UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO 3 1822 03836 5789 Strategic Reflections Operation Iraqi Freedom July 2004-February 2007 George W. Casey, Jr. US DEPOSITORY ITEM RECEIVED JAN 15 2013 USDOCS GEISEL LIBRARY UCSO D5.402:1R1 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO 3 1822 03836 5789 Strategic Reflections CONTENTS 4 GOVERNMENT TRANSITION AND THE RISE OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE (JANUARY-JUNE 2006) ..81 Government Transition..... ..84 The Samarra Bombing and Its Aftermath .89 Building New Partnerships...... ..98 Camp David and June D.C. Consultations.. .104 109 ..110 5 THE TOUGHEST DAYS (JULY 2006–FEBRUARY 2007) .... Adjusting the Plan .. Civil-Military Relations Military Operations in Baghdad.. Washington Policy Review . 120 • .126 ..135 153 ..154 .156 .159 6 INSIGHTS FOR LEADERS Developing Vision and Strategy Creating Unity of Effort.. Continuous Assessment and Adaptation. Influencing Organizational Culture. . Civil-Military Interaction ..... Political-Military Integration. Momentum and Transitions .... Sustaining Yourself .... .162 ...165 ..170 ..172 .175 viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book would not have been possible without the efforts of Sandy Cochran and Kelly Howard, who have been involved in this effort since Iraq and who assisted me in researching, writing, and fact-checking. I am also appreciative of the comments from many who read the paper, and of the support of the National Defense University Press, particulary Frank G. Hoffman, Jeffrey D. Smotherman, and Tara J. Parekh. Finally, my wife, Sheila, was my strongest supporter throughout my career and particularly during my time in Iraq. She is also a tireless advocate for the families of the men and women of our Armed Forces. xi STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS insights that come from experience and hindsight, but I felt it is more important to focus on what I thought and what I did then to provide the best insight into the challenges I faced and how I dealt with them. It reflects my insights as a commander in one theater of a broader war. In preparing this book, I relied on the historical records that I kept from Iraq-personal notes, briefings, plans, assessments, meet- ing notes—that, while decidedly incomplete, greatly sharpened my personal recollections and offered insights into how we viewed the situation over time and what we conveyed to our political leaders. They are available for research at the National Defense University. As in any major endeavor, personalities mattered. Throughout my entire command tenure, I interacted with an extremely profes- sional group of civilian and military leaders. My Commander in Chief was President George W. Bush, who was served by two Secretaries of State, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, and two National Se- curity Advisors, Dr. Rice and Stephen Hadley, whom I interacted with regularly. Strategic oversight came from two Secretaries of De- fense, Donald Rumsfeld for 30 months, and Robert Gates for my final 2 months. I worked closely with two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, USAF, for 17 months and General Peter Pace, USMC, for 15 months. My immediate military commander for my entire tenure was Commander of U.S. Central Command General John Abizaid, USA. I was privileged to work side-by-side with two U.S. Ambassadors, John Negroponte and Zalmay Khalilzad, for 8 months and 22 months, respectively, and one interim Ambassador, Jim Jeffrey, who later returned as our Am- bassador to Iraq. I worked with the leaders of three different Iraqi governments, led by Prime Ministers Ayad Allawi, Ibrahim al-Jafari, INTRODUCTION and Nuri al-Maliki. I had the benefit of working with very talented military subordinates: four Multi-National Corps—Iraq (MNC-I) commanders—then-Lieutenant Generals Thomas Metz, John Vines, Peter Chiarelli, and Raymond Odierno–and two Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I) commanders, then—Lieutenant Generals David Petraeus and Martin Dempsey. I also worked closely with Lieutenant General Stan McChrystal, who led our efforts against al Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over 65 years ago in his initial dispatch following Operation Torch, General Dwight Eisenhower wrote that “the accomplish- ments of this campaign are sufficiently evident to make comment unnecessary. Our mistakes, some of which were serious, may be less apparent at this moment, and, in the interest of future operations, they should be subject to dispassionate analysis.” Although the accomplishments of this campaign may not cur- rently be seen with sufficient clarity to make comment unnecessary, I submit this book in the same spirit. The challenges that I faced during my command hold valuable lessons for future military and civilian leaders as we enter our second decade of war. It is my hope that this book will provide insights that allow future leaders to better prepare themselves for the challenges they will surely face in this era of persistent conflict. I purposely focused this book on my actions and the actions of my headquarters and, as a result, have only touched briefly on the significant stories of the advances that were made during this time in training indigenous security forces, targeting high-value individuals, detainee operations, reconstruction, and dealing with improvised ex- plosive devices. The men and women of the MNF-I, the Intelligence STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS Community, and the Department of State who served in Iraq during this time rewrote the books in these and other areas and postured us for success in Iraq and in future conflicts. Operation Iraqi Freedom is part of a larger story—that of the United States as a nation adapting to the security challenges thrust on us by the al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, and that of a military transforming in the midst of war. As this book illustrates, the forces involved, both military and civilian, adapted under fire and in the face of the uncertainty and complexity of Iraq to ac- complish our national objectives and provide 27 million Iraqis the opportunity for a better life. It is a historic accomplishment, and one of which all Americans can be justifiably proud. —George W. Casey, Jr. General, U.S. Army, Retired May 2012 President George W. Bush addresses U.S. Army War College on Iraq, May 24, 2004 White House (Eric Draper) 1. PREPARING FOR THE MISSION (MAY-JUNE 2004) I did not go to work on May 17, 2004, thinking I would be the commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq in 45 days. I knew that the Secretary of Defense was looking to increase the new MNF-I headquarters from a three-star to a four-star command to handle the wide range of strategic issues that a corps's headquarters is not equipped to deal with. But as the Army vice chief of staff, I was decisively involved in the multiyear reorganization of the Army. I had been asked by my boss, Army Chief of Staff Pete Schoomaker, to see that through. Three days later, Pete told me that I had been selected by President George W. Bush to lead coalition forces in Iraq. With Pete's support, I immediately shifted gears and laid out a plan to take command. My 5 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS plan involved reading to update my thinking on counterinsurgency operations and the region; meeting with key figures in the executive branch to understand what was expected of me; meeting with leaders from other government agencies to understand how they planned to contribute; visiting the intelligence agencies to develop a better un- derstanding of the intelligence picture (at least as it was viewed from Washington); meeting with knowledgeable experts outside of gov- ernment to better understand the context for the current situation; meeting with financial and contracting experts to understand the mechanisms required to get the reconstruction effort moving; and meeting with numerous Members of Congress to get their views and to prepare for my confirmation hearing. This process proved essential in framing my understanding of the mission and greatly facilitated the rapid production of our campaign plan once I assumed command. Framing the Mission Years of experience at the strategic level had taught me that the higher up you go, the less guidance you receive. This mission proved no exception. I found there were three key documents that were most useful in framing the mission for Iraq: the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) of May 11, 2004, the President's May 24 speech at the Army War College, and United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546, with attached letters from new- ly appointed Prime Minister of Iraq Ayad Allawi and Secretary of State Colin Powell. The NSPD established the organization for U.S. Government operations in Iraq after the termination of the Coalition Provisional Authority, which was to occur no later than June 30, 2004, and the PREPARING FOR THE MISSION reestablishment of “normal” diplomatic relations with a sovereign Iraq. It made the Ambassador responsible for the “direction, coor- dination and supervision of all United States Government employees, polices and activities in country” except for the “U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq,” which were the responsibility of the commander of U.S. Central Command (US- CENTCOM), the combatant commander to whom I would report. It directed the “closest cooperation and mutual support” between them.' The NSPD also designated the Secretary of State as responsible for the “continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance in Iraq” and directed the USCENTCOM commander to lead the ef- forts to organize, train, and equip the Iraqi security forces (ISF) “with the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission.” It established two new organizations: one under the Secretary of State (the Iraq Reconstruc- tion Management Office) to guide the development effort, and one under the Secretary of Defense (the Project and Contracting Office) to provide contracting and project management support to the recon- struction and assistance missions. Finally, the NSPD recognized that assisting Iraq through the transition to democracy would take “the full commitment of all agencies” of the United States, and enjoined the heads of all agencies to support the mission.” Clear division of labor and lines of command are critical to the effective prosecution of any mission, and this NSPD endeavored to provide that. In retrospect, while the division of labor was clear, the NSPD did not create the unity of command necessary for the effective integration of civil-military efforts in successful counter- insurgency operations. The Ambassador and I would have to create the unity of effort required for success. This would prove a constant STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS struggle as the two supporting bureaucracies—State and Defense— often had differing views. Things would get more complex as we increasingly brought the new Iraqi government into the effort. The political and economic effects, so necessary to sustaining our mili- tary success, would be outside of my direct control. Shortly after the NSPD was issued, President Bush outlined our mission in a speech at the U.S. Army War College. He stated that our goal was “to see the Iraqi people in charge of Iraq for the first time in generations,” and that our job in Iraq was not only to defeat the enemy, but also “to give strength to a friend—a free, representative government that serves its people and fights on their behalf.” He laid out five steps to accomplish our goal: hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government help establish stability and security continue rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure encourage more international support : hold free, national elections [that will bring forward new leaders empowered by the Iraqi people].” President Bush noted that national elections were the most important of the five steps and that, because of recent violence in Fallujah and the South, we would maintain our troop level at 138,000 “as long as necessary.” He stated that the United States would do “all that is necessary—by measured force or overwhelming force—to achieve a stable Iraq.” These were comforting words to a prospec- tive commander. Finally, he talked about accelerating our program for training Iraqi security forces with an eventual goal of an Iraqi PREPARING FOR THE MISSION army of 27 battalions and an overall ISF number (to include police and border guards) of 260,000," making it clear that this would be a major part of my mission. In all, this seemed like clear direction, and I used the speech as the basis for my planning. Perhaps the most important document in framing the mission was UNSCR 1546. It provided the chapter VII mandate from the United Nations: “... the Multinational Force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.” The accompanying letters relayed the public consent of the new Iraqi government to accept MNF-I and the politi- cal transition laid out in the UNSCR. This public acceptance would be essential to me when it came to working with the Iraqi government. It also established a timeline for the political transition: • forming the sovereign Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) that would assume governing responsibility and authority by June 30, 2004 • convening a national conference reflecting the diversity of Iraqi society • holding direct democratic elections by December 31, 2004, if possible and in no case later than January 31, 2005, for a Transitional National Assembly, which would have respon- sibility for forming an Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and drafting a permanent constitution for Iraq leading to a constitutionally elected government by December 31, 2005." This gave the Iraqis and coalition forces a political timeline for the next 18 months, which we saw as a good, if not necessary, driver to STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS force consensus on what we knew would be tough issues. What we did not anticipate was the debilitating effect that three governmen- tal transitions would have on our efforts to increase the capacity of Iraqi institutions. Finally, the UNSCR and its supporting letters clearly stated my responsibility to establish a “security partnership” with the soon-to-be sovereign government of Iraq and to assist in building the capability of the Iraqi security forces and institutions that, the UNSCR envisioned, would “progressively play a greater role and ultimately assume full responsibility for the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.” The UNSCR gave me a direct role with the sovereign government of Iraq to coordinate this security partner- ship, a role normally reserved for the Ambassador. I did not realize at the time how difficult and all-consuming this particular task would become. Building a Key Relationship I recognized from the outset that a close, cooperative relation- ship between John Negroponte, the newly appointed Ambassador to Iraq, and me would be absolutely essential—an instinct that he shared. We worked hard from the beginning to ensure that we en- tered Iraq with a common view of the situation and how we needed to address it. One of the most important agreements we made took place at our first meeting. There we discussed the fact that any counterinsurgency effort required political and military integration for success, and we agreed upon a concept to create unity of effort between the Embassy and MNF-I-One Team/One Mission. We agreed that we would develop a common statement of our mission 10 PREPARING FOR THE MISSION and then guide the Embassy and MNF-I teams to work together to accomplish it. This understanding would prove vital to our success. One of the toughest challenges for strategic leaders is to clearly ar- ticulate to their subordinates what it is they want them to accomplish. Before we left, the Ambassador and I worked to develop a clear view of what we wanted to accomplish in Iraq–understanding that we would take a period of time after we arrived to calibrate our views with reali- ties on the ground. We also discussed the NSPD, the President's speech, and the UNSCR and how they would help us frame what we needed to do. We recognized that the return of sovereignty to the Iraqis presented both challenges and opportunities, and we wrestled with how to use the transition to create momentum for the mission. To do this, we felt we needed to work on enhancing the legitimacy of the IIG to move Iraqis away from the perception of the coalition as an occupying force. We also realized that the transition from the Coalition Provisional Au- thority to the Embassy and the One Team/One Mission concept would require some significant organizational changes to enable our success, and we began planning how to accomplish them. In the end, we went into Iraq thinking that our mission was to facilitate the establishment of a representative Iraqi government that respected the human rights of all Iraqis, and that had sufficient secu- rity forces to maintain domestic order and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists. To achieve that objective, we knew that we would have to build the national and international team to accomplish our mis- sion, develop an integrated effort to defeat the insurgency, and work to build the legitimacy of the IIG and ISF. These discussions with the Ambassador were extremely helpful in establishing a common view of the mission and the challenges we 11 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS would face together. It was, we both realized, just the beginning of a long journey, but we were at least starting in the same place. Consultations and Direction As part of my preparations, I solicited views on Iraq from vari- ous experts from inside and outside the government: the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of State, National Security Council, and Intelligence Community. The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and my alma mater, Georgetown University, both hosted special sessions for me that were very helpful. My consultations with these organizations surfaced a wide range of concerns and questions. Some experts questioned how to obtain and sustain unity of effort between the Embassy and mili- tary, while others wondered about the challenges and implications of sovereignty. There were concerns about the newly constituted ISF (mission, force levels, equipment requirements, and timelines for development), and the impacts of disbanding the Iraqi army, stringent de-Ba'athification policies, and Abu Ghraib. There was also real uncertainty about the nature of the threat. While most agreed that we were dealing with an insurgency, there was much debate about the composition of the insurgency. Lastly, from these consultations I gained a sense that people thought that Iraq would be an 18-month mission: we would complete the UNSCR politi- cal timeline while growing the ISF and turn the country over to the Iraqis when that was done. In all, I found that having access to a wide variety of views and insights better helped me sharpen my thinking about the mission. 12 PREPARING FOR THE MISSION During that month, I had several office calls with Secretary Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dick Myers to get direction. I had reviewed the Secretary's April 27, 2004, guidance to USCENTCOM that planners should maximize the use of ISF, international forces, and contractors before resorting to U.S. forces.” He also sent me a copy of the memorandum he prepared for the President in early June, entitled “Some Thoughts on Iraq and How to Think about It,” that sought perspective from history with respect to what he termed “a rough period of months.” He empha- sized that “there is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done.” Those were prescient words. During these office calls, the Secretary emphasized two con- cerns. The first was about the “can-do” attitude of the American soldier. The Secretary was worried that, in our zeal to accomplish the mission, we would try to do everything ourselves and not allow the Iraqis to gain the experience they would need to ultimately take charge. He felt that this would only extend our time there, and he en- couraged me to take this attitude into consideration in my planning. I understood what he meant, having seen this attitude in our soldiers in Bosnia, and even getting captured by it myself during my time there. We were going to have to find the right balance between the drive needed to accomplish things in a tough environment and doing everything ourselves if we wanted the Iraqis to take charge anytime soon. This would be easier said than done. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers were also concerned about the status of the ISF, and they asked me to develop an immediate assessment and long-term plan for ISF development as a matter of priority. We agreed that I 13 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS would report back with an assessment of the situation and recom- mendations within my first 30 days on the ground. Direct Insights In mid-June I was granted permission from the Senate Armed Services Committee to accompany Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz on a 5-day trip to Iraq.* The purpose of the trip was to gain a better understanding of the issues surrounding the transi- tion of sovereignty to the IIG, which was scheduled to take place by the end of the month. The trip would enable me to meet with the Iraqi and coalition military leaders whom I would be working with to gain important on-the-ground insights. I focused on gaining an understanding of how the new Iraqi leaders viewed the threat, their current security challenges, their security forces, and the consulta- tive mechanisms called for in the UNSCR to ensure coordination between the coalition and the Iraqi government. Not surprisingly, the insights I gained from this visit played a prominent role in pre- paring me to take command of the mission. Here are a few of my key takeaways from the trip: Threat and Security Challenges. Prime Minister Allawi viewed radical Islamists and ex-regime loyalists, who were increasingly siding with the radicals, as Iraq's primary threat. He thought both groups were getting support from regional powers, primarily Syria and Iran, and taking advantage of Iraq's porous borders to undermine the * Permission was necessary to avoid “presumption of confirmation.” We can do better preparing senior leaders for key wartime jobs. For example, I would have welcomed the chance to study Arabic for several months, something I could not do without "presuming confirmation.” + The Iraqi Interim Government was appointed by the Coalition Provisional Authority just prior to sovereignty being passed. 14 PREPARING FOR THE MISSION political process under way. He stated that things would get worse before they got better and that establishing a functional democracy in Iraq would take a long time. He also said that his priority was to establish security across Iraq. It was clear that the April uprisings by Sadrist militia and the failed efforts to establish a government security force in Fallujah weighed heavily on him and the new government. Muqtada al-Sadr had established a safe haven in Najaf, and terrorists and insurgents had established a safe haven in Fallujah. Coalition and Iraqi forces loyal to the central government could not go into either area. The Iraqis saw them as separate problems with Fallujah being the more serious of the two. They also saw them as longer term problems and did not expect them to be resolved before sovereignty was estab- lished. I would inherit them. Vision for Iraqi Security Forces. The prime minister and his security ministers believed there were insufficient ISF to deal with the threat, and those that did exist were underequipped. They saw this situation as unacceptable, and rightly so. On the army side, they looked down on the recently formed Iraq Civil Defense Corps (coalition-armed local security forces), and the prime minister and his ministers felt that they needed armored forces—at least five di- visions—that could rapidly deploy around the country. They also wanted an aerial capability to assist in the counterinsurgency fight. On the police side, they recognized that, given the threat, the police would need the support of the army for some time, and that current training needed to be enhanced to allow the police to survive in a counterinsurgency environment. They wanted to create strong bor- der and counterterror forces. They also wanted our help to unify the security effort (coalition, army, police), to develop an appropriate 15 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS chain of command for the army and police, to build a “rapid deploy- ment force,” so the central government could respond anywhere in the country, and to develop a strict vetting process for key leaders. Finally, they wanted Iraqi forces, not “photocopies of the U.S. or UK forces.” Consultative Mechanisms. The letters from Prime Minister Allawi and Secretary of State Powell attached to UNSCR 1546 called for the establishment of consultative mechanisms to fa- cilitate coordination between the coalition and the sovereign government of Iraq. We agreed that the Ministerial Commit- tee for National Security would be the core forum for working strategic security issues and that the Strategic Action Committee would be the forum to prepare issues for its consideration. We began discussions on developing a policy for “sensitive offensive operations”—operations that could cause political problems for the government—and establishing formal and informal coordina- tion mechanisms at the national, provincial, and local levels. We also agreed to establish a joint command center as quickly as pos- sible. Establishing these agreements in advance would be critical to progress in the months ahead. Confirmation The conclusion of these busy weeks came with my confirma- tion hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 24 shortly after my return from Iraq. During the several days prior to the hearings, I visited key members of the committee to get their views and insights on the mission, and submitted my “advance ques- tions” to the committee for the hearing. 16 PREPARING FOR THE MISSION I felt that my preparations to take command had set me up well for the hearing as the Senators echoed many of the concerns I had been hearing in the past few weeks. Members of the committee asked me how I planned to ensure unity of effort with the Embassy and to establish a good relationship with the Ambassador, how I planned to establish an effective relationship between MNF-I and the gov- ernment of Iraq, about the status of the ISF and how I planned to develop them, and how I viewed my relationship with General Abi- zaid. I was also pressed by a number of Senators on whether I felt I had enough troops to accomplish the mission. I pledged several times to ask for more troops if I felt they were necessary, but I reiter- ated, as I did with many of the questions, that I had only been on the ground in Iraq for 3 days, and I would make a thorough assessment once I took command. I also agreed to consult with them frequently. In response to a question posed by the committee conc ncerning the major challenges I would face as the MNF-I commander, I listed the following: implementing an effective transition from occupation to partnership with the IIG defeating anti-Iraqi and anticoalition forces alongside the IIG and ISF assisting the IIG in efficiently rebuilding the ISF with the ISF, providing a secure environment to permit elections in December 2004 or January 2005.10 This represented an accurate view of what I thought my main challenges would be as I prepared to depart for Iraq. 17 **** CASEY SIE General John P. Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command, General Casey after he assumed command of Multi-National Force-Iraq, July 1, 2004, and outgoing commander Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, seated behind General Abizaid 2. ESTABLISHING THE MISSION AND PREPARING FOR THE FIRST ELECTIONS (JULY 2004-JANUARY 2005) On June 28, as I was about to board a plane to the Middle East having been confirmed by the Senate 2 days prior, Ambassador Ne- groponte called to tell me that sovereignty had been passed to the Iraqis earlier that day. While he intended to head into Iraq later that day, I had planned stops at USCENTCOM forward headquarters in Qatar and at my supporting Army headquarters in Kuwait, Third Army, en route to Iraq. Despite the early transfer of sovereignty, I decided to stick with my travel plan as insights from my higher and supporting headquarters in theater would be important in framing my understanding of the mission. My change of command remained scheduled for July 1. 19 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS I arrived in Iraq the night of June 29 and immediately began meeting with the key people in the mission: outgoing commander Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo Sanchez, Ambassador Ne- groponte, my United Kingdom (UK) deputy Lieutenant General John McColl, and new Multi-National Security Transition Com- mand–Iraq Commander LTG David Petraeus. The following day, I conducted my first secure video teleconference with President Bush and his national security team in Washington. I told the President that I would give him my assessment of the overall situation and recommendations for the way ahead in 30 days and that my im- mediate priorities were to develop an integrated counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the insurgency, develop a plan for the formation of ISF, build the consultative and coordinating mechanisms with the IIG, and complete the transition of military support from the Coali- tion Provisional Authority to the Embassy. I assumed command of MNF-I the following day, July 1. Following the change of command, I met with my immediate boss, General Abizaid, to receive his oral and written guidance for the mission. He had been in USCENTCOM for 18 months and was commander for the last year. I would be one of his two theater com- manders (LTG Dave Barno was the commander in Afghanistan). John was a seasoned regional hand and a close friend whose insights I valued. His direction reflected his experience. He told me to focus on setting the conditions for the January elections while building loyal Iraqi security forces and institutions and respecting Iraqi sov- ereignty. He told me to let him know the adequacy of the rules of engagement and support from his headquarters, and informed me that I was authorized to communicate directly with the Chairman 20 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION and Secretary of Defense on “matters relating to the operational and tactical direction of the force.” He asked only to be kept informed in these instances. This would substantially increase our agility to prosecute tactical actions, and I resolved not to abuse this trust. Our session began an invaluable relationship that continued throughout my entire tenure. At that time, MNF-I consisted of around 162,000 coalition forces from 33 countries that had been organized into five Multi-National Division (MND) areas of operation and one Multi-National Bri- gade (MNB) area of operation in northwest Iraq (see figure 2-1). MND-South East was commanded by a UK two-star general, and MND-Center South was commanded by a Polish two-star general. These two divisions contained the preponderance of non-U.S. coali- tion forces. MND-Baghdad, MND-North Central, and MNF-West, the USMC sector, were commanded by U.S. two-star generals, and MNB-North West was commanded by a U.S. one-star general. While the U.S. units contained some multinational forces, they were pre- dominantly U.S. organizations. These units reported directly to the Multi-National Corps-Iraq commander, a U.S. three-star general who was responsible for orchestrating the operational aspects of our mission. I visited each of these units and a good number of their sub- ordinate brigades and battalions in the first 30 days after my arrival. Not surprisingly, the insights provided by subordinate commanders were invaluable in developing my assessment of the situation. While the Ambassador and I crisscrossed the country meeting with Iraqi and coalition leaders to build our own assessment of the situation and refine our vision and strategy, we undertook two sepa- rate and parallel staff actions to help us frame our mission and plans. 21 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS First, I made a decision to continue with the campaign planning that had been initiated by my predecessor, LTG Sanchez, when the MNF-I headquarters was formed that May. The headquarters was established to provide a separate four-star theater headquarters to handle the stra- tegic aspects of the mission and to deal with Washington, the Embassy, and the Iraqi government. This was a very necessary step, and over the course of the mission, it greatly facilitated the accomplishment of our national objectives. The MNF-I headquarters was established on May 15, 2004, with personnel authorizations for individual officers and noncommissioned officers from across the U.S. Services and coalition countries. These personnel were slow to arrive, and the headquarters was still forming when I arrived at the end of June. To complement that nascent planning effort, the Ambassador and I felt we needed a way to bring our key subordinates and staffs together with a shared view of the threat, the nature of the conflict we were involved in, and our mission, so we decided to form a Red Team—a group of experienced senior people empowered to oper- ate outside of normal staff processes to provide their insights and recommendations directly to the Ambassador and me. Our hope was that the Red Team would both provide us with alternative views that we could use to vet the MNF-I campaign plan and, just as importantly, form a basis for a joint mission statement, which the Ambassador and I would issue. This document would enable us to bring our respective organizations together around common objec- tives and operationalize the One Team/One Mission concept we had agreed to in Washington. The Red Team was led by a senior Foreign Service officer with an Army two-star general as his deputy. Their task was to take an 22 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION Figure 2-1. Multi-National Force-Iraq, July 2004 Multi-National Brigade North West (MNB-NW) Tal Afar Mosul Erbil SYRIA O . Sulaymaniyah Kirkuk Baiji Multi-National Division North Central (MND-NC) Tikrit Samarra Balad Multi-National Division Hit Baghdad (MND-B) Baqubah Ramadi YBaghdad Fallujah IRAN Multi-National Force West (MNF-W) JORDAN Karbala Hillah Najaf Amarah Multi-National Division Center South (MND-CS) Samawah Nasiriyah Basra Multi-National Division South East (MND-SE) SAUDI ARABIA KUWAIT 23 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS independent look at both the nature of the threat and the nature of the war, and to give us recommendations on how we should proceed. The team consisted of handpicked senior members of the Embassy and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the British embassy and Special Intelligence Service, and MNF-I. The Ambassador and I gave them 30 days to do their work, with the intent of bringing it together with the ongoing MNF-I campaign planning effort. We planned to issue the joint mission statement and campaign plan by early August. I felt very strongly that it was my responsibility to ensure that every member of the coalition clearly understood what it was that we were trying to accomplish in Iraq so each one could contribute to our success. These two documents would go far in helping me do that. In late July, after several productive sessions with them, the Red Team reported back to the Ambassador and me. They concluded that we were fighting an insurgency and that it was “stronger than it was nine months ago and could deny the IIG legitimacy over the next nine months.” In their view, the insurgency was primarily led by well-funded Sunni Arab “rejectionists” who had lost power with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and rejected the new order. The rejectionists centered around former regime elements, members of the former Ba'ath Party, and former Iraqi security and intelligence forces who had the wherewithal to challenge the formation of a democratic government in Iraq. The Red Team felt that there was “not a monolithic Ba'ath Party” controlling the insurgency, but a “loose system of leadership with no single leader,” and that many of the key leaders and facilitators were based outside of Iraq, pri- marily in Syria. The insurgents shared a range of motivations from “the explicitly religious to Arab nationalists to Saddam loyalists.” 24 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION They felt that foreign Islamic extremists (al Qaeda) were a “small if lethal problem in Iraq” (numbering fewer than 1,000) and that “Iran is hoping to win influence over Iraq's political and electoral process without having to provoke a Shia-based insurgency (for which it is preparing, nonetheless).” Despite their different objectives, all in- surgents shared a common goal—the failure of the coalition mission. We accepted this view of the threat and graphically portrayed it in our campaign plan as shown in figure 2-2. The staff dubbed this rep- resentation “The Wonder Bread Chart.” The Red Team also concluded that “although the IIG enjoys early popular support, it has a weak hold on the instruments of governance and has to manage a war-battered economy, a fragile and damaged infrastructure and the meddling of some neighboring states, especially Syria and Iran.” They noted that we, and the members of the interna- tional community, needed to work to strengthen the legitimacy of the IIG in the eyes of the Iraqis in order to strengthen the government's hand in dealing with these challenges and defeating the insurgency. They felt that our political, economic, and security efforts were “hampered by the lack of a unifying strategy, inadequate intelligence, ineffective strategic communications and the embryonic nature of IIG counterparts.” We clearly had our work cut out for us. Looking back, the Red Team was an effective vehicle to bring together senior political, military, and intelligence leadership to ad- dress the key issues affecting the mission and how to deal with them. We agreed on broad issues, such as the nature of the enemy (Sunni Arab rejectionists), the nature of the war (counterinsurgency), the nature of our relationship with the Iraqi government (partnership), and our mission in Iraq (to help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq). 25 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS While everyone did not agree on everything, we at least all knew where we stood, and we were close enough on the major issues to get moving. Our effort did not, to this point, include the Iraqis—a gap that we would close over time. I was so pleased with the results of the Red Team effort that I used it frequently throughout my tenure to shed light on difficult issues. Working directly from the Red Team assessment, the Ambas- sador and I crafted a joint mission statement for our respective organizations and signed it on August 18. In this first critical docu- ment, we formally defined our objective: “To help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq, at peace with its neighbors, with a constitutional, representative government that respects human rights and possesses security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order, and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.” We stated that the IIG shared this objective, but was “in the early stages of consolidating the aspects of national power,” so we aimed “to bolster the IIG's legitimacy in perception and fact,” acknowledging this would be a major chal- lenge. We also conveyed our common view of the threat, noting that the gravest immediate threat to IIG legitimacy was an insurgency principally led by well-funded Sunni Arab rejectionists drawn from former regime elements. To deal with that threat, we laid out a se- ries of tasks in three interrelated categories: political, security, and economic, and asserted that these tasks would be the “focal point of integrated efforts mounted by everyone operating in Iraq under our authority [emphasis added].” The joint mission statement was a good start, but it was not suf- ficient to guide coalition military efforts in a multiyear campaign, especially one in which national contingents rotated once or twice a 26 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION Figure 2-2. View of the Threat, Summer 2004 Sunni Arab Rejectionists Former Regime Elements Facilitators Outside Iraq Sadr/Shia Extremists Criminals Iraqi Islamic Extremists Foreign Islamic Extremists (Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) 27 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS year. For that we needed a campaign plan. I intended to craft a writ- ten plan to clearly define our mission and how I saw the threat and risks and to articulate a strategy and organizational framework to accomplish the mission. This campaign plan would also provide op- erational direction to my subordinate commanders for the conduct of the military effort and would put in place an assessment mecha- nism to continuously evaluate our progress in accomplishing our objectives. This would allow us, again continuously, to reevaluate the conscious, and unconscious, assumptions that drove the plan, and to adapt it as necessary. As I traveled throughout the country, my staff continued work on the campaign plan in parallel with the Red Team effort. I met with the campaign planners several times a week to cross-level insights and discuss important issues. One of the key discussions we had was on the “center of gravity,” an important element of any successful cam- paign. While we generally agreed that the strategic center of gravity was coalition public support, we differed on the center of gravity for the Iraq theater of operations. In counterinsurgency operations, the center of gravity is usually the people of the country in which the insurgency is being contested. Our discussion revolved around the is- sue of who could best “deliver” the Iraqi people—the coalition or the Iraqi government. I felt that, as our goal was a government seen as representative by the Iraqi people, the more we did to build the legiti- macy of those governments in the eyes of the Iraqi people, the sooner we would achieve our goal. Others argued that we should focus more * Although the joint mission statement was signed shortly after the MNF-I military campaign plan was released, good cross-staff coordination, and my personal oversight, ensured that its tenets were fully incorporated into the plan. 28 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION directly on the Iraqi people. In the end, we made the legitimacy of the Iraqi government the theater center of gravity. We spent a great deal of time debating this and several other key issues as we built the cam- paign plan, but it was time well spent. I found that the issues we were dealing with were so complex that I benefited from hearing different views when making critical judgments. The campaign plan, issued August 5, 2004, laid out direction for the next 18 months. The plan put the Iraq mission in the con- text of our efforts up to that time (the Liberation and Occupation Phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom), and focused primarily on the next 18 months (the Partnership Phase), which entailed the comple- tion of the UNSCR timeline and the formation of a constitutionally elected Iraqi government by 2006. The plan looked beyond January 2006, but only broadly, to the Iraqi Self-reliance Phase, where Iraqis would assume security responsibility. As we were still early in the mission, we purposely did not assign a timeline for this phase. The mission statement from the campaign plan reflected the key elements of partnership with the IIG, counterinsurgency operations, training and equipping ISF, and completing the UNSCR 1546 by the end of 2005: “In partnership with the Iraqi Government, MNF-I conducts full spectrum counterinsurgency operations to isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and foreign terrorists and or- ganizes, trains and equips Iraqi security forces in order to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process on schedule.” To accomplish this mission, we laid out a counterinsurgency strategy that sought to use the full spectrum of military and civil- ian tools to separate insurgents and extremists from the Iraqi people 29 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS and defeat the insurgency while we restored Iraqi capacity to govern and secure the country. We knew executing this strategy would be very difficult in what amounted to a postwar failed state—although it would be awhile before we realized how difficult—so we laid out a framework in the campaign plan designed to integrate and synchro- nize all of the elements of Iraqi and coalition power to accomplish our objectives over time. We used four lines of operation represent- ing the four major elements of power that we would bring to bear: security, governance, economic development, and communicating. Each of these lines was aligned with specific organizations designat- ed to accomplish the specific effects shown in figure 2-3. We made a conscious effort to minimize what the U.S. Government sought to achieve as we developed these objectives, and believed that ac- complishing these effects in an integrated fashion would lead us to the endstate. Coordinating the integration of efforts would have been tough for any one organization, but our efforts were complicated by the fact that we had two organizations—the Embassy and MNF-I-that shared responsibility for success. MNF-I was responsible for securi- ty and the Embassy for governance and economic development. We shared responsibility for communicating. We also shared responsi- bility with the Iraqi government. Execution and coordination within and across the lines of operation were continuous challenges, under- scoring why the One Team/One Mission concept was so important. Everyone had to deliver in a coordinated fashion if we were going to succeed. On the security side, I told the MNC-I commander to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign to: 30 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION Figure 2-3. Initial Campaign Framework Lines of Operation Effects Endstate Insurgents and terrorists neutralized Security Capable ISF Governance A legitimate Iraqi government Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the war on terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny safe haven to terrorists Economic Development Basic needs met A wedge driven between the insurgents and population of Iraq Communicating Changed images of coalition 31 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS • neutralize the insurgency in the Sunni Triangle • secure Baghdad © block the borders of Iraq to disrupt the flow of support to the insurgency • assist in building the ISF • sustain support for coalition force efforts in Shia and Kurdish areas. With an eye toward getting an “Iraqi face” on elections in Janu- ary 2005, I directed the MNC-I and MNSTC-I commanders to focus on getting the ISF to the point where they could plan and conduct security operations at the platoon/police station level with limited coalition support by January. I told them to prioritize these efforts in 15 key cities, in which almost half of the population of Iraq resided. I also gave them some broader ISF objectives for 2005, but our initial focus was successful elections in January. The campaign plan also established the Commander's Assess- ment and Synchronization Board (CASB) to assess and manage the accomplishment of the plan. We recognized upfront that the cam- paign plan was a “living” document that would have to be adjusted as conditions changed and assumptions failed to materialize. The CASB was initially designed to be a monthly process, but we soon went to a bimonthly timeline to minimize redundancy and reduce staff time spent on preparations. I found that getting the assessment process to yield meaningful results—ones the Ambassador and I could act on—took a great deal of my personal effort. The tendency of a staff is to track the things that are most easily measured, not nec- essarily what is most critical. I finally found that if I forced the staff 32 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION to answer the following three questions about each effect, I came closer to getting what I needed: What are we trying to accomplish? What will tell us if we are accomplishing it? How do we measure that? It took a year of trial and error before I was satisfied with the assessment process. With the campaign plan complete, I briefed my staff and sub- ordinate units and gave them 2 weeks to review and develop their supporting plans. I spent the latter part of August listening to back- briefs presented by my subordinates to ensure that they understood the plan and my intent. I was generally pleased with their work. I also shared the plan with the Ambassador and Embassy staff, and the Ambassador and I briefed President Bush and the National Security Council in mid-August. As part of this briefing, I highlighted to our leadership some “potential good and bad” things that could happen in the next 6 months that could affect the plan. I wanted to remind them that we were at war and that things would change. While I had been on the ground for only a month and had developed and issued a campaign plan, I knew we still had a very long way to go. Organizing for Success As the Ambassador and I looked at what we had to do, it was clear to us that the One Team/One Mission concept required some changes to both of our organizations to facilitate the integration of our efforts. For starters, we put our offices next to one another and met frequent- ly over the course of the week. I looked at the configuration of the MNF-I headquarters—which was the standard J1–J9 organization that worked so well in conventional operations—and realized that it would not be suitable for executing the key functions of a counterinsurgency 33 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS campaign plan where political, economic, and information effects need- ed to be generated and synchronized with the security effort, and vice versa. It was also clear that the MNF-I staff would have to work closely with the Embassy staff, and that this could not happen effectively if they operated from separate locations. I also had an internal MNF-I issue in that I needed to refocus my headquarters at the theater level and get them out of the corps's operational and tactical business, which they had been overseeing until the standup of the MNF-I headquarters in May. After discussions with my staff and the Ambassador, and some help from U.S. Joint Forces Command, we designed a headquarters that could more easily carry out the nonstandard functions of the campaign and that would better facilitate the integration of the civil- military effort. To do this, we split the MNF-I headquarters between the Embassy in the Green Zone and Camp Victory in West Baghdad. To the Ambassador's credit, he accepted about 300 military person- nel working permanently in his Embassy alongside his staff. These staff officers worked to integrate our security plans with the Embassy in the key areas of operations, planning, assessment, strategic com- munications, and reconstruction and economic development. We created three staff sections at the Embassy: Strategic Plans and Assess- ments, Political-Military-Economic Effects, and Strategic Operations, all under the oversight of my UK deputy and working directly with Embassy principals. At Camp Victory, we retained the key support functions (personnel, logistics, signal, intelligence) and detainee oper- ations. I maintained offices in both locations, starting my day at Camp Victory, but spending the majority of my time working from the Em- bassy office or visiting units across the country. The wiring diagram in figure 2-4 lays out the organization that we established that summer. 34 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION Figure 2-4. MNF-I Staff Organization* COMMNF-IZ CSM CIG DCG DCG Detainee Ops MNC-1 MNSTC-1 GRD TE TF 134 ISG JCC COS 6-26 DCS STRAT, PLANS & ASSESSMENT DCS POL/MILI ECON DCS STRAT OPNS DCS STRATCOM DCS INTEL DCS RESOURCES & SUSTAIN DCS CIS POLICY DEV/INT MIN COORD ECON EFF DEP IRMO PLANS OPNS ASSESS CPIC COORDISOCCMO SYNCHI BRIEF RM LOG CHAPLAIN PERS DEP STRAT PLANS SURGEON DOS SPT PAO IG SCJS SJA COALITION STRATEGY CONT PLANS CAMP PLANS Secretariat ASSESS JVB PROTOCOL Camp Victory International Zone Major Subordinate Commands Tactical Control *See appendix 1 for abbreviations. 35 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS No organization is perfect, but this organization served us well, with minor adjustments, during my tenure. My key subordinate headquarters, their responsibilities, and locations were as follows: MNC-I, the corps's headquarters, re- sponsible for the operational aspects of the mission; Task Force 134, responsible for detainee operations; and the Iraq Survey Group, responsible for searching for weapons of mass destruction until it disbanded in late 2004, all resided at Camp Victory near the Baghdad airport. MNSTC-I, responsible for training and equipping the ISF; the Gulf Regional Division of the Army Corps of Engineers, respon- sible for reconstruction project management; and Joint Contracting Command, responsible for our contracting support, all resided in the Green Zone. Task Force 6-26, our special operations task force, resided at Balad Airbase. We felt that we had a good plan for joining MNF-I and Embassy efforts, but it quickly became clear to the Ambassador and me that we needed to be integrated with the sovereign Iraqi government. Al- though developing coordination and consultation mechanisms with the new government had been specified in UNSCR 1546, bringing the Iraqi government—particularly the security leadership—into the development of a long-term, country-wide counterinsurgency effort would prove to be a daunting undertaking. The Ambassador and I met with Prime Minister Allawi early in an informal, getting-to-know-you session. He was clear on his desire to make sovereignty as meaningful as possible consider- ing the 162,000 foreign troops he had in his country. This would * Due to security precautions, the name of the special operations task force frequently changed. 36 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION be something we would all wrestle with throughout my tenure: Iraqis rightfully wanted control, but they lacked the capacity to ex- ecute it—especially when they were trying to fight an insurgency and build their country simultaneously. I also visited the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI), and we began our first consultative sessions that week. There were two principal security forums. The Strategic Action Committee, cochaired by the National Security Advisor and me, was basically a weekly deputies committee to frame security issues for ministers. The Ministerial Committee for National Security, chaired by the prime minister and attended by key security ministers (with the Ambassador and me as invited participants), met weekly and was the decisionmaking body. We also began separate weekly dinners with the prime minister and his security ministers as confidence-building sessions to create the trust that would be essential to move forward in a common direc- tion. It was clear to us that, even though this government was only scheduled to be in power for 6 to 7 months, it was imperative that we invest in these relationships. Looking back, I cannot overstate the importance of taking the time to build personal relationships. They proved essential in conducting the battles in Najaf and Fal- lujah and in preparing for the elections. Our weekly meetings and informal dinners grew in productivity over time and allowed us to stay connected with the Iraqi leadership. Our goal of One Team/ One Mission was progressing and expanding to include the Iraqis. During this first month, I began to report back to Secretary Rumsfeld on the ISF assessment that he had requested. During our many video teleconferences on the ISF, he asked some great questions: How many ISF are there really? How many did the 37 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION success. With strong support from Ambassador Negroponte, the plan was approved by Prime Minister Allawi and the U.S. Govern- ment in mid-August. As a result of the review, we had a new start point for the ISF that we were comfortable with, but we knew that we had a long way to go to get the Iraqis to the point where they could secure their own elections in January and ultimately take over the coun- terinsurgency campaign. That July, only about 30,000 of the police on duty were trained—and the new plan called for 135,000 police; only about 3,600 of the 18,000 border guards had weapons—and the new plan called for 32,000 border guards; and only 2 of the Iraqi battalions had reached an initial operating capability while the new plan called for 65.7 We set out to build the ISF at a pace that would not only meet our operational timelines, but also ensure that the forces held together when challenged. This meant that the coalition would have to carry the security load in the near term to give the ISF time to grow and mature—we would have to fight our way to the first election. Using the operational framework of our campaign plan, we prioritized the development of the ISF in the 15 key cities of Iraq to get them to the point where they could conduct platoon- (or police station) level operations by the first elections in January. We, and the Iraqis, felt that it was important to the legitimacy and sovereignty of the government that the Iraqis be seen as playing the predominant role in providing election security. Our longer term goal was for them to be able to secure their own country. We gradually came to appreciate the fact that building infantry battalions was the easy part, whereas creating institutional 39 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS capacity' and building the entire police system were much harder. The more experience we got working with the Iraqis, the more we realized that the institutional development would take years. Military Operations All of this work was essential to setting the conditions for our long-term success, but the enemy did not take a break while we set- tled in. In early August, while the planning and assessing were going on, Sadrist forces that had been controlling and terrorizing the city of Najaf for several months attacked one of our coalition patrols. The violence escalated rapidly as Muqtada al-Sadr mobilized his forces in Baghdad and the southern part of the country. This provided a key opportunity for the prime minister and the new government to demonstrate their strength by restoring Iraqi government control to Najaf. As the elimination of the Sadrist stranglehold on the popula- tion of Najaf would need to be seen as a largely Iraqi operation and there were very few capable ISF available, success required careful integration of the political and military efforts. With some master- ful tactical actions by coalition forces and Iraqi commandos that involved brutal hand-to-hand fighting, some careful management of ISF coming directly out of training into the operation, and excellent political-military interaction at all levels, we managed to evict the Sadrists first from their base in the cemetery and finally from the city itself. Al-Sadr was left no option but to negotiate his personal release. The IIG had its first victory. "For example, building the training, education, intelligence, financial, administrative, logistical, and procurement institutions. 40 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION We followed up the military operations with quick-impact con- struction projects to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that there was a benefit to supporting their government. While this part of the op- eration took months and did not have the immediate impact we had hoped, it did help consolidate our gains. Thus the “Najaf Model” was born: hard-hitting coalition-Iraqi military operations, with political support mustered by the Iraqi government, followed by fo– cused reconstruction efforts. This model later formed the basis for the “clear-hold-build” concept. My relationship with Prime Minister Allawi was critical during this battle as we melded coalition military power with the legitimacy of his government. He emerged from the battle for Najaf more con- fident and focused upon building momentum toward resolving the security situation across all of Iraq. As we looked to learn from what happened in Najaf, we gained many insights, to include legitimizing coalition military operations with the help of the Iraqi government, incorporating even small numbers of ISF in military operations to put an Iraqi face on these operations, and integrating reconstruction projects immediately following military operations. Most impor- tantly, Prime Minister Allawi had emerged as a leader, and he was gaining the confidence of the Iraqi people. Building upon this operational success, I urged Prime Minister Allawi to adopt a country-wide strategy to eliminate the terrorist safe havens across Iraq before the elections. I suggested that we conduct joint operations to neutralize safe havens in Baghdad (Sadr City), Samarra, and Fallujah. I gained the prime minister's concur- rence on this approach in September, setting the operational agenda for the next several months as we turned our focus to the January 41 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS 2005 elections. We were constrained in this effort by the limited number of ISF and the pace at which we could build them if we expected them to hold together. Over the next several months, we worked with the Allawi government to reduce Sadr City and Sa- marra as terrorist safe havens. Last up was Fallujah. As we executed this strategy, whether we really needed to eliminate the terrorist safe haven in Fallujah became a difficult policy question for the prime minister. Prime Minister Allawi, the Ambassador, and I wrestled with this until we became convinced that having a terrorist safe haven within 30 miles of the capital presented an unacceptable risk to the conduct of the upcoming election. The specter of the April “fail- ure” in Fallujah hung over the discussions, and the fact that we would be attacking a largely Sunni area at a time when we were trying to bring the Sunni population into the political process weighed heavily on us. The Ambassador strongly supported the operation, and we told the prime minister that if we undertook the operation, we would be suc- cessful, but that there was a high risk of coalition and Iraqi casualties and collateral damage. We also told him that if we started it, we had to stay at it until we finished. “Start together, stay together, finish togeth- er” became our motto. To his credit, Prime Minister Allawi not only accepted this, but he also built and sustained the Iraqi political support that allowed us to complete the operation. Fallujah was the toughest tactical battle of my time there, but more than any other operation, it opened the door for the successful elections in January. Election Planning and Preparation Concurrent with this operational focus, we began the com- plex planning for the first free elections in Iraq since 1954. The 42 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION Independent Iraqi Election Commission had the lead with ad- visory support from the United Nations. The Iraqis wanted to provide the security, or at least be seen as providing the security, but would still need our logistical and security support. This ten- sion in the planning effort between what the Iraqis wanted to do and what they were capable of doing was constant throughout my tenure, but most pronounced during this period because of the strategic importance of the elections. We constantly struggled with finding a balance between putting an Iraqi face on important events and not allowing them to fail. Finding this balance was more of an art than a science. From a military perspective, we set up a series of offensive op- erations in the aftermath of Fallujah to maintain the momentum and to keep the pressure on the insurgents. To do this, I requested 10,000 additional troops to get us through the elections. I also personally visited every province to check on election preparations. It became clear to me that, as chaotic as things might look from Baghdad, coali- tion commanders and Iraqi provincial leaders had a good handle on things at their levels. It began to appear that we were positioned to execute successful elections, which we defined as fairly conducted elections in which every Iraqi who desired had the opportunity to vote. We knew that there would be violence as the insurgents worked to unhinge the elections, but I felt we had a good plan—further enhanced by some last minute curfews and movement restrictions— and that we would be successful. On the political side, a looming election issue was Sunni par- ticipation—would they boycott the election and, if so, what would be the post-election implications? The Ambassador and his staff 43 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS worked this very hard, and our commanders in the field reinforced their efforts with the Sunni populations in their areas of operation. Ultimately, a good number of the Sunni population did boycott the election'—an occurrence that would have long-term implications for our mission—but the elections were still largely successful from a security perspective. Looking Beyond the Elections After the Fallujah operation in November, when the progress of military operations and the growth of the ISF made it increasingly likely that the January elections could be held on time and with an Iraqi face to enhance the legitimacy of the IIG, we began looking ahead to 2005. We drew on the experience that we had gained in 5 months on the ground and on several key studies and assessments to formulate our plans. In the early fall of 2004, I directed my planners to review counterinsurgency best practices to see what we could learn from history. “COIN” was something that we, in the U.S. military, had not been involved with for some time. My perception, from ob- serving and talking to subordinates, was that we understood the doctrine well enough, but that we all had a lot to learn about how to apply that doctrine, particularly in Iraq. The staff did their usual good work and examined a series of 20"-century counter- insurgency campaigns for successful and unsuccessful practices (see figure 2-5). They developed a comprehensive report that in- cluded the list below that I shared with the Secretary of Defense, "Turnout of Sunni voters was as low as 2 percent in Anbar Province. 44 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION Figure 2-5. Counterinsurgency Practices SUCCESSFUL UNSUCCESSFUL (average 9 years) (average 13 years) Emphasis on intelligence Inferior intelligence operations Focus on population, their Primacy of military direction of needs & security counterinsurgency Secure areas Priority on “kill-capture” of enemy, not on established, expanded engaging population Insurgents isolated from Ineffective, minimal population (population psychological operations control) campaigns Unity of Effort on multiple Battalion-size operations as lines of operations, local the norm to national Resources Military units concentrated on (money, manpower, time) large bases for protection Effective, pervasive Special Forces focused psychological operations campaigns on raiding Amnesty & rehabilitation for insurgents Advisor effort a low priority Building, training indigenous Police in lead, military supports army in image of own (foreign) force Police force Peacetime government expanded, diversified processes Conventional military forces reoriented for Open borders, airspace, coastlines counterinsurgency Special Forces, advisers present with indigenous forces Insurgent sanctuaries denied 45 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION our progress at 6-month intervals based on the six strategic ef- fects from the campaign plan: a legitimate Iraqi government, neutralization of the insurgents and terrorists, a capable ISF, ba- sic Iraqi needs met, a wedge driven between the insurgents and the people, and changing Iraqi perceptions of the coalition. The December CPR marked the first formal semiannual assessment. I made it a point not to overly involve myself in the produc- tion of the document, and found it a good way to find out what “The Colonels” were really thinking. This candor was further enhanced because the drafter, as a result of coalition-agreed staff- ing, was always a British colonel, who soon gained the moniker “the Gloomy Brit.” The staff concluded in the December 2004 CPR that our strategy was “sound, but must be implemented more effectively to succeed—particularly along the non-kinetic lines of operation” and that the “Iraqis must play an increasingly larger role.” They objectively looked at what we had accomplished and gave their assessment of where we needed to focus our efforts in the year ahead. They felt that some things had gone well: • elimination of terrorist safe havens and the suppression of the Shia insurgency improvement in IIG capacity election planning was broadly on track the pace of reconstruction was accelerating : generation of ISF was exceeding MNSTC-I projections (more than 20 percent growth since August) • the coalition was still largely intact. 47 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS On the other hand, the review noted that we still had a number of challenges: • an intensifying insurgency of former regime elements (who would not be defeated by military means alone) • police and border guard capacity was still particularly weak and needed to be improved • the engagement program with Sunni Arabs was limited and needed to expand • ISF operational performance was mixed, but generally more positive in the presence of coalition assistance teams • economic development and communication lines of opera- tion were not performing at full potential • building unity of effort between MNF-I, the Embassy, and the Iraqi government needed work. Overall, I was pleased with where we had gotten in 5 months, but it was becoming increasingly clear to the Ambassador and me that building the capacity of the Iraqi government to a minimally acceptable level, particularly the ISF, was going to take a lot lon- ger than the 18 months covered by UNSCR 1546 and our campaign plan, especially if there were going to be two changes of the Iraqi government in that period. Armed with these insights, I returned to Washington in mid- December for consultations on the situation in Iraq and to provide my thoughts on the way ahead after the January elections. I met with the President, Secretary Rumsfeld, and the Joint Chiefs and shared the findings of our Campaign Progress Review, COIN, 48 ESTABLISHING THE MISSION and Red Team studies, and reported on our preparations for the upcoming elections. I also began to discuss the concept of placing coalition advisor teams alongside Iraqi military, police, and border forces to hasten the development of our “capable indigenous partner.” I told the national security team that we would be ready to conduct the January elections, but that there would be violence as insurgents and terrorists attempted to disrupt the elections. I also warned them to expect a loss of momentum during the government formation process after the elections, and—to emphasize our thinking on how long this might take—I stated that even if the UNSCR 1546 process was completed on schedule, the Iraqis would still face an insurgency, long-term development challenges, and meddling neighbors. I also pointed out that a year from then, the ISF would still not be capable of independent COIN operations.” My message was that the mission in Iraq was going to extend beyond the 18 months of the UN timeline, but we would be ready for the first democratic elections in over five decades. The First Elections: January 30, 2005 Upon my return to Iraq, I focused on the execution of the elec- tions. With the additional troops that I had requested for election security, we had kept pressure on the insurgents throughout Decem- ber and January. Keeping the insurgents off balance allowed us to focus on securing the election process and ensuring that the ISF would be seen as the face of election security. Although we had been working hard, and had been largely successful in achieving local control (ISF capable of platoon- or police station-level operations) in the 15 key 49 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS cities of Iraq, the ISF still were not ready for a mission of this scope— delivering and recovering election material to and from 5,200 polling stations across Iraq and securing them. Together we developed an “in- ner ring/outer ring” plan to secure the polling stations to prevent a determined effort by insurgents and terrorists to stop or significantly disrupt the elections. The ISF would secure the inner ring (the area immediately surrounding the polling stations), and coalition forces would secure the outer ring (the approaches to the cities and polling stations). I personally visited all provinces in the weeks prior to the election to ensure this concept was understood, and also supervised a “ROC drill”—an election-day rehearsal—with key Iraqi, Embassy, and coalition leaders. We were as ready as we could be. On January 30, our detailed preparations paid off as over 8 mil- lion Iraqis—58 percent of the eligible population—turned out to vote. There were almost 300 attacks on election day, but our operations and ISF security of the 5,200 polling stations ensured that insurgents did not significantly disrupt the voting. The Iraqi people had freely elected their parliament over the course of what was a very emotional day in Iraq. President Bush spoke to Prime Minister Allawi and congratulated him, and also addressed the American public that evening in a televised speech. MNF-I had begun 2005 by achieving what 6 months before President Bush had announced as his “most important” task. It was a good feeling. But as things went in Iraq, we had to take the bad with the good. As pleased as we were with the election turnout and secu- rity efforts, the lack of Sunni participation meant that they would have limited influence in the development of the constitution, and this did not bode well for our efforts to defeat the insurgency. 50 U.S. Ambassador to Iraq John Negroponte (left) greets Interim Iraqi Government Prime Minister Ayad Allawi 3. COMPLETING THE UN TIMELINE AND SETTING CONDITIONS FOR A NEW IRAQ (JANUARY-DECEMBER 2005) Perhaps the best insight into what I was thinking as we entered 2005 can be gained from the first several paragraphs of an assessment I wrote to my boss, General Abizaid, on January 5, laying out my plans for 2005. I began that with the famous passage from T.E. Lawrence that provided advice on dealing with Arabs: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.” It was a mindset that I had concluded we would need to instill in coalition forces if we were to be successful in Iraq. I told General Abizaid: 51 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS I shared our 5 month assessment with you in DC. We used it to get a comprehensive view of where we stand in executing the Campaign Plan, and to frame our thinking for an approach for 2005. We believe that we are broadly on track. We have rolled back insurgent gains and eliminated insurgent and terrorist safe havens in Iraq, suppressed the Shia insurgency, quintupled reconstruction activity, kept ISF development roughly on track, made progress in local control in 14 of 18 provinces, and saw the growth of Iraqi governmental capacity. Election preparations are proceeding in all but Ninewa and Al Anbar provinces. We have also seen a [former regime element] insurgency that has gotten better organized, that is conducting a campaign of intimidation in the Sunni areas that threatens to unhinge political, economic and security force development, and that is creating a real sense of uneasiness about the security situation for the upcoming elections. Further, while ISF development has progressed, they still lack the capacity for independent action, absenteeism threatens the viability of our training and equipping programs, and Iraqi intelligence organizations have not developed as hoped. That said, our objective of an Iraq “at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists” is still attainable. However, security force development won't be completed in ’05, and sustaining our investment will take even longer.2 52 COMPLETING THE UN TIMELINE I strived hard to achieve balance in my reporting. Things in Iraq were never all good or all bad, so I tried to highlight both the posi- tive and negative aspects of the situation. In a mission as complex as Iraq, you must make slow, steady progress even as you deal with setbacks—and setbacks are a reality of war. We were positioned for successful elections, but we had a long road ahead of us. A number of things had also become clearer to us after 6 months on the ground. First of all, it was going to take much longer than the 18 months of the UNSCR 1546 timeline to complete our mission. Ambassador Negroponte, in a December 2004 cable to the Secretary of State, suggested we should be thinking in terms of at least a 5-year time horizon. Our counterinsurgency study had found that success- ful insurgencies had historically lasted around 9 years. There was no reason to think Iraq would be different. During my December meet- ings in Washington, I had emphasized that resolving the situation in Iraq would take longer than the 18 months of the UNSCR timeline. We clearly needed to expand our horizons beyond the end of 2005. Second, the Shia political parties and politicians, who were going to lead the Iraqi Transitional Government, had little experience in gov- erning. Their election represented a reversal of the governing situation that had prevailed in Iraq for the last three and a half decades. We were concerned about this from two perspectives: inexperienced ministerial leadership would inhibit ministerial capacity-building, and the reversal of the governing situation would feed the feelings of disenfranchise- ment in the Sunni population that former regime elements had been leveraging to sustain the insurgency. We were further concerned about the limited Sunni turnout in the elections, which meant that this popula- tion would be underrepresented in the drafting of the constitution. 53 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS Third, while the training and equipping of the ISF were gener- ally on track, it was going to take much longer to get them to the point where they could credibly and independently assume the lead of a nationwide counterinsurgency campaign. If we wanted this to go faster, we would have to commit more resources and look at new approaches to their training. Fourth, in spite of our best efforts to improve the Iraqi view of the coalition, much of the population still viewed it as an occupation force, and while there was a clear understanding at the governmental level that we intended to leave, there was apprehension at the local level that we were in Iraq to stay-an apprehension that was ma- nipulated by the insurgents. This tension of having a large foreign Western force in a sovereign Middle Eastern country was a constant friction. We needed to demonstrate that we had a plan to leave. Fifth, we expected that there would be a loss of momentum in the period following the election as the transitional government was selected, formed, and transitioned into the job. We looked for ways to sustain the momentum of the elections through this period but were largely unsuccessful outside the security sector. Finally, 2005 was to be a year of key transitions: there would be two transitions in the Iraqi government (the last one spilling over into 2006) bringing with them changes in ministers and other key person- nel; MNC-I and its subordinate units would change in February; and the key leaders in the Embassy and MNF-I, who had done such great work to get us to this point, would change out in the summer, taking with them the wealth of experience gained.* The turbulence generated * At that time, we did not know about Ambassador Negroponte's March departure to become the first Director of National Intelligence. 54 COMPLETING THE UN TIMELINE as new people and units came and went was a significant complicating factor, particularly on the Iraqi side. We would have to work hard to mitigate the impacts of the frequent transitions. Adapting in Transition The transitions at the political level significantly impacted our strategic momentum. While we were able to mitigate the loss of operational momentum caused by the MNC-I transition, political momentum proved tougher to deal with. In retrospect, we underes- timated the impact of three government transitions in 2 years on our ability to build capacity in the Iraqi ministries and to provide consis- tent leadership to the Iraqi people. The governments were just starting to get a feel for governing when they were replaced. Prime Minister Allawi held office for 11 months (4 months of which were a “lame duck” period following the January 2005 elections). Ibrahim al-Jafari was prime minister for 13 months (6 months of which were lame duck). We had an initial view that we could continue to build ministe- rial capacity through the transitions. This did not turn out to be the case. In fact, we lost ground in many ministries during the al-Jafari government. The small pool from which to draw qualified ministers and the lack of an established government bureaucracy meant that we had to almost start from scratch with each new government and min- ister. What would continue to become clearer was that, in these types of operations, everything takes longer than you think—particularly those things over which you do not exercise direct control. Armed with these insights, we began 2005 certainly wiser than we had been when we arrived 6 months before, but with a full plate of very difficult issues. The Ambassador and I set out to adjust our 55 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS strategy and plans for 2005 based on these insights. We did this dur- ing the transition period of the new government to posture ourselves to move forward once the ITG was seated. Building a Transition Concept. Our review of our plans began with the Campaign Progress Review in December, which helped shape the insights mentioned above and focused us on what we needed to accomplish in 2005. As we looked ahead, we wrestled with the realization that we could well complete the UN timeline on schedule by the end of the year, but that Iraqi government and security forces capacity would not be at a point where Iraqis could credibly take responsibility for their own se- curity and governance as UNSCR 1546 had envisioned. At that time, we had not been through the actual transition of governments, so we made this judgment with the projection that ministerial capacity would con- tinue to grow as governments transitioned—an assumption that did not pan out. We knew that our mission was ultimately to hand over security responsibility to the Iraqi government, but we had not yet developed a concept to do this. We thought that if we could demonstrate a plan to build credible Iraqi security capacity as rapidly as possible and follow that with a conditions-based plan to transition the security mission to the sovereign Iraqi government, we would come closer to meeting the expectations of Washington, the Iraqi government, and the Iraqi people. We were very cognizant of the fact that we would need to continue our efforts to defeat terrorists and insurgents while executing this concept. The Ambassador and I worked together to shape this think- ing into a second joint mission statement that we issued to our subordinates on February 7, shortly after the elections. In it we stated, “In 2005, we will work closely with the Iraqi Transitional 56 COMPLETING THE UN TIMELINE Government... to diminish the insurgency and prepare the Iraqi Secu- rity Forces and the ITG to begin to accept the counterinsurgency lead. We also will support the ITG’s efforts to complete the timetable laid out in UNSCR 1546.” These two sentences captured our major missions for 2005, but it was the last two sentences of the overview that captured a change in mindset that would be essential in accomplishing this strat- egy: “We must always remember that we have transferred sovereignty to the Iraqis; they have elected a Transitional Government; and they will begin to take the counterinsurgency lead. There is a consistent message here: Iraq's destiny belongs to Iraqis; they want to control it; and the more they do for themselves, the more they will value the results.” Inculcating this mindset into the coalition forces and Embassy staff would prove difficult, as we were pressing against the “can-do” culture of two high-performing organizations. Things were hard enough to get done in Iraq, but they were easier if we did them ourselves. Helping the Iraqis help themselves would be more difficult and take longer, but it would get us to our objectives faster. We had to discipline ourselves to build for the future while we dealt with the very difficult present. The work underpinning this adaptation to our plans had been ongoing since November. Following the Fallujah operation, we noted that the performance of Iraqi units with embedded coalition advisors was far superior to those without them. We also found that we had much better accountability of the weapons and equipment that we gave the Iraqis with advisors present. We had substantially increased the size of the ISF-forming more than 80 army and spe- cial police battalions by February 2005—and some of these forces were at a point in their development where they could benefit from more coalition experience and expertise. 57 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS Given my personal experience in the Balkans, I was concerned that the longer we waited to begin giving Iraqis responsibility for their own security, the more dependent they would become on us— and the longer we would remain in Iraq. We came to believe that by embedding coalition advisors with Iraqi military, police, and border police units, and by aligning Iraqi units in supportive relationships with coalition units (called “partnership”), we could not only accel- erate their development, but also get them more actively involved in the counterinsurgency fight sooner—increasing the forces we could field against the insurgents. I directed my staff to begin working the details of how this might work and alerted the incoming corps to be prepared to implement this new approach on arrival. As this approach would require some 2,500 additional U.S. forc- es and the approval of the Iraqi government, I began discussing it with coalition and Iraqi leaders. Washington was concerned about the safety of the teams living and working with Iraqi units, the im- pact that pulling 2,500 officers and senior noncommissioned officers out of units would have on the Services, and the naming of the teams (transition teams was chosen over advisor or assistance teams to high- light that these teams were part of a process to “transition” security responsibility to the Iraqis). The Iraqi leaders saw value in accelerating the development of the ISF, but wanted the program implemented in a way that did not impact on their sovereignty. (Prime Minister Allawi would not agree to police transition teams working in local police stations for this reason.) Washington approved the addi- tional forces in March, and we signed memorandums of understanding with the outgoing ministers of interior and defense in April to imple- ment the transition team and partnership programs. We expected that 58 COMPLETING THE UN TIMELINE Figure 3-1. Army Partnership Alignment 2 MNB-NW Tal Afar Mosul Erbil SYRIA Sulaymaniyah Kirkuk Baiji MND-NC Tikrit IRAN Samarra Balad Baqubah MND-B Hit Ramadi Baghdad Fallujah MNF-W JORDAN Karbala Hillah Najaf 8 Amarah MND-CS Samawah Nasiriyah 10 Basra MND-SE MNF-W Coalition partner unit Iraqi division SAUDI ARABIA 59 COMPLETING THE UN TIMELINE • Phase IV: Iraqi security self-reliance (Iraqis in charge of their own security). It would be summer before the new Iraqi government was ready to se- riously discuss this process. This original plan was adjusted as a part of those discussions. We did not set specific timelines for any phase but Phase I (June 15) as we expected all transitions to be conditions-based. Changing Our Mindset. We were very conscious that this adjust- ment to the campaign plan entailed a major shift for our conventional Army and Marine forces. For the first time since Vietnam, we would be asking conventional forces to actively participate in the training of indigenous forces during combat operations. To make this work, we recognized that we would not only have to “train the trainers”—that is, to teach conventional forces the art of training and working with in- digenous forces—but we would also have to change the mindset of our forces away from doing things themselves to helping the Iraqis do them. To train the trainers, we established an in-country training cen- ter, Phoenix Academy, and used our Special Forces to educate our conventional forces. To ensure the concept was understood across MNF-I, the staff produced a campaign action plan for 2005 that captured the adaptation to our plan and adjusted our mission accord- ingly. Our endstate remained the same. We wanted to progressively shift the coalition main effort from fighting the counterinsurgency ourselves to transitioning the responsibility for fighting the coun- terinsurgency to the Iraqi government and security forces. We would accomplish this by increasing our capacity to improve ISF capabilities—transition teams and partnerships—and by conducting aggressive counterinsurgency operations to bring the insurgency to 61 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS levels that could be contained by increasingly capable ISF. The re- vised mission statement reflected this strategy: In partnership with the Iraqi Transitional Government, MNF-I progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and Iraqi Security Forces, while aggressively executing counterinsurgency operations, to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process and the sustainment of political and economic development.” As I went around the country to receive unit backbriefs on the action plan, I reinforced the fact that we would progressively im- plement this mission because all transitions would be based on ISF capabilities and those would vary widely across the country. I en- couraged leaders to be candid in their assessments of the ISF because I would make some difficult decisions based on those assessments. I also met with the commanders of each incoming unit within 30 days of their arrival to personally brief them on the concept and to answer their questions directly. Finally, to communicate directly with the coalition servicemem- bers, I issued a set of “flat-assed rules” (FARs, see figure 3-2) to every incoming coalition service man and woman. The FARs were intended to convey my priorities for success in Iraq and to instill the mindset that we were there to help the Iraqis restore control to their country, not to do it for them. By the late spring, the time when the transitional govern- ment was finally appointed, we were well on our way to implementing the new approach, but the change in the mindset would take a lot longer. 62 COMPLETING THE UN TIMELINE Figure 3-2. Commanding General's FARS, February 2005 Make security and safety your first priorities. • Help the Iraqis win, don't win it for them. Treat the Iraqi people with dignity and respect. Learn and respect Iraqi customs and culture. Maintain strict standards and iron discipline every day. Risk assess every mission-no complacency! Information saves lives-share it and protect it. Maintain your situational awareness at all times—this can be an unforgiving environment. Take care of your equipment, it will take care of you. Innovate and adapt- situations here don't lend themselves to cookie-cutter solutions. • Focus on the enemy and be opportunistic. Be patient. Don't rush to failure. • Take care of yourself and take care of each other. Implementing the new mission was not an easy task for the MNC-I commander, LTG John Vines. The U.S. military was still adapting to counterinsurgency operations and now he had a new mis- sion to develop indigenous forces while keeping the pressure on the terrorists and insurgents. That he had to do this in a political vacuum as the new government was forming made his task even more difficult. While MNC-I was transitioning to the new mission, it was conduct- ing counterinsurgency operations across the country to keep pressure 63 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS on the terrorists and insurgents and executing the operational tasks from the campaign plan: neutralizing the insurgency in the Sunni Tri- angle, securing Baghdad and the borders, sustaining support in Shia and Kurdish areas, and providing security for the October constitu- tional referendum and the December elections. I received a backbrief from LTG Vines early in his tenure on how he intended to accomplish these tasks. Following that, with few exceptions, I left the day-to-day management of these operations to him. The exceptions involved op- erations that I felt were critical to the theater mission. In 2005, this meant MNF-directed operations to restore Iraqi control to their west- ern border, operations that I discuss later. Keeping Washington Up to Date. Shortly after Prime Minister al-Jafari was appointed and the new government was formed in early May, we conducted our second semiannual Campaign Progress Review." While this was intended to be a 6-month assessment, it became an assessment of the campaign over the last year. Armed with this assessment and a year's experience on the ground, General Abizaid and I visited Washington in June. Theater command- ers have a role in helping the administration communicate about their mission to the American people and Congress. Given that I had been on the ground a year and that we had made some substantial adjust- ments to the mission, it made sense to go back and update Congress and national security leadership on the mission and to conduct en- gagements with the U.S. media. I returned to Washington three times in 2005 and a total of seven times in my 32-month tenure. I reported to the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs that the campaign was broadly on track and that the transition team and partnership programs were already paying dividends with the Iraqi 64 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS notion that terrorists and insurgents had the upper hand, I also empha- sized what the insurgents and terrorists had not accomplished: they were unable to reconstitute their safe haven in Fallujah, they had not expanded their base of support (the insurgency remained largely con- fined to 4 out of 18 provinces), they had not prevented the growth of Iraqi security forces (then around 170,000), they had not yet sparked sectarian violence, and they had not stopped political and economic development. I told Congress that after a year on the ground, I felt that the mission was “both realistic and achievable,” but that it would require patience and will for us to succeed.’ While I was back, I was asked by the President to continue to serve as the MNF-I commander for another year. When I left for Iraq the previous June, I was told to plan to be in Iraq for 12 months, but it quickly became apparent that staying through the completion of the UN timeline in 2005 made more sense. He was asking me to stay beyond that until June 2006, and I agreed. I took a week of leave with my family to recharge my batteries for an even longer haul. Completing the UN Timeline By June, we had made good headway implementing the transition team and partnership program, and we had begun to build our relation- ships with the new prime minister and his security ministers. Again, I felt it very important to invest in these relationships even though we expected the new team to be in place for less than a year. Our focus for the rest of 2005 was to continue building the Iraqi security forces, governance, and economic development while we established a security situation that would allow the completion of the UNSCR 1546 timeline—a constitution by August, a national referendum on 66 COMPLETING THE UN TIMELINE the constitution by October, and elections for a government based on that constitution by the end of the year. It also involved planning for the post-election period. We would accomplish this while bringing on board a new U.S. Ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, who arrived in late June from Afghanistan, and a new Iraqi government. I viewed my relationship with the Ambassador as my most impor- tant relationship, and we spent quite a bit of time together discussing how he saw the mission and the way ahead. He agreed immediately on the One Team/One Mission concept, and was even willing to look at ways to take the integration of our efforts further. We also formed another Red Team to look at the nature of the enemy and the war and to give us their thoughts on how we were executing the mission. The Red Team was again under U.S. Embassy leadership with MNF, CIA, and UK participation. The team looked at how to achieve decisive re- sults by prioritizing and synchronizing our finite resources to “break the back” of the insurgency in 1 year and to defeat the insurgency in 3 years, and it also made some useful suggestions on how to better integrate our counterinsurgency efforts. This independent assessment, along with our recently completed June Campaign Progress Review, helped us shape a common vision for the way ahead. We began to plan in earnest for the mission to con- tinue beyond the end of the year—the conclusion of the UN mandate. As we looked beyond the December 2005 elections, we were again concerned with the potential loss of momentum because of the po- litical and operational transitions in early 2006 (we would also face a transition of MNC-I during the government transition and formation period), so we redoubled our efforts to leverage the benefits of complet- ing the UN timeline and seating an Iraqi government based on an Iraqi 67 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS constitution. Given the uncertainty of the December election outcome and what lay beyond the end of the year, we developed interim guidance to leverage the momentum of successful elections while we worked on a broader campaign plan for the post-election period. This interim guidance became known as the “Bridging Strategy” because it bridged the gap between the fall of 2005 and the seating of the constitutionally elected government that would come some- time after the first of the year. The strategy was focused on setting the conditions for the December elections and shaping the aftermath in ways that would have a decisive, positive impact on our mission. To be decisive, we felt that we had to defeat al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) while bringing and keeping the Sunni population in the political process in a manner that began to neutralize the insurgency. We had to do both of these tasks while continuing to grow and develop ISF capabilities and, as these capabilities grew, by placing the Iraqis increasingly in the lead of security operations. “Al Qaeda out, Sunni in, ISF in the lead” became the shorthand version of the strategy, and it drove our efforts in the second half of 2005 and into the spring of 2006.” Concurrently, the Ambassador and I directed the development of a new joint cam- paign plan, which would be the first plan to be jointly prepared with full Embassy integration in the planning process. It would cover the 4-year tenure of the new Iraqi government. With the new Ambassador also came a renewed interest in Sunni engagement and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Sunni engage- ment was something that General Abizaid and I had been pushing for some time. We had pressed hard for an engagement strategy with the Sun- ni population as a means of driving a wedge between the general Sunni population and the terrorists and insurgents. Early in the mission there 68 COMPLETING THE UN TIMELINE was reluctance to do this for fear of alienating the Shia population that had been disenfranchised for so long. In my view, we would not make progress with the Sunni population, and, as a result, the insurgency, unless we facilitated a dialogue to bring them into the political process. While our subordinate leaders were engaging tribal leaders locally, there was no cohesive mission effort to do this. With the arrival of Ambassador Khalil- zad, we began a concerted effort to bring the Sunni population into the political process. This effort set the conditions for increased Sunni partici- pation in the constitutional referendum and December elections, and for continued post-election dialogue, particularly in Anbar Province. We had begun a pilot effort in the summer of 2005 to establish seven Provincial Support Teams based on the PRT model that was developed in Afghanistan during Ambassador Khalilzad's time there. (We actually sent a team to Afghanistan that March to see how their PRTs functioned.) We allocated $70 million from the Commander's Emergency Response Program to fund development and reconstruc- tion in these provinces. Our intent was to bring coalition support to the provincial level to facilitate development from the bottom up. It had become clear that the top-down approach from Baghdad was not working. With the Ambassador's arrival, we enhanced this effort in the fall by appreciably increasing the size of three PRTs in the key provinces of Mosul, Kirkuk, and Babil. After considerable interagen- cy discussion with Washington, we received approval to go forward with enhancing the remaining PRTs in 2006. Although they began to have a positive effect almost immediately, their impact was inconsis- tent—in my view, too tied to the personal initiative and competence of the PRT leader. It would take a while to even out the performance, but, over time, they accomplished their intended effect. 69 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS Military Operations. With the seating of the al-Jafari government in May, we began to see an increase in suicide attacks focused primar- ily on the Shia civilian population. These attacks had the potential to unhinge the progress we were making on the political side by exploit- ing existing Sunni/Shia tensions. Our intelligence analysts began to see a shift away from the Sunni insurgency as the most dangerous threat to the accomplishment of our mission to the Islamic extremists who were conducting the attacks. We became concerned that if we did not reduce the ability of the extremists to conduct suicide attacks across Iraq, the coming constitutional referendum and December elections could be in jeopardy. Our analysts believed that the vast majority of suicide bombers were not Iraqi and entered into the country by cross- ing the Syrian border. They were moved to their targets by facilitation networks along the western Euphrates valley and Tal Afar-Mosul corridor. Accordingly, I directed the MNC-I to conduct operations to defeat those networks and restore Iraqi control to the borders be- fore the December elections. This would become the major MNC-I operational focus in the runup to the elections as it also continued to focus on securing Baghdad, steady-state counterinsurgency opera- tions across Iraq, and developing the Iraqi security forces. The operations in the west required careful integration of the actions of our special operations task force, which was targeting the al Qaeda leaders of the facilitation networks, with conventional forces, which were attacking network sanctuaries and freedom of movement and reestab- lishing the ISF presence along the border. The task force had established its own country-wide intelligence collection and operational network to go after al Qaeda in Iraq. Its efforts were focused on AQI leadership, and it conducted several operations a night across Iraq in pursuit of al Qaeda 70 COMPLETING THE UN TIMELINE targets. It coordinated its efforts with local commanders in whose areas it operated. This coordination improved over time as the conventional and special operations forces became more comfortable working together. The targeting process developed by the task force proved very effective for hunting down individual terrorists, so, with its assistance, we began to develop “fusion centers” in each of the U.S. divisions in 2005. These fusion centers enabled the coalition divisions to access intelligence from all available national sources and, because they were directly connected to forces that could rapidly act on the intelligence, to attack high value targets in their areas of operations independently. These centers greatly increased our ability to attack al Qaeda and insurgent leadership and were instrumental in our long-term success. By the end of the year, we had significantly disrupted the flow of foreign fighters and suicide bombers into Iraq and seen the number of suicide attacks cut in half between June and November to the point that the constitutional referendum and December elections were held with limited interference. (There were 90 and 80 attacks, respectively, on ref- erendum and election days compared with 299 on the day of the January 2005 elections.) The operations also loosened the al Qaeda stranglehold on the Sunni populations of those regions, allowing them to participate more fully in the referendum and election processes—something that would help us later. We continued to monitor the implementation of our transition team and partnership programs and continued to evaluate ourselves on how we were applying counterinsurgency doctrine. When we imple- mented the transition team concept in the spring, I directed a special assessment of the concept for September. By September, we had embed- ded 174 transition teams into Iraqi military and police units, and seen 71 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS increased performance in those units as a result. We had also developed and instituted a transition readiness assessment (TRA) to measure and quantify the readiness of Iraqi units to assume security responsibili- ty.* The assessment found that the transition teams, augmented by the partnership program between Iraqi and coalition forces, had “made a significant difference in our efforts to rebuild and professionalize the Iraqi Army.” It also found that the Iraqi security ministries (MOI and MOD) showed “limited progress toward self-reliance” and that the Iraqi Police Service “lags in development.” We had a long way to go, but I felt fairly comfortable that we had a credible system to measure prog- ress and the presence in the Iraqi units to verify it. The assessment also found that our presence was positively received by Iraqi units and that it served as a deterrent to detainee abuse and violence against civilians.' We used this assessment to press the Ambassador to move the re- sponsibility for developing the ministries of interior and defense from the Embassy to MNF-I. I believe that this move made a significant difference in our ability to increase the capacity of the ministries. We quickly began a serious effort to develop key ministerial functions in both ministries-planning, programming, budgeting, manning, equipping, and sustaining—and to establish internal accountability. We also used it to increase our focus on the development of the police. We calculated that the police were about a year behind the army in terms of development. We believed that we could not credibly handoff security until the local police were capable of maintaining domestic order and denying terrorist activity, so we began to develop a plan to * By this measure, 1 Iraqi division headquarters, 5 brigades, and 7 battalions had achieved the second highest transition readiness assessment - able to conduct counterinsurgency operations with limited coalition support-by that June. 72 COMPLETING THE UN TIMELINE accelerate police development in 2006. Police development is much more difficult than army development, especially for soldiers. This is an area that needs continuous work across government to craft the means to more rapidly build police capacity. With the development of the other rule-of-law institutions (for example, judicial and prison systems), it was the long pole in our development tent. At the same time, we completed a survey of how we were apply- ing counterinsurgency doctrine across the force. As I observed the new forces coming into Iraq, it seemed that our execution was uneven at best, as we and the Services wrestled with ingraining a new form of warfare into our conventional forces. I sent a team across MNF-I for 15 days that summer to take a look. The team concluded that there was a general understanding of counterinsurgency doctrine, but that its application was in fact uneven and very dependent on the individual commander's grasp of the doctrine and how to apply it in Iraq. It also concluded that we were still being forced to apply peacetime practices in a wartime environment. As a result, things got even more complicated the fur- ther down the chain of command we went as each level added its own restrictions. It was a good and thorough report that I forwarded to the Service chiefs for their use in training deploying forces and to my staff and subordinate commanders to begin implementing the recommenda- tions. One of the principal recommendations was to establish a COIN Academy to teach the nuances of applying counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq to incoming commanders in order to ensure more commanders started at the same level. We established the academy and conducted the first course that November. I addressed every class, and felt that this academy not only substantially improved our execution in Iraq, but also formed a basis on which the Army and Marine COIN doctrines 73 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS could be updated. It was a significant factor in changing the conven- tional mindset of U.S. Servicemembers. In the meantime, the Iraqis, with coalition support, conducted the second of the UNSCR-prescribed national polls, a referendum on the Iraqi-drafted constitution. Over 15 million citizens, nearly 64 percent of those eligible, registered to vote, and 10 million of these citizens voted, an increase of 1.5 million from the January election. On referendum day, over 6,000 voting sites were open, more than a 20 percent increase from the previous election, with major increases in the Sunni areas. Vio- lence levels were a third of the previous January, with only one-quarter the casualties. In a radio address to the American public, President Bush stated, “By casting their ballots, the Iraqi people [dealt] a severe blow to the terrorists and [sent] a clear message to the world: Iraqis will decide the future of their country through peaceful elections, not violent insur- gency. And by their courageous example, they are charting a new course for the entire Middle East.” As I reported to both President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld, the referendum's success was the result of a well- executed civil-military plan with extensive preparatory operations. Though 78.6 percent of Iraqi voters cast ballots in favor of the constitution, Sunni voters largely voted against it. The Sunni repre- sentatives had been marginalized during the drafting process, and the constitution did not emerge as the national compact that we had hoped for. In fact, it was only the last-minute efforts of the Ambassador to elicit promises to address Sunni concerns and amend the constitution after the vote that made Sunni participation even possible. What could have been a major step forward was not. So while we were pleased with voter participation and ISF performance, we were apprehensive about the long-term impacts of the new constitution. 74 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS assessment of the threat; an assessment of police capability in the prov- ince (all had to be rated at least “TRA 2,"* that is, able to conduct COIN operations with limited coalition support); an assessment of the military capability in the province (all had to be TRA 2 and able to coordinate operations with the police); and an assessment of the provincial leader- ship's ability to coordinate security efforts. We worked hard to find the right conditions that would serve as a forcing function for the Iraqis to increase their capabilities and yet still be attainable. We intended for all transfers to be conditions-based and therefore did not set a timeline for the transitions. There were no provinces ready for transfer in 2005, and we did not get our first chance to implement the process until the sum- mer of 2006 when Muthanna Province in southern Iraq became the first Iraqi province to assume responsibility for its security. In September, Secretary Rumsfeld requested that I provide Ste- phen Hadley, the National Security Advisor, with an update of our campaign. There was apparently some uncertainty with what we were doing to accomplish our national objectives in Iraq. Although puzzled by this, as we were providing weekly updates by video teleconfer- ence to the National Security Council and the President, I provided Mr. Hadley with an overview of our campaign plan from July 2004 through September 2005. I emphasized how the campaign had evolved over the past year as we adapted to changes in the threat and the en- vironment, how our plan had changed with the implementation of the transition teams, and how the military operations we were con- ducting had kept the pressure on the insurgents and terrorists while TRA is a monthly report prepared by both the Iraqi commanders and transition team leaders that documented and rated ISF unit ability to conduct independent COIN operations. TRA 2 was the second-highest rating for a unit. 76 COMPLETING THE UN TIMELINE we worked to complete the implementation of the UN timeline and grow the ISF." I did not receive any new direction as a result of the discussions, and at the end of November, the National Security Coun- cil (NSC) issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI). Its endstate was almost the same as the one that Ambassador Negroponte and I had crafted 18 months prior: “A new Iraq with a constitutional, representative government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from be- coming a safe haven for terrorists.” The description of “victory” in the strategy paralleled our own lines of operation with political, secu- rity, and economic tracks. On the political track, the NSVI prescribed forging a broadly supported national compact by isolating Iraqi ele- ments that could not be won over to the political process, engaging those outside the political process, and building effective national institutions to protect all Iraqis. The economic track prescribed set- ting the foundation for a self-sustaining economy by restoring Iraq's infrastructure, reforming Iraq's economy, and building the capacity of Iraqi institutions to maintain infrastructure. The security track stated that our strategy was to “clear” areas of enemy control by remain- ing on the offensive, “hold” areas freed from enemy influence, and "build” ISF and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services. 12 The strategy had codified our approach. Shortly after receiving the NSVI, the Ambassador and I issued a new joint mission statement, “Building Success-Completing the Transition.” This statement was the output of a joint planning effort that had been ongoing since the summer to devise a strategy and plan to guide coalition and Embassy operations following the election and seating of the new Iraqi government. Significantly, we took a 77 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS longer view than the first campaign plan and tied our guidance to the 4-year term of the soon-to-be-elected government. We set our objectives for the mission during this period as: • defeating the terrorists and neutralizing the insurgency • transitioning Iraq to security self-reliance • helping Iraqis forge a national compact for democratic government • helping Iraqis build government capacity and provide essential services • helping Iraqis strengthen their economy • helping Iraqis strengthen the rule of law and promote civil rights • increasing international support for Iraq • strengthening public understanding of coalition efforts and public isolation of the insurgents. We further directed annual goals to guide our progress. Our plan- ners took this directive and began to turn it into a campaign plan to guide our efforts for the next 4 years.” In December, we held our semi-annual Campaign Progress Re- view," which, for the first time, included the full participation of the Embassy staff. The review concluded that there were “clear grounds for optimism” as we had successfully completed the 18-month UN timeline, thwarting terrorist and insurgent efforts to derail the political process, and had developed the ISF to the point that they principally provided security for their elections. This was a significant accomplishment, and one that I was not sure we would 78 COMPLETING THE UN TIMELINE accomplish 18 months before. We had also made great progress in growing the ISF, particularly on the army side. By the end of 2005, 80 percent of Iraqi battalions were fighting the insurgency with us. Moreover, 1 of the 10 divisions, 4 of the 36 brigades, and 33 of the 112 battalions were able to operate with limited coalition support—a significant increase in just a year. But we were a long way from being done. The police lagged the development of the army significantly and the institutional capabilities of both the interior and defense ministries were still in their nascent stages. It was clear that we need- ed a major effort in both these areas to accelerate their development. Perhaps the most troubling trend at the end of 2005 was the in- crease we were seeing in sectarian violence. On 14 September, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi issued a public declaration of war against “Shia infi- dels” while continuing his campaign of suicide attacks against the Shia population. Although our operations in the west had greatly reduced the number of suicide attacks, there were still enough attacks to drive sectarian tensions. We were also seeing small-scale actions by Shia mi- litia against the Sunni population. The trend was troubling enough that we established an intelligence working group that September to monitor it. These tensions were compounded when, in November, coalition forces discovered an MOI detention facility in which the de- tainees, primarily Sunni, were mistreated and in some cases tortured. Sunni leaders clamored for action against the interior minister, but the leadership of the transitional government took none. It was becoming clearer to us that just completing the UN political process was not going to be enough to bring the country together. We came to believe that a program of national reconciliation would be essential if Iraq was to move forward. 79 lad Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari addresses city leadership of Fallujah January 2006 as Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and General Casey look on 4. GOVERNMENT TRANSITION AND THE RISE OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE (JANUARY-JUNE 2006) We entered 2006 knowing that it was going to be a year of politi- cal transition as the Iraqis formed and seated a permanent government and this new government began to govern. We remained hopeful that we could continue to make progress during this period; however, based on our previous experience with Iraqi government transitions, we knew it was going to be hard work. That was the message that I car- ried to Washington shortly after the first of the year. I spent Christmas in Iraq visiting and congratulating soldiers on their accomplishments in 2005, and then departed for consultations in Washington. I reported that, in general, we were pleased with the accom- plishments of the last 18 months, but the elections had not yet 81 GOVERNMENT TRANSITION could happen that could affect the direction of the mission. I thought it best to temper expectations because there was just too much uncertainty in this government formation period. Looking back, several of the things on the list did happen, and did affect the direction of the mission. The other major element of discussion in Washington was the implementation of the first “off-ramp” plans that we had announced following the completion of the elections in December.* I had recom- mended, and the Secretary of Defense had approved, not replacing 2 of the 17 U.S. Brigade Combat Teams that were programmed to redeploy from Iraq that summer, effectively reducing the number of U.S. combat brigades from 17 to 15. This was a difficult decision, as we were very cognizant of the uncertainty and potential turbulence of the post-election period, but we felt that the improvement, and projected improvement, of the ISF would more than mitigate the tactical risk. We also believed that the potential strategic benefits far outweighed the tactical risks. The image of U.S. forces depart- ing Iraq would demonstrate to the ISF and the Iraqi people that the United States was indeed serious about following the UN mandate to return security responsibility to the Iraqis as they became more capable, and about ultimately departing Iraq. We decided to keep one of the brigades in Kuwait as an in-theater reserve just in case we had miscalculated. The discussions that January revolved around de- veloping a recurring process to periodically review the situation and make recommendations on the continuing reduction of U.S. forces. Off-ramp was the term used to describe the removal of troops from theater without replacements, essentially reducing U.S. forces. * At the time of the decision, there were some 216,000 trained and equipped ISF. 83 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS would not conduct any major operations in the last days before the elections but that we would continue routine force protection and high-value target operations. That was good enough for them, and, true to their word, they went on Iraqi television and told Sunni vot- CrS to VOtC. The Sunni leaders told us that January they had concluded that their common enemies were al Qaeda and Iran—not the United States. They felt that we were leaving, and they needed our help to get Iraq back from al Qaeda and Iran. The election collaboration was a small step and the beginning of a series of confidence-building measures between the MNF-I and Sunni political leadership that led to serious, but ultimately unproductive, discussions about ceasefires and reconciliation over the course of 2006. To continue this dialogue, we established a cell, under a U.S. two-star general, to better coordinate engagement activities with political and insurgent leaders among the different agencies of the mission. At this time, the U.S. Embassy, UK embassy, CIA sta- tion, and MNF-I were all getting feelers from different leaders and groups claiming to have influence over the insurgency. Each needed to be vetted, evaluated, and acted on in a coordinated way. While there were some hopeful signals, several promising leads failed because of the inability of the interlocutors to deliver on their promises. It soon became clear to us that this was an early but essential part of the ultimate reconciliation process that the Iraqis would have to go through to conclude the insurgency. In the end, it was the beginning of an important dialogue that we continued. It marked a significant shift in how the Sunni population, particularly in Anbar Province, saw the MNF-I and U.S. presence. 86 GOVERNMENT TRANSITION ISF in the Lead. The growth of ISF was just about on sched- ule at this point (mid-January 2006) with over 225,000 trained and equipped army and police forces of the 325,000 that we were build- ing with the Iraqis. We believed at that time that it would take us another year to complete the training and equipping of the ISF and that the police would take a concerted effort just to make that. More significant was the increase in the number of these forces that were actively participating in counterinsurgency operations either in- dependently or with coalition support—100 Iraqi army battalions were actively in the fight, a number that had increased by one-third in just 6 months as the transition teams and partnership programs continued to demonstrate their worth. The police and security ministries continued to lag the army in development. We began a focused effort to improve police capac- ity and planned for the transition in ministry leadership that would come with the establishment of the new government. The deficien- cies in the police were well known. Our trainers were reporting a lack of trained police, significant deficiencies in low-level leader- ship, and sectarian bias at the highest levels of the Ministry of the Interior. Our effort to improve police capacity became known as the “Year of the Police.” We introduced specific programs not only to increase the numbers of Iraqi police, but also, more importantly, to improve their professionalism and quality of their training. Our 2004 COIN study had driven home the key role to be played by the police, so we needed to refocus our efforts to organize, equip, train, and field a professional police force that embodied national unity. The ambitious goals we set for ourselves—an MOI capable of lead- ing border security efforts by June 2006 and assuming the lead in 87 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS September declaration of jihad against the Shia population by al- Zarqawi were more than just tensions and needed to be addressed more broadly. From my personal interaction with Iraqi leaders, I saw a great fear of “Ba'athist return” among Shia leaders: a fear that the Ba'athists would overthrow the duly elected Shia government and return to power, subjugating the Shia population as they had been for more than 30 years under Saddam Hussein. I also saw a great fear among Sunni leaders that Iranian influence would ensure the continued subjugation of the Sunni population. While we might have seen these views as caricatures, they defined the views of Iraq's leaders, who would ultimately have to resolve these sectar- ian tensions. These views were not new. What was new, however, was how the scope of the sectarian violence made them more real to the Iraqis and made trust between Iraq’s leaders more difficult to attain. We began a review of our plans and strategy, asking ourselves the fundamental question: “Does the advent of significant sectarian vio- lence in this transition period require a change in our strategy for Iraq, and, if so, what should we do differently?” Looking at the situation, we came to the conclusion that the post-Samarra violence may have been an indication of a significant change in the nature of the Iraqi conflict. Taken in the context of the conclusion of the UN political timeline, the initial departure of coalition forces, and the ongoing efforts to form a 4-year Iraqi government, the sectarian violence seemed to indicate that the main conflict in Iraq was moving away from an insurgency against the coalition to a struggle for the division of political and economic power among Iraqis. This would be a significant change. 92 GOVERNMENT TRANSITION Figure 4-1. Post-Samarra Security Environment, March 2006 Iran Sunni Extremists Division of Political and Economic Power by Iraqis Shia Extremists Resistance As I thought my way through this, I saw four major groups influencing the security situation to affect the outcome of the con- flict: Sunni extremists, Shia extremists, the Sunni resistance (the insurgency), and Iran. I saw the main antagonists as the Sunni and Shia extremists, each heavily influenced by fear of the other and each motivated by fear of exclusion and retribution. The Sunni resistance, which was still active against the coalition in parts of the country, was losing relevance and influence. Finally, the Iranians were actively supporting Shia extremist groups and using political and economic influence to shape an outcome that would ensure that the new Iraq would be a benign neighbor. I graphically portrayed this as shown in figure 4-1. It was a far more complex environment than we had previously dealt with. 93 GOVERNMENT TRANSITION Figure 4-2. Strategy for Post-Samarra Security Environment Prevent Civil War Protect Population Secure Environment Division of Political Sunni and Economic Shia Extremists Extremists Power by Iraqis Iran E 1 Resistance my thoughts on what to do if the violence did degenerate into civil war, I stated that we could leave, return to our bases and wait it out, intervene, or pick a side, but that doing anything but reinforcing and stopping the violence-intervening-would ac- knowledge strategic defeat. We also got a number of questions during that time from Wash- ington about how U.S. forces were operating and how we might shift our weight away from activities that caused casualties. We respond- ed with a study that looked at whether having increased coalition presence in the streets actually improved security or if our higher visibility posture simply invited attacks and reduced the pressure on the Iraqis to step forward. 95 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS Our study showed what we intuitively knew: that increasing the number of operations, which we had done in response to the sec- tarian violence, did not necessarily translate into higher casualties. Rather, maintaining an offensive posture kept the enemy off balance and disrupted his ability to respond to our actions. It also allowed us to maintain necessary contact with the population and to conduct the necessary patrolling for force protection and intelligence opera- tions that were essential to successful COIN operations. We also found that coalition casualties decreased when security responsibili- ties were transferred to the Iraqi army. The majority of coalition and ISF casualties were confined to just 3 of the 18 provinces, namely Baghdad, Anbar, and Ninewah. Civilian casualties were mainly lim- ited to just two provinces: Baghdad and Diyala. Charting a Way Forward. While we dealt with the Samarra adjust- ments, we moved ahead with the development of our overall campaign plan made necessary by the completion of the UNSCR political timeline. The outcome was a comprehensive effort with the Embassy designed to guide the mission over the next 3-plus years—the tenure of the new, still- to-be seated government. We defined these next years as “the decisive phase to bring security and stability to Iraq” and laid out three phases: Phase one— stabilization (2006 to early 2007); Phase two—restoration of civil authority (early 2007 to early 2008); and Phase three—support to self- reliance (early 2008 to 2009). Using this strategic framework (see figure 4-3), we laid out specific objectives and tasks in each phase that were aligned along the five integrated lines of operation, much as we had outlined in our earlier campaign plan—security, governance, economic development, communications, and transition (added in the new plan). 96 GOVERNMENT TRANSITION Figure 4-3. Campaign Framework, April 2006-December 2009 LIBERATION OCCUPATION PARTNERSHIP SELF-RELIANCE Stabilization April 2003 June 28, 2004 April 2006 Restoration of Civil Authority ~ December 2009 Provincial Elections Support to Self-reliance Constitution Amendment Referendum (T) (T) Tentative: At that time, we believed that it would be possible to hold provincial elections and the promised referendum to adjust the constitution in late 2006/early 2007. 97 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS We also looked at “wild cards” that might impact the projections we made for each phase, established specific effects and metrics for each phase, and identified the coalition or U.S. Embassy agency responsible to the Ambassador and me for accomplishing them.” Most importantly, we included the strategic concept developed in the aftermath of the Samarra bombing into the campaign plan. In it we adjusted our mission statement to reflect the new situation: The U.S. Mission and Coalition Forces will, in partnership with the Government of Iraq, contribute to an environment where Iraqis can develop representative and effective institutions capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people, creating the conditions for the Rule of Law, defeating the terrorists and irreconcilable insurgents, bringing other insurgents into the political process, reducing sectarian tensions and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror." The mission and the campaign plan reflected our central belief that the conflict was about the division of political and economic power among Iraqis. We believed that enduring strategic success could only be achieved by Iraqi political and military leaders work- ing together to resolve Iraq's substantial problems. It was our job to work with them to help them do that. Building New Partnerships There was a break in the political stalemate in late April when a relatively unknown Shia politician, Nuri al-Maliki, was appointed prime minister. While it would take another month before he and 98 GOVERNMENT TRANSITION his cabinet were sworn in, and 2 weeks after that before agreement would be reached on his key security ministers, it was a start. During the month between the appointment of Prime Minister— designate al-Maliki and his formal inauguration, the Ambassador and I met with him frequently to update him on pressing issues and to get his views on the way ahead. We recognized from the outset that we had to build our relationships with him, just as we had with his predecessors, if we were going to sustain a partnership to deal with the very difficult issues facing the country. What I did not fore- see, however, was how much of my personal time and energy would be consumed in building and sustaining my relationship with the new prime minister in the coming months. In our first session, I addressed the security situation and de- velopment of the ISF. I told him that the primary threat to Iraq was terrorists and militia fomenting civil war and that Baghdad and An- bar provinces were the greatest security challenges. I recommended developing and implementing a plan to secure Baghdad as the first priority. I told him that the ISF were making good progress in build- ing security capacity, but that we needed a major effort to restore public confidence in the police, particularly among the Sunni popu- lation, because of their perceived, and sometimes demonstrated, sectarian bias. I also told him that we were 18 to 24 months away from having the ISF to the point where they could operate without substantial coalition support. I encouraged him to build a strong, representative security team and to address the militia issue as matters of priority. He stated that he thought the 18 to 24 month timeline for the security forces seemed like a long time, and shared his view that the ISF were poorly trained and equipped, and in some 99 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS cases infiltrated. I knew I would have to bolster the prime minister's confidence in his ISF. During another of our initial meetings, the Ambassador and I drew on our experiences with the previous transition and offered some thoughts for the first 100 days of the new government. We suggested a program based upon three tenets—Unity, Security, and Prosperity—and provided him with some recommendations to generate political momentum in these areas during his first days in office. We believed that the new government had to be perceived as representative of all Iraqis and seen as taking positive steps to rec- oncile the concerns of the ethnic and sectarian groups (Unity) as a complement to security efforts to halt the violence (Security). Once security was established, economic development could continue (Prosperity). We had numerous other sessions with Prime Minister al-Maliki in this interim period to ensure this wartime transition of power went as smoothly as possible. Prime Minister al-Maliki and the majority of his cabinet were sworn in on May 20. The key security ministers could not be agreed upon in time for the parliamentary session, so the selection process for the security ministers continued into June. In our first meeting with the newly inaugurated prime minister, he agreed to the Unity- Security-Prosperity construct that the Ambassador and I had laid out earlier. He stated that he wanted our help to formulate a short- term plan to improve current conditions, and a longer term plan to resolve the more intractable issues facing Iraq. He asked to meet in a few days to discuss a plan that would lead to a “dramatic” improve- ment in the security situation in Baghdad. He also expressed concern about the situation in Basra where competition for wealth among the 100 GOVERNMENT TRANSITION Shia population and increasing Iranian influence were making for a difficult security situation. With so many pressing issues, the Ambassador and I worked to get only the most important issues in front of the prime minister to avoid overwhelming him in his first days. On the security side, I needed to help him assume his role of commander in chief of Iraqi forces, work with him to develop and take ownership of plans to secure Baghdad, familiarize him with the capabilities of his security forces, and, further down the road, familiarize him and his govern- ment with the plans to transition security responsibility to capable ISF. There were also two time-sensitive issues—the need to strike a Sadrist headquarters near Sadr City involved in kidnapping and murder, and a coming meeting in Baghdad with the Iranian foreign minister—that we needed him to focus on. Earlier that month, one of our unmanned aerial vehicles had filmed a kidnapping and murder in Baghdad from start to finish. A man walking across a bridge was forced into a car and taken to a large walled complex that we knew to be a Sadrist headquarters. After his captors went inside for a period, they came out and drove the man to the outskirts of Baghdad where they shot him. The Am- bassador and I took the videotape to the prime minister shortly after he was sworn in, showed it to him, and told him that we intended to conduct an operation to search the facility. He recognized the vola- tility of the tape, and asked me to hold off until he had some time to confer with his advisors and the presidency council. I agreed. After a few days, he told the Ambassador and me that he had decided that the public release of the tape at this time would have such a negative impact on the security situation that he was not going to release it. 101 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS He also asked me not to conduct any operations against the facility. I reluctantly agreed (largely because we had seen carloads of mate- rial being removed from the facility in the intervening days). It was a troubling indicator so early in his tenure. The other pressing issue was the visit of the Iranian foreign min- ister to Baghdad. By that time, we had strong evidence of the support that Iran was providing to the Shia militia. I thought it was impor- tant for the prime minister to have access to that evidence before the meeting. The Ambassador and I had Major General Rick Zahner, my deputy chief of staff for intelligence, lay out the evidence, which he did in such a compelling way that the prime minister commented at the end of the briefing that what the Iranians were doing was con- ducting terrorism in Iraq. We asked him to press the Iranian foreign minister to halt the support. We had the first meeting with the newly inaugurated prime minister and the outgoing security team a few days after the inaugu- ration. Because I wanted to have something ready to go for the new government, I had MNF-I review the lessons of Operation Scales of Justice and prepare a plan to secure Baghdad. As we presented the plan, it became immediately clear that the prime minister was not comfortable with accepting a plan that he and his advisors were not familiar with, especially without his own security team on board. It was critically important that the new government make the plan their own so that they felt responsible for its execution. We agreed to have a combined Iraqi-coalition team study and wargame the plan and report back to the prime minister. It would be a few more weeks before Prime Minister al-Maliki got his security team on board and approved the plan. 102 GOVERNMENT TRANSITION It was a difficult time for the new prime minister, and the Am- bassador and I worked to help him deal with the challenges he was confronted with while continuing to press for the actions that we knew were needed. It was a delicate balancing act. Civil-military interaction is difficult in any country, even in peacetime. Cross-cul- tural civil-military interaction in the middle of a war is even harder and requires patience and trust on all sides. About 2 weeks into the prime minister's tenure, he was able to gain consensus on his security team—the same day, as it turned out, that our special operations task force tracked down and killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the longtime leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. The task force had been tracking him for some time and finally got a break. It located him in a house a few kilometers northwest of Baquba, about 30 kilometers north of Baghdad, and attacked the house with joint direct attack munitions, destroying the house and killing al-Zarqawi and nine members of his inner circle. We were able to get a Special Forces team to the house just as Iraqi police, who had responded to the explosion, were loading a body that turned out to be al-Zarqawi into an ambulance. The team took the body and brought it to Balad Airbase for identification. DNA samples and fingerprints were taken and sent to the United States for positive identification. We made a decision to keep the operation very quiet until we were certain of the identification. We also wanted to ensure the new prime minister had the opportunity to announce the death. Shortly after the arrival of the remains in Balad, I got a call from LTG Stan McChrystal, who had seen the remains and confirmed that it was in fact al-Zarqawi. Based on that information, I called the Secretary of 103 GOVERNMENT TRANSITION campaign plan to grow the capabilities of the Iraqi government so that by the end of the 4-year tenure of the new government, it would be able to govern without our assistance. Because of the shift in the nature of the conflict and the added complexity that came with it, and the ground that was lost in the 6 months of government forma- tion, we estimated that the new government would be hard-pressed to demonstrate substantial progress in the next 6 months, and that it would take us until early to mid 2007 to stabilize the security situa- tion to the point that political and economic development could take place without significant disruption. We also estimated that it would take us until the end of 2009 to achieve our campaign endstate.” We highlighted the continuing growth of the ISF in numbers and capabilities (while acknowledging the lagging development and sectarian issues with the police forces), the success we had been having against al Qaeda leadership and facilitation networks, and the inroads we were beginning to make with the Sunni resistance leaders. There was no doubt that we faced a tough 6 months, but there was some potential for advancement if the government of national unity could begin to bring the country together. To help move them in this direction, the Ambassador and I suggested the development of political “benchmarks” to replace the UNSCR timeline as a forcing function to drive the political progress essential to move the country forward. The benchmarks would include such important milestones as the amendment of the constitution, provincial elections, modification of de-Ba'athification policies, and militia disarmament. We had seen over time that, as difficult as the political issues were, if there was nothing to drive Iraqi leaders to make decisions on key issues, decisions would not get made and the 105 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS country would not come together politically. If, as we had postulated, the struggle in Iraq was over the division of political and economic power, we needed a political alternative to violence as a means to resolve political issues. Unfortunately, we were notable to overcome the objections of the sovereign government of Iraq. It would be a significant void in our efforts throughout 2006 and beyond. At the conclusion of the Camp David meeting, President Bush clandestinely departed the United States and flew to Iraq. He had pri- vate meetings with the Iraqi leaders, most importantly Prime Minister al-Maliki, and then met with the new cabinet as a group. His message was one of empowerment and support, and it had the intended ener- gizing effect on the new prime minister and his government. While there, the President also met with and thanked the members of the Embassy and MNF-I, which was a great morale boost for the team. About 2 weeks later, I returned to Washington to serve as the president of an Army promotion board for two-star generals, to get face-to-face feedback from the Camp David session on our planned way ahead, and to take some leave as I entered my third year in Iraq. In my Pentagon discussions, I reemphasized the points that I had made at Camp David—namely that the sectarian violence had signifi- cantly complicated the security environment, but violence, though high, was not widespread (14 of the 18 provinces had less than nine reported incidents of violence/day); that it would take about 6 months to see if the new government could make a difference; and that army develop- ment remained on track, but that we needed a major effort to restore confidence in the police. I projected that we would be finished with the planned training and equipping of the ISF by the end of 2007, that we would have all of the Iraqi divisions leading operations by the next 106 GOVERNMENT TRANSITION spring, and that we would have the Iraqi provinces responsible for their own security by the end of 2007. I believed that with the government of national unity in place, steadily improving ISF, and a still-substantial coalition presence, we could move Iraq forward in the next few years if-and it was a big if–the new government could begin to reconcile the divergent interests of Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups. My discussions with the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs also focused on whether or not the time was right to continue the drawdown of U.S. forces. We had done a quarterly review in March and concluded that there had been insufficient time to as- sess the impact of the first off-ramp decision and that there was just too much uncertainty in the outcome of the government for- mation process to continue to draw our forces down at that time. Having recently completed our June assessment," and discussions with corps and division commanders, we had concluded that we could reduce our forces by another three brigades (about 10,000 people) over the course of the year and still maintain an appro- priate level of security because of the continued development of the ISF. (In June, for the first time, we had almost as many Iraqi brigades and battalions leading operations as we had coalition brigades and battalions, 87 and 91, respectively.) We would re- tain the reserve in Kuwait and a force that could deploy from its home station on short notice to hedge against the uncertainty of the coming months. As Prime Minister al-Maliki and I had not completed our discussions on the proposal, a decision was put off until after my return to Iraq. The question that we all wrestled with was why draw down coalition forces in the face of increasing sectarian violence. My 107 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS thinking was that since the fundamental problem in Iraq was over the division of political and economic power, and that this conflict was the root cause of the sectarian violence, the ultimate solution would be political and not military. Furthermore, my experience had been that the longer we remained there in force, the more the Iraqis relied on us to solve their problems, and the less they moved forward on their own. I found this to be true at both the political and military levels. Finding the right force lev- els that would provide the right capacity for security, reduce Iraqi dependency on us, and foster resolution of the political issues at the heart of the violence was definitely more art than science. I calculated that the specter of continued coalition reductions would reinforce the notion that the coalition was eventually leaving and create a sense of urgency in the new Iraqi government and its security forces that could spur the reconciliation that was so desper- ately needed for Iraq to go forward. We would still have a coalition force of over 120,000 and two of the three brigades on a short string to deploy to Iraq if we had miscalculated. I felt that I was taking a calculated risk that would take advantage of the seating of the con- stitutionally elected unity government to produce the substantial payoff of early reconciliation. Unfortunately, as I was having these discussions in Washington, al Qaeda in Iraq launched retaliatory suicide attacks following al- Zarqawi's death, setting off a chain of events that made continuing the drawdown of our forces impractical in 2006, and I canceled the projected drawdown shortly after I returned to Iraq to begin my third year in command. With spiking sectarian violence and an un- proven new government, I knew we were in for a tough 6 months. 108 Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and General Casey sign documents returning operational control of Iraqi forces to government of Iraq, September 2006 AP Photo (Khalid Mohammed) 5. THE TOUGHEST DAYS (JULY 2006–FEBRUARY 2007) As I returned to Iraq at the end of June, I weighed our chal- lenges and opportunities. After two governments in 2 years and a protracted government formation period for the third, we finally had an Iraqi constitution and a permanent and democratically elected Iraqi government based on that constitution. It was, at least nominally, a government of national unity, and it would need some time to establish itself, particularly with the sectarian tensions that it faced in the aftermath of the Samarra attacks. We continued to make progress with the ISF. The Iraqi army had held together fairly well through the sectarian violence, although we were starting to see the impact of political influence—political leaders threatening mili- tary leaders who took action against members of their factions—on 109 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS the willingness of the army to take operational risks. The national police's effectiveness had been limited by absenteeism, lack of lead- ership, and, in some cases, direct involvement in sectarian violence. They would have to be completely reorganized to be effective. The local police were a mixed bag and still lagged the army in devel- opment. The initial operation that we mounted in Baghdad with the new government, Operation Together Forward, had, from its mid-June start, reduced violence in general and in the five areas of Baghdad where the sectarian violence was the worst. Unfortunately, al Qaeda had lashed out in late June with a series of suicide attacks that would continue into July, driving retaliatory attacks by Shia death squads that further inflamed the situation. The combination of the two–suicide attacks and death squad executions—had led to a spike in violence against civilians that we would have to contain. The situation was further complicated by continuing evidence of Iranian training and equipment support to Shia militias. Adjusting the Plan The first session that I had with my staff on my return was my monthly intelligence update. It was a sobering brief on the security situation, particularly around the capital. My intelligence officer highlighted the recent attacks by al Qaeda and the Shia death squad backlash and assessed that the tit-for-tat violence had become self-sus- taining. He stated that he was beginning to see an almost predictable cycle of al Qaeda suicide attacks, followed in a few days by Shia death squad attacks against Sunni areas in Baghdad. The sectarian violence was focused in Baghdad and southwest Diyala Province and, in those areas, focused more on civilians than on Iraqi and coalition security 110 THE TOUGHEST DAYS forces. The violence across the rest of the country remained relatively low, with the exception of Anbar Province where the violence was pri- marily directed against the coalition and not sectarian. In fact, around 80 percent of the violence in Iraq continued to remain centered in 4 of its 18 provinces: Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Ninewah. This finding was reinforced in the unit visits that I undertook in the first week fol- lowing my return. The other disturbing finding was that my analysts were beginning to see a geographical component to the violence—that the Shia death squads may have been trying to drive Sunni families out of mixed neighborhoods to improve their control of Baghdad. If this were true, it would mark another worrisome shift in the conflict. It would bear careful watching. As I left this briefing, I began to rethink the plans to reduce our forces that I had discussed in Washington. The other major focus in early July was to refine the Baghdad security effort that we had begun in mid-June. Because of the need to get the new government to act quickly in the face of rising sectarian violence and the late appointment of the security ministers, the new Iraqi leadership had not participated in planning the initial operation to the degree that they desired. As they gained more experience, they wanted more of a role. I saw this as a positive step in that they were willing to begin to take ownership over the plan to secure their capital. So, while continuing with Operation Together Forward, we began working with the Iraqis to enhance our collective efforts in Baghdad to bring security to the capital by the end of the year. I told the MNC-I commander that Baghdad was our main effort and that he needed to " From May to mid-July 2006, 40 percent of the violent incidents in the Baghdad area were against civilians, 32 percent against the ISF, and 28 percent against the coalition. 111 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS develop a plan to secure Baghdad that was sufficiently weighted to en- sure our long-term success. He began working with Iraqi military and police planners and crafted a plan based on an operational concept where joint (Iraqi and coalition forces) would clear areas of Baghdad of enemy control and then protect these areas while we improved the capacity of the ISF, and worked with the Iraqis to improve services (electricity, wa- ter, sewage) in the areas. MNC-I would simultaneously limit al Qaeda and death squad movement by creating a barrier around Baghdad linked to the canal system and channeling all traffic into Baghdad through checkpoints. In addition, the Iraqis would manage a system of fixed and mobile checkpoints around the city to further limit extremist mobility. MNC-I would also conduct targeted offensive operations against death squad and al Qaeda targets in Baghdad and in the surrounding support zones. This plan was worked painstakingly with Iraqi leaders to ensure that we had their buy in and strong commitment to its success. We had originally proposed beginning with clearing operations in Sadr City, but the prime minister did not support this action, and we began with a focus west of the Army Canal that divides Baghdad. The next phase of Opera- tion Together Forward was approved for implementation by the prime minister and me in early August, and it began shortly thereafter. As we worked through these adjustments, several conflicts that would hamper our efforts became clearer. I began to see that the prime minister and I had fundamentally different views of the threat. I felt that the Shia militias were the greatest threat to our ability to bring security to Baghdad and to long-term security in Iraq. I showed Prime Minister al-Maliki data that the casualties from death squads (largely Shia) far eclipsed the casualties from the more spectacular suicide attacks (largely al Qaeda). The prime minister believed that 112 THE TOUGHEST DAYS the “Ba'athists” (Sunni extremists) were the greater threat, and he expressed concern that we were putting all of our efforts against the militia and not enough against the Sunni extremists. I tried to counter this notion by having our special operations task force commander show him the scope of our significant effort against al Qaeda. He also believed that the Shia militia could be dealt with politically, but that the “Ba'athists” could only be dealt with by force. This was the reason he turned down our request for a major operation into Sadr City, where we thought the main militia threat was coming from. The prime minister also did not see the “geographical component” of the Shia violence, further impacting his reluctance to deal expedi- tiously with the militias. We would work on reconciling these views over time, but, as they were strongly held by both of us, they would cause increased friction between us as we wrestled with bringing se- curity to Baghdad and Iraq. I note these conflicts to demonstrate the complexities of conducting military operations inside a sovereign country and the importance of political and military leaders having a common view of the threat to drive effective military operations. Canceling the “Off-ramp.” By mid-July, we had concluded that our long-held assumption that the government of national unity would be seen as representative by most Iraqis and have a positive impact on the security environment was not going to hold true. The new government was seen as not representing the interests of a good portion of the population. The differences in threat view that I saw were also visible to Sunni leaders and only compounded their negative views of the government. It had also become clear that the Iraqis would not be able to secure their capi- tal without more support from us. 113 THE TOUGHEST DAYS would need these additional forces through the end of the year. I con- cluded by restating my belief that, while the extra forces would help the security situation in the short term, they would not have a decisive impact until Iraqi religious and political leaders committed to stop the sectarian killing.' I was concerned that without a commitment by the Iraqis to a reconciliation process, our continuing resolution of the se- curity problems would allow them to postpone the reconciliation that was essential to our collective long-term success. The request was approved expeditiously. This effectively canceled any further plans to reduce our forces through the end of the year, al- though we did continue with our plans to pass security responsibility to Iraqi provinces as their security capabilities and local security situations warranted. The first Iraqi province to assume responsibility for its own security, the southern province of Muthanna, did so on July 13, 2006. After we canceled our plans to reduce our forces, and as we con- tinued our planning to secure Baghdad, the MNC-I commander approached me with an option to request a 90- to 120-day extension for a redeploying Stryker brigade to give us a mobile strike capability in Baghdad. After initial reluctance because of the turbulence caused by extensions, I agreed that the potential operational benefit in Baghdad at this critical time would be significant and requested the extension. In retrospect, I waited too long to make the decision to cancel the drawdown and to extend the Stryker brigade, and this caused sub- stantial turbulence at the tactical level. We had a deliberate process in place that we went through in June with our commanders in which the recommendation to off-ramp three brigades in 2006 was made. * In September, I revised this through the spring of 2007. 115 THE TOUGHEST DAYS dedicated to countering malign Iranian influence in Iraq. As with all new intelligence operations, it took some time before it was produc- ing actionable targets. At that point, I aligned the cell with our special operations task force to action the targets. The effort paid off hand- somely in December when we caught several Quds Force operatives and confirmed a lot of what we suspected about Iranian activity. The second Red Team reviewed our 2006 action plan in light of the recent violence and noted that while our priority in Baghdad was the correct strategic priority, it was “inadequately resourced across all lines of operation” and that the new government did not have the capacity to secure Baghdad without significant coalition support over the next 6 months, conclusions which played in my decision to cancel our planned troop reductions. I reviewed the second Red Team assessment with the staff in late July. They generally agreed with the findings of the team, and I di- rected them to look across all of the lines of operation and determine what additional resources should be moved to Baghdad. Our origi- nal plan called for us to prioritize Baghdad and nine key cities. We would keep moving forward outside Baghdad, but we would accept delays in other places in order to focus key resources on Baghdad. In mid-August, the Ambassador and I convened our key staff and commanders to review the situation and to ensure that the new staff from the summer rotation understood the direction that we planned to head over the next 8 to 10 months. We laid out our pri- orities. Our first priority was to mass all of our efforts—military, political, economic, and informational—to secure Baghdad. Second, "We had refined our list of 15 key cities to 9 after the first election. 117 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS we had to sustain country-wide pressure on al Qaeda and the death squads to keep them out of Baghdad. Third, we needed to sustain progress “away from the ball”—continuing to develop the ISF, especially the police; continuing to transfer security to Iraqi prov- inces that were ready to assume security responsibility; continuing our work with the PRTs to build capacity at the provincial level; and continuing with economic development around the country. In short, we needed to continue to execute our campaign plan where security conditions permitted, while we worked with the Iraqis to secure Baghdad. The plan to enhance security in Baghdad was christened Opera- tion Together Forward II, and it began in earnest in early August with the planned addition of 12,000 Iraqi (unfortunately, the Iraqi troops failed to arrive) and coalition troops to the Baghdad mission. The additional troops included five military police companies that would work as transition teams with the Iraqi police to shore up their stay- ing power and evenhandedness—the two major issues we had with the local police. The plan also began a retraining program for the national police where a brigade at a time was pulled offline, refitted with equipment and retrained, and its leadership purged of sectarian influence. The program produced positive results over time. With Operation Together Forward II, we sought to make a de- monstrable improvement in the Baghdad security situation by the beginning of Ramadan (September 23–October 22). We expected to " I used a basketball analogy—“play away from the ball”—to make the point that securing Baghdad was a long-term proposition, and, as important as that was, it was not the whole country. We had to keep making progress in the rest of the country—“away from the ball”—while we worked to improve security in and around Baghdad. 118 THE TOUGHEST DAYS see increased violence during Ramadan as we had every year.* This year the expected increase in violence was helped by a September 7 call by the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, to kill an American in the next 15 days. Clearing operations in the focus areas, the areas of highest sectar- ian violence, proceeded well, and violence decreased from July levels through the end of August. We intended to maintain momentum by expanding efforts to additional focus areas, completing the Baghdad barrier to limit extremist freedom of movement, consolidating our gains in the focus areas by improving security and basic services there, and maintaining pressure on al Qaeda and death squad leadership. As we cleared the focus areas, the terrorists and death squads shifted their efforts outside of the cleared areas and continued their attacks. By Ramadan, the operation had kept attacks against civilians and civilian casualties below July levels, but had not stopped the sectarian killings. We continued to make gradual reductions in the sectarian vio- lence and to keep the pressure on the al Qaeda and death squad leaders through Ramadan, but coalition forces bore the brunt of the violence. Most of the casualties were the result of IEDs, and almost 85 per- cent were in Baghdad or Anbar provinces. September was a difficult month, particularly because we were beginning to see indications that the Iraqi security forces were not performing to standard. Moreover, in some cases, particularly in the national and local police, we found active collaboration with the militia. Additionally, we were seeing very slow responses by the Iraqi government to bring services into the Sunni areas that had been cleared and in moving Iraqi brigades into Historically, we had seen violent incidents increase by 15 to 20 percent during Ramadan. 119 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS Baghdad in support of the plan. There was also little movement on the Iraqi political front in support of the security efforts. Civil-Military Relations The lack of Iraqi political support to security efforts continued to be disappointing. In the types of operations we were conduct- ing in Iraq, political and military actions are irrevocably linked. I strongly believed that until the Iraqis began to resolve the politi- cal issues that were dividing them, the rationale for violence would not be eliminated, and Iraq would continue to struggle, requiring the continued presence of coalition forces. I believed that they were capable of resolving these issues because I had seen them work to- gether in the tough days before the January 2005 elections. Throughout the late summer and early fall, there was a concerted U.S. effort to get the Iraqi government to agree to a series of “bench- marks” designed to establish a timeline for the resolution of the difficult political issues dividing the country. Issues such as reviewing the de- Ba'athification process, establishing a timeline for provincial elections, reviewing the constitution as promised before the December elections, and completing the hydrocarbon law needed to be resolved in order to better align political and economic power in the country—the issue at the heart of the violence. We believed that equitable movement on these issues would cause the government to be seen as more representa- tive of the entire Iraqi population and ultimately lead to a lessening of the violence. Unfortunately, we lacked sources of leverage to move the Iraqis to action. They were a sovereign country with a duly elected gov- ernment, and their leaders intended to exercise that sovereignty. They tended to act on their timelines and assessments, and the leaders that I 120 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS concerned because it was not true and that it had reached President Bush. He wanted to know if it had come from me. It had not. I told him that I suspected that it had come from people below me who were upset with constraints on our operations in Sadr City. At another meeting in September, where the deputy chief of the U.S. mission and I laid out the options for the next phase of opera- tions to secure Baghdad, the prime minister told me that he thought I was second-guessing his decisions on military operations. I told him that I did not think that I was. He emphasized strongly that he made decisions based on his convictions about what was best for the country and not along sectarian lines. These were difficult sessions, but I was glad that he thought enough about the importance of the relationship to speak openly about what was on his mind. I came to realize that until we resolved our differing views of the threat—his seeing Ba'athists as the most dangerous threat, and my seeing the militia as the most dangerous—we would continue to be at odds. I continued to work to address those differences. Toward the end of October, one of our soldiers was kidnapped in downtown Baghdad. The division commander reacted quick- ly and established checkpoints throughout the city to recover the soldier. We kept the checkpoints in place while we ran down every lead. We had kept these checkpoints in place for a week when we heard that the Sadrists were pressuring the prime minister to remove the checkpoints. I called the division commander and asked if the checkpoints were still necessary. He stated that they were no longer necessary for finding the lost soldier, but that they had seen a general drop in violence during the week that the checkpoints were in place. The prime minister called the next day and asked for a meeting. 122 THE TOUGHEST DAYS view of how things were going on the ground. With the exception of the units in the Baghdad area, most were reporting continued prog- ress. I was particularly pleased with a visit to Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province, where the new unit had made significant progress since August, pushing al Qaeda out of the city and implementing the security force plan for the province that the previous prime minister had approved. The combination of our military actions against al Qaeda and the hiring of security forces from Anbar, vetted by their tribal leaders, was galvanizing the tribes in Anbar against al Qaeda. At the end of October, President Bush and Prime Minister al- Maliki agreed to establish a working group to accelerate the pace and training of the ISF, the Iraqi assumption of command and control over the ISF, and the transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqi gov- ernment. As we worked with the Iraqi security leadership and our subordinate units to operationalize this agreement in November, we were adamant that it had to be accompanied by an Iraqi-led reconcili- ation effort to be successful. I thought that might be our leverage—if the Iraqis wanted to advance the time when they would control their security forces, they would have to take the steps toward reconcilia- tion that were essential for our collective, long-term success. The Ambassador and I suggested an integrated political-military framework to demonstrate how political actions and security actions could be mutually reinforcing and lead to our long-term success (see figure 5-1). The framework began with the Council of Representa- tives (COR) debating and passing a series of laws that would codify the division of political and economic power—hopefully in a man- ner that represented the interests of all ethnic and sectarian groups. This would be followed by reconciliation and militia disbandment 125 THE TOUGHEST DAYS Figure 5-1. Framework for Integrating Political-Military Efforts, Fall 2006 Set Conditions for Reconciliation Stabilization and Reconciliation Seal National Compact Complete Transition to Self-reliance De-Ba'athification Law Approved Provincial Powers Law Approved Insurgent Reconciliation Provincial Elections Militia Law Approved Provincial Election Law Approved Militia Disbandment Constitutional Referendum Hydrocarbon Law Approved Amnesty Agreement Approved Amnesty Agreement Implemented Flag, Emblem & National Anthem Law Approved Investment Law Approved Transition Security to Iraqi Control Security Stabilization 127 THE TOUGHEST DAYS The report was not all negative. Curfews, driving bans, and Army Canal checkpoints proved effective. The Iraqi army was proving adept at holding areas, and the Iraqis were getting better at coordinating army, national police, and local police operations through a joint command center that they had established. All of these were necessary to move forward. We blended our lessons with the proposals made by Prime Min- ister al-Maliki and the Iraqi security ministers. There was general agreement that there were too many stationary checkpoints tying up Iraqi forces and that these needed to be reduced to free up forces for offensive operations. There was general agreement that the ISF needed to be on a more offensive footing like the coalition, patrol- ling and conducting targeted operations against terrorists and death squads. The Iraqis also perceived a need for more joint operations— coalition, army, police—as a means of building trust between the Iraqi army and police forces and suppressing the likelihood that any Iraqi forces would succumb to sectarian influences. They suggested joint security stations across Baghdad, located in selected local po- lice stations, where coalition, Iraqi army, and police forces would be based and operate out of to bring security to the surrounding areas. Finally, we worked with the Iraqi leaders to establish an Iraqi command structure for Baghdad. While I had originally envisioned a joint coalition/Iraqi command for Baghdad, the Iraqis convinced me that they were capable of taking command, still with our support. They were taking ownership of the mission to secure their capital, which was essential for our success. The operational structure established for Baghdad was com- posed of two commands, one east and one west of the Tigris River 131 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS that almost bisected Baghdad, under a Baghdad operational com- mand, headed by an Iraqi three-star who would report directly to the prime minister. Each of the commands would be joint army/ police commands, one (east of the river) commanded by an army division commander with a police deputy and the other (west of the river) commanded by a police two-star with an army deputy. Each of the nine Iraqi districts in Baghdad would come under the command of an Iraqi army or police brigade augmented by the local police assigned to the district and a coalition battalion. This structure made sense from a military perspective, and it allowed the prime minister to better fix responsibility on his Iraqi military and police leaders. It also lessened the likelihood of the Iraqi forc- es becoming involved in sectarian violence as everyone—army, police, and coalition forces—would be watching each other. The plan called for five additional brigades to be moved to Bagh- dad (three Iraqi and two coalition) and the execution of a phased effort to establish long-term security. In the first phase, 35 joint security stations would be established and occupied by Iraqi and coalition forces. This was a significant logistical and construction effort that we estimated would take around 6 weeks to complete. In- place Iraqi and coalition forces would continue their security efforts to sustain pressure on the extremists during this phase. Then areas would be cleared, expanded, and held by the joint forces, and, over time as violence lessened, the ISF would assume full responsibility for the security of their capital. The fact that forces would flow into Baghdad over time actually helped us in that the new forces ensured that we could continue to hold and expand cleared areas—some- thing that had eluded us in the previous efforts. 132 THE TOUGHEST DAYS On December 23, the minister of defense briefed the plan to Prime Minister al-Maliki. He laid out the operational concept mentioned above, and recommended to the prime minister that the military op- erations be accompanied by robust media, political, and economic reconstruction campaigns to ensure sustained political support for the operations. He recommended closing Iraq's borders for a period of time to limit the entry of external threats into the country during this critical period. He also recommended that the prime minister address a commanders' conference to provide his intent directly to the army and police commanders who would be executing the plan. On the ques- tion of timing, always difficult in civil-military discussions, the MOD estimated that it would take about a month from the prime minister's approval before the nine-district command structure would be up and functioning (which I thought was optimistic by a few weeks). He said that operations in two of the districts would begin right after the first of the year and that sustaining operations would also continue across Baghdad while the command structure and bases were established. We had jointly pressed to kick off offensive operations with the New Year. Unfortunately, the movement of forces and construction of the joint security stations would take longer than we had hoped. We agreed that we should not announce the start of a big operation early on, but rather to begin the operations, construct the joint security stations, flow in ad- ditional forces, and let the people see the accomplishments of the forces. The prime minister approved the plan right before Christmas, and I clarified with him that he was also approving the deployment of two ad- ditional coalition brigades in support of the plan. He acknowledged that he was, but was clear that he wanted to downplay the significance of the deployment of additional coalition forces. This left two remaining 133 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS issues, the appointment of the commander and the prime minister's speech in which he would publicly empower the security forces to take action against “all who broke the law.” Both of these would be resolved after the first of the year. For the commander, Prime Minister al-Maliki chose a rela- tive unknown, at least to the coalition, Lieutenant General Qanbar Abud, who had worked directly for the prime minister, and was clearly someone whom he trusted. I was initially uncomfortable having someone so unknown to us responsible for our main effort, and I had several sessions with the prime minister where I expressed my concerns. In the end, he appointed him, telling me that if Abud proved that he was not up to the job, I should let him know and he would replace him. In the end, the general proved a capable choice. In his Army Day speech on January 6, the prime minister laid out the key points we had been looking for from him to empower his security forces. He stated that the government would: “Not permit any political authority to weaken our armed forces ... because weakening the army will lead to delay- ing the process of receiving the security responsibility from the MNF” “Not allow any militias, regardless of their belongings, to be a replacement for the state” “Enforce the law against all those who infringed the sacred rights of the Iraqi people.” With respect to the Baghdad security plan, he reemphasized that the government would not tolerate political interference, that the 134 THE TOUGHEST DAYS security forces would pursue all “outlaws, regardless of the sectarian or political affiliation,” and that military commanders would be given “all authorities to execute the plan.” He closed by calling on the people of Baghdad to support and assist their armed forces. We, and our Iraqi military and police colleagues, finally felt that we had the political backing that had been lacking to pursue both the Sunni and Shia extremists who were fomenting sectarian violence. It was a good start. Washington Policy Review As we were wrestling with the tactical and operational chal- lenges brought on by sectarian violence and the change in the nature of the mission, Washington was grappling with its strategic implications. I was informed about a review of the Iraq strategy in October by General Pace, but, from my perspective, it did not begin in earnest until after Secretary Rumsfeld’s resignation in early November. As part of this process, I met with the Iraq Study Group, a congressionally appointed, bipartisan commission, by video teleconference in early November. I had spoken to the group in Iraq in August, and they asked to speak to the Ambassador and me again before they finalized their report. I made five points with them: • Conflict in Iraq is about the division of political and eco- nomic power among Iraqis. • Sectarian violence is the greatest threat to the accomplish- ment of our strategic objectives. Reconciliation among Iraqis is essential for our success. 135 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS Enduring strategic success will only be achieved by Iraqis- and it will take longer than we want even to get to “Iraqi OK.” We are two-thirds of the way through a three-step process to bring the Iraqis to the point where they can credibly as- sume security responsibility by the end of 2007. We have adapted and adjusted our strategy, plans, and troop levels to meet the changing dynamics of the situation on the ground. Their questions were good ones: Why wasn't the Baghdad security plan having greater effect? Is the prime minister the right guy, and is he willing to go after the militias? Should we transition without reconciliation? I answered these questions and told them that we were in no danger of losing militarily, and that more coalition troops would have a temporary and local effect on the security situation. I also commented that more coalition forces at this point would give Iraqi leaders more time to avoid hard decisions on reconciliation and ultimately prolong our time there. The report was released on December 6 and offered 79 recom- mendations advocating internal and external approaches to reverse what they called a “grave and deteriorating" situation. I was heart- ened to see the co-chairs note in their opening letter that there were no “magic formulas” to solve Iraq's problems and that no one could "guarantee” that any course of action would work to stop the sec- tarian violence. Externally, they recommended a diplomatic offensive I used the term Iraqi OK to make the point that we were trying to get Iraq to a level that was acceptable to Iraqis, and not imposing U.S. or European standards on them. 136 THE TOUGHEST DAYS to build international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. Internally, they recommended that the United States “adjust its role to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own destiny.” On the military side, they recommended accelerating the assumption of security responsibility by Iraqis and changing the primary mission of U.S. forces to one of “supporting the Iraqi army.” They also rec- ommended that the United States work closely with Iraqi leaders “to support the achievement of specific objectives—or milestones—on national reconciliation, security and governance”—something that we had been trying to establish for months with the benchmarks.” I also had visits from the National Security Advisor and his dep- uty at the end of October and early November, respectively. As I did with most visitors, I did not accompany them as I felt that through our frequent video teleconferences, they knew what I thought. I wanted them to hear from my subordinate leaders without any im- pression of influence. I did review their itineraries to ensure where they went enabled them to meet their trip objectives and I met with them to answer their questions. In mid-November, shortly after my video teleconference with the Iraq Study Group, I was informed that the Deputy National Security Advisor was working to get the strategy review to the Pres- ident before the end of November. A week later I sat through a video teleconference with the Joint Chiefs to discuss their independent strategy review to help General Pace shape his military advice for a meeting with the President later that week. Their proposal was to accelerate passing the security lead to the Iraqis. It was based on two big ifs—achieving unity of effort with the Iraqi government and the government making progress on reconciliation. It proposed shifting 137 THE TOUGHEST DAYS Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group, and a report on the joint committee for accelerating the transfer of security responsibilities that the prime minister and President Bush had agreed to the month before. The prime minister agreed to the proposed agenda and during the intervening days also had his staff draft a proposal for securing Baghdad that contained many of the proposals that we had been discussing with the ministers. The important element was that it was his plan. Although it was not what we would think of as a military plan, it was a good overview of the policies and principles that he saw as important to succeed in Baghdad, which we could incorporate into the ongoing, collective coalition and Iraqi military planning efforts. I took advantage of a few minutes with the President before the meeting to update him on the three topics and encouraged him to reiterate that the prime minister must have militia reintegration and reconciliation strategies for us to proceed with the accelerated transition programs, and to support the prime minister's proposed security plan for Baghdad. During the meeting, the two leaders ex- changed views on the situation, and al-Maliki discussed his Baghdad plan and asked for the President's support to help it succeed. The President agreed. They also discussed the work of the joint com- mittee and agreed that any accelerated transition was dependent on the security situation, reconciliation, and militia reintegration. The meeting concluded with a joint press conference in which the Presi- dent reiterated what he and the prime minister had talked about. President Bush went on to call the meeting with the prime minister “a key part of the assessment process”—the review of Iraq strategy. The first week in December, the pace of the review picked up substantially. It began with a video teleconference with the NSC on 139 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS December 1, in which I gave an update on the current situation. To demonstrate that the country was not “aflame,” I began with a slide that showed that only four of Iraq's provinces (Anbar, Baghdad, Saladin, and Diyala) had averaged more than 10 reported attacks per day in the 6-month period from May through November, the height of the sectarian violence. I showed another slide showing that only two of Iraq's provinces (Baghdad and Diyala) had averaged more than three sectarian casualties per day during that same period. The rest averaged less than one per day. Our problem was Baghdad, and it was significant. Most striking was the fact that we were averaging more than 40 civilian casualties per day in Baghdad over that period and between 150 and 250 deaths per week as a result of sectarian violence. This was clearly unacceptable. I also showed that the vast majority of civilian fatalities were caused by the largely Shia death squads as opposed to the suicide attacks of the Sunni extremists. I closed with a slide that showed how we had sub- stantially increased our operations against both Sunni extremists and the death squads since the summer to demonstrate the level of offensive action we were taking. In November alone, we had killed or captured over 800 extremists and death squad members in targeted operations. In early December, General Pace called to say that my session to provide input to the President on the strategy review would be on December 12. It would be preceded by a session with outside experts on the 11" and followed on the 13" by a meeting with the President and Joint Chiefs. He expected a decision and the announcement of the results before Christmas. This was not my only session during the re- view. In the week of December 8–15, we had five video teleconferences with the NSC. The issues covered ranged from how to ensure the sup- 140 THE TOUGHEST DAYS port of the Iraqis, to the potential size and composition of a “civilian surge” to accompany a surge in military forces, to how to deal with a confrontation with the Sadr militia, to how to enhance operations in Anbar Province. It was the policy process at work—a meeting with the NSC, questions, scrambling for answers, staff meetings to prepare for the next meeting of the NSC, another NSC meeting, and a repetition of the cycle. It was all focused on framing the issues and providing the best information possible to permit the President to make the most in- formed decision. In the end, there was general agreement that success in Iraq was essential to our national security and that, while reconciliation was essential, there would have to be a reduction in sectarian violence to allow reconciliation to take place, which would, in turn, provide for a more stable longer term outcome. My session on December 12 included General Abizaid. I used the opportunity to lay out my proposed way ahead. I proposed an integrated political-military effort to stabilize the country and pass security responsibility to the Iraqis in 2007 as had been agreed in Amman. I was clear that the Iraqis would still require coalition support beyond 2007 and that the level of that presence should be negotiated with the Iraqis over the course of 2007. I stated that accomplishing what I proposed would require coalition forces to: • assist the ISF in quelling sectarian violence and neutraliz- ing the extremists • support Iraqi efforts on reconciliation and dismantling militias • complete the training and equipping of the ISF by the end of 2007 141 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS • continue our efforts against al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranian surrogates. We would also continue to work with the Embassy to build Iraqi institutional capacity at the national and provincial levels and to con- tinue economic development. I also highlighted the risks involved, which were not insig- nificant, and more on the political than the military side. I worried primarily about the ability of the Iraqi leadership to take the neces- sary political steps to support our security operations—reconciling the interests of the different ethnic and sectarian groups, dealing with militia and illegal armed groups, giving our forces free rein to attack hostile targets, and eliminating political interference with the ISF. I knew there was a push to move five U.S. brigades into Iraq to deal with the security situation. I had asked for two to meet the needs of the Baghdad security plan and two battalions of Marines to maintain our momentum in Anbar Province, so I offered my thoughts on bringing more forces than that into Iraq. I stated that additional forces: • would have a temporary, local effect in reducing sectarian violence where they were committed • could provide breathing space for a committed government to address militia and reconciliation challenges • would place the new forces in a complex environment where consent for their presence was diminishing • could extend the time it takes to pass security responsibility 142 THE TOUGHEST DAYS • would result in additional coalition casualties • would not have a decisive effect without government com- mitment to reconcile and deal with the militias. After watching the impact on our Baghdad division of having to operate in such a complex, politically constrained environment, I was very concerned about bringing fresh U.S. troops into the middle of a sectarian conflict in an Arab country where there was not clear political support for their actions. I felt very strongly that I would not ask for one more American Servicemember than needed to ac- complish our mission, especially in this environment. This was an intense period as it was clear that Washington was looking for something different from what I was recommending to them. I worked hard to provide my military advice dispassionately, as I felt that I was providing the President only one of the many op- tions he was reviewing. I believe that a President is best served by having a variety of options to choose from. I had said all along that success in Iraq would take patience and will and believed that what I was recommending—to accelerate the transition of security to ca- pable Iraqis in exchange for their action to solve the core problem in Iraq, that is, reconciling the interests of the different ethnic and sectarian groups—offered the most effective way to accomplish our strategic objectives in Iraq. I believed that I had asked for the troops that I needed to accomplish our operational objectives, and that, if the prime minister delivered on his pledges to the President to allow our forces and the ISF to operate freely without political interference, we would bring security to Baghdad by the summer. I felt that additional troops beyond that would risk introducing 143 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS them into a very confusing and difficult operational environment without a plan for how their introduction would contribute to the accomplishment of our strategic objectives. I remained adamantly opposed to that. In retrospect, I believe that I should have directly offered the President a broader range of options for achieving our objectives in Iraq. I had discussed different options for improving the security situation with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman: accelerated transition of security responsibility; local (with in-country forces), small, and large coalition reinforcement; coalition withdrawal on a fixed timeline; and maintaining the status quo. Only the accelerated transition and reinforcement were actively considered. In the end, I only presented the President the course of action we selected-ac- celerated transition-and I believe that I should have offered him a wider range of options to meet his policy needs. The pace kept up in the weeks before Christmas. MNC-I swapped out on December 14, bringing a new team into the com- plex environment. Secretary Rumsfeld departed on the next day after coming to Iraq earlier that month for a farewell visit. Secre- tary Robert Gates took over 3 days later and made his first visit to Iraq as the Secretary of Defense on December 20 with General Pace. General Abizaid and I met with them and laid out our views on the situation. Secretary Gates was familiar with the issues as he had been sitting in on the video teleconferences during the strategy review. We also continued to work with Iraqi leaders to finalize the plan to * While we did our own course of action analysis in December and studied the logistical implications of bringing in the additional forces, we had ideas, but no operational plans, for the additional three brigades. These would be developed by MNC-I in February and March before the forces flowed into Iraq. 144 THE TOUGHEST DAYS secure Baghdad until we received the prime minister's final approval on December 23. In the middle of all this, our efforts to target Iranian operatives paid off with the capture of six Iranians who appeared to be engaged with Iraqi militia in planning for the expansion of Shia-controlled ar- eas in Baghdad. It was the first time that we had clear evidence of this. Four of the six had ties to the Iranian embassy and were released in a few days. We believed that the other two were Quds Force operatives who had entered Iraq under false names and had no right to diplomat- ic status, so they were held as we continued to evaluate the material that was discovered with them—maps, weapons receipts, and money. The most disturbing element was that they appeared to be working very closely with Badr Corps operatives. The Badr Corps was a militia with close ties to one of the main Shia political parties. I continued my Christmas tradition of visiting the troops and thanking them for their work before heading back to Washington for some face-to-face discussions. During my session with General Pace at the end of December, he informed me of major pending decisions on the Iraq strategy by the President and his national security team. Specifically, he told me that our “2 + 2* proposal (two brigades for Baghdad and two battalions for Anbar) had been judged as “too mod- est,” and that, while there was not yet a final decision, he expected one by the end of the month that would add a total of five brigades and supporting forces. We took some time so he could be clear on the dif- ference between my request and the likely Presidential decision. I was asking for the two brigades that we needed to imple- ment the Baghdad plan and two Marine battalions to maintain our momentum in Anbar Province, about 9,000 troops. We 145 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS expected the first brigade to flow in by mid-January, the second by mid-February. The additional three brigades, if approved, would flow at the rate of one per month, if they were required. (I knew that I would be leaving shortly and wanted to give my successor as much flexibility as possible by having the option to turn off deployments if he decided he did not require the addi- tional brigades.") A few days later, the Chairman informed me that the President had decided on the five-brigade surge and that the President intended to nominate LTG Dave Petraeus to replace me. I had provided the President my military advice on what I felt was the best approach to accomplish our strategic objectives in Iraq as rapidly as possible. He chose a different course of action. His decision was disappointing to me, to say the least, but I im- mediately set out to make it successful. As Washington prepared for the rollout of the “surge” strategy, we were working hard to set the conditions for its success and to finalize the plans for securing Baghdad. This included a video tele- conference between President Bush and Prime Minister al-Maliki on January 4 to ensure that they shared a common understanding of the new Baghdad security plan and that the prime minister was prepared to provide the political support for the coalition and Iraqi forces that was essential for the success of the plan. During the video teleconference, the President informed the prime minister of his inclination to increase coalition troop levels provided that they reach “a common understanding.” The President * Army Chief of Staff General Pete Schoomaker told me that I was being considered to replace him in the spring, and Secretary Gates confirmed this during his visit to Baghdad. Secretary Gates offered me the Army chief's job, which I accepted before I returned to Iraq in early January. 146 THE TOUGHEST DAYS was frank, stating that the additional coalition forces were meant to help the Iraqis break the back of terrorism to help accelerate the transfer of responsibility to the Iraqi government. He noted that the United States was willing to commit to help secure Baghdad, but that Iraqi commitment was also very important. He told Prime Minister al-Maliki that he needed him to publicly state his govern- ment's commitment prior to the President's planned address to the American public on January 10. The prime minister was cautious and judicious in his responses, noting that it was important they work together. He stated that his cabinet would start planning and would get back to him in several days. On January 6, Iraqi Army Day, Prime Minister al-Maliki gave his promised speech outlining the elements of his Baghdad security plan in which he strongly made the points that President Bush had requested. On January 10, the President outlined his decision in a prime-time speech that announced a plan “to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad.” He announced the commitment of 20,000 more troops to Iraq and that the majority of them—five brigades—would be deployed to Baghdad. The remainder would go to Anbar Province to “work with Iraqi and tribal forces to keep up the pressure on the terrorists.” He couched the mission in Iraq in broader terms, calling our struggle against extremism in the Middle East “the decisive ideological struggle of our time,” and stating that the new plan would “change America's course in Iraq, and help us succeed in the fight against terror.” It was a moving speech and a powerful statement of U.S. commitment to Iraq. In a press conference that the Ambassador and I held in Iraq a few days later, I noted that the plan to secure Baghdad had several 147 THE TOUGHEST DAYS was beginning operations. Offensive shaping actions that we had be- gun in Baghdad after the first of the year—some 14 battalion or larger operations in 20 days—continued to put strong pressure on al Qaeda and the death squads through daily intelligence-based raids. The Iraqi command and control headquarters—Baghdad and the two sectors– were expected to be operational in about 2 weeks. About one-third of the joint security stations were operating, with almost 20 more project- ed to come on line by mid-February. Iraqi army brigades were being alerted and moved on the agreed timelines, but were arriving at between 55 and 65 percent strength, and the Iraqis were moving to address the shortfalls. In all I was pleased with the progress that we were making and the sense of energy that I was seeing in the Iraqis. I was also pleased that we had seen a 5-week decline in sectarian violence and civilian casualties in Baghdad and that we continued to make good progress in Anbar. In the middle of all this, I returned to Washington on February 1 for my confirmation hearing to be the Army chief of staff. I flew straight into a Pentagon “murder board” and 2 days of office calls with the members of the committee. The hearing was a tough one as the Senators asked hard questions about my 32 months in Iraq. I was confirmed on February 8, 2007. General Petraeus had been confirmed on January 27, and we set the date for our change of command for February 10. When I returned to Iraq after the hearing, I focused on our continuing preparations in Baghdad and on setting the conditions for a smooth turnover with General Petraeus. At my final meeting with Prime Minister al-Maliki, I offered my thoughts to him on civil-military interaction with his military and police uniformed leadership. I had told him once, early on, that he and 149 THE TOUGHEST DAYS Before we parted, the prime minister gave me a copy of the Iraqi constitution signed by him and his security ministers, and I gave him the pistol that I had carried throughout my 32 months in Iraq. Two days later, on February 10, 2007, I relinquished command to General Petraeus. In my remarks, I commented on how far Iraq had come since it achieved its sovereignty over 2% years ago and expressed my deepest gratitude to the Servicemembers and their families who had given up so much to build a new Iraq and bring liberty and de- mocracy to 27 million Iraqis. I closed with the Arabic words, Iltizam Mushtarak (United Commitment), which had been the motto of Iraqi and coalition forces during my time in Iraq. I was very conscious of the difficult challenges still facing the mission, but I felt that I had done everything possible to set the conditions for our ultimate success. It had been a long 32 months, but I believe that the efforts of the men and women who served in Iraq during that period drove a signifi- cant transformation in the U.S. military and established the conditions for the ultimate success of our mission in Iraq. The completion of the UN political timeline that led to an Iraqi constitution and the seating of an Iraqi government based on that constitution in just 24 months established Iraq as a democratic state after over 3% decades of totali- tarian rule—a significant historical accomplishment. The growth of the Iraqi security forces from a relative handful of army battalions and po- lice forces to a force of over 325,000 that was actively participating in securing their country and had held together during difficult sectarian violence is a tribute to the men and women from over 30 countries who trained, mentored, and fought beside them. This growth established the 151 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS the hardest to do-for example, getting the strategy right in very uncertain environments; instilling the strategy in the organization; driving organizational change; influencing organizational culture; sustaining momentum; and influencing key partners not under your direct control. By their nature, these things are complex and difficult and do not lend themselves to simple solutions. They re- quire the time, energy, and experience of the senior leaders in the organization to be done effectively. What follows are some insights in those areas for future leaders. Developing Vision and Strategy The question that I asked most in Iraq, and, interestingly, the one I asked most as Army chief of staff, is, “What are we really trying to accomplish?" I found that this question was hard to answer clearly and succinctly in the complex and uncertain environment of Iraq. Yet it was imperative that I clearly articulated to my subordinates what it was I wanted them to do if we were going to be successful. A fuzzy idea coming out of the four-star headquarters did not get clearer as it was transmitted through the chain of command. Accordingly, we spent a lot of time and intellectual effort sharpening our views of what we wanted to accomplish in Iraq and for major operations, for example, Fallujah, elections, the western Euphrates campaign, and Baghdad. The Army's primary doctrinal manual, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, offers a construct to assist commanders in framing solutions to difficult problems-understand, visualize, describe, direct-and, although we did not think of what we did in those terms at the time, that is what Ambassador Negroponte and I did initially as we grappled with the mission. We both felt that we 154 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS I found that writing things out caused me to think more clearly about issues, so I personally wrote several of the key segments of the first campaign plan (for example, mission, intent, risks). We built a deliberate assessment process into the campaign plan because we knew the plan would require continuous adjustment. As part of this process, we forced ourselves to challenge our assump- tions and ask ourselves hard questions about the efficacy of the plan. The assessments proved useful in adapting our efforts to changing realities. I also found there was constant tension between retaining focus on the broader campaign and adapting to short-term changes in the environment. One of the ways that we used to mitigate this tension was to publish annual campaign action plans that allowed us to retain the focus on our broad counterinsurgency campaign while dealing with shorter term issues. The annual action plans also proved helpful in maintaining continuity through the transition of subordi- nate units and staffs. I am convinced that one of the hardest things for leaders to do in complex and uncertain environments is to get clarity in their minds on what it is they want their subordinates to accomplish to achieve success. Because it is so hard, it takes the full involvement and com- mitment of the senior leader to accomplish it successfully. Creating Unity of Effort Another difficult challenge for senior leaders is to create unity of effort among organizations whose cooperation is necessary for their success, but that are not under their direct control. The National Secu- rity Presidential Directive issued in May of 2004 established the division of labor between the Departments of State and Defense for the mission 156 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS Building the “One Team” was equally challenging. The old adage that “Defense is from Mars and State is from Venus” just scratches the surface of the cultural differences between two profes- sional communities. Given human nature, major institutional and cultural differences do not disappear in a war zone, and working through them requires the continuous involvement of senior lead- ers. The Ambassadors and I went to great lengths to bring the two organizations together and keep them moving in the same direction to accomplish our national goals in Iraq. We used the Red Team concept frequently to keep us intellectually aligned. We collocated our offices, traveled together, and consulted regularly and visibly to ensure our subordinates saw us linked together. We integrated our headquarters with the Embassy to provide the physical proximity necessary for effective coordination. Sustaining the One Team/One Mission concept between the Embassy and MNF-I took a lot of the personal time and effort of the Ambassadors and me, particularly with the annual rotation of staffs and two changes of Ambassador. Over our initial weeks on the ground, the Ambassador and I wrestled with the implications of Iraqi sovereignty on our efforts. The United States had returned sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government on June 28 and the Coalition Provisional Author- ity had appointed Ayad Allawi as the interim prime minister. We recognized that unless we shared our vision and plans with the Iraqi leadership, we would not only generate unproductive friction between us, but also be unable to leverage the influence of the gov- ernment in support of our efforts. While the Iraqi government had publicly accepted MNF-I presence, the modalities of coordinating our operations had to be worked out. We set out to establish them 158 INSIGHTS FOR LEADERS in a way that respected Iraqi sovereignty but that retained our free- dom of action. Sovereignty meant that the Iraqis had a vote and that things would not necessarily get done the way we wanted when we wanted. The Ambassador and I would have to balance Washington's directives and timelines with the needs and desires of the sovereign Iraqi government. It was a delicate balancing act, and one that re- quired our almost constant attention. I cannot overstate the benefit we got from spending the time to establish strong personal relations with Iraqi leaders. Strong personal relationships can help bridge the frictions that will always be encountered. My staff and I found that we spent a lot of time integrating the efforts of the Embassy, three Iraqi governments, and MNF-I. There were frustrating days when I asked myself whether this was the best use of our time. In the end, I saw it as my headquarters’ responsibili- ty to work with the Embassy and the Iraqi government to deliver the political, economic, and communications effects that would make MNC-I security operations successful and sustainable. Just gener- ating these effects in a postconflict state, let alone integrating them at the required time, was very hard work. In the end, I believe that creating unity of effort among diverse entities beyond your control is, and will continue to be, one of the key tasks that will require the attention of senior leaders in 21"-century warfare. Continuous Assessment and Adaptation In long missions such as Operation Iraqi Freedom where leaders are intensely immersed in difficult issues daily, it is easy to lose your perspective on the larger mission. I found that we had to create op- portunities to get leadership to take a step back and look broadly at 159 INSIGHTS FOR LEADERS planning. As it is a constant struggle for senior leaders to get their sub- ordinates to share their doubts with them, I left the development of this assessment to the staff and the writing to the gifted colonels in our plans and assessment shop. I found the anonymity of the staff process produced greater candor. I found this process and product most help- ful in seeing broad changes required in the mission and in developing our annual action plans. We used these assessments to adapt the mis- sion over time. For example, the need to get better visibility on and performance from Iraqi security forces that led to the development of the transition team and partnership programs came from the Decem- ber 2004 assessment. A shift in the nature of the most significant threat from former regime elements to Islamic extremists that took place in the spring and summer of 2005 and led to the western Euphrates and Tal Afar operations later that year was identified in the June 2005 as- sessment. The significant shift in the nature of the conflict that took place after the Samarra bombing in 2006 and that led to an increased focus on Baghdad and operations to lessen sectarian tensions later that year came from the June 2006 assessment. There were three other forums that also enhanced our ability to adapt. The first was the monthly intelligence update where our intel- ligence officer reviewed intelligence trends with the staff and me. I found this forum most useful for putting the insights and thoughts that I had accumulated over the month into perspective. It allowed me to better assess the impact of individual incidents in a broad- er context. The second was the monthly commanders’ conference where I sought to balance the MNF-I view of the mission with the views of the division and corps commanders. While I generally vis- ited each of the divisions once or twice a month, having them share 161 INSIGHTS FOR LEADERS that it would be tough to change this mindset, but in an environ- ment where distinguishing the enemy was very difficult and civilian casualties bred additional enemies, we would have to do it. Second, I worried that our “can-do” attitude would make it harder for us to get the Iraqis trained and responsible for their own security—the precondition of our ultimate success. I saw the impact of this at- titude myself in Bosnia and Kosovo. In complex environments, it is very difficult to get even simple things done, so the natural tendency is to do them yourself. I had to find a way to get our troops to focus on Iraqi solutions without damaging the can-do spirit that sets U.S. Servicemembers apart, and that we would need to succeed. To do this, I realized that I was attempting to change deeply em- bedded Service culture and that I would have to change the mindset of the force. I greatly underestimated how long this would take. We began by clearly stating in our campaign plan mission statement that we were conducting counterinsurgency operations to send the mes- sage to the force that we were doing something different than they had been trained for. I reinforced this in my discussions with leaders during their campaign plan backbriefs. But that was hardly enough, and shortly thereafter we took measures to improve our understanding and application of coun- terinsurgency doctrine. We had MNF-I staff take a historical look at successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency practices in the 20" century, and disseminated their work to the force and to Service trainers who were preparing the next rotation. Our efforts continued with the implementation of the transi- tion team and partnership concepts in early 2005. For the first time since Vietnam, we were asking conventional forces to be involved 163 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS in the training of indigenous forces during a war—another sig- nificant cultural change. The establishment of Phoenix Academy to train all of the incoming transition team members, use of Spe- cial Forces to train conventional forces in the art of working with indigenous forces, and development of the “flat-assed rules” to communicate the new mindset to every member of the command played key roles in driving cultural change in our forces. This was a start, but we slowly began to realize that changing the organiza- tional culture embedded in the Services for decades was not going to happen overnight. In the summer of 2005, I chartered a survey of how we were applying counterinsurgency doctrine across the force. The study found that, while we generally knew the doctrine, it was being ap- plied unevenly across the command, and the application was very dependent on the local commander's knowledge and initiative. It recommended that we establish a COIN Academy to augment the training that they were getting at home station to ensure that enter- ing commanders started with a common view of how to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. We conducted the first class in November of 2005 and began to see an appreciable change in the conduct of our operations throughout 2006 as all company, battalion, and brigade commanders began to rotate through the weeklong course before they began their tours in Iraq. Continuing change was facilitated with the publishing of the joint Army— Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual in December 2006, an essential element of driving cultural change within the Services. In the end, I found that as our lessons learned were continu- ously incorporated into Service training programs and more soldiers 164 INSIGHTS FOR LEADERS came back for second and third tours, I saw continuous improve- ment in the preparedness of the forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations and work with the Iraqi forces. Recognizing the impacts of organizational culture comes from the experience of growing up in the culture. Recognizing the potential impacts in new situations requires a broader perspective and is intuitive work. It is the work of senior leaders. Civil-Military Interaction Civil-military interaction around matters of policy and strategy is inherently challenging. The issues are complex, the stakes are high, and the backgrounds of the people involved can vary widely. The interac- tion only gets more difficult in war, and is particularly difficult with leaders from other cultures. Developing plans and strategies, report- ing, managing expectations, and developing and providing military advice to civilian leaders all require the senior leader's full attention. My previous experience at the policy level in Washington taught me not to expect written direction from civilian leaders, and that proved the case in Iraq. We developed the initial campaign plan based upon my verbal discussions with the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman, the direction provided in the President's Army War College speech, UNSCR 1546 and its attached letters, written guidance from the USCENTCOM commander, and my interactions on the ground in Iraq with Iraqi and coalition leaders. The Ambassador and I developed our strategy and campaign plan to accomplish the endstate that we created from this guidance and presented it for approval by the Secretary of Defense and President in August of 2004. 165 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS Throughout the mission, I had interaction with Washington sev- eral times a week usually in the form of secure conference calls and video teleconferences, most with the Secretary of Defense, Chair- man, and USCENTCOM commander, and weekly in a National Security Council meeting chaired by the President. These sessions were designed to keep Washington up to date on the situation in Iraq. In them, I would usually present a short update and highlight upcoming events to avoid surprises. I would then answer questions. Periodically, about every 4 to 6 months, I would return to Wash- ington for face-to-face discussions. This was essential because it is difficult to have substantive discussions on a video teleconference that includes a dozen Cabinet-level leaders with staff often operating from multiple sites. It is also much easier to get a sense of how your presentation is being received in person. The Secretary of Defense and Chairman would also visit several times a year, presenting the best opportunity for discussion and interaction. I had almost daily interaction with General Abizaid by secure telephone and face-to- face contact several times a month during his visits to Iraq or my visits to his headquarters in Qatar. His broader perspective was in- valuable in seeing the Iraq mission in the context of the larger war and region. It is difficult for subordinates to communicate to their superiors the depth of the complexity that they are dealing with. It is no differ- ent at the strategic level. I worked hard to provide a balanced view of what was occurring in Iraq– the bad with the good. I realized early on that, as I had the direct interactions with civilian leaders, I had the best understanding of what they needed, so I found that I spent a lot of my time and intellectual energy preparing properly balanced 166 INSIGHTS FOR LEADERS presentations for Washington. I felt that it was very important to convey the right balance in the presentations to avoid creating false expectations. I was not uniformly successful. I found it difficult to keep the discussions at a level that would provide civilian leaders with the insights they required to develop the strategies and policies essential for success. Even at the strategic level, leaders can get capti- vated by tactical actions. Setting common expectations is another difficult but essential task. In any military campaign plan, it is important to set objec- tives and make judgments on when they will be accomplished. As senior military leaders, we owe our civilian leaders our best views on how long things will take. When we offer our views, we need to be clear that in war things will change and assumptions will prove invalid. I would often conclude a briefing in which I made key projections with a slide entitled “Bad Things That Could Happen” to make this point. When I was conveying timelines, I was very conscious that precious little in Iraq got accomplished right on time, so I would often convey projections to Washington “seasonally”—for example, we would complete a certain task by “the summer of 2006”—to give them a perspective on time with- out getting unnecessarily specific. A key expectation to resolve is how to measure progress at the strategic level. Going into Iraq, we made a conscious decision not to use enemy casualties—body count—to measure strategic progress. I believe that was the right decision, but the unintended consequence was that our casualties were reported and the enemy's were not. It appeared to some domestic audiences that the enemy had the up- per hand—which was not at all true. Over time, I began selectively 167 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS reporting enemy losses to give a more balanced picture of the situa- tion to our home audiences. We looked at a variety of ways to measure progress at the stra- tegic level, primarily focusing on significant events and milestones that, linked together, would demonstrate steady progress toward our ultimate endstate (for example, elimination of terrorist safe havens, success in major military operations, successful elections, completion of the UN timeline, seating of governments, meeting developmental gates for the ISF, transferring security responsibility to Iraqis). As these major events took months and even years to ac- complish, I found that they did not compete with the daily reports of casualties and violence as a means of expressing our progress. While I disagreed with using daily casualty and violence levels as the measures of our strategic progress (they were measures of the enemy's tactical capacity and a measure of our overall progress), in retrospect, I believe that, over time, casualties and violence became the de facto measure of strategic progress in Iraq, and I should have forced a more in-depth discussion with my civilian leadership about their strategic expectations. I had civil-military interaction with three Iraqi prime min- isters and three different sets of cabinet ministers. I treated the Iraqi leaders with the respect due civilian political leaders, and worked to provide them with the key elements of military ad- vice necessary for their decisionmaking. The list I provided Prime Minister al-Maliki when I departed was a compilation of the key areas I had come to believe that civilian and military lead- ers should discuss in preparing for military operations. As with any difficult issue, I found that productive civil-military interac- 168 INSIGHTS FOR LEADERS tion is an iterative process that requires a continuous dialogue among civil-military principals until a common understanding is reached. I found that this common understanding is heightened by clearly sharpening differences of opinion rather than papering over them to gain consensus. In the latter months of 2006 and early 2007, I was consumed with civil-military interaction with civilian leaders in both Baghdad and Washington. As we finalized our plan to secure Baghdad, we worked with Iraqi leadership to cement Iraqi political support for the mission and gain their commitment to the plan's success. The Ambassador and I had long daily sessions with the prime minister and his security ministers, pounding out the details of the plan and ensuring our forces would have freedom of action once they were committed. Once the plan was approved just before Christmas, we turned our attention to the execution of the plan, a phase that re- quired fairly constant interaction with Iraqi leaders that continued through my departure in February. Simultaneously, we were participating in the Washington re- view of Iraq policy and strategy that also concluded just before Christmas 2006. The review involved numerous long sessions by video teleconference and had an implementation phase for the announcement and execution of the new policy that continued through January. The transition between Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Gates in November and December further complicated the civil-military situation. Someone told me once that the decisionmaking process at the national level is “idiosyncratic at best.” That is an important lesson for future leaders when providing military advice. Do not look for 169 INSIGHTS FOR LEADERS Embassy leadership was kept abreast of the planning, to include participation, with ISF leadership in a rehearsal of the operational concept. In providing security for the January 2005 elections, the imposition of last-minute curfews and driving bans by the inte- rior minister at our request helped disrupt the insurgents’ ability to affect the elections. I found that it was not necessary to share tactical details, but giving political and diplomatic leaders a broad idea of what to expect greatly facilitated their ability to support the operation. Political-military interaction was less productive with both of the elected Iraqi governments that followed. I can only surmise that the greater demand for sovereignty by both subsequent govern- ments affected their ability and willingness to take political risk to support Iraqi and coalition military operations. We had some suc- cess with the Iraqi Transitional Government in winning support for the Tal Afar operation in September 2005 and with the agreement the ITG made with Anbar provincial leaders in early 2006 to bring An- baris into the security forces, to provide money for reconstruction in Anbar, and to release some Anbari prisoners. We were not able to gain their support for weapons and militia bans that would have facilitated our operations to secure Baghdad. I go into some detail about the political-military integration with the constitutionally elected government of prime minister al-Maliki. The desire of the government for greater say in security actions and a differing view of the threat created frictions that took some months to get through. That said, the Prime Minister's Army Day speech in January of 2007 is a good example of political leaders building public support for military action. 171 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS string together a series of political successes that would continue moving the country in a positive direction. By linking these with military operations, we hoped to break the sectarian stalemate that was strangling the county. Unfortunately, the idea never gained the committed support of the newly elected Iraqi leaders. On the military side, the semiannual and annual transitions of units and staffs affected our momentum, but, largely because of the significant effort made by the Services to prepare their forces, the substantial interaction that took place between units before the new units arrived, and our in-theater training and integration efforts, we were able to somewhat mitigate the impact. I began visiting all newly arrived brigades in early 2005 within 30 days of their arrival to give them a theater overview and to ensure that the leadership clearly understood their mission. With the development of the Phoenix Academy in early 2005 and the COIN Academy in November 2005, I spoke to every class, providing an overview similar to what I provided the brigades. In order to maintain mo- mentum, I felt that it was important incoming leaders heard my expectations directly from me. I was generally pleased with the unit transition process, but usually I found during my post-transition visits that there was something major that got dropped. For example, the troops that came into an area after a major battle usually did not have the same intensity and commitment to the reconstruction effort as those that had won the victory, and new troops generally seemed to believe that the war began with their arrival. It was human na- ture at work. The post-transition visits helped with maintaining continuity and momentum. 174 INSIGHTS FOR LEADERS Maintaining momentum through political and military transi- tions is another area that is more art than science, and an area of important effort for senior leaders. Sustaining Yourself One of the toughest challenges for senior leaders in deployed environments is to sustain their physical, mental, and emotional fit- ness at levels that allow them to deal with the complex challenges confronting them. I watched four corps's worth of senior leaders come through Iraq. I encouraged each of them to establish a regimen where they got sufficient rest, exercise, and intellectual stimulation so that they could provide their subordinates the direction they needed for success in Iraq. I told them that to sustain themselves for the duration of the mission, they needed to find quality time every day to REST: read-exercise-sleep-think. I had found this a useful formula for myself during my time in Bosnia and began to share it with my subordinate leaders as they entered Kosovo in 2000. I prac- ticed it myself in Iraq. Read. Sometimes the hardest thing to come by after you have been deployed for a while is a fresh idea. Staffs, especially when there are frequent rotations, tend to fall into repeating “facts” based on shared conventional wisdom. I strongly encouraged leaders to find quiet time daily to read something besides their email, their inbox, or intelligence as a way to stimulate new insights. I read every night before I went to sleep and found that it had the added benefit of slowing a mind that was spinning with the events of the day down to the point I could get to sleep. I read a wide variety of books, from T.E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom to David 175 INSIGHTS FOR LEADERS Over time, I learned to watch myself to know when I was not at my best. If I got to the point where I did not feel like I was capable of providing creative inputs to the challenges we were dealing with, I looked for the opportunity to get a short break. I also made it a point to take at least a week off outside of Iraq every year and to ensure that all of my subordinates took advantage of R&R leave. Preserving your physical, mental, and emotional strength is critical to the ability to lead at the strategic level. Operation Iraqi Freedom is part of the larger story of the Unit- ed States of America adapting to the security challenges thrust on us by the al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001. The world we live in is in a period of continuous and fundamental change as technol- ogy's continuous march ties us closer and closer together and puts the instruments of catastrophic destruction in the hands of nonstate actors. As a result, war in the 21" century will not be like the conven- tional war that I spent 30 years of a 40-year career training to fight. It will also not be just like Iraq or Afghanistan. At the tactical level, it will be as uncertain and as difficult and as brutal as war has always been. I believe, however, that the complexities of the international security environment will only increase at the operational and stra- tegic levels, bringing greater challenges for senior leaders. We will require agile, adaptive senior leaders to handle the challenges of war in the second decade of the 21" century. It is my hope that this book will contribute to the development of those leaders. 177 APPENDIX 1 MIN COORD: [Iraq] Minister Coordination MNB: Multi-National Brigade MNC-I: Multi-National Corps-Iraq MND: Multi-National Division MNF-I: Multi-National Force-Iraq MNSTC-I: Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq MOD: Ministry of Defense MOI: Ministry of Interior N NSC: National Security Council NSPD: National Security Presidential Directive NSVI: National Strategy for Victory in Iraq O OIF: Operation Iraqi Freedom OPNS: operations OTF: Operation Together Forward P PAO: public affairs officer PERS: personnel PLANS: planning POLICY DEV/INT: Policy Development and Integration R RM: Resource Management S SCJS: Secretary of the Combined and Joint Staff SJA: Staff Judge Advocate SOC: Special Operations Command STRATEGY: strategy planning 181 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS T TACON: tactical control TF 134: Task Force 134 (Detainee Operations) TF 6-26: Task Force 6-26 (Special Operations Task Force) TRA: transition readiness assessment U UK: United Kingdom UN: United Nations UNSCR: United Nations Security Council Resolution USCENTCOM: U.S. Central Command 182 APPENDIX 2: THE COALITION, JULY 2004 Albania Macedonia Australia Moldova Azerbaijan Mongolia Bulgaria Netherlands Czech Republic New Zealand Denmark Norway El Salvador Republic of the Philippines Estonia Poland Georgia Portugal Hungary Romania Italy Singapore Japan Slovakia Jordan Thailand Kazakhstan United Arab Emirates Republic of Korea Ukraine Latvia United Kingdom Lithuania Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not just a seminal experience for the U.S. military. Forces from more than 38 countries contributed effectively to the operation. As with the U.S. forces, the OIF experience had transformative effects on all the militaries that participated. The list above shows the 33 countries that were providing 23,000 forces to OIF when I assumed command in July of 2004. Armenia and Bosnia-Herze- govinia were added in 2005. Coalition participation held fairly constant throughout my command tenure until completion of the United Nations timeline in De- cember 2005 when it began to decrease. By the end of 2006 we had about two-thirds of the coalition forces that we had when I arrived in 2004. 183 APPENDIX 3: LEADERSHIP IN IRAQ, 2004-2007 Iraqi Leaders June 28, 2004-May 3, 2005: Iraqi Interim Government Prime Minister: Ayad Allawi Minister of Defense: Hazem Shaalan Minister of Interior: Falah Hassan al-Naqib National Security Advisor: Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie* May 3, 2005–May 20, 2006: Iraqi Transitional Government Prime Minister: Ibrahim al-Jafari Minister of Defense: Saadoun al-Dulaimi Minister of Interior: Bayan Baqir Solagh National Security Advisor: Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie May 20, 2006-June 14, 2010: Government of Iraq Prime Minister: Nuri al-Maliki Minister of Defense: Qadir Obeidi Minister of Interior: Jawad al-Bulani National Security Advisor: Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie U.S. Ambassadors June 2004–March 2005: John D. Negroponte March 2005-July 2005: James F. Jeffrey (U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission and U.S. Chargé d'affaires) July 2005–March 2007: Zalmay Khalilzad * Dr. Rubaie was appointed to a 5-year term in 2004. 184 APPENDIX 3 MNF-I Leaders Commander GEN George Casey, USA, July 2004-February 2007 Command Sergeant Major CSM Jeff Mellinger, USA, August 2004-May 2007 Deputy Commanding General Lt Gen John McColl (UK), May 2004–October 2004 Lt Gen John Kiszley (UK), October 2004-April 2005 Lt Gen Robin Brims (UK), April 2005-October 2005 Lt Gen Nick Houghton (UK), October 2005-February 2006 Lt Gen Rob Fry (UK), March 2006-September 2006 Lt Gen Graham Lamb (UK), September 2006–March 2007 Chief of Staff MajGen Joe Weber, USMC, March 2004-April 2005 MajGen Tim Donovan, USMC, May 2005-May 2006 Maj Gen Thomas “Tango” Moore, USMC, May 2006-May 2007 MNC-I Commander LTG Tom Metz, USA, January 2004–January 2005 (III Corps) LTG John Vines, USA, January 2005-January 2006 (XVIII Airborne Corps) LTG Peter Chiarelli, USA, January 2006-December 2006 (V Corps) LTG Ray Odierno, USA, December 2006-December 2007 (III Corps) MNSTC-I Commander LTG Dave Petraeus, USA, June 2004–September 2005 LTG Marty Dempsey, USA, September 2005–March 2007 185 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS Special Operations Task Force LTG Stan McChrystal, USA, September 2003–August 2008 Deputy Commanding General for Detainee Operations MG Geoff Miller, USA, April 2004–October 2004 MG Bill Brandenburg, USA, November 2004–November 2005 MG Jack Gardner, USA, November 2005–December 2006 MajGen Doug Stone, USMC, December 2006–September 2007 Gulf Region Division-Corps of Engineers MG Tom Bostick, USA, June 2004-June 2005 MG Bill McCoy, USA, June 2005–October 2006 BG Mike Walsh, USA, October 2006 October 2007 Joint Contracting Command MG John Urias, USA, January 2005–January 2006 Maj Gen Darryl Scott, USAF, February 2006–October 2007 Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects MG Hank Stratman, USA, June 2004-July 2005 MG Rick Lynch, USA, June 2005-July 2006 MG Bill Caldwell, USA, June 2006-May 2007 Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy, Plans, and Assessment Maj Gen Steve Sargent, USAF, December 2003–May 2005 Maj Gen Rusty Findley, USAF, May 2005-May 2006 Maj Gen Kurt Cichowski, USAF, May 2006–May 2007 Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Operations MG Tom Miller, USA, July 2003–August 2004 MG Jim Molan (AUS), September 2004–April 2005 MG Eldon Bargewell, USA, April 2005-June 2006 MG Dave Fastabend, USA, June 2006-June 2007 186 APPENDIX 3 3 Joint Interagency Task Force-High Value Individuals BG Frank Kearney, USA, August 2004-July 2005 BG Craig Broadwater, USA, August 2005-January 2006 Brig Gen Mike Longoria, USAF, January 2006-July 2006 Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence MG Barbara Fast, USA, July 2003-August 2004 MG John Defreitas, USA, August 2004-July 2005 MG Rick Zahner, USA, July 2005-October 2006 BG Dave Lacquement, USA, October 2006–September 2007 Deputy Chief of Staff for Coalition Operations BG De Pascale (HUN), May 2004-November 2004 BG Alessio Cecchetti (IT), October 2005-April 2006 BG Pier Paolo Lunelli (IT), May 2006-November 2006 BG Dan Neagoe (ROM), November 2006-February 2007 Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications and Information Systems RADM Nancy Brown, USN, August 2004-March 2005 Brig Gen Rick Dinkins, USAF, March 2005-December 2005 Brig Gen Gary Connor, USAF, December 2005–December 2006 Brig Gen Ronnie Hawkins, USAF, December 2006– December 2007 Deputy Chief of Staff for Resources and Sustainment BG Scott West, USA, July 2003-June 2004 BG Gerry Minetti, USA, July 2004-July 2005 MG Kathy Gainey, USA, July 2005–September 2006 BG Steve Anderson, USA, September 2006-August 2007 187 APPENDIX 4 Graph A4-1. Iraqi Security Forces Growth 325K 90K 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 March 2005 November 2005 March 2006 November 2006 July 2004 September 2004 November 2004 January 2005 May 2005 July 2005 September 2005 January 2006 May 2006 July 2006 September 2006 January 2007 Ministry of Defense Forces Border Enforcement Iraqi Regular Police Service Other Police 189 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS Graph A4-2. Army Transition Readiness Assessment Growth 140 642 14 |13|12 120 8 || 9 ILUK 9 10 7 6 18 | 10119 100 13 +23+19+21+23 21 15 151 15 33 51 3228 9 80 47 +40 44 60 +55+49- 60 +55+ + -85 +55 50 -85+85784 52 54 78 81 76 | 76 40 661 59 | 60 60 52 44 20 31731735737439 23 1 3 2 0 21/ 5 557 8 8 9 13 12 12 0 October 2006 November 2006 December 2006 December 2005 August 2005 September 2005 October 2005 November 2005 July 2005 June 2005 January 2007 April 2006 May 2006 March 2006 January 2006 February 2006 July 2006 August 2006 June 2006 September 2006 Level 1: Independent Level 2: In the lead w/CF support Level 3: Side by side Level 4: Unit being formed 190 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS November 8–18, 2004 Battle of Fallujah. December 5, 2004 First Campaign Progress Review published. December 14–20, 2004 GEN Casey returns to Washington for consultations. Also visits Fort Bragg to direct incoming XVIII Corps to begin preparing to implement partnership and transition teams on arrival with internal assets. January 30, 2005 Iraqis vote to elect a Transitional National Assembly in first democratic elections in Iraq since 1954. Eight million Iraqis—58 percent of electorate-turn out to vote. February-May 2005 Iraqi government transitions from Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) to Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG). February 7, 2005 Second U.S. Embassy/MNF-I joint mission statement, “ A Plan for the Year Ahead: Transition to Self-Reliance,” published. February 10, 2005 Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) transition of authority from III Corps, commanded by LTG Tom Metz, to XVIII Airborne Corps, commanded by LTG John Vines. March 2005 Ambassador Negroponte departs Iraq. April 2005 Phoenix Academy, a training center for incoming transition teams, established. 194 APPENDIX 5 April 22, 2005 MNF-I campaign action plan, “Transition to Self-Reliance,” published, emphasizing development of Iraqi security forces (ISF) capacity and establishing transition team and partnership programs and initial framework for transition of security responsibility to Iraqis. May 2005 Transition readiness assessment developed to measure ISF capabilities. First report delivered in June. May 2005 ITG seated. Transitional National Assembly begins drafting constitution. June 15, 2005 Seven Provincial Support Teams, the predecessor to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), established. June 22, 2005 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad arrives. June 22–28, 2005 GEN Casey visits Washington for consultations. June 27, 2005 Second Campaign Progress Review (December 2004–June 2005) published. July–August 2005 MNF-I conducts survey to determine how well coalition forces are applying counterinsurgency doctrine. July–December 2005 MNF-I military operations focus on restoring Iraqi control to Iraq's western border. Third Armored Cavalry Regiment reinforces Tal Afar—Mosul corridor. Western Euphrates River Valley campaign conducted in Anbar Province. 195 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS August 16, 2005 U.S.-Iraqi Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility established to set conditions for gradual transition of security to appropriate Iraqi authorities. September 2005 Intelligence task force established to track sectarian violence in Iraq. September 2005 COIN Academy established; first class conducted in November 2005. September 5, 2005 Command of Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq changes from LTG David Petraeus to LTG Martin Dempsey. September 10, 2005 Assessment on transition teams published. September 27–October 3, 2005 GEN Casey visits Washington for consultations. October 2005 Responsibility for developing Ministry of the Interior (MOI) moved from U.S. Embassy to MNF-I. October 15, 2005 Iraqis approve constitution drafted by Transitional National Assembly. Ten million Iraqis vote; 78.6 favor constitution. October 30, 2005 “Strategic Planning Directive (November 2005–April 2006)— Making the Elections Decisive” published to bridge uncertainty of new government formation period. Tenets include “Al Qaeda out,” “Sunni in,” and “ISF in the lead.” 196 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS March 14–June 14, 2006 Operation Scales of Justice stabilizes situation in Baghdad sufficiently to allow establishment of constitutionally elected government of Iraq. April 21, 2006 Nuri al-Maliki chosen to replace Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari, becoming the first democratically elected prime minister of Iraq under new constitution. April 28, 2006 New joint campaign plan, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Transition to Iraqi Self-Reliance,” published, projecting December 2009 as time when Iraqis would be self-reliant for security. May 20, 2006 Prime Minister al-Maliki's government confirmed by Iraqi parliament. Security ministers not confirmed for 2 more weeks. June 7, 2006 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, killed during U.S. air raid. June 7, 2006 New security ministers confirmed. June 9, 2006 Joint campaign action plan, “Unity, Security, Prosperity,” published. June 12, 2006 Camp David discussions. Ambassador Khalilzad and GEN Casey participate by secure video teleconference. June 14, 2006 Fourth Campaign Progress Review published. 198 APPENDIX 5 5 June 15–August 6, 2006 Operation Together Forward I (Baghdad security), the new government's first attempt to halt sectarian violence in capital, meets with initial success but flounders as ISF do not consistently hold cleared areas. June 19–23, 2006 GEN Casey visits Washington for consultations. July 13, 2006 Muthanna becomes first Iraqi province to assume security responsibility. July 18, 2006 Anticipated off-ramp of U.S. forces canceled. July 19, 2006 Joint Committee to Achieve Iraqi Security Self-Reliance established to refine framework for Iraqi assumption of security responsibility, continuing work of Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility. July 28, 2006 172nd Stryker Brigade extended 4 months in Iraq to address sharp increase in sectarian violence. August 7-October 22, 2006 Operation Together Forward II (Baghdad security) initiated to reduce sectarian violence before Ramadan. September 21, 2006 Dhi Qar becomes second Iraqi province to assume security responsibility. October-December 2006 U.S. Government review of Iraq policy. October 7-11, 2006 GEN Casey visits Washington for consultations. 199 APPENDIX 5 January 6, 2007 In Iraqi Army Day speech, Prime Minister al-Maliki announces government support for ISF and new Baghdad security plan and agrees to take action against “all who break the law.” January 10, 2007 President Bush delivers speech to Nation, announcing deployment of five brigades to Iraq. February 8, 2007 GEN Casey confirmed as Army chief of staff. February 10, 2007 GEN Casey passes command of MNF-I to GEN Petraeus. 201 NOTES Chapter 1 1 National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004. 2 Ibid. · George W. Bush, speech at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, May 24, 2004. 4 Ibid. 5 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, June 8, 2004. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Donald Rumsfeld, memo to General John Abizaid, “Support for Other Government Activities in Iraq,” April 27, 2004. ? Donald Rumsfeld, memo, “Some Thoughts on Iraq and How to Think about It,” June 7, 2004. 10 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Advance Questions for General George W. Casey, Jr., U.S. Army, Nominee for Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq,” June 24, 2004. 11 Bush, speech. Chapter 2 John P. Abizaid, memo to General Casey, “Initial Guidance,” July 1, 2004. 2 Red Team, “Building Legitimacy and Confronting Insurgency in Iraq,” July 15, 2004. 3 Ibid. * Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and U.S. Mission- Iraq, “MNF-I-Embassy Joint Mission Statement,” August 18, 2004. 5 MNF-I campaign plan, “Operation Iraqi Freedom- Partnership: From Occupation to Constitutional Elections,” August 5, 2004. 203 STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS •Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, presentation to the Secretary of Defense, “IPR [In-Progress Review] with Secretary of Defense,” August 4, 2004. ? Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, presentation to the Secretary of Defense, “IPR with Secretary of Defense,” July 14, 2004. 8 Bill Hix and Kalev Sepp, “Successful and Unsuccessful Counterinsurgency Practices,” January 22, 2005. 'MNF-I, “MNF-I 5-Month Campaign Progress Review,” December 5, 2004. 10 George W. Casey, Jr., “Iraq Update,” December 16, 2004. Chapter 3 George W. Casey, Jr., memo to General Abizaid, “The Way Ahead for 2005,” January 5, 2005. 2 Ibid. 'MNF-I, “Joint Mission Statement,” February 7, 2005. Emphasis added. 4 Ibid. 5 MNF-I, “Joint Campaign Action Plan,” April 22, 2005. “MNF-I, “Campaign Progress Review (December 2004-June 2005),” June 27, 2005. George W. Casey, Jr., congressional testimonies before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, June 23, 2005. 8 MNF-I, “Strategic Planning Directive (November 2005–April 2006)-Making the Elections Decisive,” October 30, 2005. °MNF-I, “The September Assessment [of Transition Teams],” September 10, 2005. 10 George W. Bush, radio address, October 15, 2005. 11 George W. Casey, Jr., presentation to Stephen Hadley, “Iraq Campaign Plan,” September 17, 2005. 12 NSC, “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” November 2005. 13 MNF-I and U.S. Mission-Iraq, “Joint Mission Statement,” December 6, 2005. 14 MNF-I, “Campaign Progress Review,” December 20, 2005. 204 NOTES Chapter 4 George W. Casey, Jr., presentation to National Security Council, “MNF-I Update,” January 5, 2006. 2 MNF-I, “Strategic Directive: Golden Mosque Bombing,” February 24, 2006. 3 MNF-I and U.S. Mission-Iraq, “Joint Campaign Plan,” April 28, 2006. * Ibid. - George W. Casey, Jr., presentation to NSC at Camp David, “Joint Campaign Plan,” June 12, 2006. • MNF-I and U.S. Mission-Iraq, “Joint Campaign Progress Review,” June 14, 2006. Chapter 5 "George W. Casey, Jr., email to Generals Abizaid and Peter Pace, July 18, 2006. 2 James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” December 2006. 3 George W. Bush, speech to Nation, January 10, 2007. 205 INDEX congressional engagement, 6, 64–66, 135 construction projects, 41 Council of Representatives, 128 counterinsurgency academy, 73, 88, 164, 174 best practices summary, 45, 163 doctrine application, review, 73, 164 duration of, 45, 53 increased presence leads to reduced casualties, 96 manual for, 164 “Najaf model,” 41-42 need for popular support, 28 criminals, 27 culture importance of understanding Iraqi, 63 institutional change in, 162–163 interagency differences in, 158 organizational, 162–165 curfews, 90 initial plan 2004, 28–31 intent, 156 joint plan 2006, 96-98 presented to President Bush, 33, 104-105 Campaign Progress Reviews 2004 December, 46–48 2005 June, 64-66 2005 December, 78–79 2006 June, 107 2006 December, 200 described, 160–161 "can-do” attitude, impact on mission, 13, 57, 163 checkpoints, 112, 122–123 Chiarelli, Peter, LTG USA, 3, 88 civil authority integrating military efforts, 127 interactions with military, 165-170 civil war, 94-95 civilians attacks on, Baghdad and Diyala, 96, 110-111, 140 casualties in Baghdad, 140 as targets of attack, 70 clarity of thought, 154–156 clear-hold-build concept, 41 COIN. See counterinsurgency COIN Academy, 73, 88, 164, 174 command, lines of, 7-8 Commander's Assessment and Synchronization Board, 32–33, 160 commanders' conferences, 161 Commander's Emergency Response Program, 69 communication with civil authorities, 166 communication mission, 31 confirmation hearings for chief of staff of the Army, 149 for commander, MNF-I, 16-17 death squads attacks by, 110–111 casualties from, 140 Iranian training of, 116 relative importance of, 112-113 decisionmaking process, 169–170 Dempsey, Martin E., LTG USA, 3 Desert Protectors, 85 Diyala Province, 96, 110–111, 140 drawdowns 2006 cancellation, 113-115 2006 plans, 83, 107 economic development mission, 30–31 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 3 elections 2005 January, 49–50 2005 December, 80 2005 outcome possibilities, 46 deadlines for, 9 planning and preparation, 42–44 210 INDEX polarizing effect, 82 security efforts, 43 security planning, 39 suicide attacks as threat, 70–71 Sunni participation, 85–86 exercise, importance for leaders, 176 expectations, setting, 82–83, 166-167 Fallujah as haven for insurgents, 15 importance of reclaiming, 42 success in, 170 fighter networks, 70 "flat-assed rules," 62, 63 fusion centers, 71 Gates, Robert M., U.S. Secretary of Defense, 2, 144, 146, 148, 169 governance mission, 30-31 Green Zone, 36 group think, avoiding, 162 Iraq Civil Defense Corps. See also Iraqi National Guard inadequacy of, 15 Iraq Study Group, 135–137 Iraq Survey Group, 36 Iraqi army. See Iraqi security forces (ISF) Iraqi government (interim). See Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) Iraqi government (sovereign) coordination of efforts with, 158–159 differing view of threats, 112-113, 122–123 early establishment of, 19 legitimacy of, 28–29 Iraqi government (transitional). See Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) Iraqi National Guard, 38 Iraqi people independent action, encouragement of, 13 view of coalition forces, 54 Iraqi police. See also Iraqi security forces (ISF) 2005 updated plans for, 38 collaboration with militia, 119 deficiencies in, 15, 87–88, 110 delayed development, 72 sectarian influence, 91 transfer of responsibility for, 72 “Year of Police,” 87–88 Iraqi security forces (ISF) 2005 development priorities, 32 "face of” 2005 elections, 49-50 growth in capability, 105 growth in numbers, 189–191 "ISF in the lead” concept, 87 improving readiness, 54 initial review of, 38 Iraqi vision for, 15-16 transition concept, 60–61 troop goals, 9 Hadley, Stephen J., National Security Advisor, 2, 76, 138 headquarters organization, 33–34, 35 IEDs (improvised explosive devices) cause of casualties, 119 counter-efforts, 88–89 Iranian supply of, 116 Independent Iraqi Election Commission, 43 "Insurgency,” as term less useful, 104 insurgency, Red Team view of, 24-25, 27 intelligence updates, 161 Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) early assessment, 25 formation, 9 Iran concerns over influence, 92, 93, 95 countering influence of, 116 operatives captured, 145 211 INDEX Ninewah Province, 96, 111 Odierno, Raymond, T., LTG USA, 3 "off-ramp” plans. See drawdowns One Team/One Mission concept, 22, 30, 33, 37, 67, 152 building and sustaining, 158 formation, 10–11 unity of effort, 157 Operation Iraqi Freedom chronology, 192-201 Operation Scales of Justice, 90-91 Operation Together Forward, 110 Operation Together Forward II, 118–119 Red Teams 2006 actions, 116 avoiding group think, 162 election outcomes, 46 initial, 22-28 subsequent formations of, 67 unity of effort, 157–158 reporting, balance in, 53 reversing decisions, 115-116 Rice, Condoleezza, U.S. Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, 2 ROC drill, election, 50 rowboat analogy, 150 Rumsfeld, Donald H., U.S. Secretary of Defense, 2, 144, 169 consultations with, 48, 74, 76, 114 initial guidance, 13, 18 resignation, 126, 135 teleconferences with, 37–38 Pace, Peter, GEN USMC, 17th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2, 114, 135, 137, 138, 140, 144, 145 Partnership concept, 29, 58–59 Petraeus, David H., LTG USA, 3, 20, 146 change of command, 149, 151 ISF assessment leadership, 38 Phoenix Academy, 61, 164 policy review, Washington 2006, 135–138 political-military integration, 127, 170–172 Powell, Colin, U.S. Secretary of State, 2, 6, 16 presumption of confirmation, 14 prisons, Iraqi, 79 progress, measuring, 32–33, 46–47, 72, 160, 167-168 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), 68–69 public services, 112, 119 public support, as center of gravity, 28 Sadr City car bombs in, 129 clearance efforts, 112-113 safe haven elimination Fallujah, 42 Najaf, 40 Saladin Province, 140 Samarra bombing, 89–96 Sanchez, Ricardo, LTG USA, 20, 22 Schoomaker, Peter J., GEN USA, 5, 146 Secretary of Defense, U.S., 2. See also Gates, Robert M.; Rumsfeld, Donald H. Secretary of State, U.S., 7. See also Powell, Colin; Rice, Condoleezza sectarian violence 2005 increase in, 79 after Samarra bombing, 89-91 civilian focus, 110–111 geographic focus, 140 security challenges, Iraqi view of initial, 14-15 Ramadan, violence during, 118-119 Ramadi, 125 reading, importance for leaders, 175 reconciliation, importance of, 79, 86, 108, 114-115, 125-127, 135-142 reconstruction funding to PRTS, 69 213 INDEX United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) commander, 7, 19–20, 157, 165-166. See also Abizaid, John, GEN USA Unity, Security, and Prosperity plan, 100 unity of effort importance of, 156-159 One Team/One Mission concept, 10-11 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Regional Division, 36 U.S. Army partnership alignment with Iraqi army, 59 U.S. Army War College, 8 Washington consultations December 2004, 48–49, 53 January 2005, 64-66 December 2005, 81-83 June 2006, 104-108 October 2006, 123-124 December 2006, 145–146 Western Euphrates River Valley campaign, 70–71 “Wonder Bread” chart, 25, 27 Vines, John R., LTG USA, 3, 63, 64 visualizing, process of, 155 voter participation, 43-44, 74, 85-86 215