COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky DAVID S. LYLES, Staff Director JUDY A. ANSLEY, Republican Staff Director SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky (II) 60 A75 107th no. 11 main C O N T E N T S CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM OF IRAQ FEBRUARY 27, 2002 Page Cordesman, Dr. Anthony H., Arleigh Burke Chair and Senior Fellow, Strate- gic Assessment, Center for Strategic and International Studies ..................... 7 Duelfer, Charles A., Visiting Resident Scholar, Center for Strategic and Inter- national Studies .................................................................................................. 92 (III) 2 identifying the urgent threats to our security, and the capabilities we need to meet these threats. This subcommittee, started under Senator Roberts' able chair- manship, has focused on threats that were once considered emerg- ing, or more remote in some people's minds, even hypothetical, but we held hearings and pressed on in 1999 and in 2000 in combating terrorism, preventing proliferation, and even in 1999 on biological weapons aimed at U.S. agriculture. Last year, 4 months before September 11, we held a hearing on the military's ability to respond to domestic terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction, and in the winter we addressed issues of bioterrorism and terrorist motivations. We learned through those hearings, but more pointedly we learned on Septem- ber 11, that these threats have, indeed, emerged. Because of our scheduling today, I am going to ask Senator Rob- erts if he would go first with his opening statement. I will follow, he will be able to submit some of his questions in writing, and then we will proceed. He has an Intelligence Committee meeting that is running concurrent with this one, so at this time, I will recognize Senator Roberts. STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I apolo- gize to you and to the witnesses. I am doing a mea culpa that I said I would never do, and that is to abdicate early, but we do have an Intelligence Committee meeting in reference to Saudi Arabia. I had already actually prepared some specific questions for the wit- nesses that are there at this time, so I apologize to you, and I want to thank you for your leadership in holding this hearing. I want to thank the witnesses for taking time out of your very valuable schedules to come and testify. It is always helpful to hear from informed experts about the situ- ation in Iraq. Over 15 years ago, a prominent U.S. news magazine ran a picture of Saddam Hussein on its cover with the caption, “Most Dangerous Man in the World.” Despite a long war with Iran in the mid-1980s, a devastating defeat by the United States in 1991, major revolts by the Kurds and the Shiite elements within his country, numerous coup attempts, wary neighbors, and a con- stant international application of sanctions, Saddam Hussein re- mains in power and continues to develop all of the weapons of mass lººtion. threatening his own citizens and neighbors in the WOTIOI. In his State of the Union Address to the Nation on January 29, President Bush included Iraq as part of the now well-known axis of evil, along with Iran and North Korea. I understand that many, including some of our European allies, had some frustration and concern with this. Some even were very quick to criticize the Presi- dent for applying this brand, suggesting that such a declaration is dangerous and provocative. Let me remind all those folks that President Reagan was heavily criticized when he labeled the Soviet Union an evil empire. I be- lieve his words of resolve helped lead to the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, so I salute the President for 3 having the courage to decisively confront the new evils that we face in this new century. I might add that having traveled with the President to Denver just a short time ago to talk to the American cattlemen, before he was on his way to Salt Lake City—and I do not think I am reveal- ing any presidential classification here—he has no intent to “go to war with Iraq.” He simply indicated that he has informed the three countries that we know what they are doing, and they now know what we know. We know much of what they do in aiding and abet- ting the transnational terrorist organization sworn to kill us and to do great damage to western civilization. That is not permissible, and there will be a price to pay. Saddam Hussein and his regime, in my personal view, are evil and threatening. They use terror, torture, and weapons of mass de- struction on their own people. They support terrorism around the world, and they continue to develop and proliferate weapons of mass destruction. I often ask witnesses what threats are so ominous that they keep them awake at night, and in this particular case I am going to an- swer my own question. This time, one of the things that does keep me awake is the thought that this evil man, Saddam Hussein, does possess weapons of mass destruction and the means to effectively deliver them, as our witnesses I think will testify to. From 1991 to 1998, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, of which Mr. Duelfer was an integral part, did make consider- able progress in the monitoring and the dismantling of Iraq's WMD capability. In late 1998, however, as we all know, Iraq became in- creasingly defiant and stopped this cooperation with the weapons inspections, in defiance of the UN, in violation of its own pledge. Because of that refusal to cooperate, the U.S. attacked Iraqi WMD sites in December of 1998 in a Military Operation called Operation Desert Fox. This Operation did attack over 90 targets, mostly mis- sile-related. I am not sure how effective this attack really was. By all ac- counts, the Iraqi efforts in increasing their capability of weapons of mass destruction have continued without any oversight over the last 4 years, and May well be accelerating. Our two witnesses have closely followed the developments in Iraq and the Middle East, and are well-qualified to bring us up-to-date on the recent developments. Thank you again for your willingness to testify. We look forward to your comments and a productive dis- CUISSIOIl. I would add only this in regards to what I have to say, Madam Chairwoman, and I again apologize for having to leave, but Dr. Cordesman has great expertise in NATO, and I thought either the full Committee or the subcommittee could have him back. I think NATO is a very timely subject, and I look forward to visiting with him about NATO, but in reading his testimony, one of the things he points out is that the Gulf War did surprisingly little damage to Iraq's missile program or any of its chemical, biological, radio- logical, and nuclear programs. Second, he points out that they have lied to the UN and the world every time it was suitable for them in regards to increasing the probability that they would use these kinds of weapons. He also 4 points out that Iran's conventional weakness pushes it toward the threat or use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, and Saddam Hussein took massive risks in- volved. So he thinks if Saddam is in a more weakened state that perhaps it increases the risk of some attack, and then he also said Iraq May have the capability to attack agriculture as well as hu- mans. I, for one, have been trying to convince this administration and my colleagues in the past administration of the danger of agriterrorism. It is so easy to do, and I want to thank you for in- cluding that in your testimony. Finally, the U.S. cannot count on Iraq ceasing to proliferate sim- ply because of regime change. So much of the time we hear, Madam Chairwoman, that if we aid and assist in a change of re- gime, it automatically assumes that this threat would be lessened. As Dr. Cordesman has pointed out, that May be true, but it also May not be true. On the very last Page of Mr. Duelfer's testimony, here is what Saddam says: “If the world tells us to abandon all of our weapons and keep only our swords, we will do that. We will destroy all the weapons if they destroy all their weapons. But if they keep a rifle and then tell me I have the right to possess only a sword, then we would say no. As long as the rifle has become a means to defend our country against anybody who May have designs against it, then we will try our best to acquire the rifle.” We all know what “the rifle” means in regards to what their capability would be. Mr. Duelfer goes on to say, as our other witness did also, of course, that the difference in the regime is everything. The present regime in Baghdad will not give up their weapons of mass destruc- tion, even if inspectors go in again. The present regime will also remain quite willing to use them. Now, that is not an emerging threat, that is a threat. So with those comments, Madam Chairwoman, I again apologize, and I thank the witnesses. Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator Roberts, and I want to thank you for your able leadership over the last several years. I ap- preciate the contribution that you continue to make to this sub- committee's work. Let me begin by just reviewing very briefly the focus of our sub- committee for this year, because it goes without saying that we are living in dangerous times. It is the mission of this subcommittee to focus first on the likely threats that we face, not just the likely threats, but every threat, and second, on our capabilities, or the ca- pabilities that our Military and our Nation need to protect us from those threats. We will help our Congress through the work of this subcommittee to hopefully fashion our Defense budgets to reflect the realities of those threats, and the capabilities that are nec- essary. In our subcommittee hearings over the next several weeks, there- fore, we will focus on the most urgent threats—proliferation and terrorism. We will explore how our Armed Forces can build their capabilities to more effectively counter extremists and groups who would strike out against Americans using weapons of mass destruc- tº. or conventional terrorism on the scale of the September 11 at- tacks. 7 world's experts conclude that Baghdad has reconstituted its prohibited WMD pro- gram, and it is suspected that Baghdad has active chemical and biological weapons programs. We also know that Iraq has rebuilt portions of its missile production facilities, and has ºp. to purchase numerous dual-use items, supposedly for legitimate civil- ian use. However, I would not be surprised if these dual-use items were being di- verted to further Iraq's WMD program capabilities. Iraq is also known to be aggres- sively pursuing a nuclear capability, and continues to acquire and develop advanced conventional weapons. With that said, the on-going challenge is to find ways to better understand the capabilities that Iraq currently has, and to determine and explore what strategic op- tions exist to stop this proliferation now and in the future. The more we know, the ºr we are able to deter and detect terrorist activities similar to the events of 11. I do not believe that we will solve this action today, but I find it encouraging to see the United Nations Security Council and this administration engaged in this issue. I thank you for taking the time to testify before this subcommittee and I look forward to hearing your candid assessments of Iraq's WMD program, and hope to ain some additional insight into measures that can be taken to stop Iraq's pro- iferation. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. We will begin, Dr. Cordesman, with your testimony. STATEMENT OF DR. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH BURKE CHAIR AND SENIOR FELLOW, STRATEGIC ASSESS- MENT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Dr. CORDESMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. If you do not mind, I will ask that my formal statement and the attachments be included in the record and will just comment on a few points which I think May serve as an introduction. One thing we have to remember is that we have made almost three decades' worth of effort to fight proliferation in the Middle East. We May be focusing on current developments; but I can re- member going to the battlefields after the October War and finding them covered with chemical Defense gear for two sides which were prepared as far back as 1973 to begin a serious chemical war. In fact, Egypt used chemical weapons in Yemen as far back as the 1960S. Nations like Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Israel, Libya, Syria, and others have now been proliferating consistently for decades, so we are not talking about something which can be tied to a single country or even to a single part of the Middle East, and it certainly cannot be tied to a single type of weapon. I think, however, that virtually everyone would agree that Sad- dam Hussein has both been extraordinarily dedicated to prolifera- tion and has been willing to make it the focus of his Military capa- bilities and his state. It is particularly worthwhile, I think, to point out that during the Gulf War Saddam Hussein went so far as to prepare a launch-under-attack capability to use chemical or biologi- cal weapons. It was a crude capability. It involved dispersing weapons where they could be used to arm aircraft, although it May have involved some dispersal of missile warheads. But the fact that he was will- ing to go this far, and was willing to intermingle chemical and bio- logical weapons with conventional weapons and with very unclear ºns between types, indicates the level of risk he is willing to take. 12 The four most serious uncertainties, however, are not matters of what weapons Iraq has or how it might use them, but rather ones relating to the strategic options open to the U.S. First, they are whether U.S. containment can be successful in pre- venting Iraq from exploiting its CBRN capabilities. If the U.S. should lose its ability to enforce Operations Northern and Southern Watch and freedom of action in strik- ing at those Iraqi capabilities it can identify, the answer is clearly no. The same May well be true if UN sanctions erode to the point where Iraq has much greater freedom of action in importing dual use items. The second uncertainty is whether any new round of UN inspections can really be successful in stopping Iraqi proliferation. The answer is probably no. They might well be able to stop Iraq from major development of missiles and their deployment, large-scale production of chemical weapons, and producing fissile material in any significant amounts. They cannot affect Iraq's technology base, they cannot hope to detect a covert biological program with nuclear lethalities, and they cannot hope to prevent Iraq from assembling a nuclear device if it can obtain fissile or “dirty” fissile material from outside Iraq. In fact, efforts directed at large, observable Iraqi CBRN and missile activities May simply push Iraqi into concentrating on biological weap- ons and asymmetric means of delivery. Third, it is uncertain that the U.S. can now do a more effective job of targeting Iraqi missile and CBRN facilities and weapons than it did during the Gulf War and Operation Desert Fox, in spite of the impressive advances in U.S. targeting and strike capabilities demonstrated in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Iraq is expert at cam- ouflage, deception and the use of decoys, exploits dispersal and movement (shell games), creating duplicate and back-up systems, and creating small covert facilities. Preserving such residual capabilities would be particularly important in the case of biological and nuclear weapons. Finally, the U.S. cannot count on Iraq ceasing to proliferate simply because of re- gime change—even if the new regime initially appears to do so. Iraq is a highly na- tionalistic country that exists in a region where Iran, Israel, Pakistan, India, Syria, and Egypt are also proliferators. As is the case with a number of Asian powers like South Korea and Taiwan, Iraq May at a minimum preserve a sudden breakout capa- bility in an area like biological weapons almost regardless of regime. 13 The Military Balance in the Guif 2/21/02 Page ii Table of Contents TRENDS IN THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE - OvEE.viEw................................................................................................ l IRAQI VS. NEIGHBORING FORCES IN 2002 - PART oNE................................................................................................ IRAQI vs. NEIGHBORING FORCES (N 2002 - PART ONE.................................................................................................... 4. GULF MILITARY FORCES IN 2002 - PART ONE................................................................................................................5 GULF MILITARY FORCES IN 2002 - PART ONE................................................................................................................. 6 MAJOR MEASURES OF COMBATEQUIPMENT STRENGTH - 2002......................................... TOTALGULF MILITARY MANPOWER BY SERVICE - 2002................................................................................................ 8 TOTALACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER IN GULFARMIES IN 2002................................................................................... 9 TOTALGULF OPERATIONAL ARMORED FICHTING VEHICLES - 2002............................................................................ 10 TOTALOPERATIONALTANKS IN ALL GULF FORCES 1990-2002.............................................. MEDIUM TO HIGH QUALITY MAIN BATTLE TANKS BY TYPE IN 2002............................ ADVANCED ARMORED INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES, RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES, SCOUT VEHICLES AND LIGHT TANKS BYTYPE IN 2002..… 13 TOTAL GULFSELF-PROPELLED, TOWARD AND MULTIPLE LAUNCHER GULF ARTILLERY BY CATEGORY - 2002..... 14 GULF INVENTORY OF Towed ARTILLERY BY CALIBER IN 2002............................................................................ ...15 GULF INVENTORY OF SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY BY CALIBER IN 2002..... .16 GULF INVENTORY OF MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS BY CALIBER IN 2002................................................................ l7 – TOTAL GULFAIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE MANPOWER – 2002.............................................................--------------------- 18 TOTALOPERATIONAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT INALL GULF FORCES 1990-2002................................................ .19 GULF HIGH AND MEDIUM QUALITY FIXED WING FIGHTER, FIGHTER ATTACK, ATTACK, STRIKE, AND MULTI-RolE COMBAT AIRCRAFT BYTYPE - 2002........................................................... -------------------------------------------------------------------- 20 GULF MEDUMQUALITY FIXED WING FIGHTER, FIGHTER ATTACK, ATTACK, STRIKE, AND MULTI-ROLE COMBAT AIRCRAFT BYTYPE - 2001.....................…......................................................................…............. 21 GULF LOW QUALITY FIXED WING FIGHTER, FIGHTER ATTACK, ATTACK, STRIKE, AND MULTI-ROLE COMBAT AIRCRAFT BYTYPE - 2002...... GULF RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT IN 2002.................................................................................................................. 23 SENSOR, AWACS, C4I, EW AND ELINT AIRCRAFT IN 2002.......................................................................................... 24 GULF ATTACK HELICOPTERS IN 2002.............................. …~~~~25 GULF LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN 2002....................................... 26 TOTALGULF NAVAL MANPOWER IN 2002........................................................................................…......................... GULF NAVAL SHIPS BY CATEGORY IN 2002.............................................. GULF WARSHIPS WITH ANTI-SHIP MISSILES IN 2002..................................................................................................... GULF MINE WARFARE SHIPS IN 2002................................................................................…........…. 30 GULFAMPHIBIOUS WARFARESHIPS IN 2002.................................................................................................... 31 GULF NAVAL AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS AIRCRAFT IN 2002................................................................................... 3 GULFARMS BUYS BY SUPPLIER: l987-2000........................................................................................................... ... 33 TOTAL GULF NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS FROM THE GULF WAR TO 2000. ...34 TOTALGULF NEW ARMS DELIVERIES FROM THE GULF WAR TO 2000.... ...3 TOTAL GULF NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES 1997-2000..... - IRAQ-OVERVIEw...................….......…. 37 IRAQI DEPENDENCE on DECAYISC, OBSOLETE. OR OBsolesCeNT MAJOR WEAPONS................................................ 38 Land Forces.…...…........….. 38 IRAQ'S MASSIVE MILITARY EFFORT BEFORE THE GULF WAR ...................................................................................... 39 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 20 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 6 Gulf Military Forces in 2002 - Part One Iran Iraq Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi UAE Yermen Arabia" Total Naval Manpower 38,000” 2,000 1,000 2,000 4,200 l,730 15,500 2,000 1,500 Regular Navy 15,400 2,000 1,000 2,000 4,200 1,730 l2,500 2,000 1,500 Naval Guards 20,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Marines 2,600 - - - - - 3,000 - - Major Surface Combatants Missile 3 0 3 0 0 0 8 + 0 Other 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 Patrol Craft - Missile 10 l 6 10 6 7 9 8 4. (Revolutionary Guards) 10 - - - - - - - - Other 42 5 4 0 7 - 17 6 5 Revolutionary Guards (Boats) 40 - - - - - - - Submarines 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 () Mine Vessels 7 3 0 O 0 0 7 0 6 Amphibious Ships 9 0 0 0 l 0 0 0. l Landing Craft 9 - 4 2 4. 0 8 5 5 Support Ships 22 2 5 4. 4 - 7 2 2 Naval Air 2,000 - - - - - - - - Naval Aircraft Fixed Wing Combat 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MRIMPA 10 0. 0 0 (7) 0 0 0 0 Armed Helicopters 19 0 0 0 0 0 21 (8) O SAR Helicopters 0 0 0 0 0 4 (6). 0 Mine Warfare Helicopters 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. Other Helicopters 19 - 2 - - - 6 Note: Equipment in storage shown in the higher figure in parenthesis or in range. Air Force totals include all helicopters, including army operated weapons, and all heavy surface-to-air missile launchers. * Iranian Total includes roughly l00,000 Revolutionary Guard actives in land forces and 20,000 in naval forces. ** Saudi Totals for reserve include National Guard Tribal Levies. The Total for land forces includes active National Guard equipment. These additions Total 450 AIFVS, 730(l,540) APCs, and 70 towed artillery weapons. *** Total tanks include tanks in storage or conversion. **** Includes navy, army, national Guard, and royal flights, but not paramilitary. ***** Includes in Air Defense Command Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from interviews, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance (IISS, London); Jane's Sentinel, Periscope; and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance in the Middle East (JCSS, Tel Aviv) Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 8 Total Gulf Military Manpower By Service - 2002 6OOOCO S00000 400000 H. H. - - 300000 2OOOOO 1 OOOOO Saudi 1 S500 l6ooo 20000 7SOOO 7SOOO UAE 2000 Kuwait 2OOO 2SOO 11000 Bahrain l000 1500 8500 Iran l8000 1 SOOO 4SOOO L2SOOO 32SOOO Iraq 2OOO l7000 30000 375000 L - Air Def [] Air D. Guard - 4000 59000 Source: Estimated by Anthony H. Cordesman using data from the IISS Military Balance, the on-line edition of Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, and the on-line edition of Periscope. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 23 The Military Balance in the Gulf 500000 450000 400000 350000 300000 25OOOO 200000 l50000 l00000 50000 2. 2 Total Active Military Manpower in Gulf Armies in 2002 (Total includes Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Saudi National Guard, and Omani Royal Guard) E Total m Regular O Tº Saudi - - Iran Iraq Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen La Total 4500001375,000 150000 8500 11 OOO 31 500 8500 59000 49000 * Regular 325000 |375000 || 75000 || 8500 | 1 l000 |25000 8500 59000 || 49000 Source: Estimated by Anthony H. Cordesman using data from various editions of the IISS Military Balance, Military Technology Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. Jane's Sentinel, and 32 The Military Balance in the Gulf 22102 Page 18 Total Gulf Air Force and Air Defense Manpower – 2002 50000 45000 40000 +- 35000 - Iran Iraq Saudi || Bahrain | Kuwait Qatar UAE Yemen C. Air 30000 || 30000 || 20000 1500 2500 47 CO 1500 4000 3500 - Air Def 15000 || 17000 || 16000 - - - - - Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS. Military Balance. Peliscope JCSS. Middle East Milºry Balanc: Jane's Sentinel, and Jane's Defense Weekly and material provided by US experts. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, ail rights reserved. 34 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2,21/02 Page 20 Gulf High and Medium Quality Fixed Wing Fighter, Fighter Attack, Attack, Strike, and Multi-Role Combat Aircraft By Type - 2002 400 300 250 2OO 1 SO 1 OO 50 Saudi Arabia 22 85 4.5 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance. Periscoce. JCSS. Middle Eas; Military and lace's Defense Weekly and material provided by US experts. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 36 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 22 Gulf Low Quality Fixed Wing Fighter, Fighter Attack, Attack, Strike, and Multi-Role Combat Aircraft By Type - 2002 I2O 80 40 20 i. UAE Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Arabia Qatar 12 Source: Adapted by Anthory H. Cordesman from :he IISS. Military Balancz, Periscope. CSS, Mi and lace's Defense Weekly, and material provided by US experts. • s— Jane's Sentimel. º -- Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. The Military Balance in the Gulf 2:21 IO2 Page 23 Gulf Reconnaissance Aircraft in 2002 2O Saudi 10 Iraq Ornan Qatar UAE Bahrain | Kuwait Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS. Military Balance, Periscope, JCSS, Mi and Jane's Defense Weekly. and material provided by US experts. Military Balarce. Jane's Sentinel, Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, ail rights reserved. 38 The Military Balance in the Gulf 221/02 Sensor, AWACS, C4I, EW and Elint Aircraft in 2002 0 - - Iran Iraq Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Yemen s PF3F 5 I tº E-3A Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the SIS.S. Military Balance. Periscope. JCSS, Middle East Military Balance. Jane's Sentinel. and jar: . Defense Weekly and material provided by US experts. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 39 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2:21/02 Page 25 Gulf Attack Helicopters in 2002 80 60 40 Saudi 6 •) Bahrain Kuwait Oman UAE Qatar 15 12 18 Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS. Militar Balance. Periscope, JCSS. Middle East Miłitur Ralance . Jare's Sentine; and Jan: Defense Weekly, and material provided by US experts. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 41 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 27 Total Gulf Naval Manpower in 2002 40000 35000 3COOO 2SGOC 20000 1S000 1 OCOO SOOO O ---. —l - --- ‘...: -: :* Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yermen 2500 20000 1 S400 2000 12SO0 000 2000 4200 1730 2000 1 500 Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Militury Balance, Periscope. JCSS, Middle East Military Balance. Jane's Fignting Ships. 2000-200l, Jane's Sentipei, and Jane's Defense Weekly, and material provided by US experts. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21:02 Page 29 Gulf Warships with Anti-Ship Missiles in 2002 25 20 Iran Saudi 4. 8ahrain | Kuwait Oman UAE 4 l Iraq Qatar 3 2 with Exocet with Skua Craft with C-801 Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS. Military Balance, Periscope, JCSS, Midd Ships. 2000-200l, Jane's Sentirel, and Jane's Defense Weekly... and material provided by US experts. , Jane's Fighting Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved 44 The Military Baiance in the Gulf 2/2. O2 Page 30 Gulf Mine Warfare Ships in 2002 †. : É. -- * †T. Bahran T.Kºwalº Tºoman I Satar I UAE EYEMEN a Mine Countermeasure 7 | 4. | 7 | o | 0 | o | O I O I 6 Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesmar from the IISS. Military Balance. Periscope. JCSS. Middle East Military Balance. Jane's Fighting Ships, 2000-200l, Jane's Sentinel. and Jane's Defense Weekly... and material provided by US experts Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 45 The Military Baiance in the Gulf 2:21:02 Page 3| Gulf Amphibious Warfare Ships in 2002 30 25 + 20 + 15 - 10 + - - - 5 - - -- - - - tº: £º O - --- - --~~ tran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen ls Landing Craft 17 8 4 2 I + T 5 2 la Amohibious Shics 9 —l 1 Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS. Military Balance, Periscope. JCSS, Mi Ships, 2000-2002, Jane's Senfinel, and Lane's Defense Weekly... and material provided by US expers. - Copyright Acthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 46 The Military Balance in the Gulf 221:02 Page 3 2 Gulf Naval Aircraft and Helicopters Aircraft in 2002 30 25 Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar º Total 40 0 31 0 0 0 8 15 0 Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the (ISS, Military Balancs. Periscope. JCSS, M. Ships, 2000-2001, Jane's Sentinel, and Jace's Defense Weekly, and material provided by US experts. -º-, Jane's Fighting Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights rescryed. 47 The Military Baiance in the Gulf Buyer Country- Iran 1987.90 1991-94 tgºs-98 1996-99 1997-2000 traq 1987.90 1991-94 1995-98 1996.99 1997.2000 Bahrain tg87.90 1991-94 tº 5.98 1996-99 1997-2000 Kuwait tºgº.90 1991-94 1995-98 1996-99 1997-2000 Oman 1987.90 1991-94 1995-98 1996-39 1997-2000 Qatar 1987.90 1991-94 1995-98 1996.99 1997-2000 Saudi Arabia 1987-90 1991-94 1995-98 1996-99 1997.2000 UAE 1987-90 1991-94 1995-98 tºº.6-99 1997-2000 0 = less :han S50::::::ion or nil. and ai; data rounded to the nearest S100 million, - Transfers ::, th --- Supplier Country Gulf Arms Buys by Supplier: 1987-2000 (New arms agreements in current US Smillions) !.S. : : 300 500 700 : 800 500 i : 18.800 15,600 5,100 5.500 4,300 300 300 100 300 6,800 Source: Richard F. Grimmer. Russia. China 3,500 2,300 200 200 200 800 200 800 300 600 300 700 0 o 0 o o o 0 o 0 o o o 0 o o o 0 o 200 0 800 o 0. 200 0. 200 0 200 0 O o 0 0 o o 0 0 0 o o 0 0. o 0. 0. 0 0 O 200 300 0 o o o 0. O 0 0. o o 500 0 400 0. 400 0 800 - Major West European i : 200 i.800 700 100 0 300 3,900 6,000 6,000 6,000 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. Other European 1.200 too 300 too 100 º : * º : All Qthers Total 1,600 8.800 6co 1.200 ico 1.200 Q 1.100 2C0 i.300 1,000 3,000 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 o 0. 300 0 200 0 :00 0 500 0 700 200 3,300 100 6.2 o 1,900 o 1.100 0. 700 0 700 100 600 100 500 o 400 9 400 c d 0 2,000 o 900 0 800 0 0 200 44,800 0 22.300 300 7.000 300 7.100 300 5,700 400 1,000 0 4,800 100 7,400 200 7.7C0 2 14,000 48 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2,21/02 Page 34 Total Gulf New Arms Agreements from the Gulf War to 2000 (scurrent US Millions) 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 l0,000 É Iran Iraq *::: Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen D. : 389-1992 || 6,700 l,800 26,700 300 2,900 800 700 2,000 1 C0 In l993-1996 || 7,200 l90 l8,800 300 4,300 700 2,200 5.000 7C0 D 1997-2000 i, 100 220 5,700 700 700 400 0 i 4,000 4CO 0 = less than $50 million or nii. and all data rounded t o the nearest S100 million. Source: Richard F. Crimrºnett. Conv at Arms ------ N:: Insfers to the Devel is, Congressional Research Service, various editions. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 49 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2.21/02 Page 35 Total Gulf New Arms Deliveries from the Gulf War to 2000 (scurrent US Millions) 120,000 l00,000 30,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0 T E_ ºi F-l ſ-l Iran Iraq Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Yemen D 1989-1992 || 6,300 5,500 29.600 500 2,000 200 3C0 2,900 l,200 - 1993-1996 || 2,600 190 31,900 200 4,600 1,200 0 3,700 400 D. 1997-2000 || 1,700 * 90 34,000 500 3,000 200 1,700 4,200 200 0 = less than $50 million or nil, and all data rounded to the neares: $100 million. Source: Richard F. Grimmett. vent: Arms T. - - Nations. Congressional Research Service, various editions. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 50 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 36 Total Gulf New Arms Agreements and Deliveries 1997-2000 ($Current US Millions) 18.000 16,000 $4,000 l2,000 10,000 8,000 S,000 4,000 2,000 Saudi Arabia J 700 700 700 400 o $4,000 400 - De1iv l6,200 500 3,000 200 3,700 4,200 200 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yermen 0 = less than $50 million or nil. and all data rounded to the nearest S100 million. Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Transfers :o the Deyeloping Nations. Congressional Research Service. various editions. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 51 P a g e 3 7 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Iraq - Overview • Iraqi purchases matched Saudi purchases during the mid-l980s, but Iraqi deliveries in current US dollars dropped from $ll billion annually during l988-1991 to below $200 million annually in 1992-l995. • Comparisons of Iraqi new agreements and arms deliveries by supplier country reveal a drastic decline in new agreements before the Gulf War that would have seriously compromised Iraq's import-dependent forces even without the Gulf War. • New agreements with Russia dropped from $l1,8 billion in l983-l986 to $4.l billion in l987-l990, before dropping to zero after 1991. • New agreements with China dropped from $l.7 billion in l983-l986 to $0.6 billion in l987-l990, before dropping to zero after 1991. • New agreements with E. Europe dropped from S4.0 billion in l983-l986 to Sl.0 billion in l987-l990, before dropping to zero after 1991, • In contrast, new agreements with the major West European States rose from $l.0 billion in l983-l986 to $2.7 billion in l987-l990, before dropping to “zero" for everything but minor deliveries of smuggled parts and equipment after 1991 -- reflecting Iraq's growing interest in advanced Military technology before the cutoff of arms imports. • In spite of various claims, Iraq's domestic production capability can only play a major role in allowing Iraq to sustain its modern weapons and ability to use advanced Military technology. Iraq remains an import dependent country. • Iraq's past pat-ern of arms imports makes it highly dependent on access to a wide range of suppliers -- particularly Western Europe and Russia. Even if one nation should resume supply, Iraq could not rebuild its Military machine without broad access to such suppliers and would be forced to convert a substantial amount of its order of battle to whatever supplier(s) were willing to sell. • In spite of some smaggling, Iraq has had negligible export earnings since l990, and faces significant long term limits on its ability to import even when sanctions are lifted. • Iraq will encounter severe problems after UN sanctions are lifted because of the inability of the FSU to provide efficient deliveries of spares and cost-effective upgrade and modernization packages. • No accurate data are available on Iraqi Military spending and arms imports since 1991, but estimates of trends in constant dollars, using adjusted US government data, strongly indicate that Iraq would need to spend sums approaching $20 billion to recapitalize its force structure. • Major modernizaticn efforts to counter US standards of capability could add $10 billion each to key modernization efforts like land-based air Defense, air Defense, air and missile strike capabilities, armored modernization, modernization of other land weapons, and reconstitution of the Iraqi Navy. Modernization to match Saudi levels of capability would be about half these totals. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 53 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 39 Iraq’s Massive Military Effort Before the Gulf War ($US Millions) 25 20 15 10 S O —: 1986 || 1987 1988 || 1989 || 1990 13.8 14 13.7 11 11.9 16.8 16.4 15.6 12 12.4 - - - - - 4.9 6 6.9 5.4 2.3 2.8 - l 6.1 7.3 6.9 6.1 2.5 2.9 0 = less than $50 million or mil, and all data rounded to the nearest $100 million. Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conyentional Armstransfers to the Deyeloping Nations. Congressional Research Service, various editions. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 54 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 40 The Iraqi Cumulative Arms Import Deficit Enforced by UN Sanctions (Measured in $US 0l Constant millions) 7OOOO —k—Imports Required to Sustain Pre-Gulf War 65659 Annual Average (1985- 1990) 60000 f —e—Imports Required to 596.96 Sustain 1990 Level 5372l ——Imports Required to 50000 + Sustain Post Gułf War Force 47752 —Imports Required to Sustain Post Gulf War 4l783 40000 +- Force and React to Lessons of the Gulf War 35814 36663 Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Xpenditures and Arms Transfers, various editions. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved 57 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 43 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 58 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page ii Table of Contents IRAQI WMD FORCE DEVELOPMENTS ........ *~~~~ ! CIA ESTIMATE OF IRAQI THREAT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF IRAQI THREAT........................................................................ 5 Objectives, Strategies, and Resources............................................................. 5 Nuclear Program ------------ 5 Biological Program............................................................................... ---- ..5 Chemical Program....... 6 Ballistic Missiles --------------- 6. Cruise Missiles and other Means of Delivery............................................................................................................. 7 OvErviEw of IRAQ: NBC AND MISSILE PROGRAMS................... ...8 Muclear…~… 8 Biological - -------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 Chemical.… 8 Ballistic Missiles............................. - ...8 Other Means of Delivery Available..... ...8 IRAQI COVERT BREAKOUT CAPABILITIES........................................................................................................................ 9 WHAT IS AT STAKE IN TERMS OF THE UNSCOM CRISIS IN IRAQ:................................................................................ 10 IRAQI BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM............................................ . 12 IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM ..... ------- -------------------- .13 IRAQ'S MAJOR USES OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS l983-l988 14 IRAQI BIOLOGICALWARFARE PROGRAM........................................................................................................................ 15 IRAQ'S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ............................................................................................... 16 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 59 Iraqi WMD Force Developments Iraq is currently under UN sanctions that include controls on its imports and how it uses its oil revenues, and which prohibit the sale or transfer of weapons and dual-use technology to Iraq. UNSCOM dismantled much of its missile holdings and production capabilities between 1991 and l998, as well as many of its stocks and capabilities to produce weapons of mass destruction. The US and Britain struck hard at Iraq's remaining missile production capabilities in Operation Desert Fox in December l998, Nevertheless, Table III.7 shows that Iraq retains significant capabilities to design and build long-range missiles, and biological and nuclear weapons. Although UNSCOM and the IAEA succeeded in destroying much of its capabilities, and virtually all of its fissile material production facilities, Iraq has managed to retain the capability to build missiles with ranges of l50 kilometers or less, and has exploited this situation to develop facilities which can rapidly be converted to the production of longer-range missiles. The sheer complexity and persistence of the Iraqi effort described in Table III.7 is a warming of what the current regime in Iraq May do if it can ever free itself of UN sanctions. It shows that Iraq continues to try to import dual-use components that can be used in the production of nuclear weapons, and much of its biological weapons equipment has never been found. It is also important to note that Iraq has persisted in such efforts at the cost of nearly a decade of sanctions, massive economic sacrifices, and the inability to import conventional arms. Table III.7 is a history of immense costs and immense sacrifices involving a full spectrum of massive programs - facts that are generally ignored by those who focus on the human costs of sanctions while ignoring the potential cost of not maintaining them. - The National Intelligence Council summarizes the Iraqi ballistic missile threat to the US as follows: “Although the Gulf war and subsequent United Nations activities destroyed much of Iraq's missile infrastructure, Iraq could test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States during the next 15 years. * After observing North Korean activities, Iraq most likely would pursue a three-stage Taepo Dong-2 approach to an ICBM (or SLV), which could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to parts of the United States. If Iraq could buy a Taepo Dong-2 from North Korea, it could have a launch capability within months of the purchase; if it bought Taepo Dong engines, it could tes: an ICBM by the Middle of the next decade. Iraq probably would take until the end of the next decade to develop the system domestically, * Although much less likely, most analysts believe that if Iraq were to begin development today, it could test a much less capable ICBM in a few years using Scud components and based on its prior SLV experience or on the Taepo Dong-l. * If it could acquire No Dongs from North Korea, Iraq could test a more capable ICBM alcng the same lines within a few years of the No Dong acquisition. * Analysts differ on the likely timing of Iraq's first flight test of an ICBM that could threaten the United States. Assessments include unlikely before 20l5; and likely before 20l5, possibly before 20l0–foreign assistance would affect the capability and timing." A CIA report in August 2000 summarized the state of proliferation in Iraq as followsii Since Operation Desert Fox in December l998, Baghdad has refused to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687. Although UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 284, adopted in December l999, established a follow-on inspection regime to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in the form of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC), there have been no UN inspections during this reporting period. Moreover, the automated video monitoring system installed by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq has been dismantled by the Iraqis. Having lost this on-the-ground access, it is difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the current state of Iraq's WMD programs. Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its missile production facilities. It has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. This equipment—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Since the suspension of UN inspections in December 1998, the risk of diversion has increased. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 60 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 2 Following Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities destroyed by the US oombing, to include several critical missile production complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities. In addition, it appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents. UNSCOM reported to thc Security Council in December l998 that Iraq continued to withhold information related to its CW and BW programs. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq War in the l980s as had been declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that Iraq May have an additional 6,000 CW munitions hidden. We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its WMD programs, although given its past behavior, this type of activity must be regarded as likely. We assess that since the suspension of UN inspections in December of l998, Baghdad has had the capability to reinitiate both its CW and BW programs within a few weeks to months, but without an inspection monitoring program, it is difficult to determine if Iraq has done so. We know, however, that Iraq has continued to work on its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which involves converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. These modified and refurbished L-29s are believed to be intended for delivery of chemical or biological agents. Iraq continues to pursue development of two SRBM systems which are not prohibited by the United Nations: the liquid-propellant Al-Samoud, and the solid-propellant Ababil-100. The Al-Samoud is essentially a scaled- down Scud, and the program allows Baghdad to develop technological improvements that could be applied to a longer range missile program. We believe that the Al-Samoud missile, as designed, is capable of exceeding the UN-permitted l50-km-range restriction with a potential operational range of about l80 kilometers. Personnel previously involved with the Condor II/Badr-2000 missile—which was largely destroyed during the Guif war and eliminated by UNSCOM-are working on tne Ababil-l00 program. If economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, Baghdad probably would attempt to convert these efforts into longer range missile systems, regardless of continuing UN monitoring and continuing restrictions on WMD and long-range missile programs. Once again, there is no way to determine whether Iraq will actually create such capabilities to strike the US. It does seems likely, however, that if Saddam Hussein or his immediate coterie remain in power that Iraqi will be an aggressive and revanchist state. This could take the form of an effort to create a missile threat to the US. Any Iraqi leadership with ambitions to seize the territory of another power in the region might conclude that Iraq would need a credible deterrent capability to strike the US in order to prevent the US from using its forces to halt Iraqi Military action. The sheer scale and cornplexity of the past Iraqi efforts shown in Table III.7 is a warning that Iraq is perfectly capable of acting in such a manner. At the same time, it is far from clear that a future Iraqi leadership will have the ambitions and attitudes of Saddam Hussein. Even a relatively hostile leadership might conclude that deploying ICBMs to strike the US would be so provocative that the US might preempt – as it did in striking Iraqi missile production facilities in December l999 during Operation Desert Fox. Such a regime might conclude that creating a regional capability to strike with missiles and weapons of mass destruction would hold the allies, power projection forces, and bases of the US as hostages without triggering the kind of reaction the US might make to a direct threat to its Homeland. Given the o-her major proliferators in the region -- which include India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Syria — even a regime that is not actively hostile to the US might continue to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles in spite of its agreements not to do so. At the same time, there is no way to predict that Iraq will pose such a threat, or the size, timing, and effectiveness, of any forces it May deploy. Iraq presents the same dilemma for NMD planning purposes as North Korea and Iran. There is no way that the justification for an NMD system can be built around the certainty of an Iraqi threat or tailored to some clear concept of what that threat will be. There equally is no way that the need for an NMD system can be dismissed because of the lack of a valid potential threat. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 62 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 4 be diverted for WMD purposes. Since the suspension of UN inspections in December l998, the risk of diversion has increased. After Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities destroyed by the US bombing, including several critical missile production complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities. In addition, Iraq appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents. - * * UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December l998 that Iraq also continued to withhold information related to its CW program. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq war in the l980s as had been declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that Iraq May have hidden an additional 6,000 CW munitions. - In l995, Iraq admitted to having an offensive BW program and submitted the first in a series of Full, Final, and Complete Disclosures (FFCDs) that were supposed to reveal the full scope of its BW program. According to UNSCOM, these disclosures are incomplete and filled with inaccuracies. Since the full scope and nature of Iraq's BW program was not verified, UNSCOM had assessed that Iraq continued to maintain a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time, if the decision is made to do so. In the absence of UNSCOM or other inspections and monitoring since late l998, we remain concerned that Iraq May again be producing biological warfare agents. Iraq has continued working on its L-29 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which involves converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. It is believed that Iraq has conducted flights of the L-29, possibly to test system improvements or to train new pilots. These refurbished trainer aircraft are believed to have been modified for delivery of chemical or, more likely, biological warfare agents. We believe that Iraq has probably continued low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient Source of fissile material remains Iraq's most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon. Although we were already concerned about a reconstituted nuclear weapons program, our concerns were increased last September when Saddam publicly exhorted his "Nuclear Mujahidin" to "defeat the enemy." Iraq continues to pursue development of SRBM systems that are not prohibited by the United Nations and May be expanding to longer-range systems. Pursuit of UN-permitted missiles continues to allow Baghdad to develop technological improvements and infrastructure that could be applied to a longer-range missile program. We believe that development of the liquid-propellant Al-Samoud SRBM probably is maturing and that a low-level operational capability could be achieved in the near term — which is further suggested by the appearance of four Al Samoud transporter-erector-launchers (TELS) with airframes at the 3l December Al Aqsa Cal parade. The solid-propellant missile development program May now be receiving a higher priority, and development of the Ababil-100 SRBM – two of such airframes and TELS were paraded on 3l December—and possibly longer range systems May be moving ahead rapidly. If economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, Baghdad probably would increase its attempts to acquire missile-related items from foreign sources, regardless of any future UN monitoring and continuing restrictions on long-range ballistic missile programs. Iraq probably retains a small, covert force of Scud-type missiles. - Iraq’s ACW acquisitions remain low due to the generally successful enforcement of the UN arms embargo. The weapons and ACW-related goods which have been delivered to Iraq tend to be smaller arms transported over porous land borders. Iraq continues, however, to aggressively seek ACW equipment and technology. Adapted from Statement by Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 3l December 2000, Report of September 2001. - Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 63 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 5 Department of Defense Intelligence Estimate of Iraqi Threat Objectives, Strategies, and Resources Iraq believes NBC weapons and ballistic missiles are necessary if it is to reach its goal of being the dominant power in the region. Since the end of the Gulf War, Baghdad steadfastly resisted the terms of the cease-fire agreement, which required it to cooperate with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA in identifying and eliminating Iraq's NBC and theater ballistic missile capabilities. Iraq's policy of deception and denial sparked numerous confrontations with UNSCOM and the IAEA over the years and culminated with the allied bombing of Iraq under Operation Desert Fox in December l998. Since late l998, Baghdad has refused to allow UN inspectors into Iraq as required by UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRS) 687,707, 7l5 and l284 (UNSCR l284, adopted in December l999, established a follow-on regime to UNSCOM called the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC]). As a result, there have been no UN inspections for over two years, and the automated monitoring systems installed by the UN at known and suspected Iraqi NBC and missile facilities are no longer operational. This abeyance of on- site inspections and our previous judgments about Iraqi intentions raise concerns that Iraq May have begun such reconstitution efforts and that it will again be able to threaten its neighbors. In support of these rebuilding efforts, Iraq is known to have attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items under the guise of legitimate civil use since the end of the Gulf War. - Iraq remains largely a petroleum-based economy. Prior to the l990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraq's petroleum sector accounted for 6l percent of its GDP and about $l4.5 billion in exports; per capita GDP was $2,270. UN sanctions subsequently were imposed on Iraq, and since then there has been a significant decline in Iraqi economic output. Increased illegal petroleum product exports since l996 and crude oil exports allowed by the UN since l997 have led to significant growth in the industrial and petroleum sectors since l996. However, under UNSCR l284, Iraq can export any volume of petroleum for humanitarian needs. Nonetheless, inflation fluctuates wildly depending on supply and demand, the political situation, and regime market manipulation; inflation estimates range from 90 to almost 300 percent. While oil exports are still a dominant economic force in Iraq, Iraqi per cap-ita GDP was reported to have dropped to $587 by l999. Despite these severe pressures on its economy, Saddam Hussein's government continues to devote Iraqi resources to rebuilding certain portions of its NBC weapons and missile infrastructure. Nuclear Program Iraq has ratified the NPT. Nevertheless, before the Gulf War, Iraq had a comprehensive nuclear weapons development program that was focused on building an implosion-type device. The program was linked to a ballistic missile project that was the intended delivery system. From April 1991 to December l998, Iraqi nuclear aspirations were held in check by IAEA/ UNSCOM inspections and monitoring. All known weapons-grade fissile material was removed from the country. Although Iraq claims that it destroyed all of the specific equipment and facilities useful for developing nuclear weapons, it still retains sufficient skilled and experienced scientists and engineers as well as weapons design information that could allow it to restart a weapons program. Iraq would need five or more years and key foreign assistance to rebuild the infrastructure to enrich enough material for a nuclear weapon. This period would be substantially shortened should Baghdad successfully acquire fissile material from a foreign Source. Biological Program Iraq’s continued refusal to disclose fully the extent of its biological program suggests that Baghdad retains a biological warfare capability, despite its membership in the BWC. After four and one-half years of claiming that it had conducted only “defensive research" on biological weapons Iraq declared reluctantly, in 1995, that it had produced approximately 30,000 liters of bulk biological agents and-or filled munitions. Iraq admitted that it produced anthrax, botulinum toxins and aflatoxins and that it prepared biological agent-filled munitions, including missile warheads and aerial bombs. However, UNSCOM believed that Iraq had produced substantially greater amounts than it has admitted —three to four times greater. Iraq also admitted that, during the Persian Gulf War, it had deployed biological agent-filled munitions to air-fields and that these weapons were intended for use against Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 64 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 6 Israel and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. Iraq stated that it destroyed all of these agents and munitions in 1991, but it has provided insufficient credible evidence to support this claim. The UN believes that Baghdad has the ability to reconstitute its biological warfare capabilities within a few weeks or months, and, in the absence of UNSCOM inspections and monitoring during l999 and 2000, we are concerned that Baghdad again May have produced some biological warfare agents. Chemical Program Since the Gulf War, Baghdad has rebuilt key portions cf its industrial and chemical production infrastructure; it has not become a state party to the CWC. Some of Iraq's facilities could be converted fairly quickly to production of chemical warfare agents. Following Operation Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a rapid reconstruction effort on those facilities to - include former dual-use chemical warfare-associated production facilities, destroyed by U.S. bombing. In I999, Iraq May have begun installing or repairing dual-use equipment at these and other chemical War-fare-related facilities. Previously, Iraq was known to have produced and stockpiled mustard, tabun, sarin, and VX, some of which likely remain hidden. It is likely that an additional quantity of various precursor chemicals also remains hidden. In late l998, UNSCOM reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq continued to withhold information related to its chemical program. UNSCOM cited an example where Baghdad seized from inspectors a document discovered by UNSCOM inspectors, which indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many chem-cal munitions during the Iran-Iraq War as had been declared previously by Baghdad. This document suggests that Iraq May have an additional 6,000 chemical munitions hidden. Similarly, UNSCOM discovery in l998 of evidence of VX in Iraqi missile warheads showed that Iraq had lied to the international community for seven years when it repeatedly said that it had never weaponized VX. Iraq retains the expertise, once a decision is made, to resume chemical agent production within a few weeks or months, depending on the type of agent. However, foreign assistance, whether commercial procurement of dual-use technology, key infrastructure, or other aid, will be necessary to completely restore Iraq's chemical agent production capabilities to pre-Desert Storm levels. Iraqi doctrine for the use of chemical weapons evolved during the Iran-Iraq War, and was fully incorporated into Iraqi offensive operations by the end of the war in I988. During different stages of that war, Iraq used aerial bombs, artillery, rocket launchers, tactical rockets, and sprayers mounted in helicopters to deliver agents against Iranian forces. It also used chemical agents against Kurdish elements of its own civilian population in l988. Ballistic Missiles Iraq likely retains a limited number of launchers and SCUD-variant SRBMs capable of striking its neighbors, as well as the components and manufacturing means to assemble and produce others, anticipating the reestablishment of a long-range ballistic missile force sometime in the future. Baghdad likely also has warheads capable of delivering chemical or biological agents. While Iraq's missile production infrastructure was damaged during the December l998 strikes, Iraq retains domestic expertise and sufficient infrastructure to support most missile component production, with the exception of a few critical subelements. During l999, Iraq continued to work on :he two short-range ballistic missile systems that fall within the l50- kilometer range restriction imposed 3y the UN: the liquid-propellant Al Samoud and the solid-propellant Ababil- l00. The Al-Samoud is essentially a scaled-down SCUD, and work on it allows Baghdad to develop technological capabilities that could be applied to a longer-range missile program. We believe that the Al Samoud missile, as designed by the Iraqis, has an inherent potential to exceed the l50-kilometers range restriction imposed under UNSCR 687, Iraqi personnel involved with pre-Desert Storm ballistic missile efforts are working on the Ababil-100 SRBM program. - Once economic sanctions against Iraq are lifted, unless restricted by future UN monitoring, Baghdad probably will begin converting these efforts into longer-range missile systems. Despite the damage done to Iraq's missile infrastructure during the Gulf War, Desert Fox, and subsequent UNSCOM activities, Iraq MAY have ambitions for longer-range missiles, including an ICBM. Depending on the success of acquisition efforts and degree of foreign support, it is possible that Iraq could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 20l5 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 65 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 7 Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery Iraq May have a very limited stockpile of land-launched short-range anti-ship cruise missiles and air-launched short- range tactical missiles that it purchased from China and France prior to the Gulf War. These are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. Iraq also has a variety of fighter aircraft, helicopters, artillery, and rockets available as potential means of delivery for NBC weapons, although their operational status is questionable due to the cumulative effects of the UN arms embargo. However, Iraq has continued to work on its UAV program, which involves converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. These modified and refurbished L-29s May be intended for the delivery of chemical or biological agents. In the future, Iraq May try to use its research and development infrastructure to produce its own UAVS and cruise missiles or, should the UN arms embargo be lifted, it could try to purchase cruise missiles. Source: Adapted by Anthony H, Cordesman from Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Washington DC, Department of Defense, January 200I Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 66 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page Overview of Iraq: NBC and Missile Programs Nuclear * Had comprehensive nuclear weapons development program prior to Operation Desert Storm. Infrastructure suffered considerable damage from Coalition bombing and IAEA dismantlement. * Retains scientists, engineers, and nuclear weapons design information; without fissile material, would need five or more years and significant foreign assistance to rebuild program and produce nuclear devices, less time would • be needed if sufficient fissile material were acquired illicitly. • Ratified the NPT, has not signed the CTBT. Biological * Produced and weaponized significant quantities of biological warfare agents prior to Desert Storm. • Admitted biological warfare effort in l995, after four years of denial; claimed to have destroyed all agents, but * offered no credible proof. * May have begun program reconstitution in absence of UN inspections and monitoring. * Acceded to the BWC. Chemical * Rebuilt some of its chemical production infrastructure allegedly for commercial use. • UNSCOM discovered evidence of wxpersistent nerve agent in missile warheads in l998, despite Iraqi denials for * seven years that it had not weaponized VX. - May have begun program reconstitution in absence of UN inspections and monitoring. * Has not signed the CWC. Ballistic Missiles * Probably retains limited number of SCUD-variant missiles, launchers, and warheads capable of delivering * biological and chemical agents. Retains significant missile production capability. • Continues work on liquid- and solid-propellant SRBMs (l50 kilometers) allowed by UNSCR 687; likely will use * technical experience gained for future longer range missile development effort. * Not a member of the MTCR. Other Means of Delivery Available * Land-launched anti-ship cruise missiles; air-launched tactical missiles; none have NBC warheads; stockpile likely "... is very limited. • Air systems: fighters, helicopters, UAVS. * Ground systems: artillery, rockets. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 67 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 9 Iraqi Covert Break Out Capabilities UNSCOM and the IAEA'S success have created new priorities for Iraqi proliferation. The UN'S success in destroying the large facilities Iraq needs to produce fissile materials already May well have led Iraq to focus on covert cell-like activities to manufacture highly lethal biological weapons as a substitute for nuclear weapons. All of the biological agents Iraq had at the time of the Gulf War seem to have been “wet" agents with limited storage life and limited operational lethality. Iraq May have clandestinely carried out all of the research necessarily to develop a production capability for dry, storage micro-power weapons which would be far easier to clandestinely stockpile, and have much more operational lethality. Iraq did not have advanced binary chemical weapons and most of its chemical weapons used unstable ingredients. Iraq has illegally imported specialized glassware since the Gulf War, and May well have developed advanced binary weapons and tested them in small numbers. It May be able to use a wider range of precursors and have developed plans to produce precursors in Iraq. It May have improved its technology for the production of VX gas. Iraq is likely to covertly exploit Western analyses and critiques of its pre-War proliferation efforts to correct many of the problems in the organization of its proliferation efforts, its weapons design, and its organization for their use. Iraq bombs and warheads were relatively crude designs which did not store chemical and biological agents well and which did a poor job of dispersing them. Fusing and detonation systems did a poor job of ensuring detonation at the right height and Iraq made little use of remote sensors and weather models for long-range targeting and strike planning. Iraq could clandestinely design and test greatly improve shells, bombs, and warheads. The key tests could be conducted using towers, simulated agents, and even indoors. Improved targeting, weather sensors, and other aids to strike planning are dual-use or civil technologies that are not controlled by UNSCOM. The net impact would weapons that could be 5-10 times more effective than the relatively crude designs Iraq had rushed into service under the pressure of the Iran-Iraq War. UNSCOM and the IAEA'S success give Iraq an equally high priority to explore ways of obtaining fissile material from the FSU or other potential supplier country and prepare for a major purchase effort the moment sanctions and inspections are lifted and Iraq has the hard currency to buy its way into the nuclear club. Iraq could probably clandestinely assemble all of the components of a large nuclear device except the fissile material, hoping to find some illegal Source of such material. The components for cruise missiles are becoming steadily more available on the commercial market, and Iraq has every incentive to create a covert program to examine the possibility of manufacturing or assembling cruise missiles in Iraq. UN inspections and sanctions May also drive Iraq to adopt new delivery methods ranging from clandestine delivery and the use of proxies to sheltered launch-on-warning capabilities designed to counter the US advantage in airpower. Iraq can legally maintain and test missiles with ranges up to l50 kilometers. This allows for exoatmospheric reentry testing and some testing of improved guidance systems. Computer simulation, wind tunnel models, and production engineering tests can all be carried out clandestinely under the present inspection regime. It is possible that Iraq could develop dummy or operational high explosive warheads with shapes and weight distribution of a kind that would allow it to test concepts for improving its warheads for weapons of mass destruction. The testing of improved bombs using simulated agents would be almost impossible to detect as would the testing of improved spray systems for biological warfare. Iraq has had half a decade in which to improve its decoys, dispersal concepts, dedicated command and control links, targeting methods, and strike plans. This kind of passive warfare planning is impossible to forbid and monitor, but ultimately is as important and lethal as any improvement in hardware. There is no evidence that Iraq made an effort to develop specialized chemical and biological devices for covert operations, proxy warfare, or terrorist use. It would be simple to do so clandestinely and they would be simple to manufacture. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 68 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 10 What is At Stake in Terms of the UNSCOM Crisis in Iraq: Summary of the Iraqi Threat Reported in the Note by the Secretary General, “Report of the Secretary- General on the Activities of the Special Commission,” S-1997-774, October 6, l997 * Analysis had shown that Iraq had destroyed 83 of the 85 missiles it had claimed were destroyed. at the same time, it stated that Iraq had not given an adequate account of its proscribed missile assets, including launchers, warheads, and propellants. It also stated that Tariq Aziz, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, “gave an explicit order in the presence of the Executive Chairman, to the Iraqi experts not to discuss such issues with the Chairman.” • Iraq had continued to lie regarding the way in which it has destroyed its pre-War inventory of missile launchers, and major uncertainties remained over its holdings of biological and chemical missile warheads. Iraq initially claimed that it had 45 missile warheads filled with chemical weapons in l992. It then stated that it had 20 chemical and 25 biological warheads in l995. UNSCOM established that it had a minimum of 75 operational warheads and 5 used for trials. It has evidence of the existence of additional warheads. It can only verify that 16 warheads were filled with Sarin, and 34 with chemical warfare binary components, and that 30 were destroyed under its supervision -- 16 with Sarin and 14 with binary components. Iraq again failed to provide documentation on this issue in September, l997. • It continued to conceal documents describing its missile propellants, and the material evidence relating to its claims to have destroyed its indigenous missile production capabilities indicated in might has destroyed less than a tenth of what it claimed. * “The Commission identified some other areas of concern related to Iraq’s chemical weapons program. The most important among them are the accounting for special missile warheads intended for filling with chemical or biological warfare agent, the material Balance of some 550 l55 mm mustard gas shells, the extent of VX programs, and the rationale for the acquisition of various types of chemical weapons.” • UNSCOM stated that it had been able to destroy l20 pieces of additional equipment for the production of chemical weapons that Iraq had only disclosed in August, l997. Major uncertainties still existed regarding some 4,000 tons of declared precursors for chemical weapons, the production of several hundred tons of additional chemical warfare agents, the consumption of chemical precursors, and Iraq's claims to have unilaterally destroyed some l30 tons of chemical warfare agents. Major uncertainties existing regarding I07,500 empty casings for chemical weapons, whether several thousand additional chemical weapons were filled with agents, the unilateral destruction of 15, 620 weapons, and the fate of l6,038 additional weapons Iraq claimed it had discarded. “The margin of error" in the accounting presented by Iraq is in the neighborhood of 200 munitions.” * The uncertainties affecting the destruction of VX gas affect some 750 tons of imported precursor chemicals, and 55 tons of domestically produced precursors. Iraq has made unverifiable claims that 460 tons were destroyed by Coalition air attacks, and that it unilaterally destroyed 2l2 tons. UNSCOM has only been able to verify the destruction of l55 tons out of this latter Total, and destroy a further 36 tons on its own. Iraq systematically lied about the existence of its production facilities for VX gas until l995, and made “significant efforts” to conceal its production capabilities after that date. * “Iraq has not provided physical evidence (relating to) binary artillery munitions and aerial bombs, chemical warheads for short range missiles, cluster aerial bombs, and spray tanks.” Iraq has claimed these were only prototype programs, but there is no current way to know how many were deployed as weapons. * “Until July, l995, Iraq totally denied it had any offensive biological warfare program. Since then, Iraq has presented three versions of FFCDs and four “drafts.” The most recent FFCD was presented by Iraq on ll September l997. This latest submission followed the Commission's rejection, in April l997, of the previous FFCD of June l996...in the period since that report, the Commission conducted eight inspections in an attempt to investigate critical areas of Iraq's proscribed activities such as warfare agent production and destruction, biological munitions manufacturing, filling and destruction, and Military involvement in and support to the proscribed program. Those investigations, along with documents and other evidence available to the Commission, confirmed the assessment that the June l996 declaration was deeply deficient....the new FFCD, received on 11 September l997, contains fewer errata and is more coherent. However, with regard to the important issues...the report contains no significant changes from the June l996 FFCD. ...the Commission's Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 69 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 11 questions are rephrased to in order to avoid having to produce direct answers, or are answer incompletely, or are ignored completely...little of the information the Commission has gathered since June l996 has been incorporated into the new document.” * Iraq has never provided a clear picture of the role of its Military in its biological warfare program, and has claimed it only played a token rolc. It has never accounted for its disposal of growth media. “Media unaccounted for is sufficient, in quantity, for the production of over three times more of the biological agent -- Anthrax -- stated by Iraq to have been produced...bulk warfare agent production appears to be vastly understated by Iraq.Experts calculations of possible agent production quantities, either by equipment capacity or growth media amounts, far exceed Iraq's stated results....significant periods when the fermenters were claimed not to be utilized are unexplained.” * Iraq's accounting for its Aflatoxin production is not credible. Biological warfare field trials are underreported and inadequately described. Claims regarding field trials of chemical and biological weapons using R400 bombs are contradictory and indicate that, “more munitions were destroyed than were produced." No documentation has been provided on munitions filling. The account of Iraq's unilateral destruction of bulk biological agents is “incompatible with the facts...the Commission is unable to verify that the unilateral destruction of the BW-filled Al Hussein warheads has taken place.” • There is no way to confirm whether Iraq destroyed l57 bombs of the R400 type, some of which were filled with Botulin or anthrax spores. : * “The September l997 FFCD fails to give a remotely credible account of Iraq's biological program. This opinion has been endorsed by an international panel of experts.” Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 70 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 12 Iraqi Ballistic Missile Program Item Initial Inventory Soviet supplied Scud Missiles 819 (includes Iraqi Modifications of the Al-Husayn with a range of 650 km and the Al-Abbas with a range of 950 km) Comments UNSCOM accepts Iraqi accounting for all but two of the original 8l9 Scud missiles acquired from the Soviet Union. Iraq hasn't explained the disposition of major components that it May have stripped from operational missiles before their destruction, and some Iraqi caims--such as the use of 14 Scuds in ATBM tests- are not believable. Gaps in Iraqi declarations and Baghdad's failure to fully account for indigenous missile programs strongly suggest Iraqi-Produced Scud Missiles Unknown Iraqi-Produced Scud Warheads i20 Iraqi-Produced Scud Airframes ... 2 Iraqi-Produced Scud Engines 80 Soviet-Supplied Missile Launchers 11 Iraqi-Produced Missile Launchers 8 that Iraq retains a small missile force. Iraq denied producing a completed Scud missile, but it produced-procured and tested all major subcomponents. Iraq claims all l20 were used or destroyed. UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 15. Recent UNSCOM inspections found additional CW-BW warheads beyond those currently admitted. Iraq claims testing 2 indigenous airframes in l990. It is unlikely that Iraq produced only 2 Scud airframes. Iraq's claim that it melted 63 engines following acceptance tests--53 of which failed quality controls-- are unverinable and not believable. UNSCOM is holding this as an open issue. UNSCOM doubts Iraq's claim that it unilaterally destroyed 5 launchers. The Soviet Union May have sold more than the declared il launchers. Iraq has the capability to produce additional launchers. Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from material provided by the NSC on February l9, l998. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 71 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 13 Iraqi Chemical Warfare Program. Agent St ite tric tons CW Agent Chemical Agents Potential CW Agents Comments" Declared by Iraq based on Unaccounted Precursors” VX - At least 4 200 Iraq denied producing VX until Husayn - Kamii's defection in 1995 G-agents (Sarin) 100-150 200 Figures include both weaponized and bulk agents Mustard 500-600 200 Figures include both weaponized and bulk agents, W Delive e is of Weapons Swstern Delivery System Estimated Numbers Munitions Comments Before the Gulf War Unaccounted for * Missile Warheads 75-100 45-70 UNSCOM supervised the destruction of Al-Husayn (Modified Scud B) 30 warheads Rockets 100,000 l5,000-25,000 UNSCOM supervised the destruction of bombs) 28,000 of which were fircd. Aerial bombs l6,000 2,000 Artillery Shells 30,000 15,000 Aerial Spray Tanks Unknown Unknown l.) These estimates are very rough. They are derived from reports provided by UNSCOM to the Security Council and to UNSCOM plenary meetings. Gaps in Iraqi disclosures strongly suggest that Baghdad is concealing chemical munitions and precursors. Iraq May also retain a small stockpile of filled munitions. Baghdad has the capability to quickly resume CW production at known duel-use facilities that currently produce legitimate items, such as pharmaceuticals and pesticides UNSCOM has supervised the destruction of scime 45 different types of CW precursors (l,800,000 liters of liquid and l,000,000 kg of solid). - 2.) All these munitions could be used to deliver CW or BW agents. The numbers for missile warheads include 25 that Iraq claims to have unilaterally destroyed after having filled them with biological agents during the Gulf war. UNSCOM has been unable to verify the destruction of these warheads. Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from material provided by the NSC on February l9, l998. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 72 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 14 Iraq’s Major Uses of Chemical Weapons 1983-1988 Date Area Twpe of Ga Approximate Target Casualties August l983 Haij Umran Mustard Less than 100 Iranians-Kurds October-November 1983 Panjwin Mustard 3,0000 Iranians-Kurds February–March 1984 Majnoon Island Mustard 2,500 Iranians March 1984 Al Basrah Tabun 50- 100 Iranians March 1985 Hawizah Marsh Mustardſſabun 3,000 Iranians February l996 Al Faw Mustard/Tabun 8,000-l0,000 Iranians December 1986 Umm ar Rasas Mustard l,000s Iranians April l987 Ál Basrah Mustardſſabun so Iranians October 1987 Sumar/Mehran Mustard-Nerve Agents 3,000 Iranians March 1988 Halabjah Mustard-Nerve Agents Hundreds Iranians-Kurds Note: Iranians also used poison gas at Halabjah and May have caused some of the casualties. Source: Adapted from material provided by the NSC on February l9, l998. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 73 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 15 Iraqi Biological Warfare Program BW Agent Production Amounts BW Agent Declared Concentrated Declared Total Comments Amounts Amounts Anthrax 8,500 liters 85,000 liters UNSCOM estimates production amounts (Bacillusanthracis) (2,245 gallons) (22,557 gallons) were actually 3-4 times more than the declared amounts, but is unable to confirm. Botulinum toxin 19,400 liters 380,000 liters UNSCOM estimates production amounts (Clostridium Botulinum) (l0x and 20x concentrated) (l00,396 gallons) Were actually 2 times more than the (5,l25 gallons) Declared amounts, but is unable to confirm. Gas Gangrene 340 liters 3,400 liters Production amounts could be higher, but (Clostridium perfringens) (90 gallons) (900 gallons) UNSCOM is unable to confirm. Aflatoxin N/A 2,200 liters Production amounts and time frame of (Aspergillus flavus and (58l gallons) production claimed by Iraq do not correlate. Aspergillus parasiticus) Ricin N/A 10 liters Production amounts could be higher, but (Castor Bean plant) (2.7 gallons) UNSCOM is unable to confirm. BW-Filled e d Deliverv s Delivery System Anthrax Botulinum Toxin Aflatoxin Comments Missile warheads 5 16 4 UNSCOM cannot confirm the unilateral Al-Husayn (modified Scud B) Destruction of these 25 warheads due to conflicting accounts provided by Iraq. R-400 aerial bombs 50 100 7 Iraq claimed unilateral destruction of l57 - Bombs, but UNSCOM is unable to confirm this number. UNSCOM has found the remains of at least 23. Aircraft aerosol spray tanks 4 - Iraq claims to have produced 4, but May F-l Mirage modified fuel drop tank Have manufactured others. BW Agent Growth Media Media Quantity Imported Unaccounted For Amounts BW Agent Growth Media 3l,000 kg 3,500kg (68,200 lbs.) (7,700 lbs.) Total refers to the amount of material obtained from production process, while concentrated refers to the amount of concentrated agent obtained after final filtration/purification. The concentrated number is the amount used to fill munitions. Media refers to the substance used to provide nutrients for the growth and multiplication of micro-organisms. Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from material provided by the NSC on February l9, l998. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 74 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 16 Iraq’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction Delivery Systems Prior to the Gulf War Iraq had extensive delivery systems incorporating long-range strike aircraft with refueling capabilities and several hundred regular and improved, longer-range Scud missiles, some with chemical warheads. These systems included: • Tu-16 and Tu-22 bombers. • MiG-29 fighters. • Mirage F-l, MiG-23BM, and Su-22 fighter attack aircraft. • A Scud force with a minimum of 819 missiles. • Extended range Al Husayn Scud variants (600 kilometer range) extensively deployed throughout Iraq, and at three fixed sites in northern, western, and southern Iraq. • Developing Al-Abbas missiles (900 kilometer range), which could reach targets in Iran, the Persian Gulf, Israel, Turkey, and Cyprus. • Long-range super guns with ranges of up to 600 kilometers. Iraq also engaged in efforts aimed at developing the Tamuz liquid fueled missile with a range of over 2,000 kilometers, and a solid fueled missile with a similar range. Clear evidence indicates that at least one design was to have a nuclear warhead. Iraq attempted to conceal a plant making missile engines from the UN inspectors. It only admitted this plant existed in l995, raising new questions about how many of its missiles have been destroyed. Iraq had design work underway for a nuclear warhead for its long-range missiles. The Gulf War deprived Iraq of some of its MiG-29s, Mirage F-ls, MiG-23BMs, and Su-22s. Since the end of the war, the UN inspection regime has also destroyed many of Iraq's long-range missiles: • UNSCOM has directly supervised the destruction of 48 Scud-type missiles. • It has verified the Iraqi unilateral destruction of 83 more missiles and 9 mobile launchers. A State Department summary issued on November 16, l998, indicates that UNSCOM has supervised the destruction of: • 48 operational missiles; - 14 conventional missile warheads; • six operational mobile launchers; 28 operational fixed launch pads; • 32 fixed launch pads; • 30 missile chemical warheads; * other missile support equipment and materials, and a variety of assembled and non-assembled supergun components. • 38,537 filled and empty chemical munitions; • 90 metric tons of chemical weapons agent; • more than 3,000 metric tons of precursor chemicals; • 426 pieces of chemical weapons production equipment; and, • 9l pieces of related analytical instruments. The entire al-Hakam biological weapons production facility and a variety of production equipment and materials. The UN estimates that it is able to account for 8l7 of the 8l9 long-range missiles that Iraq imported in the period ending in 1988: • Pre-l980 expenditures, such as training 8 • Expenditures during the Iran-Iraq War (l980-l98l), including the war - of the cities in February-April l988 516 * Testing activities for the development of Iraq's modifications of Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 75 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 17 * imported missiles and other experimental activities (l985-l990) 69 • Expenditures during the Gulf War (January-March l9l) 93 • Destruction under the supervision of UNSCOM 48 • Unilateral destruction by Iraq (mid-July and October 1991 83 • UNSCOM's analysis has shown that Iraq had destroyed 83 of the 85 missiles it had claimed were destroyed. at the same time, it stated that Iraq had not given an adequate account of its proscribed missile assets, including launchers, warheads, and propellants. • UNSCOM also reports that it supervised the destruction of 10 mobile launchers, 30 chemical warheads, and 18 conventional warheads. * Iraq maintains a significant delivery capability consisting of: * HY-2, SS-N-2, and C-60l cruise missiles, which are unaffected by UN cease-fire terms. * FROG-7 rockets with 70kilometer ranges, also allowed under UN resolutions. • Multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery. • Experimental conversions such as the SA-2. * Iraq claims to have manufactured only 80 missile assemblies, 53 of which were unusable. UNSCOM claims that 10 are unaccounted for. • US experts believe Iraq May still have components for several dozen extended-range Scud missiles. * In addition, Iraq has admitted to: - • Hiding its capability to manufacture its own Scuds. • Developing an extended range variant of the FROG-7 caled the Laith. The UN claims to have tagged all existing FROG-7s to prevent any extension of their range beycnd the UN imposed limit of l50 kilometers for Iraqi missiles. • Experimenting with cruise missile technology and balistic missile designs with ranges up to 3,000 kilometers. • Flight testing Al Husayn missiles with chemical warheads in April 1990. • Developing biological warheads for the Al Husayn missile as part of Project l44 at Taji. . Initiating a research and development program for a nuclear warhead missile delivery system. • Successfully developing and testing a warhead separation system. * Indigenously developing, testing, and manufacturing advanced rocks engines to include liquid-propellant designs. • Conducting research into the development of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) for the dissemination of biological agents. • Attempting to expand its Ababil-100 program designed to build surface-to-surface missiles with ranges beyond the permitted 100-l50 kilometers. • Importing parts from Britain, Switzerland, and other countries for a 350 mm “super gun," as well as starting an indigenous 600 mm supergun design effort. * Iraq initially claimed that it had 45 missile warheads filled with chemical weapons in l992. It then stated that it had 20 chemical and 25 biological warheads in l995, UNSCOM established that it had a minimum of 75 operational warheads and 5 used for trials. It has evidence of the existence of additional warheads. It can only verify that 16 warheads were filled with Sarin, and 34 with chemical warfare binary components, and that 30 were destroyed under its supervision -- 16 with Sarin and 14 with binary components. * US and UN officials conclude further that: • Iraq is trying to rebuild its ballistic missile program using a clandestine network of front companies to obtain the necessary materials and technology from European and Russian firms. • This equipment is then concealed and stockpiled for assembly concomitant with the end of the UN inspection regime. • The equipment clandestinely scught by Iraq includes advanced missile guidance components, such as accelerometers and gyroscopes, specialty metals, special machine tools, and a high-tech, French-made, million-dollar furnace designed to fabricate engine parts for missiles. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 76 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 18 * Recent major violations and smuggling efforts: • In November, l995, Iraq was found to have concealed an SS-2l missile it had smuggled in from Yemen. - Jordan found that Iraq was smuggling missile components through Jordan in early December, l995. These included } l5 gyroscopes in 10 crates, and material for making chemical weapons. The shipment was worth an estimated $25 million. Iraq claimed the gyroscopes were for oil exploration but they are similar to those used in the Soviet SS-N-18 SLBM, UNSCOM also found some gyroscopes dumped in the Tigris. * Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the UN sanctions regime * The fact the agreement allows Iraq to continue producing and testing short-range missiles (less than l50 kilometers range) means it can retain significant missile development effort. • The SA-2 is a possible test bed, but UNSCOM has tagged all missiles and monitors all high apogee tests. • Iraq's Al-Samoud and Ababil-100 programs are similar test beds. The Al-Samoud is a scaled-down Scud which Iraq Seems to have tested. • Iraq continues to expand its missile production facility at Ibn Al Haytham, which has two new buildings large enough to make much longer-range missiles. • US satellite photographs reveal that Iraq has rebuilt its Al-Kindi missile research facility. * Ekeus reported on December 18, l996 that Iraq retained missiles, röcket launchers, fuel, and command system to “make a missile force of significance". UNSCOM reporting as of October, l997 is more optimistic, but notes that Iraq. “continued to conceal documents describing its missile propeliants, and the material evidence relating to its claims to have destroyed its indigenous missile production capabilities indicated in might has destroyed less than a tenth of what it claimed” * The Cla reported in January l999 that Iraq is developing two ballistic missiles that fall within the UN-allowed l50-km range restriction. The Ai Samoud liquid-propellant missile—described as a scaled-down Scud-began flight-testing in l997. * Technicians for Iraq's pre-War Scud missiles are working on the Al Samoud program and, although under UNSCOM supervision, are developing technological improvements that could be applied to future longer-range missile programs. The Ababi!-100 solid-propellant missile is also under development, although progress on this system lags the Al Samoud. After economic sanctions are lifted and UN inspections cease, Iraq could utilize expertise from these programs in the development of longer-range missile systems, * A State Department report in September l999 noted that: • Iraq has refused to credibly account for 500 tons of SCUD propellant, over 40 SCUD biological and conventional warheads, 7 Iraqi-produced Scuds, and truckloads of SCUD components. * Iraq refuses to allow inspection of thousands of Ministry of Defense and Military Industries Commission documents relating to biological ard chemical weapons and long-range missiles. * The CIA estimated in September l999 that although the Gulf war and subsequent United Nations activities destroyed much of Iraq's missile infrastructure, Iraq could test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States during the next 15 years. * After observing North Korean activities, Iraq most likely would pursue a three-stage Taepo Dong-2 approach to an ICBM (cr SLV), which could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to parts of the United States. If Iraq could buy a Taepo Dong-2 from North Korea, it could have a launch capability within months of the purchase; if it bought Taepo Dong engines, it could test an ICBM by the Middle of the next decade. Iraq probably would take until the end of the next decade to develop the system domestically. * Although much less likely, most analysts beiieve that if Iraq were to begin development today, it could test a much less capable ICBM in a few years using Scud components and based on its prior SLV experience or on the Taepo Dong-1. • If it could acquire No Dongs from North Korea, Iraq could test a more capable ICBM along the same lines within a few years of the No Dong acquisition. • Analysts differ on the likely timing of Iraq's first flight test of an ICBM that eculd threaten the United States. Assessments include unlikely before 20l5; and likely before 20l5, possibly before 20l0–foreign assistance would affect the capability and timing. * The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000 that Iraq has continued to work on the two SRBM systems authorized by the United Nations: the liquid-propellant Al-Samoud, and the solid-propellant Ababil-100. The Al- Samoud is essentially a scaled-down Scud, and the program allows Baghdad to develop technological improvements that could be applied to a longer range missile program. We believe that the Al-Samoud missile, as designed, is capable of Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 77 The Military Balance in the Gulf - 2/21/02 Page 19 exceeding the UN-permitted l50-km-range restriction with a potential operational range of about l80 kilometers. Personnel previously involved with the Condor II/Badr-2000 missile-which was largely destroyed during the Gulf war and eliminated by UNSCOM-are working on the Ababil-I00 program. Once economic sanctions against Iraq are lifted, Baghdad probably will begin converting these efforts into longe: range missile systems, unless restricted by future UN monitoring. * Defense intelligence experts say off background that Iraq has rebuilt many of the facilities the US struck in Desert Fox, including 12 factories and sites associated with missile construction and the production of weapons of mass destruction. These are said to include the missile facilities at Al Tajiiii * US intelligence reports in June 2000 indicated that Iraq has resumed testing of missiles under l50 kilometers in range, possibly the system modified from the SA-2. They say :hat the system is not ready for deployment, and that there are problems with the rocket motor, guidance system, and there is no evidence Iraq is ready to start production. " In late June 2000. Iraq was reported to have carried out eight tests of the Al Samoud missile * A CIA report in August 2000 summarized the state of missile development in Iraq as follows, * Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its missile production facilities. It has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise cf, legitimate civilian use. This equipment—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Since the suspension of UN inspections in December l998, the risk of diversion has increased. * Following Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities destroyed by the US bombing, to include several critical missile production complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities. In addition, it appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents. * Iraq continues to pursue development of two SRBM systems which are not prohibited by the United Nations: the liquid-propellant Al-Samoud, and the solid-propellant Ababil-100. The Al-Samoud is essentially a scaled-down Scud, and the program allows Baghdad to develop technological improvements that could be applied to a longer range missile program. We believe that the Al-Samoud missile, as designed, is capable of exceeding the UN-permitted l50-km-range restriction with a potential operational range of about l80 kilometers. Personnel previously involved with the Condor II/Badr-2000 missile—which was largely destroyed during the Gulf war and eliminated by UNSCOM–are working on the Ababil-100 program. If economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, Baghdad probably would attempt to convert these efforts into longer range missile systems, regardless of continuing UN monitoring and continuing restrictions on WMD and long-range missile programs. * A Department of Defense report in January 200l reported that, * Iraq likely retains a limited number of launchers and SCUD-variant SRBMs capable of striking its neighbors, as well as the components and manufacturing means to assemble and produce others, anticipating the reestablishment of a long- range ballistic missile force sometime in the future, Baghdad likely also has warheads capable of delivering chemical or biological agents. While Iraq's missile production infrastructure was damaged during the December l998 strikes, Iraq retains domestic expertise and sufficient infrastructure to support most missile component production, with the exception of a few critical subelements. - • During l999, Iraq continued to work on the two short-range ballistic missile systems that fall within the l50-kilometer range restriction imposed by the UN: the liquid-propellant Al Samoud and the solid-propellant Ababil-l00. The Al- Samoud is essentially a scaled-down SCUD, and work on it allows Baghdad to develop technological capabilities that could be applied to a longer-range missile program. We believe that the Al Samoud missile, as designed by the Iraqis, has an inherent potential to exceed the l50-kilometers range restriction imposed under UNSCR 687. • Iraqi personnel involved with pre-Desert Storm ballistic missile efforts are working on the Ababi-100 SRBM program. Once economic sanctions against Iraq are lifted, unless restricted by future UN monitoring, Baghdad probably will begin converting these efforts into longer-range missile systems. Despite the damage done to Iraq's missile infrastructure during the Gulf War. Desert Fox, and subsequent UNSCOM activities, Iraq MAY have ambitions for longer-range missiles, including an ICBM. • Depending on the success of acquisition efforts and degree of foreign support, it is possible that Iraq could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 20l5. Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery Iraq May have a very limited stockpile of land-launched short-range arti-ship cruise missiles and air-launched short-range tactical missiles that it purchased from China and France prior to the Gulf War. These are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. * Iraq also has a variety of fighter aircraft, helicopters, artillery, and rockets available as potential means of delivery for NBC weapons, although their operational status is questicmable due to the cumulative effects of the UN arms embargo. However. Iraq has continued to work on its UAV program, which involves converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 80 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 22 • 690 tons of chemical warfare agents. • More than 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals. • Over 100 pieces of remaining production equipment at the Muthan State Establishment, Iraq's primary CW research, production, filling and storage site. • Since that time, UNSCOM has forced new disclosures from Iraq that have led to: • The destruction of 325 newly identified production equipment, l20 of which were only disclosed in August, l997. • The destruction of 275 tons of additional precursors. • The destruction of l25 analytic instruments. • The return of 9l analytic pieces of equipment to Kuwait. • As of February, l998, UNSCOM had supervised the destruction of a Total of: - 40,000 munitions, 28,000 filled and l2,000 empty. • 480,000 liters of chemical munitions • l,800,000 liters of chemical precursors. • eight types of delivery systems including missile warheads. • US and UN experts believe Iraq has concealed significant stocks of precursors. Iraq also appears to retain significant amounts of production equipment dispersed before, or during, Desert Storm and not recovered by the UN. • UNSCOM reports that Iraq has failed to account for • Special missile warheads intended for filling with chemical or biological warfare agent. • The material Balance of some 550 l55 mm mustard gas shells, the extent of VX programs, and the rationale for the acquisition of various types of chemical weapons • l30 tons of chemical warfare agents. • Some 4,000 tons of declared precursors for chemical weapons, • The production of several hundred tons of additional chemical warfare agents, the consumption of chemical precursors, • l07,500 empty casings for chemical weapons, - • Whether several thousand additional chemical weapons were filled with agents, • The unilateral destruction of 15, 620 weapons, and the fate of l6,038 additional weapons Iraq claimed it had discarded. “The margin of emor” in the accounting presented by Iraq is in the neighborhood of 200 munitions." * Iraq systematically lied about the existence of its production facilities for VX gas until l995, and made “significant efforts" to conceal its production capabilities after that date. Uncertainties affecting the destruction of its VX gas still affect some 750 tons of imported precursor chemicals, and 55 tons of domestically produced precursors. Iraq has made unverifiable claims that 460 tons were destroyed by Coalition air attacks, and that it unilaterally destroyed 2l2 tons. UNSCOM has only been able to verify the destruction of l55 tons and destroy a further 36 tons on its own. * Iraq has developed basic chemical warhead designs for Scud missiles, rockets, bombs, and shells. Iraq also has spray dispersal systems. * Iraq maintains extensive stocks of defensive equipment. * The UN feels that Iraq is not currently producing chemical agents, but Iraq has offered no evidence that it has destroyed its VX production capability and-or stockpile. Further, Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the UN sanctions regime. * Recent UNSCOM work confirms that Iraq did deploy gas-filled l55 mm artillery and l22 mm multiple rocket rounds into the rear areas of the KTO during the Gulf War. • " Iraq's chemical weapons had no special visible markings, and were often stored in the same area as conventional weapons. * Iraq has the technology to produce stable. highly lethal VX gas with long storage times. * May have developed improved binary and more stable weapons since the Gulf War. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 81 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 23 * Since l992, Iraq attempted to covertly import precursors and production equipment for chemical weapons through Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan since the Gulf War. * The current status of the Iraqi program is as follows (according to US intelligence as of February l9, l998 and corrected by the National Intelligence Council on November 16, l998): - Agent Declared Potential orn ts Unaccounted RI Chemical Agents (Metric Tons) (Metric Tons) VX Nerve Gas 3 300 Iraq lied about the program until l995 Gagents (Sarim) 100-150 200 Figures include weaponized and bulk agents Mustard Gas 500-600 200 Figures include weaponized and bulk agents Deliyery Systems (Number) (Number) Missile Warheads 75-I00 2-25 UNSCOM supervised destruction of 30 Rºckets 100,000 15,000-25,000 UNSCOM supervised destruction of 40,000, 28,000 of which were filled. Aerial Bombs l6,000 2,000-8,000 High estimate reflects the data found in an Iraqi Air Force document in July, l998. Atillery shells 30,000 15,000 - Aerial Spray Tanks º 7 * A US State Department spokesman reported on November 16, l998 that Iraq has reported making 8,800 pounds (four tons) of VX nerve gas, 220,000 pounds (100 tons) to 330,000 pounds (l50 tons) of nerve agents such as Sarin and l.l million pounds (500 tons) to l.32 million pounds (600 tons) of mustard gas. Data from UN weapons inspectors indicates that Iraq May have produced an additional l.32 million pounds (600-tons) of these agents, divided evenly among the three. "In other words, these are the differences between what they say they have and what we have reason to believe they have." • UNSCOM reported to the Securiy Council in December l998 that Iraq continued:o withhold information related to its CW and BW programs. • For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the lºan-Iraq War in the l980s as had been declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that Iraq May have an additional 6,000 CW munitions hidden. • We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its WMD programs, although given its past behavior, this type of activity must be regarded as likely. We assess that since the suspension of UN inspections in December of l998, Baghdad has had the capability to reinitiate both its CW and BW programs within a few weeks to months, but without an inspection monitoring program, it is difficult to determine if Iraq has done so. We know, however, that Iraq has continued to work on its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which involves converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. These modified and refurbished L-29s are believed to be intended for delivery of chemical or biological agents. * The CIA reported in January l999 that Iraq had purchased numerous dual-use items for legitimate civilian projects—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—that also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Since the Gulf war, Baghdad has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents. The recent discovery that Iraq had weaponized the advanced nerve agent VX and the convincing evidence that fewer CW munitions were consumed during the Iran-Iraq war than Iraq had declared provide strong indications that Iraq retains a CW capability and intends to reconstitute its pre-Gulf war capability as rapidly as possible once sanctions are lifted. • A State Department report in September l999 noted that: • In July l998, Iraq seized from the hands of UNSCOM inspectors an Iraqi Air Force document indicating that Iraq had misrepresented the expenditure of over 6,000 bombs which May have contained over 700 tons of chemical agent. Iraq continues to refuse to provide this document to the UN. • Iraq continues to deny weaponizing VX nerve agent, despite the fact that UNSCOM found VX nerve agent residues on Iraqi SCUD missile warhead fragments. Based on its investigations, international experts concluded that "Iraq has the know-how and process equipment, and May possess precursors to manufacture as much as 200 tons of VX ... The retention of a VX capability by Iraq cannot be excluded by the UNSCOM international expert team." Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 82 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 24 The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000 that “We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its WMD programs, although given its past behavior, this type of activity must be regarded as likely. The United Nations assesses that Baghdad has the capability to reinitiate both its CW and BW programs within a few weeks to months, but without an inspection monitoring program, it is difficult to determine if Iraq has done so." It also reported that, - Since Operation Desert Fox in December l998, Baghdad has refused to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687. As a result, there have been no UN inspections during this reporting period, and the automated video monitoring system installed by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq has been dismantled by the Iraqis. Having lost this on-the-ground access, it is difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the current state of Iraq's WMD programs. Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its missile production facilities. It has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. This equipment-in principle subject to UN scrutiny-also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Following Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities destroyed by the US bombing, to include several critical missile production complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities. In addition, it appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents. The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) reported to the Security Council in December l998 that Iraq continued to withhold information related to its CW and BW programs. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq War in the l980s as declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that . Iraq May have an additional 6,000 CW munitions hidden. This intransigence on the part of Baghdad ultimately led to the Desert Fox bombing by the US. Iraqi defector claims in February 2000 that Iraq had maintained a missile force armed with chemical and biological warheads that can bee deployed from secret locations, and they that warheads are stored separately near Baghdad and have been deployed to the missiles in the field in exercises iv • A CIA report in August 2000 summarized the state of chemical weapons proliferation in Iraq as follows, Since Operation Desert Fox in December l998, Baghdad has refused to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687. Although UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) l284, adopted in December l999, established a follow-on inspection regime to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in the form of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC), there have been no UN inspections during this reporting period. Moreover, the automated video monitoring system installed by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq has been dismantled by the Iraqis. Having lost this on-the-- ground access, it is difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the current state of Iraq's WMD programs. Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its missile production facilities. It has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of legitimate civilian use. This equipment—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Since the suspension of UN inspections in December l998, the risk of diversion has increased. Following Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities destroyed by the US bombing, to include several critical missile production complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities. In addition, it appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents. • A Department of Defense report in January 200l reported that, Since the Gulf War, Baghdad has rebuilt key portions of its industrial and chemical production infrastructure; it has not become a state party to the CWC. Some of Iraq's facilities could be converted fairly quickly to production of chemical warfare agents. Following Operation Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a rapid reconstruction effort on those facilities to include former dual-use chemical warfare-associated production facilities, destroyed by U.S. bombing. In l999, Iraq May have begun installing or repairing dual-use equipment at these and other chemical War-fare-related facilities. Previously, Iraq was known to have produced and stockpiled mustard, tabun, sarin, and VX, some of which likely remain hidden. It is likely that an additional quantity of various precursor chemicals also remains hidden. In late l998, UNSCOM reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq continued to withhold information related to its chemical program. UNSCOM cited an example where Baghdad seized from inspectors a document discovered by UNSCOM inspectors, which indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many chemical munitions during the Iran-Iraq War as had been declared previously by Baghdad. This document suggests that Iraq May have an additional 6,000 chemical munitions hidden. Similarly, UNSCOM discovery in l998 of evidence of VX in Iraqi missile warheads Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 83 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 25 showed that Iraq had lied to the international community for seven years when it repeated:y said that it had never weaponized VX. * Iraq retains the expertise, once a decision is made, to resume chemical agent production within a few weeks or months, depending on the type of agent. However, foreign assistance, whether commercial procurement of dual-use technology, key infrastructure, or other aid, will be necessary to completely restore Iraq's chemical agent production capabilities to pre-Desert Storm levels. Iraqi doctrine for the use of chemical weapons evolved during the Iran-Iraq War, and was fully incorporated into Iraqi offensive operations by the end of the war in I988. During different stages of that war, Iraq used aerial bombs, artillery, rocket launchers, tactical rockets, and sprayers mounted in helicopters to deliver agents against Iranian forces. It also used chemical agents against Kurdish elements of its own civilian population in l988. Biological Weapons Had highly compartmented "black” program with far tightersecurity regulations than chemical program. Had 18 major sites for some aspect of biological weapons effort before the Gulf War. Most were nondescript and had no Guards or visible indications they were a Military facility. The US targeted only one site during the Gulf War. It struck two sites, one for other reasons. It also struck at least two targets with no biological facilities that it misidentified. Systematically lied about biological weapons effort until l995. First stated that had small defensive efforts, but no offensive effort. In July, l995, admitted had a major defensive effort. In October, l995, finally admitted major weaponization effort. Iraq has continued to lie about its biological weapons effort since October, l995. It has claimed the effort was headed by Dr. Taha, a women who only headed a subordinate effort. It has not admitted to any help by foreign personnel or contractors. It has claimed to have destroyed its weapons, but the one site UNSCOM inspectors visited showed no signs of such destruction and was later said to be the wrong site. It has claimed only 50 people were employed full time, but the scale of the effort would have required several hundred. Since July l995, Iraq has presented three versions of FFCDs and four “drafts.” * The most recent FFCD was presented by Iraq on ll September l997. This submission foilowed the UNSCOM's rejection, of the FFCD of June l996. In the period since receiving that report, UNSCOM conducted eight inspections in an attempt to investigate critical areas of Iraq's proscribed activities such as warfare agent production and destruction, biological munitions manufacturing. filling and destruction, and Military involvement in and support to the proscribed program. Those investigations, confirmed the assessment that the June l996 declaration was deeply deficient. The UNSCOM concluded that the new FFCD, it received on ll September l997, contains no significant changes from the June 1996 FFCD Iraq has not admitted to the production of 8,500 liters of anthrax, l9,000 liters of Botulinum toxin, 2,200 liters of Aflatoxin, Reports indicate that Iraq tested at least 7 principal biological agents for use against humans. • Anthrax, Botulinum, and Aflatoxin are known to be weaponized. * Looked at viruses, bacteria, and fungi. Examined the possibility of weaponizing gas gangrene and Mycotoxins. Some field trials were held of these agents. * Examined foot and mouth disease, haemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus, rotavirus, and came pox virus. • Conducted research on a “wheat pathogen" and a Mycotoxin similar to “yellow rain" defoliant. The “wheat smut" was first produced at Al Salman, and then put in major production during l987-l988 at a plant near Mosul. Iraq claims the program was abandoned. The August l995 defection of Lieutenant general Husayn Kamel Majid, formerly in charge of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, revealed the extent of this biological weapons program. Lt. General Kamel's defection prompted Iraq to admit that it: - Imported at least 39 tons of growth media (3l,000 kilograms or 68,200 pounds) for biological agents obtained from three European firms. According to UNSCOM, 3,500 kilograms or 7,700 pounds) remains unaccounted for. Some estimates go as high as l7 tons. Each ton can be used to produce 10 tons of bacteriological weapons. Other reports indicate that Iraq obtained nearly 40 tons of the medium to grow anthrax and botulinum bacterium for its biological weapons program from Oxoid Ltd, and other suppliers in the UK in l988, • Imported type cultures from the US which can be modified to develop biological weapons. Tried to import the Ames strain of Anthrax from the US but does not seem to have succeeded. Did import the Steme and A-3 strains of Anthrax from the Institut Pasteur in France, and two Vollum strains and five other strains of Anthrax from the American Type Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 84 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 26 Culture collection, located near Manassas, Virginia, Vollum lb is the strain of Anthrax the US developed for its own biological weapons program before it signed the BWC. - • Had a laboratory- and industrial-scale capability to manufacture various biological agents including the bacteria which cause Anthrax and botulism; Aflatoxin, a naturally occurring carcinogen; Clostridium perfringens, a gangrene-causing agent; the protein toxin Ricim, tricothecene Myco-oxins, such as T-2 and DAS, and an anti-wheat fungus known as wheat cover smut. Iraq also conducted research into the rotavirus, the camel pox virus and the virus which causes haemorrhagic conjunctivitis. • Created at least seven primary production facilities including the Sepp Institute at Muthanna, the Ghazi Research lrstitute at Amaria, the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute, and facilities at Al-Hakim, Salman Pak Taji, and Fudaliyah. According to UNSCOM, weaponization occurred primarily at Muthanna through May, l987 (largely Botulinum), and then moved to Al Salman. (Anthrax). In March, l988 a plant was open at Al Hakim, and in l989 an Aflatoxin plant was set up at Fudaliyah. - Had test site about 200 kilometers west of Baghdad, used animals in cages and tested artillery and rocket rounds against live targets at ranges up to 16 kilometers. • Took fermenters and other equipment from Kuwait to improve effort during the Gulf War. Iraq had least 79 civilian facilities capable of playing some role in biological weapons production still in existence in l997. * The Iraqi program involving Aflatoxin leaves many questions unanswered. • Iraqi research on Aflatoxin began in May l988 at Al Salman, where the toxin was produced by the growth of fungus aspergilus in 5.3 quart flasks. • The motives behind Iraq's research on Aflatoxin remain one of the most speculative aspects of its program. Aflatoxin is associated with fungal-contaminated food grains, and is considered non-lethal. It normally can produce liver cancer, but only afte: a period of months to years and in intense concentrations. There is speculation, however, that a weaponized form might cause death within days and some speculation that it can be used as an incapacitating agent. • Iraq moved its production of Aflatoxin to Fudaliyah in l989, and produced 48l gallons of toxin in solution between November, l988 and May, l990. • Produced l,850 iters of Aflatoxin in solution at Fudaliyah. - It produced a Total of at least 2,500 liters of concentrated Aflatoxin (l,850 liters filled into munitions). * It developed 16 R-400 Aflatoxin bombs and two Scud warheads. Conducted trials with Aflatoxin in l22 mm rockets and R-400 bombs in November l989 and May and August l990. Produced a Total of 572 gallons of toxin and loaded 4l0.8 gallons into munitions. • UNSCOM concluded in October, l997, that Iraq's accounting for its Aflatoxin production was not credible. * Total Iraqi production of more orthodox biological weapons reached at least l9,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum (l0,000 liters filled into munitions); and 8,500 liters of concentrated Anthrax (6,500 liters filled into munitions): • It manufactured 6,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin and 8,425 liters of Anthrax at Al-Hakim during l990; 5400 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin at the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute from November 1990 to January 15, 1991: 400 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin at Taji; and l50 liters of concentrated Anthrax at Salman Pak. - Iraq acknowledged to UN SCOM that it had produced at least l9,000 liters of botulinum toxin, using more than half to fill at least 1 16 bombs and missile warheads. • Fitled at least 50 bombs and missile warheads with a wet Anthrax agent using the Vollum strain, or one very similar. • Some Al Hussein warheads were found at the Al-Nibal missile destruction site with traces of wet Anthrax agent, similar to the Vollum strain. Vials were found with a dry freeze-dried Anthrax agent of the Vollum strain; reports differ as the whether Iraq weaponized a dzy clay coated of the particle size most lethal for delivering inhaled Anthrax, and clay coasted the particles to eliminate the electrostatic charge and ensure optimal dispersion. * Iraq is also known to have produced at least: 340 liters of concentrated Clostridium perfringens, a gangrene-causing biological agent, beginning in August l990. * 10 liters of concentrated Ricin at Al Salam. Claim atandoned work after tests failed. * Iraq weaponized at least three biological agents for use in the Gulf War. The weaponization consisted of at least: Copyright Anthony H, Cordesman, all rights reserved. 85 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 27 * 100 bombs and 16 missile warheads loaded with Botulinum. * 50 R-400 air-delivered bombs and 5 missile warheads loaded with anthrax, and * 4 missile warheads and 7 R-400 bombs loaded with Aflatoxin, a natural carcinogen. • The warheads were designed for operability with the Al Husayn Scud variant. * Iraq had other weaponization activities: * Armed l55 mm artillery shells and l22 mm rockets with biological agents. * Conducted field trials, weaponization tests, and live firings of l22 mm rockets armed with Anthrax and Botulinum toxin from March l988 to May l990. • Tested Ricin, a deadly protein toxin, for use in artillery shells. • Iraq produced at least l9l bombs and 25 missile warheads with biological agents. * Developed and deployed 250 pound aluminum bombs coverage in fiberglass. Bombs were designed so they could be mounted on both Soviet and French-made aircraft. They were rigged with parachutes for low altitudes drops to allow efficient slow delivery and aircraft to fly under radar coverage. Some debate over whether bombs had cluster munitions or simply dispersed agent like LD-400 chemical bomb. • Deployed at least l66 R-400 bombs with 85 liters of biological agents each during the Gulf War. Deployed them at two sites. One was near an abandoned runway where it could fly in aircraft, arm them quickly, and disperse with no prior indication of activity and no reason for the UN to target the runway. • Filled at least 25 Scud missile warheads, and l57 bombs and aerial dispensers, with biological agents during the Gulf War. * Developed and stored drop tanks ready for use for three aircraft or RPV s with the capability of dispersing 2,000 liters of anthrax. Development took place in December l990. Claimed later that tests showed the systems were ineffective. • The UN found, however, that Iraq equipped crop spraying helicopters for biological warfare and held exercises and tests simulating the spraying of Anthrax spores. • Iraqi Mirages were given spray tanks to disperse biological agents. • Held trials as late as January l3, 1991, * The Mirages were chosen because they have large 2,200 liter belly tanks and could be refueled by air, giving them a longer endurance and greater strike range. • The tanks had electric valves to allow the agent to be released and the system was tested by releasing simulated agent into Desert areas with scattered petri dishes to detect the biological agent. UNSCOM has video tapes of the aircraft. - * Project l44 at Taji produced at least 25 operational Al Husayn warheads. Ten of these were hidden deep in a railway tunnel, and 15 in holes dug in an unmanned hide site along the Tigris. * Biological weapons were only distinguished from regular weapons by a black stripe. * The UN claims that Iraq has offered no evidence to corroborate its claims that it destroyed its stockpile of biological agents after the Gulf War. Further, Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the UN sanctions regime. • UNSCOM reported in October l997 that: - Iraq has never provided a clear picture of the role of its Military in its biological warfare program, and has claimed it only played a token role. - It has never accounted for its disposal of growth media. The unaccounted for media is sufficient, in quantity, for the production of over three times more of the biological agent -- Anthrax -- Iraq claims to have been produced. • Bulk warfare agent production appears to be vastly understated by Iraq. Expert calculations of possible agent production quantities, either by equipment capacity or growth media amounts, far exceed Iraq's stated results • Significant periods when Iraq claims its fermenters were not utilized are unexplained • Biological warfare field trials are underreported and inadequately described. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 80-791 D-4 86 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 28 • Claims regarding field trials of chemical and biological weapons using R400 bombs are contradictory and indicate that, "more munitions were destroyed than were produced. • The Commission is unable to verify that the unilateral destruction of the BW-filled Al Hussein warheads has taken place.” Botulin or anthrax spores. - There is no way to confirm whether Iraq destroyed l57 bombs of the R400 type, some of which were filled with • “The September l997 FFCD fails to give a remotely credible account of Iraq's biological program. This opinion has been endorsed by an international panel of experts.” • The current status of the Iraqi program is as follows (according to US intelligence as of February l9, l998): &ent Declared Concentrated Amount Declared Total Amount Uncertainty liters Gallons Liters Gallons Anthrax 8500 12,245 85000 2.2457 Could be 3-4 times declared amount Botu1inum 19,400 NA 380,000 NA Probably twice declared tºxin amount, Some extremely concentrated. Gas Gangrene 340 90 3,400 900 Amounts could be higher Qostridium Rerfingens Aflatoxin NA NA 2,200 581 Major uncertainties Rcin NA NA 10 2.7 Major uncertainties * UNSCOM cannot confirm the unilateral destruction of 25 warheads. It can confirm the destruction of 23 of at least 157 bombs. Iraq Islay have more aerosol tanks. UNSCOM used to inspects 79 sites -- 5 used to make weapons before war; 5 vaccine or pharmaceutical sites; 35 research and university sites; thirteen breweries, distilleries, and dairies with dual-purpose capabilities; eight diagnostic laboratories. Iraq retains laboratory capability to manufacture various biological agents including the bacteria which cause anthrax, botulism, tularemia and typhoid. Many additional civilian facilities are capable of playing some role in biological weapons production. A State Department spokesman reported on November 16, l998 that there is a large discrepancy between the amount of biological growth media -procured and the amount of agents that were or could have been produced. Baghdad has not adequately explained where some 8,000 pounds (3,500 kg) of the material went out of some 68,000 pounds (3l,000 kg) of biological growth media it imported. Iraq's accounting of the amount of the agent it produced and the number of failed batches is seriously flawed and cannot be reconciled on the basis of this full disclosure Iraq has made. The CIA reported in January l999 that Iraq continues to refuse to disclose fully the extent of its BW program. After four years of denials, Iraq admitted to an offensive program resulting in the destruction of Al Hakam-a large BW production facility Iraq was trying to hide as a legitimate biological plan: Iraq stili has not accounted for over a hundred BW bombs and over 80 percent of imported growth media-directly related to past and future Iraqi production of thousands of gallons of biological agent. This lack of cooperation is an indication that Baghdad intends to reconstitute its BW capability when possible. A State Department report in September l999 noted that • Iraq refuses to allow inspection of thousands of Ministry of Defense and Military Industries Commission documents relating to biological and chemical weapons and long-range missiles. • In l995, Iraqis who conducted field trials of R-400 bombs filled with biological agents described the tests to UNSCOM experts in considerable detail, including the use of many animals. These field trials were reflected in Iraq's June l996 biological weapons declaration. Yet, amazingly, Iraq now denies that any such trials were conducted at all. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 87 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 29 • In September l995, Iraq finally declared the existence of two projects to disseminate biclogical agents from Mirage F-l and MiG-2l aircraft, yet there is no evidence that the prototype weapons and aircraft were ever destroyed. There is also no evidence that the 12 Iraqi helicopter-bome aerosol generators for biological weapon delivery were ever destroyed. • Apart from one document referring to a single year, no iraci biological weapon production records have been given to the un-no records of storage, of filling into muritions, or of destruction. This is why UNSCOM refers to Iraq's biclogical weapons program—which deployed SCUD missile warheads filled with anthrax and botulinum toxin to be ready for use against Coalition forces—as a “black hole." - • The Iraqis have repeatedly changed their story about their biological weapons warheads. Iraq has revised several times its declarations regarding the precise locations of warhead destruction and the fill of warheads. The movements of concealed warheads prior to unilateral destruction, claimed by Iraq, have been proven to be false. * The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000 that “We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its WMD programs, although given its past behavior, this type of activity must be regarded as likely. The United Nations assesses that Baghdad has the capability to reinitiate both its CW and BW programs within a few weeks to months, but without an inspection monitoring program, it is difficult to determine if Iraq has done so." • Iraqi defector claims in February 2000 that Iraq had maintained a missile force armed with chemical and biological warheads that can bee deployed from secret locations, and they that warheads are stored separately near Baghdad and have been deployed to the missiles in the field in exercises v • George Tenet, :he Director of the CIA, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 20, and identified Iraq as a key country seeking biological weapons. * A CIA report in August 2000summarized the state of biological weapons proliferation in Iraq as follows,vi • Since Operation Desert Fox in December l998, Baghdad has refused to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687. Although UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) l284, adopted in December l999, established a follow-on inspection regime to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in the form of the United Nations Monitoring, verification, and inspection Committee (UNMOVIC), there have been no UN inspections during this reporting period. Moreover, the automated video monitoring system installed by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq has been dismantled by the Iraqis. Having lost this on-the-- ground access, it is difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the current state of Iraq's WMD programs. * Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its missile production facilities. It has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. This equipment—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Since the suspension of UN inspections in December l998, the risk of diversion has increased, * Following Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities destroyed by the US bombing, to include several critical missile production complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities. In addition, it appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agen:s. • UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December l998 that Iraq continued to withhold information related to its CW and BW programs. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq War in the l980s as had been declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that Iraq May have an additional 6,000 CW munitions hidden, • We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its WMD programs, although given its past behavior, this type of activity must be regarded as likely. We assess that since the suspension of UN inspections in December of l998, Baghdad has had the capability to reinitiate both its CW and BW programs within a few weeks to months, but without an inspection monitoring program, it is difficult to determine if Iraq has done so. We know, however, that Iraq has continued to work on its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which involves converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. These modified and refurbished L-29s are 3elieved to be intended for delivery of chemical orbiological agents. • A Department of Defense report in January 200l stated that Iraq's continued refusal to disclose fully the extent of its biological program suggests that Baghdad retains a biological warfare capability, despite its membership in the BWC. After four and one-half years of claiming that it had conducted only "defensive research" on biological weapons Iraq declared reluctantly, in l995, that it had produced approximately 30,000 liters of bulk biological agents and-or filled munitions, Iraq Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 88 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 30 admitted that it produced anthrax, botulinum toxins and aflatoxins and that it prepared biological agent-filled munitions, including missile warheads and aerial bombs. However, UNSCOM believed that Iraq had produced substantially greater amounts than it has admitted —three to four times greater. Iraq also admitted that, during the Persian Gulf War, it had deployed biological agent-filled munitions to air-fields and that these weapons were intended for use against Israel and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. Iraq stated that it destroyed all of these agents and munitions in 1991, but it has provided insufficient credible evidence to support this claim. The UN believes that Baghdad has the ability to reconstitute its biological warfare capabilities within a few weeks or months, and, in the absence of UNSCOM inspections and monitoring during l999 and 2000, we are concerned that Baghdad again May have produced some biological warfare agents. Nuclear Weapons - Inspections by UN teams have found evidence of two successful weapons designs, a neutron initiator, explosives and triggering technology needed for production of bombs, plutonium processing technology, centrifuge technology, Calutron enrichment technology, and experiments with chemical separation technology. Iraq had some expert technical support, including at least one German scientist who provided the technical plans for the URENCOTC-ll centrifuge. Iraq's main nuclear weapons related facilities were: • Al Atheer - center of nuclear weapons program. Uranium metallurgy; production of shaped charges for bombs, remote controlled facilities for high explosives manufacture. • Al Tuwaitha - triggering systems, neutron initiators, uranium metallurgy, and hot cells for plutonium separation. Laboratory production of UO2, UCL4, UF6, and fuel fabrication facility. Prototype-scale gas centrifuge, prototype EMIS facility, and testing of laser isotope separation technology. • Al Qa Qa-high explosives storage, testing of detonators for high explosive component of implosion nuclear weapons. • Al Musaiyib-Al Hatteen - high explosive testing, hydrodynamic Studies of bombs. • Al Hadre -firing range for high explosive devices, including FAE. • Ash Sharqat-designed for mass production of weapons grade material using EMIS: • Al Furat-designed for mass production of weapons grade material using centrifuge method. - Al Jesira (Mosul)- mass production of UCL4. • Al Qaim - phosphate plant for production of U308. * Akashat uranium mine. Iraq had three reactor programs: • Osiraqſſammuz I 40 megawatt light-water reactor destroyed by Israeli air attack in l981, • Isis-Tammuz II 800 kilowatt light water reactor destroyed by Coalition air attack in 1991, • IRT-50005 megawatt light water reactor damaged by Coalition air attack in 1991, Iraq used Calutron (EMIS), centrifuges, plutonium processing, chemical defusion and foreign purchases to create new production capability after Israel destroyed most of Osiraq. Iraq established a centrifuge enrichment system in Rashidya and conducted research into the nuclear fuel cycle to facilitate development of a nuclear device. After invading Kuwait, Iraq attempted to accelerate its program to develop a nuclear weapon by using radioactive fuel from French and Russian-built reactors. It made a crash effort in September, l990 to recover enriched fuel from its supposedly safe-guarded French and Russian reactors, with the goal of producing a nuclear weapon by April, 1991. The program was only halted after Coalition air raids destroyed key facilities on January l7, 1991, - Iraq conducted research into the production of a radiological weapon, which disperses lethal radioactive material without initiating a nuclear explosion Orders were given in l987 to explore the use of radiological weapons for area denial in the Iran-Iraq War. • Three prototype bombs were detonated at test sites -- one as a ground level static test and two others were dropped from aircraft. - Iraq claims the results were disappointing and the project was shelved but has no records or evidence to prove this. UN teams have found and destroyed, or secured, new stockpiles of illegal enriched material, major production and R&D facilities, and equipment-- including Calutron enriching equipment. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 89 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 31 * JNSCOM believes that Iraq's nuclear program has been largely disabied and remains incapacitated, but warns that Iraq retains substantial technology and established a clandestine purchasing system in l990 that it has used to impor: forbidden components since the Gulf War. • The major remaining uncertainties are: • Iraq still retains the technology developed before the Gulf War and US experts believe an ongoing rescarch and development effort continues, in spite of the UN sanctions regime. • Did Iraq conceal an effective high speed centrifuge program. • Are there elements for radiological weapons. * Is it actively seeking to clandestinely buy comporents for nuclear weapons and examişning the purchase of fissile material from outside Iraq • Is it continuing with the development of a missile warhead suited to the use of a nuclear device. • A substantial number of declared nuclear weapons components and research equipment has never been recovered. There is no reason to assume that Iraqi declarations were comprehensive. • Work by David Albright indicates that Iraq still holds approximately 1.7 metric tons (MT) of low-enriched uranium (LEU) and several hundred MT of natural uranium. He estimates that if Iraq should master one of the uranium enrichment technologies that it was pursuing before the Gulf War, its LEU stock would provide a means to rapidly make enough HEU for at least one nuclear weapon, and that the natural uranium could become the feedstock for many more. This uranium remains in Iraq because the UN Action Team did not have a mandate under resolution 687 to "remove, destroy or render harmless" this uranium. Without further enrichment or irradiation in a nuclear reactor, it is not "weapons-usable nuclear fraterial." * Dr. Khidhir Hamza a highest-ranking [raci scientist who defected from Iraq claims Iraqi scientists were commanded to build one nuclear bomb immediate.y after Saddam invaded Kuwait in l990, and that the resulting device was crude and untestec and might even could fall apart. In an April 2, 200l edition of Middle East Forum Wire, he says that, • Iraq still runs its nuclear program and distributes its nuclear program infrastructure among dozens of small corporations, as it does with biological and chemical weapons. * One group was responsible for enrichment of uranium by diffusion, and did this under the front of a large refinery in Baghdad. A refinery and a uranium enrichment plant require similar piping, structures, compressors, and handling of gases. He says " His assistant, who designed bombs under Hamza, is now running the program while also doing seismic prospecting for oil maps. Apart from designing weapons, he engineers underground explosions that generate seismic waves in order to locate oil. When an inspector visits, all programs relating to the bomb design are put aside, and replaced with seismic prespecting maps. The bomb designer is a real expert at seismic prospecting, so he is very convincing to the inspectors. • In a l998, New York Times interview, he stated that Iraq was three years away from nuclear capability. Sadly, inspections ceased that same year. Three years have passed, and Saddam is undoubtedly on the precipice of nuclear power. • He now estimates that Iraq will have between three to five nuclear weapons by 2005, Iraq now has twelve tons of uranium and l.3 tons of low enriched uranium. This is enough for at East four bombs already. • The CIA reported in January l999 that Iraq continues to hide documentation, and probably some equipment, relating to key aspects of past nuclear activities. After years of Iraqi denials, the IAEA was able to get Iraq to admit to a far more advanced nuclear weapons program and a project based on advanced uranium enrichment technology. However, Baghdad continues to withhold significant information about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, and weapons design. • The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000 and August 2000 that “We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Deser: Fox to reconstitute its WMD programs, although given its past behavior, this type of activity must be regarded as likely. The United Nations assesses that Baghdad has the capability to reinitiate both its CW and BW programs within a few weeks to months, but without an inspection monitoring program, it is difficult to determine if Iraq has done so.” • Press reports in February 2000 claimed that Iraq might have developed biological warfare agents it had kept secret from UNSCCM inspectors and which were never discovered. The reports followed similar warnings by UNSCOM experts on January 25, 2000 that Iraq might have done so, that not all suspected biological weapons production and research facilities had been inspected, and that the undiscovered weapons might include infectious viral agents.vii Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 90 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 32 • George Tenet, the Director of the CIA, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 20, 2000 and stated that, “We are concemed atout the potential for States and terrorists to acquire plutonium, highly enriched uranium, and other fissile materials, and even complete nuclear weapons...iran or Iraq could quickly advance their nuclear aspirations through covert acquisition of fissile material or relevant technology." • A Department of Defense report in January 200l stated that, • Despite these severe pressures on its economy, Saddam Hussein's government continues to devote Iraqi resources to rebuilding certain portions of its development program that was focused on building an implosion-type device. The program was linked to a ballistic missile project that was the intended delivery system. From April 1991 to December l998, Iraqi nuclear aspirations were held in check by IAEAS UNSCOM inspections and monitoring All known weapons-grade fissile material was removed from the country. • Although Iraq claims that i: destroyed all of the specific equipment and facifities useful for developing nuclear weapons, it still retains sufficient skilled and experienced scientists and engineers as well as weapons design information that could allow it to restart a weapons program. • Iraq would need five or more years and key foreign assistance to rebuild the infrastructure to enrich enough material for a nuclear weapon. This period would be substantially shortened should Baghdad successfully acquire fissile material from a foreign Source. * The CIA estimated in January 2002 that Baghdad had a crash program to develop a nuclear weapon for missile delivery in l990, but coalition bombing and IAEA and UNSCOM activities significantly set back the effort. The Intelligence Community estimates that Iraq, unconstrained, would take several years to produce enough fissile material to make a weapon. Iraq has admitted to having biological and chemical weapons programs before the Gulf war and maintains those programs. Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 91 The Military Balance in the Gulf 2/21/02 Page 33 'National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 20l5, (September l999 (www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nielnie%3). Also see the report of the Rumsfeld Commission, Commssion to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat ſo the United States, Executive Summary, July 15, l998, pp. 7. * CIA, August 10, 2000, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, l July Through 3l December l999 internet edition. "New York Times, February l, 2000. " London Sunday Times, February 2l, 2000. * London Sunday Times, February 2l, 2000, * CIA, August 10, 2000, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, l July Through 3l December l999 internet edition. * Associated Press, February 9, 2000, 0l54; Washington Post, February 10, 2000, p. A-23; ſew Tim International, February 8, 2000. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. 92 Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you very much. Mr. Duelfer. STATEMENT OF CHARLES A. DUELFER, VISITING RESIDENT SCHOLAR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Mr. DUELFER. Thank you. I will try not to repeat many of the points that Tony made. I am in agreement with much of what he said. Let me begin by talking a little bit about the incentives that the regime has. One of the aspects of UNSCOM’s work in Iraq was to understand in detail the concept of use, the rationale, and the decisions which were taken to acquire these weapons. From the beginning, through our existence there, and until 1995, Iraq refused to describe those concepts, requirements, and so forth, the types of decisions that you and this Committee take when you reflect upon the United States' Defense programs. But after Hussein Kamal, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, defected in August 1995, all of a sudden Iraq became for a short period of time quite cooperative, largely because they were concerned that Hussein Kamal, who had been in charge of all these weapons pro- grams, would spill the beans when he was in Jordan. In point of fact they were partially correct on that. In any case we had a very interesting meeting one evening where Iraq finally did discuss where these programs came from, who made the decisions, and why they were important to the regime. As Tony has pointed out, in essence the regime believes it owes its survival to the possession of these weapons in a war with Iran. Iran was deploying human wave attacks on the southern front near Basra. Large numbers of Iranians would Storm across the border, and Iraq could not defend against that except by using large num- bers of chemical munitions. Iraq described to us that they con- sumed 101,000 chemical munitions. These were artillery rounds, aerial-delivered bombs and artillery rockets, filled mostly with sarin, but also mustard gas. So they used a lot. It saved the regime in that war. More interestingly, however, I also explored with them the dy- namics that weapons of mass destruction played in the second Gulf War. Again, they played a very important role. They were not used, but as in the Cold War they played a very important role. You will recall that Secretary Baker met with Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz in January 1991, before the war. One key point of his discussion was to warn the Iraqis and Tariq Aziz that, “if you use chemical or biological weapons, we will respond overwhelm- ingly, and it will be regime-ending.” The Iraqis did not use these weapons even when they were losing, and I asked them why, and the long and the short of it was that Saddam thought that he would not survive. So the message worked. Saddam was deterred. But at this meeting with very senior Iraqis, including ministers, they went on to describe how before the war they loaded not just aerial bombs but missile warheads with chemical agent and biologi- cal agent. They described the agents as aflatoxin, anthrax, bofullinim toxin, and nerve agents. They dispersed them to five lo- cations. Warheads were at two and the aerial bombs were at three 93 others. Then they said they were predelegated the authority to use them under certain circumstances. So I asked them “under what circumstances?” They said, “If the Americans went to Baghdad.” They described the targeting, and then they added that it worked. The Americans did not go to Bagh- dad. So from the Iraqi perspective, the possession of these weapons saved the regime once again because it kept the Americans from going to Baghdad. It is not an illogical concept. Of course, it was a monumentally depressing moment, as an in- spector who is trying to get them to give up these things, because at that point I think it dawned on us that this was not just an up- hill battle, it was an impossible battle. Tariq Aziz would regularly point out to us that “You are not General Macarthur. You did not occupy Iraq. Therefore, there are limits to what you can do.” They have a very refined sense of the use of force. They under- stand what an opponent is willing to pay and what it is not willing to pay. They understood that if we did not occupy Iraq, there were limits that the United States and the coalition were not going to go beyond, and that left us, the inspectors, out dangling. We were seeking to cause them to give up weapons which they considered vital to their national security. It was coercive disarmament, not arms control. The Iraqi regime will often try to cause this to morph into an arms control discussion, which it is not. This is coercive disar- mament. Iraq fought a war, they lost, and they are supposed to give up these weapons. So I say all this by way of explaining just how important these capabilities are to the regime. They are not going to give them up, under any circumstances that I can imagine, without conflict. Cer- tainly, as we learned in December 1998, they found that the price which the coalition and, in particular, the United States was will- ing to cause them to pay was worth it. In other words, they en- dured 4 days of bombing of some set of targets. That was fine by them. They got rid of the inspectors; they have the weapons. Let me talk just very briefly about the missiles and other weap- ons which, in my judgment, remain. When we finished our work, there were a lot of unresolved issues. In the missile area, let me just summarily say that I suspect strongly that there is a strategic reserve of SCUD variant missiles left, on the order of a dozen or so. These are modified SCUD missiles which had been provided by the former Soviet Union, or produced in Iraq’s own indigenous mis- sile program. They had proceeded pretty far in getting a capability of building their own SCUD-like missiles. In addition to that, they have been permitted by the UN resolu- tions to build missiles up to a range of 150 kilometers. As the Iraqis themselves have pointed out, the technology and skills re- quired to make a missile go 150 kilometers are not terribly dif- ferent from those required to make a missile go much further, so it was our judgment and our suspicion that embedded in the per- mitted program were activities to support longer range missiles. Certainly, we discovered the Iraqis had the desire for longer range missiles. They had paper plans for missiles going as far as 3,000 kilo- meters. There was a program called the Al Abbas, which was a de- 95 how effective an agricultural weapon could be. This case appears to be caused by some pig from South Africa or something. There is no reason to believe that it was caused by a country, but it is illustrative of something that could easily be caused by a country— and we might not know it. Finally, I want to make a couple of comments about the Iraqi nu- clear program, and where it May be headed. The nuclear program fortunately was never achieved by the Iraqis. In spite of a lot of effort, resources, and thousands of people devoted to it, they did not get a weapon. They had a good design. They almost got a weap- on, but they did not. Towards the end of our work, we were looking around to see where some of the key people that were involved in the nuclear program were located. They were reemerging in clusters. They were clustering in areas where they had similar expertise, at state establishments and key Defense factories. It appeared to us not co- incidental. In other words, it appeared that the nuclear team was reassembling from 1998 onward. Now, how far they are going and how far they have gotten is an open question. There is some limited reporting by defectors, some of whom have gone public, that the program continues. Similarly, there is defector reporting in each of the other areas which con- firms that these programs are continuing and weapons exist, and that the nuclear program is the biggest risk, but fortunately is also unlikely to be achieved in the short term. On Iraqis who leave Iraq, it seems to me the United States has not done as good a job as it could have towards encouraging brain drain. Ultimately, it is the people who make the weapons, and ulti- mately it is the expertise that we at UNSCOM left behind. These are technocrats—smart, energetic people. In many cases, they are trapped in the system. They face daily dilemmas that we do not. Do you risk leaving? Do you risk not serving the regime? Risk your life? Risk your family's life? These are daily decisions these people confront, and they have a lot of sympathy from me, despite the fact that they May participate in these programs. I think we could do a lot both to help them and to help ourselves by encouraging them to vote with their feet. As it becomes more and more clear that the United States is serious about changing the regime in Baghdad, Baghdad is going to get pretty ugly. Saddam’s a proactive guy. He May be paranoid. He May have good reason for being paranoid. People are going to be starting to look next to him and saying, who is likely to be disloyal? People are going to die. I would hope some of these more productive Iraqis will decide sooner to leave rather than later, and perhaps we can make that message clear. This plays into a final point. If we do confront Iraq militarily we face another issue where Saddam May actually order the use of these weapons. Deterring him this time May be difficult because he May realize that we are not going to stop until he is gone, period. That takes away some of the leverage on deterrence, so in that case, one of the messages you May wish to transmit is to all the people who have to execute the orders and say, look, there will be a new regime. Judgments will be made at that point in time, and your actions now will be evaluated at that point in time. Iraqis in 96 the chain of command must think about it, because we will be watching to see who actually does this and who does not do it. Maybe the people can be deterred, if not their leader. Those are my comments. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Duelfer follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY CHARLES A. DUELFER Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your subcommittee. I would like to make my presentation in two parts. The first part will address the motivations, concepts, ..f organizations supporting the Iraqi WMD programs. The second will discuss the ensuing programs and their probable status today. UNSCOM had long pressed Iraq to provide information and documents describing the requirements and operational concepts for the biological, chemical, ballistic mis- sile, and nuclear programs. Iraq refused until shortly after Saddam Hussein's son- in-law, Hussein Kamal, defected to Jordan in August 1995. Hussein Kamal was the most senior regime official with control over these weapons programs. Baghdad was concerned about what Kamal would reveal and sought to limit the damage by a burst of controlled cooperation and admissions. On September 18, 1995, I had a long, late night meeting with several senior Iraqi ministers and other officials. The meeting was arranged to discuss the Iraqi con- cepts and requirements for their WMD development and production programs. Pre- viously, Baghdad had refused to engage in such a discussion. I remember the meet- ing quite well, not simply because there was an unusual amount of candor, but be- cause I suddenly realized how unlikely it was that the government would ever com- ply fully with the UN demand to completely give up all WMD capabilities forever. Consequently, the UNSCOM inspectors had an ultimately hopeless task under the conditions they were permitted to operate. Iraq revealed that evening how weapons of mass destruction were viewed from the position of the presidency. (They even provided selected presidential documents.) Partial descriptions of the origin of WMD efforts were discussed. They also dis- cussed how these programs had been used and their importance to the regime. In essence, the possession of WMD had saved the regime on two occasions. The first was in the war with Iran in the 1980s when Iranian human wave infantry attacks were repelled with chemical munitions (UNSCOM learned that 101,000 were re- ported “consumed” during this period). The second instance where WMD preserved the regime was more surprising. I had asked about the decision by the Iraqi leadership not to employ WMD in the 1991 Gulf War. In a carefully worded response, the impression was conveyed that the President thought if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons against the coali- tion, retaliation would end his regime and probably him personally. He was success- fully deterred. However, my interlocutors went on to describe how they had loaded biological and chemical agent into various missile warheads and bombs before hos- tilities began in 1991. Moreover they dispersed these weapons and pre-delegated the authority to use them if the United States moved on Baghdad. The Iraqis stated that these actions apparently deterred the United States from going to Baghdad. Whether the Iraqi leadership believes this was the only reason the United States did not go to Baghdad in 1991 is unknown. However, clearly they are convinced that the possession of WMD contributed to keeping the Americans away and thus was vital to their survival. The Iraqi WMD programs, which were begun in the mid-1970s, and consumed large material and human resources throughout the 1980s, were well worth the in- vestment from the perspective of the leadership. It was difficult then and more dif- ficult now, to imagine circumstances under which this regime would end these pro- grams. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said on more than one occasion, “You are not. McArthur. You did not occupy Iraq. Therefore, there are limits to what you can do.” He was absolutely correct. Inspectors would be inherently limited in what they could do and accomplish. Nevertheless, we did eventually obtain a pretty good pic- ture of the extent of Iraq's programs. From that, and from evidence that continues to be available even now, it is possible to make a reasonable judgment about Iraq's current capabilities and intentions. Organizations. The key organizations of the Iraqi programs included not just the Ministry of Defense, Military services and Military Industrial Corporation, but also the intelligence services. The role of the latter was particularly relevant to the bio- logical weapons program and contributed to our lack of understanding in that area. The Military services had clear roles in the chemical area. Air forces and army forces stocked and used a variety of munitions for battlefield purposes. The long- 98 UNSCOM did receive provided guidance to continue to develop types of chemical weapons, attempting to manufacture the most dangerous types in large quantities. It was in this period that development and production of the advanced nerve agent VX was conducted. There remains considerable uncertainty about the extent of this program and its disposition. There was a pattern to Iraqi revelations—they gave up the oldest and least advanced projects and materials most readily. UNSCOM accounted for and destroyed huge amounts of chemical agent, muni- tions, production equipment, and precursors. Yet, there certainly remained unac- counted materials for the production of both precursors and final agent. Iraq can make munitions indigenously and can probably make needed chemical production equipment indigenously. The expertise for such work remains. Areas where Iraq could be expected to be doing development would be in produc- ing stabilized VX and improving their munitions and dispersal systems. In particu- lar, the aerial bomb designs Iraq had in the early 1990s were not efficient for dis- persing nerve agent. Fusing was a problem. It was apparent that Iraq was begin- ning to look into cluster munitions. Such munitions could be much more effective battlefield weapons. Aerial spray devices, possibly attached to remotely piloted vehi- cles, were under development and had application for both chemical and biological agents. "Biological Weapons Status. The biological weapons program was the least well verified of all Iraq's WMD programs. Part of the reason is because, as noted earlier, it emerged from the security organizations. The original purposes probably were not Military in nature. This program was also not admitted until 1995, or 4 years after UNSCOM began work in Iraq. We know that the biological weapons program large- ly shared the same munitions as chemical weapons. However, the production levels and disposition of both agent and production equipment has significant uncertainty. The three biological agents Iraq States it º for weapons were anthrax, bot- ulinum toxin, and aflatoxin. There were many other biological agents on which Iraq conducted research and development. These included Clostridium perfringens (causes gangrene), ricin, wheat cover Smut, and some early work on viruses. Iraq had begun some early genetic engineering work as well. Iraq conducted experiments mixing lethal and non-lethal agents such as CS, commonly used as a riot control agent. Iraq never made clear the purposes of many of these programs and experiments, extensive though they were. It seemed probable that Military use was not the only purpose. In fact, the Military seemed to have almost no interest or relationship to the program. It is difficult to understand why Iraq would produce and put alatoxin into aerial bombs. It has the effect of causing cancer over a period of several years. Experiments Iraq conducted in mixing aflatoxin with riot control agent appear par- ticularly insidious as they would mask the exposure of individuals to this cancer causing agent. The experiments with wheat smut are evidently aimed at developing economic weapons. It was clear that Iraq understood that depending on the method of dispersal, the origin of the agent could be concealed. In other words, they understood the potential for conducting an attack that would be near impossible to connect to Baghdad as the responsible actor. The sites where Iraqi biological weapons work was known to have occurred were accounted for by UNSCOM. The largest, Al Hakam, was destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in 1996. Another, the Daura Foot and Mouth disease facility, is being used for civilian purposes according to public accounts. There were elements of pro- duction equipment that UNSCOM understood were shipped into Iraq, but which were never located. Nuclear Weapons Status. The nuclear weapons program is the most critical and most difficult for Iraq to achieve. While successful in all other WMD areas, Iraq did not quite achieve a nuclear weapon capability before invading Kuwait. Iraq had a huge sustained investment in nuclear weapons development throughout the 1980s. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) accounted for most of the program and key facilities were destroyed. However, the intellectual capital remains, as does the will of the leadership to achieve a nuclear capability. Even during the time UNSCOM and IAEA were still in Iraq, there was a pattern of the former staff of the nuclear program being reassembled in common locations according to their ex- pertise, e.g. specialists from former centrifuge enrichment program can be found clustered at one facility. Of course Iraq claimed they were engaged in activities al- lowed by the UN resolutions, but coincidences like these occurred too often. Key facilities where personnel congregated included Al Majd Center, the Ibn Sina Center, Al Raya Center, Sa'ad Center (right across from the Rasheed Hotel familiar to all visitors), and the Al Tahaddi Center. These centers have legitimate rationales 100 UNSCOM left in 1998. Chemical weapons munitions for the battlefield can be pro- duced in existing Iraqi munition factories. The biological program is the most problematic for a number of reasons. First, it is the least visible. Facilities can be hidden or made mobile. UNSCOM had received reports of mobile biological weapons facilities. Unlike nuclear programs, biological weapons programs have a small signature. The best window into the Iraqi program will be from defectors. Some have been providing such information.” Another key concern about the biological programs is that Iraq can accomplish everything indige- nously. They can produce all the production equipment (fermenters, dryers, cen- trifuges, etc.). Iraq is also quite able to produce dispersal weapons of various sorts. Finally, they have access to seed stocks for a whole range agents. The types of research Iraq is known to have conducted points to their interest in biological weapons not just as a battlefield weapon, but as a strategic weapon, an economic weapon, a terror weapon, and possibly a genocide weapon. It remains to be learned precisely what agents were used in Kurdistan and whether they were strictly chemical agents. Biological weapons are the most difficult present threat posed by Iraq. They cer- tainly have the capacity to deploy it clandestinely or through surrogates should the regime so decide. Moreover, it is possible that such things as wheat smut could be spread without any way of tracing the Source. It is not impossible to imagine an economic disaster like the British foot and mouth disease outbreak that could be se- cretly directed from Baghdad and we would never be able to prove the Source. Biological weapons remain a high priority for the regime. Defector information in- dicates recruitment efforts among top Baghdad University biology students. It is also interesting to note that people associated with the biological weapons programs have been promoted. One key individual is now deputy director of the Military In- dustrial Corporation—the state run Defense research, development, and production center. Saddam Hussein has stated his policy on weapons himself. In a televised meeting with top officials of the Military Industrial Corporation on June 12, 2000, he said, “If the world tells us to abandon all our weapons and keep only swords, we will do that. We will destroy all the weapons, if they destroy their weapons. But if they keep a rifle and then tell me that I have the right to possess only a sword, then we would say no. As long as the rifle has become a means to defend our country against anybody who May have designs against it, then we will try our best to acquire the rifle.”6 Finally, and most recently, the official newspaper of the Iraqi Bath party, Ath- Thawra, wrote that “Acquiescing to Israel’s, but not Arab, possession of such weap- ons (WMD) is a case of double standards. But no matter how much those who pur- sue double standards try to obstruct the Arabs, they will not stop their efforts to achieve this goal, be they overt or covert, in future. Acquiring weapons of mass de- struction is consistent with “the right to self-Defense and the requirements of na- tional security, irrespective of the nature of a ruling regime.”7 Of course, the difference in the regime is everything. The present regime in Bagh- dad will not give up WMD even if inspectors go in again. The present regime will also remain quite willing to use them. Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you very much. Those were excellent Summaries of your testimony, and I think you have really given us a tremendous amount of food for thought, and there will be ques- tions, of course. We will proceed with 6 minute rounds, our usual procedure. Let me begin, Dr. Cordesman, with trying to revisit an issue for just a moment. I agree that we have probably spent too much time focusing on missiles as a method of delivery. Although I have sup- ported some of the development of our programs here in the United * One of the better known was Abbas Al Janabi who left in February 1998. He was a close aid to Saddam's elder son, Udey. He reported that the effectiveness of UNSCOM was limited # in Pºular. Iraq retained a biological weapons capability. See Paris Match February 11, pp. 3–5. 6 From a FBIS report 122115Z of June 12, 2000. 7 From an Agence France Press wire report from Baghdad of January 20, 2002, describing a report in Ath-Thawra of the same date. 104 would not trigger an immediate Iraqi reaction, and it could be a duel that lasted for years, if not a decade. There are options which I would regard as being very dangerous for other reasons. These include relying on a weak, if not impotent, opposition movement like the INC, praying that you got a repeti- tion of Afghanistan, starting something we cannot not finish, and then creating a “Bay of Kurdistan” and embarrassing the United States throughout this region by a conspicuous failure. The only thing worse, quite frankly, than Saddam is for the U.S. to try to overthrow him and still have Saddam. If you are going to draw the conclusion from his weapons of mass destruction that we must strike, the follow-on conclusion must be that if we are going to do something militarily, it has to be quick, it has to be decisive, it has to be thorough, and it has to have an American presence on the ground. It has to be followed up by a major effort to rebuild Iraq, to create a state that the Iraqi people deserve. The Iraqi people, frankly, are often a remarkably decent group of people. If we meet these conditions, we are willing to use several air wings and the equivalent of a heavy corps so this can be done in a matter of weeks, and if we can get the support of nations like Turkey, Kuwait, and hopefully Saudi Arabia, then the threat of proliferation here is so dangerous that that would be an option which I would say would be justified. But if it is the U.S. supporting the INC in fumbling its way into defeat, or if it is simply another set of air strikes, if Saddam sur- vives, if Iraq goes on and proliferates, and we then convince every- one in the region that the U.S. has tried and failed, that would be a disaster. Senator BINGAMAN. Mr. Duelfer, did you wish to give an opinion? Mr. DUELFER. I would say a couple of things. One is there are two alternative futures. One is an Iraq under the current regime, which continues to develop its WMD capabilities, ultimately result-- ing in a nuclear weapon. They are going to have 4 or 5 million bar- rels of oil production a day in the not-too-distant future, and a will- ingness to use this power. That is one future. The alternative future is an Iraq under a government that be- haves according to international norms, with whom we can have relations, with a vibrant, developing society, with, again, the pro- duction of oil, agriculture, and a population which is secular, west-- ward-leaning, who want nothing more than to be reattached to the West. They would love to have the Internet. They would love to have fax machines. They would love to have satellite TV. The dif- ference between those two futures is huge, and a positive Iraq can ºse everything in the region. To me, that is worth taking some ITISK. I agree with Tony that it is going to require a strong American presence, because one of the artifacts of American policy in the past 10 years is that people do not believe us. Sending a few cruise missiles does not mean anything. The Iraqis have grown to like cruise missiles. I had conversations with them on this topic. They said, “well, why do you do this, you target buildings.” I said, “well, we have these pictures, so we target the buildings.” Buildings to them are like Scotch tape. They do not care. 105 So they are used to America not being serious, but if America demonstrates that it is serious, it will change people's minds in Iraq. They will question, are they going to fight to defend this re- gime, or are they going to say, “here comes the future.” Similarly, our European friends and allies and the countries in the region will begin to think about what position they want to be in with the next regime, which will be quite positive. It is a tough decision. Senator BINGAMAN. I guess I am still unclear. Is it your view, Dr. Cordesman, that we could accomplish the objective that both of you are referring to here, changing the regime in Iraq, in a quick, deci- sive way? Dr. CORDESMAN. It depends upon what you mean by quick and decisive. I think it would be disastrous to go into this region today, not having established the credibility of what we intend to do with our regional allies, not having proven that this time we are truly serious and have a high chance of success, and not having shown we have a clear plan for what we are going to do in Iraq after we wiil. Now, we cannot take these steps tomorrow. It probably could be done in a year, perhaps less. It would require a very clear U.S. commitment, however, to act decisively and to use a great deal of our political influence. Our efforts would also be complicated by the second intifada. But, I think within a year it is at least possible, although I would prefer a year to 18 months if we had the time. I do think—I want to be very clear about this—that the people who talk about Iraq being another Afghanistan are kidding them- selves. Those who feel the INA and INC, with their almost massive penetration by Iraqi intelligence and their acute weakness, or the Iranian-backed SARI, with its ability to conduct a few minor raids but no troops, plus a few air strikes, can give us a quick overthrow capability believe in a dangerous myth. Acting on it would do us far more harm than good. Mr. DUELFER. Two quick comments. One, it requires U.S. forces on the ground. We have to convince the regular Iraqi Army that we are serious about regime change. There are institutions in Iraq that we want in the next government anyway, such as the regular army and the regular civil service. The second point is, on rebuilding Iraq, that it is vastly different than Afghanistan. The Iraqis will rebuild Iraq lickety-split. In 1992 they had their communications and a lot of the essential services back. These guys will take care of themselves, once they have the opportunity. Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you. Senator LANDRIEU. Senator Hutchinson. Senator HUTCHINSON. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for hold- ing the hearing today, and thank you for what I think is very chilling testimony. What you have told us today justifies the Presi- dent's characterization of Iraq as part of an axis of evil, at least in my estimation. My only question about the President's use of the term “axis of evil” is why there were not some other nations in- cluded in that axis as well that are either terrorist States or export- ing terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. 106 I thank you for your very candid and forthright testimony. It is needed as a part of a wake-up call for the price that is going to be required and the commitment that is going to be necessary to do what you have, under various scenarios, suggested. I just came back from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan, and we stopped in Brussels and met with our NATO commander. One of the things that struck me in particular in the visit with NATO was the skittishness of our European allies that have been forthrightly foursquare behind our effort in Afghanistan but are very, if not outright, opposed to-very nervous about—any expan- sion of the war on terrorism beyond Afghanistan. Part of their point, or part of the contention they make, is that there is no evi- dence that Iraq exports. That Iraq, while it May be developing weapons of mass destruction, is not sharing or proliferating those weapons with others. In your testimony, if I heard correctly, Mr. Duelfer, you sug- gested that you would not be surprised if we found evidence of Iraqi connections with Al Qaeda in those caves in Afghanistan, and that at least those connections, those communications, I think you made a distinction between their goal being the destruction of, or the undermining, of Saudi Arabia, but not necessarily an attack upon the United States. It seems to me that if you are going to communicate with and share intelligence and information with Al Qaeda, whatever your motive is, the end result is going to be that you are assisting an enemy of the United States. Maybe if you could just respond a little bit to the issue of whether Iraq is in fact proliferating and sharing its WMD technology with others. Mr. DUELFER. When we were in Iraq as UNSCOM we did not see conclusive evidence that Iraq was sharing its WMD expertise with other nations. They, of course, were obtaining WMD expertise from other nations. There were some indications that Iraqis who had WMD expertise were traveling abroad. I am sure the Iraqis would simply say, they were probably just taking vacations in these countries. This is very suspicious, but in terms of absolute facts, I cannot tell you that Iraq was sharing its capabilities with other countries, or non-state actors. Having said that, there certainly were lots of what we would call terrorist groups hanging out in Iraq. We inspected a couple of bases there to see if they were conceal- ing weapons. There were lots of places and activities we stumbled across not related to our mandate under the UN, but which would indicate there certainly were connections between the Iraqi intel- ligence services and some of these terrorist organizations, but I cannot tell you that there was a WMD connection. We had enormous access in Iraq. We inspected Mukhabarat headquarters, the elite Special Security Organization, all kinds of sensitive places, because we knew that is where the WMD mate- rials were controlled and where decisions were made. We would stumble across all kinds of things, but it was not related to our mandate. I cannot tell you for sure if there was any connection be- tween terrorists and WMD in Iraq. Dr. CORDESMAN. Senator, if I could pick up on a point Charles raised, these are the “crown jewels” to Iraq. Lethal biological 107 agents, any kind of radiological agent, or a nuclear weapon that was a fissile weapon would be the Iraqi regime's most valuable asset. This also would be a scenario where if we suddenly saw such weapons in the hands of a terrorist group, we would be imme- diately asking the question, how did something that sophisticated come into the hands of such a group? Now, Al Qaeda is not the ideal group for Iraq to support. Its ide- ology is different. There are many other terrorist cells and groups which are more secular, easier to control, and that would be more dependent on Iraq for money. I think even limited aid, such as the provision of a particularly lethal biological strain, would be some- thing Iraq would not do. At the same time, Al Qaeda would not need all that much tech- nical skill to have the ability to conduct an attack in the United States using hazardous materials. It would not take much outside help to get a crude biological agent. There are a lot of ways in which an Iraqi intelligence service might or might not help Al Qaeda to acquire CBRN weapons. At the same time, I know that some of the manuals involved that are required to produce these weapons have been commercially available for more than 15 years in the open literature in English, so it is by no means clear there has been any relationship. There either is a clear chain of evidence to prove Iraqi involvement or there is not. We cannot answer your question. Perhaps the intel- ligence community can. Senator HUTCHINSON. Is it your sense that if we had inspectors go back in, if they allowed inspectors back in, that there would be any freer rein, any greater access to these weapons than what you had before? You said it was pretty wide-open, and I am surprised at that. Mr. DUELFER. Even when we were UNSCOM, when we were traipsing around all these various palaces, we could not find what Iraq desired to conceal. It is difficult for me to imagine any cir- cumstances under which Saddam would permit this new group to go in that would be more effective. We did a study when we were out of Baghdad on what we be- lieved would be required for effective monitoring in the biological area, which is the toughest one, and it requires a lot of access to people and documents in a very short time frame all over the coun- try. It is hard for me to imagine Saddam making that available, but we will see. Dr. CORDESMAN. The other issue here, Senator, is what we call break-out capability. When Iraq first used mustard gas it was made in university laboratories. It did not have previous Military facilities. Poison gas was used in small amounts, but it was still used. When Iraq converted a pharmaceutical plant to the mass produc- tion of anthrax agents before the Gulf War, it took less than 6 months. So, even if you could dismantle all of the facilities in Iraq today, as long as this regime is present and has the basic tech- nology and has some core elements of proliferation, even a 100 per- cent or 99 percent inspection effort could not really prevent this re- gime from proliferating. 111 When we talked about U.S. forces, however, this is another reason why you need decisive forces. You need to be able to use air and land power quickly, surgically, and with enough effect to break up any kind of cohesive Iraqi resistence. That does not mean we will not take casualties or we will not take risks, but if we wait for the risk we will face in 3 or 5 years as distinguished from the risk we face now, it is not clear that buy- ing more vaccines will really make the situation better. Senator HUTCHINSON. I think the vaccine capability could be ad- dressed very quickly, in a matter of months, not in a matter of years, so that we could render that protection. Mr. Duelfer, did you want to say anything? Mr. DUELFER. I would agree with what Tony said. I would point out that we are in a much worse situation than we were in 1991. Senator HUTCHINSON. We did not go to Baghdad. Mr. DUELFER. True, and that is a problem. I would also point out one of the last known smallpox outbreaks was in Iraq, so the potential of them actually having that is not negligible, it is serious. Senator HUTCHINSON. Thank you. Senator LANDRIEU. Senator Nelson. Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Before we go into closed session, see if you can answer this for the record. It took us about 6 months to build up when we started in the Gulf War. Now, if we discovered that Iraq were suddenly getting ready with the likelihood to use weapons of mass destruction in a 2- month, 3-month period, how would we respond, and could we re- spond with the kind of force that would be necessary to neutralize that threat? Dr. CORDESMAN. You have not described whether we are talking nuclear or biological, or the numbers involved and the delivery sys- tems, but if it is to totally neutralize the threat, the answer is no. Could you create a climate in which it would be virtually impos- sible for Iraq to conduct coherent Military operations and use these weapons in large amounts with any effectiveness, with the kind of air power targeting and other capabilities we have? I think the an- swer would be yes. That would not necessarily deal with the kind of covert attacks that we discussed before you came in, Senator, but again, everything depends on the quality of our intelligence and our targeting capabilities. My guess would be that our intelligence would be so limited that we would have to launch an absolutely massive air campaign to be certain of suppressing such an offensive capability by Iraq as thor- oughly as possible. We would have to explain to the world that in the process many of the targets we hit were not targets we could prove had weapons of mass destruction, and that there would be serious collateral damage. Let me give you a specific example. One of the possible places that you can produce biological weapons is an infant formula plant. One of the places you could produce these weapons is a pharma- ceutical plant. You are not going to leave those targets behind in your scenario just because you, say, have only a 10 percent con- fidence that that is where they are actually being made rather than 90 percent. 112 Mr. DUELFER. There is definitely a history for them colocating Military and civilian activities. Part of their agent production was a place called the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Production Plant, which is a pharmaceutical plant, but it had been making biological agent before. Bear in mind, this is the mindset that puts civilians in palaces as their own SDI. They place civilians right next to mili- tary locations. It is a heavy price to pay if we were to attack. Senator BILL NELSON. I have a number of questions for the closed session. Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. We are going to move now into the closed session, but let me just wrap up again by thanking you very much for your very candid comments and remarks and for the years you have spent in this area, because our President and this Congress are going to have to make some very tough decisions about the position we are going to take regarding this one particu- lar threat. Let me express to the members of the subcommittee how much I appreciate their help in this exploration, because this subcommit-- tee is charged with identifying emerging threats, and I remind my- self and all of us that Iraq obviously is a threat, and we are trying to define what that threat is. There are materials all around us in our own Nation that can be used in the wrong hands at the wrong time by people who have sometimes very difficult motives to under- stand. So we are going to take our time to explore all of the many facets of this, but I thought that this hearing was very timely. I think we got a lot of good information, and very good testimony on the record about how we should and can proceed in this regard. We are going to now move to closed session, which is in room SR-232—A. Let me just say that only those that are appropriately cleared will be admitted. Before proceeding to the room, let me re- mind everyone to turn off all electronic devices before entering the room. We will adjourn here and proceed in about 5 minutes to the next room. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB SMITH LOW END ITEMS 1. Senator SMITH. Dr. Cordesman, a good deal of the information presented to date deals with the production of weapons and Iraq's delivery capabilities on the battlefield and in the geographical region. Has there has been any information gath- ered or gleaned about the lower-end items associated with Iraq's ability to sustain a WMD combat offensive capability—items such as individual protective measures, personnel and equipment decontamination capabilities, and so on—that would indi- cate their ability to conduct sustained operations over time or do indicators point to a one time, ºš Bang use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons at a tactical or strategic level? Dr. CORDESMAN. Iraq still has very significant supplies of chemical weapons de- fense gear. It is unclear that it has effective vaccines for all of its potential biological weapons, although it should have sufficient antibiotics to deal with limited casual- ties from accidents in handling anthrax. It is doubtful that Iraq could COPE with any outbreak from a use of smallpox as a weapon. In general, however, Iraq is far more likely to use biological weapons at ranges or distances that preclude the need for extensive defensive gear or immunization. The real problem for Iraq is that any attack using highly lethal biological agents is almost certain to trigger a massive U.S. response, or Israeli response should Israel come under attack. The same would be true of a nuclear attack. The level of provocation is so high that Iraq's leaders would have to see it as a desperate one- 113 time action. The same May be true of anything but highly local limited use of chemi- cal weapons against Iraqi domestic targets. President Bush has sent a very clear message and Iraq must realize that any use of a CBRN weapon could trigger a major U.S. Military response and effort to overthrow the regime. OPERATION DESERT STORM 2. Senator SMITH. Dr. Cordesman, can it be either positively confirmed or denied that our troops during Operation Desert Storm were exposed to the biological weap- ons you spoke of in your prepared remarks? Dr. CORDESMAN. There is no firm evidence that U.S. or allied troops were exposed to biological weapons during Operation Desert Storm, and claims that such weapons were used against the Kurds have never been documented. This does not mean it is not possible that some weapons were used and proved ineffective or that the U.S. caused the release of some agent during its air and ground attacks. If this hap- pened, however, any casualties are in the noise level of the statistical patterns and fluctuations in frequency of symptoms and disease in small population samples. IRAQ'S THREAT TO ISRAEL 3. Senator SMITH. Dr. Cordesman, we all recall Iraq's capability and practice dur- ing Operation Desert Storm of hitting Israel with SCUD–B ballistic missiles, which were topped with conventional munitions. Does Iraq retain the same capability of delivering ordnance onto the land of Israel today? Does it have better capabilities? Does it have the ability to deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical agents? Dr. CORDESMAN. We really do not know. Many advances in warhead design can be accomplished with little visibility and tests without missile firings. A test of power or vapor dissemination and fusing might also be possible on a missile fired without the permitted 150 kilometer range and might not be detectable by U.S. in- telligence. There is no unclassified evidence, however, of actual tests of such weap- ons on a missile warhead. 4. Senator SMITH. Dr. Cordesman, what defenses are we pursuing to protect both Israel and our other friends in the region, such as Kuwait, Oman, Turkey, and Bah- rain, from similar attacks? Dr. CORDESMAN. Upgrades to the Patriot offer significant increases in Defense in those countries where the Patriot is deployed and the U.S. can airlift in more de- fenses. We have worked with our allies to help them develop passive and civil de- fenses, and we have somewhat improved our targeting and strike capability to pre- empt and suppress Iraqi attacks. At this point in time, however, we have no clear idea of when we will have truly advanced wide-area theater missile defenses, what their cost will be, and how effective they will be. It is easy to be pro-missile Defense, but we probably will have nothing actually ready beyond the Patriot PAC 3 level for the next decade. ANY MEANS NECESSARY 5. Senator SMITH. Mr. Duelfer, when Iraq ignored the United Nations resolution and kicked out weapons inspectors the world stood by and watched while the Clin- ton administration did nothing about it. I think that was a contributing factor in Usama bin Ladin's thinking that the United States was weak and that his cowardly attacks would be successful and not responded to. Do you think the United States enforcing the resolution by any means necessary is the right thing to do? Mr. DUELFER. Given the high value the Baghdad regime attaches to WMD, the only way they will completely relinquish this capability is under sufficient threat that, in effect, threatens the regime. Senior Iraqis as much as stated this. The rel- ative absence of consequences to Iraqi defiance during the past several years has convinced the regime that they can pursue WMD and other activities which erode the UN sanctions. In my opinion this trend must change and probably will only change when there is a new government in Baghdad. NAVAL THREATS 6. Senator SMITH. Mr. Duelfer, have you seen any indications that Iraq–or for that matter the other States in the axis of evil—is pursuing mounting and launching its ballistic missiles on Ships? What would be the technological limitations on such