16 The Baghdad guard force and other PSCs in contingency areas such as Kabul are like other local guards, serving as the first line of defense for our facilities and staff, but they differ from our typical local guard forces in that they have higher recruiting, screening, and training requirements; a high percentage of American and Third Country National personnel; and some specialized support services such as medical and logistics. The Kabul and Baghdad guard forces also have specialized weapons and equipment which are necessary to defend against the extreme threats in those countries and defend our personnel and facilities from attack. The recent terrorist attack in Kabul illustrates the critical need for enhanced and robust security programs, including properly equipped private security contractors who are operationally overseen by direct hire members of the Department's Diplomatic Security Service and act in concert with host country security forces. In contingency areas, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, our PSCs are under management and oversight of DS direct hire personnel; as illustrated by the September 13 terrorist incident in Kabul, the Embassy’s security elements acted swiftly to protect embassy staff and Afghan visitors in the compound, moved them to safe locations, assumed defensive positions, and took defensive actions as directed by the Chief of Mission. 18 State has already instituted operational measures, as well as increased contract oversight to ensure professionalism and responsibility through improved direct oversight of security contractor personnel when CWC’s report was written. Diplomatic Security is already staffed to achieve this oversight. Its actions for management, oversight, and operational control of contract personnel include: • DS Special Agents at each post in Iraq and Afghanistan serve as managers for the Static Guard and Personal Protective Security programs; • DS Special Agents at each post also serve as Contracting Officer's Representatives (CORs) and Assistant CORs (A/COR) for the direct management and oversight of the Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract; - • DS personnel at each post are assigned as Government Technical Monitors (GTMs) to assist the COR and A/COR in the oversight of the WPS contract; • DS personnel provide direct operational oversight of all protective motorcades in Iraq and Afghanistan; • DS personnel continue to conduct frequent, unannounced health and welfare after-hours visits to WPS housing compounds. Collocation of contractor life support areas on Embassy, Consulate or other compounds enhances after- hours oversight of contractor personnel; 28 under Chief of Mission authority and facilitate the transition from a military- led to a civilian-led mission by continuing to support ISF development and modernization. The OSC-I represents a critical component of the normalization of the U.S.-Iraq bilateral relationship. Continuing to Set State Up for Success as DoD Draws Down The Department of Defense (DoD) is committed to ensuring a smooth transition of DoD functions to the Department of State in support of the enduring U.S. Government diplomatic and security assistance missions in the region. We continue to provide oversight of the logistical functions associated with the orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of December 2011. With regard to logistical issues, we are in the execution phase of this transition and are on track, and in some cases, are ahead of schedule. DoD recognizes the importance of the transition in Iraq and is committed to executing these tasks by the end of the year. Although the role that the Department of State will ultimately take on in Iraq is consistent with its work throughout the world, we continue to see that the scale and complexity of the transition presents a huge undertaking that requires close cooperation and synchronization. Both DoD and the State Department are committed to working together to achieve a successful transition. As the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) explained in our March 2, 2011 testimony, the Defense and State Departments established a Senior Executive Steering Group focused on coordinating and synchronizing the materiel and support aspects of the transition. That same group continues to lead the initiatives associated with this transition. It is co-chaired at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level and meets biweekly to review milestones and ensure regular progress is being made in the eight subordinate functional areas (supply chain, equipment, contracting, medical, facilities and construction, information technology, security, and aviation). This past Tuesday (October 11, 2011) marked the 28th meeting of this group. We have had constant, direct participation from the U.S. Embassy in Iraq and from USF-I as well as from other key players in Washington, D.C. The Executive Steering Group reports to both Ambassador Kennedy, the Under Secretary of State for Management, and to Acting Under Secretary of Defense Kendall on a regular basis in order to 31 Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Contracts in support of the Security Support Services - Iraq (SSS-I) requirements. • DoD will also provide fixed site contract security, under Combatant Commander rules, for the independent sites operating in support of the OSC-I. • Administrative contract support and oversight will continue to be provided by the Defense Contract Management Agency and Defense Contract Audit Agency. • Two DoD IT Systems - the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) and the Total Operational Picture Support System (TOPSS) have been designated by the State Department as its preferred personnel management tool. Again, the State Department will reimburse DoD for all these contracts and services provided. Conclusion Although there has been excellent progress in both drawing down U.S. forces in Iraq and providing support to the Department of State, challenges exist and more still needs to be done. We will continue to coordinate closely with the State Department to address these challenges and any other issues that might arise over the coming months as we continue to draw down forces responsibly, reallocate or redeploy equipment, and dispose of material appropriately. We are now at the point where the strategic dividends of our sacrifice are within reach, as long we take the proper steps to consolidate them. A long-term strategic partnership with Iraq, based on mutual interests and mutual respect, presents many advantages for the United States. At a time of unprecedented change in the Middle East, we must stay focused on Iraq in order to advance our broader regional objectives of peace, prosperity, and security. 39 rect supervision of diplomatic security special agents or security protective officers who are all direct hire. Mr. TIERNEY. What contingency plan does the State Department have if facts on the ground change substantially enough that it is no longer feasible to have private security contractors in use? Mr. KENNEDY. I think that is an option I have thought about. I cannot speak for my colleagues. I think I would have to report to the Secretary that we would have to severely scale down our oper- ations in Iraq. I have even done an analysis based upon an old General Accounting Office study on the number of Federal law en- forcement personnel in the entire Federal Service. Even if I took 10 percent of the Bureau of Prisons guards, I would not have enough static officers there and the Bureau of Prisons might have some comment on that. I believe that these professionals that we engage that we vet, that we rewrite the syllabus for their training, we spot check their training, we direct their performance hands-on, eyes-on, I believe that is the way to go. Mr. TIERNEY. The plan is if it becomes untenable, then there is a scaled down operation as opposed to hiring more and more con- tractors? Mr. KENNEDY. I am sorry? Mr. TIERNEY. So many things on the ground change and become so violent over there. Mr. KENNEDY. I am sorry, I thought you meant I could no longer keep contractors there? Mr. TIERNEY. Right and that is my point if it comes to a point where the contractors are not feasible to operate where you have made the analysis on that, it is not to keep loading them in hoping things are going to change just to scale down operations? Mr. KENNEDY. I think we have in our plan sufficient contractors to provide perimeter security in cooperation with the Iraqi police and military. Mr. TIERNEY. I know you do but contingency plans are for when that doesn’t work. I think I heard you say you would recommend the Secretary scale back? Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Estevez, do you have a dollar figure or esti- mate of what assets will be either turned over to the Iraqis or left behind? Mr. ESTEVEZ. There are a couple different programs we have for turning things over to the Iraqis, including foreign military sales. They are buying military equipment from us which is not left be- hind, basically new equipment. There are some things they have purchased from us. Mr. CHAFFETZ. What is the value? How much have they pur- chased? Mr. ESTEVEZ. I am trying to give you a couple different pro- grams, under what we call foreign excess property is $321 million to date. That will go up as we continue over the next 3 months to draw down. Mr. CHAFFETZ. That is where the Iraqi government pays the United States.