UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA CRUZ 3 2106 00080 7427 - -ーーーーーーー ​ーーーーーーーーーーーーー ​ HB 31 IRAQ'S PEOPLE AND · RESOURCES BY DORIS GOODRICH ADAMS UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS IN ECONOMICS Volume 18 THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY JAN 2 3.1900 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. SANTA CRUZ UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS · BERKELEY AND LOS ANGELES 1958 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS IN ECONOMICS VOLUME XVIII EDITORS H. S. ELLIS R. A. BRADY G. F. BREAK HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN TOSKA MEIN NUWU IRAQ’S PEOPLE AND RESOURCES BY DORIS GOODRICH ADAMS UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS BERKELEY AND LOS ANGELES 1958 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS IN ECONOMICS EDITORS (BERKELEY): H. S. ELLIS, R. A. BRADY, G. F. BREAK, HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN Volume 18, 7 figures in text Submitted by editors July 1, 1957 Issued October 30, 1958 Price, $3.00 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS BERKELEY AND LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON, ENGLAND PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PREFACE THE BASIS of this study is a doctoral thesis, "Population Trends in Relation to the Economic Development of Iraq,” submitted in July, 1955, in the Department of Economics of the University of California, Berkeley. The research was made pos- sible by a thirty-one-month fellowship from the Board on Overseas Training and Research of the Ford Foundation. The first year of the fellowship was spent in research and Arabic studies in Washington, D.C., and the remainder of the fellow- ship period, from September, 1953, to March, 1955, in travel and study in Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries. It must be noted that the Ford Foundation is not the author, owner, publisher, or proprietor of this work and is not to be understood as approving by virtue of its grant any of the statements made or views expressed herein. The manuscript was substantially rewritten, with the addition of newly avail- able materials, after my return to Iraq in October, 1955. Much has taken place in the Middle East since the completion of the manuscript in its present form in July, 1956. I have made a few additions and modifications, but have been unable to rewrite the entire work. I present it with misgivings, aware that recent political and social developments have undoubtedly disproved some of my statements and obviated some of my policy suggestions. The empirical basis of the chapters which follow is a combination of statistics assembled by the Government of Iraq and technical assistance agencies, field trips, small-scale studies which I made in various parts of the country, and innumerable conversations and interviews. However, the individuals and agencies who supplied information are in no way responsible for opinions, expressed or implied, nor for any misinterpretations, errors, or omissions which may appear in this study. I alone am responsible for all choice of relevance, all judgments in regard to accu- racy of data, and all interpretations of information provided by others. In studying a society with institutions very different from one's own, one has the advantage of objectivity, but the disadvantage of the lack of prolonged fa- miliarity with its institutions. This deficiency may be remedied in part through close contact with that society, or wide reading, or both. But, try as one may to bar ethnocentric judgments, they will creep into his thinking and writing. I have attempted, in making suggestions on policy, to assess the suitability of institutions and the viability of programs with respect to the economic goal of the majority of Iraq's people--a self-sustaining increase in per capita real income-rather than according to my own goals and values. However, there are undoubtedly many places in which “my bias is showing,” and for these I ask the reader's indulgence. Without the coöperation of the Government of Iraq through its various depart- ments this study could not have been attempted. Special thanks are due Dr. Fu'ad G. Massa, of the Directorate General of Census; Mr. Fu'ad Jamil, of the Ministry of Education ; Dr. Hasan Thamir and Mr. Muhammad Zaki Abdul Karim, of the Development Board ; Mr. Badi’ Butti, of the Ministry of Economics; and Dr. Salah Haider, of the Ministry of Finance. I am grateful to Dr. K. G. Fenelon, Expert in Statistics, Ministry of Economics, who supplied much of my statistical information and offered advice and encouragement. [v] Preface The personnel of the United Nations and its specialized agencies aided in many ways. I wish to thank especially Dr. Salah Abd, United Nations Technical Assist- ance Expert on Community Development, and his staff in the Ministry of Social Affairs; Dr. Kataya Cama, United Nations Technical Assistance Expert on Social Welfare; and Dr. Otto Jager, of the World Health Organization. Mr. Norman Burns, of the United States Department of State, merits special thanks for having suggested Iraq as an interesting field for research. American technical assistance personnel, especially in the programs for community development, public health, and land settlement, were coöperative. Among my advisers at the University of California, Professor Emily H. Hunt- ington gave unstintingly of her time and energy in helping me to complete the thesis and its subsequent revision; Professor Howard S. Ellis and Professor Wil- liam Petersen offered many helpful suggestions; and Professor Emeritus Melvin M. Knight first stimulated my interest in economic development. It was a privilege to live and work in Iraq on the eve of momentous economic and social changes. I wish to dedicate this work to my countless hosts in every walk of life, who contributed to such understanding of their country as I have. D. G. A. University Park, Pennsylvania February, 1958 CONTENTS CHAPTER I. Introduction .................. The problem in its historical setting ...... Physical characteristics of Iraq ............. II. A Cultural Description of the People ............. Ethnic and religious differences ............ Different ways of life . . . . . Desert nomadsAgricultural people of the alluvial plain—Marsh dwellers- Mountain people --Urban people III. Population Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 The census of 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Total numbers and population density-Rural-urban distribution-Age-sex struc- ture-Literacy-Marital status-Religion—Occupation-Type of residence Liwa of birth and residence Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. Vital Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimates of fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimates of mortality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rate of natural increase and size of the present population ... Factors explaining mortality and the vitality of the population .. Ignorance and superstition-Nutrition—Sanitation and medical services—Declin. ing mortality Factors explaining the level of fertility ........ · · · · V. Income and Consumption ................. Estimates .................... Explanation of current levels . . . . . . . . . . . Agricultural productivity—Industrial productivity · · · VI. Economic Development: Potentialities and Programs . . . . . . . 102 Oil revenues and the development board .......... 102 Agricultural development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Industrial development · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 111 Development of human resources . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 [vii] CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION THE PROBLEM IN ITS HISTORICAL SETTING THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ is at the same time one of the newest and one of the oldest countries in the world. A political entity only since the end of the First World War and an independent state only since 1932, Iraq is also the site of the first civiliza- tion. The earliest known settlers migrated into the valley of the Tigris and Eu- phrates during the sixth millennium, B.C., from the mountainous north and east, areas in which the wild ancestors of wheat and barley were indigenous. These people lived in villages, an indication that they were not primitive food gatherers but had brought with them the cultivation of domesticated grains. The dawn of written history found them living in houses much like those seen in Middle Eastern villages today. They gradually learned that, through irrigation, a much more productive agriculture was possible on Mesopotamia's alluvial plain than in rain-fed mountainous regions. The surplus over subsistence that could be pro- duced by improved methods of cultivation allowed the growth of a sizable non- agricultural population and the founding of great cities such as Eridu, Ur, Baby- lon, and Nineveh. The citizens, freed from the toil which had hitherto been man's lot, were able to turn their attention to other matters. The cylinder seal, writing, a written code of law, the wheel, ornamental architecture—all were products of this new freedom. Mesopotamia's development was not continuous. Waves of migration involved warfare, and some conquerors did not learn the necessity of the irrigation system for agriculture in an arid region until after they had destroyed it or allowed it to fall into decay. The rule of the Sumerians, the Babylonians, the Sassanide Per- sians, and the Abbaside caliphs, who used their power and influence to encourage a productive agriculture, coincided with a high level of culture. Others who, through ignorance, lethargy, corruption, or malice, allowed the irrigation system to decline, initiated periods of cultural eclipse. Moreover, during much of its history Mesopotamia was a frontier province between two powerful empires, each of which coveted it. Persia held it at intervals from the sixth century B.C., when Cyrus annexed it to his empire, until the brief tenure of Baghdad by Shah Abbas in the seventeenth century A.D. The major contenders from the west were Alexan- der the Great and the Seleucid Greeks, followed by the Romans, who tried repeat- edly to conquer Mesopotamia but never fully succeeded. The Arabs founded the Abbaside caliphate in the eighth century A.D., and Baghdad became the center of the Muslim world. The zenith had been passed when the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century initiated a deterioration from which Iraq has not yet recovered. Finally, in the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire wrested control of Meso- potamia from Persia and held it, with brief interruptions, for four centuries.' Even during the flowering of Mesopotamia's culture—as under the Abbaside caliphs, when “Its great towns were the seat of learning and progressive thought; The best single work on the history of Iraq is Lloyd, Twin Rivers. See also Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modern Iraq and 'Iraq, 1900 to 1950. For recent political history, see Khadduri, Independent Iraq. [1] Iraq's People and Resources its highways were safe for travellers; its peasants contented and the waters of its two great rivers flowed with controlled regularity into a million irrigation ca- nals”—even then, the great majority of inhabitants labored in the fields in return for livelihood at a subsistence level. The surplus produced on the fertile plain was available as a tribute to be paid to the privileged who did not labor, or to be ex- tracted by military might. So it has been for mankind throughout history, until the last four hundred years in countries affected by Western civilization. Here, technological advance in both agriculture and industry, so rapid as to outstrip population growth, was followed by the eventual adjustment of human fertility to changed conditions of mortality—although only after several continents had been peopled by the overflow population of Europe. In consequence, a level of living above subsistence for the majority of the population, once a utopian dream, became a reality. European standards of consumption have been adopted by the wealthy classes in preindustrial countries in which the economy could not support higher con- sumption for more than a few. Thus the gulf between the rich and the poor has widened in many of these countries. At the same time, increasing communication between nations has conveyed to their poorer classes the idea that poverty is not inevitable. As a result, the poor in one preindustrial country after another have come to blame the luxury consumption of the wealthy classes for their own miser- able lot, not recognizing that alleviation of mass poverty requires the emancipation of themselves as well as their rulers from outmoded methods. Edwin Markham, looking at “The Man with the Hoe," asked a question at the end of the nineteenth century, the answer to which has been written in blood in many nations during the twentieth: How will it be with kingdoms and with kings- When this dumb terror shall rise to judge the world, After the silence of the centuries pas The hard economic fact is that, aside from international loans and subsidies, the per capita national product can be increased only by increased productivity, which in turn requires the diversion of a significant portion of that product from con- sumption to investment. Consumption must even be depressed initially, and can- not be allowed to rise as rapidly as production if the pace of development is to accelerate. Governments that have tried at the outset of development to give their people both increased consumption and increased investment have produced in- flationary forces, with disruptive effects upon the economy which impede develop- ment. Governments that attempt to finance development by depressing consumption must be exceedingly strong to withstand the resultant unrest, and are constantly threatened by competitive powers, indigenous or foreign, who win popular support by promising immediate alleviation of poverty. The methods of capital formation used in their initial stages of development by countries now highly industrialized cannot be duplicated by today's preindustrial countries. First, resignation to poverty quickly wanes once development starts, because of growing communication between developed and underdeveloped coun- tries. The number of material possessions that people can want has greatly in- ? Lloyd, op. cit., p. 186. * From "The Man with the Hoe." Used by permission, Iraq's People and Resources to twice the entire national income of 1950. Thus the government is to some extent spared the necessity of depressing consumption in order to channel funds into in- vestment. However, the Five-Year Plan is already running into serious difficulties, most of which originate in the inability to adapt institutions to new economic con- ditions. The administrative machinery, a legacy of a bygone era, cannot spend the revenues as rapidly as they accrue; skilled and semiskilled laborers cannot be hired in sufficient numbers at any price; there is little or no machinery to teach better farming practices; and scientifically trained people are needed in certain jobs which the system of status prevents literate people from undertaking. The long- run plans of the Development Board will require an almost complete transforma- tion of Iraq's economy and society. There is no doubt that Iraq is entering a period of rapid change-economic, social, and demographic. The changes would be substantial even as simple results of the influx of the oil revenues into the economy. The problem is rather of the direc- tion of change. If the royalties are used to develop the productivity of the economy, creating a greater savings capacity and profitable investment outlets—that is, if a cumulative process of expansion is started—Iraq's economy can continue to pros- per even if oil prices should fall or political factors should otherwise interfere with oil production. But if the royalties are dissipated in inefficient and corrupt admin- istration or are used largely for consumption or the encouragement of uneconomic industries, a rare opportunity will have been lost. This study is concerned with Iraq's people—their social characteristics, popula- tion structure, and potentialities for population growth; and Iraq's resources— their present state of development, the level of living they provide, their poten- tialities, and the plans for fulfilling these potentialities. Because of the enormous supply of capital suddenly available and the commendable act of Iraq's govern- ment in turning over 70 per cent of the oil revenues to a planning agency, changes which took many times longer in other countries are being telescoped into a few decades and can easily be observed. Therefore, although this study is confined to one transitional economy, it is hoped that it will prove to have broader significance as a testing ground for theories of economic development. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF IRAQ Iraq covers an area of approximately 172,000 square miles, bounded on the north by Turkey, on the east by Iran, on the south by the Persian Gulf, Kuwait, and Sa’udi Arabia, and on the west by Jordan and Syria. Iraq is divided administra- tively into fourteen states, each called a liwa, and three desert zones. (See fig. 1.) The liwas constitute 53 per cent, and the deserts 47 per cent, of the total land sur- face. Iraq may be divided geographically into four regions whose physical differ- ences lead to distinctive ways of life. The alluvial plain of central and southern Iraq is composed of silt laid down by * Law no. 43 of 1955: an expenditure of 304,000,000 dinars is planned over the five-year period. The Development Board receives 70 per cent of the oil revenues. Iraq's national income of 1950 was estimated at 150,000,000 dinars by the United Nations Statistical Office. This equals approxi- mately 30 dinars, or $85, per capita. Iraq's unit of currency, the dinar (abbreviated I. D.), is divided into 1,000 fils. In foreign exchange it is the equivalent of the British pound, or approxi- mately $2.80 (American). 5 Iraq's geography and climate are discussed in Fisher, The Middle East, chap. XV; Grant, The Syrian Desert; Lloyd, op. cit.; and Worthington, Middle East Science, Introduction TURKEY KARBIL SYRIA VI ATHAR USULA OSULAIMANIYA RKUK JAZIRA DESERT BOSSER ZAD WADI DIYALA A EUPHRATE GRIS HANAQIN DULAIM LIWA BA'QUBA HIT TRAN DIYALA LIWA KAZI- MAIN RAMADIOS LAKEV HABBANIYA MOBAGHDAD RUTBA JORDAN NORTHERN DESERT KARBALAO: HINDIYAMOHILLAS AJAFI ANIY YA.... AMARA SAUDI ARABIA PURNA UN R MUNTAFIO LIWA SAMAWA NASARIYA -SUO ASH-SHUYUKH SCALE BASR Kms.50... 50 100 150 200 Kms. MATT AL-ARA SOUTHERN DESERT PER noSIAN KUWAIT GULF NEUTRAL ZONE - NATIONAL BOUNDARIES ---- LIWA BOUNDARIES ma RIVERS VII BORDER OF RAINFALL ZONE O LIWA CENTERS (name of liwa given only if different from name of liwa center) OTHER CITIES AND TOWNS MENTIONED IN THE TEXT Fig. 1. Map of Iraq. Adapted from Ahmed Sousa, Atlas of Iraq (Baghdad: Surveys Press, 1953). the Tigris, its tributaries, the Euphrates, and the Karun and Karkheh rivers which enter the Shatt al-Arab from the southern Zagros Mountains. Some archaeologists hold that the original coastline of the Persian Gulf passed through Hit and Samarra," north of Baghdad, and that the silt has slowly pushed the coastline southward; about 3,000 B.C. the ancient city of Ur, near modern Nasariya, and the * Arabic place names appear in the text without the vowel markings which indicate where the accent falls, but these markings are given in the Appendix. Iraq's People and Resources site of modern Amara lay on the shores of the Gulf, while in Roman times the Gulf reached the site of modern Basra. It has been calculated that the rate of land formation averaged about one mile in fifty years, decreasing as the newly formed land moved farther from the mountains. This same theory explains Iraq's exten- sive lagoons and swamps as having been dammed back by the deltas of the Karun and Karkheh rivers, which expanded more rapidly into the Persian Gulf than did the deltas of the Tigris and Euphrates. The marshes have gradually moved south- ward as the alluvium dried out and became rich agricultural land. If the Persian Gulf has truly moved hundreds of miles southward almost within historic time, the popular notion that Mesopotamia was the Garden of Eden- that man originated in the region where the Tigris and Euhprates blend into the Shatt al-Arab—could not be true, although gullible tourists still travel to see the “Tree of Life” in Qurna. However, new evidence indicates that Mesopotamia con- sists of a basin which has been slowly settling at the same time that sediment has been deposited by the rivers over millions of years. The balance between the con- sequent rise and fall of the land surface has been delicate, causing the coastline of the shallow Persian Gulf to shift erratically. According to this theory, the orig- inal shoreline of the Gulf may not have been far from its present site.' Thus it may be geographically possible that the Garden of Eden was located on Iraq's alluvial plain, but it is highly unlikely that primitive man could have begun his existence in an area where artificial irrigation is necessary to agriculture. Whether the marshes are caused by the damming action of deltas or by sub- sidence of the earth's surface—the final answer to this question must await more evidence—they occupy nearly 6,000 square miles, or more than 3 per cent of Iraq's total area. An estimated 80 per cent of the discharge of the Tigris at Baghdad is drawn off into this region of lagoons, mud flats, reed beds, and meandering water- ways. The extreme flatness of the alluvial plain causes inundation of vast areas whenever either river rises above its banks. Because of the heavy burden of silt carried by the rivers and laid down in canals and riverbeds, perpetual vigilance is required to prevent floods. A second geographic region consists of the upper valleys and the Jazira, or undulating wasteland, between them. At about the latitude of Samarra the alluvial plain changes to the uplands. North of this line the two rivers flow in well-defined and separate valleys, with irrigated cultivation possible along only a small strip on either side of the river. The Jazira wasteland, inhabited only by nomads, con- tains the Wadi Tharthar, a large natural depression that has been developed as part of Iraq's flood control machinery: the barrage at Samarra, completed early in 1956, can divert the waters of the Tigris into the Wadi. A third geographic area comprises the foothills and mountains on Iraq's north- ern and eastern boundaries. This region is roughly coextensive with the rainfall zone, where rain-fed agriculture is combined with pastoralism as a way of life. A striking feature of the area is its acute state of deforestation, the result of the operation of several factors over thousands of years. First, the forests of the Zagros ? The older theory, as expressed by Fisher, Lloyd, and Worthington, is criticized by Lees and Falcon, “The Geographical History of the Mesopotamian Plains," The Geographical Journal (London), CXVIII (March, 1952), 24–39. Thesiger, “The Ma’dan or Marsh Dwellers of Southern Iraq,” Royal Central Asian Journal, XLI (Jan., 1954), 4–25. Introduction are marginal and, once destroyed, cannot easily be restored. Second, the mountain- ous zone of Iraq has long been inhabited by minorities, notably the Kurds, who have often been hostile to the government controlling the lowlands. Organized into tribal federations and seminomadic, they have neither the desire nor the ability to carry out projects designed to halt deforestation, much less projects of reforesta- tion. They use the scarce wood and brush for fuel and in housing, and make char- coal to sell in the towns. Their reliance on the goat is probably the major factor in deforestation, because this hungry animal destroys any seedlings that happen to develop. The government has begun some reforestation projects, but they must re- main small and expensive, requiring barbed wire, guards, or both, until other sources of livelihood are available to the inhabitants of the mountains and foothills. TABLE 1 AVERAGE MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM TEMPERATURES (F.) IN SELECTED CITIES OF IRAQ January August City Zone Period covered Mean max. Mean min. Mean max. Mean min. 54° 35° 70° Mosul...... Baghdad... Basra. Rutba. 60 Rainfall Irrigation Irrigation Desert 1927–1952 1938–1952 1937–1952 1930–1952 110° 110° 106° 60° 64° 79° 34° 102° 70° SOURCE: Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1952, pp. 19-21. The desert areas of Iraq comprise approximately half of the country's total area. Besides the Jazira, there is the large portion of the Syrian Desert which falls within Iraq's boundaries and which Iraq shares with Syria, Jordan, and Sa'udi Arabia. Here nomadic life is a necessity because water and pasture are scarce. The triangular-shaped Syrian Desert plateau, sloping gently from northwest to south- east, is characterized by exceptional flatness, broken by occasional hills, ruins, lava patches, and salt marshes. Bounded by the Mediterranean coastlands on the west and the Euphrates on the east, it gradually becomes more arid and blends into the deserts of Arabia on the south. The climate of Iraq shows less regional variation than does the topography. Throughout the country the summers are long, hot, and dry, and the winters are short, cold, and rainy. The climate combines Mediterranean features, in its summer drought and scant winter rain, with continental features, in its great seasonal vari- ation in temperature. The daily variation in temperature in summer, when the thermometer may register over 120° at noon and below 75° just before dawn, can be compared with the short, severe winter, when the thermometer may remain near the freezing point night and day. The greater daily variation in temperature in summer than in winter can be explained by the very low summer humidity. Rela- tive humidity between 10 and 15 per cent is normal in Baghdad during the hot weather. Typical average temperatures are shown in table 1. Throughout the country almost no rain falls between the end of May and the beginning of October. However, a geographic difference in the amount of winter rain causes a significant agricultural differentiation. The mountainous and hilly northeastern region, including four of the fourteen liwas and part of a fifth, nor- Iraq's People and Resources mally receives more than fifteen inches of rain annually; hence artificial irrigation is not necessary. In the arid remainder of the country, cultivation is impossible without irrigation. The approximate boundaries of the rainfall zone can be seen in figure 1. The agriculturally important parts of Iraq are therefore the alluvial plain of the central and southern liwas, the narrow river valleys north of Baghdad, and the northeastern liwas which receive sufficient rain for rain-fed agriculture. Almost the entire population of Iraq lives in these regions, which Sir Ernest Dow- son termed Iraq's “productive core.” He estimated that approximately 80 per cent TABLE 2 AGRICULTURAL USAGE OF LAND IN IRAQ, 1952–53 Per cent of Area Square kilometers Cultivable land Fourteen liwag Iraq Agricultural holdings (Dowson, 1930) 100 Iraq............ Fourteen liwas............... Cultivable land (Dowson, 1930) Agricultural holdings ...... Planted. Fallow Fruit trees and vines.. Pasture Woodlands.. ...... Uncultivable. 444,442 235, 733 92,000 63,800 25, 300 27,900 1,300 2,300 500 6,400 SOURCES: Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1954, pp. 1, 65-67; Dowson, An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions. • Less than 1 per cent. of the country's total land surface was “unproductive or slightly productive des- ert, steppe, marsh and hill masses.” He divided the productive lands into those falling in the rainfall zone, approximately 9 per cent of the total land surface, and those falling in the irrigation zone, approximately 11 per cent of the total land surface. The Census of Agriculture, conducted by the Ministry of Economics in 1952–53, revealed that only 14 per cent of Iraq's total land surface consisted of agricultural holdings, although these holdings included almost 70 per cent of the cultivable land, if Dowson's estimates are still valid. During the 1952–53 season, a greater percentage of the area in agricultural holdings lay fallow than was planted-an indication of the extensive nature of cultivation. The different uses of agricultural holdings, related to the area of Iraq and to Dowson's estimates on the amount of cultivable land, are detailed in table 2. Barley and wheat are by far the most important field crops in both rainfall and irrigation zones. According to the Census of Agriculture, during the 1952–53 season 48 per cent of the cultivated area was planted to barley, 41 per cent to wheat, and 5 per cent to rice. Rice culture is mostly confined to the irrigation zone, º Dowson, An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions, p. 11. 10 Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1954, pp. 65–69. An agricultural holding was defined as a farm or estate worked or organized as one unit. This definition does not refer to ownership; most of the land contained in the holdings was owned by the government and farmed under several types of tenure. Introduction as were the 18,000,000 fruit-bearing date palms enumerated by the census. Impor- tant subsidiary crops of the rainfall zone are fruits, nuts, and tobacco. Wheat and rice are grown almost entirely for domestic consumption. Export of these two products in recent years has been small, and in seasons of scarcity the government prohibits the export of wheat. Barley, in contrast, is Iraq's most im- portant export aside from oil. In 1952, 52 per cent of the previous winter's crop was exported; in 1953, 44 per cent; and in 1954, 40 per cent." It is apparent from table 3 that barley has accounted for almost half of the value of Iraq's exports TABLE 3 PRINCIPAL EXPORTS OF IRAQ, EXCLUDING OIL, 1952–1954 (Thousands of dinars) 1952 1953 1954 Export Value Per cent of exports Value Per cent of exports Value Per cent of exports 9,517 9,743 8,567 8,957 :: :: All grains and pulses....... Barley.. Wheatb. Rice.......... Dates. Live animals. Raw wool... All others........ 73 4,652 880 1,123 2,603 10,036 8,824 452 234 3,526 1,563 941 1,908 61 4,227 1,583 1,124 2,392 Forcowe er co a Value of exports....... 18,775 19,069 17,974 SOURCE: Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1954, pp. 202–226. Local products only: oil and re-exports excluded. b Export of wheat was prohibited in 1952 and 1953. other than oil. Dates are next in importance, and comprised more than one-fifth of the value of agricultural exports. After grains and dates, exports next in value are live animals and raw wool. These four classes of products have recently ac- counted for almost 90 per cent of the value of exports other than oil. Although Iraq is an agricultural country, with more than half of the labor force actively engaged in agriculture and two-thirds of the population living outside cities, oil is by far the most important product and export. It alone comprised one- half to two-thirds of the value of annual exports from 1937 to 1951, and has cur- rently risen to more than four-fifths." The reader may be puzzled by the fact that oil is not included in table 3, and is not discussed at length in the chapters that follow. The reason is in part statistical. Information concerning oil production, export, and revenues is kept separate from data pertaining to the remainder of the economy. However, a more fundamental reason is that Iraq, having granted concessions to foreign companies to exploit the oil resources, has virtually divorced these resources from the domestic economy. Certain points of contact between oil production and the domestic economy re- main, and with these we shall be concerned. For example, the foreign-managed petroleum industry provides excellent technical training, and its relatively high 11 Ibid., pp. 71-74, 226. 12 Iversen, A Report on Monetary Policy in Iraq, p. 73. 12 Iraq's People and Resources Fertility and mortality are characteristically high in the tradition-directed so- ciety. In Iraq a short life span and high levels of infant mortality (documented in later chapters) are accepted as inevitable. Attempts to control disease are often made through magic or religious rituals. For the majority of the population, mar- riage takes place at puberty or soon after, and no attempt is made to control fer- tility. In fact, in religious and magic rites much attention is given to assuring high fertility as the only way in which the family may be maintained and strengthened. Therefore the population of the idealized preindustrial society is in the state of “Malthusian equilibrium”—that is, numbers are held in check by mortality, any decline in which results in an increase in numbers. Because in all recorded demo- graphic experience a sizable and lengthy decline in mortality has preceded any prolonged decline in fertility, preindustrial societies are said to be of high growth potential. One of the economic characteristics of the tradition-directed society is an absence of rationalism in the Western sense of the word: Western ways seem highly irra- tional to the tradition-directed person. There is little desire to accumulate beyond fulfilling simple needs in traditional ways, and leisure is valued highly, with the resulting reverse elasticity of supply. It is an obvious but significant corollary that, because the maximization postulate does not hold, much of the economic theory developed in capitalist economies does not apply. Production in rural areas is pre- dominantly for subsistence, although the portion of the product claimed by land- lords enters the national or international market. In the towns, profits are sought from short-run speculative ventures; the idea of investing labor or money for a small but steady future income is rarely conceived. Traditional methods of pro- duction are maintained with little variation from one generation to the next. The level of productivity is low compared with economies in which science is applied to increasing production, with the result that only a small nonagricultural popula- tion can be supported. Therefore the majority of workers must be employed in agriculture. Extremes of wealth and poverty are typical, and all but a small number of the highest status are very poor. With a few modifications to meet special circumstances, the society described above could be that of any preindustrial country today or of Western Europe dur- ing the Middle Ages. Although each tradition-directed people is anthropologically unique, all have similar social characteristics forced upon them by common circum- stances. Death rates are high because of the absence of science; long-run survival re- quires institutions strongly supporting high fertility. The uncertainty of life caused by failure to control the environment, together with the exactions of a leisured class supported by status, leads to a fatalistic attitude. The “God wills it” philosophy typical of the Arab until recent times is the product of a long succession of despotic rulers, civil and martial strife, a severe climate, and periodic floods, famines, and pestilences. It is not an approval of the existing state of affairs so much as a rationalization of a situation over which the individual has no control. This re- signed pessimism is described by Huizinga with respect to France and the Nether- lands in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: “Bad government, exactions, the cupidity and violence of the great, wars and brigandage, scarcity, misery and pestilence to this is contemporary history nearly reduced in the eyes of the people. ... The idea of a purposed and continual reform and improvement of Cultural Description of the People 13 society did not exist.” Huizinga documents the similarities between the temper of the times in preindustrial Europe and that of Iraq today. Life then was "violent and high-strung.” “All emotions required a rigid system of conventional forms, for without them passion and ferocity would have made havoc of life.” Society was viewed as a hierarchy; chivalry, emphasizing elaborate etiquette and honor, was the preoccupation of the nobility. For the illiterate masses, religion permeated thought and included a large element of pagan superstition.' Not all of Iraqi society fits the description in the foregoing paragraphs; rather, it is of the dualistic nature defined by Boeke.' Values and ideas from capitalistic nations, brought in first by colonial powers, have been adopted by a small but economically important segment of Iraq's population. These ideas involve a break with tradition in numerous ways. Wants, once simple and stereotyped, suddenly multiply, forcing the individual to look for new sources of income. Many seek larger incomes in the traditional manner, through intrigue and reliance on family loyalties, but an increasing number are beginning to think in terms of investment. The desire to keep the fruits of one's own enterprise weakens kinship ties. As effective demand increases, it becomes obvious that certain occupations, formerly taboo, would be highly profitable if operated on a scientific basis, and a few coura- geous men begin to break down the barriers. If they succeed, others follow, and new avenues of economic activity are explored. The application of science causes a sharp decline in infant mortality at the same time that material desires are increasing, and, as a result, this small segment of the population begins to consider the control of fertility. Their new way of life is copied, in varying degrees, by other groups in the urban population. Iraq differs from other preindustrial countries, most of which have some ele- ments of dualism, in that the oil revenues permit more rapid social and economic change. Because economic development has already begun, the economy may be said to be transitional, although the preindustrial elements described above are still dominant. ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES Settled by migration from earliest times and fought over by rival empires desirous, of possessing Mesopotamia's agricultural wealth, modern Iraq is inhabited by a people of diverse ethnic and religious origins. Moreover, the society of the Middle East, rather than acting as a melting pot, tends to maintain ethnic and religious differences by its organization as a number of in-groups. An individual may belong to one or more of these groups on the basis of family, village or town, re- ligious sect, or language. Where all these coincide for a given group, as within a village or a nomadic tribe, cohesion is strong and resistance to cultural change very great. However, even cities are organized as congeries of in-groups, each tending to live in its own quarter and maintain a characteristic way of life, expressed by place and manner of worship, occupation, language, costume, and diet. Endogamy is important to the maintenance of the in-group and involves marriage between 2 Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages, pp. 6, 21, 28, 40. See also chaps. i, ii, iii, xii. 3 Boeke, op. cit., p. 4: "Social dualism is the clashing of an imported social system with an indigenous social system of another style. Most frequently the imported social system is high capitalism." Gulick defines an in-group as "a well-defined unit of people which has a very high degree of esprit de corps." Social Structure and Culture Change in a Lebanese Village, p. 156. 14 Iraq's People and Resources the closest relatives short of incest. In Iraq a Muslim man customarily has first claim on the daughter of his father's brother. Carleton Coon refers to the social organization of the Middle East as the “mosaic system” and sees as its basis the ethnic division of labor. Production is organized with "a maximum of skill, taught from father to son, and a minimum of organizational complexity.” Whether we agree that the economic or the religious motive is basic, it is clear that the mosaic system is breaking down in Iraq and that the breakdown will con- tinue. Apprenticeship is declining as an ever larger proportion of children are able to enter schools; at the same time that they are prevented from learning their fathers' trades, they are able to learn different ones. Increasing educational facilities and economic opportunities for women enable people of marriageable age to meet outside the family circle and thus reduce the prevalence of endogamy. Rural-to-urban migration is giving the cities large numbers of workers who have no industrial skills, and the government is choosing to favor large-scale industry utilizing unskilled laborers. The incompatibility of strong kinship ties with nationalism is another factor contributing to its decline; the government is attempting, with some success, to widen the in-group feeling to include the nation as an object of loyalty. Iraq's most important minorities are the Shi'ites and the Kurds. The division of Islam into the Sunna and Shi'a sects took place over the issue of the caliphate. Shi’ites believe that the Prophet designated his son-in-law 'Ali to be Imam, or leader of the Muslims, and therefore Caliph. 'Ali secured the caliphate only after three illegitimate caliphs had preceded him, and was the only true Imam ever to be Caliph, according to Shi'a belief. There have been twelve imams, or seven ac- cording to the Isma'ilite branch of Shi'ism. Shi'ites constitute the great majority of Iran's population and are a significant minority in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. Their special significance in Iraq lies in the presence of four Shi’a holy cities with their golden domed shrines, visited by thousands of pilgrims each year. Najaf is believed to be the burying place of 'Ali; Karbala marks the spot where 'Ali's son Husain was killed by the Sunnite army; Kazimain is the burying place of the seventh and ninth imams; and Samarra is the place where the twelfth and last Imam disappeared." To the Shi'ite, ’Ali and Husain rank with Muhammad as objects of worship, while the imams are regarded as saints, capable of healing, granting wishes, and offering divine guidance. That the Sunnites killed Husain and sixty-two (or seventy-two) of his followers on the battlefield at Karbala is something that Shi'ites cannot forgive or forget. The ten days of Muharram each year mark a period of mourning, during which sidewalk meetings are held and Shi'ites march through the streets beating themselves with chains. Women gather in private homes to wail and beat their breasts in unison. The grief and hatred thus rekindled reach their climax, at the end of the ten-day period, in passion plays enacting the • Coon, Caravan: The Story of the Middle East, p. 153. See also pp. 3-5. * Traditionally under Islam, non-Muslims were tolerated in Muslim lands provided they were “People of the Book”—Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and a few others. However, they were not given full political right, and were required to pay a special tax. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Muslim Institutions, p. 123. Such special treatment has undoubtedly contributed to preventing their assimilation. ? Donaldson, The Shi'ite Religion. For the distribution of Shi'ites in Islamic countries, see France, Les Musulmans dans le monde. Cultural Description of the People 15 battle and in head-cutting ceremonies held in the courtyards of the Shi'ite shrines. The greater fanaticism of the Shi'ites, combined with their lower economic and educational status, has hindered their assimilation. The Kurds live in the mountainous and hilly regions of the rainfall zone. They maintain an intense tribal consciousness and have resisted Arabization, although TABLE 4 ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN IRAQ, 1945–1950 Religion and ethnic group Sect Language Characteristics Approximate number Per cent of population Muslim Arab. 4,450,000 3,568,000 Arabic Sunna Shi'a Sunna Sunna Shi'a Kurd.. Turkoman...... Iranian ....... Christian (Urban and agricultural Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural Largely urban Kurdish Turkish Persian 1,400,000 2,100,000 792,000 50,000 40,000 190,000 (Neo-Syriac, ( Urban and Arab. (Various, {Uniate and (non-Uniate , agricultural 178,000 Armenian. ... Jewish ........ Other {Arabic, Kurdish | Armenian, Arabic Arabic Urban Urban 12,000 15,000 20,000 Total. 4,675,000 100 SOURCES: Adapted from U. S. Department of State, Data Book: Near East and Independent Africa, p. 40; and Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World, p. 13. • Less than 1 per cent. b 125.000 until 1948. Mostly Yezidis (so-called “Devil-Worshipers”) of Mosul liwa and Mandaeans, who specialize in metalwork and boat- building. they long ago adopted the Sunnite sect of Islam. The idea of an independent Kurdish state carved out of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey appeals to them, especially in the face of the Pan-Arab movement. The relative numbers of Iraq's ethnic and religious groups are not known. A question on religion in the Census of 1947 was probably answered accurately for the most part. However, the interesting breakdown of Muslims, who constituted 94 per cent of the population, religiously into Sunna and Shi'a, and ethnically into Kurdish and Arab Muslims, was not made. The Shi'ite and Kurdish minorities would have feared persecution as a result of answering such questions and might have refused to coöperate with the census questioners. Also, the non-Kurdish Sunnites, who dominate the government, would not want it to appear that they are a minority of the population. An impression of unity is given by classifying all Muslims together. Combining the estimates of the Department of State and Albert Hourani gives the approximate breakdown of ethnic and religious groups in table 4. Although the details of the table are by no means accurate, the major conclusion that can be drawn from it is probably correct: no one of Iraq's major ethnic-religious groups constitutes a majority of the population. Grouping all the 16 Iraq's People and Resources Sunnites gives a false picture, for a Kurd considers himself above all a Kurd. Grouping all Arab Muslims gives an equally false picture, for the two sects have different loyalties. Middle Eastern people have many characteristics in common, but there is at least as much cultural difference between a Kurdish mountaineer and an Arab Sunnite as between the latter and an Arab Christian. The relations between Sunnites and Shi'ites are of fundamental importance to Iraq's future as a nation, because of the political leadership of the Sunnites and the numerical dominance of the Shi'ites. Genuine assimilation of minorities re- quires the development of in-group sentiments with respect to either the Arab world or the nation of Iraq. The Pan-Arab movement could lead to a serious Kurdish problem. However, Iraq is differentiated from neighboring countries by its oil resources. Moreover, education and rising incomes bring secularization, which may cause religious minorities to lose some of their special characteristics. DIFFERENT WAYS OF LIFE Although automobiles and radios have penetrated the remotest regions of Iraq, and although a small group of people in the largest cities have adopted a new set of values, the majority of Iraq's people remain tradition-directed. Yet any detailed description of the Iraqi way of life must distinguish several groups, each to a large extent culturally traditional, but differentiated because of variations in physical environment as well as in ethnic and religious origins. Desert nomads.-Fully nomadic Bedouins are those living outside the areas of cultivation who must migrate in search of pasture for their flocks. The fully nomadic Bedouins of Iraq were estimated to number 250,000 at the time of the Census of 1947, distributed among the four liwas of Mosul, Karbala, Dulaim, and Muntafiq, bordering on the Syrian Desert and the Jazira between the Tigris and the Euphrates. Although this estimate may be somewhat low, being only 5 per cent of the enumerated population, it is certain that the Bedouins do not comprise more than 10 per cent of Iraq's people. The influence of these nomads is greater than their numbers would indicate. The Bedouins of Arabia are the origin, culturally, at least, of the majority of Iraq's population, who profess the religion which originated there and call themselves Arabs. Iraq's population has been continually replenished by migration out of the desert. The rivalry over land and water between settled cultivators and nomadic herdsmen, symbolized in the parable of Cain and Abel, has continued up to the present day. When a strong central government has existed to build and maintain an elaborate irrigation system, the cultivators have flourished, inducing some nomads to settle and join them, extending the area under cultivation and making possible a high degree of civilization. Throughout Mesopotamia's history, when such a government has been conquered by a people who have not understood irriga- tion, the system has declined-perhaps from neglect even more than from outright destruction—and the relative dominance of the nomadic herdsmen has increased. * The descendants of the immigrants from Arabia are found today in all stages of settlement from fully nomadic Bedouins to fully settled fellahin. Tribal vestiges persist throughout Iraq among settled people. Most villagers believe that they owe 8 Dr. Haider's thesis, "Land Problems of Iraq,” contains detailed discussion of the successive cycles of settlement and tribalization throughout Iraq's history. Cultural Description of the People 17 a degree of allegiance to their sheikh, even if he is only an absentee landowner- far removed from the desert sheikh, who is judge, governor, and spiritual guide. Another tribal vestige is a prejudice against manual labor: in the hierarchy of agricultural occupations, raiding and herding are placed at the top, grain raising on the acceptable level, and vegetable growing at the bottom. To be a fellah means to grow grain and is compatible with being a tribal Arab. Only certain lowly tribes near the major cities engage in growing and vending vegetables, and they do not intermarry with the more noble tribes. The laws of hospitality, necessary on the desert, where to be refused food and drink may mean death to the traveler, persist today among all classes of society in both rural and urban areas. It is customary to serve refreshments to every caller in the home or place of business, and it is considered shameful—that is, involving a loss of honor—not to serve several times more food than the guests can eat. Under tribal conditions nothing is wasted, for many are waiting to finish what the guests leave: in order of priority, the important men of the tribe, their sons, the lesser men, the older boys, the women and young children, and finally the dogs. However, the growth of material desires, especially in the towns, may soon put an end to the traditional lavish hospitality except among the wealthy. The origin of many more cultural traits found throughout Iraq can be seen in the description of Bedouin life which follows. The economy of the desert nomads is based upon breeding and raising animals, notably camels, but sheep, goats, donkeys, and horses as well. Bedouins have lived also by raiding each other, settled cultivators, or caravans passing through their territories. Typically they do not take an active part in commerce across the desert, but raid, levy tolls, and occasionally supply transport for caravans. The necessity of fighting for pasture and water in years of scarcity intensifies their warlike nature. Despite the fact that a settled life leads to greater material prosperity, Iraq's Bedouins, the poorest and least educated portion of the population, con- sider themselves superior to farmers and artisans. Their dependence upon animals and the scarcity of water and grazing away from the river valleys make nomadic life necessary. They must settle near wells or rivers during the summer, when the animals require daily watering. The welcome rains, which begin in October, bring grass on the desert and allow man and his animals to stray farther from the sources of water. From October to May the camp is moved about every ten days, when the grass is depleted and the camp becomes unsanitary. The tribe must settle again in May, when the dreaded summer begins. The life of the Bedouins is hard and simple. They subsist upon camels' milk and dates during most of the year. Bread and rice are luxuries, and meat is enjoyed only when an animal dies or is killed in honor of guests. Housing consists of a tent made of goat hair or wool, characteristically black in color. Health conditions are poor, although it is not clear whether on balance they are worse than those in the villages, where malaria and bilharzia are associated with irrigated agriculture. Nomadic life is hard on infants, the aged, and the infirm, and consequently the span of life is short, but most adults are tough and wiry. The birth rate must be high to main- See Dickson, The Arab of the Desert; Field, The 'Anthropology of Iraq; Grant, The Syrian Desert; Jamali, The New Iraq; and Tannous, “The Arab Tribal Community in a Nationalist State,” Middle East Journal, I (Jan., 1947), 5–17. 18 Iraq's People and Resources tain a population constantly depleted by privation and war. The institution of polygamy, sanctioned by the Prophet Muhammad as preferable to female infanti- cide, not only takes care of the excess female population resulting from warfare but maintains a high birth rate as well. Social organization is patriarchal, with a complex hierarchy of status. Each tribe has its sheikh or sheikhs, usually older men, although the office tends to be hereditary. Tribes are organized into confederations, such as the Shammar of the Jazira, with a paramount sheikh as chief of the lesser leaders. The rigid code of honor and morality of the Bedouin is found in varying degrees throughout Iraq. Westerners approve of some parts of the code, such as the moral necessity of offering food, water, and shelter to the traveler, and giving protection to anyone who requests it, even if the person is an enemy. At the same time they deplore others, such as the avoidance of manual labor and the compulsion to avenge the family honor by killing a woman relative who is rumored to be guilty of misconduct. For better or for worse, the moral code is weakened by settled life, whether in towns or villages. On the positive side, the anonymity of a large city makes it somewhat less necessary for a man to kill his offending sister. On the nega- tive side, the discipline of the tribe has not yet been replaced by a sense of respon- sibility to any group other than the immediate family. The treachery prevalent in Middle Eastern towns is not merely the urban counterpart of the Bedouin's raid- ing, which follows established rules. The Government of Iraq has continued the policy, begun by the Ottomans in the late nineteenth century, of attempting to settle the tribes on agricultural land, although the resulting pattern of land tenure has tended to perpetuate the power of the sheikhs. The reasons for a central government's desire to put an end to nomadism are sound and obvious: the internecine feuds of the Bedouins are a threat to internal security, and their habit of encroaching upon settled agriculture in dry years is a threat to agricultural development and irrigation schemes. They cause difficulties with respect to taxation and the control of smuggling and to censuses, military conscription, and health and education programs. Their very existence as tribes precludes their developing a spirit of national patriotism. More planning is required in tribal settlement than has hitherto been devoted to it. Nomads should be regarded as part of the nation's economy, turning the scanty resources of the desert into meat, milk, and wool. Some of these resources, lying far from the areas where a permanent existence is possible, would be wasted if all the tribes were settled. It may be that Iraq's economy cannot at present spare the products of the Bedouins, although as national income rises their production will surely be rendered submarginal. Moreover, Iraq's agriculture has many unsolved problems, among which land tenure looms large, and settling the tribes under their sheikhs, as has been done in the past, gives a material incentive to perpetuation of tribal organization. The most potent force in detribalization may prove to be the availability of land as the irrigation projects are carried out, if complementary reforms are included to allow an individual to farm a piece of land profitably. Agricultural people of the alluvial plain.—The typical Iraqi, if he can be said to exist, lives in a mud hut in a village on the alluvial plain of central or lower Iraq, farming by irrigation the land held by his sheikh, who gives him a yearly share of Cultural Description of the People 19 the crop in return for his labor." This fellah" (plural, fellahin) usually considers himself a member of some tribe, even though his ancestors have been settled agri- cultural people for centuries, and he maintains certain tribal traditions. This man may be called typical because he is a member of the most numerous cultural group in Iraq. According to the Census of 1947, at least two-thirds of Iraq's population lived in villages, and 70 per cent of the nonnomadic population was residing in the irrigation zone. Therefore about half of Iraq's nonnomadic population lived in villages in the irrigation zone in 1947." The people under discussion include fully settled and semisettled agriculturists, but exclude the fully nomadic Bedouins, who do not stay in one place long enough to raise crops. Sir Ernest Dowson, who surveyed Iraq's population in 1930, divided the rural, nonnomadic population into "settled” and “tribal" (seminomadic) people, comprising 32 per cent and 48 per cent of the total population, respec- tively." However, the fully settled and the semisettled agricultural people will be combined in our description because it is difficult to distinguish the two groups. The Iraqi fellah is a mobile person in several senses. First, because of the soil salination which follows irrigation without drainage under conditions of rapid evaporation, it has been common throughout the centuries for whole villages to move when the productivity of their lands is diminishing. Floods, shifting river courses, or the silting up of canals have also caused villages to move. Second, it is an accepted practice for a sheikh to dismiss any fellah and his family at will. An abundance of land relative to the size of the population and the partial dependence on pastoralism of most rural people in Iraq are further elements making for mobility. The fellah is sufficiently settled to raise a crop and to build himself a mud or reed hut, and commonly allies himself with a given tribe and its sheikh even if the allegiance is temporary. The individual peasant proprietors found in parts of the rainfall zone are almost unknown on Iraq's alluvial plain. The expense of both lift and flow irrigation is a partial explanation for the paucity of small landholders, but a more fundamental reason is the manner in which tribes have settled the plain. Typically, when a tribe owing allegiance to a sheikh and his family has settled as cultivators, the sheikh's family, through traditional leadership and perhaps the supplying of capital, has come to be considered the proprietor. Usually the sheikh does not own the land in fee simple, but is himself a lessee of government land, the largest category of land ownership in Iraq. The privilege of collecting rent goes with the leasing of government land. The word "sheikh,” meaning, in nomadic Bedouin life, the leader of the tribe, the elder, and the source of wisdom and guidance, has come to mean also a landlord. 10 See Coon, op. cit., chap. xi; Dodd, A Controlled Experiment on Rural Hygiene in Syria; Tannous, “The Arab Village of the Middle East,” Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution (1943), pp. 523-543; and Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle East. . 11 Only the Arabic words that are fairly well known to English-speaking readers have been used. They appear in the text unitalicized and without the vowel markings that indicate where the accent falls. The Appendix lists these Arabic words with their vowel markings and meanings. 12 This statement assumes that the urban population is the same percentage of the total popu. lation in both zones, an assumption that is approximately true. The Marsh Arabs would be in- cluded in the half of the population living in irrigation zone villages. 13 Dowson, An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions, p. 12. His rural nonnomadic population, comprising 80 per cent of the total, is larger than our present category by the in- clusion of mountain and marsh rural people and the urban populations of all but the three major cities. 20 Iraq's People and Resources Because of the comfort and convenience of urban life, many sheikhs live in the towns and therefore have lost all but their rent-collecting functions. When the landlord is an absentee, one of the wealthier tenants may be considered the sheikh, meaning that he is a tribal leader, and the landlord is simply called a landlord. The fellahin's meek acceptance of their miserable lot may be traced in large part to their tribal origins. Tradition demands that the sheikh's decisions be obeyed without question, just as traditionally he could be expected to look after the wel- fare of his people. As the villagers come to realize that their sheikh’s motivations have changed, discontent develops. The status of those who farm ranges from sharecropper to fellah, who is actually an agricultural laborer. Although each man is assigned a plot of land by the landlord and sometimes is given seed and implements, the two groups differ in income and social status. The sharecropper customarily receives half of the crop. The fellah receives a much smaller share, which varies little from year to year because it is seldom above a subsistence level. The major difference between share- cropper and fellah appears to be bargaining power. Sharecroppers are those who, through family connections, literacy, or other means, can exact a greater share from the landlord. Fellahin are too ignorant to compute the size of their debt or the value of their crop, or are fearful of having their land taken away and given to another family. The landlord may give them just enough to keep them and their families alive and in debt until the next season. Because of the lack of incentive for the fellahin to work, foremen, often members of the sheikh's family, are em- ployed on the large estates as supervisors. The majority of farmers on Iraq's alluvial plain are fellahin rather than sharecroppers, the reverse of the situation prevailing in most other Middle Eastern countries. The village is the typical form of agricultural settlement in Iraq and throughout the Arab world. It is “a classic example of the in-group,'»5 in that tribe, residence, religion, language, and often even family are the same for each person in the village. The origins of the village are lost in prehistory, but it is certain that the necessity for protection against marauders has been important in maintaining it. Social customs appropriate to village life have developed, and act as impediments to any change toward scattered farmsteads. The typical Iraqi village is small. The fertility of the surrounding agricultural land and the amount of water available set initial limits on its size. Another limit- ing factor is that the fields must not be farther than a few hours' walk from the village, or they will be uneconomical to farm and impossible to protect against animals and thieves. Finally, there is a political factor: the government of the village is based upon personal relations and administered by the ruling elders. If the village has grown beyond a certain size, contests for leadership develop: one faction may establish a new village, or a formal municipal government may de- velop. In the latter case the village will have become a town. Its increased size will bring other attributes not found in villages, most important of which are a permanent market and a group of artisans. Villages in Iraq typically contain 14 According to Doreen Warriner's recent estimates, the landowner on flow-irrigated land takes between three-fifths and two-thirds of the crop, and on pump-irrigated land five-sevenths. War- riner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East, p. 137. Interest, taxes, and similar expenditures would further reduce the fellah's share. 15 Gulick, op. cit., p. 162. 22 Iraq's People and Resources cooking and storage utensils, and in some houses a colorful wooden chest made in town out of tea crates. Tables and chairs are not used, but there may be a wooden bench for the men to sit on; otherwise a rug may be unrolled for sitting. Ordi. narily, people sit or squat on the ground, where they eat and wash the dishes. The thick mud walls of the house offer protection against the intense heat of summer. During the short but cold winter, the family sits in the brilliant sunshine by day and huddles together in one room, often with their animals, by night. When it rains, no one is comfortable, but the culture does not place a high value on physical comfort. The diet of the fellahin consists mainly of bread, a round, flat loaf of whole wheat or barley flour. Tea with sugar is greatly enjoyed, although many families are too poor to consume it regularly. Bread alone makes a meal, and bread with sweetened tea a good meal. Dates, onions, and tomatoes, cheap when in season, are the most common additions to the basic bread and tea. Most families keep a few chickens, which must scratch for their food, and hence are thin and diseased and lay few eggs. Families who have cattle make sour milk and cheese. Rice, meat, and fruits are purchased less often, but are enjoyed at times of celebration or when the sheikh has guests. The tradition of feeding the entire village whenever a feast is prepared is probably an important alleviating factor in the diet of the fellahin. Clothing follows tribal traditions. Around the village the men and boys wear a loose gown, hitching it up for work in the fields, and adding the traditional Arab headdress and a homespun cape for trips to town. The women and girls wear a loose long-sleeved dress. Women and older girls wear a black headdress at all times, adding a cape when they go to town. The woman's cape differs from the man's in that it covers the head and is invariably of a dark color. Because of the lack of washing facilities and the low incomes of the villagers, their clothes are often dirty and ragged. The majority go barefoot, although the use of leather sandals or wooden clogs is common. Lack of skills is a factor contributing to the low level of living of the fellahin. Soapmaking and candlemaking are unknown, despite the availability of animal fats and the obvious need for soap and candles. A few village women who can sew make a good income from sewing for others. There is a little spinning and weaving of capes, rugs, and blankets, but little or no manufacture of agricultural imple- ments, furniture, mattresses, cooking utensils, shoes, and other necessities, which are usually purchased in the nearest town. The social characteristics which owe their origins to Bedouin life remain, al- though somewhat modified, among settled cultivators. They include the emphasis on hospitality and on the family and tribe rather than on the individual or nation. A strong system of status is evident in the refusal to do certain tasks. Carrying fuel and water, having anything to do with chickens, cooking, washing clothes or dishes, or caring for children are women's tasks which no man could perform without a loss of honor in the eyes of his fellow men. No one of either sex in a tribe of fellahin can raise vegetables, unless vegetable growing is a specialty of the tribe. Despite the subservient status of village women, they enjoy greater freedom than do townswomen. They never veil their faces, and are free to talk with men. Segregation of the sexes is impossible in the village house, as is wearing a cape while doing agricultural labor. Both sexes work hard, dividing the labor between Cultural Description of the People 23 them according to established customs which no one questions. At times of feasting, the women share in the festivities, although they do not eat until the men are finished. The men spend their leisure time sitting in their huts, the teahouse, or the sheikh's guesthouse. Time means little to them, and they are content to sit, with or without conversation, for many hours. The women and children remain at home or visit their neighbors when they have no work to do. A United Nations expert on handicrafts estimated that the typical fellah has one hundred idle days a year. Many wheat or barley cultivators have nothing to do in the summer, when there is not enough water to irrigate all the land that was planted to winter crops. Rice growers are idle all winter until the spring floods. However, if underemployment is defined as a situation in which a certain per- centage of the population could be withdrawn without affecting the size of output, its prevalence is less certain under present conditions. In general, the fellahin are sick and poorly nourished and are therefore incapable of sustained physical effort; moreover, they would not gain financially by working harder. Some localities of high population density have a significant amount of rural underemployment, but its extent throughout the country has probably been overestimated. Until recent years there were no schools outside cities and towns. Despite re- markable progress in the spread of rural education, schools are not yet available to the majority of rural children, and few of the schools in existence offer education beyond the primary grades. Some villages have a local religious leader who teaches a few of the boys to read the Quran. However, these students cannot be considered truly literate, as they commonly memorize the passages. The way in which most village children are educated is aptly described by Stuart Dodd: “Their occupa- tion is chiefly hanging around and picking up the adults' culture by absorption."14 Illiteracy is universal among women and almost universal among men. Super- stitious beliefs, as well as diseases, abound. Marsh dwellers. There are no reliable estimates of the number of people in the inhospitable region of Iraq's southern marshes. They are of mixed origin racially, as one would expect in an area which offers protection to fugitives of all kinds. True Arabs despise the marsh dwellers because of their mixed blood, and their name, Ma'dan, connotes "yokel” outside the marshes." The Ma'dan live in villages of reed huts built on islands. The reeds of the marshes, the main form of natural vegetation, are important to the livelihood of the marsh people. From a giant reed (Phragmites communis) they make not only their own houses but housing and roofing materials used throughout southern Iraq. The United Nations expert on handicrafts reported in 1952 that approximately one-fifth of the population of Suq ash-Shuyukh qada of Muntafiq liwa were em- ployed in matmaking. The water buffalo, whose milk is an important item in the diet, feeds on young reed shoots. Some water buffaloes are bred for sale to mer- chants in town. Fishing, also a major source of food, is done from the boats which are the chief means of transport in this region of few roads. The fish have little commercial value, as the Ma'dan do not know how to preserve them. Ma'dan living in the permanent marshes subsist almost entirely on fish and milk products. 10 Dodd, op. cit., p. 98. 17 Thesiger, “The Ma'dan or Marsh Dwellers of Southern Iraq," Royal Central Asian Journal, XLI (Jan., 1954), 4–25. See also Field, op. cit.; and Fulanain, The Marsh Arab. 24 Iraq's People and Resources People living on the peripheries of the marshes in the seasonally flooded areas are rice cultivators, producing for the national market. Their way of life resembles that of both the Ma’dan and the fellahin of the alluvial plain. Their villages are built of reeds, and they keep water buffaloes, yet they are tied to the land by the same type of tenure system as that of wheat and barley cultivators. In social customs the Ma’dan have much in common with other tribal people, but are more backward than the fellahin because of their isolation and greater poverty. Here, as elsewhere in Iraq, a high value is placed on hospitality. Visitors to marsh villages are entertained in distinctive guesthouses built of the giant reeds woven into intricate designs. Like most of the fellahin, they are of the Shi'a sect of Islam and, because they lack religious instruction, few pray or keep the fast. The special marriage customs of the Shi'ites are intensified in the marsh region. Throughout Iraq, the prospective groom must pay a dowry to his bride's father; but, in southern Iraq especially, the father spends much of it on golden jewelry, which his daughter wears at all times. It is no accident that Amara and Basra cities are jewelry-making centers. The gold is regarded as the wife's insurance if her husband should divorce her, for divorces are easily and commonly made: the hus- band need only say "I divorce you” three times before witnesses, and the divorce is final. Polygamy is permitted by Islam, but among the Ma'dan the institution of temporary marriage—the Arabic name, mut'a, literally means "enjoyment”—is more common. Under this system, a marriage is contracted for a definite period of time, at the end of which the girl is sent back to her people and any children remain with the husband's house. If her people are in need of money, she may be given in mut'a a number of times. It is suspected that many of these women eventually become prostitutes. In compensation for her low social status and the omnipresent possibility that her husband will divorce her or take another wife, the Ma'dan woman has relatively great freedom. The hierarchy of seclusion of women is described by Fulanain: The daughter of the despised Ma'dan has one great advantage over her social superiors; she goes unveiled, as free as any English girl to comb her hair and don her gayest dress when a chance meeting with her lover seems possible. As the social level rises, so does the seclusion of the Arab woman become stricter. The rich shaikh, for example, will build a reed fence or a wall of mud to give greater privacy to his women's quarters, while the shaikh of a desert tribe when moving camp will hang some brightly-coloured cloth on the leading camel, as a warning to strangers to keep their distance. The strictest rules are those which govern the well-to-do families of the towns. There the woman must go heavily veiled; she may not see her future husband, nor he her; only in the bridal chamber do they discover whether their messengers had been truthful, or whether, corrupted by gifts, they had extolled imaginary charms.18 Mountain people. In the zone where rain-fed agriculture is possible, Iraq's mountains and foothills, the way of life is significantly different from that on the plains. Not only does the physical environment necessitate a different economic structure, but the mountain people have different ethnic origins. They are pre- dominantly Kurds, who represented approximately 17 per cent of the population in the late 1940's (table 4). Various Christian sects, also, live as peasant pro- prietors in mountain villages, particularly in Mosul liwa; but the entire Christian population constituted only 4 per cent of the population, and this number in- 18 Fulanain, op. cit., p. 66. In recent years the generalization that seclusion is greatest among the urban wealthy has been less true in the largest cities, although it is still true in the towns. 26 Iraq's People and Resources of the severe winters and the availability of stone for building. Houses are made of mud, stone, and brush, typically placed so close together on the mountainside that the roof of one house is another's terrace. Abundance of water and sparsity of population make for better sanitary conditions than among the fellahin. How- ever, the severity of the winters, the poverty of the area, and the presence of ma- laria in some regions of Kurdistan cause mortality to be higher than among the people of the plains. As in all villages in Iraq, medical and educational facilities, electricity, water purification, and similar amenities are almost wholly lacking. Social life bears many similarities to that of the Arab majority. The exclusion of women from the social life of men and from positions of authority is found here TABLE 5 URBAN POPULATION OF IRAQ, 1947 Number of inhabitants Number of towns Cumulative per cent of total population Cumulative per cent of urban population More than 150,000.. 50,000–150,000. 20,000-50,000...... 10,000–20,000. 3,000–10,000....... SOURCES: Census of 1947; Lebon. "Population Distribution and the Agricultural Regions of 'Iraq,” Geographical Review, XLIII (2), 223-228, and (4), 570. Not available. also. However, Kurdish women have an air of independence that Arab women lack. They talk and laugh with men and almost never cover their colorful costumes with a black cape. The men wear a matching shirt and pair of baggy trousers, a wide sash, and an embroidered skull cap wrapped around with a large fringed turban. Because of the centuries of warfare and the high value placed upon prow- ess, a man carries some kind of weapon—at least a dagger in the sash, and, if he can afford it, a gun. Urban people.-According to the Census of 1947, 34 per cent of Iraq's popula- tion were living in places having a municipal government, that is, in towns and cities. Baghdad city alone contained 10 per cent of the total population and 29 per cent of the urban population; the next largest city, Mosul, was less than a third as large. A frequency distribution of the numbers of cities and towns by size appears in table 5. Because its fertile plain, when irrigated, could support a large nonagricultural population, Mesopotamia logically became the site of the first cities in recorded history. Unlike modern cities, which purchase their food with services and indus- trial products, early cities were supported in large part by customary tributes, in return for which the cities provided services such as protection and marketing for their hinterlands. In Mesopotamia the city has been of particular importance as the seat of the central government which built and maintained the irrigation network during the periods when agriculture flourished. The rationale of the Middle Eastern town is threefold: (1) commerce is un- usually important because the area is at the junction of three continents; (2) administration is important because, during much of their history, Middle Eastern Cultural Description of the People 27 countries have been colonies of foreign powers, whose ruling representatives re- quired the security and amenities that only towns could supply; and (3) the re- ligious significance of certain towns, particularly through the pilgrimage, has reinforced their commercial significance." The four largest cities, Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, and Kirkuk, were all administrative centers of the Ottoman Empire. The next three, Najaf, Kazimain, and Karbala, are holy cities housing important Shi’ite shrines, visited by thousands of pilgrims each year. All the cities and towns in Iraq are important commercially. In the Census of 1947, 10 per cent of the em- ployed population were engaged in commerce, an occupation outnumbered only by agriculture and service trades. Even in Baghdad city, center of much of the country's industry, more people were engaged in commerce than in manufacture. The preindustrial city, including the old sections of dualistic cities, is character- ized physically by congested, unplanned, and unsanitary conditions and a division into quarters reflecting ethnic, religious, and occupational differences. Production is organized along guild lines and is carried on in small unmechanized operations without specialized management. Education is not technical in its orientation and is limited to sons of the ruling classes. The middle class is small and weak, kinship ties are strong, religion pervades all spheres of activity, business and government are carried out by means of personal relationships—in short, the old city is part of the tradition-directed society. Such cities tend to be relatively small and few in number, for their agriculture is not productive enough to supply much surplus, nor can the city compete with its products on the world market to buy food from other countries. “The static character of agriculture and of the economy generally [is] fostered ... by the insulation of the religio-political officials from the practical arts and the reduction of the peasant to virtually the status of a beast of bur- den"*—a statement that would apply to much of the Middle East today. A description of a typical medium-sized town in southern Iraq will illustrate what is meant by the old Middle Eastern town. Samawa, home of some 20,000 people, is located on the southern Euphrates approximately midway between Baghdad and Basra. Its rationale is primarily commercial, for it acts as a center where the Bedouin tribes from the desert may trade their animal products for necessities such as dates and cloth. The extensive bazaar consists of a large number of tiny shops, conforming to Boeke's explanation of the coexistence of poverty and a large commercial population in the Oriental town: "It is ... this very poverty which explains the situation. Only very small quantities are taken to market, only very small quantities are bought at one time ...'24 Poor people cannot afford to tie up their money in household stores, and typically finish one box of matches or bar of soap before going to the market for another. Time is plentiful and money scarce in Samawa. The major industries utilize animal products supplied by the Bedouins. The cleaning and baling of wool, which has long been the most important industry, employs several hundred workers at the peak of activity in the spring. 22 Fisher, op. cit., pp. 120–122. * Davis, “The Origin and Growth of Urbanization in the World," American Journal of Soci. ology, LX (March, 1955), 431. The entire March, 1955, issue of the American Journal of So. ciology is devoted to urbanization: see especially Ginsburg, “The Great City in Southeast Asia," pp. 455–462, and Sjoberg, “The Preindustrial City," pp. 438–445. See also Hoselitz, “The Role of Cities in the Economic Growth of Underdeveloped Countries,” Journal of Political Economy, LXI (June, 1953), 195–208. 24 Boeke, op. cit., p. 75. 28 Iraq's People and Resources Manufacture of clarified butter (ghee) is second in importance. Hand-woven wool rugs and blankets are important products of home industry. There is no brickkiln; materials for housing other than mud brick must be brought in by the railway which runs through the town. The Census of 1947, which enumerated Samawa's population at 15,292, gave a labor force of 4,350 (see table 6). Social classes range from wealthy landowners and merchants to Bedouins who come in to camp near the river in summer. The middle class consists of professional people, civil servants, skilled artisans, and merchants. The lower class consists of TABLE 6 EMPLOYMENT IN VARIOUS INDUSTRIES IN SAMAWA, 1947 Industry Number of workers Per cent of workers 445 599 Agriculture.... Manufacture......... Public utilities and transport.. Service (public and private).. Commerce.... ............. Miscellaneous and unspecified..... Apprenticeship. 338 692 1,641 348 287 Total. 4,350 Source: Census of 1947. domestic servants, poorer merchants and street vendors, and unskilled workers of all kinds. Fellahin inhabit the land surrounding the town. Their landlords live in the town, or, if they are both wealthy and desirous of a more cosmopolitan life, in the nearby city of Diwaniya or in Baghdad. The fellahin tend the date gardens along the Euphrates and raise wheat and barley by irrigation. Tribal traditions remain so strong that almost no vegetables are grown around Samawa; those sold in the market are imported from Diwaniya or Baghdad. Housing for the town dwellers is almost entirely of Oriental style. The outer wall of the house rises directly from the street, and the few outside windows are barred and shuttered for reasons of security as well as privacy of women. The building material is baked or mud brick, depending on the wealth of the owner. The floor plan is typically a hollow square with an inner courtyard into which all the rooms open. The house may have one or two stories, but invariably has a flat, walled roof, where the family sleeps in summer. A wealthy household may have a walled garden for summer use. Most of the houses have some form of plumbing, for a water purification plant was installed in 1952, and pipes were laid in all the streets. As in Baghdad, there is no system of sewage disposal; most houses have septic tanks. The typical house is inhabited by more than one family in the conjugal sense. But the inhabitants usually belong to one patriarchal family, for purdah demands that no man see a woman unless he is married to her or is a close relative. It is rare for a son to set up a home of his own when he marries. The cost of living is too high to allow any but the wealthy to live as conjugal families. Moreover, social cus- toms would make conjugal family life undesirable and inconvenient in Samawa. Cultural Description of the People 29 A gregarious people unaccustomed to companionship of the opposite sex, Arabs enjoy being with members of their own sex at all times. Visitors to the women's public bath make it a social institution, bringing food and their children and spending many hours there. The way in which housework is done requires an abundance of female labor. Marketing involves going to a number of different stalls in the bazaar and must be repeated each day, as refrigeration is almost unknown. Food preparation is a time-consuming process. Rice contains a sizable percentage of waste and must be sorted grain by grain, an operation which takes several hours a day for a large family. In the preparation of a favorite Iraqi and Lebanese dish, kubba burghul, meat and cracked wheat must be pounded in a large mortar for an hour or more. It is customary for the man to be served his midday or evening meal immediately, whenever he decides to come home. The food must be ready, and there must be someone to serve it. Callers of either sex are served tea and coffee several times during each visit. The mainstay of the diet of all but the wealthy is bread, the same flat loaves eaten by the fellahin. Rice, cheaper here than in Baghdad because it is grown nearby, is enjoyed by all but the poorest class. A few vegetables are eaten when in season, either raw or cooked with meat and rice. Meats and fruits are not regu- larly available to the lower classes because of their cost, but dates are abundant and cheap in winter. Milk products are consumed mostly in the form of yoghurt and cheese. The social life of the sexes is completely segregated. The men spend their spare time in the coffeehouses and restaurants and in visiting each other. In private homes they sit in a special room at the front of the house—the urban equivalent of the tribal guesthouse. Refreshments are served by a male servant or by the host himself, who carries them from the women's quarters, or harim. The women enjoy an active social life if there is enough help to free them from work, sitting with their children in a room at the back of the house, eating sweets and gossiping. Because of the highly personal orientation of Middle Eastern people, discussion in both groups centers around people whom the speakers all know. Women prob- ably gossip more because they have little knowledge of or interest in affairs outside their homes. Reputations are made and broken in the gossip sessions, which are the wealthy woman's pastime and the poor woman's recreation. Every man desires that his wife shall be freed by servants of the need to appear on the streets or in the market, but not all can afford it. Purdah, meaning literally a curtain and therefore the seclusion of women, is a relative thing. In its extreme form, among conservative and wealthy Muslims in India, the woman must not be seen, even completely veiled, nor must her voice be heard, by any man not her husband or a close relative. In Iraq, purdah is stricter in the towns than in the large cities and is least strict for the countrywoman, who must go without cape and veil and talk with men in order to do her work. In Samawa a woman is con- sidered decent if she is never seen in public without the black cape and if she does not talk unnecessarily, smile, laugh, or otherwise draw attention to herself in public. The family honor is at stake in her behavior, and any serious breach must be paid for with her life. In towns even more conservative than Samawa, for ex- 30 Iraq's People and Resources ample Suq ash-Shuyukh to the south, most women wear a black veil covering the face when they are outside their homes. Until recent decades, life in Samawa had not changed significantly in hundreds of years. The railroad, automobiles, electricity, the radio, schools, and a govern- ment clinic brought the first changes. More recently, the paving of a few streets, the availability of purified water, the establishment of a secondary school for girls, and the opening of a Maternal and Child Health Center by the Ministry of Health with the aid of American technical assistance have had an impact upon living con- ditions in the town. Construction of a cement plant and a modern bridge are offer- ing greater employment opportunities and, through the resident officials of for- eign construction companies, are serving as sources of new ideas. The coming decades will undoubtedly see major social changes. Iraq's largest cities display many elements of Western culture, brought in first by colonial powers and maintained by the increasing volume of trade and com- munication with the West. A small section of the urban population has adopted a changed set of values and pattern of consumption and acts as a funnel through which ideas from outside enter the country and eventually reach other portions of the urban population. The sine qua non of the new type of city is industrialization, which enables the cities to purchase their food with industrial goods. Iraq's four largest cities, which have strongly dualistic characters, contain most of the country's large-scale industry. The industry may be initiated and operated by foreigners, as with Kirkuk's oil production, or by indigenous powers, as with most of Baghdad's large-scale plants. To the extent that the old rationale and way of life remain after the entrance of rationalized industry, the city is dualistic. Despite the rapid transformation now in process, Baghdad city retains much of its old character. Dualism is strikingly illustrated in the bimodal distribution of industrial employment by size of firm, as disclosed by the Census of Manufacture conducted in 1954. In Baghdad city and its suburbs, 4,330, or 95 per cent, of the 4,573 manufacturing enterprises employed less than ten workers, but these small shops employed only 30 per cent of the industrial labor force. The three largest firms alone employed 20 per cent of that labor force. The remaining 50 per cent of the workers were distributed fairly evenly among firms employing from ten to one thousand workers." Undoubtedly a distribution of the value of trade by size of commercial establishment would show similar dualism in commerce; the enor- mous number of tiny shops together with the few large establishments probably carry on the bulk of trading. The most striking characteristic of the dualistic city is its extraordinary differ- ence from the surrounding countryside. Paved residential streets, buildings of permanent structure, electricity and plumbing, people in Western dress, recrea- tional facilities, educational and medical institutions—all end abruptly at the city limits and are replaced by villages of mud huts and a way of life that has changed little through the centuries. This difference existed even before industry came to the Middle East. Because of the great importance of commerce in the area, towns were cosmopolitan and rich, but the rural regions, poor in natural resources, remained backward and impoverished. Landowners have long been drawn to the cities to live, further delaying the development of rural amenities. 23 Iraq, Report on the Industrial Census of Iraq, 1954, p. 44. 32 Iraq's People and Resources Houses still have walls around them, but only to give privacy and protect the gardens from sheep and goats. The growing population of Baghdad can no longer stay within the bounds of the old city. But values are changing: the new houses do not duplicate the old style, but have Western designs, with more emphasis on comfort and convenience. A significant minority have been occupied from the beginning by single conjugal families, and that number has grown. The new sections have increasingly reflected the adoption of Western values and standards of consumption. As the more affluent and progressive families moved out of the downtown area, their former homes became tenements, occupied by poorer members of their ex- tended families or by groups of unrelated persons. Most of the old houses now contain several families in the conjugal sense. The city's artisans, small merchants, servants, and much of the white-collar class live in these houses at present. The incomes of many of this group have not kept pace with the rising cost of living. The artisans are suffering from severe competition from mechanized methods of production using unskilled labor, and must eventually acquire new skills if they are to maintain their standards of consumption. The authorities in charge of Baghdad's city planning have as their goal the eventual clearing of the old sections. Already a number of wide avenues have been cut through, and the old dwellings along these streets have been replaced by new or remodeled commercial buildings. Public housing in the suburbs is planned to take care of the present inhabitants of the old city, although only a few hundred units had been completed and occupied by mid-1956. The way in which the suburbs were settled has brought about another housing trend. Commonly, one man buys or leases a large piece of property and builds at first only one or two houses on it. The newer portions of the suburban areas con- tain numerous empty lots, which are taken over by migrants from rural areas, who come to the capital because of the promise of industrial employment. They build their huts (sarifa) of reed mats and mud. Those from marshy areas bring their water buffaloes with them; others keep cows, sheep, and chickens. Some are so poor when they finally decide to leave their villages that they bring nothing but the clothing on their backs, a little bedding, and a few cooking utensils. Among the strangest sights in Baghdad are the squalid settlements near the finest man- sions and newest middle-class homes. The government, composed primarily of occupants of the new homes and man- sions, periodically attempts to clear the huts from the residential areas. A few days' notice to move is given, and then the remaining huts are torn down. Prior to the flood of March, 1954, the suburbs had been fairly well cleared of them, and the migrants were settled beyond the eastern dike in the area known as 'Arasat al- 'Asima. When that area was inundated, they returned, filling the empty lots within the suburbs, and the government was unable to force them out when the floodwaters receded. In the winter of 1954–55 the suburbs were again cleared of most of the huts, but when the vigil of the police relaxes huts are rebuilt. Whether these people are new migrants to the city or simply people who have returned from across the dike cannot be said with certainty, for the villages of mud huts surrounding the city have continued to grow with the increase in rural-to-urban migration. Cultural Description of the People 33 Despite the fact that wealthy Iraqis abhor the unsanitary and unsightly condi- tions next to their homes, a social system has developed based upon the proximity of the poorest to the wealthiest elements of society. The hut dwellers supply cheap servants and guards and easily obtainable milk, eggs, chickens, and bread. The major source of milk products in the city is the cattle of the hut dwellers; often diseased and invariably ill fed and dirty, these animals give a product that leaves much to be desired. Most of the eggs and chickens sold in the local market originate in the huts. Some wealthy families, only a generation or two removed from village life, prefer the flat type of bread baked in the mud ovens of their sarifa neighbors to the loaves put out by the bakeries. The hut dwellers in turn have grown to de- pend upon their wealthy neighbors for much of their income; for water, which is not available to many of the urban poor; and for garbage, which yields food scraps for animals and paper for fuel. Therefore the attempts of the government to gather the huts permanently in one place apart from the residential areas have failed thus far and will undoubtedly continue to fail until alternative sources of income and public services are available to the urban poor. In summary, three different ways of life are found in Baghdad city. First, the inhabitants of the old sections live and work in the traditional manner, fighting hard to maintain their established patterns of consumption in the face of a rising cost of living and competition from new methods of production. Second, the for- eigners and Iraqis who have changed their mode of living occupy suburban houses of modern design. Third, the hut dwellers, recent migrants, have brought their rural way of life with them. Along with physical changes have come profound changes in social life in Bagh- dad. In the city's newer sections, women wearing the black cape are in the minor- ity; several restaurants are patronized by both sexes; and women are increasingly employed in stores and offices, breaking with the taboo against allowing them to meet the general public. Radios are found in most middle-class homes, and the cinema is now the most popular form of entertainment. Younger Iraqis are be- ginning to show an interest in athletics. Orderly ways are being brought to a people who have heretofore cared little for order, by devices such as railings forc- ing them to queue for buses, and policemen strategically placed to keep traffic on the right side of the street. Thus, although business is still conducted mostly in the old section of town and the majority of the population live and work under condi- tions similar to those in Samawa, this situation will no longer be true in a few decades. CHAPTER III POPULATION STRUCTURE A DISCUSSION of Iraq's population prior to the first and only census in 1947 must be confined to total numbers and their geographic distribution. Specific details of population composition are unavailable, and even the estimates of total numbers are subject to wide error. Understandably, the greatest doubt in regard to total numbers exists with re- spect to the ancient period. It is commonly believed in Iraq today that at various times, as for example during the Babylonian, Neo-Babylonian, and Abbaside periods, Mesopotamia supported a population of 30,000,000 or more and that therefore Iraq can support that many again. Credence is given to this belief by the large scale and number of remnants of irrigation works throughout the country, as well as by the extent of the ruined cities. It is easy to make the false assumption that all these works were in operation, and all the cities inhabited, at the same time. Throughout Iraq's history, soil salination has caused large tracts of land to be abandoned in favor of virgin land, and therefore the capitals of succeeding em- pires were located in different places. Seton Lloyd set 15,000,000 as the maximum population in ancient times, and believed that only about half of this number could have been engaged in agriculture, the other half being supported by com- merce. Furthermore, the smaller population of recent times has not been caused by any lessening of the water supplied by the Twin Rivers. Ecological factors alone-specifically, in Iraq, that the canal system was allowed to fall into dis- repair, and drainage was not practiced with irrigation—are responsible for the change toward desert conditions that has occurred in the Middle East in the last four millennia. Estimates of Iraq's population during the Ottoman period are few and ques- tionable. The Ottoman rulers attempted numerical estimates of population only for the purposes of taxation or conscription, with understandably deleterious ef- fects on their accuracy. The modern state existed only as three administrative divisions named after their capitals, Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra. Vital Cuinet estimated their respective populations in 1890 to be 850,000, 300,280, and 700,000, or a total of about 1,850,000. However, it is doubtful that he included minorities such as the Kurds or the Bedouins, or even the semisettled nomadic peoples, who were then a larger proportion of the population than they are at present. Longrigg estimates the population of the three states in 1900 to have been about 1,250,000, less than 500,000, and 500,000, respectively—a total of about 2,250,000. Two partial population registrations were carried out by the newly formed Government of Iraq in 1927 and 1935. The enumerators sat in the street and asked 1 Locher, a visitor to Mesopotamia in the late nineteenth century, stated that “Mesopotamia ... once yielded food for more than fifty million of people.” With Star and Crescent, p. 92. Popula- tion estimates by the following authorities have been used: Lloyd's estimate is given by Wor- thington, Middle East Science, p. 191; Vital Cuinet's estimate was cited in an unpublished report by the Directorate General of Census; Longrigg's estimate is given in 'Iraq, 1900 to 1950, p. 7; Dowson's estimate is given in An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions, p. 12; Jawad's estimates are contained in The Social Structure of Iraq, pp. 9–11; United Nations estimates are taken from Demographic Yearbook, 1952, table 3. [ 34 ] Population Structure 35 passers-by to register. Because of the seclusion of women, it was to be expected that the figures would include more males than females. But because of the fear that the government had conscription in mind, the count even of males undoubt- edly reflected underregistration. The results were 2,970,000 for 1927 and 3,210,000 for 1935. In both counts 51 per cent were males. The well-known estimates of Sir Ernest Dowson for Iraq's population in 1930 gave a total of 2,800,000. He also made a breakdown by liwas, for the three major towns, for nomadic tribes, and for "settled” and “tribal” rural populations. His method was to ask the liwa authorities, because "the Census Department was not in a position to give me any better material.” He estimated the population of the three principal towns as 344,000 (Baghdad 219,000, Mosul 79,000, Basra 46,000) and the fully nomadic as 234,000. Subtracting these two groups from the total population estimated at 2,824,000, he arrived at a "rural population" of 2,246,000. The latter he divided into two groups, "settled” and “tribal" (seminomadic), the former group numbering 895,000 and the latter 1,351,000. Settled rural people outnumbered seminomads in Mosul, Sulaimaniya, Baghdad, and Karbala liwas only. The other liwas were peopled predominantly by seminomads: Kurds in the mountainous north and east, marsh tribes in the south, and tribes of Arabian origin on the west. Dowson's data are probably the most valid estimates prior to 1947. If each household cannot be entered and enumerated, the next best method is to interview local officials, as he did, for they have a fairly accurate idea of the numbers under their jurisdictions. Comparison of his figures with the results of the Census of 1947 reveals that the populations of the three largest cities rose from 12.2 per cent of the total estimated population in 1930 to 14.6 per cent of the total enumerated population in 1947, while fully nomadic tribesmen fell from 8.3 to 5.2 per cent of the population. Hashim Jawad incorporated Dowson's estimates into his report and compiled some additional population estimates from “various official sources.” His estimates of Iraq's total numbers are 2,850,000 for 1919, 2,820,000 for 1930, 2,840,000 for 1932, 2,930,000 for 1934, 3,350,000 for 1935, and 4,150,000 for 1942. Jawad's fig- ures vary considerably from the official reports submitted to the United Nations for the Demographic Yearbook, giving Iraq's population as 3,745,000 in 1941. The appropriate conclusion is that no one knew within a wide margin of error the size of Iraq's population at any time prior to 1947. THE CENSUS OF 1947 On October 19, 1947, the census authorities carried out Iraq's first modern census. In fact, it was the only census in the country's history, if the word be properly defined as an individual enumeration of the entire population. A staff of 24,000 men and boys, composed of government officials and intermediate school students, began enumeration at five o'clock in the morning, visiting homes and institutions throughout Iraq. People were instructed to remain in their homes until they were notified that their quarter or village had been completed. The schedule was simple and short. For each person in the family, the following information was recorded: name and sex; name of the father, mother, and paternal grandfather; relationship 36 Iraq's People and Resources to the head of the family; occupation; literacy; religion; age; place of birth; in- firmities, if any; marital status; and kind of residence. A preliminary total was published immediately, but the detailed results were released only slowly over the next seven years because of difficulties in training personnel and obtaining tabulating machines and supplies. The published results are excellent from the standpoint of internal consistency. In general, data for the largest administrative subdivisions have appeared first, in the Ministry of Eco- TABLE 7 PUBLISHED DATA FROM IRAQ'S CENSUS OF 1947 Data Geographic division Source Liwa, qada, major cities A, pp. 43–46 Population by sex..... ........... Population by sex and residence, rural or ur- ban areas... Population by age and sex... Population by sex and literacy......... Population by sex and marital status.... Qada, nahiya Liwa Nahiya, qarya or mahalla Liwa Nahiya, qarya or mahalla Liwa Qada Nahiya, qarya or mahalla Liwa Qada, nahiya Qada, nahiya Nahiya, qarya or mahalla C, tables 3, 4, 6 A, pp. 48-49 C, table 1 A, p. 47 C, table 1 B, pp. 47-48 A, pp. 50-56 C, table 1 A, pp. 57-58 C, table 6 C, table 7 C, table 2 Population by sex and religion........ Population by sex and occupation........... Population by sex and type of residence...... Population by sex, liwa of birth, and present residence. ......... Population by sex and infirmities...... C, tables 3, 4 A, pp. 59-60 Qada, nahiya Liwa Nahiya, qarya or mahalla Liwa Qada, nahiya Aliens by sex and nationality....... A, pp. 61-62 C, table 5 SOURCES: A, Iraq. Statistical Abstract, 1952: B, Statistical Abstract, 1953, which includes most of the data contained in source A; C, Iraq, Census of Iraq. 1947. nomics' yearly Statistical Abstract; the first census data appeared in the issue for 1947, published in 1949. The complete results of the census were published in 1954 by the Directorate General of Census itself. Data are given in great detail, most of them by the smallest geographic subdivisions, with no totals for the larger divisions or the country as a whole. The geographic subdivisions of Iraq are, from largest to smallest, liwa, qada, nahiya, and qarya or mahalla. Iraq is divided into fourteen states, each called a liwa, and three badiya, or desert, areas; two of the badiyas are on the southwest boundary of Iraq, and the third lies between the two rivers and the liwas of Dulaim and Mosul. The three badiyas were assumed in the census to be unin- habited. Actually, their part-time inhabitants, the Bedouins, were assigned to the liwas where they are customarily found when they are not on the desert. Each liwa in turn is divided into a number of smaller units, called qadas, the number per liwa ranging from two in Karbala liwa to eight in Mosul liwa. There are sixty- 2 Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1947; 1949; 1950; 1952; 1953; and 1954; Census of Iraq, 1947. The data contained in the remainder of this chapter are drawn from these publications. Population Structure 37 one qadas in the fourteen liwas. The liwa center is the main city of the liwa and is located in a qada of the same name. With three exceptions—the cities of Ra- madi, Ba'quba, and Nasariya, in Dulaim, Diyala, and Muntafiq liwas, respec- tively—the liwa center has the same name as the liwa itself. Each qada is further divided into a number of small units, called nahiyas, which commonly have the name of the major city or town contained therein. There are 169 nahiyas, further divided into villages (qarya) in a rural area, or quarters (mahalla) in an urban area. Baghdad is therefore a liwa, a qada, and a nahiya, containing seventy-six mahallas. The types of census results which have been published are summarized in table 7. Liwa totals are nowhere available for rural-urban distribution, occupation, type of residence, or liwa of birth and present residence, although they can be calcu- lated by a laborious adding up of the nahiya or qada totals. The usefulness of the census is greatly reduced by the unavailability of totals for all geographic areas, particularly the largest, in the same publication. Many problems arise in census taking in all countries, leading to errors and omissions, but in an underdeveloped country conducting its first complete enu- meration, all these problems appear in magnified form. One basic difficulty is that any representative of the central government is still regarded with suspicion in many parts of the country, where people remember all too well the taxation and conscription of the Ottoman period. When the names and ages of the young men are listed by an official, they fear that the data will be used in connection with the system of universal military training. Questions on income were deliberately omitted, as they would surely have aroused apprehension. Although the govern- ment broadcast appeals to the people for coöperation with the enumerators, stress- ing the objectivity of the census, it is certain that a significant portion of the popu- lation escaped the count. Only the building of confidence in the central govern- ment through just and consistent policies will eliminate this problem. A second difficulty is ignorance, which, combined with certain social traditions, greatly distorted the answers. The age-sex distribution in particular was affected. Not only was there the familiar phenomenon of bunching of ages at multiples of five, but also the large number of people who have little conception of the meaning of numbers may have reported ages decades from the truth. Forty and one hun- dred are favorite numbers denoting to an illiterate person perhaps nothing more precise than "very old.” As further examples, the shame of having an unmarried daughter of fifteen or older may lead to the omission of her name or an under- statement of her age; girl babies may be considered so unimportant as to be omit- ted; or boy babies may be reported as girls to avoid the Evil Eye. Questioning by a male enumerator concerning women in the household undoubtedly aroused ap- prehension and probably led to underenumeration in conservative households, for strict purdah demands that not even the names of women be mentioned to male outsiders. Even if the informants wish to coöperate, their answers may be biased because they do not understand the meaning of objective truth. They may assume that the questioner has a personal interest in the answer and therefore, out of courtesy, give the answer they think he wants to hear. Moreover, the average secondary school student or junior government official who does the enumerating for the Population Structure 41 is feared, and for a surplus of males in the major cities: whether the data give a true representation of heavy rural-to-urban migration of males, or whether they reflect an underreporting of males because of ignorance and fear. Undoubtedly both factors operated. However, it would seem that the latter might be given more weight, in the absence of a reasonable explanation for the sizable surplus of females reported in the country as a whole. TABLE 9 TOTAL POPULATION OF IRAQ, 1947 (Nomads included) Per cent Liwa Population Density per square kilometer Male Female 47.3 45.3 45.0 45.2 Mosul .......... Arbil........... Sulaimaniya Kirkuk Diyala Baghdad. Dulaim Karbala Hilla Kut Diwaniya...... Muntafiq Amara... Basra..................... 595, 190 239,776 226,400 286, 005 272,413 817, 205 192,983 274, 264 261,206 224,938 378,118 371,867 307,021 368, 799 52.7 54.7 55.0 54.8 50.9 50.0 50.0 51.8 49.1 50.0 50.0 48.2 47.9 52.1 46.2 53.7 57.7 60.2 42.3 39.8 45.0 49.8 55.0 50.2 All liwas....... 4,816,185 46.9 53.1 SOURCE: Census of 1947. A modest correction would add perhaps 10 per cent to the total number of males, bringing their number to about 2,483,000, or 49.3 per cent of the total population, which would then have numbered about 5,042,000. A more liberal correction would increase the males by 15 per cent and the females by 5 per cent, giving a total of 5,283,000, of which 2,596,000, or 49.1 per cent, would be male and 2,687,000, or 50.9 per cent, female. It seems probable that either of these estimates is closer to the truth than are the published figures. Density of population per square kilometer ranged from five persons in Dulaim liwa to sixty-four persons in Baghdad liwa and was twenty for the fourteen liwas combined. A large urban area relative to the total population of the liwa explains the relatively high densities in Baghdad and Karbala liwas. Baghdad city con- tained 57 per cent of the liwa's population. The raison d'être of Karbala liwa is its two holy cities, Najaf and Karbala, which together contained over one-third of the liwa's population and 67 per cent of the nonnomadic population. The rela- tively high density of Hilla liwa can be explained by the well-developed irrigation system on the lower Euphrates, as can Muntafiq's and Diwaniya's to a lesser extent. Basra liwa's density was high not only because of its several cities but also because of the dense settlement in the date gardens along the Shatt al-Arab. Population Structure 43 It is noteworthy that, after the four largest cities, which were administrative centers during the Ottoman Empire and which today contain most of Iraq's in- dustry, the three cities next in size have a primarily religious significance. The next city in size, Amara, is the center of much small-scale industry; the most TABLE 11 POPULATION OF MAJOR CITIES AND TOWNS OF IRAQ, 1947 Cities grouped according to size Population Per cent of total population *(4,816,185) Cumulative per cent of total population Per cent of urban population (1,624,297) Cumulative per cent of urban population 9.7 28.7 ..... 466,783 9.7 28.7 17.2 50.9 2.8 133,625 101,535 68,308 56,261 2.1 1.4 1.2 0 cos in eo is 22.4 66.3 1.0 0.9 0.8 48,676 44,150 36,907 36,577 33,510 27,036 24,038 ainajai aco no 0.8 0.7 More than 150,000 Baghdadb... 50,000-150,000 Mosul. Basra................... Kirkuk. Najaf (Karbala)....... 20,000-50,000 Kazimain (Baghdad). Karbala....... Amara.................. Hilla..... Sulaimaniya......... Arbil........... Nasariya (Muntafiq)....... 10,000–20,000 Tal Afar (Mosul)........ Diwaniya.. Zubair (Basra). Kut.................. Samawa (Diwaniya). Kufa (Karbala).... Abul Khasib (Basra). Hindiya (Hilla)..... Falluja (Dulaim). Ba'quba (Diyala). Hai (Kut)........ Khanaqin (Diyala).. 0.6 o 5 1.5 25.8 76.6 19,951 19,878 17,884 16, 237 15, 292 13,700 11,598 11,077 10,981 10,511 10,199 10,090 Total. 1,244,804 SOURCE: Census of 1947. Name of liwa viven if different from name of town. • Baghdad city includes Old City and west-bank settlement (352,137), Urban A'zamiya, northern suburb (58,697), and Urban Karrada, southern suburb (55,949). • Percentages not given for this group: each is less than 0.5 per cent of total population. important is the production of reed mats, which are widely used in housing and roofing. Next in size came Hilla, center of the richest agricultural region in the country. Age-sex structure.-Sources of bias in the age-sex distribution have been indi- cated above. Corrections can be made on the basis of sociological knowledge of the sources and directions of the errors. Although the corrections involve arbitrary decisions in regard to their magnitudes, the resulting picture is probably closer to the truth than are the published figures. The corrections are of two kinds: addi- Population Structure 45 on the assumption that civil and martial strife of the past, in addition to poor health conditions, have affected males more than females. The assumptions that form the basis for the corrected distribution were as follows: (1) to correct for the reporting of male babies as female because of fear of the Evil Eye, we transferred 0.2 per cent from females aged 0-4 to males aged 04; (2) to correct for underreporting of young women because of apprehension when a male enumerator asks about them and for understatement of the age of AGE PERIOD MALES FEMALES 10 0-4 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 PERCENTAGE Fig. 2. Population by age and sex, Iraq, 1947. Unbroken line signifies uncorrected data; broken line signifies corrected data. females still unmarried after puberty, we added 1.0 per cent to females aged 10–19, and 0.5 per cent to females aged 20–29, and transferred 0.5 per cent of females aged 5-9 to females aged 10–19; (3) to correct for underenumeration of males for fear of conscription and overstatement of men's ages when they are near the upper age limit for conscription, we added 3.0 per cent to males aged 10–19, and 2.5 per cent to males aged 20–29, and transferred 0.5 per cent from males aged 40-49 to males aged 30–39; (4) finally, we corrected for the tendency to overesti- mate ages in the middle and later years because of prestige attached to old age, forgetfulness, and ignorance by moving 0.5 per cent of females aged 30–39 to females aged 20-29, and taking 1.0 per cent from females aged 60 and above, putting 0.7 per cent into females aged 50–59, and 0.3 per cent into females aged 40-49; for males, we moved 1.0 per cent from those reporting ages 60 and above, putting 0.7 per cent into males aged 50–59, and 0.3 per cent into males aged 40–49. All the percentages were for the entire enumerated population of 4,566,185. In contrast to the distribution reported for the country as a whole, the popula- 46 Iraq's People and Resources tions of the four largest cities showed male surpluses. Baghdad city reported a male population of 51.7 per cent of the total, Mosul 50.4 per cent, Kirkuk 53.9 per cent, and Basra 52.9 per cent. Percentage distributions for the four cities are shown in table 13 and age pyramids in figure 3. The differences between the dis- tributions for Baghdad and Mosul and that of the population as a whole are not so great as might be expected. Considerable underreporting of men of military age in the cities can be surmised, and, if the truth were known, the percentage of the male population aged 10–39 might have been markedly greater in these cities TABLE 13 AGE-Sex DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION OF MAJOR CITIES OF IRAQ, 1947 (Percentages) Baghdad Mosul Kirkuk Basra Age Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 7.6 6.6 7.2 6.7 10.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 10.8 8.1 8.3 11.1 6.2 6.6 5.7 8.1 9.3 7.1 7.1 0-4........ 5-9...... 10–19. 20-29 30-39. 40–49........ 50-59.. 60 and above...... co 7.6 7.4 10.1 9.6 6.6 6.3 3.1 7.7 7.6 10.5 6.1 5.3 4.6 3.1 4.6 6.5 4.5 5.9 4.5 2.9 3.9 5.8 O ooooooooo 6.5 5.4 4.5 2.8 3.3 5.0 5.3 3.1 ܒt ' ܚ 4.0 3.9 Total 51.7 48.3 50.4 49.6 53.9 46.1 52.9 47.1 SOURCE: Census of 1947. than in the country as a whole. This was indeed true of Kirkuk and Basra, despite probable underenumeration. The oil industry in Kirkuk, although still small in 1947, superimposed a new way of life on an old city, and its effects can be seen in the numbers of men drawn in from the surrounding countryside. Basra has re- ceived many immigrants, particularly surplus agricultural population from Amara and Muntafiq liwas, swelling the male population in the productive years. Mosul alone has not exerted the pull of a growing industrial economy, a fact which shows in the similarity between the age distribution of Mosul's population and that of the country as a whole. All four cities, and to a lesser extent the other liwa centers, draw in young men and women to their schools. All the colleges are located in or near Baghdad city. In 1954 only five liwas (Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Karbala, and Diyala) had more than two secondary schools for girls, and only three liwas (Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul) had more than six secondary schools for boys. Because secondary school students numbered only 34,810 in 1954, their presence in the major cities would not noticeably affect the age distribution, but will affect it in the future unless secondary and higher education is greatly de- centralized as it expands. Distributions of population by age and sex are available for each liwa, qada, nahiya, and village or quarter, but need not be given in such detail for our pur- poses. All distributions, both rural and urban, show the striking characteristic that *Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1954, pp. 59–60. 48 Iraq's People and Resources long before but had had little opportunity to practice their reading and writing, and others who had been taught by local religious leaders to read the Quran but who had only memorized passages, may have reported themselves as literate. Second, the minimum age for literacy was set at five years, meaning that a child who had just entered school might have been reported as literate by his proud TABLE 14 LITERACY BY SEX OF POPULATION OF IRAQ, 1947 (Nomads included) Literate population Per cent of total population Locality Total Male Female Total Male Female LIWAS Mosul.......... Arbil Sulaimaniya.. Kirkuk...... Diyala. Baghdad.... Dulaim. Karbala. 48,826 9,410 10,304 20,534 20,520 149,546 15,926 21,384 17,117 10,213 15,723 12,460 15,606 40,007 36,024 8,401 9,085 17, 142 18, 223 108, 957 14, 110 17,086 14,910 8,793 14,292 11,112 13,013 32,316 12,802 1.009 1,219 3,392 2,297 40,589 1,816 4,298 2,207 1,420 1,431 1,348 or w for woo oo oo oo ver A CO Hilla Kut......... Diwaniya...... Muntafiq...... Amara......... Basra. ........ 2,593 7,691 All liwas..... 407,576 323, 464 84,112 14.3 MAJOR CITIES Baghdad...... Mosul.. Kirkuk. Basra ......... 124,918 32,541 13,496 20,447 87,493 21,573 10,653 14,845 37, 425 10,968 2,843 5,602 SOURCE: Census of 1947. mother; certainly large numbers of first- and second-year primary school pupils were included among the literates. On the other hand, males of military age omitted from the count undoubtedly included a greater percentage of literates than in the country as a whole. From table 14 it appears that 8.5 per cent of Iraq's population of all ages, in- cluding nomads, were literate in 1947, or 14 per cent of all males and 3 per cent of all females. The nomads could be included, although no data are given on their literacy, because they have no opportunity to attend schools and can be presumed to be almost 100 per cent illiterate. If they are excluded, the literacy rate would be 8.9 per cent. That literacy is correlated with urbanism is to be expected from the rural-urban distribution of educational facilities. Baghdad city alone had 31 per cent of Iraq's literates and 44 per cent of the literate females. Population Structure 49 TABLE 15 MARITAL STATUS OF POPULATION OF IRAQ AGED TEN AND ABOVE, 1947 (Nomads excluded) Number Per cent Locality Sex Unmarried Married Widowed, divorced, separated, unknown Unmarried Married Widowed, divorced, separated, unknown IRAQ Male Female 542,502 494,511 801, 233 860,846 37, 138 254,151 39.3 30.7 58.0 53.5 2.7 15.8 Both sexes 1,037,013 1,662,079 291, 289 34.7 55.6 9.7 MAJOR CITIES Baghdad... Male Female 89, 105 53,586 78, 800 81,786 3,666 25,336 51.9 33.3 45.9 50.9 2.1 15.8 Both sexes 142,691 160,586 29,002 42.9 48.3 8.7 47.8 Mosul...... Male Female 23,008 15,458 21,750 22,725 734 7,572 50.6 33.8 1.6 16.5 49.7 Both sexes 38,466 44,475 8, 306 42.2 48.7 9.1 553 Kirkuk .... Male Female 13,014 6,459 13,002 11,987 49.0 29.7 48.9 55.1 2.1 15.2 3,304 Both sexes 19,473 24,989 3,857 40.3 51.7 8.0 Basra.... Male Female 18,826 9,782 21,044 18,802 1,037 6,673 46.0 27.7 51.4 53.3 2.5 18.9 Both sexes 28,608 39,846 7,710 37.6 52.3 10.1 SOURCE: Census of 1947. Marital status.—The statistics on marital status (table 15) are probably very accurate. It is unfortunate that they are not available by age, for the near-uni- versality of marriage, which is a well-known phenomenon, is lost by the inclusion of all persons aged ten and over. The dowry which is paid to the girl's father tends to postpone the age of marriage for men among the rural and traditional elements, while the increased opportunity for education is tending to postpone marriage * A survey made among 173 Iranian villages on the Varamin Plain south of Tehran in 1950 revealed a marital situation probably similar to Iraq's. Although only 60 per cent of males, and 63 per cent of females, aged ten and above were married, among those forty-five and above less than 1 per cent of each sex remained unmarried. Women married earlier than men: 52 per cent of the women between the ages of fifteen and nineteen were married, as opposed to only 2 per cent of the men; between the ages of twenty and twenty-four, 93 per cent of the women and only 38 per cent of the men were married. Above the age of forty-five, 49 per cent of the women were widowed and only 3 per cent of the men, the explanation being that a widower usually remarries a young woman. Mashayekhi et al., "Some Demographic Aspects of a Rural Area in Iran,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, XXXI (April, 1953), 156. Iraq's People and Resources among the less traditional of both sexes. Still, an over-all percentage of 55.6 of persons aged ten and above were married with spouse present in 1947, and an additional 9.7 per cent had been married at one time, leaving 34.7 per cent who had never been married. Because of the surplus of females in the population, the percentage of men married was larger than the percentage of women, although in absolute numbers married women outnumbered married men by an amount approximately compen- TABLE 16 IRAQI MARRIED MEN WITH TWO OR MORE WIVES, 1947 (Nomads excluded) Liwa Per cent Liwa Per cent 6.1 8.7 Diwaniya........ Muntafiq... Amara...... Basra..... 12.2 12.6 6.7 7.1 7.0 7.2 7.1 Mosul......... Arbil. Sulaimaniya. Kirkuk. Diyala ........ Baghdad. Dulaim Karbala. Hilla Kut......... City Per cent ܛ 6.3 8.0 Baghdad. Mosul.. Kirkuk Basra........ 4.5 3.7 4.6 6.4 8.5 7.7 SOURCE: Census of 1947. sated by polygamy. Unmarried men exceeded unmarried women in numbers as well as in percentages, indicating that the men marry later, on the average, than do the women. If the underenumerated males of draft age had been included, this difference would undoubtedly have been even greater. The great difference between the sexes in the category "widowed, divorced, separated, and unknown" can be accounted for by the large number of widows. Of the 254,151 women in this category, 243,197, or 96 per cent, were widowed, 9,933 divorced, 543 separated, and 478 of unknown status. There were only 34,271 widowers. The difference must not be presumed to indicate much greater female longevity—its explanation in the United States—but rather that widowers re- marry in greater number than do widows. The widespread desire for numerous progeny and the absence of a desire for companionship in a wife lead a man of any age to choose a young wife. Regional differences in marital status can be shown, but are so small that it can- not be said with certainty whether they were genuine or were caused by differences in reporting. The liwas showing the smallest percentages of unmarried males (Amara, Muntafiq, Diwaniya, and Kut) were also the liwas in which the reported surplus of females was great and in which considerable underenumeration of young males can be surmised. The similarity between the liwas in the percentage of men divorced, widowed, or separated was striking; that the percentages are small indicates the universality with which widowers remarry. Even the rural-urban differences in marital status were not great, although they were significant. The presence of young men in the labor market and in educational Population Structure 51 institutions served to increase the percentages of unmarried males in the large cities. But the pattern for urban females was not noticeably different from that in the country as a whole evidence that the economic independence and even the secondary and higher education of women were still on a small scale in 1947. TABLE 17 DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN IRAQ, 1947 (Nomads included) Number Per cent _ _ _ Locality Muslims Christian Jews Others Muslims Christian Jews | | Others LIWAS 32,535 a 77,298 8,049 565 7,767 79.8 95.3 98.7 13.0 3.4 0.2 10 95.8 10,345 3,109 2,271 4,042 2.851 77,542 1,442 2.7 751 98.6 73 286 183 186 0.3 4.4 36,164 Mosul........ Arbil......... Sulaimaniya.. Kirkuk....... Diyala Baghdad. Dulaim....... Karbala Hilla........ Kut......... Diwaniya. Muntafiq..... Amara Basra ........ 9.5 475,012 228,610 223,562 274, 123 268,525 702,316 180,990 274,210 259, 129 224,239 377,007 370, 281 301,477 349,298 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 10,365 39 5.4 0.0 0.1 cownis is ignon oises in 190 1,865 22 180 170 85.9 93.8 100.0 99.2 99.7 99.7 99.6 98.2 94.7 0.1 0.1 161 125 349 825 652 2,131 10,537 0.0 0.0 143 286 7,724 791 3,127 b 1,240 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.3 2.1 All liwas.... 4,508,779 149,656 118,000 39,750 93.6 3.1 0.8 MAJOR CITIES 1,051 235 Baghdad..... Mosul........ Kirkuk.. Basra. 353,202 106, 151 58,654 85,889 35, 146 21,722 6,715 5,104 77,384 5,517 2,873 9,921 75.7 79.4 85.9 84.6 7.5 16.3 9.8 16.6 4.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.6 66 4.2 621 5.0 9.8 SOURCE: Census of 1947. • Of whom 32,410 were Yezidis. b Of whom 3,115 were Followers of St. John (Mandaeans), specialists in boatbuilding and silverwork. • Of whom 32,437 were Yezidis and 6,597 Followers of St. John. Polygamy is disappearing in Iraq, but it is still found among the classes of society who consider it a source of prestige. In 1947, 62,718, or 7.8 per cent, of married men were married polygamously. Of these, 56,283, or 89.8 per cent, had two wives ; 5,304, or 8.5 per cent, had three wives; and 1,131, or 1.8 per cent, had four or more wives. Table 16 shows the percentage of married men with two or more wives by liwa and for the major cities. If data were available on the nomads, the percentages for their liwas would undoubtedly be higher. Their influence can be seen among the sedentary populations of the two liwas closest to Arabia, Diwaniya and Muntafiq. The substantial Christian minority in Mosul liwa and city contributes to lowering the percentage of polygamous marriages. Religion.—Table 17 makes it clear that Iraq is an overwhelmingly Muslim 52 Iraq's People and Resources TABLE 18 EMPLOYMENT IN VARIOUS INDUSTRIES IN IRAQ, 1947 (Nomads excluded) City Sex Iraq Baghdad Mosul Kirkuk Basra 1. AGRICULTURE 906 Total. Male.......... Female. 737,756 677,579 60, 177 4,863 4,722 141 2,545 2,466 890 2,467 2,340 127 79 16 Per cent of employed population..... 55.3 3.3 6.8 4.6 6.6 2. MANUFACTURE Total... Male........................ Female.. 87,668 76,803 10,865 21,613 18,928 2,685 6,381 5,377 1,004 3,135 2,888 3,960 3,726 234 247 Per cent of employed population.....) 6.6 14.7 17.1 15.8 10.6 3. PUBLIC UTILITIES, TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS Total. Male....... Female..... 52,974 52,838 136 13, 922 13,918 2,398 2,398 1,655 1,655 5,652 5,652 0 Per cent of employed population.....! 4.0 9.5 6.4 8.4 15.2 4. SERVICE (PUBLIC AND PRIVATE) Total. ..... ....... Male. Female............................ 157, 408 141,646 15,762 44,746 39,915 7,320 6,166 1,154 4,170 3,703 8,479 7,676 803 4,831 467 Per cent of employed population.....! 11.8 30.4 19.6 21.0 22.8 5. COMMERCE Total....... Male............ Female... 137,844 133,595 4,249 22,332 21,947 385 6,400 6,359 41 3,333 3,298 5,023 4,851 172 35 Per cent of employed population.....! 10.3 15.2 17.2 16.8 13.5 6. MISCELLANEOUS Total.. Male... Female.......... 1,271 15,542 13,803 1,739 4,192 3,481 2,233 2,111 692 554 138 711 122 27 Per cent of employed population..... 1.2 2.9 6.0 1.9 54 Iraq's People and Resources was the largest single occupational group. Those falling under this heading were, for the most part, unskilled laborers who change employment so frequently that they could name no customary trade. However, it may have included some workers with definite skills who happened to be unemployed at the time of the census. It is not clear whether the customary, present, or most recent employment was re- ported. An important distinction is lost in that, although some categories include only public servants, others include both public and private, and therefore the extent of government employment cannot be determined. Finally, the difficult problem of defining “economically active" caused the size of the labor force to be somewhat arbitrary, particularly in agriculture, the largest category. Almost all wives and older children of fellahin work in the fields part of the year, and yet were not included in large numbers. Furthermore, because occupations are re- garded as a way of life, almost every adult male reported an occupation, despite substantial unemployment and underemployment. Occupation data are summarized in table 18 for Iraq and the four largest cities, combining the thirty-six industries of the published data in eight groups. Despite the inadequacies of the data, some generalizations can be drawn from them. The most obvious conclusion is that Iraq is an agricultural country, with 55 per cent of the economically active population engaged in agriculture in 1947. By the definition adopted by the Population Division of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, Iraq was “underdeveloped, or preindustrial" because more than half of the occupied males were engaged in agriculture. The next most important industry, service of all kinds, was only one-fifth as large as agriculture, followed closely by commerce (12 and 10 per cent of the labor force, respectively). Manufacture employed only 7 per cent of the economically active, and public utilities, transport, and communications 4 per cent. The category of unspecified workers, comprising 9 per cent of the economically active, is a rough measureprobably an understatement of the casual labor force. The number of apprentices under ten years of age is not a true measure of the extent of child labor, and probably includes only children who were actually learning a trade; many more are engaged in various casual jobs. The employment of women was on a small scale: only 4 per cent of the non- nomadic female population were included in the labor force. Because of the in- adequacy of the definition of “economically active,” however, the large number who work with their husbands in the fields were almost entirely excluded. Aside ? Our eight industrial groups in table 18 combine thirty-six categories of published data as follows: 1. Agriculture: Agriculture and livestock production; fishing and hunting. 2. Manu- facture: Preparation of construction materials; mining and quarrying (except oil); industries connected with vegetable foods; industries connected with animal foods; extraction of petroleum and manufacture of petroleum products; beverage industries; tobacco manufacture; soap, matches, and other chemical industries; manufacture of wood, bamboo, and cane products; manu- facture of leather; manufacture of footwear, saddlery, and leather products; textiles industries; tailoring and dressmaking; metallurgy and manufacture of metal articles; reparation of machines and machine tools; jewelry, manufacture of other precious articles, and watch repair; printing, photography, and painting. 3. Public utilities, transport, communications: Construc- tion and maintenance of roads and public works; sanitary services, water supply, electric power; communications (post, telegraph, telephone, radio); railway transport; transport other than railway. 4. Service: Banks, insurance, brokerage, legal services; educational services; medical and other health services; religious services; government and municipal services; police, jails, firemen; art, literature, journalism; private and public services (including domestic service). 5. Commerce. 6. Miscellaneous. 7. Unspecified. 8. Apprenticeship (under ten years). 8 Davis and Golden, “Urbanization and the Development of Pre-Industrial Areas,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, III (Oct., 1954), 7. Population Structure 55 from agricultural employment, women were found in relatively large numbers in service and manufacture. Of the 15,762 women employed in service trades, 11,534, or 73 per cent, were in private and public services, which consist primarily of domestic service. Another 2,172, or 14 per cent of those in service, were engaged in educational services, and 1,194, or 8 per cent, in medical and health services. Of the 10,865 women employed in manufacture, almost half were in tailoring and dressmaking and one-fifth in industries connected with animal foods. Another 16 per cent of those in manufacture were in textiles industries. In summary, of the 101,518 occupied women, who were only 4 per cent of the female population, 59 per cent were engaged in agriculture and 26 per cent in the two other largest categories, service and manufacturing. It will be noted that, aside from rural employment, women were used primarily in work where they do not come in con- tact with men and where, in fact, they serve to keep other females from coming into contact with men. The segregation of the sexes has made education the major opportunity for Iraq's educated women. They remain virtually excluded from many types of employment. Liwa statistics can be computed but are omitted because such detailed analysis is unnecessary here. In only three liwas—Baghdad, Karbala, and Basra, all heavily urban—was less than half of the occupied population engaged in agriculture. The social problem of Basra, both liwa and city, is reflected in the large proportion of the labor force having no definite employment. Moreover, the high percentage of Basra's males who were in the labor force indicates heavy migration from rural areas. The service category in Baghdad city was swelled by government employees and domestic servants. Unfortunately, the exact number of civil servants cannot be computed from the data. All railway and communications workers, most workers in education and health, some employees in banks, and of course all in the category of government and municipal services were on the public payroll. Even in Baghdad city, commerce was more important than manufacture as an employ. ment-evidence of the underdeveloped nature of the economy. Type of residence.—The tables on type of residence give only a rough approxi- mation of the true housing situation because of faulty definitions and incomplete filling out of schedules. The census categories were: (1) single-family houses of permanent structure, (2) single-family houses of mud or mud brick, (3) multi- family houses, (4) mud or reed huts and nomads' tents, (5) institutions of various kinds, and (6) means of transportation, as for example boats. If the distinction between a house (categories 1–3) and a family dwelling which is not a house (category 4) had been clearly made, an accurate if simplified picture of Iraq's housing situation would have resulted. The census authorities defined a house, whether of mud or permanent structure, as a building with paved floors, windows with glass and frames, and doors that lock; electricity and plumbing were not included as requisites. Confronted with many borderline cases, the enumerators had to use their own judgment. They appear to have erred in the direction of reporting many huts as houses, whether from national pride or from the modesty of their own homes. Particularly in the four mountainous liwas, where climate demands a substantial dwelling and building stone is available, almost all the dwellings were called houses, although the majority of Kurdish village homes are mud huts with stone added to the mud for strength. Therefore the reported per- Population Structure 57 and Baghdad cities were reflected in their housing, as well as in their employment, situations, for the urban hut dwellers are recent migrants from rural areas and constitute a great part of the casual labor force. Analysis of the 'Arasat al-'Asima section of the rural portion of Karrada nahiya, lying just east of the eastern dike of Baghdad, reveals that 20,713 of the 20,910 people living there in 1947 occupied huts rather than houses. If this section were added to our definition of Baghdad city, the 12.6 per cent of its population living in that kind of housing would be increased to 16.2 per cent. The rural origins of the 'Asima people are indicated by the fact that the 20,910 included only 694 literate males and 5 literate females. A survey of this area in the winter of 1953–54 conducted by a group of social welfare students confirms that this settlement has grown since 1947, and that it is composed overwhelmingly of migrants from rural areas. The students estimated that 50,000 people were living in the area at the time of their survey, at least three-quarters of them having come from a single liwa, Amara. All the houses in the area were of reed mats and mud, and in the entire settlement there were no latrines and only four water taps. The men and boys were working at various unskilled jobs and suffered much frictional unemployment because of their weak bargaining position. Nevertheless, the level of living of these migrants is far higher than it was when they were fellahin. The flood of March, 1954, which inundated the entire 'Asima area, sent its inhabitants and their ani- mals over the dike to camp in empty suburban lots. Since that time, the majority have been forced to move out of the city again, while the continuing migration has caused the 'Asima settlement to grow. Doreen Warriner estimated its in- habitants at 40,000 in 1955. Detailed analysis of the housing data for Baghdad city substantiates some of the generalizations made in the previous chapter. The city, as here defined, in- cludes three sections: the old quarters contained within a boundary that was once walled, plus the relatively small portion on the west side of the Tigris; the northern suburb of urban A’zamiya; and the southern suburb of urban Karrada. The dominant types of permanent housing in the two suburbs are single-family houses, the majority of which are modern in design, and the huts in empty lots. The Oriental-style homes in the old quarters have tended to become tenements (see table 20). Since 1947 the suburbs have grown enormously and today contain a higher proportion of single-family houses. The correlation between the degree of urbanization and the doubling up of several families in the same house can be seen in table 19. Self-contained apart- ments are almost unknown in Iraq, and families in multifamily dwellings must share sanitary and cooking facilities, a common entrance, and, in summer, a com- mon sleeping place—the roof. Privacy for women and security of property make a single-family dwelling highly desirable, and it is only the pressure of urbaniza- tion that brings multifamily housing. When a house must be shared, relatives are preferred. Unfortunately, it is not known to what extent the families in multi- family dwellings are related by blood. According to the 1947 data, the number of families per multifamily dwelling ranged from two to five. The average size of family was computed from the published data, but is obscured by an inadequate definition of "family.” Even the census authorities " Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East, p. 181. 58 Iraq's People and Resources were unable to give a clear definition that would apply in borderline cases, although they defined the term generally as a group of people related by blood and living together. There is widespread agreement in Iraq that husband, wife, children, servants, and unmarried or widowed relatives who live with them con- stitute a single family. But in regard to the common phenomenon of a married couple living with their parents, there is disagreement, for Iraq is in a state of transition between the dominance of the patriarchal and the conjugal family. TABLE 20 TYPE OF RESIDENCE, BAGHDAD CITY, 1947 Area Population Single- family houses Multi- family houses Huts Other NUMBER OF RESIDENTS Old City... Urban A'zamiya...... Urban Karrada. 352, 137 58,697 55, 949 85,064 33, 190 22, 140 209,974 12,803 20,529 35,966 11,594 11,094 21,133 1,110 2,186 Baghdad.. 466,783 140,394 243, 306 58,654 24, 429 PER CENT OF RESIDENTS 6.0 Old City.......... Urban A'zamiya...... Urban Karrada 24.2 56.5 39.6 59.6 21.8 36.7 10.2 19.8 19.8 1.9 3.9 Baghdad......... 100 30.1 52.1 12.6 5.2 Source: Census of 1947. The more sophisticated enumerator would call this a multifamily dwelling, while others might call it a single family. There may be systematic rural-urban differ- ences in the enumerators' definitions of family which account at least in part for the observed rural-urban differences in family size. Table 19 shows the average size of family in each type of housing. As would be expected, the typical family living in multifamily houses was smaller than in the other types, because of the presence of unattached males, newly married couples, old people, and others who for various reasons were not able to maintain a separate household. Taking the common-sense definition of family as a group of people related by blood and living together, but realizing that this definition usually means more than husband, wife, and children, we see that the average size of family ranged from 3.5 persons (in Hilla liwa, multifamily houses) to 7.4 (in Diwaniya liwa, huts). The typical Iraqi family consisted of five or six persons. Liwa of birth and residence.—Table 21 gives a striking picture of internal migration and probably a fairly accurate one, because most people in Iraq, as elsewhere, are proud to name their birthplace and have no reason for falsification. Comparison of columns 7 and 4 in table 210 shows that there were two liwas of 19 These two columns cannot be simply subtracted, for the two percentages have different bases: The percentages in column 4 have column 1 as a base, and those in column 7 have column 5 as a base. Column 5 differs from column 1 in the magnitude of column 6 minus column 3. However, they do give an indication of the direction of net change and its relative magnitudes. 60 Iraq's People and Resources occurred most notably in total numbers and the age-sex distribution, where in- formants were ignorant or fearful. Faulty definitions and inadequate instruc- tions to enumerators were responsible for obscuring the data on literacy, occupa- tion, and type of residence. Inaccuracies should not be attributed to the specific methods used in the census taking. Whatever the methods, an accurate census cannot be taken in a country where illiteracy is widespread and the government is regarded with apprehension. As literacy is gradually increased, as the standards of education are raised so that enumerators are better able to follow instructions, and as subsequent census counts prove to the people that their purpose is not oppression, each subsequent census should give a more precise picture of Iraq's population. The second population census, conducted in 1957, was designed to remedy many of the specific defects of the first. The Census of 1947 tells many things about Iraq's population, although with varying degrees of certainty and accuracy. The population probably numbered a little more than 5,000,000, distributed over the fourteen liwas with an average density of twenty persons per square kilometer. Two-thirds of the people lived outside the municipalities, in villages and Bedouin camps; and only Baghdad liwa was more than 50 per cent urban. Baghdad city contained 10 per cent of the country's population and almost 30 per cent of its urban population, and was more populous than the next six largest cities combined. The age-sex structure of Iraq, even when corrected for underenumeration, maintains its essential characteristic of indicating a population with high birth and death rates. Of the country's population, 18 per cent was under five years of age and 34 per cent under ten years of age. The largest cities showed some surplus in the productive ages over the age structure of the country as a whole. About 8 per cent of the population was reported as literate, 14 per cent of males and 3 per cent of females. More than 20 per cent of the population of the four major cities was literate. Of all persons aged ten and above, 56 per cent were married and an additional 10 per cent had been married, an indication of the near-universality of marriage in Iraq. A sizable proportion of the women and a negligible proportion of the men were widowers and not remarried, indicating that most widowers and rela- tively few widows remarry. Rural-urban differences in marital status existed for males but not for females. Of the married men, 8 per cent were married polyg- amously; the rates were lowest in the large cities and highest in liwas of strong tribal influence. About 94 per cent of the population was Muslim, 3 per cent Christian, and 2 per cent Jewish. Only two liwas, Baghdad and Mosul, had religious minorities com- posing more than 10 per cent of their populations. The four largest cities were more heterogeneous than the country as a whole. Over half of Iraq's economically active population was found to be engaged in agriculture. Service trades and commerce were next in importance, while manu- facture occupied only 7 per cent of the labor force. The casual labor force listing no definite trade was of significant size in Baghdad and Basra cities, where it reflects a serious social problem. Only 4 per cent of the females reported an occupa- tion, although many more are employed in agriculture. Those who reported occu- pations were predominantly engaged in agriculture; other important occupations Population Structure for women were domestic service, production of animal foods, dressmaking, and teaching. Almost half of Iraq's population was found to live in dwellings not classified as houses—huts for agricultural people and the urban poor and tents for nomads. Aside from a small percentage living in institutions, the remainder was divided between single- and multifamily dwellings, the former predominating in the country as a whole and the latter in the large cities. The typical family—that is, a group of people related by blood and living together-included five or six persons. Finally, data on liwa of birth and residence indicate that the cities of Baghdad, Basra, and Kirkuk and the liwas of Baghdad and Basra have been recipients of large numbers of people from other liwas in recent decades. Amara looms above all others as the major source of migrants: in 1947 one-fourth of the people born in Amara liwa were living outside it. 64 Iraq's People and Resources registered in the health centers in 1951 are divided by the 38,127 registered births of that year, an infant mortality rate of 89 per thousand live births results. This rate is probably fairly accurate for infants whose mothers visited medical insti. tutions and therefore whose birth and mortality would be recorded. It may be somewhat too low even for them, as some babies born under medical supervision later die without medical attention. But the rate of 89 per thousand is far lower than the rate for the majority of babies who are born without medical care. As it appeared in the Census of 1947, 66 per cent of Iraq's people lived outside munici- palities, and it will be at least several decades before doctors or even nurses will TABLE 22 VITAL STATISTICS FOR MAJOR CITIES OF IRAQ, 1948 City Data Three cities combined Baghdad Mosul Basra Population, 1947.. Births, 1948. ............ Deaths, 1948.......... Infant deaths, 1948... 466,7832 14,747 7,384 1,945 133,625 4,627 1,382 101,535 1,823 967 194 701, 943 21,197 9,733 2,447 308 32 35 18 Crude birth rate per 1,000. Crude death rate per 1,000. Infant mortality rate.. 30 14 10 132 106 115 SOURCES: Population data from Census of 1947. Data on number of births, deaths, and infant deaths from Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1952, pp. 63-64. Baghdad city is defined as including urban portions of northern and southern suburbs. be commonly available to villages. Even in the towns, a significant segment of the population does not seek medical care. Furthermore, those who, through ignorance, fatalism, fear, or poverty, do not visit medical institutions are by and large the same people who do not voluntarily register vital phenomena with health authori- ties and who suffer the highest morbidity and mortality. The Ministry of Economics' Statistical Abstract publishes yearly totals of births, deaths, and infant deaths for the three largest cities only. These rates should be closer to the actual ones than those for all the health-center towns, because the people in the large cities are more accustomed to giving information to authorities. It is not clear from the published data whether they pertain to the urban portion of the city only or to the qada containing it; however, because the majority of rural people, even those living near large cities, do not commonly seek medical care, it is probably more accurate to relate the number of recorded births and deaths to the populations of the urban portions only. Table 22 gives the rates that result from the vital registrations of the three largest cities in 1948 and their enumerated populations in October, 1947. Heavily weighted by Baghdad city's numerous population, the rates for the three cities combined appear higher than those for the health-center cities and towns. This Iraq, Annual Bulletin of Health and Vital Statistics for 1951, pp. 2–6. I have used the generally accepted definitions of these demographic measures. The crude birth and death rates are the incidence of births or deaths during a given year, multiplied by one thousand, divided by the midyear population in which the births or deaths occurred. Infant mortality is the number of deaths of infants under one year during a given year, multiplied by one thousand, divided by the number of live births during that year. Vital Rates 65 difference is evidence not of higher fertility and mortality in the large cities, highest in Baghdad, but rather of underestimation of vital rates in the published vital statistics. The rates rise as the data become more accurate. Baghdad city, which has the best medical facilities and conditions of health and sanitation in the country, seems to have the highest rates because this city has, through its medical facilities, the best means of registration. Yet registration in Baghdad is far from complete evidence that the actual rates are even higher. Because the published vital statistics are inaccurate, other methods of estimation must be used. No single method of estimation or source of information can give Iraq's vital rates with any degree of certainty. However, if a variety of independent sources point to similar answers, there is a presumption that they reflect the truth. It has been established that Iraq's published vital statistics represent an underregistra- tion of unknown magnitude, and hence they are almost useless as a basis for estimating the actual rates. A better picture can be obtained by combining several types of information: (1) comparison between known facts about Iraq and similar data for other countries, so that Iraq may be placed demographically with respect to them; and extrapolation of the similarities between Iraq and demographically similar countries about which more data are available; (2) estimates by medical experts who are familiar with conditions among certain segments of the population or in certain parts of the country; and (3) fragments of evidence from other sources. The first step is to place Iraq demographically with respect to other countries.' In the absence of usable vital statistics, we must use data on population structure as a basis for comparison. The age structure of Iraq's population can be used as an indication of high fertility. In 1947 almost one-fifth of the population was below five years of age, one-third below ten, and one-half below twenty ; our hypothetical corrections for underenumeration did not substantially alter these percentages. The best measure of fertility which can be computed from the age-sex distribution is a fertility ratio consisting of the number of children under five years divided by the number of women of childbearing age. Table 23 compares Iraq with other countries in various stages of economic development with respect to the proportion of popula- tion under five and under ten years of age, and with respect to the fertility ratio.' The only population included in the table that is closely similar to Iraq's in these respects is one that is also culturally similar, the Palestinian Muslims during the Mandate. Undoubtedly there are other populations in the world with rates as high for which data are not published, because of the correlation between demographic ? I am grateful to Ernest Jurkat for suggesting this method. It has not seemed appropriate to follow his method in as much detail as he has done with countries having more reliable data. Because of the doubtful nature of Iraq's statistics, building upon them through extrapolation becomes subject to ever wider error the farther one moves from the data upon which the extrapo- lation is based. Therefore my analysis has been confined to the level of crude rates rather than more refined measures, such as gross and net reproduction rates. The latter could be computed for Iraq by means of Dr. Jurkat's method, but the resulting estimates would be subject to so many sources of error that their value would be questionable. For a short explanation of this method and examples of its use, see Jurkat, "Prospects for Population Growth in the Near East," in Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth, pp. 84–85. • Because Iraq's Census of 1947 tabulated ages above ten by ten-year intervals only, the fer- tility ratio had to be defined as children under five per thousand females aged ten to thirty- nine. Ten is better than twenty as the lower age limit, for in Iraq marriages frequently take place at the age of eleven or twelve for females. Ideally the interval fifteen to forty-four should be used. 66 Iraq's People and Resources TABLE 23 NET REPRODUCTION RATES, FERTILITY RATIOS, AND POPULATION UNDER FIVE AND UNDER TEN YEARS, SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1944–1953 Per cent of population under Country and year Net reproduction rate Fertility ratios Five years Ten years MIDDLE EAST Iraq, 1947... Palestine Muslims, 1944.. Palestine Jews, 1944.... Israel, 1950-51. Egypt, 1947... Jordan, 1950.. Turkey, 1945. Cyprus, 1950..... 837 856 424 562 536 669 538 546 ASIA, AFRICA, OCEANIA Japan, 1950..... Philippines, 1948.... Formosa, 1950...... Union of South Africa, 1946 ... New Zealand, without Maoris, 1950...... New Zealand Maoris, 1950.. American Samoa, 1950..... Fiji Islands, 1951......... Ryuku Islands, 1950....... 525 582 635 528 545 1.6 780 746 667 605 AMERICAS 1.4 United States, 1950... Honduras, 1950.. Jamaica, 1950-51...... Trinidad and Tobago, 1953 470 629 523 664 1.5 2.00 EUROPE Austria, 1951.... Denmark, 1950–51 France, 1950.. Italy, 1950......... Netherlands, 1950–51.. Norway, 1949-50... Sweden, 1949–50..... Yugoslavia, 1948-50. Switzerland, 1950–51. England and Wales, 1950–51. ........ 0.9 1.1 1.3 ... 1.4 1.1 358 444 456 381 519 446 433 1.1 383 1.4 1.1 419 405 1.0 SOURCES: For Iraq, Census of 1947. For other countries, United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1948; 1951; 1952; 1954. children under 5 * Fertility ratio = ? X 1.000. females 10-39 b 1940. • 1946. 68 Iraq's People and Resources Iraq today is probably in a state of demographic development similar to that of the Muslims of Palestine in the late 1920's and early 1930's. As Hilma Granqvist's detailed studies show, superstition still prevailed over science outside the cities in Palestine at that time, and reproduction was close to the biological maximum.' The conditions of mortality are different in the two populations. Infant mor- tality is higher today in Iraq than it was then in Palestine, because Iraq's severe climate is hard on young children in the absence of adequate shelter, diet, and TABLE 24 VITAL STATISTICS FOR MUSLIM POPULATION OF PALESTINE, 1925–1946 Crude rate per thousand Reproduction rate Year Infant mortality Birth Death Natural increase Gross Net 53.0 1925–29........ 1930–34.. 29.3 25.6 23.7 24.8 176 163 50.4 1.80 1.69 1.85 en 5: :: 19.9 1.69 23.5 3.36 3.04 3.18 3.06 3.57 3.76 3.69 3.64 175 148 136 29.1 1931. 1932..... 1933..... 1934.... 1935..... 1936... 1937 1938.. 1939...... 1940... 1941.. 1942. 2.11 2.49 33.1 24.9 179 2.11 2.41 28.6 128 3.59 2.46 29.0 22.7 122 147 3.81 52.6 53.1 49.8 47.3 46.4 47.4 49.2 45.2 52.4 53.7 54.2 54.2 2.17 20.0 24.9 18.7 17.4 24.7 21.4 19.9 19.0 17.3 16.4 15.9 27.8 132 25.3 1943...... 33.4 140 113 36.4 103 1944.. 1945... 1946.. 94 37.8 38.3 SOURCES: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1948; 1958. clothing. Over-all mortality is higher also because of differences in the prevalence of literacy as well as special sanitation problems associated with life on an alluvial plain. However, in the absence of better data, our best estimates for Iraq's present vital rates would be within the range presented by table 24 for the late 1920's and early 1930's. The crude birth rate would be between 50 and 55 per thousand, the crude death rate between 25 and 30, and the crude rate of natural increase ap- proximately 25, with infant mortality at least 175 per thousand live births. Data pertaining specifically to Iraq's vital rates will be examined next, and it will be noted whether they confirm or contradict these estimates. ESTIMATES OF FERTILITY On the basis of the Palestinian data, we would expect the crude birth rate of Iraq's population to be between 50 and 55 per thousand, an estimate confirmed by various authorities. Evidence comes from the records of the maternal and child health • See Granqvist, Birth and Childhood among the Arabs and Child Problems among the Arabs. s Jurkat, op. cit., pp. 84, 88; Fisher, The Middle East, p. 248. Vital Rates 71 present high level for several generations. Therefore a rising rate of natural in- crease can be deduced. The statistical evidence, scanty and poor as it is, lends support to this deduction. Hashim Jawad, whose estimates of total numbers cover the years 1919 to 1942, concluded that the rate of natural increase of the popula- tion was not much more than 1 per cent per annum. Yet, if his estimate of 4,150,000 for 1942 is comparable with the census total of 4,816,185 in 1947, the population was increasing at the rate of almost 3 per cent per annum. The recent Census of 1947 (Corrected) U.N. Cen, of 1947 Jawad Total Population, Millions Jowad Partial Census Partial Census Jowad Dowson Longrigg 1910 1950 1900 1920 1930 1940 Fig. 5. Estimates of Iraq's total population, 1900–1950. acceleration in the rate of growth of Iraq's population can be seen if the various estimates of total numbers since 1900 (see chap. iii) are plotted and a trend line is fitted to them, as in figure 5.' If the estimates are substantially true, it is evident that the rate of natural increase has accelerated in recent decades and that Iraq's population has entered a period of rapid growth. This fact is hinted in the graphi- cal representation of the age structure, which is narrow down to the age of twenty but widens when twenty is reached (see fig. 2). A rate of natural increase of 20–25 per thousand, or 2.0–2.5 per cent per annum, is indicated for recent years. To the extent that earlier estimates tended to underenumeration more than later ones, the rate would be closer to the lower figure. The approximate size of Iraq's population at present can be projected by add- ing a probable natural increase to the 1947 population. Such an estimate is subject to error from both the base figure and the allowance for increase, but, for estimates based on a recent census, the first source of error is the more important. Therefore, the aggregate for 1947 should be corrected for the underenumeration that is known to have taken place. A modest correction would put Iraq's total population • Jawad, The Social Structure of Iraq, pp. 17–18. • The trend line is an exponential equation of the second degree to the logarithms of y, fitted by the method of least squares. Its equation, plotted on an arithmetic scale, is: Yt = (3.211) (1.031)+(1.001) ra, with 1935 chosen as year zero. The yt/Yt-, values (ratio of trend value in any year to that of the preceding year) increase, establishing an acceleration in the rate of natural increase. The writer is grateful to her colleague Dr. Robert Kautz for technical assistance in this matter. 72 Iraq's People and Resources at about 5,000,000 in 1947. A natural increase of 20 per thousand for nine years would give a population of 6,000,000 in October, 1956, while a rate of 25 per thousand would give a population of 6,200,000.0 It is too soon to project when and if the rate of growth will cease its acceleration. The factors which are maintaining the present level of fertility will be slow to change but are not immutable. Population projection on the basis of the scanty information we have for Iraq's numbers and vital rates would be pure guesswork. A qualitative discussion of the adjustment that vital rates can be expected to make to economic development is the subject of the remainder of this chapter. Immigration, which may be induced as the irrigation projects make more agri- cultural land available and as the shortage of skilled labor becomes more acute, has been omitted from the discussion because it is a political issue beyond the scope of this study. It could, of course, have a profound effect upon population growth." FACTORS EXPLAINING MORTALITY AND THE VITALITY OF THE POPULATION The average span of life is short in Iraq, and the typical man is hungry and dis- eased. The recurrent catastrophes that have punctuated Mesopotamia's long his- tory—such as the plague of 1831 and the flood that followed it, which together are said to have reduced Baghdad city's population from 150,000 to 50,0001—cannot be used as explanations of the high morbidity and mortality rates prevailing today. During the flood of 1954, which was one of the worst in Iraq's history, large-scale relief activities prevented the loss of any lives, and neither epidemics nor starva- tion ensued. Today a shortage of grain brings an embargo upon its export rather than a famine. The irrigation and flood control program will, it is anticipated, eliminate the threat of floods within the coming decade. The prevalent causes of illness and death, more insidious than catastrophes, almost without exception result from poverty and ignorance. In examining the common diseases in Iraq, we cannot use the published data on incidence of disease, for they include only diseases treated at medical institutions and therefore show low incidences for some of the most prevalent diseases—those affecting the poorest and most rural elements of the population. The incidence of endemic diseases among the rural poor is not recorded: first, this group does not normally have access to medical institutions; second, certain endemic diseases and nutritional deficiencies are so widespread that they are considered normal. Many of Iraq's poor do not know how good health looks or feels. Therefore we must turn to the opinions of medical experts for information concerning the most prevalent dis- eases. Table 25 lists the common illnesses in Iraq, roughly according to their inci- 10 Computed according to the compound interest formula (1+i)n, in which i is the percentage increase per annum and n is the number of years. 11 External migration has not yet played an important role in Iraq's population growth. From 1940 to 1954, the number of people entering the country has exceeded the number leaving every year, but by an amount never greater than the 66,640 for 1950; more commonly, the net increase through immigration has been about 20,000 a year, and this includes many foreigners whose stay in Iraq is only temporary. Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1944-45 to 1954. 12 Lloyd, Twin Rivers, pp. 199–200. 13 For example, bilharzia, a fluke disease caused by pollution of irrigation water by urine, showed an incidence of only five per thousand population for 1953. Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1953, pp. 250–254. Yet Ministry of Health surveys in which urinalyses were made among rural people not normally having access to medical care disclosed local incidences as high as 75 per cent of the population. Watson, “Studies on Bilharziasis in Iraq," Journal of the Faculty of Medicine, Baghdad, Iraq, XIV (Jan.-March, 1950), 27-28. 74 Iraq's People and Resources dence in the opinions of these experts. Except for malaria, the important ailments are social in origin, although some are aggravated by the severe climate. Striking illustration of the social nature of illness in Iraq is offered in data gath- ered by experts of the World Health Organization in Baghdad's Sheikh Omar Maternal and Child Health Center. If infant mortality is separated into deaths per thousand in the first month of life, and those during the next eleven months, the number of deaths is relatively larger in the first month in countries of low infant mortality; in countries of high infant mortality, however, the highest rate applies to infants between the ages of two months and twelve months. Taking data from 2,000 Baghdad families visiting the center in 1954 and from families visiting a similar center in Hamburg, Germany, in 1952, the experts computed that the 135 deaths per thousand among Baghdad infants were divided into 40 in the first month and 95 in the remaining eleven months of the first year of life. The 33 deaths per thousand among Hamburg babies were divided into 27 in the first month and only 6 per thousand in the remaining eleven months. Deaths in the first month are caused by conditions of birth and are, in highly developed coun- tries, near the irreducible minimum. That they are to a large extent beyond human control, at the present state of medical science, is seen in the similarity between the rates of Germany and Iraq. The causes of death later in the first year of life are social. In Iraq they are malnutrition, with its consequent lack of resistance to dis- ease, and contaminated water. There is widespread belief that it is harmful to give a baby solid food during its first year, and many babies do not receive food other than breast milk until they are old enough to feed themselves. The state of nutrition of Baghdad and Hamburg babies may be compared with data on weights. On the average, the Iraqi child weighs 200 grams more than the European at birth. At about the fourth month, the curves of average growth cross, and by the end of the twelfth month the Iraqi child weighs on the average 1,600 grams less than the European. Ignorance and superstition.-Poverty and ignorance, the basic causes of death and illness in Iraq, take various specific forms. One of the most important is the lack of scientific knowledge of the cause and cure of disease. The fellahin, the Bedouins, and a large proportion of the urban people live in a world in which Allah gives good health or takes it away at will, in which flies come from Allah, and so do dysentery and trachoma, with no causal nexus. No studies have been made of the medical knowledge possessed by the Iraqi people. However, from the fact that, in 1947, 90 per cent of the population was illiterate, we can presume that the degree is low. The study made by Stuart Dodd in seven Syrian villages in 1931 is instructive because of the similarity between them and Iraqi villages." The Syrian villages were inhabited by Alaouites, who are of the Shi'a sect of Islam, as are the majority of Iraqi villagers in the irrigation zone; members of this sect are the poorest and most backward group of Syria's population. The villagers were mostly fellahin, raising cereals and livestock, and receiving an annual income equivalent to about $80 (American) per capita. Their homes were of mud, their fuel of dung; in almost every detail their way of life was 14 Dodd, A Controlled Experiment on Rural Hygiene in Syria. Other references on unhygienic practices and superstitious beliefs include Granqvist, Birth and Childhood among the Arabs and Child Problems among the Arabs; and Stevens, Folk-Tales of 'Iraq. Vital Rates 75 similar to that of the Iraqi fellahin. Dodd's survey disclosed an almost complete lack of scientific knowledge of the causes of disease. No one among the one hun- dred families interviewed knew that the mosquito carries malaria or that food is the carrier of diarrhea and typhoid. Only 15 per cent knew that eye diseases are communicable. One villager in four knew that colds are communicable. It is prob- able that such a survey in Iraq would yield similar results. Lack of knowledge of the way in which diseases are communicated, when com- bined with extremely low incomes, leads to a variety of unhygienic practices. All the Alaouite villagers threw their garbage into the yards or fields. No family had a latrine of any kind. One-third of the villagers admitted that they did not wash their hands after defecation, and over half of them ate with their fingers from a single dish for the whole family. In Iraq, also, many do not understand the impor- tance of keeping human excreta out of food and water. The contents of cesspools are bought by market gardeners to be used as fertilizer, and night soil is used on all intensively grown vegetables. If the vegetables are not polluted before they are harvested, they become polluted before they are sold, through the common practice of rinsing them in irrigation ditches on the way to market. The irrigation ditch which serves as the village water supply is commonly used as a latrine also. Bilharzia is spread by pollution of streams by urine, while the dysenteries, ty- phoid, and intestinal parasites are spread by contaminated feces. If measures are taken against flies or mosquitoes, it is usually only because they are considered a nuisance. Meat, bread, confections, dates, and dairy products appear in the markets and are stored in homes with little protection against flies or other sources of contamination. Here poverty enters also as a cause, for the majority of the people would not be able to afford foods that had been packaged or refrigerated. Young children in the villages are commonly seen with their eyes covered with flies, because they wipe their eyes with sticky fingers, leaving a resi- due that attracts flies. Only a minority of rural mothers are aware that trachoma is spread in this way. In all levels of society, eating utensils are simply rinsed with cold water, and often they go from one user to another without even that precaution. Dishes are often washed on the ground in the courtyard and stacked there. In the villages, common dishes are used by all, going first to the guests and tribal elders, then to the younger or less important men, and finally to the women and children. In the tribal guesthouse Arab coffee is served from a few cups to all the men, each man's order reflecting his position in the tribe. Most of these unhygienic practices originated in poverty as well as ignorance, and the majority are also of tribal origin-cultural holdovers from a time when water was so scarce that it could not be used for washing, when soap was inacces- sible, and when the camp could be moved as it became unsanitary. The folklore of Iraq is exceedingly rich, and superstitious explanations exist for almost every natural phenomenon, including the high mortality that has existed through the centuries. It is commonly believed that evil spirits, possessing super- natural powers, can cause disease. The jinn (genii) are numerous inhabitants of the Iraqi fellah's world. They dwell under the ground and can enter a human being in various circumstances, as when a person steps on a crack or takes a bath. Contact with jinn can cause sickness or death, unless one protects himself in their 76 Iraq's People and Resources presence by touching steel, calling Allah's name, or carrying magic amulets. Women and children are the special prey of Qarina, a female devil who is blamed for the high mortality of infants and among women of childbearing age. She can be warded off by amulets made of the afterbirth or the navel cord of the newborn child. The most common fear is of human beings possessed of the Evil Eye, who are believed to be able by a look to bring misfortune to an object they covet or to its owners. Boy babies, the Arabs' most valued possession, are the main target of the Evil Eye, but houses, animals, and (a recent addition) automobiles can be affected also. Blue beads are the usual amulet to ward off misfortune, the idea being that the eye is drawn to the bead rather than to the object wearing it. They are pinned on babies' caps, embedded in walls of houses, strung around horses' necks, and woven into little pillows hung from the rear-view mirrors of automobiles. Most village babies wear some kind of amulet. However, the best defense against the Evil Eye and other malicious spirits is to avoid envy. “The Arabs have a very strong feeling that admiration and envy are ... closely related. They do not be- lieve that people may honestly delight in the good fortune of another ..."15 For this reason boy babies may be dressed as girls and may even be called by girls' names. In rural areas children are seldom washed, and flies are allowed to swarm on their faces and eyes. Thus disfigured, they are protected from envy. When illness strikes, superstition affords remedies. Burning or cauterizing with a heated nail was a common remedy for a variety of ailments in rural Palestine. If a child had diarrhea, mutton, onions, and herbs were wrapped in dough and baked, and the cake was broken over his face. Antimony applied around the eyes is used by women in rural Iraq as both a cosmetic and a medicine for eye disease. It is a short step from antimony to aureomycin ointment, if the cause of the disease is not understood. Many preventive measures and remedies, such as inoculations, D.D.T., and antibiotic drugs, are to their recipients just a new kind of amulet- and, through their greater effectiveness, are even more magical than the discarded ones. Nutrition.—Nutrition is a factor of great importance in explaining the generally poor health of Iraq's population. An expert of the Food and Agriculture Organi- zation of the United Nations summarized his report on the state of nutrition in Iraq as follows: “... our findings as a whole make it clear that malnutrition is general. Apart from the upper classes suffering from faulty nutrition through overeating, it may be said that 75–80% of the inhabitants do not seem to receive either proper or sufficient food. Most children are backward both as to height and weight, and adults are underweight."?10 Professor Gounelle's conclusion can be corroborated statistically. The average per capita daily calories for Iraq were estimated at 1,930 for the period 1946–1949, whereas the daily calories recom- mended for maintaining good health in American adults range from 2,000 for a sedentary woman to 4,500 for a man doing heavy work (2,400 for a moderately active woman and 3,000 for a moderately active man). By the same standard, one daily gram of protein is recommended for each kilogram of body weight among adults—for example, sixty grams of protein for an adult of 130 pounds—and, for 15 Granqvist, Child Problems among the Arabs, p. 112. 16 United Nations, Report to the Government of Iraq on Nutrition, p. 8. 78 Iraq's People and Resources children, two or three grams of protein for each kilogram of body weight. Yet the average daily intake of proteins in Iraq during the period 1946–1949 was only fourteen grams." In figure 6 Iraq is compared with twenty-two populous or important food-pro- ducing countries with respect to daily per capita supplies of various foodstuffs during the period 1946–1950. The data on cereals for Iraq as well as for other preindustrial countries are undoubtedly understatements because of the difficulty of estimating farmers' consumption of their own produce. However, figure 6 proves that the diet in Iraq is relatively deficient in protective values and hints strongly that it is deficient in quantity as well. More recent data, pertaining to 1954–55, give average per capita daily caloric intake at 2,340 for Iraq, 2,340 for Egypt, 2,250 for Lebanon, 2,150 for Jordan, 2,130 for Syria, and 2,000 for Iran. Nutrition in Iraq appears relatively good in comparison with other Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, Iraq was ahead of these other countries in the percentage of animal foods in the diet, with 14 per cent of the average caloric intake consisting of meat, fish, milk, and eggs. 19 How- ever, in countries in which a significant segment of the population is wealthy enough to choose their diets freely, about 40 per cent of the calories consumed consist of animal foods. Over-all averages obscure the inequality in the distribution of food consumption within a country. That the wealthy and middle classes customarily suffer from obesity, while the diets of the fellahin and urban poor are lacking in both energy and protective values, is documented by a small-scale nutritional study made by Dr. Mahmoud Jalili in 1949–50. He divided a sample of fifty-five families into five groups, on the basis of income, and studied their purchases of food over a one- year period. His five classes and their average daily consumption are summarized in table 26. The relative numbers in the classes obscure the fact that Class V in- cludes the great majority of Iraq's population, and therefore the findings relating to it must be weighted heavily. In fact, because the Class V sample was drawn from villages near cities, the families studied were probably relatively well off in com- parison with truly rural people. Dr. Jalili found that the average daily caloric intake of adults in the five classes ranged from 3,328 to 1,813. Of the Class V people, he separated out a subgroup whose daily intake averaged only 1,460 calories. The first three classes were found to have sufficient calories—in fact, a surplus, considering their sedentary way of life. Class IV was somewhat deficient because members of this class do much harder physical labor than those in the first three classes. The diet of Class V was markedly deficient: “Although these people are supposed to do hard physical work because of their occupation, yet they do not perform much work because of their inability to do so due to their deficient diet and the endemic diseases they suffer 17 The data on Iraq are taken from United Nations, Second World Food Survey, p. 49. Of the fourteen grams of proteins, eight were of animal protein and six of pulse protein. The standards were set by the National Research Council, Recommended Dietary Allowances, pp. 7, 16. It should be noted that differences in climate, average body weight, and similar factors reduce the usefulness of the National Research Council standards in international comparisons. 18 U. S. Department of Agriculture, "Food Balances, Consumption Year 1954–55..." The data include food imports and estimated consumption of home-produced foods, and exclude food exports and nonfood uses. in Jalili, “The State of Nutrition in Iraq,” Journal of the Faculty of Medicine, Baghdad, Iraq, XIV (May-July, 1950), 73–141. 82 Iraq's People and Resources The majority of babies born in Iraq are delivered by untrained midwives. Although the Ministry of Health has licensed several hundred of them, possession of a license does not signify that the midwife has been trained. In 1954 there were only eighty-five trained midwives in Iraq. A survey conducted in 1955 in a public housing development outside of Baghdad, inhabited by regularly employed la- borers and junior government officials, indicated that 90 per cent of the mothers had been attended in childbirth by untrained midwives. The number of hospitals increased from 83, with 5,378 beds, in 1951, to 104, with 7,240 beds, in 1954. In 1954 half a million people received vaccinations and inoculations, the majority for smallpox, given free of charge at government institutions. Because of the agreement among government planners and the population as a whole that better sanitation and medical facilities are desirable, we can expect a continued rapid expansion of such services. Declining mortality.—It is probable that death rates have been declining in re- cent decades in Iraq. Evidence exists in the recent expansion of educational, medi- cal, and sanitary facilities, combined with small-scale studies of the local effect of such projects upon health conditions. From these studies it can be reasoned that nationwide measures such as inoculations and the increasing availability of puri- fied water must be having a significant effect upon over-all mortality. Underdeveloped countries have tended to stress curative medicine more than preventive medicine, and preventive medicine more than the development of a healthy group of people in a sanitary environment, because, in the short run, it is cheaper and easier to cure disease than to prevent it, and low productivity in such countries has precluded a high level of health among the general population. Gov- erning groups, whether colonial or indigenous, have tended to use measures which are dramatic and immediate in their effects, and have found that the superstitious and illiterate masses welcome such measures. A striking example is the drive against trachoma carried out in southern Morocco by authorities of the French government in coöperation with the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund. Aureomycin ointment was used and came to be known by the recipients as the “miracle ointment.” In some villages, tests were made with sulfa drugs and an anti-fly campaign designed to exter- minate the germ carriers. No aureomycin treatment was given at first. But villagers in these test areas clamoured for the miracle ointment, of which they had heard from other villages.... It is difficult to make the villagers understand the link between dirt, flies and trachoma.... The method which the Arabs do understand, however, is the aureomycin ointment...25 In many countries such policies have resulted in the paradoxical combination of declining rates of illness and constant or even declining per capita food consump- tion, as the population has increased without correspondingly increased agricul- tural productivity. An alternative method of reducing morbidity and mortality is to raise produc- tivity and thereby incomes, to educate the population on the causes and prevention of disease, and to raise their resistance to infection by improvements in nutrition and housing. Although slower and more costly, this approach does a double job. Not only does it reduce the incidence of disease but also, through instilling in * The Iraq Times (Baghdad), December 8, 1955. Vital Rates 83 tradition-minded people some understanding of cause and effect, it reinforces the efforts devoted to increasing productivity and prepares the people for eventual adoption of birth control. It is the only long-run solution to illness and poverty, for mortality must eventually rise in countries in which populations are allowed to grow dense while mores perpetuating high birth rates and low labor produc- tivity remain unchanged. Individuals must use palliative measures because they cannot alone effect basic solutions. Thus many doctors in Iraq use antibiotics indiscriminately because they cannot perform their rightful educational functions. They cannot seriously recom- mend that patients of medium or low incomes avoid eating contaminated food, drink milk and orange juice each day, or heat their homes in winter. In rural areas it does little good to tell villagers of the evils of impure water if there is no in- expensive way for them to purify water. However, the Government of Iraq pos- sesses the economic resources with which an all-out attack on poverty can be made. Beginnings can be seen in the programs of village development, town planning, and public health training at present being carried out. Nevertheless, curative medicine still tends to be stressed above preventive medicine and environmental sanitation. For example, most of the efforts at control of bilharzia, the debilitating and prevalent disease spread by urination in irrigation canals, are devoted to cur- ing infected persons, who quickly become reinfected, and destroying the snails that act as vectors. The more fundamental solution of educating rural people not to urinate in the canals is not stressed because it is much more difficult. Thus, while it is certain that mortality will continue to decline in Iraq, a valuable opportunity will be lost if health measures are not made part of a general program to teach the scientific principles of cause and effect and to raise the level of living. FACTORS EXPLAINING THE LEVEL OF FERTILITY The fertility of Iraq's population is high, even in comparison with other countries of relatively high fertility. Yet it cannot be said that it is at the biological maxi- mum. Certain factors operate in all cultures to reduce fertility somewhat below the level of fecundity. Iraqi widows do not remarry so universally as do widow- ers: the Census of 1947 revealed that 15 per cent of females and only 2 per cent of males aged ten and above were widowed and not remarried. Differential mor- tality might account for part, but certainly not all, of this difference. The institu- tion of the dowry tends to postpone marriage for males. Divorce is easy and common in Muslim states as compared with other Eastern countries. Marriage is typically early in Iraq for females, but the relationship between the age of mar- riage and fertility is complex; although, on the whole, earlier marriage means higher fertility, childbearing immediately after puberty may reduce fecundity. Certainly the mere absence of antinatal practices does not assure fertility at the level of fecundity. The females included in a postwar British hospital survey would have had, in the absence of any birth control, an average of five live births during the childbearing period. At the other extreme, females of Soviet Armenia in the late 1920's were averaging almost eight live births per female living to the end of her reproductive years. Palestinian Muslims, with crude birth rates approxi- mating those of the Armenians as well as those estimated for Iraq, tended in the 84 Iraq's People and Resources 1930's to have almost eight live births per surviving female.* Rates as high as these probably approximate a kind of sociobiological maximum, reflecting a minimum of cultural factors tending to reduce fertility, an almost complete absence of overt antinatal practices, and strong institutional conditions favoring high fertility. No systematic information exists concerning the prevalence of antinatal prac- tics in Iraq, but the consensus of medical workers is that they are uncommon. Although cultural factors operate to postpone marriage and to prevent certain groups from remarrying if the marriage is dissolved, birth control is practiced by a negligibly small portion of the population. During two years of operation of the Maternal and Child Health Center in the town of Samawa on the southern Euphrates, only a few upper-class women requested birth-control information, while among the middle and lower classes, according to a nurse-midwife, it was “not even thought of.” We can understand why it is not considered by the over- whelming majority of Iraq's women when we examine the institutional factors which motivate and implement high fertility. The institution most important to fertility in any society is the family, but its nature and meaning differ widely between East and West. Kinship systems, com- mon to all cultures, can be organized in a cognative way—that is, the individual recognizes all his relatives, of both sexes, but the nuclear family of husband, wife, and children holds primary importance. Nuclear, or conjugal, families, which have been dominant in countries of Western civilization since before the advent of industrialism, tend to restrict family size by placing the burden of rearing the children almost entirely upon the parents. Alternatively, kinship systems may be or- ganized along patrilineal or matrilineal lines, as in most societies not strongly influ- enced by Western civilization. The nuclear family is absorbed into the extended family, clan, or tribe; the ties between husband and wife have less strength than those between successive generations. Maintenance of lineage, whether on the male or female side, is an incentive for having large families. The Muslim family is patrilineal, surviving only through its sons. Two Arab proverbs say, “The boy is the tent peg of the house,” and “A girl's house is ruined, she builds up the house of someone else."2 The Muslim family is patrilocal: upon marriage the girl goes into the house of her husband's father, and if she should be divorced her children remain with her husband's people. Finally, it is patriarchal; the elder males rule the entire household, including their adult sons. Surviving sons are necessary not only to maintain the lineage but also as social security. In Iraq, as in other Eastern agrarian countries, there is no capital market to provide earnings without direct supervision of business, nor are savings banks and life insurance available to most people. Parents are supported in their old age by their sons, who, in rural areas, take over cultivation of the family land or, in urban areas, carry on the father's business. Under conditions of high mortality typical of such societies, many sons 23 Lorimer et al., Culture and Human Fertility, pp. 31–38. 27 For general discussion of the determination of fertility, see Davis, “Institutional Patterns Favoring High Fertility in Underdeveloped Areas,” Eugenics Quarterly, II (March, 1955), 33–39; and Lorimer, op. cit. Discussions relating specifically to Muslim countries are contained in Daghestani, “The Evolution of the Moslem Family in the Middle Eastern Countries,” Inter. national Social Science Bulletin, V (1953), 681-691; Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Muslim Institu- tions, chap. viii; Granqvist, Birth and Childhood among the Arabs and Child Problems among the Arabs; Woodsmall, Moslem Women Enter a New World. A less scientific but interesting view is contained in Stewart and Haylock, New Babylon : A Portrait of Iraq, chap. xii. 28 Granqvist, Child Problems among the Arabs, p. 138. Vital Rates 85 must be born to insure that one or two will survive to support their aged parents. Girls are a necessary by-product, and, although their birth is not heralded, they are loved and protected. Households, termed joint or composite because they include several nuclear families, are typically large—a fact in itself conducive to high fertility. The parents are not alone responsible for caring for their children, either financially or physically. Additional children can be absorbed into such households with little trouble. Another handful of rice is added to the pot; another yard or two of cloth is bought at the time of the feast when everyone has new clothes; and the grand- mothers or widowed relatives, who are about the house all day, care for the children while the mothers go to market or work in the fields. Children become economic assets early in life, learning the father's trade or helping with the harvest. Marriage need not await economic independence and typically takes place at an early age for girls, soon after puberty, for boys somewhat later because of the necessity to give a dowry. Marriage for Iraqi men tends to be later in urban than in rural regions in part because the dowry must buy a larger number of material possessions. In the villages the “bride's furniture" consists of a metal bed, a crude wooden chest, some bedding, and a few cooking pots; in the towns it must buy more substantial furniture such as tables, chairs, and wardrobes. Moreover, urban men have access to cabarets and brothels as alternatives to early marriage. For a man who has adopted Western values, attendance at an institution of higher education or the process of learning a trade may postpone marriage, but his father may at any time become impatient to see grandchildren and order him to marry a woman selected by the family. Because the bearing of many children is the foremost aim of marriage, and companionship between the husband and wife is not considered, a man of any age tends to take a young wife. A further incentive to marry off females soon after they reach puberty is the system of morality wherein the female but not the male may bring disgrace to the family through “misconduct.” The exact nature of an immoral act ranges from showing her face in public-among the most conservative families in small towns- to being a prostitute. The typical avenger is the brother and the typical weapon a knife. Although civil authorities in the cities are beginning to consider honor killings murder, the punishment is at most a few years in prison, and an unknown but sizable number are unreported. The following items from the Iraq Times are representative: (December 15, 1955] Killed his sister. A- was arrested in Mosul, North Iraq, after stabbing his sister 2 to death in the street. He claimed he killed her for reasons of honour. December 19, 1955) Killed sister for honour reasons. Police arrested A- and his cousin J- for the fatal shooting of A— 's sister, F- , on Saturday morning at W- , near Baghdad. They readily confessed that they shot her for reasons of honour as she had escaped from her husband. (July 6, 1956] Murder for honour. Sayid A- Judicial Investigator, yesterday continued in- vestigation into the murder of L- ... She was stabbed to death by her uncle S- for reasons of honour. Police are trying to find out whether the woman was killed because of bad conduct. Her father and uncle told the Investigating Magistrate yesterday that they had heard about her misconduct, while her husband ... told the Magistrate that his wife was faithful. The husband attributed the crime to disputes between his wife and her relatives and promised the Investigat- ing Magistrate to produce a certificate from the headman of their quarter to this effect. The 86 Iraq's People and Resources murderer ... confessed yesterday that he had killed L- for bad conduct and that he had been tracking her for more than a year. I was on her way to her house ...8— saw her, shouted for her to stop and when she turned stabbed her seven times. She died instantly. Her three-month- old daughter ... whom she was carrying was wounded. The interesting point in the last story is the relevancy, in the eyes of the court, of whether the misconduct charges were true. Presumably, if the murderer could prove his charges, he would be exonerated. The seclusion and differential treatment of females are products of the code of morality. Although they are not in the same category as slaves—for they enjoy certain rights, such as inheritance, under Muslim law-females are in some re- spects a kind of commodity belonging to the male members of the family. Thus, according to Bedouin tradition a certain number of women may be given, as an alternative to money or rice, to compensate another tribe for injury done it. If the fasl-woman, as she is called, does not bear sons, she may be sent back to her tribe and another woman demanded in her place. Among the Shi'ites a poor family may be forced by economic necessity to give a daughter in temporary marriage a number of times. Wealthy tradition-minded men consider polygamy a source of prestige, much as other men are proud of having two automobiles. It is not to be inferred that the wives in plural marriages are usually mistreated. The Quran specifies that a man's wives should receive equal treatment and that a man must take no more wives than he can support adequately. Most Muslim men feel a strong obligation to protect and care for their women, and, unless the latter have been exposed to Western values, they find life in the harim secure and happy. But the Muslim woman is barred from obtaining secondary or higher education or achiev- ing economic independence, not only because these activities would require that marriage be postponed but also because they might bring her in contact with men and thus bring dishonor to the family. When asked why he would not allow his daughter to become a nurse, a middle-class Iraqi replied, “If she became a nurse, some important sheikh would see her and want her. I am a poor man. If I were to refuse, he would make trouble for my family.” Thus women are identified with the two functions of gratifying sexual desires of men and bearing children, and it never occurs to the majority that any other function is possible. For the Muslim woman, married young and taken into a strange house, status and security depend upon bearing many sons as soon as possible, and her life depends upon the avoidance of any act that might arouse suspicion of immorality. The Islamic religion itself is conducive to high fertility. Born of a life of pillage and warfare in a physically hostile environment, its maintenance and expansion demanded an abundance of warriors. Polygamy was approved by the Prophet Muhammad as a humane alternative to female infanticide and a way of allowing excess females to help maintain the population. During the centuries of Islam's expansion, more men meant larger armies and the control of more and better re- sources. As the religion spread into settled agricultural regions, such as the Mesopotamian plain, where cultivation replaced warfare as a means of existence and civil government replaced rule by tribal elders, Islam continued to support high fertility. The word “Islam” means literally submission, yielding, resignation, to the will of God. That certain passages of the Quran can be construed as enjoiners Vital Rates 87 against contraception is less important than the “whole emphasis in Islamic cul- ture on strict conformity to social obligations and the sense of divine destiny ..." Associated with these values is a strong sense of the omnipotence of Fate. Among orthodox Muslims and many humble followers of the Prophet, the circumstances of human life are not in- fluenced by the actions of individuals. It is, in fact, impious for them to attempt to interfere in any way with the courses of nature. It is, then, not surprising that Muslim populations are gen- erally characterized by extremely high fertility, and include some groups ... with recorded fer- tility at or near the maximum indicated by any moderately reliable data. 29 The family in Iraq is in a state of transition, and examples can be found of every shading from tribal groupings reminiscent of the early days of Islam to the con- jugal, nuclear family found in the dualistic quarters of the largest cities. Fertility remains high in all groups except those at the latter extreme. Unlike society in Western Europe and in lands settled by Europeans, in which the nuclear family has long been dominant and the association of landholding and marriage has always put a certain limitation on fertility, the relatively independent conjugal family in Iraq is a result of conscious abandoning of old values in favor of new. The break from the paternal household, often a painful one, requires strong motivation-usually the desire for companionship between husband and wife, for independence and privacy, and for higher levels of consumption, Many elements of this new life are causally related to limitation of fertility. Conjugal family life, with its duplication of facilities, is enormously expensive. Therefore not only is economic independence a necessity, but the husband must earn much more than he would have needed to pay his share in the operation of the paternal household. The new set of values includes many items of consumption, formerly luxuries, as necessities—for example, education and medical care for the children. Thus not only do more of the children survive because of their more healthful environment, but each one becomes more expensive to raise. The wife, in order to operate the household without a large number of female helpers and a mother-in-law as overseer, needs a certain amount of education. Therefore her marriage must have been postponed after puberty, with the result that she will have interests and sources of enjoyment other than childbearing. The fertility of such couples is affected also by a selective factor: if they have been able to break with tradition to an extent sufficient to establish their own home, they are likely also to be able to withstand the abuse which will be heaped upon them by their elders for having only a few children. The fact significant to over-all fertility in Iraq is the extremely small percentage of the total population represented by this group. Not only must they be of the upper-middle class or upper class, but they must have adopted a new set of values and be willing to adhere to their convictions in the face of strong criticism. In 1947 only 16 per cent of Iraq's population were living in the four cities containing strongly dualistic elements, and the great majority of the inhabitants of these cities were still living and working under traditional conditions. It may be argued that high mortality, which supplied rationality for the high fertility of Iraq's population in the past, is changing under the impact of economic development and that, as the rationality vanishes, the fertility must change. How- 29 Lorimer, op. cit., p. 187. CHAPTER V INCOME AND CONSUMPTION THE MOST STRIKING characteristic of life in Iraq is widespread poverty. By almost any standards—including those of a large segment of Iraq's population-adequate food, clothing, shelter, and other elements of a healthful and decent life are mark- edly deficient for all but a small percentage of the population at the upper end of the income scale. However, attempts to quantify the extent and degree of poverty and to make international comparisons of income involve many difficulties which, although they are not insuperable, greatly reduce the precision of estimates. We must first distinguish between a level and a standard of living. Although the two are often confused in common parlance, a level of living is an actually attained condition of life, while a standard of living is a desired condition of life, by which actual conditions may be evaluated. The degree of satisfaction attained by the individual from his income depends not only upon the absolute quantity of goods and services which he can buy but also upon the size of the gap between his level and his standard of living. This differentiation is of particular significance in countries undergoing eco- nomic development: factors such as urbanization, growing labor mobility, the import of foreign capital goods, and the influx of foreign technicians—integral parts of the development process—tend to raise the standards of living of the indigenous population. Discontent may even grow as real incomes rise, if the standards are rising more rapidly. Political unrest develops when contact with the West is limited to the import of consumption goods without measures to in- crease earning power. Poor countries must allocate relatively more of their re- sources to producing consumption goods, as opposed to investment goods, than do wealthier countries, and within a country at a given time the poorer classes con- sume a higher proportion of their incomes than do the wealthier classes. The reason is the same in both cases: poor nations or individuals must devote most of their earning power to securing the elementary necessities of life. However, it is also true that—barring depression of consumption by public policy—the per- centage of national product consumed in underdeveloped and developing countries at present tends to be higher than it was in countries now highly industrialized at a comparable stage in their development. The reason is a vast difference in stand- ards. Iraq's people are able to observe-in the cinema, in shopwindows, among foreigners, and among wealthy Iraqis—levels of consumption never dreamed of in earlier centuries. Every increase in real income can be matched or exceeded by an increase in aspirations far up the income scale. Thus the difference between levels and standards of living constitutes one factor restricting the supply of domestic savings. (Others are discussed in chap. vii.) Second, we must distinguish between a level (or standard) of consumption and a level (or standard) of living. Consumption refers simply to the goods and services consumed by the individual; living refers to all the elements, material and nonmaterial, which enter into his welfare. Nonmaterial elements include freedom, 1 See Davis, “Standards and Content of Living,” American Economic Review, XXXV (March, 1945), 1-15; also Public Administration Clearing House, “Definition and Measurement of Standards of Living.” [ 89 ] 90 Iraq's People and Resources security, leisure, the size of the gap between the standard and the level of living, and hope that the gap will be reduced in the future. If our concern is with welfare, we should attempt to measure levels of living rather than of consumption. How- ever, measurement of nonmaterial elements of welfare is fraught with difficulties even in our own society, and in societies of different value systems reflects the estimator's degree of sympathy with these value systems. In a country such as Iraq, where values are in a state of flux, members of the society cannot themselves agree on the proper or prevailing value system. For example, does underemploy- ment represent a deduction from or an addition to the level of living? The tradi- tion-minded shopkeeper may derive as much enjoyment from an hour of bargain- ing over the price of a copper jug as does another merchant from a night at the cabaret. It would be impossible to assign a net value, positive or negative, to underemployment in Iraq, even if its extent could be determined. We attempt to avoid such difficulties by assessing only levels of income and consumption, assum- ing that a good or service is worth what is paid for it. In making this assumption we may exaggerate the differences between developed and underdeveloped coun- tries, by using norms formulated in highly developed countries in assessing the incomes of all. The United Nations Department of Social Affairs elaborated this point with respect to the Middle East: The nomadic tribes of the Middle East are good examples of a society where it is difficult to assess "standards of living” according to norms evolved elsewhere, particularly norms evolved in a sedentary urban-industrial society. Nomadic societies lack schools, newspapers, doctors, hos- pitals, police, law systems, etc., in fact are deficient in practically every social instrumentality generally considered necessary to ensure a decent standard of living. Yet, their way of life does exhibit clear-cut ... adjustments to their environment..., and, with its highly developed folk culture, provides satisfactions that may not be measurable by the standards of other peoples in quite different environments.? Further difficulties in assessing levels of income and consumption of under- developed and developing countries arise from a dearth of reliable statistics. Any realistic estimates must include the sizable proportion of the national product that is consumed without entering the market. Even if its physical quantity were known, placing a money value upon it would involve arbitrary decisions, Iraq's rural population subsists largely on its own agricultural production, selling a part of it for a small cash income. Rural people build their own houses from materials of little or no commerical value. Only the urban third of the population obtains necessities through the market. It is understandable that no national income statis- tics are being regularly assembled in Iraq and that the cost of living data gathered by the Ministry of Economics pertain to urban areas only. IMATES The Statistical Office of the United Nations made a rough estimate of Iraq's national income for 1950 at 30 dinars, or $84 (American), per capita, or, taking the population at 5,000,000, a total of 150,000,000 dinars, or $420,000,000. Eco- nomic experts visiting Iraq since that time have been unable to improve upon the accuracy of the United Nations estimate. Yet it is not clear to what extent the subsistence sector of the economy was included nor how it was valued. In that * United Nations, Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation, p. 151. See also Buchanan and Ellis, Approaches to Economic Development, pp. 17-18. Income and Consumption 91 same year, Iraq appeared in the income class, under $100 per capita, with Afghan- istan, Iran, Sa’udi Arabia, Yemen, most of Asia and Africa, and a number of Latin American countries. Within the range of $100 to $149 appeared Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey among Middle Eastern countries, and Japan, the Philippines, Greece, and a number of Latin American countries. Israel was the only Middle Eastern country with per capita income above $150 in 1950. Com- parisons of the absolute differences in per capita income between Iraq and more highly industrialized countries have little validity. Although most people would agree that per capita income is higher in Italy than in Iraq, to say it is two, three, or four times as high has little meaning. Comparisons between countries of similar institutions, climate, and state of economic development have more validity ; prob- ably the most important consequence of the similarities is that the proportion of the national product consumed directly by the agricultural population does not vary greatly among them. Observation confirms that, prior to the enormous in- crease in Iraq's oil revenues, per capita income did not differ much between Iraq and Iran, and was significantly lower in Iraq than in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. Iraq's relative postition has been changing rapidly since 1950. Dr. K. G. Fenelon, Expert in Statistics for the Ministry of Economics, estimated Iraq's net national income in 1957 at 292,400,000 dinars. If the population numbered about 6,000,000, per capita income would be 49 dinars, or $136. Income is not the only indicator of relative levels of living, nor is it necessarily the best one, because of the difficulties involved in its measurement. Various other indicators may be used, none of them conclusive. On the basis of international differences in per capita income, life expectancy, tuberculosis rates, illiteracy, diet, and clothing, the Department of State has classified fifty-three countries as "well-developed," "intermediate," or "underdeveloped.” Although it is not in- cluded in the list, Iraq clearly belongs in the underdeveloped group with Egypt, Palestine, India, Japan, China, and twenty-three others, representing in all two- thirds of the world's population. By Eugene Staley's definition also, Iraq is under- developed, for it is “characterized (1) by mass poverty which is chronic and not the result of some temporary misfortune, and (2) by obsolete methods of produc- tion and social organization, which means that the poverty is not entirely due to poor natural resources and hence could presumably be lessened by methods already proved in other countries.” Within Iraq's population there are significantly different levels of consumption. Numerically, the two most important groups are the fellahin and the urban wage earners; fragmentary data exist concerning the consumption of each of these groups. The International Bank Mission described the yearly income and consump- tion of a typical fellah in the irrigation zone. He raises a winter crop of 25 donums (15.5 acres) of barley. If his yield is 300 kilograms per donum—a reasonable United Nations, op. cit., p. 131. The basis for the United Nations Statistical Office estimates is national income expressed in American dollars. The method of conversion of the various cur- rencies into dollars was, with some countries, to use prewar exchange rates adjusted for changes in purchasing power of the currencies concerned, and, with other countries, to use the exchange rates prevailing in 1950. *K. G. Fenelon, "Development in Iraq,” The Economist, CLXXXIII (June 22, 1957), 14. 5U. S. Department of State, Point Four: Coöperative Program for Aid in the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Areas, pp. 103–108. See also Buchanan and Ellis, op. cit., chap. i. • Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries, p. 13. 92 Iraq's People and Resources assumption on flow-irrigated land—the total crop amounts to seven and a half tons. His landlord will give him about two-fifths of the crop, or three tons of barley. From this he must save seed for the next year and pay his harvest help, leaving two to two and a half tons. If his family consists of five or six members, he must save at least one ton of barley for food, or more if he has livestock. Therefore one ton or slightly more remains to be sold. Usually he will have sold his crop long before the harvest. In addition to the high interest represented by a forward sale, he must pay the tax on sale of agricultural commodities and charges for bagging, weighing, and transport. In all, his cash income from the winter crop may consist of 10 dinars, or less than $30 (American). A summer crop may give him another 10 dinars. The yearly money income of five to six persons therefore consists of 20 dinars, or $56.' If the family's consumption of its own produce is added in, the total family income may be valued at $100-$150, or approximately $20-$30 per capita. The money income is spent upon tobacco, tea, sugar, dates, a few vegetables, cotton sheeting (out of which clothing for all the family is made), and an occa- sional second-hand jacket or homespun cape. Household equipment is simple and is purchased when a new household is established. Regular purchase of supplies such as soap or kerosene cannot be made by fellahin unless they have supplemental sources of income. Little or nothing is spent upon education, medical care, or recreation, nor upon agricultural implements other than primitive plows and spades. Savings may exist in the form of the women's jewelry upon which part of the dowry is spent. Consumption of rural people varies throughout the country, but is low by urban standards. Tenants in the mountainous and hilly rainfall zone receive a larger share of the crop, and peasant proprietors are numerous. However, life is more precarious in this region because of the uncertainty of rainfall. In the words of a villager near Mosul, “In the year when we do not have drought, we have locusts." The poorest elements of the population are the Bedouins and the marsh dwellers, but they are partly compensated by the freedom which they enjoy, as compared to the fellahin on the alluvial plain, who are tied to the land by debt. Fellahin near the major cities have a somewhat higher level of consumption because of the bar- gaining strength given them by additional employment opportunities. Details concerning the level of income and consumption of urban wage earners are supplied by a survey conducted in Baghdad city in 1954 by the Ministry of Economics: 350 households were selected at random to be included in the survey, 291 in the built-up sections of the city and 59 mud and reed huts in the area known as 'Arasat al-'Asima. Because the study was designed to cover wage earners only, any household in which the monthly income of one member exceeded 20 dinars was rejected. Unfortunately, the survey did not indicate the general level of in- come in Baghdad city. However, we can surmise that only the families of semi- skilled and skilled laborers and the better-educated white-collar workers were excluded. In 1954 the minimum legal wage, which is the going wage rate in many types of employment, was 250 fils a day, or about 6.5 dinars a month. In certain employments in which there is a shortage of labor (e.g., in construction), un- ? International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, pp. 132-134. ** Iraq, Report on the Household Budget Enquiry in the City of Baghdad and Its Environs. Income and Consumption 93 skilled laborers might have received as much as 350 to 400 fils a day, or 9–10 dinars a month. But many workers, particularly young boys, were receiving less than 250 fils. Government salaries, including allowances made for the high cost of living, were at that time at such levels that account clerks, assistant auditors and draftsmen, one-language typists, clerks, and unskilled office workers were included in the survey. The average household (in the 291 houses surveyed) was 7 persons, including 1.4 wage earners; 40 per cent of these wage earners were laborers. The average hut sheltered 5.7 persons, including 1.2 wage earners, 61 per cent of whom were TABLE 27 AVERAGE MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE OF WAGE EARNERS IN BAGHDAD City, 1954 291 houses 59 huts Category Dinars Per cent Dinars Per cent Food......... Clothing......... Soap, cleaning materials. Fuel, electricitye.. Furniture Rent.... Miscellaneous.. 11.2 1.4 0.7 1.4 0.3 1.8 8.0 0.9 0.4 1.2 0.1 0.0 1.5 z owo wo 2.7 Total......... 19.6 100 12.2 100 SOURCE: Iraq, Report on the Household Budget Enquiry in the City of Baghdad and Ils Environs. • Weighted average of winter and summer expenditure. laborers. Government employees were the next most numerous group, comprising 27 per cent of wage earners living in houses and 19 per cent of those living in huts. There were a few drivers, tailors, weavers, barbers, and house painters in the former group and none in the latter. Among those engaged in commerce, retailers with shops were more numerous than street peddlers among the former, while the reverse was true among the latter. It is obvious that the wage earners of the huts had fewer skills than did the inhabitants of the houses, an indication of their rural origins. Average monthly expenditure for the two groups was 19.6 and 12.2 dinars per household, respectively, or 2.8 and 2.1 dinars per capita, that is, $94 and $72 per capita per annum. While few urban wage earners receive a significant amount of income in kind from employment, they do receive many free government services such as medical care and education unavailable to rural people. The distribution of average monthly expenditures made by the two urban groups is summarized in table 27. The more detailed findings cast light on the level of consumption represented by household expenditures. For example, both groups spent as large a percentage of their food allotment on meat as on bread and flour—an indication of a higher level of consumption than among the fellahin, who eat almost no meat. Of the 291 houses, 69 per cent had electricity, but none of the huts had electricity. In the houses, kerosene was the most commonly used summer fuel and charcoal the most 94 Iraq's People and Resources commonly used winter fuel; among the huts, dung predominated in both seasons. Of the houses, 79 per cent were of burned brick, and 86 per cent were supplied with city water. The huts were by definition constructed of reed mats and mud, and none had plumbing. Of the houses, 38 per cent had radios; no huts were so equipped. It is evident from the findings of the survey that unskilled urban wage earners, even those of recent rural origin, enjoy levels of material welfare significantly higher than those of rural cultivators, a difference which is increased by the availability of free government services in the cities. Among urban wage earners, those who live in houses are primarily of urban origin and have well-established patterns of consumption. They include a number of religious minorities, although most of them are Muslim. The more highly developed skills of these householders, compared with the urban workers who live in huts, result from a handicraft tradi. tion. Properly retrained in new methods of production, they can become a valuable skilled labor force as handicraft production is replaced by more highly mechanized operations. The hut dwellers are of rural origin, having a far lower standard of consumption and level of skill. Engel's law of consumption, which states that the poorer a family the greater the percentage of income spent upon food, is confirmed by the survey's findings. According to table 27, the families living in houses spent 57 per cent of their in- comes on food, while those living in huts spent 66 per cent of a smaller average income, representing a smaller absolute expenditure, on food. Zimmerman's elaboration of Engel's law can be used to distinguish between the fellahin and these two urban groups. At the lower end of the income scale, increments to income may be associated with an increasing proportion of income spent on food as well as with a larger absolute amount. Among Iraq's fellahin, this phenomenon is probable. However low the income, the family must spend something on clothing and a few other necessities. The diet may be so grossly inadequate that almost all of any increment to income will be spent upon more and better food, expenditures on items other than food remaining almost constant. Thus, for example, it is difficult to quantify the benefits from the land distribution program of the Govern- ment of Iraq, for on some projects the clothing, housing, and cash incomes of the settlers do not differ noticeably from those of landless peasants in the same district. Increments to real income have often gone almost entirely into increased home consumption of agricultural products. Zimmerman states that, above a very low income, Engel's principle is valid: additional increments to income result in an increasing amount but a decreasing proportion of the income spent on food. The family has a sufficient quantity of food and divides increased income between greater variety and better quality of food and improvements in other kinds of consumption. In the consumption survey in Baghdad city, the families living in houses divided their larger incomes between better diets—as reflected in absolutely and relatively larger expenditures on meats, fats, vegetables, fruits, and eggs— and larger expenditures on housing, clothing, and other items. The hut dwellers spent smaller percentages of their food budgets upon all foods except cereals, sugar, and tea; this group spent a larger absolute amount on sugar and tea than did those W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, World Population and Production, pp. 269–271. Income and Consumption 95 living in houses, probably because fewer other sources of pleasure and forms of hospitality are available to them. Information concerning the trend in levels of income and consumption in Iraq is scanty and of questionable validity. A cost of living index for the major cities is kept by the Ministry of Economics, but contains substantial bias because it is based upon a consumption survey made in 1939. Consumption patterns have been changing rapidly. Judging by the market basket purchased by unskilled laborers in Baghdad city in 1939, the cost of living multiplied approximately sixfold dur- ing the Second World War. It registered 590 for 1945, rising to a high of 673 in 1948, and falling to 491 in 1950 and 480 in 1954. The trend in wages for unskilled labor is less certain. It is generally agreed that wages did not keep pace with the rising cost of living during the war years. It is certain, however, that general purchasing power has been rising since 1951, the year when the enormously in- creased oil revenues began to enter the economy. Between 1951 and 1954, the Development Board spent an estimated 26,000,000 dinars, some of which un- doubtedly went into inflationary pressures because of specific shortages, but most of which represented increased imports and domestic production. Because of the relatively high propensity to consume, the multiplier effects of these large expendi- tures must be substantial. Casual observation confirms that consumption is rising in the cities and towns. Durable consumer goods such as radios, refrigerators, electric fans, and air coolers have only in recent years become common in middle- class homes. Imported foods in much greater variety and quantity are appearing in the shops. As women discard the black cape which has become a symbol of female inequality, their husbands discover that a Pandora's box of dresses, suits, coats, gloves, purses, and nylon stockings has been opened. In 1951 there were 6,000 private automobiles; in 1954, 14,000. The number of permits granted for new buildings increased from 3,000 in 1951 to 5,600 in 1954." However, at least a part of the additional purchase of material possessions reflects redistribution of ex- penditures—notably a decline in the lavishness of hospitality and perhaps, also, more crowded conditions in housing. As in any process of rapid expansion, some groups have benefited at the expense of others. The level of consumption of the fellahin appears to have remained ap- proximately constant. Landlords living in the cities, exposed to rising standards of consumption, may have made greater demands upon their fellahin; but the lot of fellahin in villages near the cities has improved somewhat because of the labor shortage caused by industrial employment opportunities. Persons on fixed salaries, such as civil servants, have experienced declining purchasing power. Merchants and others with flexible incomes have benefited. EXPLANATION OF CURRENT LEVELS The foregoing pages have depicted a low general level of income in Iraq, however that level is defined and measured. The goatherds and fellahin eking out sub- sistence near the ruins of Ur and Babylon make one reflect upon the causes of 19 Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1954, p. 160. The cost of living index was revised in 1956 and will be run along with the 1939 index for a time. 11 United Nations, Quarterly Bulletin of Economic Development (Beirut), no. 11 (July, 1954), p. 34. 12 Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1954, pp. 148, 198; and 1952, pp. 135, 244. 96 Iraq's People and Resources Iraq's poverty. The wealth of the cities in contrast to the rural areas and the great difference between the urban rich and the urban poor might suggest maldistribu- tion as the explanation. But average annual income probably is not above $150 per capita, indicating that absolute equality in income would not alleviate poverty. No systematic data exist on the distribution of income and ownership of wealth in Iraq. The distribution has had in the past, and probably retains to a significant degree in the present, the shape typical of underdeveloped countries: a large TABLE 28 REVENUES OF IRAQ, FISCAL YEARS 1949–50, 1953–54, AND 1955-56 Per cent of government revenue Source 1949-50 (actual) 1953-54 (actual) 1955-56 (estimated) Import and excise duties..... Import duties Excise duties.. Government's share of oil royaltiesa. Agricultural produce tax (istihlak). Direct taxes. Income and surtax....... Property tax. Stamp duties...................... Public services; registration fees; profits from National Bank of Iraq, companies, and miscellaneous....... Extraordinary revenue.. envuoro Não Total revenue (dinars).......... ............ 28,632,872 47,720,843 50,973,000 SOURCE: United Nations, Quarterly Bulletin of Economic Development, no. 13 (April, 1956), pp. 51-53. & Of oil royalties, 30 per cent enters government budget; 70 per cent goes to Development Board. b From fiscal year 1954-55, a land tax in part replaced the istihlak. number of incomes below the average and a tiny number far above it, with rela- tively small numbers in the intermediate categories. The wealthy in Iraq have probably not been so numerous or so wealthy as those in Egypt, as evidenced by the poverty of Egypt's fellahin and the relatively higher average per capita in- come. Inequality may well increase in the early stages of economic development, because of the concentration of savings and ownership of assets; for, where average income is low, only those already wealthy can save.13 Such concentration can be offset, at least in part, by a redistribution of govern- ment services in favor of the lower income groups. In Iraq, government services have been confined almost completely to urban areas, but realistic plans are being made and carried out to bring schools, public housing, water purification, and medical care to rural regions. The educational system is free through the college level, and entrance and promotion are based upon merit. It is unlikely, however, that government services for lower-income persons will become so extensive as to offset completely the concentrative effects of the ability to save. Moreover, the existing system of taxation is highly regressive. It is apparent from table 28 that even with the present large oil revenues, 30 per cent of which 13 This point is argued by Kuznets in “Economic Growth and Income Inequality,” 'American Economic Review, XLV (March, 1955), 22–23. Iraq's People and Resources WHEAT DENMARK UNITED KINGDOM - IRELAND-- NEW ZEALAND- FRANCE EGYPT -- JAPAN -- ITALY - - CANADA-- GREECE-- TURKEY ARGENTINA-- AUSTRALIA WORLD (ex. U.S.S.R)- U.S.A. - - KENYA — — — MEXICO ISRAEL*- BRAZIL JORDAN* IRAN* INDIA - SYRIA - - - -- IRAQ PAKISTAN - LIT BARLEY 1! la DENMARK IRELAND UNITED KINGDOM — JAPAN — EGYPT- NEW ZEALAND - FRANCE — CANADA U.S.A. — TURKEY — ARGENTINA WORLD (ex. U.S.S.R.)- ITALY -- AUSTRALIA GREECE KENYA SYRIA IRAN IRAQ — JORDAN BRAZIL ISRAEL INDIA MEXICO PAKISTAN RICE (PADDY) SPAIN ITALY AUSTRALIA PORTUGAL- GREECE EGYPT - - - TURKEY- FRANCE ---- YUGOSLAVIA — JAPAN - - ARGENTINA SYRIA U.S.A. - - FORMOSA-- IRAQ - WORLD (ex. U.S.S.R.) MEXICO -- BRAZIL-- PAKISTAN THAILAND — — BURMA — INDIA - CEYLON -- PHILIPPINES VENEZUELA 0 10 20 30 40 100 Kilograms per Hectare 50 60 Fig. 7. Yield per hectare, wheat, barley, and rice, Iraq and selected countries, 1953. SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1954 (Rome, 1955), 1, 21-37. (Asterisk indicates data for 1952.) 100 Iraq's People and Resources done usually by the trampling of animals in southern and central Iraq and by a roller pulled by oxen in the northern hilly regions. The grain is bagged and car- ried, again on backs, to the nearest town. The absence of farm management can be further illustrated by other agricul- tural operations. Livestock are raised with little or no medical attention or special feeding. Beginnings have been made in dairy farming around the largest cities, but the cleanliness of milk products marked "pasteurized” is highly variable. There is no scientific poultry or egg production outside a few experimental and educational institutions. Fruit trees are seldom pruned or protected from insects and disease; as a result, deciduous fruits are of poor quality when they leave the orchard and, because of the absence of grading, poor packing, and transportation difficulties, of even worse quality when they arrive in the market. There is little grading of products for differential prices according to quality, and farmers, trying to increase their pitifully low incomes, frequently shovel dirt into grains and pulses in order to add to the weight. Because of the large size of the agricultural sector of Iraq's economy, low productivity in agriculture greatly depresses the per capita national income. Industrial productivity.—Industrial production has been and remains confined almost entirely to urban areas. According to the Industrial Census of 1954, the three largest cities alone contained one-third of all industrial establishments and employed 56 per cent of all industrial workers, excluding oil production. Three of the four firms outside of oil production employing 1,000 workers or more were located in the environs of Baghdad.' The dualistic nature of Iraq's economy and society is exemplified by the dichotomy between oil production and the remainder of industrial establishments. In 1954 nearly 12,000 workers were employed by the three exporting oil companies, and the largest firm outside of oil production em- ployed less than 3,000. Because of the relatively high degree of mechanization in the oil industry, the gulf between it and the remainder of economy is greatly widened when value of product is considered. The Industrial Census gave 39,000,000 dinars as the total receipts of all industrial establishments other than oil during 1954; the exports of the three oil companies for that same year were estimated by Lord Salter at 136,000,000 dinars." Employing foreign managers and technicians, providing the best technical schools in the country, and offering superior wages and fringe benefits for local labor, the crude oil industry is not typical of production in Iraq. Despite the recent growth of large-scale industry and its conscious encourage- ment in government policy, the majority of industrial enterprises are small and use traditional methods of handwork. In 1954, 45 per cent of Iraq's industrial enterprises other than oil production employed only one worker, and only 1 per cent employed more than twenty workers. The average number of workers per establishment was four; it was highest in Basra and Baghdad liwas (eleven and seven respectively) and lowest in Amara, Kut, and Arbil liwas (less than two 18 Iraq, Report on the Industrial Census of Iraq, 1954. The three largest cities are Basra, Mosul, and “Greater Baghdad”—Baghdad city plus the immediate northern and southern suburbs and the city of Kazimain. The oil industry and the port facilities of Basra are excluded from the data. An industrial establishment was defined as any enterprise producing a product for sale or engaging in maintenance or repair work and having a fixed place of business. 19 Salter, The Development of Iraq, p. 144. Income and Consumption 101 workers). Yet the 1 per cent of enterprises employing twenty or more workers together employed 43 per cent of the industrial labor force. Productive processes in the many tiny enterprises and the few large ones differ in kind rather than in degree. Most small enterprises are worked by male artisans, with an ethnic division of labor and skills passed from father to son. Processes are little mechanized and have not changed much over the centuries. Production is on a small scale, often fulfilling a special order from an individual customer. Because of its relative in- efficiency, with consequent high cost and poor quality, this type of production has difficulty competing with imported equivalents even after high transport costs and customs duties have been added to the price. As standards of consumption rise, the urban Iraqi is rejecting the hand-made article in favor of the mass- produced one. Shoes, textiles, matches, soap, salt, bread, and vegetable oil are among the domestic products recently available in standardized mass-produced form. Still, by their numbers the small establishments remain the typical form of production. The average value of tools and equipment in the 22,460 enterprises outside of oil production enumerated by the census was 700 dinars, or slightly less than $2,000. Average gross horsepower utilized by the machinery was less than nine per establishment. Of the enterprises, 91 per cent were owned by one person and an additional 7 per cent by two partners. Only 97 of the 22,460 enterprises were private limited companies, outnumbered by the 116 government-owned enter- prises. The annual payroll of all the enterprises gave an average of 64 dinars, or $180, to each worker in 1954. If the 8,450 unpaid family workers are excluded, the average is raised to 71 dinars, or approximately $200. Despite high profits to some owners, it is reasonable to assume that average productivity per worker corresponds to his low earnings. A heavy burden of underemployment is carried in under- takings of small and medium size. The most common types of establishment were found to be spinning and weaving, tailoring, metalwork, carpentry, and baking. Operations employing the largest number of workers were spinning and weaving, date packing, tailoring, brickmaking, metalwork, and baking. Of these processes, only spinning and weav- ing and date packing were in part carried out on a large scale in 1954. It is noteworthy that the most important industries in Iraq are those supplying food, clothing, and shelter-evidence of the underdeveloped nature of the economy. Since 1954 a number of new large-scale enterprises have gone into operation, given impetus by the planning agencies which will be discussed in chapter vi. The Daura refinery near Baghdad alone employs an estimated 1,000 workers and is modern and highly mechanized. The coming decades will see major changes in industrial processes in Iraq. At present, however, low per capita industrial produc- tivity contributes to low per capita income. CHAPTER VI ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: POTENTIALITIES AND PROGRAMS “POVERTY and the hunger, disease, and lack of opportunity for self-development that it implies have been the lot of the ordinary people in the underdeveloped countries for centuries past. The new thing is that now this poverty has become a source of active political discontent.” Iraq is more fortunate than countries in which discontent over poverty has grown but resources do not permit increasing per capita consumption, or temporary gains in levels of living are wiped out by population increase. The only persisting basis for rising real income is increased productivity. In Iraq the pace of change can be rapid, making possible a rate of growth of national product in excess of population growth, because of the size of the oil revenues and the decision of the government to turn over the larger por- tion of these revenues to a planning agency entrusted with formulation and execu- tion of an economic development program. The Development Board was created in the face of strong demands from all sides to use the revenues for financing an immediately higher level of consumption. Any criticisms of Iraq's development program must be taken along with the highest commendation of this farsighted and unusual act. Oil REVENUES AND THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD The immediate obstacle to development in most underdeveloped countries is the shortage of funds for capital formation. Therefore oil is the key to Iraq's poten- tialities for rapid economic growth. In the words of the Clapp Mission, "the economic problem of Iraq is one of translating oil revenues into the rehabilitation of the Tigris-Euphrates valley." Iraq's prospects have not always been so favor- able as they are at present. The government was forced to borrow 3,000,000 dinars in order to cover a deficit in its ordinary budget for 1948–49, and 1953 was the first year in which exports other than oil plus oil revenues exceeded imports in value. If the United Nations estimate of Iraq's national income of 1950 150,000,000 dinars—has substantial validity, then oil revenues for 1955 alone amounted to almost half of the entire national income of five years earlier. The 1955 Five-Year Plan of the Development Board calls for spending between 1955 and 1959 an amount equal to twice the national income of 1950. The abrupt change in Iraq's financial position is apparent in table 29, in the acceleration in the growth of both oil production and oil revenues in 1952. Between 1951 an 1952 oil production more than doubled, jumping from 1.6 to 3.3 per cent of the world total. The increase in oil production originated in part from the urging of the Government of Iraq and in part by decision of the inter- national oil companies to expand output after the cessation of Iranian production. The increase was implemented by the opening in 1952 of a thirty-inch pipeline from the Kirkuk fields to the Mediterranean port of Banias, by increased produc- tion at the Kirkuk fields, and by the opening of the Zubair field near Basra in 1951 and its subsequent rapid expansion of production. Four oil producers are 1 Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries, p. 18. : United Nations, Final Report of the Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, p. 36. [ 102 ] Economic Development 103 operating in Iraq, three of which export crude oil. The Iraq Petroleum Company is by far the largest: 79 per cent of the oil produced in 1954 came from its Kirkuk fields. The Basra Petroleum Company, with its Zubair fields, produced 15 per cent of the 1954 output, the Mosul Petroleum Company 4 per cent, and the Khanaqin Oil Company 1 per cent. The Khanaqin field, with its nearby refinery, has operated for domestic consumption only. Its relative importance has been reduced by the opening of the new refinery near Baghdad, which is supplied from Kirkuk. In 1954, 98 per cent of the crude oil produced in Iraq was exported. While oil production doubled between 1951 and 1952, oil revenues trebled. The phenomenal rise in oil revenues is partly the result of increased production, but TABLE 29 OIL PRODUCTION AND OIL REVENUES OF IRAQ, 1948–1955 Oil production Oil revenues (millions of dinars). Year Metric tons (millions) Per cent of world total Total To ordinary budget To Develop- ment Board budget 0.8 2.0 3.5 4.0 3.3 2.0 3.3 5.3 6.2 1.3 6.6 6.7 1948... 1949........... 1950... 1951..... 1952...... 1953.. 1954 1955. ....... ....... 1.6 3.3 21.5 8.1 18.1 27.3 29.6 5.3 13.3 39.4 49.8 68.4 73.7 17.9 34.8 4 7 S... 15.0 ....b 30.0 ....6 0 SOURCES: United Nations, Quarterly Bulletin of Economic Development, no. 13 (April, 1956), p. 47; Iversen, A Report on Monetary Policy in Iraq, p. 92; The Iraq T'imes, January 9, 1956. ► Oil revenues pertain to fiscal years beginning April 1. b Comparable data not available. an even more important stimulus was the 1951 agreement between the Govern- ment of Iraq and the international oil companies. The agreement, signed in 1951, ratified by the Parliament in February, 1952, and retroactive to January 1, 1951, requires the international oil companies to pay the Iraqi government 50 per cent of all profits from oil production. Profits were defined as the difference between the value of crude oil at the point of export from Iraq and the cost of production. However, border values and costs were defined in the agreement in such a way that the government's revenue should not fall below a certain percentage of the value of production at posted prices, and a minimum was set on production such that the revenues should not fall below a certain absolute amount. The method of computing profits was revised in Iraq's favor in March, 1955. The Iraq Petroleum Company had been selling crude oil at a discount under posted prices and deducting the discount as a cost. According to the 1955 agreement, the maximum deduction allowed in the computation of profits, formerly seventeen and a half shillings per ton of Kirkuk crude, was set at two shillings. As a result, the 1954 revenues included a retroactive payment of 10,700,000 dinars. The magnitude of the oil revenues can be understood if they are compared with foreign exchange earnings from domestically produced exports, which are primarily agricultural products: grains and dates composed 76 per cent by value * Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1954, p. 149. 104 Iraq's People and Resources in 1954. (See chap. i, table 3.) Until 1952, exports excluding oil exceeded the oil revenues in value, but by 1954 the oil revenues were almost four times the value of exports other than oil. Were it not for the oil revenues, Iraq's balance of trade would be unfavorable; domestically produced exports were only one- fourth the value of imports in 1954. It would be fallacious to include the value of oil exports along with other exports, because the oil exports do not earn foreign exchange for Iraq except in the form of revenues. Even before the 1951 agreement, certain influential people in the Iraqi govern- ment foresaw that the oil revenues, then still small, could be of greater benefit to the country's economic development if they were spent by a nonpolitical, semi- autonomous agency rather than through ordinary government channels. The De- velopment Board was created in May, 1950, having as its purpose “the develop- ment of the resources of Iraq and the raising of the standard of living of her people.” Although the board was linked to the government through the member- ship of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance, it was stipulated that the six executive members could not be government officials. The nonpolitical nature of the board was specified in the provision of the law that an executive member “shall be deemed to have resigned if he becomes a Minister or an official or a member of the Senate or is elected a Member of Parliament, or if his private interests will directly benefit from the programme and projects of the Board." The board was designed to be semiautomonous; although its over-all plans must be ratified by the Parliament, it keeps its own budget and may initiate many activities without express permission. According to the 1950 law, the Development Board was awarded 100 per cent of the oil revenues. As can be seen in table 29, this provision was never fully enforced. After the 1951 oil agreement, when the potential size of the revenues became apparent, pressure grew to place the administration of the funds under the jurisdiction of a larger group. The law was amended in 1952 to give 70 per cent of the oil revenues to the board and 30 per cent to the ordinary government budget. A subsequent amendment in 1953 distinguished between large "capital development projects,” to be carried out directly by the board, and “small develop- ment projects,” to be carried out by the government departments with funds supplied by the board. Therefore the government's 30 per cent is available for meeting ordinary expenses, which have grown with the increased pace of economic activity. The autonomy of the board was reduced by the 1953 law, which created a Ministry of Development, thus placing its employees under civil service and adding a third cabinet member, the Minister of Development, to the board. Al- though this revision had certain desirable features, such as facilitating coördina- tion of parallel or overlapping projects of the board and the ministries, it has lessened the board's efficiency by requiring adherence to traditional administra- tive procedures and has obstructed the recruitment of skilled personnel because of the inadequacy of government salaries. • Law no. 23 for 1950; see Iraq, Compilation of Laws Concerning the Development Board. See also Habermann, "The Iraq Development Board: Administration and Program," Middle East Journal, IX (Spring, 1955), 179–186; and Iversen, A Report on Monetary Policy in Iraq, chap. v. 5 Law no. 6 for 1952. * Law no. 27 for 1953. Economic Development 105 Planning has been made difficult by the continual increase in oil revenues—a difficulty which any country would be happy to encounter-requiring the con- tinual upward revision of projected expenditures. The first Five-Year Plan for 1951–1956, which sanctioned a total expenditure of 65,800,000 dinars, or an average of 13,000,000 dinars a year, was revised in 1952 into a Six-Year Plan for 1951–1957, which sanctioned a total expenditure of 155,400,000 dinars, or an average of 26,000,000 dinars a year. Another Five-Year Plan was passed in 1955, TABLE 30 PROJECTED EXPENDITURES BY THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD OF IRAQ, 1955-1961 Category Dinars (Millions) Per cent of total Irrigation, drainage, flood control.. Transportation and communication ... Roads Railways.. Bridges. Airports. ..... Port.. Industry, mining, electrification ...... Buildings. .... Housing.... Public buildings.... Medical centers... Educational buildings........ Resorts and rest houses........ Land reclamation, agricultural and livestock improvement, wells. Small development projects of government departments..... Administration and research. ......... tion and research..................................... 153.8 122.9 63.7 24.9 22.9 7.4 4.0 67.1 61.9 24.1 20.9 10.0 4.3 2.6 14.3 61.3 7.0 ܟܐ ܬ ܘ ܗ ܘ ܒܬ ܝܢ ܛ ܚ ܗ ܛ ܒܨ ܝܕ ܝܕ ܚ ܟ ܝܢ Total.............................. 488.3 SOURCES: The Iraq Times, April 30, 1958; and Ministry of Development. proposing an expenditure of 304,300,000 dinars, an average of 61,000,000 dinars a year. This plan was revised in 1956 into a Six-Year Plan for 1955–1961, involving 488,300,000 dinars, including the 46,600,000 that had been spent during 1955, an average of 81,000,000 dinars a year over the six-year period.' The recent Six-Year Plan is outlined in table 30. The recommendation that irrigation, drainage, and flood control should receive the largest single share of the funds was made by the International Bank Mission as well as by subsequent advisers and is carried through the latest plans. Trans- portation rightly comes next, as it, unlike industry, cannot conceivably be financed and planned by private enterprise. Industrial development receives a smaller but significant share. The only major category of consumption-like expenditures, buildings, is an essential part of Iraq's economic development. Housing, schools, and medical institutions are necessary for the morale and efficiency of the labor force, and public buildings will contribute to national pride. The much smaller allocation to the improvement of agricultural productivity can be sufficient if ? Law no. 35 for 1951, Law no. 25 for 1952, Law no. 43 for 1955; The Iraq Times (Baghdad), April 30, 1956. 106 Iraq's People and Resources effectively used and accompanied by appropriate policies with respect to rural institutions. The "small development projects" to be carried out by various government departments will cut across all other categories of expenditure. Projected expenditures have been based more upon expected revenues than upon the rate at which the mobilization of resources could realistically be expected to proceed—a fact indicated by the failure of the Development Board to spend the amount sanctioned in any year thus far. For each of the fiscal years 1951-52, 1952–53, and 1953–54, less than half of the appropriation was spent. In 1955–56 three-fourths of the appropriation of the 1955–1959 plan was spent. The sizable sterling balances which have resulted from the board's failure to disburse all its funds protected the development program from substantial curtailment after the Suez crisis of November, 1956. Oil exports temporarily dropped when the pipeline through Syria was cut at the same time that the canal was closed, but the board's plans and commitments suffered surprisingly little modification. Recognizing the need for technical assistance in over-all planning as well as in implementing specific projects, the Government of Iraq invited the Interna- tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development to send a study mission in 1951. Its report, published in 1952, is a comprehensive survey of existing economic conditions and resources for development as well as a catalogue of recommenda- tions. Since 1952, two additional over-all surveys have been made: one by three Danish monetary experts headed by Carl Iversen, made in 1952–53 and published in 1954; and the study made by Lord Salter in 1954 and published in 1955. A number of studies on specialized aspects of the development program have been carried out--for example, the Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy survey of irrigation needs and potentialities, and the Arthur D. Little Company survey of industrial possibilities. It is outside the scope of the present work to compare their findings and recommendations. The important point is that no internally con- sistent development plan, complete with priorities, has yet evolved from these studies. The projected expenditures of the Development Board reflect the adoption of specific points made by the advisers and the pressures of interests within and outside the country. Projects based upon unsound planning (or the absence of planning), while they do employ hitherto unemployed labor and generate new income, have several harmful effects. First, although the supply of oil revenues may appear inexhaustible, certain resources, particularly skilled and semiskilled labor, are in short supply, and it is unfortunate to waste them when they could be helping to raise the productivity of the economy. Second, wasteful projects lend substance to the claims made by irresponsible political elements that the Develop- ment Board exists only to channel the oil revenues into the coffers of the wealthy. Actually, the board has learned much in its first years of operation and has already made some significant achievements, the more important of which will be men- tioned later in this chapter. But Iraq is discovering that unlimited capital is only a partial substitute for modern social and economic institutions as means of mobil- izing resources to alleviate poverty. Technicians, advisers, machinery, and build- ing materials can be imported, but impartial and effective administration and institutions which encourage and teach efficient work habits cannot be imported International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq; Iversen, op. cit.; Salter, The Development of Iraq. Economic Development 107 and can be developed only slowly at best. Over-all plans, to be effective, must give immediate attention to these intangible requisites of economic development. AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT There is general agreement among those who have studied Iraq's economy that its major potential for development lies in agriculture. The International Bank Mission concluded, “Aside from oil, water and land may be said to be the principal natural resources of Iraq.” Although estimates vary, it is believed that the area under cultivation can be approximately doubled as the irrigation projects are carried out. The International Bank Mission held that "In the rain-fed zone the area under cultivation could theoretically be more than doubled; and in the irrigation zone it could be almost tripled.”10 The consulting engineers Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy envision a 70 per cent increase in cultivated land if their recommendations concerning irrigation and drainage are carried out. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency more optimistically projected a 90 per cent increase in cropped land be- tween 1955 and 1975." The more intensive cultivation of presently cropped land is of even greater potential importance than the geographic expansion of cultivation. Present meth- ods of cultivation are extensive and inefficient, legacies of a period when land was plentiful relative to population size. Perpetuation of extensive cultivation has been encouraged by the absence of a land tax. Almost half of the land in agricul. tural holdings lies fallow in winter and far more than half during the summer. Soil experts believe that the fallow system, supposed to restore the fertility of the soil, is actually harmful in areas in which salination is a problem, as it is in much of the irrigation zone. Certainly capital improvements such as irrigation, drain- age, leaching out salt, leveling the land, and providing roads and utilities are far costlier than they would be if the land were farmed more intensively. Water is the essential ingredient for extension as well as intensification of cul- tivation. At present much of the water of the Twin Rivers is wasted, entering the permanent marshes or flowing into the Persian Gulf. The rivers, flowing from north to south and originating in winter rain and snow, are characterized by extreme annual variation in flow. Each reaches its minimum in September. The Tigris, the larger of the two rivers, reaches its maximum in April, the Euphrates in May—too late to be of optimum use in winter crops and too early for use in summer irrigation. Wasteful irrigation is encouraged by the plethora of water when it is available, while the area in summer crops is restricted by water short- age. The variations in flow, together with the flatness characteristic of the alluvial plain, have produced periodic floods throughout Iraq's history. The obvious needs are storage facilities to prevent floods and to make water available in summer, and irrigation facilities to carry the water to land under cultivation. A drainage net- work, physically less impressive than dams, barrages, and canals, is of equal im- portance, for the salt which accumulates in the soil through irrigation must be International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, op. cit., p. 136. Iversen, op. cit., p. 177, and Salter, op. cit., chap. ii, agree. 10 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, op. cit., p. 137. 11 Iraq, Development of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, pp. 4–5; United Nations, Quarterly Bulletin of Economic Development (Beirut), no. 11 (July, 1954), p. 1. Economic Development 109 properly planned and managed resettlement schemes."'? Four hypothetical condi- tions are posited by the engineers. Condition 1 is the cultivation of 8,000,000 acres under the present system which allows 30 per cent of this acreage to lie fallow each year and devotes 39 per cent to grains and 20 per cent to roads, canals, and utilities. Condition 2 is the presently cultivated 8,000,000 acres farmed in the same way but with the addition of drainage facilities, which would raise crop yields. Condition 3 maintains the same cultivation of the 8,000,000 acres as under condition 2, but adds 5,600,000 acres of arable land cultivated on the basis of modern diversified and intensive methods “including crop rotation, improved methods of cultivation and irrigation, [and] livestock management.” The engi- neers determined that it was unrealistic to project such methods for all the arable land because of the shortage of water. Therefore condition 4 assumes that 5,600,000 of the 8,000,000 acres now cultivated, in addition to the 5,600,000 brought under cultivation, are farmed as described under condition 3. Net farm income, exclusive of production costs other than labor, under condition 2 was computed to be less than twice that of condition 1. For condition 3, net farm income was almost five times, and for condition 4, almost seven times, that of condition 1.' In summary, achievement of Iraq's agricultural potential requires that farmers utilize different methods of cultivation. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that irrigation works without major changes in farming practices will not bring the increase in agri- cultural productivity envisioned by the planners. Recognition of the importance of land tenure to agricultural development is reflected in the Miri Sirf land development program," instituted more than a decade ago. Although title to much of the land in Iraq is as yet unsettled, it is estimated that more than 90 per cent of all land is under some form of government tenure. Ownership in fee simple is confined mostly to urban areas. The cultivated portions of government lands are farmed by individuals under a variety of tenures. More than half of the total land surface in Iraq is Miri Sirf, or purely government land, much of it potentially cultivable if irrigation were provided. The govern- ment has been able to institute land reform by distributing Miri Sirf lands which are newly opened to cultivation by irrigation projects, thereby avoiding some of the objections of tribal sheikhs who understandably would resent relinquishing their customary domains. A potentially important move toward the creation of a class of small owner- operators was made in 1945, when the government established the Dujaila land settlement project, one hundred twenty-five miles southeast of Baghdad. The com- pletion of the Kut barrage in 1939 and the postwar construction of the Dujaila canal made possible the irrigation of nearly 250,000 acres of hitherto uncultivated land with Tigris water. The sheikhs of the region, indignant that fellahin should be given land at all, were placated by a grant of more than half of this new land and perpetual water rights for it. Since 1946 the remaining land has been divided 12 Iraq, Development of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, pp. 25–26. This publication is an abridg- ment of the detailed report. 13 Ibid., pp. 4-5 and plates 3-8. Production cost does not include labor cost, since it is assumed that family labor is used. 1 For descriptions of the Miri Sirf program, see Adams, “The Land Development Program in Iraq with Special Reference to the Dujaila Settlement, 1945 to 1954”; Ali, Land Reclamation and Settlement in Iraq; Ali, “Miri Sirf Land Development in Iraq," International Social Science Bulletin, V (1953), 713–717; Burns, “The Dujaylah Land Settlement,” Middle East Journal, V (Summer, 1951), 362–366. 110 Iraq's People and Resources into plots of 62.5 acres and distributed to some 1,300 settler families chosen from among 50,000 applicants. Certain requirements were laid down regarding the way in which land was to be used: the settler must live on his land, having no outside employment, must build a house according to general specifications, and must diversify his crops in a specified way. If a settler complies with the regulations for ten years, he will obtain title to the land, but he may not sell or mortgage it for another ten years. Many problems have arisen since the Dujaila project was established. The most serious physical problem has been the increasing salinity of the soil, reducing crop yields and even necessitating the abandonment of some lands. Although this con- dition has been recognized for more than a decade, only recently have steps been taken to provide suitable drainage. Agricultural credit, necessary to the small proprietor if he is to raise his level of living, has not been generally available to Dujaila settlers. A law of 1946 au- thorized the Agricultural Bank to lend settlers up to 100 dinars at a maximum of 7 per cent interest per annum, but four years later only about one-quarter of the settlers had received loans. Others remain in the grasp of moneylenders and pay a much higher rate of interest. Moreover, the credit that was extended by the Agricultural Bank was unsupervised, and some of it resulted in unproductive expenditures. Many settlers, having realized their lifelong ambition to be pro- prietors of land, used the loans to acquire the marks of their new status: another wife, a horse, and a gun. Furthermore, about two-thirds of the settlers have taken on “assistant farmers”—often a relative and his family—who actually perform the labor and receive half of the crop or less. The settler, while living on his land as the law requires, thereby escapes manual labor and enhances his social status. Traditional methods of cultivation have necessarily been followed in the ab- sence of instruction in improved methods. The requirements in regard to diversi- fication of crops have been widely disregarded, particularly the stipulation that vegetables be grown. Several cooperatives, established by the government to mar- ket the crops and provide agricultural machinery, went out of existence because of mismanagement, lack of financial supervision, and failure to educate the mem- bers in the principles of coöperation. Despite these and many other difficulties, as compared to fellahin the settlers and even their “assistant farmers” are less ragged, are better nourished, and live in better mud huts. While crop yields and farm incomes are difficult to assess, most visitors have the impression that they are somewhat higher than among the fellahin living near the Dujaila project. Schools and clinics established by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization as a training center have had some impact upon the way of life there. The least tangible differ- ence between the settlers and fellahin is perhaps the most important: the settlers have a spirit of self-determination and hope for the future. Since 1951 six additional Miri Sirf projects have been established in various parts of the country on lands newly brought under irrigation. In 1953 an esti- mated 1,250 families were settlers on these other projects, in addition to 1,300 at Dujaila—a total of 2,550 families, representing about 2 per cent of the 125,045 agricultural holdings enumerated by the Census of Agriculture of 1952–53. Not only is the number of persons affected very small, but the auxiliary services neces- Economic Development 111 sary to turn fellahin into successful owner-operators have not been available on a significant scale. Credit, farm supervision, and drainage are slowly being intro- duced on the newer projects, but shortage of trained field personnel and admin- istrative bottlenecks limit the scope of all activities. Hence the Miri Sirf land development program has had little impact as yet upon the dominant form of land tenure in Iraq or upon over-all agricultural productivity. If the program is vigor- ously pursued, it can have a profound effect upon agricultural institutions. If not, the presently dominant form of land tenure may spread into the lands brought under cultivation as the irrigation works are completed. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT It is understandable that countries undergoing economic development should wish to encourage the growth of industry. In countries in which a relatively high per- centage of the labor force is engaged in manufacture and production is highly mechanized, the working class is relatively prosperous. However, the relationship between industrialization and high per capita income is complex. In the United States, mechanization is a result as well as a cause of workers' prosperity. Be- cause of the chronic labor shortage which has existed, machines have been sub- stituted for men in many operations in which such substitution would be economi- cally impossible elsewhere in the world. Some totalitarian countries have financed rapid industrialization by depressing consumption, with the result that the indus- trialization process has not necessarily been accompanied by the elimination of poverty. In contrast, Denmark and the Netherlands have achieved high levels of income based in large part upon efficient, scientific agriculture. Prosperity results from the concentration of resources in the production of products in which a country is relatively efficient, using scientific, as opposed to traditional, processes. Relative prices must be taken into account in the choice between different propor- tions of technologically substitutable factors. If either the choice of product or the choice of factor proportions is strongly influenced by noneconomic considera- tions, the productive process may fulfill noneconomic needs but will not alleviate poverty. An underdeveloped country may import iron ore, coal, and all the plant, equipment, and skilled personnel necessary for a highly mechanized steel mill. This may enhance national prestige, and foreign advisers should not de- nounce it as foolish, but the country will be disappointed if it places its hopes for rising per capita real income in such projects. However, consideration of factor prices and technical input-output relationships is not sufficient for a country desiring to utilize its resources to achieve optimal economic development. The prices received for exports on the world market must be considered also. On the whole, the terms of trade have been adverse for pro- ducers of primary products. The result has been that underdeveloped countries have helped to pay for the increasing prosperity of workers in highly developed countries, through the relative prices of primary products and manufactured goods. This trend may be reversed in the future, as pressure of world population on food supplies increases, and former primary producers such as India and Japan enter the world market with their manufactured goods." In the past the terms of 15 Salter, op. cit., pp. 16–17, believes that the terms of trade are becoming less unfavorable for primary producers, Singer, on the other hand, sees increasing inequality between developed and underdeveloped countries:'"Economic Progress in Underdeveloped Countries," Social Research, XVI (March, 1949), 3-4. 112 Iraq's People and Resources trade may have supplied a rational argument for industrialization. Whether or not this argument loses some of its force, it is intelligent for underdeveloped countries at least to diversify their products and to enter production of those manufactured articles or processed primary products for which some comparative advantage exists. The population argument for industrialization has validity in countries of high population density with little undeveloped agricultural resources, as in Egypt, where rising per capita income requires a certain amount of industrialization in order to employ the increasing numbers for whom there is no land. This argument has little application to Iraq. There is already a shortage of farm labor in many regions, and the development program calls for more intensive cultivation of a larger area of land. The people in many small countries, remembering times of acute shortage when countries normally supplying them with necessities were at war, desire industrial- ization for self-sufficiency. Yet self-sufficiency is impossible at the level of living which Iraq's people desire. The country's most valuable resource, oil, loses its value unless it is sold abroad. The aggregate of goods and services entering the national income will be greater if the foreign exchange earned by oil is spent on importing goods which could be produced domestically only at high cost, and if domestic resources are concentrated on products which can be produced with relative efficiency. Certain raw materials important to the achievement of a high degree of indus- trialization are unavailable in significant quantities in Iraq: notably timber, coal, and metallic ores. The cost of importing these in their raw state is so great that manufactured articles produced from them could not compete on the world mar- ket. Another essential ingredient of rapid industrialization, a skilled and disci- plined labor force, is in short supply. Former artisans make excellent industrial laborers with a minimum of retraining, but they have never composed a large pro- portion of the population. The degree to which truly rural people can lack me- chanical skills is almost incomprehensible to the urban-bred American, who was given his first mechanical toy when he was a baby, who as a small child watched his mother use a washing machine and his father change a tire, who learned how to follow directions so early that he thinks he was born with the ability, and who in the course of everyday life handles telephones, venetian blinds, automatic vend- ing machines, automobiles, and a thousand other contrivances. He may not regard these actions as industrial training, but without them it would take much longer to make him a skilled mechanic. This is not to imply that Iraq's rural people can- not enter industry; a trip through Baghdad's factory and workshop sectors would convince one that they can and do become good industrial laborers. However, na- tional prosperity will be enhanced by emphasis on teaching agricultural people better ways of doing what they are already doing, especially because of the large proportion of oil revenues being devoted to extension of land under cultivation. The spread of primary education and the availability of practical technical schools will gradually enlarge the skilled labor force. The Development Board has wisely chosen to sponsor industries which utilize domestic raw materials and the products of which can be absorbed by the domestic market. One of the important achievements thus far has been the completion of Economic Development 113 an 11,000,000-dinar oil refinery at Daura, near Baghdad, in November, 1955, sup- plied by a twelve-inch pipeline from the Kirkuk oilfields. All of Iraq's rapidly in- creasing petroleum needs, except aviation gasoline, can be domestically supplied in the foreseeable future. Several cement plants and a bitumen refinery, built with oil revenues, are in operation to use domestic raw materials. Iraq's most promising undeveloped industrial resource is the natural gas produced in con- junction with oil, at present burned off and wasted. Familiar sights at the Kirkuk oilfields are the fires of the “degassing stations,” modern and brighter counterparts TABLE 31 ACTIVITIES OF THE INDUSTRIAL BANK OF IRAQ, 1947-1954 Loans (dinars) 1947 to end of 1952-53 fiscal year 1953-54 fiscal year ...... 504 1,429,000 2,840 181 734,000 4,060 10 Total number of loans.. Total amount loaned.. Average size of loan... Loans to companies Number of loans..., Amount loaned.......... Average size of loan.... Total capital of companies.......... Average participation of the Bank Loans to individuals Number of loans.. Amount loaned.. Average size of loan...... 1, 244,000 124,400 5,075,000 245,000 81,670 850,000 29% 25% .......... 494 185,000 370 178 489,000 2,750 SOURCE: Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1954, pp. 134-135. of the nearby Eternal Fires into which Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego were cast. Many chemical products could be produced from the gas, the most important being ammonium sulfate fertilizer. Gypsum, the other ingredient necessary for the fertilizer, is found in significant quantities near the oilfields. A chemical in- dustry utilizing the natural gas received half of the 44,000,000 dinar allocation for industry, mining, and electricity in the Five-Year Plan of 1955, which indi. cates that the Development Board intends to take action on a large scale. A cotton spinning and weaving plant at Mosul, built with Development Board funds, was nearing completion in mid-1956. Sugar plants sufficient to fulfill domestic require- ments were being planned. Sugar beet culture will aid in the diversification of agriculture in northern Iraq. The Industrial Bank is a second agency responsible for initiating and financing industry. It was established in 1940 under the Ministry of Finance with a capital of 500,000 dinars, but did not begin operations until after 1946. In 1950 its capital was raised to 1,000,000 dinars, in 1952 to 3,000,000 dinars, and in 1956 to 8,000,000 dinars. Its operations are small compared to those of the Development Board, but are important to Iraq's economic development. Because of the absence of a capital market, the Industrial Bank is the only major institution to which individuals or companies may appeal for funds. The Bank is empowered to make loans for the purchase or improvement of plant and equipment and for supplying short-term Economic Development 115 The classification of factories and dams as “investment" and health, housing, and educational facilities as “consumption” is somewhat arbitrary, for human beings not only are the ends of economic activity but also are resources capable of development. Iversen went so far as to assert in his report that improvements in health, education, nutrition, and housing would probably pay for themselves in increased labor productivity." Some amelioration of the conditions of life of the labor force, particularly in rural areas, is essential to the development of Iraq's unused resources. The danger in most countries seeking rapid economic development originates in the popular pressure to spend all the development funds for these consumption-like items, which, although necessary, do not alone bring the increased productivity necessary to eliminate poverty. Iraqis are in the happy position of being able to eat their cake and have it too. Wisely expended to con- serve factors in short supply, the oil revenues are sufficient to build houses and dams both on a large scale and at the same time. Projects having an immediate effect upon levels of living are desirable not only because of their impact upon labor productivity but also for political reasons. Centuries of foreign rule administered by selfish governors have made the people of Iraq skeptical of government promises. The inhabitants of Baghdad cannot see the dams and rural roads under construction, but they can see government officials riding in new automobiles; propaganda organs in opposition to the government are ever ready to help them conclude the worst. An official of the Development Board reported upon a visit to a number of Kurdish villages scheduled for sub- mersion within a year under water backed up behind the Dokan dam. They had had several years' warning and offers of help in resettling. When the official asked village leaders what plans they had made for moving, they replied, “None. We do not think the government will ever finish the dam.” Lord Salter, recognizing the distrust of the Development Board among certain segments of the population, recommended “substantial expenditure of a kind which will bring quick and clearly visible benefits."'18 The desirability of meeting the immediate needs of the general population is recognized by the Development Board. The projected expenditure for housing, 6,000,000 dinars in the Five-Year Plan formulated in 1955, was raised to 24,000,000 dinars in the plan of 1956. The board envisions building 30,000 houses between 1956 and 1960. Attention is being given first to the acute shortage of housing for lower-class laborers in the largest cities and to housing for personnel of a number of indus- trial plants under construction outside the main cities. During the coming five years, however, the housing plan calls for building in all parts of the country, housing those presently living in mud and reed huts as well as urban slums. The extremely low level of income of these groups, the large scale of the program, and shortages of labor and construction materials necessitate departure from conven- tional building methods. In 1956 the Development Board began an experimental program designed to encourage the development of labor-saving methods of con- struction and the use of new building materials. Tenders were let for five hundred experimental houses, to be built in groups of twenty or thirty by each contractor. 17 Iversen, op. cit., p. 70. 18 Salter, op. cit., p. 37. 116 Iraq's People and Resources The architectural design but not the method of construction nor the materials to be used were specified in the tenders. In rural areas, materials will be supplied and the labor of underemployed rural people will be used in order to minimize the cost of their houses. Very little had been attempted in public housing until the formulation of this recent plan. A few hundred houses near Baghdad city, built by the Ministry of Social Affairs, are occupied by junior government officials and laborers not of the lowest class—that is, people who would otherwise live in crowded sections in old multifamily dwellings. Many of the government departments have their own hous- ing programs for their employees. Most cities and towns have housing for teachers TABLE 32 ENROLLMENT IN GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS OF IRAQ, 1930–1954 Primary schools Secondary schoolgt Year Enrollment Per cent of girls Enrollment Per cent of girls 35,000 20 1930–31. 1931-32. 1953-54. 10 3,000 35,000 258,000 SOURCES: Iraq, Report of the Educational Inquiry Commission; United Nations, Com- pulsory Education in Iraq; Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1964, pp. 58-60. * First through sixth years. o Seventh through eleventh years. and for railway employees. The Mortgage Bank was established in 1948 for the purpose of financing private building, but, because the loans are limited to 60 per cent of the value of the property and must be repaid within eight years, lending has necessarily been restricted to middle- and upper-class people. The new plan of the Development Board is the first attempt to house the sizable sector of the population now living in dwellings which cannot be classified as houses. It is essen- tial that such a program reach the rural areas as well as the cities and towns, or else the stream of rural-to-urban migration may be turned into a flood. Remarkable progress has been made in education since Iraq became a nation. Under the Ottoman regime, schooling was available only to wealthy males. Since the end of the First World War it has reached the middle class and even some in the lower class, and the percentage of females in the schools has increased despite doubling and redoubling of total enrollment. Expansion of education did not await the growth of oil revenues; however, schools established in old houses and even in mud or reed huts are now being replaced by modern buildings financed by oil revenues. The compulsory education law of 1940, which requires six years of school for each child wherever facilities are available, has had no need of en- forcement, for classrooms are filled to overflowing just as quickly as teachers can be trained to staff them. Table 32 indicates the phenomenal increase in enrollment in government primary and secondary schools since Iraq's independence. In 1950 an estimated 23 per cent of children of primary school age were attend- ing school. The percentage has grown since that time. Progress in bringing pri- mary schools to villages and small towns has been especially notable. Although remote areas, such as the mountains and marshes, have scarcely been touched by Economic Development 117 education, the more densely populated agricultural regions are rapidly receiving schools. Where possible, a woman teacher is provided for girls. Where one is not available, the few villagers who strongly desire their daughters to be educated are breaking down the tradition of segregation of the sexes which is still dominant in Iraqi primary schools. Secondary schools, which are found in urban areas only, remain completely segregated. Institutions of higher education and special schools have grown also. In the academic year 1953–54 there were approximately 5,000 students divided among eleven colleges. Although the vast majority of college students are men, the col- leges of law, commerce and economics, arts and science, medicine, pharmacy, den- tistry, engineering, and secondary school teacher training are coeducational. There is a special liberal arts college for women; the agricultural and police colleges are limited to men students. In 1947-48 approximately 4,000 students were registered in eight colleges; the colleges of arts and science, agriculture, and dentistry had not been established at that time. A student may enter one of the special schools before he completes the eleven years of primary and secondary education required for entrance into the colleges. Among these are schools of agriculture, domestic arts, nursing, the primary teachers' training schools for men and for women, and technical schools. With the exception of private schools, all education in Iraq is free of charge, even in the colleges and special schools. As attendance at institutions of higher education often involves living away from home, not only tuition but also board and lodging, medical care, clothing, and travel between the student's home and the school are provided at government expense. Admission to the colleges is based upon scholastic record and proportional representation from the various liwas. Promo- tion from one level to the next depends upon passing public examinations, which are uniform throughout the country. The first public examination comes at the end of the sixth year of primary school, and the substantial percentage of students who fail may try again the next year, enter a special school open to primary school graduates, or discontinue their education. The examination at the end of the eleventh year is a real hurdle, and entrance into the college of the student's choice depends in large part upon his score in this examination. The educational system is highly centralized. The Ministry of Education in Baghdad is in charge of appointment, promotion, and dismissal of teachers, found- ing and financial support of schools, determination of curriculum and textbooks, teacher training, and formulation and grading of examinations. Courses of study as well as examinations are, with a few exceptions, uniform throughout the coun- try. Even the curriculum of private schools is influenced by the public examina- tions, which the students must pass to obtain a certificate to enter a college. Defects in the educational system are the result in part of this high degree of centralization and in part of the rapidity with which the system has expanded. The curriculum is determined in urban areas and has little reference to rural needs. It may well prove that the education of the present generation of rural school children is making them singularly unfit to be fellahin. As early as 1932, the Monroe Commission advised that rural schools turn their attention to increas- ing agricultural productivity, raising standards of health, teaching coöperation, 118 Iraq's People and Resources and educating girls in domestic arts and sciences.Little has been done to carry out this recommendation, although a few hours a week are devoted to "object les- sons and hygiene” and “moral and civic duties” in all primary schools. A further problem is that neither rural nor urban education is directed toward practical goals. Emphasis is upon memorization with little development of under- standing and judgment and almost no learning by doing. Rules of Arabic gram- mar are commonly memorized without practice in their use. A graduate of the College of Commerce who has studied accounting may have had almost no prac- tice in it and therefore may be incapable of keeping simple business accounts without further training. A poorly trained teacher finds it easier to read a lecture and require the students to memorize it than to use demonstration and discussion. In the present emergency, primary school teachers are not required to be grad- uates of secondary schools, but the government hopes to remedy this situation. Moreover, visual aids, laboratories, and workshops are more costly than ordinary classrooms, desks, and textbooks. The government has been forced to balance qual- ity against quantity of education, and the clamor continues for ever more schools. However, there is a cultural reason for the poor quality of the educational sys- tem—the tradition that learning means memorizing and that a scholar must not work with his hands. Until recently it has been considered hardly scholarly even to memorize facts relating to practical subjects such as engineering. Higher educa- tion in Iraq illustrates the warning of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that technical assistance in education must not serve to “increase the number of holders of law and liberal arts degrees in an economy which ... (is) already sur- feited with frustrated intellectuals and which needs plumbers and mechanics."> The Arab preference for rhetoric over action has deep roots. Before secular schools were established, education consisted largely of memorizing the Quran and argu- ing its interpretation, under Muslim schoolmasters. The love of language for its own sake goes back to nomadic days, when memorization was the only way in which the beautiful poetry could be carried from one generation to the next. Freya Stark vividly describes a girls' school in Baghdad in 1931: A new word would thrill the whole class, from the teacher down to the youngest there. They loved it for its own sake; they would contemplate it with pleasure on the blackboard and remember it the day after: and I would think of the tribes of Islam many centuries ago, marching behind their rival poets, listening to the glittering alternative word-play as they rode, and shouting ap- plause. It is a curious trait, this abstract love of language, independently of meaning or purpose: it has made Arabic immensely rich and magnificent, a great organ sounding in empty spaces for its own pleasure alone.21 The rapid economic change of the past few years is forcing a degree of prag. matism into education in Iraq. There has been a recent trend toward fundamental education—the term coined by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization for practical training in literacy, agricultural methods, hygiene, domestic science, and citizenship. Throughout the country, night primary schools and literacy centers are in operation, staffed mostly by primary school teachers who wish to supplement their incomes. An estimated 14,000 persons were 19 The report of the Monroe Commission is contained in Iraq, Report of the Educational Inquiry Commission. Other works on education in Iraq include United Nations, Compulsory Education in Iraq; Matthews and Akrawi, Education in Arab Countries of the Near East. 20 U. S. Congress, Technical Assistance and Related Programs, p. 8. 21 Stark, Baghdad Sketches, pp. 56, 58. Obstacles 121 place. The problem becomes one of planning the direction of investment in order to initiate a process of cumulative economic expansion. If the revenues are spent in ways that will develop both profitable investment outlets and other sources of investment funds, productivity can continue to rise even after the oil reserves are depleted or even if oil declines in importance as a fuel. Professor Langley warns: There is serious danger that the oil royalties will be used to finance development projects that will ... raise national income and nothing more. If this happens population growth will soon absorb the increased output as it has done in Egypt. If this Malthusian result is to be avoided the oil royalties must be used as a fulcrum by means of which national income can be levered not only to a higher level but to a higher level from which it will continue to grow.2 Foreign exchange earned through oil or trade of other commodities is one of four sources of funds upon which an economy can draw to finance its development. A second source, foreign capital obtained by loan or gift, presents the same prob- lem as oil revenues: it raises national income, but whether it serves to develop further sources of investment funds depends upon how it is invested. Foreign investment in the private sector of Iraq's economy has been large in the petroleum industry but insignificant elsewhere. The government has borrowed relatively small amounts of investment funds from abroad: the largest single amount was $12,800,000 loaned by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- ment for the Wadi Tharthar project. Free assistance from abroad, rendered primarily by the United States and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, has for the most part been limited to providing technicians. International assist- ance agencies have wished to conserve their resources for nations suffering from acute shortage of investment funds. Involuntary domestic savings are a third source of development funds, arising primarily from taxation and borrowing. Some governments have resorted to note issue as a way of extracting savings, but inflation is the usual result. As we have seen (chap. v), Iraq's taxation system is narrow and regressive. During the fiscal year 1953–54, surtax and income tax were payable from only 24,319 indi- viduals and 195 companies; the amount they paid represented only 5 per cent of government revenue.' In 1956 the income tax rates were lowered in an attempt to ease the tax burden of the urban lower and middle classes. As the tax base was not widened, a reduction in the total amount collected can be anticipated. Aside from the government's share of oil revenues, taxes affecting the income and con- sumption of the poor are the major sources of government revenue. The incomes of the poorer classes are too low to provide an important source of funds for investment; furthermore, taxing this group has deleterious effects upon consumer demand and incentive to work. Government borrowing has not played an im- portant part in public finance in Iraq. In 1953 the total domestic public debt amounted to only 5,000,000 dinars, or less than one dinar per capita. Attempts to sell bonds to the general public in order to combat inflation have failed because of the high propensity to consume, and the lack of faith in the government. Monetary policy has been as ineffectual as fiscal policy. The power of the central bank, the National Bank of Iraq, in exercising monetary policy is restricted by 1 Langley, "Oil Royalties and Economic Development in the Middle East," Middle East Eco- nomic Papers, 1954, p. 97. · Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1954, pp. 124, 291. 122 Iraq's People and Resources institutional deficiencies. It may rediscount commercial papers, but has little control over private banks because of the high degree of liquidity they customarily maintain. Moreover, government accounts, including the 30 per cent of oil rev- enues not given to the Development Board, are not handled by the National Bank of Iraq but by another public institution, the Rafidain Bank, which operates for a profit. Voluntary domestic savings remain as the source of funds necessary in a process of cumulative economic expansion. According to Professor Langley, “Unless the level of domestic saving can be increased, very little lasting benefit can be obtained by the Middle Eastern peoples from their oil wealth.” At present private savings in Iraq are not normally available for investment. There is no capital market, for the idea of investing for an assured return of a small percentage over a period of years does not interest those with potentially loanable funds. Simple people, un- familiar with banking systems and distrustful of the government, would discount highly any money turned over to an impersonal institution in return for a stock, a bond, or a passbook. Desiring security, they hoard their savings in the form of currency or precious metals. Those who wish enhancement of social status as well as security purchase, but do not necessarily develop, agricultural land. Those who wish to profit from their savings speculate in urban real estate or engage in trade or usury; until recently, and to a large extent today, they have had good reason to demand personal control over any enterprise in which they invest and a quick and high rate of return on their investment. It is not intended to imply that personal integrity is a monopoly of the West but rather that exact and efficient accounting systems and impartial enforcement of law are essential if corporate private enter- prise is to flourish in Iraq. Not only do private savings take essentially unproductive forms, but also the supply of savings is restricted by increasing standards of consumption. Nurkse sees an analogy between consumption in less and more highly developed countries and Duesenberry's findings on the consumption function for different levels of income within a country: countries with high national incomes save a larger proportion of their incomes, but the propensity to consume of low-income countries shifts upward with time, and they do not save a larger proportion of their national income as it rises. Western technology is continually inventing new consumption goods, which start as luxuries, gradually become accepted as necessities within their countries of origin, and are exported throughout the world. A special prob- lem of underdeveloped countries is that rising standards of consumption do not require the same degree of institutional change as does rising productivity. The artisan in a Iraqi town, for example, does not consider it incongruous that he should continue to use methods handed down from generations of forefathers, and yet enjoy such modern inventions as moving pictures and the radio. However, he wonders why the government does not do something about the rising cost of living. He might buy a refrigerator if he could afford it, but owning an automobile has probably never occurred to him. The Baghdad artisan, with opportunity to 3 Iversen, A Report on Monetary Policy in Iraq, chaps, i, ii. - Langley, op. cit., p. 98. Other articles touching upon the supply of domestic savings in Iraq are Dalli, "Problems of Industrial Enterprise in Iraq," and Oboosy, “A Study in the Theory of Economic Underdevelopment with Special Reference to Iraq,” both in Middle East Economic Papers, 1954. 5 Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, pp. 58–60. Obstacles 123 observe the consumption of a large wealthy community, may eventually decide to learn some new skills in order to live better, but not until he has passed through a period of growing unrest. The desire for higher consumption is felt by all but perhaps the upper 1 per cent of the income scale, and therefore almost all the increase in personal income generated by Iraq's development expenditures can be expected to go into increased consumption rather than into savings available for investment. Strong pressure is exerted on the planning agencies to allocate a larger per- centage of the oil revenues for public consumption items such as housing and medical institutions. Although such expenditure is desirable for morale and work- ing efficiency, resources used in producing these things must be drawn from projects of capital formation. It is a commonly held illusion that, because of the oil revenues, consumption need not be foregone at all during the development process. Some, but not the majority, of the resources needed for economic develop- ment can be imported, no matter how much foreign exchange Iraq commands. Engineers and machinery can be brought in to build factories, but labor and materials must be bid away from residential construction. The slack of unemploy- ment has created this illusion by allowing a temporary increase in consumption among the classes first benefiting from the development expenditures. Already a severe shortage of skilled labor is appearing, and shortages of other factors will undoubtedly follow. The result of competition for scarce resources is inflation, with its arbitrary and disruptive effects upon planning and the distribution of income. Inflation is particularly likely to occur in economies undergoing industrializa- tion, because of the inelasticity of supply to increasing demand. There are im- portant institutional barriers to increasing output that no increase in price can overcome in the short run. Agricultural products constitute one such bottleneck. More and better food is the first demand of Iraq's poorer classes as their incomes rise. The supply of vegetables is expanding rapidly, but production of fruits and animal products is lagging, with consequent price increases. Labor immobility is a further bottleneck, the result of family and tribal ties, lack of training facilities, lack of knowledge of opportunities, and traditional taboos against the performance of certain jobs. In contrast with the situation in industrialized countries, in which money expenditures raise real incomes through the investment multiplier so long as there is substantial unemployment, increased money ex- penditures in underdeveloped countries—in the absence of a system of planned priorities reinforced by appropriate fiscal and monetary measures-only raise prices. The conclusion is unavoidable: domestic savings must be increased and directed into capital formation if a self-sustaining process of economic development is to be initiated. The problem of unproductive uses of savings is being attacked by the government, through measures such as the encouragement of banking, the creation of the Industrial Bank, and, under a law of 1950, exemption from taxes and import duties on machinery for certain Iraqi-owned industries. Restriction of consump- tion is more difficult and must be attempted with great care if the incentive to work is not to be destroyed. Limitations on the inducement to invest.—The limited size of the domestic Obstacles 125 Lack of external economies is a further obstacle to profitable investment in underdeveloped countries. A firm wishing to establish itself outside Iraq's major cities cannot assume the presence of electricity, transportation, housing and com- munity facilities for its workers, and a labor force accustomed to industrial discipline. Even in the cities, production costs are raised by the high price of electricity, which leads some plants to maintain their own generators, by the necessity to train laborers in the most elementary operations, by rapid depreciation of plant and equipment from poor use and maintenance, and by the difficult supply situation, which requires manufacturers to keep excessive inventories of parts and raw materials. For several months after the floods in the spring of 1954, rail and road transport to Basra, Iraq's port, was severed. Even after communication had been restored, it took several more months to clear the docks of Basra. Consider the plight of a manufacturer operating on small reserves. Government participation.-Lack of economic organization and facilities is one reason for the large amount of government participation in enterprise in countries wishing rapid development. It would be inappropriate to use profitability as the criterion for judging industries serving as external economies to other types of enterprise. The development of hydroelectric power, irrigation, and flood control are publicly financed and managed in most countries. But while enterprises such as Iraq's new refinery and the projected chemical plant could, in more highly developed countries, be financed by private capital, they require public initiation in Iraq. Partial private participation in a number of large undertakings has been made possible only through the aid and at the initiative of the Industrial Bank; presumably these enterprises will be divorced from the Bank when their viability has been proved. Another sound reason for public participation is that certain goals may be achieved only by departing from the price system. In the United States, for example, postage rates were set low and uniform throughout the country in the belief that development would be furthered by easy communication. In Iraq, if kerosene, already produced and distributed by government monopoly, were made available to the poor at subsidized prices, charcoal burning and cutting of brush, which are major causes of soil erosion and deforestation, might be halted. Similarly, when the chemical plant is completed, the government might decide to supply fertilizer to fellahin at prices below the cost of production. There appears to be no reasonable alternative to state participation in develop- ing economies. However, it has its dangers, in that it places the allocation of resources in the hands of an agency that does not need to follow economic prin- ciples. Many possible ends can be achieved besides the economic one of maximizing utility from the resources available to the country: for example, self-sufficiency, defense, or international prestige. Both the choice of industry and the factor proportions used can be guided by any or all of these motives, but if a rapid and self-perpetuating rise in national income is desired, economic motives must be placed foremost. Not only may the choice of undertaking be uneconomic—that is, serving neither to create external economies nor as a venture which could eventually be turned over to the private sector of the economy—but highly capi- talized methods of production may be adopted because planners and, too often, their foreign advisers believe that the combination of factors used in the West is in 126 Iraq's People and Resources some absolute sense “best,” irrespective of relative prices. Either way, the result is a long-run misallocation of resources. More serious, government control means political appointment of workers, man- agers, and even technicians; overstaffing; and, because excessive bureaucracy and red tape are characteristic of public administration in underdeveloped countries, inefficient administration. Thus even in industries which could be economically viable if well managed, valuable skills and materials are wasted, and any profit shown is from needlessly high prices. The International Bank Mission noted that in the government-operated tobacco monopoly the personal influence of the pro- ducer had much to do with the grade and price received by his tobacco. Yet Iraqi cigarettes, of variable quality, find a market because of high duties on imported cigarettes. The philosophy of eliminating competition rather than working for efficient production and improved quality is contagious, and is evident in the private sector of the economy also. Private producers come to expect the govern- ment to protect their markets by means ranging from high duties to outright prohibitions on import of competing products. If industry in Iraq is to pay for itself, it must be increasingly subject to the inexorable criteria of profit and loss. NONECONOMIC OBSTACLES Cultural factors. People born into Western society during the past few hundred years have experienced rapid technological and social change from birth, learning to welcome it if it contributes to anything they value—comfort, prestige, leisure, health, enjoyment, excitement, or peace of mind—without a corresponding sacri- fice of some other value. To some extent we have come to value change for its own sake. It is difficult for us to understand societies in which the status quo is valued for its own sake. “We have always done it this way” is given as a sufficient reason for continuing the old way, even if new methods are easier and more profitable. To call this attitude “irrational” is an ethnocentric judgment. To the traditionalist, change has a negative value to be balanced against any positive achievements. Elements of traditionalism exist in all societies, stronger among the elder mem- bers than among the young, embodied in custom, law, precedent, and ritual, serving as brakes to prevent the society from rushing headlong on uncharted courses. However, there is a difference in degree which has divided East from West. The breakdown of traditional values among Western Europeans and their descendants overseas has been termed the Idea of Progress. This critical examina- tion of previously accepted institutions is causally related to the Renaissance, the voyages of discovery, the Reformation, the political revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, phenomenal technological advances in agriculture and industry, and the achievement of a demographic balance characterized by low fertility and mortality. Within the present century the values of the East have begun to change rapidly. The most contagious element in the Idea of Progress appears to be the notion that a short and miserable life need not be the lot of the majority of mankind. 8 This point is made by Eckaus in his article, “The Factor Proportions Problem in Underde- veloped Areas," American Economic Review, XLV (Sept., 1955), 539-565. He also maintains that a limited number of technical choices frequently gives a real basis to overcapitalization. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, p. 227. Obstacles 127 Material advance requires institutional change, however, and among the insti- tutions which must change are many that are dear to the hearts even of those most ardently desiring material advance. The inherent stability, security, leisure, and grace of the old society must certainly suffer diminution if Western levels of in- come are to be achieved. This discussion does not imply that the writer places a negative value on Arab culture and a positive value on adoption of the culture of the West. Rather, the ruling class and a large part of the population of Iraq have chosen to adopt material characteristics of Western society which are inconsistent with certain elements of the traditional culture. Stephen Vincent Benet, referring to the industrial order which replaced the older society in the United States after the Civil War, wrote: Say neither ... “It is deadly magic and accursed," Nor “It is blest,” but only “It is here.”10 Many of the problems already arising from Iraq's development program are results of an uneven change in values. Consumption and material aspirations increase all too easily, while the cultural obstacles to greater productivity are formidable. The probable explanation is that higher standards of consumption among the wealthy have always been visible to Iraqis and therefore have a place in the traditional system of values, but few people have had the opportunity to observe higher standards of productivity. According to tradition, an educated person cannot perform manual labor or wear work clothes without being shamed. At best this leads to the employment of an unskilled assistant to carry the tools and hand them to the technician; at the worst it induces badly needed technicians to seek white-collar positions, in which their skills are wasted. Procedure without planning, appropriate to a leisurely way of life and a plentiful labor supply, is resulting in a major waste of resources as the pace of economic activity quickens. The continued use of outmoded administrative machinery and the perpetuation of a system of land tenure discouraging efficiency are so important that they will be treated separately in this chapter. The Islamic religion is often mentioned as a cultural obstacle to economic and social progress. As with the argument over the relationship between the Reforma- tion and the Industrial Revolution, it is difficult to separate cause from effect. Certainly many objections to change are couched in religious terms, in Muslim as well as in Christian societies; frequently the attempt is made thereby to lend authority to the negative value placed on change by tradition-minded people. In Iraq the Shi'a holy cities remain the most conservative parts of the country. Urban women who have discarded the black cape elsewhere believe that they cannot go safely in these cities without it. A xenophobic minority speaks eloquently in nationalistic as well as religious terms, but it does not gain much popular support because it advocates throwing out imported consumption items along with foreigners. Religious authorities frequently speak out against social change. During 1954 the Women's League of Baghdad held a "Women's Week,” with speeches, radio announcements, and newspaper articles in favor of increased rights. The religious authorities of Baghdad retaliated with an “Anti-Women's Week,” which 10 From John Brown's Body in Selected Works of Stephen Vincent Benet, published by Rine- hart and Company. Copyright 1927, 1928 by Stephen Vincent Benet. 128 Iraq's People and Resources among educated Iraqis only increased the effectiveness of the first week's propa- ganda. Among the rural and illiterate majority of the population, ignorance and superstition are often expressed in religious terms. Asked where flies come from, the villager will probably reply, “From Allah,” which really means, "I don't know.” The “God wills it” philosophy of resigned acceptance is in large part a rationalization for a life which the individual believes he cannot control—until recent times, a realistic way of thinking for poor people. Village medical workers in the Middle East have delighted in collecting good-luck charms from the caps of babies whom they have treated, for the mothers readily give them up when medical care is available. The Shari'a, or Sacred Law of Islam, has acted as an obstacle to the establish- ment of modern institutions in Iraq as in other Islamic countries. A Muslim country wishing to modernize has the choice of reformulating the Sacred Law to harmonize with social and economic development or replacing it by secular law." The former course is exemplified in the writings of a Pakistani religious authority, who suggests that the Islamic prohibition of interest be enforced and that, in the absence of loans, a coöperative form of organization be established to supply capital for development projects. He further suggests that the almsgiving require- ment of Islam be enforced, revised to tax income rather than capital.” Turkey and more recently Egypt have moved far along the alternative course of secularization. Riza Shah of Iran attempted similar reforms with less success. Iraq appears on balance to be choosing secularization also, gradually replacing the Shari'a with civil law. For example, under the established principle of waqf, a man could entail a piece of real estate and assign income from it to some religious or charitable cause in perpetuity. As a result, urban land became fragmented to such a degree that it was almost impossible to amass enough land for a building of medium or large size. Under pressure from urban real estate interests and town planners, this law was radically amended in 1954 to make possible the construction of large buildings and straight streets through the downtown sections. Interest rates and the sale of alcoholic beverages, both prohibited outright under Islam, are now regulated by secular law. The religious requirement that a dawn-to-dusk fast be maintained during the month of Ramadan is still widely observed in Iraq. The prohibition includes drink and tobacco as well as food. Because the month is calculated on a lunar basis, its calendar incidence rotates. When Ramadan occurs during the summer, with six- teen hours of daylight, during which the maximum temperature may exceed 120° Fahrenheit with less than 10 per cent humidity, the effect on labor productivity is profound. The only way to keep the fast under such conditions is to avoid exer- tion. Government offices, which normally keep a thirty-five-hour week, open later and close earlier, and no one expects to do much work during this period. Coffee- houses and restaurants hang sheets over their doors; the only way to tell what nonfasters are inside is to enter and appear a nonfaster oneself. The foreign tech- nicians in charge of building one of the postwar barrages noted a significant decline in the productivity of their laborers during Ramadan, despite the fact that 11 Gibb writes: “Islam, as a way of life, stands or falls with the supremacy of the Sacred Law.” Mohammedanism, p. 191. 12 Ahmad, Economics of Islam. Obstacles 129 the majority were not fasting; for those doing heavy labor are exempt from the necessity of keeping the fast. The management instituted a new system of payment, setting a reasonable goal for the entire crew each week, and giving each man an extra day's pay if the goal were accomplished. Not only did productivity no longer fall during Ramadan, but the year-round efficiency of the crew rose markedly. Whereas the failure of one specialized worker to appear at work had formerly been taken as an excuse for the whole crew to take the day off, now some other worker will ask to be shown how to do the missing man's job. Much has been written about the failure of laborers in preindustrial countries to respond to financial incentives." Within a certain range at least, there is likely to be a negative correlation between wages and the supply of labor wherever the acquisitive mentality of capitalist society is absent, because of the relatively low value placed on material welfare and the high value placed on leisure. The reply of the proverbial peasant when asked to perform a certain task for a dollar is typical: “Thank you, but I already have a dollar.” However, very little experi. mentation in incentive pay has been done in underdeveloped countries, perhaps in part because employers as well as workers tend to have stereotyped views on the "correct” levels of consumption for workers of different classes and to accept low productivity as normal. Because of the rapid pace of economic and social change in Iraq, much of the cultural opposition to increasing labor productivity might vanish if incentives were systematically applied. Planners could make wide use of this principle. However, two conditions are necessary in addition to financial in- centives. The change must be technically possible; that is, if special materials or training are necessary, they must be available to the workers. Moreover, the cul- tural change must not conflict with deeply entrenched mores." A pessimistic con- clusion concerning the adaptability of Middle Eastern people to changing eco- nomic requirements is often the result of failure to provide both incentive and means or of an attempt to achieve change in an unrealistic direction. Administrative deficiencies. In his report on Iraq's economic potentials and problems, Lord Salter wrote: More than once in my experience I have been invited to advise a country on economic policy, and have then found that the heart of the problem is the reform or creation of an administrative system capable of carrying it out. ... The chief limiting factor to the success of development in Iraq may prove to be neither the amount of money for investment, nor even the limits of skilled labour and materials available, but the efficiency of the administrative machine 15 The traditional way of doing business in the Middle East, whether privately or in government, is by ad hoc decisions, based in part upon the status of the indi- viduals concerned, implemented in a leisurely manner by means of personal relationships. Little or no value is placed upon handling matters impartially, uniformly, or expeditiously. This system, which originated in the slow pace of life and small volume of business of an earlier era, has become an anachronism in Iraq and constitutes perhaps the major obstacle to economic development. Al. though administrative deficiencies exist in both the public and private sectors of 18 See Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies, pp. 39–40; and Moore, Indus. trialization and Labor, chaps. V, vii. Iversen, op. cit., p. 121, is hopeful that Iraqi workers will respond to appropriate incentives. 1. This point is discussed, with many examples, in Mead (ed.), Cultural Patterns and Technical Change. 15 Salter, The Development of Iraq, p. 96. 130 Iraq's People and Resources the economy, they are far more serious in the public sector, for several reasons. First, operation for a profit tends to limit the degree of inefficiency that can be tolerated in private business. Second, public activities are generally larger; while the old administrative methods may be suitable to small-scale enterprises in which specialized management might cost more than it is worth, they seriously impede large-scale activity. The Iraqi government's policy of public participation spreads the deficiencies of public administration into all phases of the economy and makes it imperative that they be removed if much of the oil revenue is not to be dissipated in wasted effort and graft. Deficiencies in Iraq's civil service are the result of three factors enumerated in the unpublished report of William Brownrigg, an American expert on public administration who visited Iraq in 1954. The first is the philosophy of the system, a legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The civil service has constituted a way of life for leisured and educated people, and the majority of secondary school and college graduates are expected to enter it. Business is transacted in a manner consistent with the rules of hospitality and status, but inconsistent with the demands of an increasing work load. Personal calls occupy a substantial amount of an official's time. To each caller above a certain rank, refreshment is served and polite conver- sation is made before any business is conducted. If an official has received a promo- tion or other honor, courtesy demands that his associates and close friends call to congratulate him. There is no stigma attached to arriving late or leaving early, or to eating, having one's shoes shined, or reading the newspapers during office hours. Overstaffing is general, but the problem is far more serious than the consequent waste of literate manpower. There is work that needs to be done and is not being done: papers to be signed if farmers are to receive loans in time to buy seed for this year's planting, payrolls that must be met regularly if the morale of day laborers is to be maintained, customs declarations to be filled out if materials for dams and bridges are to be available when needed. Meanwhile, some officials drink tea with their friends, while others are pitifully overburdened by an enormous volume of paper work, using administrative techniques devised centuries ago. Rank, salary, and promotion are handled in such a way that little incentive exists for efficiency. Rank and pay depend largely upon scholastic attainment rather than upon duties and responsibilities. If a doctor's degree is required for a certain rank, one may find in this rank a medical doctor in the Ministry of Finance and a doctor of philosophy in the Ministry of Health. Promotion is automatic, depending upon length of service. The only way to skip ranks, aside from using personal influence, is to obtain another educational degree. The system gives no recognition for special training, as received, for example, from working with foreign technical assistance workers, unless it results in a degree. Special skills go similarly unrewarded. The typist who uses hunt-and-peck can receive the same rank and pay as the typist who uses the touch system. Mr. Brownrigg discerned nepotism and favoritism as strong additional factors in initial placement and promotion. A government official, once hired, retains tenure regardless of merit, provided he does not offend some important personage. Unfortunately, one of the more probable ways of offending his superior is to advocate administrative reform. If a government employee is forced out of one position, even for dishonesty, he is 134 Iraq's People and Resources by disciplining those found guilty of malfeasance. An amusing example is offered in a memorandum written to his chief in Baghdad by a foreign technician stationed in a rural area: Tractors stopped at eleven o'clock. Drivers stated that they were allowed only four gallons of fuel per day by M- [the government agent in charge of supplies). Discussed this with M- He said that he did this because staff had been getting fuel from drivers for their personal use. I suggested that this should be handled by disciplinary action against those misusing the fuel instead of by stopping tractors ... Another example is the rule in government hospital kitchens that no food, not even staples such as salt or flour, may remain overnight. The purpose of this rule is to prevent pilfering by kitchen help, but as a result every commodity must be ordered every day. This necessity, combined with the regulation which specifies a different menu or number of grams of each food according to the rank of the person being fed, makes an obviously large amount of paper work. Because no literate person would work as a cook, an additional staff member may be required to keep the kitchen accounts. In many ministry offices, an official who wishes a pencil or a new light bulb must ring for the farrash who has the keys to the supply cabinet and may even have to sign for it; he will probably be asked to turn in the old bulb, to insure that he will not sell the new one. Too often, the answer is that this particular farrash is not at work today: "Cannot it wait until tomorrow?” The en- tire system of checks is based upon the assumption that anyone will take any mate- rial thing for which he is not held personally responsible, and that labor and time are worth very little. The idea that loss of 10 per cent of the paper and pencils might lead to more economical operation through heightened efficiency is quite foreign to the government service, because of the prevalence of underemployment. The farrash in charge of the supply cabinet would probably be hired anyway. Some of the most laborious checks are inefficient in accomplishing their purpose. Despite the fact that several different agencies within the Ministry of Finance are empowered to audit the budget, the budget is never completely audited. The most thorough agency does only spot checks of a post-audit nature and often lacks documents, such as receipts, with which to check the statements of expenditures made. The mission sent by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- ment was given permission to study any phase of Iraq's economy, but was forbid- den to investigate public administration. One cannot help suspecting that the opposition to reform is based on the many opportunities for dishonest acquisition of funds by personnel on all levels. If procedures were simplified and specified in writing, if impartial examinations were held to determine the ability of employees and potential employees to perform their clearly stated duties, much of the cor- ruption would be eliminated. The individual reformer stands to lose his tenure in the civil service and all the attendant privileges. He is likely to be dubbed a troublemaker or even subversive by those who oppose change per se as well as by those who fear that their incompetence or dishonesty will be uncovered. Reform must come from unimpeachable sources at high levels, and thus far such sources have not recognized the damage being done to Iraq's development program by their failure to take action. It was hoped that the bill increasing government wages and salaries, passed by CHAPTER VIII CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS THE MODERN SCIENCE of economics originated in early capitalism and has been modified as capitalism developed from workshops—which inspired Adam Smith to write about the benefits to be derived from the division of labor—to automated plants. As a science, economics consists of a set of deductions drawn from certain hypotheses, or postulates, which are presumably based upon empirical fact. Among these postulates, rational calculation for the purpose of maximizing profits or utility is the foundation stone. Economics can be used on various levels to under- stand the workings of an economy, to predict future phenomena by deductions from assumed conditions, or to formulate economic policy. But the validity of the complex theoretical structure which has evolved is limited to economies in which the basic postulates are descriptions of reality. What does economics have to say about countries inhabited by two-thirds of the world's population in which a large portion of the national product never enters commercial channels, in which production and consumption are carried out in stereotyped ways without conscious calculation concerning maximization or any other end? As taught in universities in underdeveloped countries, economics is frequently an unholy union of Western economic theory-which the students learn by rote because they have little conception of the institutional framework which it presumes—and ad hoc policies, the theoretical bases of which are at best institutional analogies between the economies in question and those of Western nations. For countries in which the industrialization process is just beginning, sound policy requires a realistic theory of economies in transition. Is such a theory possible? Or is the combination of institutional conditions of each transitional economy so nearly unique as to defy generalization ? One possibility might be to derive a unified economic theory from a single set of basic postulates which all economies have in common.' For example, all people face scarcity of some resources necessary to human life and are forced to allocate them among competing demands. It can be argued—albeit tautologically—that the most primitive people maximize the satisfaction which they derive from their allocation of scarce resources, even if conscious calculation is absent, in that obedi- ence to tradition constitutes satisfaction for them. However, the possibility of choice between alternative modes of action has led to a pace of technological ad- vance in industrial economies which would be impossible elsewhere. Again, no one would deny that certain wants are culturally defined for all peoples, but the fact that wants among some peoples are constantly being modified in itself pro- duces unique institutions. All people invest, in the sense of devoting some of their resources to the production of capital goods. A wooden plow is a capital good, as is an atomic reactor, but the institutions congruent with them are worlds apart. Specialization, with the consequent necessity to exchange, is present in all econ- omies, but it ranges from the division of labor between the sexes among the most primitive people to complex markets in which a man can earn his living advertising ball bearings to be sold to manufacturers of machine tools. The differences in the See Herskovits, Economic Anthropology, especially chap. i, for a discussion of economic char- acteristics of primitive societies. ( 141 ) 146 Iraq's People and Resources and improved techniques to workers and farmers and an increase in labor mobility; and rewards for efficiency and ingenuity throughout the economy, but especially in agriculture and public administration. One of the major problems of rapid development is that governments neglect the creation of institutions which will harness the energies, intelligence, and integrity of their people. The assumption that anything the government does not do will not be done is an understandable outgrowth of the necessity to plan. In consequence, the civil service swells, and individuals fail to learn that they can control their own destinies. If the village clinic merely gives antibiotics and in- oculations, its influence carries no farther than the boundaries of the village and ends if the clinic should be discontinued, but if a lecture on the causes of illness is given with each treatment, the efforts of the clinic are multiplied. If latrines and wells are dug in rural areas by machines sent out from the cities, villagers will continue their unsanitary practices while waiting for the government to come to their village. If earnings of agricultural and industrial laborers bear little rela- tion to their skills and efforts, they do not acquire the habit of looking for better ways of working. If there are opportunities for dishonesty in government, if offenders are not punished, and if honesty goes unrewarded, numerous inspectors are necessary; but, because the inspectors are subject to the same temptations, the net effect is simply to make impossible the expeditious handling of any matter. As a result of the philosophy which uses treatment rather than prevention, paternalism rather than self-help and coöperation, and compulsion rather than incentives, human resources are wasted, and democratic forces are thwarted. Experience in Iraq indicates that there can be no safety in turning back when the development process has started. Values from the West, particularly consump- tion demands, are not easily abandoned once adopted. The misery which fellahin have suffered uncomplainingly for millennia suddenly becomes intolerable when alternatives—even unrealistic ones—are sighted. Recently acquired aspirations of the general population are better health and longer life. Justice Douglas, in his travels through the Middle East, found medical care on the top of the list of peasants' desires, followed by education, land reform, and political democracy. When the old equilibrium of high fertility balanced by high mortality is aban- doned, a period of rapid natural increase begins. This “population explosion” can be ended either by the adoption of fertility patterns in harmony with longer average life or by the eventual rise of mortality as a dense population presses upon limited resources. Because the latter alternative is unacceptable today to people in developing countries, the only solution is to move as rapidly as possible toward a new equilibrium of low vital rates, through measures such as education for women and encouragement of the nuclear family as part of national policy. At the same time every effort must be made to increase labor productivity. Even so, the pressure of increasing numbers with no safety valve of emigration is great in countries in which population is relatively dense before economic development begins. At the outset of development the population of Iraq is so small that no excessive density need result. However, present methods of agricultural produc- tion in Iraq are legacies of a sparse population and are wasteful of both land and water. These resources, although abundant, are not unlimited. Therefore, as popu- 8 Douglas, Strange Lands and Friendly People, p. 316. APPENDIX: ARABIC WORDS AND PLACE NAMES IN IRAQ ARABIC words and place names have appeared in this work unitalicized and without accents or doubled vowels to indicate long vowels in the Arabic spelling. Alphabetical lists, together with the long vowels and meanings, appear below. The Arabic spelling was taken from Elias' diction- ary, or, for colloquial words, from their customary local pronunciation. The system of translitera- tion is my own simplified adaptation of that suggested by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.? Case endings have been omitted throughout. The ta of the feminine and the definite article have been omitted except in nouns in construction (Basra rather than al-Basrat, but 'Arasat al-'Asima), or, when the noun is modified by an adjective, the definite article has been used (al-Karrada ash-Sharqiya). When the common rather than the literary spelling has been used in the text (Iraq rather than 'Iraq, sheikh rather than shaikh), the common spelling appears in parentheses. ARABIC WORDS WORD MEANING Allāh God bāb door, gate bādiya desert, wilderness badwi nomad badwin (Bedouins) plural of badwi burdāya (purdah) a curtain; hence seclusion of women (Caliph) see Khalaf dinār Iraq's unit of currency, equal to a pound sterling fallāh (fellah) peasant fallāhin (fellahin) plural of fallāh farrāsh unskilled employee in office fasl compensation for injury according to tribal law fils one-thousandth of a dinār; a small coin harim a forbidden thing; hence women's quarters of a house Imām Shi'ite leader Islām the Muslim religion istihlāk tax on sale of agricultural commodities jinn genii; evil spirits Khalaf (Caliph) successor, specifically to the Prophet; leader of Muslims liwa largest geographical subdivision in Iraq Ma'dan marsh dwellers in southern Iraq mahalla quarter of a town (Miri Sirf lands) lands owned by the government. Miri is from amiriya, "pertaining to the crown." Sirf means "pure.” Muharram Shi'ite religious period of ten days each year mukhtār political chief of a mahalla or qarya Muslim Moslem, a person subscribing to Islam mut'a enjoyment; hence a temporary marriage nāhiya geographical subdivision smaller than a qadā (purdah) see burdāya qadā geographical subdivision smaller than a liwā Qarina female devil qarya village Qurān Koran, sacred book of Muslims Ramadān Muslim month of fasting sarifa hut of reeds and mud shaikh (sheikh) tribal leader; old man; landlord · Elias A. Elias, Elias' Modern Dictionary, Arabic-English (6th ed., Cairo: Elias' Modern Press, 1953). 2 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs, 1925 (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), I, ix-xii. [ 148 ] Appendix 149 ARABIC WORDS (Continued) MEANING WORD Shari'a Shi'a Sunna wādi waqf Sacred Law of Islam one of two major sects of Islam orthodox sect of Islam dry riverbed, seasonally flooded principle of entailment of property for a religious or charitable purpose NAME Abū Dibis 'Amāra (Amara) 'Arasāt al-'Āsima Arbil A'zamiya Bab al-Mu'azum Bāb ash-Sharqi Baghdad Ba'quba Basra Dijla (Tigris) Diwāniya Diyālā Dowra (Daura) Dujaila Dulaim Furāt (Euphrates) Habbāniya Hilla Hindiya Hit 'Iraq (Iraq) Jabal Sinjär Jazira Karbală al-Karrāda ash- Sharqiya (Karrada) Kāzimain Khānaqin Kirkuk Kūt Muntafiq Mūsul (Mosul) Nāsariya Najaf Qurna Ramādi Rutba Sämarrā Samāwa Shatt al-'Arab Sulaimāniya Sūq ash-Shuyukh PLACE NAMES IN IRAQ EXPLANATION large natural depression west of Euphrates city, liwā on southern Tigris area beyond Baghdad city's eastern dike city, liwā in rainfall zone northern suburb of Baghdad city North Gate of old city of Baghdad South Gate of old city of Baghdad capital city, liwā in central Iraq city, center of Diyālā liwā city, southernmost liwā, on Persian Gulf river city, liwā on southern Euphrates liwā partially in rainfall zone, river entering Tigris below Baghdad town south of Baghdad, site of new refinery canal, land settlement project in Kūt liwā liwā on upper Euphrates river lake west of Euphrates city, liwā on central Euphrates town on Euphrates, site of barrage town on upper Euphrates, Dulaim liwā country hilly region of Mosul liwā inhabited by Yezidis desert between Tigris and Euphrates north of Baghdad city, liwā west of central Euphrates southern suburb of Baghdad city city in Baghdād liwā town in Diyālā liwa city, liwă in rainfall zone, containing major oilfields city, liwā on Tigris below Baghdad liwā on southern Euphrates city, liwā on upper Tigris in rainfall zone city, center of Muntafiq liwā city in Karbalā liwa town in Basra liwā at junction of Tigris and Euphrates town, center of Dulaim liwā border station in Syrian desert town in Baghdād liwā on upper Tigris town in Dīwāniya liwā river below junction of Tigris and Euphrates, entering Persian Gulf Kurdish city, liwā in rainfall zone town in Muntafiq liwā 150 Appendix NAME PLACE NAMES IN IRAQ (Continued) EXPLANATION large natural depression in Jazira river tributary to Tigris Wādi Thārthār az-Zāb al-Kabir (Greater Zab) az-Zāb as-Saghir (Lesser Zab) Zubair river tributary to Tigris town in Basra liwā LITERATURE CITED WORKS PERTAINING TO IRAQ Adams, Warren E. “The Land Development Program in Iraq with Special Reference to the Dujaila Settlement, 1945 to 1954.” Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of California, 1955. 326 pp. Ali, Hassan Mohammad. 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Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 84th Congr., 2d sess., Report no. 1956. Washington, D.C., 1956. 30 pp. - Department of State. Point Four: Coöperative Program for Aid in the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Areas. Rev. ed., Washington, D.C., 1950. 167 pp. Woytinsky, W. S., and E. S. Woytinsky. World Population and Production. New York: Twen- tieth Century Fund, 1953. 1268 pp. Zimmerman, Erich W. World Resources and Industries. Rev. ed., New York: Harper, 1951, 832 pp. INDEX Age-sex structure, 37, 43-47; use in estimat Cooking methods, 21, 29, 80 ing fertility, 65-67 Coon, Carleton S., 14 Agricultural Bank, 137; credit for Dujaila Cost of living index, 90, 95 settlers, 110; need for supervised credit, 138 Daura refinery, 101, 103, 113 Agricultural Census of 1952–53, 8–9, 137 Death rates. See Mortality Agricultural extension, 135, 138 Deforestation, 6–7, 125 Agriculture: principal crops, 8–9; relative Derbendi-Khan dam, 108 importance in economy of, 52, 54, 135; Deserts, 4, 7, 36 present methods of cultivation, 99–100; Development Board, 3-4, 102, 104-107; ex- plans for development of, 107–111; insti. • penditures of, 95; administrative deficien- tutional changes needed in, 138-139 cies of, 104, 132; irrigation program of, Alluvial plain, 4-6 108; and industrial development, 112-113, Amara liwa: migration from, 57, 59; tenure 114; housing program of, 115–116 situation in, 137–138 Diet. See Nutrition Amulets, 76, 128 Dinar defined, 4 n. 4 Animal products: as export, 9; in diet, 77, Divorce, 83; among Shi'ites, 24 78, 81 Dodd, Stuart C., 23, 74–75 Antibiotics, 76, 82-83 Dokan dam, 108, 115 'Arasat al-'Asima, 32, 39, 57, 92–94 Douglas, William O., 146 Arbil, 25, 136 Dowry, 24, 85 Dowson, Sir Ernest M., 8, 19, 35, 39 Baghdad: size of, 26–27, 42–43; description Drainage: need for, 99, 107–108, 138; plans of, 30–33; types of housing in, 31-33, 57, for, 105; on Dujaila project, 110 58; boundaries defined, 39; characteristics Dualism, 13, 30-31, 142–143; in industry, 30, of population, 46–61 passim; vital statis- 100-101 tics for, 64–65; income and consumption Dujaila project, 109–110 survey of, 92–94; concentration of industry in, 100 Economic theory, relevance to preindustrial Baksheesh, 133 economies : absence of rationalism, 12; cost Banks, 121–122. See also Agricultural Bank; structures, 99; inelastic supply, 123; back- Industrial Bank; Mortgage Bank ward-sloping labor supply curves, 129; Barth, Fredrik, 25 application of classical and neoclassical Basra: size of, 27, 43; characteristics of economics, 141-144 population, 46–61 passim; vital statistics Education, 116–119; concentration in cities, for, 64 46; nontechnical orientation of, 117–118, Basra Petroleum Company, 102-103 124; fundamental, 118–119. See also Liter- Bedouins, 16–18; numbers of, 19, 38–39 acy; Quran schools Benet, Stephen Vincent, 127 Egypt, 96, 112, 128. See also International Bilharzia, 72 n.13, 73, 75, 83 comparisons Birth control, 83, 84, 88 Endogamy, 13-14 Birth rates. See Fertility Engel's law, 94 Boeke, J. H., 13, 27 Ethnic groups, 13–16 Brownrigg, William, 130 ff. Evil Eye, 37, 76 Exports other than oil, 9; compared with oil Caliphate, 14; Abbaside, 1-2 exports, 103-104 Capital formation. See Investment External economies, 125 Census of 1947: methodology, 35-39; results summarized, 39–61 Fallow system, 8, 99, 107 Christians, 15, 24–25, 51, 53 Family: importance of, 11; conjugal and Civil service. See Public administration patriarchal, 28–29, 31-32, 87; average size Clapp Mission, 102 of, 56, 57–58; relation to fertility, 84-85 Climate, 7; and health, 68; and diet, 80 Farrash, 131, 134 Clothing: of fellahin, 22; the veil, 22, 24, Fasl, 86 29–30, 33, 95; of Kurds, 26 Fatalism, 12, 74–75, 86–87, 128 Commerce: and towns, 26–27; relative im Fellahin, 19, 20, 136,139 passim portance of in economy, 52 Fenelon, K. G., 91 Consumption: standards of, 2, 89–90, 122 Fertility: ratios, 65–67, 69; estimates of, 123, 126–127, 142, 146; of fellahin, 92, 68–69; causes of high levels of, 83-88 94; of urban wage earners, 93-94; recent Fertilizer, 75, 99, 113 changes in, 95. See also Nutrition Fiscal policy. See Government [ 157 ] 158 Index Floods: causes of, 6; of 1954, 32, 57, 72, 125; of 1831, 72; control of, 105 Folk society. See Preindustrial society Fulanain, 24 Genii, 75–76 Geographic characteristics, 4-7 Geographic subdivisions defined, 36–37 Ginsburg, Norton S., 31 Gounelle, Hugues, 76, 80 Government: free services, 94, 96; revenues, 96, 104; participation in economic affairs, 114, 125-126, 146; debt, 121. See also Ministries; Planning; Public administra- tion Granqvist, Hilma, 68, 76 Griffith, G. Talbot, 143 tion, 77–78; of national income, 91; of agricultural productivity, 97-99 Investment: as basis for increased produc- tivity, 2, 115; sources of funds for, 120- 123; form of, 120, 139 Iran, 1, 14, 49 n., 128. See also International comparisons Iraq Petroleum Company, 102–103 Irrigation: importance to agriculture in Southern Iraq, 1, 8, 16; plans for exten- sion of, 105, 107–109; present methods of, 107 Habbaniya, Lake, 108 Haigh Commission, 108 Handicraft production, 14, 100-101, 124 Harim. See Purdah Hindiya barrage, 108 Honor: importance of, 11, 18, 22; killings for, 18, 85-86 Hospitality, 17, 22–23, 24, 29, 95 Hourani, Albert H., 15, 25 Housing: of fellahin, 21-22; of Kurds, 25– 26; in towns, 28; in Baghdad, 31-33, 57, 58; types of, 55–57; plans for public hous- ing, 115-116; for civil servants, 116, 133 Huizinga, J., 12-13 Irrigation zone, 8 Islam: conducive to high fertility, 86–87: as obstacle to development, 127-129. See also Muslims; Shi'ites; Sunnites Iversen, Carl, 97, 106, 115, 124, 132 Jalili, Mahmoud A., 78–79 Jawad, Hashim, 35, 71 Jews, 15, 51, 53 Jurkat, Ernest, 65 n. Karbala: holy city, 14, 27; size of, 43 Kazimain: holy city, 14, 27; size of, 43 Khanaqin oilfield and refinery, 103 Kirkuk, 25; boundaries defined, 39; size of, 43; characteristics of population, 46–61 passim; oilfields, 102–103, 113 Knappen - Tippetts - Abbett - McCarthy, 106, 107, 108–109 Kurdistan, 6–7, 25 Kurds, 7, 15–16, 24–26 Kut: barrage, 108, 109; land tenure in liwa, 137 Kuznets, Simon, 145 Illness, causes of, 72–83 Immigration. See Migration, international Incentives: lack of in agriculture, 20, 136; use of in economic development, 128–129, 146; lack of in civil service, 130-131, 133-134 Income: of fellahin, 20, 91–92, 142; difficul. ties of estimation, 89–90; estimates of national income, 90–91; of urban wage earners, 92–93, 101; of civil servants, 93, 132; distribution of, 96 Industrial Bank, 113–114, 125 Industrial Census of 1954, 30, 100-101 Industry: concentration of in cities, 30-31; relative importance in economy, 52; pres- ent methods of, 100-101; plans for de- velopment of, 112-114 Infant mortality. See Maternal and Child Health Centers; Mortality Inflation, 95, 123 Institutional change, need for, 3, 4, 127, 135, 140, 143, 145–147 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: findings, 91–92, 97, 107, 126, 139; recommendations, 105, 114; study mission, 106; loan for Wadi Thar- thar project, 121; and public administra- tion, 134 International comparisons: of fertility, 65– 67; of health conditions, 74–75; of nutri- Labor: size of labor force, 52–55; skills of, 112, 124; supply of, 129 Labor law, 132–133 Landlords. See Sheikhs Land reform. See Land tenure; Miri Sirf land development program Land tenure: on alluvial plain, 19–20; in Kurdistan, 25; as obstacle to development, 135–139 Langley, S. J., 121, 122 Leibenstein, Harvey, 144 Literacy: statistics on, 47-48; centers, 118- 119. See also Education Little, Arthur D., 106 Liwa defined, 36 Lloyd, Seton, 1–2, 34 Longrigg, Stephen H., 34 Ma’dan, 23-24 Malaria, 70, 73 Malthus, Thomas, 12, 142, 143 Manufacture. See Industry Marital status of population, 49–51 Market, size of, 112-113, 124 Markham, Edwin, 2 Marriage: temporary, 24, 86; age at, 49–50, 83, 85 Index 159 Marshes, 6 production and exports, 100, 102–103; Maternal and Child Health Centers: esti. size of revenues, 102–104 mates of fertility, 69; estimates of infant Optimum theory of population, 140 mortality, 69–70; effect on infant mor Ottoman Empire, 1, 34, 130; policy of tribal tality, 70; data on causes of infant mor settlement, 18, 137; major cities under, tality, 74. See also Samawa 25, 27, 31; irrigation program, 108; edu. Mechanization, 125–126; of agriculture, 99, cation under, 116 136-137, 138; of industry, 101, 111 Medical care, 63–64, 81-82 Palestinian Muslims, fertility and mortality Medical Doctors, 81 of, 65–68, 76, 83–84 Midwives, 82 Pan-Arab movement, 15–16 Migration, internal: of Bedouins, 17; of Peasants. See Fellahin fellahin, 19; of Kurds, 25; rural-urban, Persia. See Iran 31–33 passim, 40-41, 58–59, 138 Planning, problems of, 82–83, 121, 144-147. Migration, international: immigration in See also Development Board; Government early period, 1; omitted from discussion participation of natural increase, 72; barriers to, 143 Polygamy, 18, 86; extent of, 50–51 Ministry of Agriculture, 136 Population: estimates, 34–35, 71–72; totals Ministry of Development, 104 from Census of 1947, 39-40; density, 41- Ministry of Economics, 8, 36, 79–80, 90, 92 42. See also Census of 1947; Natural in. 94, 95 crease Ministry of Education, 117 “Population explosion." See Natural increase Ministry of Finance, 131, 134 Preindustrial society: characteristics of, 11 Ministry of Health, 62 ff., 82 ff., 126–127; and vital rates, 12; and Ministry of Interior, 38 productivity, 12; the city in, 27 Ministry of Social Affairs, 81, 116, 119 Productivity: as cause of poverty, 2, 145; in Miri Sirf land development program, 109– agriculture, 97-100; in industry, 100-101 111, 138 Public administration, 104, 126, 129–135, Monetary policy. See Banks 144-145 Monroe Commission, 117–118 Purdah, 28, 29–30, 86. See also Clothing, the Morbidity. See Illness veil Mortality: estimates of, 68, 69–70; causes of, 72–82; declining, 82–83, 143. See also Qada defined, 36–37 Natural increase Quran schools, 23, 48, 118 Mortgage Bank, 116, 133 Mosul: size of, 26–27, 43; characteristics of Rainfall, 7-8 population, 46-61 passim; vital statistics Rainfall zone, 6, 7–8; crops of, 8–9; exten- for, 64 sion of cultivation in, 107 Mosul Petroleum Company, 103 Ramadan, 128-129 Muharram, 14-15 Ramadi barrage, 108 Muslims: ethnic and sectarian differences Rental shares, 20, 92, 137, 138 among, 14–16; numbers of, 15, 51, 53. See Resources, natural, 107, 112-113 also Islam; Shi'ites; Sunnites Ricardo, David, 142 Mut'a. See Marriage, temporary Rural-urban distribution of population, 42 Rural-urban migration. See Migration, in- Nahiya defined, 37 ternal Najaf: holy city, 14, 27; size of, 43 Nationalism: development of, 14, 16; need Salination. See Drainage for, 18, 147 Salter, Lord, 100, 106, 115, 129, 139–140 Natural increase: rises as result of develop Samarra: holy city, 14; barrage, 108 ment, 3, 67, 143-144, 146; estimates of, Samawa: description of, 27-30; Maternal 70–72; as obstacle to development, 139–140 and Child Health Center at, 30, 69, 70, 84 Net reproduction rates, 66–67 Sanitation: conditions of, 21, 28, 75; recent Nomads. See Migration, internal improvements in, 81-82 Nurkse, Ragnar, 122, 124 Saving, 89, 96, 121-123 Nurses, 81, 86 Sex ratios, 40–41; in large cities, 45–46 Nutrition, 73, 76–81; diet of Bedouins, 17; Shari'a, 128 diet of fellahin, 22; diet of town dwellers, Sheikhs: as tribal leaders, 17, 18; as land- 29; of infants, 74, 79; Institute, 80 lords, 19-20, 109, 136-138 Shi'ites, 14-16, 24, 74, 127 Occupations of labor force, 52-55 Smith, Adam, 142 Oil: importance of, 3-4, 9–10, 102, 115; Social security, 84, 133, 147 effect of revenues on national income, 91; Staley, Eugene, 91, 102, 145 245838 - ---- HB31 C3 v.18 з2106 00080 7427