2
ican people that the transition will succeed. The arrival of Ambas-
sador Negroponte in Iraq surely marks a new beginning for United
States-Iraq relations. Secretary Powell briefed members of our com-
mittee before the Independence Day recess on the new embassy op-
erations in Baghdad, and they represent an undeniable commit-
ment to the future of Iraq.
One area of serious concern is the pace of U.S. assistance to the
interim Iraqi Government. As of July 13, reports indicated that of
the $18.4 billion appropriated for Iraq last November by the Con-
gress, only $6 billion has been obligated, and only $458 million has
been expended. The new U.S. Embassy is attempting to accelerate
assistance, but at the same time it intends to initiate a reevalua-
tion of existing assistance programs. Such a study May be nec-
essary, but it must not serve to further delay United States assist-
aIlce.
Ambassador Negroponte has asserted that the United States
needs to construct a new embassy building in Iraq. I agree with his
assessment. A United States Embassy that occupies the former re-
gime's palace has severe symbolic disadvantages. Beyond sym-
bolism the facility was not constructed to be an embassy. Under
Secretary of State Marc Grossman testified before our committee in
May that a new embassy could cost more than $1 billion. The ad-
ministration did not include these funds in the fiscal year 2005
budget request, but indicated they might be included in a supple-
mental. The sooner we identify the costs, the more quickly funds
can be requested and construction can begin, demonstrating our
good intentions to the Iraqis.
Most Iraqis are optimistic about the future. Even before the
transfer of sovereignty, polls conducted by Oxford Research Inter-
national and the International Republican Institute found that
about three-quarters of the Iraqi people believed that they were ei-
ther about the same or better off than before the war. Oxford found
that 64 percent of Iraqis expect that their lives will be better a
year from now.
In 7 months, Iraqis are scheduled to hold elections for a 275-
member National Assembly. This assembly would then undertake
the weighty duty of writing a constitution for Iraq. The Inde-
pendent Elections Commission of Iraq, selected through a collabo-
rative process with the United Nations, was confirmed in May.
Members of the Commission completed a United Nations-sponsored
training session in Mexico.
The election plans call for setting up as many as 30,000 polling
stations, recruiting and training as many as 150,000 election work-
ers, and ensuring accurate voting results of about 13 million peo-
ple. This is an incredibly daunting prospect. The committee would
be very interested in our witnesses’ views on whether the election
plan can be executed effectively. If this is an unrealistic plan, do
other options exist that might advance the formation of a perma-
nent Iraqi Government?
Today we are most fortunate to have a panel that has been deep-
ly engaged in policymaking with respect to Iraq. We welcome Am-
bassador Ron Schlicher, the Iraq Coordinator at the United States
Department of State, and Mr. David Gompert, who worked in Iraq
as Ambassador Bremer's senior adviser for national security and


4
of law and with the obligations of a sovereign member of the inter-
national community.
It's very clear, sir, that Iraqis are anxious to assume that respon-
sibility and to assert their sovereignty. They do not hesitate to say
so. In fact, they are vigorously exercising their newly won right of
free speech in community meetings, in cafes, in mosques, and in
farm fields up and down the Tigris and the Euphrates. And in
doing so, the Iraqi people have made clear that their top concern
is the restoration of security and the defeat of the insurgents and
terrorists who want to undermine stability and undermine the path
forward toward full democracy.
In response, while the Interim Government has taken a hard line
against violence, it is also reaching out to all Iraqis willing to par-
ticipate peacefully in that political process. For example, there are
reports that the Interim Government is considering issuance of an
amnesty law that would provide an opportunity for those who wish
to give up the path of violence and join the supporters of a free and
democratic Iraq. We welcome all of these efforts at national rec-
onciliation, and of course, any final decision on an amnesty will be
an Iraqi decision.
However, we have been clear with the Interim Government that
we believe that those responsible for causing the death of Iraqi ci-
vilians and security forces or members of the U.S. or Coalition
armed forces should face justice.
Even as the Interim Government reaches out to those Iraqis who
are willing to participate in the political process, they have very ag-
gressively attacked crime and terrorism. Prime Minister Allawi has
issued a decree authorizing the Interim Government to exercise
certain limited powers in particular emergency situations in order
to give the government more tools to meet the demands of Iraqis
for safer streets.
In recognition of the lessons learned from the Saddam era, how-
ever, the decree also includes important procedural safeguards that
will prevent it from being abused to infringe on the civil rights that
Iraqis are only now beginning to enjoy. U.S. Embassy officials con-
sulted on these issues when asked by the Interim Government as
part of our commitment to support that government with advice
and assistance. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, during his re-
cent trip to Baghdad, made that commitment clear to Foreign Min-
ister Zebari when he said, the message here in the United States
is quite simple. There is a sovereign government in Iraq. Our job
is to support that government to the absolute extent that we can,
and we’re going to do it.
During our consultations with the Iraqis, they have made clear
that they want the troops and the multinational force in Iraq, ours
and those of our partners, to work with them to provide basic secu-
rity until the Iraqis can do that job themselves. The multinational
forces are doing just that, and in a manner consistent with the ex-
ercise of full sovereignty by the Iraqi Government.
But the ultimate success of the Interim Government, of course,
depends on the support of the Iraqi people, and Iraqis are showing
that they are behind it. Throughout Iraq, courageous citizens are
taking positions at all levels of their country's new government as
cabinet members, as local administrators, as local council members,


7
Sir, you mentioned Ambassador Negroponte and the establish-
ment of the Embassy. We have indeed stood up the Embassy in
Baghdad and we have opened up our four regional offices in Mosul,
in Kirkuk, in Hillha, and in Basra. To ensure that we were right-
sized, we reviewed our goals in Iraq prior to the transfer and we
aligned our mission planning in accordance with those prior stud-
162S.
Now, based on that review, in the near term we will have ap-
proximately 1,000 Americans under the authority of Ambassador
Negroponte. And I can assure you that every one of them is very
busy and will remain very busy. The embassy, of course, has tradi-
tional sections like a political, an economic, a consular, and a man-
agement section. But unlike most embassies, it also contains tem-
porary organizations, such as the liaison officers to various Iraqi
ministries and other government agencies, the IRMO, which I men-
tioned early is another of these temporary organizations. It has the
responsibility of assisting Ambassador Negroponte in setting and
monitoring reconstruction policy. IRMO will also provide consult-
ants to the Iraqi ministries, those ministries which identify their
own needs.
There will also be approximately 50 State Department and IRMO
staff in the regional offices, I mentioned earlier, and in teams em-
bodied in the military commands at the division level. Sir, this is
just one example of the partnership between the Departments of
State and Defense in Iraq. We understand that such cooperation is
vital to our success in Iraq, as indeed it is around the world. The
Departments planned jointly for the organization of U.S. activities
in Iraq following the assumption of sovereignty by the Iraqis, recog-
nizing the fact that our roles, our missions, our resources, and our
responsibilities must be complementary.
The ongoing security situation makes the closest partnership be-
tween the U.S. military commander and Ambassador Negroponte
critical to our success. Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey
are already collaborating very closely, as indeed the President has
charged them to do. Ambassador Negroponte made clear to you
here in the committee his commitment to do so during his con-
firmation hearing. Effective integration of all U.S. civilian and se-
curity operations will remain vital as we move ahead in meeting
our goals in Iraq.
These efforts, sir, underscore the commitment of the United
States to assist the Iraqi Government as it builds an independent,
secure, democratic, prosperous, and United Iraq. We share the in-
terests of Iraqis in a better future for their country because we
know that a free and democratic Iraq will mean a more secure re-
gion for the United States and more security for the United States.
As President Bush said recently, democratic governments do not
shelter terrorist camps or attack their neighbors. When justice and
democracy advance, so does the hope of lasting peace.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you again for
the opportunity to testify about our progress to date in Iraq and
I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Schlicher follows:


18
July 13, from the Defense Department, $458 million has been spent
of the $18.4 billion, and they claim that about $6 billion has been
obligated.
So there is discrepancy in these numbers and yours which I want
you to address and explain why that is. To the point, there's a
story in the Los Angeles Times today, which you’ve probably seen,
and the headline is, “State Department Criticizes Focus of Iraq Ef-
fort.” The agency which has taken the reins on the reconstruction
program in Iraq says money needs to shift from big projects to job
creation, what the chairman was just talking to you about. “The
Pentagon's $18.4 billion Iraqi reconstruction plan puts too much
emphasis on big ticket construction projects and not enough on cre-
ating jobs for the regular Iraqis, State Department officials who
have taken control of the program have concluded.”
Then it goes on and develops about reprogramming money, be-
cause as you know it's earmarked for certain programs. So within
the context of that entire universe, sort all this out for us. Are we
making progress? And reconcile those numbers for me as well.
Ambassador SCHLICHER. Yes, sir. Let me give it a stab, please.
The information that I have before me is that in fiscal 2003 money,
that of the $2.5 billion of 2003 money, $2.4 billion has been obli-
gated and $1.4 billion disbursed. For fiscal 2004, of the $18.4, my
information is that $6 billion has been obligated, and at this point,
$500 million disbursed. Those add up to the $18.4 out of the total
of $21. So I'm not sure which date, sir, these are, the DOD num-
bers you have are July 13, so I hope that helps answer the ques-
tion. But if it doesn't, I’ll certainly get you an answer.
Senator HAGEL. All right. Well, let's not quibble over a billion or
two here and there, but let's stay focused on what’s been spent.
Why out of $18.4—so let's deal with that universe, the $18.4 bil-
lion—why in your opinion has—let's say a half a billion, I'll add a
few tens of millions to it that's already been spent—according to
these numbers from the Defense Department of July 13, $458 mil-
lion has been spent from the total $18.4 billion. And the other part
of that is, did we make a mistake on so-called big ticket items, not
trying to get the money down to the job? And I’m going to want
Mr. Gompert to respond to this too because he was there. He obvi-
ously alluded to some of this in his testimony.
Ambassador SCHLICHER. Well, sir, you yourself and the chairman
have alluded to some of the reasons that have been advanced as
rationales for why the money hasn't moved quickly enough, which
is a judgment that all of us certainly share, and that's in fact the
impetus behind Ambassador Negroponte and the new team's re-
view. And part of that review, of course, as I mentioned to the
chairman, is going to be how can we speed up the actual delivery
of assistance, and how can we maximize the creation of jobs, both
of which are in our interest?
As far as major construction projects go—
Senator HAGEL. Excuse me. Can you stop for a moment and ad-
dress your question? That's the question I'm addressing to you.
How can we do that? How are we going to do that? What plans are
in place to do that? We know the problem, we know the challenge,
we know what we didn’t do. Now how are we going to fix it?


19
Ambassador SCHLICHER. Well, sir, I hope that I can answer you
in detail when I know what the results of the review are going to
be. But I think that one thing that needs to happen in that regard
is that we need to find out what are the projects that we can put
on board immediately that have no unnecessary lead time and jobs
that can create—or projects that can create Iraqi jobs immediately.
I personally have some experience in the field in Iraq with the
CERP program, which was flexible enough to give local com-
manders and local officials the ability to treat local problems very
quickly. So I hope that we will come up with some new projects
that cut out all of the middle steps that have to be undertaken if
projects are large and infrastructure-related. I hope that we will be
able to find ways to give Iraqi contractors contracts more speedily
and directly as well, and see if that can cut down some of the lead
time.
But, sir, I also don’t want to prejudge what the review is going
to be out there, because I’m not part of it.
Senator HAGEL. Well, Ambassador Schlicher, you can understand
some frustration here, and quite honestly, some significant concern
when I hear you say three times in the last 20 seconds, well, I
hope, I hope we'll find an answer, I hope we'll be able to come up
with a program, I hope. Then you continue to ask more questions,
well, what, how, review. That doesn’t instill a great amount of con-
fidence in what we're doing over there.
And I know you don’t have all the answers. I know it's not all
your responsibility. But surely in preparation for this hearing this
morning, someone would have, I would assume, have given you
something to tell us as to how we’re going to fix this problem.
Now, what Mr. Gompert has told us, and we heard from other
people who had been there, there are stories out in papers this
morning on all this, as there are daily, on how we are failing and
how we are losing the people, and so we know what the issue is,
security, obviously all the pieces are critical here, but we know
what we must do. And to have you say, well, I hope we'll find a
way, I hope we'll get at it, I hope the review will show something,
that's not good enough.
Mr. Gompert, would you respond to some of this?
Mr. GOMPERT. Yes, Senator Hagel. There is one measure that I
think deserves a great deal of attention, and that is job training
and job placement. I’m confident that jobs will be created as we in-
ject these resources, and as the Iraqis themselves have the reve-
nues from oil, there will be ample resources injected into that econ-
omy to get jobs going. I happen to think, though it’s not my field
and it wasn't my responsibility, that construction, housing con-
struction, infrastructure construction, attacked in a really strategic
way would have required, demanded jobs and soaked up a lot of
that unemployment.
But as of now, I would say, as the requirement for jobs will begin
to grow, it is very important that we link supply and demand, and
that is actually not a big ticket item. Job training and job place-
ment actually is done not for billions but for tens of millions or
hundreds of millions on a nationwide scale. I think that job train-
ing and job placement program was slow to get started, as were so
many other things, for the reasons I’ve indicated. It needs re-


22
Mr. GOMPERT. Well, I think that situation could get worse. If the
insurgents and the terrorists manage to defeat this political process
by derailing the important upcoming steps in that process, then
you could have a larger political problem and a larger security
problem, because the sects and the ethnicities of Iraq have agreed
on a federal structure, they’ve agreed on a bill of rights, they’ve
agreed to work together, they've agreed on the kind of institutions
and the political calendar. So there is broad agreement on the way
forward, but if the insurgents and the terrorists are able to disrupt
that way forward and derail it, then those fundamental agreements
could begin to be in danger, agreement on federalism, for example,
agreement on institutions that enables the majority Shia and the
two minorities to envision a pluralistic system in which they could
work together.
Those basic understandings and deals that were done over the
last year and were done in the transfer of authority to the Interim
Government, they could begin to get shaky.
Senator CHAFEE. Do you think it’s worth it to, if we know
through the democratic process and elections being called, that
even if a fierce adversary, an al-Sadr or someone were going to be
elected, to stick to it?
Mr. GOMPERT. First of all, I think that it is right for the Interim
Government to be as inclusive as possible. I think the advantages
of being inclusive—I’ll answer your question if I May just in this
way—by being inclusive and by letting democracy absorb as much
of the hopes and fears and differences and difficulties of the society
as a whole, it really does isolate the extremists who are against the
system.
So I do believe that the Prime Minister's effort to be inclusive are
important. I think that same principle should apply to the election
process, that rather than attempting or encouraging the Interim
Government to attempt to exclude or in some way condition the
electoral process so that it would be impossible for more radical ele-
ments to be elected, I think at this particular stage, legitimacy de-
mands inclusiveness, and that means taking some risks that the
election will produce victors who we May not like.
The alternative, that is to attempt now to engineer it so that that
can’t happen I think would ruin the opportunity that exists for the
creation of broad-based legitimacy, which I think is key to security.
Senator CHAFEE. Well, thank you very much. Ambassador
Schlicher—Ambassador, is that right?
Ambassador SCHLICHER. Ron is best.
Senator CHAFEE. You certainly have
Ambassador SCHLICHER. Thank you, sir.
Senator CHAFEE. What country?
Ambassador SCHLICHER.. I wish I got to pick.
Senator CHAFEE. But you have a lot of experience in the region,
Tunisia, Jerusalem, you were involved in the Egyptian-North Afri-
can affairs, you were a consular officer in Damascus, in Beirut, so
you have a lot of experience in the region. Can you talk regionally
about what's happened and how what we're doing regionally is im-
portant to our success in Iraq.”
Ambassador SCHLICHER. Yes, sir. And one important thing that’s
been happening regionally lately is the efforts of Allawi and his


29
Our commanders told us that creating jobs and improving electricity supplies,
sewage treatment, and fresh water will have a direct bearing on Iraqi support for
the insurgency. It is bordering on negligence that only $458 million of the $18.4 bil-
lion—or about 2% percent of the total—has been spent to date.
Fifth, we need to deploy an army of technical experts to help Iraq's government
build its institutional capacity. Many countries bemoaned the plight of the Iraqi peo-
ple during the 1990s. Now is the time for them to offer their money, skills, and per-
sonnel to help those same people.
Sixth, we must ensure that other nations deliver on their financial pledges and
push for debt relief. Thus far, of the $13 billion pledged by other nations and organi-
zations (of which two-thirds are loans) only about $1 billion has been delivered, and
none has been spent.
The administration appointed Secretary Baker to persuade other nations to re-
duce Iraq's crushing debt burden. I'd appreciate an update today on where things
stand with his efforts.
June 28 provided a new beginning. We have huge challenges ahead. I look for-
ward to hearing how the administration plans to tackle these challenges.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me conclude the hearing at this point,
unless—all right. We're in the second half of the vote. Go ahead.
Senator CHAFEE. I suppose I should have asked this question
first of Ambassador Schlicher, but there was an article in The Na-
tion about some of the morale in the State Department, and it
says, I'll just read it, “the State Department officers gripe about the
agency becoming irrelevant, particularly on Middle East policy.
One past Foreign Service official who served in the Middle East
Bureau and continues to work with officers there notes, ‘there has
been a huge drop in the morale of those folks working in our em-
bassies in the Middle East. I think they feel nothing is getting
through substantively, that the administration is not on receive
mode, but just wants to give instructions on matters it May not un-
derstand, as well as folks in the field.’
“Current and former State officials point to what happened to
Ron Schlicher, a career diplomat, who has been consul general in
Jerusalem until the White House yanked him and reassigned him
as Ambassador to Tunisia. Reporting out of Jerusalem, said one
Department official, was truthful and accurate, but it did not suit
the White House.”
Are you free to comment honestly or is your career—
Ambassador SCHLICHER. I would comment, sir, that I am not fa-
miliar with this article or its author, but I would say that he cer-
tainly doesn’t know what my story is. My story is that I was as-
signed to do Iraqi matters and to go to Baghdad, and my morale
in Baghdad, actually it improved, because I thought we were part
of something extremely important that was going on for the sake
of Iraq and for the sake of our nation. And although my morale in
terms of having to work 12 or 14 hours a day here, that part of
it's not pretty good, but I feel extremely strongly that I and the 50
or so people who work with me on Iraq are absolutely dedicated to
the task. We feel that we have input into the process, and I would
say that the only real problem we have is that there aren't enough
hours in the day to do everything that we need to do.
Senator CHAFEE. The reason I asked the question is we’ve heard
this morning about the great difficulties we're in in Iraq, and I
think Mr. Gompert said we’re not going to defeat our adversaries
militarily. We're in a world of hurt in Iraq, and if the administra-
tion isn't on receive mode, I think it's going to make it even more


30
difficult. That's the reason I bring that up, and you’ve certainly
spoken on the record, so thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your testimony. I think there
were good questions. I would just summarize for my own part by
saying I share Senator Biden's feelings about the security situation.
I hope that this review that's occurring with regard to dispensing
the money and getting jobs out there will proceed. It is exas-
perating that we are still reviewing it at this stage.
Senator Chafee was in a similar position, formerly as a mayor
who had responsibility for security and jobs. Probably some more
mayors or sheriffs are needed in this process. I say that respect-
fully. At the State Department and at the Defense Department, we
need some people that actually understand the street, understand
governance. And we’ve got to get on with it. Success has to be ours
and for the Iraqis in this respect.
We've got 6 months, and while this training is going on, all of
the democratic procedures we outlined today have to occur. This is
a daunting prospect, but one that has to occur. We’re going to have
to devote the resources to it to make sure it occurs, in order to en-
sure the protection of the process. Because that finally is our objec-
tive for the whole war, as a matter of fact, it comes down to wheth-
er there can successfully be a change of governance in that area
successfully, and security established for us in the war against ter-
ror, and for the Iraqis.
So we understand that you hear our urgency and our pleas. We
appreciate the hearing and your testimony. The hearing is ad-
journed.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m, the committee adjourned, to recon-
vene subject to the call of the Chair.]
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD
I thank the chairman and the ranking member for holding this hearing, and I
thank all of the witnesses for being here today.
This hearing is an important opportunity for the committee and the American
people to gain some clarity about the U.S. strategy in Iraq today. Over 900 Amer-
ican troops have been killed in Iraq. Nearly 6,000 have been wounded. Well over
a hundred billion taxpayer dollars have been dedicated to this effort to date. The
American people continue to bear a tremendous burden in Iraq, even after the
transfer of sovereignty that occurred late last month.
Moreover, directing so much military and political attention, so many taxpayer
dollars and so many intelligence assets toward Iraq means that we have less to de-
vote elsewhere, at a time when we confront global threats of terrorism and the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction. We need a strategy for stabilizing Iraq
that also eases the burden on this country and frees up resources to devote to other
important national interests. And we need to ensure that this strategy strengthens
international cooperation rather than undermining our relationships around the
world
RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
RESPONSES OF HON. RONALD L. SCHLICHER TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE
RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
Question 1. In June, the Security Council created a United Nations protection
force for Iraq. I am unaware, as of this week, of any contributions to this force. Can
you please update us on the status of this force? Where do you expect the soldiers