampled upon more than
it already has. remind you of the words of Abraham Lincoln, who said, ‘The government, with its institutions,
belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can
exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it.'...
"One has only to recall the flood of disgusting allegations against the Resistance movement:Accusations such
as torturing and murdering our own members, the cult of personality, being a cult, killing hundreds of thousands
of Iraqi Kurds and Shi'ites, money faundering, forming criminal associations, imprisoning youngsters and women
against their will, lack of popularity inside Iran, and most important and prevalent, the allegation of
terrorism....indeed, what was the purpose of all these slanders? Throughout the past three decades, these
allegations justified the hanging and torture of the Iranian people and their Resistance....
"Our goal is to establish a free and democratic republic based on the separation of church and state, gender
equality and with emphasis on women's equal participation in political leadership. We want a non-nuclear Iran.
our platform could be summed up in three words: Freedom, Equality and the supremacy of the people's vote.
This has been our ideal from the outset. We are not fighting and making sacrifices to be able to grab onto
power. We hove not even set our sights on shoring power and the ability to govern. Our biggest mission is the
establishment of the people's sovereignty and democracy....[W]e would be content to remain in opposition and
feel honored to sacrifice ourselves for the sake of giving the Iranian people the ability to choose freely. ~4
4. From text of Address by Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, President-Flect of the National Council or Resistance or Iran. Paris, Villepinle. 18 June 2011,
cxcerpts inchided in this publication:http:www.ncr-irºn.org ºn images stºriºs II/II.-latest20'likkhalikºsham-ºb.2011.pd:

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Tab 10


126
Allegation 10. MEK continues to have the capability and intent to conduct terrorist activities
The answer to the question of whether the MEK/PMOI "has engaged in planning and
preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such
acts" (per the State Department criteria) is significant because an affirmative answer to this question
alone—even if MEK/PMOI has committed no acts meeting the definition of terrorism for a very long
time-can be cited to justify its continued listing as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
As noted in earlier attachments, open sources do not point to MEK acts of violence after 2001 or
2002 at the latest. As important as the history of MEK activity is up until that time—hence, the
examination of issues covering the entire history of the organization in the previous attachments–here
the focus will be on available information relating to the MEK's possible terrorism-related activity since
the timeframe of the last 'known' acts of violence.
On June 18, 2003, the Commander of the US Army's 4"Infantry Division, MG Ray Odierno (now
US Army Chief of Staff), described the results of the MEK's voluntary relinquishment of weapons to US
military forces in Iraq in a press videoconference to the Pentagon:
“They have been completely disarmed. We have taken all small arms and all heavy equipment. They had about
10,000 small arms, and they had about 2,200 pieces of equipment, to include about 300 tanks, about 250
armored personnel carriers and about 250 artillery pieces. And we disarmed all of that equipment from them
about 30 days ago.”
Commentary about the MEK has included reference to a November 2004 FBI report available on
the internet entitled "Mujahedin-E Khalq (MEK) - Criminal Investigation,” prepared at the Los Angeles
field office, as an important source of information about alleged illicit planning and funding activities by
named persons affiliated with the MEK.’ while the author claims no professional expertise in the law
enforcement realm, or first-hand knowledge of the matters discussed in the document, the following
may bear on the degree to which judgments can rely on this resource:
• The report lacks a 'file' number and has a disclaimer typed across the bottom of page 1 that
says, “This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI."
• The document recounts MEKalleged activity back to the 1970s, many specifics of which are the
focus of this brief study; the reader is invited to assess the historical precision of this rendering.
• The key assessment in the report (p. 18) says: "It is not believed that the MEK will launch attacks
against U.S. interest or European interests based solely on a U.S. led invasion of Iraq, however,
the MEK may still attempt to organize terrorist operations in the U.S. and Europe targeting
Iranian interests."
• The report chronicles close cooperation between the FBI and French anti-terrorism authorities
leading to the Paris police operation in June 2003 that produced "165 investigative detentions,
25 arrests, and 17 international indictments." Eight years later, as noted in Attachment 2 above,
the Investigative Magistrate of Paris anti-terrorism department issued a Decision declaring that
because "the dossier is devoid of evidence for charges...we order the dismissol of charges...
against persons named above and against anyone else."
1. Maj. Gen. Odictmo vidcotcloconforcuccifrom Haghdad, ix.fcuscſ.INK, US Department of 1xfense, 18 Junczoo.3.
‘hua was: ºn:ver-oil-rºbiº *20ſº pºli.
1


127
• The report also speaks of an Iraq Investigation conducted by an FBI team at Camp Ashraf during
a period ending in April 2004, during which over 175 MEK members and "MEK defectors" were
interviewed. As the New York Times reported on July 27, 2004, “senior American officials said
extensive interviews by officials of the State Department and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had not come up with any basis to bring charges against any members of the
group.”
This last point bears elaboration. On July 7, 2011, Dr. Gary Morsch, a Colonel in the US Army
Reserves who was deployed to Camp Ashraf during this period and ran a hospital in Camp Ashraf,
testified to a House subcommittee about the criminal investigation conducted in 2003-04, saying:
"...based on my direct role as the lead physician assigned to Camp Ashrafin early 2004,... I lived and worked
with the residents of Ashraf on a 24-7 basis. ...left Ashraf with a great knowledge and insight into the
organization, as great a knowledge or insight, I believe, as any other American, or more so.
"I was there during the entire investigation-interrogation phase. And from the beginning to the end, all 3,400
or, at that time, maybe a few more — were interrogated. I did not see the official report of the FBI, but talked
to the agents and the interviewers on a daily basis as they'd come back from spending the day in these
interviews. And they were — they expressed tremendous frustration that they had come to Ashraf with
particular people they thought they were going to be able to take back to the U.S. to prosecute for various
nefarious criminal or terrorist activities, and day by day they were not able to find any evidence on any illegal
criminal or terrorist activities, and finally left empty-handed, as they said. And they were — they were quite
disappointed.""
On July 26, 2004, at the State Department's daily press briefing, then-Deputy Spokesman (and
now Ambassador) Adam Ereli was asked whether the MEK camps in Iraq were supervised, and he
responded, "The important point is that A, they're disarmed; B, they are not— as I said earlier, that they
are not in a position to pose a threat to individuals inside or outside Iraq. And that's the critical
consideration in our view.”
On July 20, 2006, MG William Caldwell, USA, Spokesman for Multinational Force – Iraq, said this
in a press briefing at the Combined Press Information Center in Baghdad:
"Currently...the MEK is out at Ashrafin a secure military facility that the coolition forces, in fact, guard on a 24-
by-7 basis. They're under continuous surveillance and control. Their future status does need to be eventually
determined, but currently, they're not operating within the country of Iraq. They're in a fenced-in facility...and
there is [sic] quite a few coalition forces that are continuously guarding that facility to make sure they are in fact
not allowed access out of it, and fit is, it's a controlled access, where they are in fact...escorted the entire
time.”
3. Douglas Jchl. “The Reach of War: People's Mujahedoch; U.S. Socs No Basis to Prosecute Iranian Opposition"Terror Group Bcing Hold in
Iraq."New York Times, July 27, 2004 litipºwſ ºver 2004:07:27:wºxidºrach-ya-pºopic-s: hººl-u. ºne-base-pºssulº.
irari for - tly, senior American officials noted that it has been more than 25 wars since members of
the People's Afujahedeen were last believed to have heen involved in anacks against the tinued States, and that mow of its recent violent acts
were directed at Irún."
**Massacre at Camp Ashraf inplications for U.S. Policy, testimony of Dr. Gary Morsch, COL, USAR and President of HearttoHeart
Inlemational. hearing of the Committee on Foreign Aſſairs. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. US Ilouse of Representatives. July 7.
2011 ºfotc; -- e.oov. 112 rºtº ºf
- *-i- -
* 1:s Ixpartment of State, Daily Press Hricfing. July 26, 2004 http:...ºut-2′º state.gºv.txºprºdphºdºdº hºu.
t; “Iraq Operational Updale Brieſing." MG William B. Caldwell IV. USA. Combined Press Information Center, Baghdad, Iraq, July 20, 2006.




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These references are cited as context for assessing any allegations of MEK terrorist-related
activity since 2002. The author has found one such mention of the MEK, in the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Report on Incidents of Ierrorism 2005:
"On 31 October 2005, at 8:30 PM, in Al Basrah, Al Basra [sic], Iraq, militants detonated a roadside command-
initiated vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) as a police patrol passed, killing 15 civilians and five
police officers, wounding 71 civilians, and damaging several restaurants, businesses, vehicles and a public
market. No group claimed responsibility although Iraq security personnelsuspect involvement by the
Mujahedin-e Khalq organization (MEK).”
(Refer to Attachment 5 above forbackground on possible Iraqi attitudes and beliefs regarding the MEK,
particularly within the Shi'ite area of southern Iraq.)
This study makes no claim to have located and surveyed every open source item of information
bearing on confirmed, alleged or suspected MEK activities during the past decade; but of the
information surveyed, no contrary information has been omitted here. Former senior US officials who
had access during their time in government to all terrorist-related information have in recent months
spoken publicly at events organized by MEK affiliated entities or groups supportive of the MEK. Some
commentators have criticized these ex-officials for reportedly receiving compensation for some or all of
these speaking appearances. Understanding that the reader will weighthose circumstances, the author
has made a judgment here-without prejudice to other prominent American public servants who have
similarly spoken at these events—that the following testimonies represent the respective officials'
truthful views:
Louis Freeh, FBI Director from 1993-2001, said the following at a Washington, DC panel
discussion on July 16, 2011:
"[W]e all keep contacts with our associations and our agencies. No one has come up to me or any of my
colleagues from their current agencies and said,...this is a bad organization; this is an organization that has
terrorists’ intent or capability.’ That's not happened...[W]e have not been notified by the Deportment of Justice
that we are suspected of providing material assistance to a Foreign Terrorist organization.”
Governor Tom Ridge, the first US Secretary of Homeland Security, from 2003-05, said the
following at the June 18, 2011 rally north of Paris (event described in Attachment 9):
"Every single doy that I had the privilege to serve in public office in Washington, D.C., just about everyday...we
would get a list of threats against the United States. And I must tell you, during that entire period of time as we
looked at threats, and we looked at terrorist organizations-those individuals orthose groups that were
threatening the security [and] the safety of the United States of America-never once, not once, never ever,
ever, ever did MEK appear on a list as being a threat to the United States of America. They are not a terrorist
organization.”
7 Repoſion Incidents of Terrorism 2005, National Counteriorrorism Cºniur, 11 April 2006, p.61
http:#www.nºtc.gov/with locs/200s repºrt can incidºrts of tºrtorism indf
8 Louis Froch, raniarks at “Pancı Discussion: Middle East. Iran Spring. Obstacles. Opportunitics and U.S. Policy.” sponsored by Human Rights
and Democracy International, Washington, DC. July 16, 2011. -
Govemor Tom Ridge, remarks, Paris, Villepinle, 18 June 2011, excerpts included in this publication:hipºwww.ng:
irºn.org:grinkagº&storicallyliºlatºstºlińi-khahºshaftºuly-20} : pdf
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130
Concluding Commentary


132
Perhaps such a calculus weighs heavily today on the US Administration. It is legitimate and quite
appropriate for US officials to assess the possible foreign policy repercussions of removing the MEK and
its aliases from the list of FTOs, consistent with the requirement to ensure that the MEK's actions do not
threaten, in the language of the State Department policy guidelines, "the national Security (national
defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests)" of the US. But it issurely unarguable that the first
question to be answered, before weighing collateral international consequences, is whether the entity
in question is engaged in terrorism, or terrorist activities. Based on this review, the author's conclusion
is that any information credibly demonstrating the MEK's engagement in recent terrorist activities must
be classified; the open sources reviewed for this studystrongly suggest the absence of such behavior.
Measuring Success
Recall the twin purposes of the entire FTO enterprise (see Introduction): "curtailing support for
terrorist activities," and "pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business." When a foreign
organization is confirmed to have committed acts within the past 2–5 years meeting the definition of
terrorist activities, US security interests are degraded, and the FTO designation mechanism is a tool of
influence to curb the danger from that organization and hopefully exert leverage toward a positive
change in behavior. Not to designate such a group as an FTO would be questionable.
Conversely, when a foreign organization already designated as an FTO is not found to have
committed acts of terrorism, engaged in terrorist activities, or planned future actions of this nature
within the past 2–5 years, is any decision other than to de-list the group appropriate? In such a
situation, there are several reasons why removing the designation is likely to be the better approach.
• First, the integrity of the worldwide FTO designation process and the influence it is designed to
exert over terrorist groups would be reinforced rather than potentially weakened.
• Second, against the backdrop of a foreign policy consideration deemed to be more important
than protecting the integrity of the FTO designation process, failure to remove the designation
of a group not found to have committed acts meriting the designation within the past 2-5 years
would confirm suspicions on the part of many observers that the FTO designation process is
politicized.
• Third, and most importantly, a US policy explicitly designed to wean groups away from terrorism
would otherwise be denied the opportunity to claim a rare victory in having pressured a group
“to get out of the terrorism business.”
Weighing Iran's Possible Reaction to de-listing the MEK as an FIO
The author's view is that FTO designations can and must be about terrorism, and the US
Government is fully capable of rendering and explaining such judgments without Iran or any other party
dangerously misinterpreting its broader foreign policy objectives and approaches. The government in
Tehran has recent experience with two key governments—the UK and France-going through a judicial
review resulting in the removal of the MEK from their respective terrorism lists as well as that of the
2


135
expulsion of the MEK population from Iraq. In February 2009, as the enclosure next under reports,
Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Talabani met in Tehran to discuss implementation of what
Khamenei said was a bilateral agreement to do precisely that. Talabani reportedly replied that the "Iraqi
government is determined to expel them and will go forward with its decision.” The first attack by
Iraqi forces on Camp Ashraf took place a few months later.
Members of the US Congress who have actively sought to prevent further harm to the Ashraf
residents are in no doubt as to the effect of the FTO designation on the safety of this population. At a
congressional hearing days after the April 8 attack that killed 34 Ashraf residents, Rep. Brad Sherman,
Democrat of California, said: "In private discussions, the Iraqi Ambassador's office has said [that]
because the MEK is listed as a terrorist group..., Iraq doesn't feel that it has to respect the human rights
of those in the camp.” His Republican colleague, Rep. Ted Poe of Texas, said at a subsequent hearing,
“When I...visited with Mr. Maliki...for almost two hours with other members of the committee,...[h]e said
one reason that the people in Camp Ashraf are treated the way they're treated by Iraq is because the
State Department continues to designate them as a foreign terrorist organization....”
if US policy planners are preoccupied with concern about the disruptive effects a decision to
remove the MEK from the FTO list might have on US-Iran bilateral relations going forward, they would
do well to give some thought to how they will explain their failure to anticipate and prevent a third
mortal attack by American-trained and equipped soldiers against a defenseless community of innocent
civilians holding ‘Protected Persons' identity cards given to them by the United States.
group.” AFP. February 28, 2011
- - Kººg SA
aiparticºLºyistºrſ Ch:
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April 14, 2011, pp. 4-5 h ſix egºſłairs hºuse.gºv. 112.35793.palſ
7 Ilearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Allairs, Ikouse of Representatives, July 27, 2011
e Commillee on loreign Aſſairs. Ilouse of Representatives,
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gºygil'zf:ASSWvcéhºtid-1971:1493700l.


136
(Concluding Commentary) attachment
Meeting of Khamenei and Talabani


138
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now we will see if someone from Academe
can actually keep within the same time frame of 5 minutes that
our diplomat did.
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH FERRIS, PH.D., CO-DIRECTOR,
BROOKINGS-LSE PROJECT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
Ms. FERRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, you may proceed.
Ms. FERRIS. Let me make it clear at the outset, that I am speak-
ing from my perspective of having 25 years of experience in very
difficult humanitarian situations. And also as an independent aca-
demic researcher. I have never been to Camp Ashraf, I don't have
expertise in judging whether or not it should be designated as a
terrorist organization, but based on very difficult situations in
other parts of the world and other times, I would like to suggest
that finding solutions should be the main focus. And what we have
learned from some of these other situations are, there is a role for .
international standards and international processes. You have to
look and see what is in the interest of the different stakeholders
and come up with a solution that responds to those interests.
For example, we look back at Vietnam and the huge Vietnamese
refugee situation and see it as having been a successful thing. But
at the time, there were agonizing choices and compromises that
were made. When we look at the international principles that are
relevant, first of all, the fundamental right to life, security of the
person, and basic human dignity. Iraq must be held accountable for
the safety of people in Camp Ashraf, that is a sine qua non, it has
to be the basis for all policy.
Another basic international principle is that people must not be
sent back to situations where their lives are in jeopardy that ap-
plies whether or not countries have signed on to the refugee con-
vention which Iraq has not, but that has become customary inter-
national law. That has to be the bedrock, both of U.S. policy and
of finding a solution.
Now if you look at solutions for refugee situations and here we
know the residents of Camp Ashraf have not yet been formally de-
termined to be refugees, but there are three solutions: People can
go back voluntarily, which is, in most cases, the best solution but
doesn't seem particularly appropriate here, unless there are some
cases of people who do want to return.
A second is local integration, to be allowed to stay in their coun-
try of refuge with full benefits, rights, and most of all, in safety and
security. Again, Iraq has made it very clear that this is not an op-
tion for the residents and a long term of Camp Ashraf.
The third solution, resettlement in a third country, has histori-
cally been used for only a small percentage of the world's refugee,
but it was designed to respond exactly to cases such as this one,
where people can be supported to start new lives elsewhere in a
way that respects their safety and also other basic human needs.
I think that this resettlement in a third country is the best op-
tion probably for most of the residents of Camp Ashraf. So if you
work backwards from that and say, “What will it take to get
there?” First of all, this question of the impossible deadline we
have heard of the closure of Camp Ashraf by December 31st of this


139
year that deadline needs to be extended, I would suggest for at
least for 6 months, to enable the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees to put into place the procedures and standards
to determine whether or not people individually meet the criteria
of refugee status. There are some things that follow from that in
terms of the way those determinations are made.
Then the process needs to begin, although it has already begun,
of looking for countries which will accept and receive the residents
of Camp Ashraf who have been determined to be refugee. And here
the role of the U.S. Government is critical, when you yourself said
in the earlier panel, Mr. Chairman, some of the difficulties when
the U.S. cannot resettle people because of terrorist designation.
But, you know, the U.S. Government has come up with very cre-
ative ways of working around legislative prohibitions and stand-
ards and procedures in other cases, whether it is coming up with
different places for processing or declaring exceptions or paroling
people in, which is not a very good solution, but it is one that per-
haps should be considered.
At the same time, the U.N. and others should explore possibili-
ties for resettling people in other countries, in Europe and Aus-
tralia and some of the nontraditional resettlement countries such
as Brazil, which might be willing to take some. But it is all linked.
Those governments are saying, well, if the U.S. Government isn't
going to accept people for resettlement, why should we? I under-
stand that several European governments have made decisions to
accept some residents for resettlement, but they need to say so
publicly because if Iraq believes the international community is se-
rious about resettling people elsewhere, I think that it will have
more incentive to cooperate not to close the camp and to make it
possible for people to be processed and resettled afterwards. Thank
you.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Perfect timing.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ferris follows:]


140
Elizabeth Ferris
The Brookings Institution
Co-Director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement
December 7, 2011, Hearing on Camp Ashraf
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on
Oversight and Investigations and on the Middle East and South Asia, for the opportunity to speak
with you today.
I would like to stress at the outset that I am speaking from my 25 years of experience in
international humanitarian issues and my perspective as an independent academic researcher.
Although I have followed developments in Camp Ashraf for a long time, I have never been to the
camp and I have never (to the best of my knowledge) spoken with anyone affiliated with the
MEK/PMOI. I do not have knowledge or expertise about whether the MEK/PMOI should be de-
classified as a foreign terrorist organization.
In many ways, the situation of Camp Ashrafis unique. In my many years of experience, it is
certainly one of the most complex situations I’ve seen. Feelings and passions run high on this
issue. What I would like to do is to step back from some of the details of this particular situation
and put this in a broader context. In particular, I would like to focus on the question of solutions.
Although the residents of Camp Ashraf have not been determined to be refugees (and they may
or may not be so under the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention), I understand that many of
them have filed applications for refugee status. Moreover, some of the issues surfacing around
the residents of Camp Ashraf have much in common with some of the difficult refugee or
refugee-like situations we have seen in the past. First, refugee situations are always political and
it is usually the case that the way refugees are treated by a host government is significantly
influenced by relationships between the governments of the country of origin and the country of
refuge. There are often vastly different understandings of why people left their country. There
have been many situations where refugee leaders have been seen as manipulating their followers
and cases where camp residents do not have freedom of movement or of expression. It is usually
difficult for even knowledgeable outsiders to fully understand the dynamics within a camp. (I
think for example of the camps in then-Zaire where Rwandan refugees were controlled by the
Interhamwe in ways that were not understood by humanitarian actors assisting them until much
later.) Particularly after the experience of Rwanda, the UN has devoted considerable energy to
emphasizing the importance of maintaining the civilian nature of refugee camps. There are also
many cases where diaspora groups have been important actors in the way a crisis has played out
(e.g. Sri Lanka). And when situations drag on for years, the dynamics can become more complex
and the process of finding solutions often becomes even more difficult.


143
EFerris Testimony on Camp Ashraf, Dec. 7, 2011
responsibility not to refoule people from its territory to a country where their lives might be in
danger, the Iraqi government is not legally bound to set up an asylum system or to allow the
foreign residents of Camp Ashraf to remain on its territory. In situations where governments
(whether signatories to the Convention or not) do not have asylum systems, UNHCR has often
played the role in refugee status determination. And there are cases, such as Turkey, where
UNHCR determines whether or not an individual is a refugee under the Convention, and the host
government insists that people found to be refugees will not be allowed to remain in Turkey but
must be resettled elsewhere. In other words, for a government which is not a party to the Refugee
Convention, determination of refugee status does not mean that the government has a
responsibility to allow people found to be refugees to remain in its territory.
In my opinion, the best solution is for UNHCR to be permitted to determine whether or not the
residents of Camp Ashraf are refugees and to find solutions for them outside of Iraq. And it is
absolutely essential that the Iraqi government take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of
the camp residents while this process is being carried out. Several recommendations follow from
this:
• UNHCR must be given the time and conditions necessary to conduct fair status
determination. That means that the deadline to close the camp by December 31" should
be extended and that an appropriate site be found where the status determination process
can be conducted in a safe and confidential manner with appropriate security guarantees
for both the asylum-seekers and UN staff.
• At the same time, UNHCR and the international community must take the steps
necessary to ensure that solutions found for the residents of Camp Ashraf meet the
concern of the Iraqi government that camp residents leave the country. I understand that
some of the residents of Camp Ashraf are nationals of countries other than Iran or that
they have close family relations where immigration might be an option. Those
possibilities should be explored. Some of the residents in Camp Ashraf may want to
return to Iran. For Iranians who voluntarily decide to return to their country, the Iranian
government must offer guarantees of their safety and allow UNHCR to monitor their
well-being and safety. This is standard operating procedure for repatriation operations.
For those determined to be refugees who do not want to return to Iran, then the solution
of resettlement in a third country must be found.
• Resettlement slots are in short supply globally and in the region and the issue is
complicated by the restrictions placed by the US government as a result of anti-terrorist
legislation. But the US role is key. If the US is unwilling or unable to accept cases for
resettlement, then other countries will find it difficult or impossible to accept them.
Without the reassurance that people will be moved on, Iraq is understandably reluctant to
go forward with a refugee determination process. If there is an assurance that people
found to be refugees will be resettled elsewhere, then the Iraqi government should be
more likely to allow the process to move forward.
• This means that first, a way needs to be found for the US, either within the existing law
or by changing the law, to accept a significant portion of the camp residents for


144
EFerris Testimony on Camp Ashraſ, Dec. 7, 2011
resettlement. Given the designation of the MEK/PMOI as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, this is difficult under existing anti-terrorist legislation. But the US
government has a track record of coming up with innovative ways of responding to
complex displacement and resettlement situations. The Attorney General has the
authority to parole people into the United States when it is in the interests of the
government although parole has limitations in terms of adjustment of status and access to
economic and social services. Or, perhaps there are ways of simply specifying that this
particular group is an exception to the anti-terrorist legislation – for example, by defining
those who lived in Camp Ashrafin a determined particular period of time, as tier Ill
rather than tier I of the anti-terrorist laws.
• At the same time, other countries should offer to make resettlement places available to
the residents of Camp Ashraf. Obviously, it will be easier for other governments to make
these commitments if the US government demonstrates its willingness to shoulder some
of the responsibility. In particular, some of the non-traditional resettlement countries —
such as Brazil, Chile and Burkina Faso – may have a particular role to play in this
politically delicate context. Moreover, governments who are willing, for humanitarian
reasons, to allow residents of Camp Ashraf to resettle in their countries should make their
commitments public. This would reassure the Iraqi government of the international
community’s commitment to finding solutions for the Camp Ashraf residents.
This is not a perfect solution and it will require a great deal of commitment and hard work to
make it happen. -
I want to close by saying that the reason the international community has developed a system for
dealing with asylum-seekers and refugees which is based on international law, on well-honed
procedures, on respect for human rights and on an impartial humanitarian agency is precisely to
be able to deal with highly politicized situations such as the present one in Camp Ashraf.
UNHCR works with refugees from all political sides, for example with Iraqis fleeing the Saddam
Hussein regime and those fearing persecution because of their association with Saddam Hussein.
The United Nations General Assembly has affirmed the humanitarian and non-political nature of
UNHCR's work. I suggest that it is in US interests to let UNHCR do its work in accord with
international standards and humanitarian principles.


145
Mr. ROHRABACHER.Colonel Martin.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL WES MARTIN, USA (RETIRED),
(FORMER BASE COMMANDER OF CAMPASHRAF)
Colonel MARTIN. Sir, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity
to address the joint committees. We have a saying in combat, if you
find yourself in a fair fight, you didn't come prepared. To my left
is Lieutenant Colonel Julie Norman who was a joint interagency
task force commander at Camp Ashraf as well, and worked closely
with the Mujahedin.
The attacks that we have seen numerous times on the video is
included in a very extensive packet I have provided to the people,
and I wish to point out, one is Sabbah, she was born in 1981 in
an Iranian prison. And the other one is Majad born in 1961, me-
chanical engineer, both educated in Germany. Having served in
Camp Ashraf and worked with many people like Sabbah and
Majad, I can honestly say the residents of Camp Ashraf are not ter-
rorists. They are real people with names, faces, lives, and they once
had protected person status, and those that had protected person
status was revoked and those lives have been extinguished. The
State Department calls these people terrorists.
Also in my packet, many contracts that we worked out with the
residents of Camp Ashraf and the leadership to include bringing us
water. These people also, whenever I left the perimeter, as Julie
can tell, I did it continually, I had members of Camp Ashraf at my
side. They were not armed, but I was proud to have them there.
And when I look at those videos, I see something in addition. When
I see those people rushing to rescue their friends, I know if I or
the soldiers with me had been shot up, they would equally be rush-
ing to our rescue, those are not terrorists, those were allies.
Ironically, the State Department does not put Mahdi Army on its
terrorist list, it doesn't put the Qods force. I have lost people to the
Mahdi army, I have lost two. We have lost hundreds of the United
States forces to Moqtada Sadr's Mahdi army, and Qod's force re-
cently that was planning the Saudi Ambassador attack. Our State
Department's response then was we need to see how high up the
leadership this plot went. The antiterrorism for Iraq, I can assure
everyone, it went all the way to Khameini.
And the other thing State Department said is well, we should
have increased diplomatic isolation. Louis Freeh and I were trying
to figure that out. He said, what is that? To me it sounds like
someone in State Department spent a lot of time in college watch-
ing Animal House, and we want to put Iran on double secret proba-
tion. The State Department claims to have intel. I have gone over
the intel and I have provided them the information from Mr.
Zebari, the foreign minister, Kurd, they said they didn't attack us.
I gave it to the State Department 6 months later, it came out they
attacked the Kurds. And I went back, What are you doing? Oh,
well, we don't talk to the people who put that out. The State De-
partment is very stovepipe in what they are doing. This is the orga-
nization that paid Chalabi Ş33 million for a bunch of false informa-
tion that we used to send our soldiers to war. 4,500 warriors later
and tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis later, we know now
Chalabi was lying the whole time. Fairness to the State Depart-


146
ment and Defense Intelligence Agency, serving Donald Rumsfeld
also provided a lot of misinformation.
So it is not just the State Department. But I do submit the State
Department employees today are serving Secretary Clinton no bet-
ter than they were serving Colin Powell.
As we heard earlier today, State Department wants to go all the
way back to the founding of the PMOI. Well, why don't we go back
to 1953 when a very popular Iranian Government was overthrown
by our own CIA and a very brutal dictator was put in its place?
The State Department never wants to do that, nor do detractors,
they also claim it is a Marxist-Leninist organization. It was found-
ed on equality between those led and those being led. Clerics don't
have sole authority on the congregations, nor do they have sole au-
thority to interpret the Koran. People call that Marx and Lenin?
I call that Jefferson and Madison.
Then we have the rumors, we heard a lot of them, and I hope
today I will be able to address of lot of those rumors and take them
apart one by one. I used to take them apart when I was base com-
mander at Camp Ashraf, as did Julie Norman.
We talked about review the FTO status, the fact and the law.
Well, the fact and the law, they are wrongfully placed on that list,
they are only foreign, they don't know threat against the United
States, they are on my flank. And also, they don't have the means
anymore. So if we talk about the fact and the law, they need to be
removed. And then I hope we have a chance to talk about this put-
ting them in a consolidated location because I have even more in-
formation, I think, than the State Department. Sir, I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Martin follows:]


147
Wesley (wes) Martin
Colonel, United States Army, Retired
December 7, 2011 — Camp Ashraf. Iraqi
Obligations and State Department
Accountability
House committee of Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
and
Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia


148
TESTIMONY
Mister and Madam Chairmen: I appreciate this opportunity to address the Committee
on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight; and Subcommittee on Middle East and South East Asia. As the first full
colonel to command Camp Ashraf my goal is to provide you with solid information
based on facts resulting from personal experience and extensive research. Of note,
with me are retired Lieutenant Colonel Julie Norman. Julie served as the Joint
Interagency Task Force Commander whose mission was to address all issues related to
the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK). *
Since our last meeting, major developments have occurred. President Obama has
announced the removal of all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the year, minus the
embassy security detail. The President has received criticism for leaving Iraq in a very
dangerous situation. In fairness to the President, he had no choice. Iraqi Prime
Minister Maliki's requirement for U.S. forces to be subject to Iraqi law is unacceptable.
Maliki knew this when he set the standard. Maliki and his ally, Moqtada Sadr, want
American forces out of Iraq so the consolidation of power can be completed. In the end,
the final outcome of the Coalition invasion of Iraq is to replace one brutal regime with
another—this time aligned with Iran.
I hope everyone has had a chance to watch the video of the April 8", 2011 attacks on
Camp Ashraf. In that video we witness unarmed people being run over by American-
made military vehicles and gunned down in cold blood. There is something else that
warrants our notice- and respect. Ashraf residents are rushing to the aid of their fallen
comrades, braving the bullets and vehicles knowing they may be the next to die. I see
something further-the people I served beside. I know if either myself or the American
warriors with me at Ashraf had been under such an attack, the residents of Ashraf
would have been rushing equally fast to our rescue. Although unarmed, they were on
our flank, and I was honored to have them there.
Mister and Madam Chairmen, I have included starting on page 1 of my support packet
two examples of the agreement between U.S. forces and the individual residents of
Ashraf. This was their rejection of terrorism, agreement not to take up arms, and to
comply with laws and mandates. This mutually-signed agreement with U.S. Forces
stated MeK members will remain under the protection of Multi-National Forces-Iraq at
Camp Ashraf until the options of their future were determined. As noted in the following
page, they received "Protected Person" status and cards from the United States. They
did comply with every mandate. They surrendered their weapons, consolidated at
Camp Ashraf, and worked as close with U.S. forces as possible. Yet, when U.S. State


149
Department could not figure out what to do with the Mek, the Protected Person status
was revoked and Camp Ashraf was turned over to the Iraqi government. These two
people, along with 32 others, were murdered by Iraqi forces on April 8*, 2011. I show
you these documents to personalize the fact that we are talking about real people with
names, faces, and lives - lives that were extinguished and "Protected Person" status
that was revoked in violation of a written agreement. In my hand are the packets of all
residents killed in the 2009 and 2011 attacks.
Yet, State Department calls the MeK terrorists. It defies logic that people who covered
the flank of American warriors are still called terrorists, while the State Department has
not seen fit to classify Moqtada Sadr's Mahdi Army and Khamenei's Qod's force as
terrorists. We have lost hundreds of American warriors to the Mahdi Army. We all
know the Qods force had numerous plots, to include the plan to kill the Saudi
ambassador to the United States in a populated American restaurant. The Qods force
has been arming our enemies in Iraq, to include Al Qaeda. I hope that during
discussion we will have the opportunity to address this matter further.
Meanwhile, State Department claims their intelligence specialists have classified
information on the MeK. This is the same organization that prepared Colin Powell for
his long-to-be-remembered weapons of mass destruction presentation at the United
Nations. This is also the same organization that paid Ahmad Chalibi 33-million taxpayer
dollars for those lies. The people who picked up the ultimate tab for America's
excursion into Iraq were the 4,500 warriors killed in action and thousands more crippled
for life. State Department employees are serving Hillary Clinton no better than they
served Colin Powell.
We hear all the rumors about the MeK. We are told they are a cult, they are Marxist-
Leninists; people are held there against their will; they attacked the Kurds; they have
American blood on their hands; they supported Saddam among other things. State
Department and the detractors take and twist their information back to 1965 and the
founding of the MeK. They never go back to 1953 with the C.I.A.-backed overthrow of
the very popular Moseddeq government. To help in understanding the MeK, an article
titled "Trapped by Politics" is provided in the packet starting on page 5. It also explains
in great detail problems dealing with the State Department on this issue.
There are two items of slander I wish to address now: the claim the MeK is a
Marxist/Leninist Islamic organization and people held against their will.
It is impossible to have a Marxistſleninist organization. They don't mix. The MeK was
founded on the principles of equality between leaders and those being lead, that clerics
don't have sole control over interpreting the Koran, and clerics can't expect blind
obedience over their congregations. To the State Department, that's Marx and Lenin. I


150
argue that's Jefferson and Madison. Further, I doubt Ronald Reagan would have
problems with those principles. I think we can all agree that Ronald Reagan was no
communist.
Then we have the slander that residents of Ashraf are being kept against their will. Both
Julie Norman and I worked out written agreements with Ashraf leadership concerning
residents who wished to leave. One of the documents is included in the agreements
with U.S. Forces section of the packet, starting on page 15. During my command at
Ashraf I visited the compounds and personally shook hands with scores of residents on
every visit. If one wished to leave, all that was necessary was to maintain hold of my
hand and we would have walked out together. Furthermore, the attack videos prove
Ashraf residents were not being held against their will. What better time to escape than
during the confusion of the attack. Yet, they stayed together. The videos say it all. I
hope we have a chance to address the other items of slander.
The MeK and Ashraf residents are not the only ones being slandered. As of late, the
multitude of political and military leaders who speak up for the MeK are being
slandered. The current main form of slander is the accusation that these leaders are
speaking out for financial gain. Ambassador Butler's verbal attack on General Wesley
Clark as reported in the "New York Times" is but one recent example. The people
coming forward are senior generals including three former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs,
former senators, former governors, members of parliaments, Archbishop Desmond
Tutu, Congressman Patrick Kennedy, former Director of Homeland Security Tom Ridge,
and former Director of the F.B.I. Louis Freeh who refused to allow his organization to
participate in the politically motivated MeK FTO designation in the first place. Letters
from many of these people are found in the packet starting on page 22. Instead of
slandering, what should be examined is the fact that all these people may be right.
The best way I can describe all the slander over the years directed at the MeK is to ask
all the members of the panel to think what would happen if everything said against you
every two years by your election opposition, and their parties, were consolidated into
one volume. Then the slander is presented as fact because so many people said and
repeated it. As base commander of Ashraf, I spent a great deal of time debunking the
rumors, a lot coming from State Department. Even recently, Iran tried to blame the
planned attack on the Saudi ambassador on the MeK. For once, Iran regime lies were
not accepted as fact.
The State Department has never figured out how to deal with the fundamentalist Iranian
government. It's been like a non-effective parent dealing with a spoiled child. To
encourage the child from misbehaving, rewards are given. Placing the MeK on the
foreign terrorist list is a good example. Fear of upsetting and provoking Iran into some
hideous act keeps State Department from doing the harder right over the easier wrong.


152
arrogance to the report - in one case directed at the United States Congress. I read the
exact comment from page 65: "Individual members who appear to view the MeK in a
positive light tend to be energetic opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran or have
significant numbers of Iranian-Americans in their districts. Others are simply
misinformed."
Maliki has stated that Camp Ashraf will be emptied of the Mujahedin e-Khalq by the end
of the year. He has already renamed the compound Camp New Iraq. Last February
Ambassador Jeffrey testified to Senators Levin and McCain that he was certain Maliki
would keep his word and protect the residents of Ashraf. Maliki forces had already
attacked Ashraf once. Two months later came the April attack. As we speak here,
Maliki has Ashraf residents under continuous psychological torture with loudspeakers
denying residents sleep while forcing them to listen to messages of pending doom.
Logistics and medical supplies are being denied from entering the Camp. The victims.
of the attacks, with open wounds and broken limbs, must endure the pain with no
sedatives or medicines to prevent infection. Last month, Maliki stated his intentions to
the European Union. His letter with responses from the European Union and the
National Council of Resistance of Iran start on page 49 of the support packet.
Let's not forget the rest of Iraq. With knives and clubs Maliki's forces have attacked
demonstrations throughout the country. Police who wished to stop the violence were .
ordered to stand down. Maliki's secret prisons are fully operational, worse than ever
because American forces are no longer authorized to conduct raids. The attacks on
Camp Ashraf are just a preview of coming attractions. Yet our State Department hails
Iraq as the most progressive democracy in the Mid-East. Sir Thomas Carlyle said it
best: "To recognize false merit, and crown it as true because a long tail runs after it, is
the saddest operation under the sun."
Should Maliki be allowed to overrun Camp Ashraf and transport the survivors back to
Iran where they will face prison and gallows, the fight for democracy in Iran will take a
severe blow. It will not die any more than the cause for liberty in Texas died at the
Alamo. Ashraf will become a rallying call. "Remember Ashraf." Eventually democracy
will come to Iran. Iranian citizens are too wired into modern technology and
communications for progress to be permanently denied. Unlike the western world, the
Middle-East did not have four centuries to go through an age of exploration, religious
reformation, Great Awakening, and industrial revolution. They are getting it all at once.
They will come out of it. Iran will one day be a democracy. The question is what role
will the United States have in that? Unless we change our course, and keep our word
to the residents of Ashraf, our role will be one of shame.
If the residents of Camp Ashraf do not receive immediate support they will cease to
exist. Many will be publicly executed to show what happens to those who oppose the
º:


153
fundamentalist regime and place their trust in the United States. The remainder will
disappear into unmarked graves and prison dens. The residents of Ashraf need to be
pulled from Iraq as soon as possible. Many people have called upon Maliki to end with
31 December deadline and allow UNHCR representatives into the camp so they can
complete their work on relocating the residents. Until that time, either blue helmeted
United Nations or U.S. Forces need to be on the ground with them. That stated, I don't
believe Maliki is going to wait for December 31* to attack Ashraf for the final time.
predict he will attack any time after December 15". His attacks in 2009 and 2011
immediately followed visits with U.S. Defense Secretary Gates. Next week he visits
with President Obama. The sooner he does it following his return from the United
States, the more he can make it appear to be a U.S. government sanctioned operation.
The United States has the capability to airlift the MeK out of Ashraf. At our training
bases and State National Guard Centers we have the facilities in the United States to
temporarily house them. Through BRAC we have federal facilities sitting empty without
use. Mariam Rajavi has already stated the MeK will pay for their logistic expenses.
Rescuing the Ashraf residents will require fast action. However, if State Department
had tried to effectively work this situation instead of being an impediment to progress,
we and the residents of Ashraf would not be in the situation we are today. What we
need now is for the President to tell members of his Executive Branch of government to
honor our written word, immediately develop a solution, and make it happen.


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159
Trapped by Politics
by Colonel (Retired) Wes Martin, U.S. Army
lf there is any expectation that the current U.S. administration is going to do the harder
right instead of the easier wrong, it is very doubtful to happen in the case of the
People's Mujahedin of Iran. The PMOI or Mujahedin, as they are more frequently
referred to, has become more of a cultural, political, and ideological threat to the Islamic
fundamentalist Iranian government than the military opposition force of years past.
Located in Camp Ashraf, Iraq. 50 miles northeast of Baghdad, the PMOI surrendered
their enomous inventory of weapons to the American military following the fall of
Saddam Hussein. The largest component of the European-based National Council of
Resistance of Iran (NCRſ), the PMOI no longer possesses offensive military capability.
Formed in September 1965 as a Muslim group opposed to Shah Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi, the PMOI grew quickly in numbers and influence. Had not the Central
Intelligence Agency twelve years earlier caused the collapse the popular iranian
government of Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq, the PMOI would have likely never come to
exist. Had President Teddy Roosevelt's grandson, Kermit, not publicly boasted about
orchestrating the overthrow and placing the US-friendly Shah Pahlavi in power, the
hostility toward the U.S. would not have occurred. Installing a government that would in
time execute thousands is bad enough; boasting about it is not the way to win hearts
and influence the minds of the victims. The June 5", 1963 brutal suppression that
ended the demonstrations resulting from the fift between the Shah and the clerics set in
motion many actions that still have major impact on Iran, the Middle-East, and the world.
In 1966 the PMO adopted a set of philosophies that would put them at odds with both
the ruling government and rising Islamic fundamentalists. They came to embrace
equality between those in power and those not, between men and women, and among
various religions and races. Going even further, they believed the clergy should not
have total control over interpretation of the Quran, nor should the clerics have total
control over their congregations. These philosophies, which still have major influence on
the PMOI, would cast them into fighting successive enemies.
Even further problems were growing. As in the case of many organtzations, an internal
element often develops that does not share organizational beliefs, but are within the
ranks because it best suits their purpose at the time. When the opportunity presents
itself, this element will either split off or attempt to take control of the original
organization. This became the situation as a Marxist element emerged within the PMOI.
Often at serious odds with established senior leadership, the Marxists soon found
themselves in a very advantageous position.
Failed attempts at attacking the Shah and disrupting the government ended up with
arrests of sixty-nine members of the PMOI in August of 1971. The core of the PMOI
leadership was off the streets, and most ended up on the gallows, including the three
founding members. As very few remaining members of PMOI leadership survived in the


160
Shah's prisons, awaiting the end of torture that only death would bring, the rift between
the rival elements intensified. By May of 1972, two PMO's existed, with the
preponderance cf power favoring the Marxists. The two elements spent as much time
fighting each other as they did engaging the Shah's regime. Meanwhile, one imprisoned
member who was not executed by the government enforcers, but rather remained
captive until the final days of the Shah's rule, was a young Massoud Rajavi, Inside
prison he built an organizational structure and a large membership anchored on ofiginal
PMOI concepts and independent cf Marxist influence.
Today, any action conducted by either the PMOI or the Marxist PMOI is viewed as a
PMOI action with no discrepancy to which organization did it. For the United States, this
is especially true concerning the deaths of three American officers; the June 1975 dual
killing of COL Paul Shaffer and Lieutenant Colonel John Turner, and the following
month's killing of Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Hawkins. The fact that in August of 1975 the
Shah's police arrested two people for the killings of Shaffer and Turner and stated they
were part of the "Islamic Marxist group,” and a member of the Marxist PMOI would later
claim to have killed Hawkins, the blame remains on the PMOI.
In November of 1976, the strength of the Marxist PMOI was shaken when they losta
major gun battle with Iranian police. Weakened, but not broken, both elements
continued to be actively involved in 1978 and 1979 uprising against the Shah. In
January of 1979, ten days before Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from exile in Paris,
Rajavi was released from prison. As he worked to rebuild the PMOI, most of the
subordinate leadership he selected also came from Qasr Prison. Soon the Marxist
element abandoned any claim to the PMOI name and renamed themselves "Paykar"
(Struggle).
Following the fall of the Shah, the PMOI had hopes of being part of the moderate
Premier Bazargan/President Bani Sadr government. However, Ayatollah Khomeini was
determined to establish a refigious regime, with himself at the center. With this latest
development, almost immediately Bazargan and the PMOI were at odds with the
fundamentalist clerics under the leadership of Khomeini. Years earlier, as a cleric,
Khomeini had been condemned to death by the Shah. The execution had been
prevented by a sudden meeting in Najaf, Iraq where Khomeini was elevated to
Ayatollah. In turn, Shah Pahlavi was left with the options of violating Islamic law by
executing an Ayatollah or exiling Khomeini out of country. Out of country did not mean
Khomeini was no longer undermining the Shah nor working to destroy his, or any
Iranian government, that did not practice Khomelni's own brand of fundamentalism.
On November 3, 1979 Khomeini addressed the university students, resulting in 400 of
them storming and taking over the American embassy in Tehran. This act caught the
rest of Iran and the world by surprise. Yet it became one more thing attributed to the
PMOI. Any military leader can verify that from Khomeini's exciting the students to their
taking over the embassy, time did not exist for any formal organization to develop and
perform a mission. Hope for a moderate Iran was immediately disappearing, as
evidenced by the same-day resignation of Premier Bazargan. Bani Sadr stayed on for
6


161
the time being as President, but it was obvious his attempts to bring order out of this
chaos were not going to succeed.
As in the words of Shakespeare, "Cry havoc and let slip the dogs of war," Khomeini was
able to seize upon this event to take the world stage and raise the fever all across Iran.
His followers had successfully attacked the center of United States presence in Iran and
now held American hostages. Khomeini used that excitement to bring his wrath on
adversaries, real and perceived, within Iran. Anyone who did not share his
fundamentalist beliefs was an adversary. Top on the list were the PMOI and the
Communists. Attempts by Rajavito work within the new government were not allowed.
In December of 1979, Khomeini refused to allow him to run for President; and the
following March, Rajavi was denied attendance to Parliament. In June 1981, the PMOI
organized a peaceful demonstration in Tehran which attracted nearly half-a-million
people. Khomeini responded by unleashing a brutal crackdown where dozens were
killed, hundreds wounded, and thousands arrested. By 1982, Khomeini's attacks
produced further bloodshed, to include the death of Rajavi's wife Ashraf and his second-
in-command, Moussa Khiabani.
This time it was the PMOI who had to seek refuge. By 1981, Rajavi and now-ex-
president Bani Sadr had moved the organizational structure behind their combined
efforts to Paris. In 1986 another major relocation took place that takes us directly to the
situation currently trying to be resolved. In the Middle-East, the belief is very real that,
"The enemy of my enemy is my friend." Iran's mortal enemy was the Iraqi govemment
under the rule of Saddam Hussein. While possessing the ability to be very charismatic,
Saddam was also one of the most corrupt, manipulating, brutal, and self-serving leaders
in the world. He was a person who enjoyed deſighting others with his charm, yet would
take equal deſightwatching those same peopke being tortured to death. The kegend of
his wood chipper was very much real.
Saddam saw a purpose for the Mujahedin. Having a major military force in his country
dedicated to the overthrow of his principle enemy and replacing that enemy with a
friendly government was very much in his interest. For the PMOI, Saddam offered a
series of bases where they could monitor the Iranian government, work their operatives
inside Iran, have a military staging area, operate a radio communications network, and
be a beacon of hope to the people in Iran hoping to survive until a better government
could take control. In 1986, a large majority of Iranian people had lived under the
Mosaddeq government or heard stories from their parents. They knew that replacing the
Shah with Khomeini was not a solution in the fight direction, only more of the same.
Even Khomeini's grandson had long since remarked that replacing the Shah's
government with his grandfather's regime had taken the country from bad to worse.
Now, just across the border into Iraq was organized iranian opposition.
For the next seventeen years, the Mujahedin operated several bases in Iraq and did
conduct military operations against the Iranian government. Up to the American-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Mujahedin grew in size and capability. It was during this
period that the majority of the people now living at Ashraf joined the PMOI. An
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162
interesting and still haunting development occurred in October of 1997. While
attempting to create positive relations with the newly elected President Mohammad
Khatami, who was then making overtures of becoming more moderale, the Clinton
administration placed the Mujahedin on the State Department list of terrorist
organizations. As time would prove, there never was an intent by the fundamentalist
Islamic leaders of iran to become more moderate. This perception was nothing more
than a successful psychological operation that achieved many desired goals, which
once achieved revealed Iran's true intent-complete with an active nuclear weapons
research program.
In 2003, as the United States developed its plans to invade Iraq, the Iranian government
set to work on how to quietly take over as much of Iraq as possible. The Supreme
Council of Islamic Revolution of Iraq and its own military arm, the Badr Corps, were
already firmly inside Iraq. The political operations of the southern Shia provinces were
continually taken over by Iranian loyalists. Since the invasion, the Ministry of Interior and
especially the national police have become more and more under the control of rebel
cleric Moqtada Sadr. Today, the Iranian influence has expanded itself through the
southern provinces, over most of Baghdad, and into Diyala province where Camp
Ashraf is located.
Also in 2003, as the Coalition prepared to invade, Mujahedin leadership made the
decision that their fight was not with the Coalition and elected not to rise up in support of
Saddam. Their fight was with the Iranian government. Even when their camps were
bombed, resulting in deaths within the organization, the Mujahedin did not return fire.
When the Coalition forces amived on the ground, rather than resistance, it became a
relationship of cooperation. The Mujahedin accepted consolidation of their ranks into the
one camp of Ashraf. Of the 10,000 members, approximately 3,700 accepted the move,
with the remainder leaving the organization. Eventually, another 190 of these members
elected to keave the PMOI and move to a small carnp under Coalition control. In time,
these 190 former members were accepted into Kurdistan where they now reside.
From the very beginning, the United States had a difficult time figuring out what to do
with the PMOI. This was a first in the history of the world: an invading force inherits
control of a military organization within the defeated country, yet that organization is an
adversary of another country. That country, being Iran, is the same one that President
Bush declared to be a nation sponsor of terrorism. In 2004, following the PMOI's formal
renouncement of terrorism, members of the Mujahedin were awarded Protected Person
status under the Fourth Geneva Convention.
My first awareness of this organization came in October 2003. After having conducted a
force protection assessment of Abu Ghraib, I had a meeting with 800"Miſitary Police
Brigade Commander, Brigadier General Janis Karpinski. A classmate from officer basic
course, I addressed with her the serious lack of adult supervision at Abu Ghrab. in the
same meeting, she addressed the PMOſ and how Coalition leadership had yet to figure
out how to deal with them and use them as a potential resource- especially in the area
of intelligence. Their name came up again when an officer reported to Coalition Forces
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J-3 (Operations), Major General Tom Milker, that the Mujahedin were constructing
combat trenches between their camp and the Americans. Turned out the trenches were
for the installation of water pipes to handke the surge of new residents caused by the
consolidation. I had noway of realizing this was just the beginning of all the unfounded
rumors I would hear about the PMOI. Two years later, the Mujahedin dilemma would
play a bigger role in my life when I became the Operations Officer for Task Force 134,
Detention Operations. Seven months after that, it became my main focus when in June
of 2006, I became the first colonel to serve as base commander of Camp Ashraf.
One thing that always impressed me in 2006 about Camp Ashraf (named after Rajavi's
first wife) was how out of the desert an oasis was built. Outside of the perimeterfences
was barren land. Supported by water pumped from two rivers and purified within the
compound was a well irrigated community. Each time I witnessed this irrigation I was
drawn back to Anwar Sadat's amazement when he first saw the work Ariel Sharon had
done during Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula. The Mujahedin had also set up
outlets along the pipeline to allow local famers to draw water for their use. Electricity
was provided to all camp facilities; a hospital and clinics served not only the Mujahedin
but anyone who showed up at the gates requesting treatment. Each compound had its
own bakery and dining facility. Each of these had a special food or item that
championed over the other facilities. They produced their own ice and made their own
soft drinks. The uniforms they wore were always well-serviced and clean at the
beginning of the work day.
I found Camp Ashraf's mosque a testimonial to the organization's founding principles of
tolerance of other religions and races as well as the clergy not possessing total control
over interpretation of the Quran of the congregations. Constructed with the two towers
of a Shia religicus center, it was open to all. Sunni residents of the local area were
welcome to come and worship. Americans and all other nationalities of any faith were
welcome to come inside the mosque. Unknown to the outside world, one of the biggest
celebrations of the year at Ashraf is Christmas. This may seem strange to outsiders, but
any resident of Ashraf is always ready to point out that Christ is the second prophet.
As base commander, I moved out to develop a professional relationship and gain a
thorough understanding of this organization. What I found is the vast bulk of proclaimed
knowledge among the Americans concerning the Mujahedin was basically rumors. No
one had attempted to study the history of the organization. It was almost like Greek
mythology. The unknown was explained with stories passed on from one to another. By
westem standards, their way of life is considered strange, if not bizarre, but that doesn't
make them bad people. They do live a Spartan life and have a closed society. Men and
women live separate of each other. Makeup is not worn. At the time of my presence, all
of the membership wore uniforms. Women have the key leadership roles of running the
organization. They do have a strong allegiance to Massoud Rajavi and his current wife,
Maryam. Often their understanding of western attitudes and perceptions is as weak as
our understanding of what they think and feel. It is easier for westerners who don't
understand them to simplify the situation by proclaiming the Mujahedin to be a cult.
have had many detailed conversations and debates with them. They have even asked
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164
me about the cult label and how they could improve the outside percepticn of
themselves. Often the advice I gave was very hard and direct. To their credit, they
accepted the advice and frequently exercised the guidance I provided.
Unfortunately, while serving as base commander, both the Mujahedin and I had to put
up with occasional visits from a State Department representative who would come in
with her own prejudice and refuse to even listen to what anyone else said - to include
Americans. The most disastrous visit by this representative occurred during the same
time I was back in Baghdad taking care of several other responsibilities. Upon my retum,
I found myself having to go visit every compound this representative had toured and
mitigate every offensive remark she made and unwarranted action she conducted. This
State Department employee is yet another testimonial to the media acknowledgment
our government made years ago that the State Department did not send over its best
and brightest during the early days of our involvement in Iraq. Part of this overall
problem can be attributed to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld refusing to turn
over the rebuilding of Iraq to Secretary of State Colin Powell. A larger part of it was that
most State Departmentemployees were not going to give up the good life to live in a
war zone in less than ideal conditions. We have paid, and continue to pay, for that
mistake. Ashfaf can be included on the tab.
Perhaps the most blatant and irresponsible rumor that came out of State Department
occurred in the fall of 2006. An urgent warning came through that the PMOI was
recruiting Iraqis by the hundreds and training them at a specific compound. My
unannounced inspection of this compound revealed a handful cf local Iraqi workers. The
Mujahedin hired local labor because there was always too much work at Ashraf for the
membership to perform. Should the workers come and go every day, their chances of
getting caught by the Shia death squads were that much greater. The workers preferred
to come and go once a week and deliver the earnings to their families. Having seen
enough to realize that once again I was chasing State Department swamp gas, t started
to leave the compound. My PMOI escort interrupted my departure and stated that there
was another building to examine. I assured him between what I already witnessed, and
his willingness to show more. I was convinced there was no ſeason to look further,
Another rumor concerned the Mujahedin keeping people against their will. They did
have concertina wire fences between their compound and ours. To the outside, it
appeared they were trying to keep people in. Upon much closer examination and
experience, I came to realize that they didn't want anyone to defect from the
organization without being debriefed and carrying in their possession sensitive
documents or information. In one case, the Mujahedin took me to accmpound they had
for peopkewishing to leave. One person was living the good life there and didn't want to
leave. He was being cared for with meals and lodging, but didn't have to work for his
keep. The Mujahedin leadership asked me to talk to him and convince him to come over
to our defector camp. Unfortunately, 1 was unsuccessful. This person had the best of
both works and didn't want to give it up. Using the logic of Imam Ali Hussein, the
Prophet's grandson, the night before the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD, Mujahedin
leadership told their membership, "We will turn out the lights." Anyone wishing to leave
/ø


165
had that choice. Mujahedin leadership just wanted to know about the departure before it
happened.
One unexpected departure afforded me the opportunity to negate another rumor: that
the Mujahedin were sneaking out of Camp Ashraf without our knowledge to conduct
business and undermine the Iraqi government. Having shown up unexpectedly in the
middle of the night, this man caught both the Americans and PMOI by surprise. The
Mujahedin accepted my doing the debriefing of this person who was now under our
control. They accepted my word that he didn't bring any sensitive documents, only
himself. This person's former role was to do the shopping and bank business trips to
Baghdad while under American oversight. When I interviewed him, he made it clear he
wanted nothing more to do with the Mujahedin. I then specifically asked him if the PMOI
were leaving camp without our knowledge. Even though he was dissatisfied with his
former organization, he assured me they were not violating any of our rules and were
complying with everything we mandated. That conversation, and many other events,
further proved to me that the PMO was fulfilling the spirit and intent of every
requirement placed on them by the Americans.
The Mujahedin was an intelligence source that we didn't kearn to fully use for a long time,
ever, though they were willing to share information. This is the organization that made
the world aware that the Iranian government was conducting nuclear research
operations. Their relationships in the local area were bringing in continual reports of Al
Qaeda, Badr Corps, and Mahdi Army activities throughout the region. Not until the
arrival of the Marine Corps Human Exploitaticn Team were we able to get that
information into the intelligence network. I was always amazed at the amount of
information they were abke to extract out of Iran. One instance was the result of a
conversation in Baghdad between that same State Department representative and a
senior Iraqi official. When the conversation was over, the Iraqi official filed his report to
Tehran. Within two weeks, all the details of the conversation were handed to me by the
PMOI.
Concerning my tour of duty at Ashraf, I came to know the Mujahedin better than any
other cutsider before, and very likely after. I heard the rumors, then pursued the facts. 1
challenged them in debate and ſistened to them in discussion. Having already been the
Antiterrorism/Force Protection Officer for all of Iraq, I had a solid understanding of the
ever-changing threat. To understand what I was working to protect, and from whom, I
had done an incredible amount of studying. When I was outside the perimeter in
missions with the Mujahedin, I found them to be a solid ally. Inside the perimeter,
found them to be a major learning opportunity. We didn't always agree, but we always
respected and trusted each other.
Upon my return to the Pentagon, I began working with State Department
representatives in Washington, D.C. to properly address the PMOI issue. Whatl found
were the two primary people at Foggy Bottom responsible for the Mujahedin had almost
no working knowledge of the organization. The first two meetings I had with them, and
several other people in attendance, concerned presenting a time-line history of the
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168
than anything else, the Iranian government wishes for the membership of the PMOI to
be turned over to them. The Mujahedin has represented resistance to the
fundamentalist government for more than a generation. Mass public executions will be
conducted to show the Iranian people what happens to people who oppose the
government. The public executions will also be used to further break the spirit of anyone
considering resistance and to show the world what happens to those trust their lives to
the United States.
To appease the Iranian government, the State Department recently placed Jundallah, a
Sunni-Balochi Islamic group, on the terrorist list. To this, it needs to be accepted that
this group in fact is conducting terrorist activities inside Iran. That stated, the timing
speaks for itself as the State Department is trying to figure a way to work with the
Iranian govemment and is making an appeasement gesture. There is little chance the
same State Department is going to make a negative gesture by removing the PMOI
despite calls from the American Legislative and Judicial Branches of government, as
well as the European Union, to professionally revisit this issue. That would be the
harder fight. History is repeating itself back to when the current Secretary of State's
husband was the President and the Mujahedin was placed on the list.
Meanwhile, the State Department claims to have access to classified information about
the activities of the PMOI. It is doubtful to be more accurate than the intelligence reports
about Saddam possessing weapons of mass destruction and those State Department
intelligence reports that frequently sent me out looking for activities that were not
happening. To date the State Department has yet to share this classified information
with either the United States military or members of Congress who do have the
clearances, need to know, and ability to validate or debunk the information. This
steadfast refusal leaves us to conclude State Department officials have realized this
“classified information" cannot withstand the test of scrutiny.
That takes us back to the already discussed real and present danger of the PMOI. Will
the United States allow the easier wrong and permit the Iraqi government to turn the
PMOI overto Iran? No matter how the United States government will attempt to cleanse
itself of this matter, one fact will always stand out above all others: the Peoples'
Mujahedin Organization of Iran surrendered to the United States miſſitary. They trusted
their safety to the United States. They renounced terrorism at the request of the United
States and through the effort lead by the United States, they accepted the status of
protected persons. As a nation, we made a serious mistake in the First Gulf War when
Kurds and Shia were encouraged to rise up against Saddam. After one hundred hours
of fighting, we shut down and left them to their fate. Thirteen years later we invaded Iraq,
setting off a whole new series of mistakes. Trusting the Iraqi government to handle the
Mujahedin any better than they handled the execution of Saddam will be a mistake that
will cost 3,500 lives. There is still time to correct this problem, but not at the pace and in
the direction the State Department is moving.
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(2) If the departing member is not willing to allow PMOI representatives to
conduct a search, a field search will be conducted by U.S. Forces while PMOI
representatives observe,
(3) Any discrepancy between PMOI and U.S. Forces will be resolved by the
Ashraſ Forward Operating Base Commander.
ſ. Any and all documents, equipment and property belonging to the PMOI will be
turned over to the PMOI. This will include any picture or document containing
intelligence value to the PMOI organization. Perscnal items will be retained by the
person leaving the PMO].
g. If the PMOI member is a female, searches from either organization will be done
by a female member under the same procedures described in paragraph 4a(5).
h. Upon completion of above mentioned, the former PMOI member will be escorted
by U.S. Forces to the TIPF for in processing.
5, Effective Date: This agreement is effective 5 November 2006. Changes to this
memorandum will be addressed between FOB and PMOI leadership.
2.24%22%2:
WESLEY.M. MARTIN MEHDIB
COL, US Army PMO] Representafye
Ashraf FOB Commander
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171
MEMORANDUM OF UNE) FRSTANDING
BETWEEN
THE US FORCESAT CAMPASHRAF AND PMOI
CONCERNING WATERSUPPLY TO FOR ASHRAF
1. General. During the presence of Coalition Forces at Ashraf, the Peoples Mojahedin
of lran (PMOI) has routinely provided additional water to support these forces. The
water supply originates at two pump stations which belong to the PMOI. The East Pump
Station is located at the town of Marfu and the West Water Pump Station is located on
the Tigris River. Maintenance as well as generator and pumping equipment to operate
both pumping stations are a result of joint U.S. Forces and PMOI efforts,
2. Purpose: The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding is to identify water
supply expectations to Coalition Forces.
3. Scope: This memorandum is limited to amount of water provided to Coalition
Forces.
4. Undersfanding:
a. PMOI agrees to provide 80,000-100,000 gallons of umpurified water to FOB
Ashraf on a daily basis. The aforementioned is required to produce approximately
40,000 gallons of purified water,
b. In the event of unexpected interruption of water to the City of Ashraf (breakdown
of equipment, loss of electrical power, broken or destroyed pipes, other technical
problems, or increase interrorist activity) water supply to FOB Ashraf will be
adjusted proportionally. Meanwhile, FOB and PMOI leadership will work out the
resolution of the specific problem.
5. Effective Date: This agreement is effective 5 November 2006. Changes to this
memorandum will be addressed between FOB and PMOI leadership.
### &%2 MANDANA
RA
COL, US Army ity of ºhnſºm
Ashraf FOB Commander —i.e. tºº.
O







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LQCAL CEASE- FIRE AGREEMENT
OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COORDINATION
The undersigned, each acting under their respective military authority,
hereby agree to a local cease — ſire between Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth
Tovo of the Coalition Forces, and Mr. Mehdi Baraie of the National
Liberation Army of Iran- NLA of the People's Mojahedin Organization
of Iran (PMOſ), also known as the Mojahedin E-Khalq within Iraq. This
agreement is intended to ensure a complete cessation of hostilities and
prohibits all acts of armed force between the parties and does not
constitute an act of surrender. The parties agree to accept and to be
bound by the conditions and terms of this agreement as set forth in the
ſollowing articles.
NLA/PMOI state that they have not fired even a single bullet against
US/Coalition forces in this war because their only enemy is the religious
dictatorship ruling Iran. NLA/PMOI also state that they have never been
involved in the war or any act of hostility with U.S./Coalition forces.
Article 1. The parties shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all
hostilities against each other in Iraq by all specified armed forces under
their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and
air forces, as appropriate, effective immediately. The NLA Units
Commanders' forces shall remain in uniform.
Article 2. Unless otherwise directed by U.S.A Coalition Commander, the
NLA Units Commander shall, in order to prevent incidents which might
lead to a resumption of hostilities or incidental engagement, ensure that
forces under his command remain within the following geographic
limits: - --
l, Ashraf Camp, described as that geographic area enclosed by the
map coordinates of 38S MC 5676 and 38S MC 6876 and 38S MC
6864 and 38S MC 5664.
2. Alevi Camp, described as that geographic area enclosed by the map
coordinates of 38S NC 037) and 38S NC 0671 and 38S NC 0666
and 38S NC 0366.
A3


173
3. Zohrah Camp, described as that geographic area enclosed by the
map coordinated of 38S NC 1784 and 38S NC 3184 and 38S NC
3158 and 31S NC 2253.
4. Rana Base, described as that geographic area enclosed by the map
coordinates of 38S NC 1762 and 38S NC 2562 and 38S NC 2255
and 38S NC 1755.
5. Sodeh Camp, described as that geographic area enclosed by the map
coordinates of 38S NC 1646 and 38S NC 2153 and 38S NC 2550
and 38S NC 2044.
6. The major roads connecting the above camps and base.
Article 3. NLA forces under the Command of the NLA Unit
Commander shall display white flags on all mechanized equipment, to
include on artillery pieces, as a flag of truce.
Article 4. During the period of this agreement, NLA Unit Commander
shall ensure that all NLA units comply with the following:
A. Not fire upon, or commit any hostile act toward, any U.S.A
Coalition forces,
B. Not destroy or damage any of the NLA unit's vehicles or
equipment.
C. Not destroy or damage any government or private property (e.g.,
public infrastructure, oil pumping, refining \storage 	ransportation
facilities).
D. . Place all towed artillery and air defense artillery pieces in a
passive travel mode.
E. : Turn off all radars. NLA emphasizes that it has never had any
radars.
F. Keep military personnel in uniform at all times.
Article 5. U.S.A Coalition forces will not fire upon, or commit any
hostile act toward, any NLA forces covered by this agreement. U.S.A
Coalition forces will not destroy or damage any NLAPMOI property in
their camps in Iraq.
Article 6. Failure to order and enforce a complete cessation of all
hostilities, or failure to comply with all requirements contained in the
preceding Article shall constitute a serious violation of this agreement.


174
A serious violation of this agreement may lead to denouncement of the
cease-fire and recommencement of hostilities.
Article 7. For mutual protection of forces the undersigned U.S.A
Coalition and NLA Unit Commanders will provide each other with the
location of all known land mines in and around the geographic vicinity
as described in Article 2. NLA emphasizes it has never planted any
mines anywhere.
Article 8. The undersigned U.S.A Coalition and NLA Commanders are
responsible for enforcement of this agreement, and shall establish within
their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to
ensure compliance with all of the provisions of this agreement, by all
elements under their command. They shall cooperate in complying with
the provisions of this agreement.
Article 9. The U.S.A Coalition and NLA Commanders agree that this
local agreement does not surrender or capitulate troops under command
of the NLA Commander. The respective Commanders agree that, except
in the case of a serious violation identified in Article 6 of this
agreement, hostilities will not recommence without appropriate notice to
the other Commander which will in no case be less than 48 hours.
Article 10, The Articles of this agreement shall remain in effect until
expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and
additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement between both
sides,
Article 1 1. NLA reserves the right to self defense against the Iranian
regime's attacks and to prevent and confront theft, looting and
abduction. The NLA agrees that if it becomes necessary to leave the
designated geographical limits established in Article 2 above in order to
protect itself in self-defense, it will inform the Coalition Forces prior to
doing so, in order that the Coalition Forces can avoid engaging the NLA
unit.
Article 12. This agreement comes into force upon signature of both
parties.
Article 13. This agreement may be amended by mutual written
agreement of the parties. 2 &


175
- - - - -il. - - - - A --
Article i4. Dome this 15" day of April. 2003. in Ashraf Camp near the
“tly of Khaſis. Iraq. in two copies, each in the Fnglish and Farsi, the
*::glish text being authentic.
A * .** /
--~~~~ (.-...}=32
', Kuniieth Tovu
> .
-------------
tºtilition thil Commander Representative of the NLA General
Cuminand Staff

2 /


176
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*::::::: *, *, *,
June 2011
Camp Ashraf
I join the UNHCHR, EU, other countries around the world and human rights
organizations and personalities to deplore strongly the Iraqi forces' violent attacks
against the defenseless and unarmed residents of Camp Ashraf on April 8th, 2011
which left 35 residents killed and hundreds of others wounded. Concerns exist that if
the UN does not immediately assume the protection of the residents, Iraqi authorities
will carry out yet another armed attack against Ashraf residents,
The proposal presented by the European Parliament is a peaceful and viable
solution for Camp Ashraf, and I hope that the United Nations, the US and EU would
assist in the implementation of this plan as they all have expressed thair concern for
the human rights and dignity of the residents of Ashraf to be preserved.
Conditions that coincide with Ashraf residents' rights under Internaticnal Law and the
Geneva Conventions must be realized for the grounds to be set to reach a
permanent solution for the crisis in Ashraf. Until the full implementation of the
European Parliament plan and during the transitional period, attempts by the US
government. UN, EU are necessary to have the following preconditions
accomplished:
1. The military occupation of Camp Ashraf must be brought to an end;
2. The 2-year-long inhumane siege against Camp Ashraf by the Iraqi
government must be lifted. The camp's gates must be opened to members of
the residents' families and their lawyers to visit the residents,
3, An independent investigation be carried out by a representative appointed by
the UN on the April 8th attack against Camp Ashraf and the crimes committed
inside the camp as has been called for by the UN Human Rights High
Commissioner, I fully support the prosecuticn of the perpetrators of the crimes
against humanity in Camp Ashraf, and
4. Ashraf's security and protection must be guaranteed with the reopening of the
UN monitoring office (UNAMI) in Ashraf.
£ tº


179
For better or worse, the State Department often makes politically motivated
designations, which is why the Irish Republican Army was never put on the list (despite
the F.B.I.'s recommendation). Similarly, Moktada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army in Iraq and the
Haqqani terrorist network in Pakistan — both of which have murdered many Americans
—have successfully avoided being listed.
During my tenure as F.B.I. director, I refused to allocate bureau resources to
investigating the Mujahedeen Khalq, because l concluded, based on the evidence, that
the designation was unfounded and that the group posed no threat to American security.
I did, however, object to the State Department's politically motivated insistence that the
F.B.I. stop fingerprinting Iranian wrestlers, and intelligence operatives posing as athletes.
when the wrestlers were first invited to the United States in a good-will gesture. And the
F.B.I. did try, unsuccessfully, to focus the Clinton administration on the threat posed by
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which exported terrorisrn and committed or
orchestrated acts of war against America, including the 1996 Khobar Towers attack in
Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 American aimen. We learned from prosecutors on
Tuesday that a unit of the corps plotted to murder the Saudi ambassador in Washington.
Some critics call the Mujahedeem Khalq a dangerous cult. But since leaving office, I
have carefully reviewed the facts and stand by the conclusion that the Mujahedeen
Khalq is notatemorist organization and should be removed from the State Department's
list immediately. Many of the most knowledgeable and respected terrorism experts in
the workſ have come to the same conclusion. (Though I have on some occasions
received speaker's fees or travel expenses from sympathizers of the Mujahedeen Khak].
my objective analysis as a career law enforcement officer is the only basis for my
conclusions.)
Britain and the European Union have already acted on the evidence, remowing the
Mujahedeen Khalq from their sanctions ſists in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The British
court reviewing the Mujahedeen Khalq dossier went so far as to call the terrorist
designation"perverse."
The Mujahedeen Khalq is now led by a charismatic and articulate woman, Maryam
Rajavi, who enjoys significant support in European governments. In 2001, the
Mujahedeen Khalq renounced violence and ceased military action against the Iranian
regime. And in 2003, the group voluntarily handed over its weapons to American forces
2 #


181
What's Next for Iran?
By Howard Dean and Tom Ridge
Published November 03, 2011
| Foxtews.ºr
. On Wednesday, Democrats and Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs Committee
unanimously approved harsher penalties against tran, citing the regime's plot to
assassinate Saudi Arabia's ambassador on American soil.
This latest Iranian provocation signals an alarming escalation by a terrorist regime that
has been complicit in killing U.S. soldiers through its proxies, the Taliban in Afghanistan
and Shia radicals in Iraq,
What evil can we expect next from the Mullahs' brutal regime?
In a word, the wholesale slaughter of 3,400 unarmed Iranian dissidents whom the U.S
government has sworn to protect...a looming humanitarian catastrophe we are honor-
bound to prevent.
There's no doubt that December 31 will be especially joyful this year; a time when
families across our country can welcome home the last remaining sons and daughters
who fought bravely in Iraq.
But December 31 will also mark the illegal and arbitrary deadline set by Iraqi Prime
Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, at Tehran's direction, for closing Camp Ashraf and dispersing
its residents throughout the country— where they can be tortured or killed quietly out of
sight of the international community. This is hardly the "successful conclusion of the
nine-year military intervention in Iraq that Americans will want to remember—or that the
American president will want to claim as his legacy in an uphill re-election campaign.
Camp Ashraf, Iraq is home to members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (PMOI/MEK) who are
"protected persons" under the Geneva Convention.
The MEK is the principal Iranian opposition movement and it is committed to non-wickent
regime change and a democratic, nuclear-free Iranian future.
During the past 25 years, this community has transformed Ashraf from a barren piece of
land into a modem, vibrant town with universities, libraries and convention centers,
parks, pools, and sports facilities. The Mullah's in Iran consider MEK an existential
threat and have vowed to annihilate its members in Camp Ashraf at all costs.
In 2004, the United States gave each and every man, woman, and child living in Camp
Ashraf, a written guarantee of protection until they could be relocated safely. But since
27


183
relations—one that will not be easily forgotten or forgiven in the Muslim world.
The amendment to the Iran Threat Reduction Act cf 2011 that was unanimously
adopted yesterday in the House Foreign Affairs Committee calls on the Obama
administration to pressure Iraq to ensure the safety of the camp residents, prevent their
involuntary return to Iran, and delay closing the camp until the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees can resettle them in another country.
Clearly, the United States has a moral and legal duty to uphold the promises it made to
the residents of Camp Ashraf, Iraq. To do otherwise would hand Iran a victory, seriously
damage American credibility throughout the work and lead to a humanitarian disaster
that must be prevented.
Howard Dean is the former Democratic governor of Vermont. He served as chairman of
the Democratic National Committee from 2005-09. Tom Ridge is the former Republican
governor of Pennsylvania. He served as our country's first Secretary of Homeland
Security in the administration of President George W. Bush.
2 *


185
intentions. But this runs counter to all of the experience by the top brass of the U.S. military as well as
intelligence officials who have worked closely with and studied the MeK over the years. Ilaiso flies
in the face of eight different court rulings in the UK, EU and France, which have resulted in the
group's delisting in those countries.
The still-unraveling plot against the Saudi Ambassador demonstrates the skill and reach of the lºanian
regime in attempting to threaten and destabilize the U.S and our allies. It is somewhat ironic that
while Tehran's agents are running loose in this country, hatching terrorist bombings and assassinations
of foreign diplomats, our government has shackled the main opposition, which the mullahs fear the
most. It is time to revisit this policy. While the administration, obviously caught off guard, is
scrambling to find the proper response, delisting the MeK is the strongest signal the U.S. can send to
the mullahs of Tehran. The timing could not be better,
-: * *
sº
Sighscribe is ſº ſhºrleºttº ºbserver.
ht p:/www.charlotteobserver.com/20i 1/1 020-pºintſz706237 for an effective response. ... 11/19/2011
3 /


188
QFFICE OF GOVERNOR HowARD DEAN
38 Eastwood Drive, Suite 300
Scuth Burlington, VT 05403
December 1, 2011
Dear Ed and Tom.
We are sorry we can't be with you today, but we wanted to register our support for the belief that
this issue of stopping potential mass murder at Ashrafin Iraq is of the highest possible importance to the
United States. At a time when our image has been battered across the world, America needs to stand up
for human rights, not acquiesce to murder. We share your call today for the President to take three
immediate steps.
First, take the MEK off the Foreign Terrorist Organization list. Not only is there no legal reason
they should be on it, as the DC Appeals court ruled in 2010, but it is clear from the kºttcrs that the
UNHCR has written to the President's senior staff, that this designation is hampering the processing of the
residents of Ashrafas refugees, and their safe removal from Iraq to a third country.
Second, we concur with the decisions to ask the President to immediately make it clear to Prime
Minister Maliki, who is currently being investigated for war crimes by the Spanish courts. that he must
extend the closure deadline for Ashraf, and to co-operate with the UNHCR in processing the residents of
Ashraf as refugees.
Third, we join with you in calling upon the President to ask the UN Security Council to establish
a UN force on the ground to protect and monitor the inhabitants of Ashraf and the behavior of the Iraqi
Govemment until all the residents are safely out of Iraq.
This is a problem of American making. Our troops invadedltaq and made it possible, overthc
years, to have a leader in Iraq who was closer to fran than to the United States. We disarmed the residents
in Camp Ashraf and gave each resident a signed promise that the United States would keep them safe.
The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation has screened each of the residents of Ashraf and found
that none had engaged in terrurism. Finally, the Obama Administration has known about this situation for
over a year.
We have thirty days to fix this problem. If we fail, the country we love will be complicit in
murder. America is a far better country than that.
Sincerely,
º - ------"3 ---
f
Howard B. Dean, M.D. Patrick J. Kennedy
Governor of Vermont (1991-2003) United States Congressman (1994-2030)


190
----
~ not by much. LTC Norman, LTC Turluck and then telephoned BG McBride and MG Gardner individually and
provided a detailed report. This verbal briefing was followed up with a documented report written by LTC
Norman.
Frequently, in person and on video-teleconference, MG Gardner would inform his entire staff to never trust Iraq
National Security Advisor General Rubaie. MG Gardner had worked with Rubaie during an investigation and
found him to be very corrupt. I remember Deb Johnson attending some of those meetings. In October 2007, and
after the warnings issued by MG Gardner, PMOI handed me a report they received from their spies in the Iranian
government. The report was written by General Rubals. In this report he referenced a meeting he had with Dab
Johnson. The information concerned potential plans on how the PMOI was wiewed and discussions on how to
daal with the PMCM. The report was vary encouraging to the Iranian government, not so to the PMO. This event
took about a week for me, and a visit from MG Gardner, to once again settle down the PMOI.
In Apſiſ of 2007, while assisting the TF 134 commander and working with the State Department, i received a set of
documents from the PMOI. The documents were transfer in succession from the United State Department of
State to the British Foreign Secretary to the British Home Ministry to the Prescribed Organizations
Commission to the PMOI. The documents included an analysis of the recent census and one titled: "The MeK
ſhe in their own loverty work." in the e-mail was Deb Johnson's assessment of the 5.2 million signatures and a
claim that the signatures could not possibly be true.
During this same time frame, I reviewed with the State Department (Washington D.C.) their latest consolidated
write-up on temorist organizations. This document had a lot of the standard, yet unfounded, comments about the
PMOI. I can not prove that Deb Johnson was involved in this write-up. However, the new comments of this
sometimes incorrect and revised summary included negative things about the PMOI that I have already shown
State Department not to be true.
in short, Deb Johnson is not halping our efforts to get the PMOI situation correctly resolved, We, as a nation, and
as individuals, are going to be judged by the world and history as to how we executed this war. That includes the
sub-issues within the war. Bottom line is we have inherited the PMOI problem. Whether we personally like them
or not is irrelevant Unfortunately. I have spent (sometimes unsuccessfully) considerable time trying to undo
damage that has been created by Deb Johnson. She has continually proven herself to be very negatively biased
towards the PMQi. The referenced e-mail, "The MeKºve in their own loverty workſ" serves as excellent testimony
to this. If the United States implements a plan based even in part onslanted information, provided by Deb
Johnson or anyone else, then we are wrong. We are likewise wrong if we know we have an individual improperly
influencing the national decision making process and we do nothing to minimize the damage being created by
that person. We are dealing with 3,700 human flves. We are also dealing with an American battalion and
Bulgarian company fied down to a mission that we need to bring to proper closure. This is not the time or place to
let personal feelings hinder the way to resolution.
Wr
COLWesley Martin
HQDA, CDCS, G-3
DAMO-ODI
(703)695-1864 -
email: - ~ - aſ Z «Ž
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193
Elaborately staged and photographed, it occurred at Camp Ashraf without the knowledge
of the MNF-I forces there and the result was yet one more piece of propaganda in their
arsenal. I don’t believe a word of it. [In short, the event seems to have been an internal
Ashrafſmek gathering.
ſiasked US official 1, US official 2 predecessor in Baghdad, about the 5.2 million Iraqis
alleged to love the MeK. She says she has been shown bookshelves at MeK Central in
Ashraf that the leadership claims contains those 5.2m signanures. She wasn't able to
actually see them, much less try to verify any of them for authenticity. Implausible on
two accounts: Strongly doubt any one could find any Iraqi MeK fans, much less 5.2
million, and there's been no opportunity for the MeK to go out and collect 5.2 million
Iraqi signatures.]
The 2004 document is the one which resulted in the protected person declaration. They
have used that to distort their status. The MeK did NOT renounced terrorism. The
individual members renounced violence but none have renounced use of violence against
Iran.
Pol Mil Officer
POLAD Task Force 134
Political-Military Affairs
US Embassy Baghdad
Unclassified: 2&state.gºv.
v
Classified: XXX&states.gov.gºv
US Cellphone: XXXX
From: (NEAſ) (US Official)
Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 12.01 AM
To:XXX (Baghdad) (US Official)
Subject: RE: The MeK live in their own loverly world
3?


196
otºtyºsºvº: πt irºcºsº stº
The senior leadership component of this group is relatively small numbering fewer than thirty.
The rest lead a relatively monotonous life characterized by long working hours, a limited diet
based on potatoes, frequent sleep deprivation, limited outside contact, and public humiliation
at MeK “self-criticism” sessions. -
Many have been erroneously informed that their families in Iran have been gruesomely killed
“by the mullahs". No telephone orinternet access is available; television and radio are
tensored, and usually tuned to MeK channels featuring tape of public hangings and executions
interspersed with shots of large red tulips.
However, the population of Camp Ashrafis far from homogeneous, as the existence of nearly
five hundred defectors to date attests. Other significant sub-groups include:
PRISONERS OF WAR
At the time of the MeK's surrender, Camp Ashraf held 387 male Iranian nationals captured by
MeK military forces during the Iran-Iraq war, or transferred to MeK custody from Iraqi Pow
camps, primarily in Ramadi. Together, these PoWs amounted to 10% of Ashraf's population.
Thirty-eight have repatriated to Iran, and twenty-one are resident in the TIPF and seeking
UNHCR interviews for refugee status determination.
PoW defectors were the earliest to agitate for repatriation to Iran. Even PoWTTPF residents
seeking refugee status are often ferocious critics of the MeK, which they describe (in Farsi) as
a destructive cult. Some report disillusionment afters initial period of reluctant allegiance;
others see themselves as incarcerated throughout.
Interviews were recently conducted with each of the 347 former Iranian PoWs still resident in
Mek facilities. Nine formally defected and took up residence in the TIPP during these
interviews; several have since requested repatriation. The remainder affirmed their allegiance
to the MeK. and asked to be permitted to remain at Ashraf.
All nine defectors appeared stunned at their decision to keave the organization, and apologized
repeatedly for their behavior, which they attributed to the stress of isolation and psychological
pressure from McKleadership. Most cited a desire to contact their families in Iran (with whom
the MeK had forbidden contact) as their rationale for defection.
The defectors were relieved to find the TTPF, which McKleadership describe to adherents as a
collection of squalid torture cells, was in fact a dusty refugee camp whose residents watch
CNN in wooden-floored tents featuring vinyl tablecloths and samovars. Several have
requested repairiation to Iran, others clearly need time to rest and recover.
The 347 interviewees had been minutely prepared for their interviews with MNF-I and Post
representatives. Many had dark circles under their eyes, in testament to the MeK's tendency to
conduct nighttime coaching sessions for lower-ranking members. Many trembled and avoided
eye contact.


197
~~~~~~~~~ * * * ******* ****
Most had memorized - and recited with some difficulty - a rote speech asking that the MeK
be de-listed as a USG-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. When PollMik)ff tried to
engage one PoW in conversation about local Iranian politics, he bit his lip, pulled a homemade
laminated catalogue from his pocket, and shouted “Look at my book of martyrs".
An elderly electrician dressed in a dark suit fought back tears when asked if he wished to
telephone his son, a law professor in Kermanshah, whom he had met once in the past two
decades. After prolonged negotiations and several awkward silences, he grasped his enamel
MeK lapel pin, asked hoarsely to go back to the MeK camp, and shuffled away.
ECONOMIC MIGRANTS
The defector population is heavily seeded with younger Iranian (and some Pakistani) males
lured to Camp Ashraf on the promise of forged EU travel documents or job opportunities in
exchange for fixed periods of labor. 21% of the TIFF population (thirty-nine males) falls into
this category, and about two hundred similar have already repatriated.
70% of the economic migrants were recruited from refugee camps and low-paying jobs in
Turkey, Pakistan, Dubai, and the UAE. Most had their passports confiscated upon arrival at
Ashraf, and were unpleasantly surprised to find themselves washing dishes, sweeping streets,
or digging potatoes indefinitely for a pseudo-paramilitary organization in the Iraqi desert.
The rate of economic migrants working at Camp Ashraf today is unknown. It is likely that
sonic remain, as 3% of the current population arrived after the year 2000, at a time when most
arrivals were family mcmbers (often elderly or minor) or worker-laborers rather than paid-up
members of the MeK's National Liberation Army.
"MEK ORPHANS
We have also identified a smaller group of orphaned-and-abandoned young-adult children of
MeK members, who were sent to Camp Ashraf as minors and not permitted to leave upon
reaching the age of majority. Five such cases existin the TIPF, two were sent to Ashraf from
Iran, Iwo from Germany, and one from France. A Canadian in a similar boat has already
repatriated.
The number of residents of Camp Ashraf brought to Iraq as minors is unknown. Many children
of MeK members (who only took up celibacy after the Ideological Revolution of 1985) were
evacuated from Iraq at the start of the 2001 Gulf War and housed in MeK orphanages in
Germany, a number (still minors) were returned from 1997-2001.
MeK parents of teenage children living in Canada and the EU in the 1990s also treated Camp
Ashraf as a boarding school, and sent their children solo to Iraq (most flew into Amman and
were smuggled across the Jordanian border). These and the “German orphan" likely account
for some part of the 15% of the Camp Ashraf female population aged below thirty, and of the
14% of the males in the same age range.
Like PoW defectors, young adults living in the TIFF are vocal in their criticism of the MeK.
Those remaining inside Camp Ashraf are carefully-coached, indoctrinated, eager to relate the
#3.


199
Embassy of the Republic -** -*------ 3.” “...º 3-4-
ºf trutg t
Brussels J-$33;
Ref. t.A. 3 A
Date: *% i , \ { t_3, \
The Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the European
Communities presents its compliments to the Éuropean Parliament
- Protocol Service and has the honºr to enclose here with a paper
explaining the position of the government of Iraq regarding the
issue of the New Iraq Camp known previously as Camp Ashraf)
The Mission of the Republic of Iraq avails itself of this
opportunity to renew to European Parliament – Prºtocol Service
the assurance of its highest consideration.
". & - * - *
The European Parliament - Protocol Service
6ſ). Rue Wiertz ...--~~
! {}.4" Rrussels


#7


200
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tº ºf irºr, sº .
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.*.*.*.*.*.*.*.*.*.*::::: *t irºi;
*::::: ***** *


202
1 : Le gouvernement irakien a décidè de feriºer d'ici la fin de l'année 2fil | le
camp Ashraf.
#
l 'organisation 'a désigrie comme ans organisation terroriste.
. }. existence de cette organisatior en lraq est défendue conformé:rent à
la constitution irakienne qui intercºit !'existence d' entités terruristes sur
· le territoire irakien (Article 7 !
L'existelºce de cette organisation contreciit la cnnstitutiºn irakienne
· Article 8). ce qui oblige le got verremen; irakien à ne pas intervenir
dars les affaires des pays voisirs L'existence de cette ºrganis#tion
provoque des problèmes avec i'lran.
#
Cette ºrganisatioii n'est pas un mouvemeni de libération conformément
attx règles du droit internatiºnal, car ses membres n existent pas sur le
lerritoire iranien, et ils pratiquem des activités terroristes sur le territoire
trakien.
, Les régies du droit internatiorial ne s'appliquent pas 2ux nicntbres de
，
ette grgatiisation | La Conventicn de $ ienève relative à la protecticn des
pcrsoiines civiles en temps de giterre .. parce que !' irak i1'est plus sous
#'occupation depuis 2969.
L. 2xistence de cette organisation en lraq nienace la sécuritê intérieure
irakienne. ainsi que la séc3rité iès pays voisins, et dcnne un prétcxte à
i'ingérence daiis les atïaires internes de l'irrk.
[ Irak n'a jamais donné le statut cie réfugié aux membres de cette
tyrganisatioit.
t'lrak traite les résidents du Camp Ashraf conformément aux principes
du drcit international hiunanitaire, des régies de la Déclaration
Hniversei}e des droits de i'htninne et dti Pacte intertatit)rai relatif attx
droits civils et pctitiqttes. Le gouvernement irakien a prit en charge la
responsabilité des affaires de 5écurité interne dans le camp Asnraf sur
base d'un mémorandum bilaiérai en 2009, qui a assuré les points
5ttivants :
La loi irakienne s'appiique aux résidetits du Cgtmp Ashraf.
* Pas d' extradition forcée pour les résidents du Casºp Ashraf aux
atiiorités iraniciuies.
2 2


206
3. The European Union and its High Representative, Catherine Ashton, must adopt a clear
position by condemning the Iraqi deadline and any forcible relocation of Ashraf residents
inside Iraq. EU member states should immediately accept some of the Ashraf residents,
particularly the ill and wounded, and persons who have been asylum seekers or who have
family relations in European countries. This would be a tangible sign that the evacuation
process had begun and would make any invasion of the camp by the Iraqi authoritics more
difficult to accomplish under the eyes of the world's media.
4. Any promises by the lraqi Government are worthless. A few hours prior to the start of
shooting in April 2011, the residents of Ashraf received a message via the US Embassy
from the Iraqi Prime Minister giving assurances that there would be no violence. When
Ashraf residents are dispersed in small groups, Iraqi forces and the terrorist iranian Qods
force will torture, and assassinate them without the world being informed. In such
circumstances if the world stands aside and allows matters to take their course without
intervening, the resident of Ashraf, including more than 1000 women, face certain death.
Struan Stevenson, MEP
President of the European Parliament's Delegation for Relations with Iraq


211
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, whereas I am the only
one left on the panel, I will proceed and take whatever time I will
consume. Let me get this straight. Mr. Ambassador, the massacre
that has already taken place until that is dealt with legally, and
the people who committed that murder are brought to justice, or
the role of the government is defined, that you are suggesting that
i. is then illegal under current law for us to sell arms to Iraq” Is
that—
Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. May I just clarify.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.
Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. For 4 years I had the delegated re-
sponsibility for arms transfers as Assistant Secretary of State for
Political Military Affairs. Under section 3 of the Arms Export Con-
trol Act, every recipient of U.S. defense equipment is required to
utilize that equipment only for the purposes that it was trans-
ferred. Whenever there is a question of not using the equipment in
accordance with the terms of transfer, the State Department is
usually required to file a section 3 report to the Congress that ex-
plains the circumstances that have called into question the use of
the equipment, and the law does point to a cutoff of arms in the
extreme case of an egregious misuse of weapons. That is a very
I’are OCCurrenCe.
I saw it once, I think in 1982, when Secretary Weinberger found
a casing of cluster munitions on a pile of well, it appeared in The
New York Times on a pile of rubble in Beirut, and he terminated
weapons to Israel until such time as they worked it out with the
Americans.
The other law that I mentioned—
Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we found a casing, a military item that
was not sold to Israel in order to be involved with Lebanon or to
be utilized in that fashion. And we immediately cut off aid
Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. President Reagan cut it off.
Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Cut off aid to Israel.
However, we now have a video of our arms shooting down inno-
cent women and children, and Iraqi army officers engaged in aim-
ing their rifles and shooting the guns themselves, that we don’t re-
taliate at all against that.
Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. It is open-ended. The State Depart-
ment is not always the fastest agency to answer the mail. And sec-
tion 3 reports have been known to take months to deliver. I do not
know the status of whether a section 3 AECA report has been re-
quired or is being prepared for the Congress.
There is a second law implicated here, too. Senator Leahy had
passed a human rights law I think about 10 years ago which ap-
plies in two different legislative vehicles, one to Defense Depart-
ment and one to State Department security assistance. In the
event of a possible gross violation of human rights by an armed
force which is trained and equipped by the United States, there is
supposed to be an investigation aided by the U.S. Embassy on the
scene, reporting back to the State Department where they make a
judgment as to whether gross human rights violations have oc-
curred. The people who were specifically involved must never be al-
lowed to receive U.S. training ever again.


212
I wrote the guidance that went to Embassies worldwide for the
Leahy law in the State Department, along with Lorne Craner who
was the DRL Assistant Secretary. -
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now the double standard that you are talk-
ing about is just a bit overwhelming. And Colonel Martin men-
tioned the Mahdi Army. And of course we understand that the
º, Sadr has—do we call him the Ayatollah? What do we call this
Iſlall.
Colonel MARTIN. Sir, he is working on his Ayatollah status, but—
I am serious—but he has not achieved Ayatollah yet.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Well, we understand that he per-
sonally murdered a fellow cleric. We know that. And we also know
that his armed militias have killed a significant number of Ameri-
cans, not to mention the large number of fellow Iraqis. And yet he
is not on the terrorist list. Is that right, Colonel?
Colonel MARTIN. Sir, he is not on the terrorist list. Neither is the
Mahdi Army.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. But those folks at Camp Ashraf who are un-
armed, they are on the terrorist list?
Colonel MARTIN. That is correct. Those people who put them-
selves between my troops in danger and I had to haul them back.
We have the guns. We will engage. They wanted to be between us
and the people trying to kill us. They are the ones being called ter-
rorists. Muqtada is not being called a terrorist. Hakim's Badr
Corps is not being called a terrorist. And they were out there kill-
1ng.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, Ambassador Bloomfield made it a point
to suggest that he had studied the background of the MEK and
that he believed that even the MEK of 30 years ago was not—and
it has been adjudicated by whom they were not terrorists even to
that point?
Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. There is a 140-page judgment in the
British court system that goes into great detail. There was a ruling
by the counterterrorism magistrate in France this past April. They
both consistently judge that terrorism is not the characterization
for the activity that has been -
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah. Let me note that we get into a lot of
trouble in the United States with the word “terrorist” because we
have such incredible double standards. And I personally believe
that we need to have a definition of terrorism and stick to it. Even
when it hurts our friends, we need to stick to it.
In this case, we have a double standard in order to hurt people
who are opposed to the mullah dictatorship, which is our worst en-
emies, and a double standard so that they are labeled terrorists
while the man who—and whose army had killed a bunch of Ameri-
cans and is allied with the country that wants to destroy stability
and freedom in that region, he is not on the terrorist list. And the
double standard is just beyond imagination.
Colonel.
Colonel MARTIN. Sir, it gets even worse. Just last week Maliki—
and it came out in the news media in Iraq, where my sources are
providing me the information. I am getting it from the streets of
Iraq. Maliki has informed Muqtada that he will receive 1,500 offi-
cer positions, 750 each in the Department of Defense and the De-


215
in something. They didn't believe in violence. They believed in
rights-based democracy.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Of course, the irony of what you are saying
is that Mossadegh—the vehicle used by those who overthrew
Mossadegh was the cutting a deal with the same mullahs that
later on overthrew the Shah. And it was the continuing payoffs
from i CIA to those mullahs that kept the Shah in power as long
as it did.
Was that an inaccurate description?
Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. If you read the legendary history of
John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles in those Cold War years, the
CIA took a lot of actions for reasons of state. I am not here to judge
the people in power at that time. I have great respect for American
public servants.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is a good way of not confirming what
I just said.
Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. But what I am saying is that today we
are making judgments as well, and we have to make judgments for
reasons of state. And a lot of the things we are talking about here
have to do with the reputation and honor of the United States.
My whole focus on this issue is not to advocate one position. You
have been elected to office. I am going to let you decide. But I am
trying to set the information table straight. I believe that we are
only getting part of the story. And if all I do is to give people a
wider aperture and a better appreciation of what really happened
here, I will be very content to let elected leaders in both branches
on both sides of the aisle make the decision.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I am happy you are talking about elect-
ed leaders. Because I don't know anybody who elected those folks
over at the State Department or the CIA. And I did read Eisen-
hower's memoirs—and I would recommend them—about the over-
throw of Mossadegh. And it was just a very short description and
it was a fascinating description of what went on.
What we have got here is a situation that is coming to a head
very quickly. And I wanted to know what you folks thought of the
great suggestion—I might add that it was fascinating that Sheila
Jackson Lee, who is not a member of this committee, who wanted
to come in and make a statement and we were just running out
of time, but I wanted to give her at least some time to get some-
thing in. And right there at the end, I think that was very pro-
found, the point she made, and I wonder what you thought of that,
is that—the suggestion that the President not meet with Maliki
until he has agreed to at least extend the deadline on Camp
Ashraf What are all three of your opinions of that suggestion?
Go right ahead, Colonel.
Colonel MARTIN. Sir, first off, it is an outstanding suggestion.
Maliki has been getting a free ride from our country. In 2002, he
was a street vendor in Damascus. Now, 3 years later, he was the
Prime Minister. That man has made billions off the United States,
and it pains me to see how much money this guy is getting.
Joe Biden went over there and came back and said, “Oh, we
overestimate the Iranian influence in Iraq. No, we don't overesti-
mate. We underestimate. And the people in Iraq on the streets
can’t believe it.”


216
Somewhere Maliki has to be made to understand that we are not
taken in by his hype, and we are getting a solid understanding of
what is really going on inside that country. He has been working
with Ahmadinejad, and his national security adviser Rubaie has
been feeding Iran all kinds of information because I was getting it
from the MEK what was being fed. And some of it was being fed
to him by a State Department representative that was a continual
source of embarrassment.
So what Sheila Jackson Lee had said I greatly think is a good
idea because somewhere we need to bring this guy under control.
And I also think telling Iraq, you are not getting all this money be-
cause we are tired of making your people in positions of power very
wealthy at the expense of the Iraqi people. Except Kurdistan, they
are living in poverty.
Sir, I yield.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Dr. Ferris.
Ms. FERRIS. I was very intrigued when she asked that question.
It seemed a very direct response to a very difficult situation.
I think the U.S. has a lot of diplomatic economic tools that can
be used to make it clear that there are certain limits. The deadline
must be extended for closing the camp, solutions must be found,
and we should use every means we–I didn't know about this sec-
tion 3. But to me that sounds also like something we should pursue
in terms of the way that the arms that we have supplied have been
used.
Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. I do not want to sort of tear down the
edifice that 8 years of military invention tried to build. I want Iraq
to come out stable. I want it to come out a good neighbor to all.
These negative tendencies that are being talked about I want to
see minimized. I want it to be a country that is governed by the
rule of law, that gives rights to all the communities. And, frankly,
#. is not for me to micromanage how the administration does these
things.
I recall another group of Iranians that were in imminent threat
of loss of life. An earthquake had just happened in Bam, inside
Iran. Nobody even called Washington. The Central Command air
component commander just sent in C-130s with blankets and
water and electricity and whatnot. We saved some lives.
So no one can tell me that we don’t have the logistical ability to
do all sorts of things or the diplomatic ability to find a spot outside
of the geography of Iraq where the whole shooting match—sorry for
that Freudian slip—could be moved so that the U.N. can do its
work and onward disposition can be processed.
I recall a cabinet-level person, who I won’t name, in the Bush ad-
ministration when I was doing sensitive negotiations around the
world who said, I am not interested in inputs. You know, don’t tell
me all the things you are doing. All we care about is the output.
Did you get it done?
And right now the only thing that matters is, will the 3,400 lives
at Camp Ashraf be unharmed as this U.N. mission is carried out?
I don’t know how long it will take. I don’t know where it will occur.
I don’t know who will have to exert themselves to make it come
about or how this conversation that seems to be in the air that
can't take place with all the parties will finally be accomplished.


218
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, I don’t think there is one thing that is
going to solve this, even getting them off the terrorist list, but that
will be a big step forward.
Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. I have not settled on final judgments,
and I haven’t advocated specific solutions. But I will put one idea
forward. You did hear Ambassador Fried talk about trying to get
the people at Camp Ashraf to participate more constructively, how-
ever he put it. And if they would only do their part, as it were, this
could all be agreed, and we could figure out what to do next.
I simply want to say that because the people at Camp Ashraf are
not just 3,400 individuals, they are on the terrorism list, so the
United States Government considers them part of a larger organi-
zation which has leadership in France. If it is too hard for the
State Department officially to have a conversation with the people
in France who could say yes or no—and I have two memos that
they wrote basically offering all sorts of options to solve this prob-
lem, so I am mystified that the details are so hard—my point is,
maybe if there is an outside party who could put a videoconference
together and get Paris, Ashraf, State Department, CENTCOM,
Iraq, and the U.N.—let's have the conversation. Let's stop the train
wreck before it happens. I am an optimist. I believe it is possible.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. The people sitting on this side of the table
can’t make that happen. I mean, we can’t. We are legislators, and
we are not in the executive branch. What you just said could very
easily happen if anybody with authority in the State Department
would have determined that a long time ago. That should have
been determined a long time ago.
And, by the way, let me agree with you and let people under-
stand, the people of Camp Ashraf are going to have to do their part
as well. And there is certainly indications that they haven’t been
willing to reach people and to go the extra half mile as well. If we
are going to save lives, everybody has got to contribute to the solu-
tion.
Colonel, does this remind you at all of I am sure you have read
the history of Colonel Gordon in the Sudan where they knew that
he was going to go under. And they knew he was—and I just re-
member that back in my reading back about 20 years ago how the
British Government just wouldn’t make a decision until finally they
made the decision to help Gordon; and, by that time, he had been
overrun and murdered.
Colonel MARTIN. Sir, that specific one I don’t remember. But this
is exactly what is going to happen. And I don’t think they are going
to make it to December 31. I think Maliki is going to pull the same
stunt he did with the execution of Saddam Hussein, and that was
a despicable act.
I was talking to Judge Poe about it earlier. Sam Houston taught
us, you don’t build democracies off lynchings. That is why Santana
wasn’t lynched.
Muqtada al-Sadr had contacted Maliki and told him, I want Sad-
dam executed tomorrow by my people. And Muqtada had promised
his people that Saddam would not live to see the light of the new
year. Maliki contacted General Gardner and said, I want him
turned over. Gardner said, what are you talking about? He is al-
ready scheduled to be executed on the 10th of January. “I want


219
him now.” And it was pursued within task force 134. “What is
going on?” And that is when it was revealed what Muqtada was up
to.
But the State Department weighed in, demanded that Saddam
be turned over, and he was. And then he was delivered to face jus-
tice. And as you saw on the videos, that chanting “Muqtada,
Muqtada,” and when Saddam was executed and then dropped to
the ground and kicked and everything else, that is—and then,
when that blew up on the videos, the State Department jumps out
of the way. And we in the military take all the heat rounds as to
why we allowed that to happen when, in fact, we objected.
The Saddam execution is a lesson because now Maliki is going
to jump before December 31. He attacked the first and the second
time immediately after Secretary Gates—a very fine man—was in
the country. Immediately after gives the impression that Secretary
Gates blessed this. I know he didn't.
Now Maliki is coming to see President Obama, and he is going
to go back to Iraq just about the same time all U.S. troops are
pulled out. I can see him attacking sooner than the end of the year.
And if I may, sir, this is from Maliki's own political magazine and
it is the center page where, when you open it up, it always opens.
And here is what the article says.
Mek organization, international terrorists from a previous dicta-
torship and the depth of western hypocrisy. The world crowded
with hundreds of very dangerous terrorist organizations according
to your laws. Mek is one of these organizations.
It goes on. .
The history of the Mek organization is full of crimes against both
Iraq and Iranian nations. After the rising of the Islamic Republic
in Iran in 1979, Mek organization, with direct support of the
West—and it goes on.
This is an attack from Maliki's own political magazine on Europe
and the United States as well as the MEK. Maliki knows most
Americans don't read Arabic. And, as a result, this is the kind of
stuff that goes unnoticed by the State Department people.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let me just note that when I was
younger I remember seeing Mussolini strung up by his heels, and
I had no sympathy for Mussolini. And I have seen dictators strung
up by their heels, and I don’t care what they did to Saddam Hus-
sein. I don't care that. The people that we need to care about in
this world are innocent, honest people that want to build a better
. not these gangsters who get power and slaughter innocent
people.
My father was in the military, too, so I understand that military
people want things done with order or they view them as being de-
structive in the end. I personally disagree with that, but I respect
that opinion. And I know you are a very honorable man and would
state that principle for us.
I think that what we are going to do is end it here, and I will
just have a very short closing statement. But I will give each one
of the witnesses 1 minute to summarize.
Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Thank you very much, Chairman
Rohrabacher. I am grateful for the opportunity to put on the record
the summary of my inquiry into this.


A P P E N D IX
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
(223)


229
Tareq al-Hashemi, Iraqi Vice President
Dr. Salman al-Jumaili, head of al-
Iraqiya's parliamentary bloc
Dr. Jamal Al Karbuli, Head of
Parliamentary Group
Dr. Zafir Al-Ani, a leading figure from
al-Iraqiya
Mahmood Osman, independent MP from
Kurdish bloc -
Mohsen Saadoun, deputy chairman of the
Kurdish parliamentary bloc
Falah al-Naqib, MP and former Minister
of Interior
Maison al-Damlougi, MP and Al Iraqia
Spokeswoman
Dr. Salini Abdullah al-Jabouri, head of
the parliament's human rights
commission
Dr. Ahmad al-Awani, head of the
parliament's commerce commission
Haider al-Mulla, Rapporteur for the
Parliamentary council on Human Rights
and official Al Iraqia spokesman
Rasem al-Avadi, leading figure from al-
Iraqiya
IIussani al-Azawi, former MP aud head
of Al Iraqia in Diyala
Arshad Arkan Zebari, member of
parliament's foreign affairs commission
Dr. Ala'a Maki, MP from Al Iraqia bloc
Ms. Atab Jasem al-Dori, Al Iraqia MP
Mohammed Osman al-Khaldi, Al Iraqia
MP
Alia Nusayiſ, Mcmber of Parliament
Ms. Shaza al-Abosi, former MP
Lºskaudar Watwat, Al Iraqia MP
Dr. Bokhari Abdullah, former MP from
the Kurdish bloc
Shwan Mohamad Taha, MP from the
Kurdish bloc
Dr. Mostafa al-Hitti, former MP
Mesal al-Osi, former MP and head of
Iraq's Peoples Party
Sheikh Abdullah ();ail al-Yāvār, Al head
of the font for Justice & Reform in Iraq
()mar Khalaſ, Al Iraqia MP
Validat al-Jomaili, Al Iraqia MP
Qais Shazar, Al Iraqia MP
Ojeil Al Yawar, Al Iraqia MP
Othman Al Joheishi, Al Iraqia MP
Ziyad Tareq Zarb, Al Iraqia MP
Fares al-Sanjari, Al Iraqia MP
Raad Al Dehlaki, Al Iraqia MP
Khalil Zaidan, Al Iraqia MP
Dr. laezeh al-Obaidi, Al Iraqia MP
Ms. Jade Younis, Al Iraqia MP
Ahmad Al-Mesari, Al Iraqia MP
Adnan al-Danbos, Al Iraqia Former MP
Falah Hassan Zaidan, Al Iraqia MP
Sardar Abdullah, MP from the Kurdish
Progressive Bloc
Azhar Sheikhli, Al Iraqia MP
Taha AI Luhayby, Former MP
Akram Naqib, Al Iraqiā legal advisor
Ms. Karima al-Javati, Al Iraqia MP
Ibrahim al-Mutlak, Al Iraqia MP
Mohammed Eqbal, Al Iraqia MP
Mohammed Karboli, Al Iraqia MP
Hani Ashur, Al Iraqia legal advisor
Ms. Sohad al-Obaidi, Al Iraqia MP
Hammed al-Mutlak, Al Iraqia MP
Yasin al-Mutlak, Al Iraqia MP
Sheikh Jamal al-Bat’tikh, former minister
and MP
Farzand Aluncil, former MP ſton, the
Kurdish bloc
Latif Mustafa, MP from the Change
parliamentary bloc
Bayazid Hassan, MP from the Change
parliamentary bloc
Sheikh Majed Ismael, MP from the
Kurdish bloc
Sheikh Azad Abu Bakr, MP from the
Kurdish bloc
Latif Hojllassan, former MP from the
Kurdish bloc
Dr. Hamid Adel Bavi, MP from the
Kurdish bloc
Dr. Mohammed Ahmed, former MP
from the Kurdish bloc
Yousif Ahmed, former MP, Kurdish bloc
Fatiah Sheikh, former MP
Dr. Mohammed Sheikhli, Director,
National Justice Center
Minas Ibrahim al-Yousiſi, Secretary
General of the Christian Democratic
Party
Abdullah Kazim, spokesman for the Vice
President Tareq Hashemi
Loei Saeidi, leading member National
Accord Movement(NAM)
Sheikh Khalaf al-Alyan, Scoretary
General of the Iraqi Reconciliation
Council
Qahtan Saeidi, leading figure from the
Iraqi Liberal Movement
Ibrahim Bajalan, former chair of Diyala
Provincial Council
In addition to 13 provincial council
members and advisors to governors


230
Nahede al-Daeni, Al Iraqia MP
Dr. Neda al-Jabori, Al Iraqia MP
Ala Talebani, MP from the Kurdish bloc
Entesar alawi, leading member National
Accord Movement(NAM)
Ziya Slickhli, leading incumber NAM
Abd Saltar Raer, leading member NAM
Haider al-Mulla
Oſſicial Al Iraqia spokesman for the bloc
Rapporteur ſor the Parliamentary Human Rights commission
November 16, 2011


231
º
Fohruary 28, 2009
Iran urges Iraq to expel opposition group
TEHRAN (AFP) — Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on Saturday urged visiting
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani to expel Iran's main opposition group from Iraqi territory, the
ISNA news agency reportcd.
"We await the implementation of our agreement regarding the expulsion of the hypocrites," he
said, using a term the lslamic republic uses to describe the main opposition group in exile, the
People's Mujahideen of Iran (PMOI).
He did not elaborate, but in late January Iraq's national security adviser Muwafaq al-Rubaie
said in Tehran that Baghdad planned to extradite armed Iranian opposition members who have
"Iranian blood on their hands."
"The only choices open to mombors of this group are to roturn to Iran or to choose anothor
country... these people will themselves choose where they want to go," Rubaie told reporters at
the time.
Founded in 1965 with the aim of overthrowing first the US-backed shah and then the Islamic
regime in Iran, the PMOI has in the past operated an armed group inside Iran.
It was the armed wing of the France-based National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) but it
renounced violence in June 2001.
ISNA said Khamenei also slammed a January decision by the European Union to remove thc
PMOI from the EU list of terror groups following a legal battle in Britain.
He said the move "shows being a terrorist is an contractual issue and is not based on reality.
Nometheless they are not ready to accept them into their countries."
The agency quoted Talabani as saying in his talks with Khamenei that the PMOI"have
committed many crimes against the Iraqis, and Iraqi government is determined to expel them
and will go forward with its decision."
Baghdad announced on December 21 it planned to close Ashraf camp north of Baghdad and
close to the Iranian border, where around 3,500 l’MOI members are held under a form of house
arrest.
On January 1, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki went further and said he would expel the
PMOI from the country.


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FYI
From
"Tahar Boumedra"
Subject:
Fw: Ashraf meetings
Date:
04/07/11 16:03:02
To:
"Behzad Saffari" . "Behzad Saſſari"
From: "Hanks, Russell J (Baghdad)"
To: "Tahar ºm
Date: 07/04/2011 10:4
Subject. RE: Ashraf meetings
Please pass to the MEK leadership. Thank you.
General Ali Ghaydan has ordered the ISF on the ground at Ashraf to only take
unoccupied land there and not molest the MeK members,
Maliki has ordered that the ISF take only unoccupied land and that they must not
use violence,
The PM is asking the MeK and urge them to be reasonable and
not create hindrances. The G0I's goal is to find a peaceful
solution to this and hopes to work to find a humanitarian
solution to this situation. . . "To help, and not hinder," the
pm reportedly said.
This email is UNCLASSIFIED,