- a v -itº Sºº-yº

S. HRG. 108–43
THE FUTURE OF IRAQ
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
FEBRUARY 11, 2003
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director
ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director
(II)


6 O
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108th
ſlo. 11
Iſlain
CONTENTS
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement . 6
Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from Kansas, prepared statement ............ 48
Cordesman, Prof. Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC ................................ 74
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 78
Feil, Col. Scott R., U.S. Army, (Ret.) executive director, Role of American
Military Power, Arlington, VA ............................................................................ 65
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 69
Feith, Hon. Douglas J., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department
of Defense, Washington, DC ................................................................................ 15
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 20
Grossman, Hon. Marc I., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, De-
partment of State, Washington, DC ................................................................... 7
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio, prepared statement ......... 56
Zinni, Gen. Anthony C., U.S. Marine Corps, (Ret.), former Commander in
Chief, U.S. Central Command, Washington, DC ............................................... 59
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 63


THE FUTURE OF IRAQ
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2003
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room SD—
419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chair-
man of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Brownback,
Voinovich, Alexander, Coleman, Sununu, Biden, Sarbanes, Kerry,
Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson, and Corzine.
The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee
will come to order.
Last Thursday this committee heard testimony from Secretary of
State Colin Powell, who joined us just one day after he presented
powerful evidence of Iraq's noncompliance with the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1441. He detailed in his statement be-
fore the United Nations Security Council a compelling document,
which was a great service to our Nation and to the world commu-
nity.
Today, for the third time this year, the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee turns its attention again to Iraq. We pose the question:
What must we do to help ensure that Iraq becomes a secure and
responsible member of the world community following any poten-
tial military action? When asking this question, we must avoid any
tendency to view military operations in Iraq as separate from re-
construction of Iraq. In fact, our ability to secure allies for any nec-
essary military action will be greatly enhanced if we have laid out
a clear vision of how the United States will work with the inter-
national community to feed and to shelter Iraq's people, to help es-
tablish responsible governance, and to eliminate weapons of mass
destruction.
We must not assume that our commitment of armed forces will
end if and when Saddam Hussein is dislodged from power. Even
under the best post-Saddam scenarios, Iraq will remain an enor-
mous security challenge that is likely to require substantial Amer-
ican and allied troops.
Since Secretary Powell's appearance last week, the debate over
Iraq has taken additional twists and turns. This past weekend Ger-
many, Russia, and France proposed doubling or perhaps tripling
international inspectors in Iraq with the support of peacekeepers to
enforce what some have termed coercive inspections. Unfortu-
nately, this proposal, as its predecessors, will fail in the absence of
Iraqi compliance and cooperation.
(1)


2
Hans Blix put it best when he said, and I quote: “The principal
problem is not the number of inspectors, but rather the active co-
operation of the Iraqi side.” Absent Iraqi cooperation, it is unclear
what impact, if any, U-2 overflights and a law against weapons of
mass destruction will have with regard to compliance with U.N.
Resolution 1441. Saddam Hussein has not complied with past U.N.
resolutions. He has not opened his weapons programs to inde-
pendent auditors, the United Nations, and the IAEA. He continues
his defiant rhetoric and refuses to disarm. Today, fully 12 years
after Operation Desert Storm, the world continues to face threats
posed by Iraq and its ruler.
We have full confidence in the United States military, which is
moving into the region with its allies in a comprehensive manner.
Tens of thousands of our reservists have been called up, including
one from our own midst, Commander Patrick Garvey, who will
leave my staff next week to join the effort.
With well over 100,000 troops already in theater and perhaps as
many more on the way, our men and women in uniform and the
technology and firepower they control will have every advantage.
There is still hope that military action can be averted. Neverthe-
less, success in Iraq requires that the administration, the Congress,
and the American people now think beyond current military prep-
arations and move toward the enunciation of a clear post-conflict
plan for Iraq and the region.
We must articulate a plan that commences with a sober analysis
of the costs and squarely addresses how Iraq will be securely gov-
erned and precisely what commitment the United States must un-
dertake.
Several groups of scholars and experts have produced blueprints
for our post-conflict policy discussions. We will use those reports as
a framework. And I thank the Council on Foreign Relations, the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, the International
Rescue Commission, the Brookings Institution, and others who
have wrestled with these issues.
In the same vein, the Washington Post posed several questions
last Sunday that have been the subject of much examination by
this committee. They are: Who will rule Iraq and how? Who will
provide security? How long might U.S. troops conceivably remain?
Will the United Nations have a role? And who will manage Iraq's
oil resources?
Unless the administration can answer these questions in detail,
the anxiety of Arab and European governments, as well as that of
many in the American public over our “staying power,” will only
grow. We want to work with the administration to formulate a
clear post-conflict plan. Such a plan must be embedded in a broad-
er vision of how political liberalization and economic development
can be fostered in the aftermath of potential military conflict.
Today we will lay out the overarching problems ahead and focus
on the security aspects. Forthcoming hearings will examine human-
itarian assistance, reconstruction, public governance, economic de-
velopment, and other critical issues. We will have before us two
distinguished panels. The first panel, at the table now immediately
before us, will feature Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman


3
and Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith, who will outline the
administration's planning with respect to the future of Iraq.
The second panel of defense security experts will attempt to
paint a picture of the security challenges the coalition will face
should the current regime be displaced, by whatever means. We
look forward to the insights to be provided by General Anthony
Zinni, Colonel Scott Feil, and Professor Anthony Cordesman.
I look forward to consulting closely with the members of this
committee and with the administration on thoughtful preparations
for Iraq. Our security, our alliances, and our credibility will depend
on undertaking a vigorous effort to move Iraq into the family of na-
tions.
[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR
Last Thursday, this committee heard testimony from Secretary of State Colin
Powell, who joined us one day after he presented powerful evidence of Iraq's non-
compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. His detailed statement be-
fore the United Nations Security Council was a great service to our Nation and to
the world community.
Today, for the third time this year, the Foreign Relations Committee turns its at-
tention to Iraq. We pose the question: what must we do to help ensure that Iraq
becomes a secure and responsible member of the world community following any po-
tential military action? When asking this question, we must avoid any tendency to
view military operations in Iraq as separate from reconstruction of Iraq. In fact, our
ability to secure allies for any necessary military action will be greatly enhanced
if we have laid out a clear vision of how the United States will work with the inter-
national community to feed and shelter Iraq’s people, help establish responsible gov-
ernance, and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. We must not assume that our
commitment of armed forces will end if and when Saddam Hussein is dislodged from
power. Even under the best post-Saddam scenarios, Iraq will remain an enormous
security challenge that is likely to require substantial American and allied troops.
Since Secretary Powell's appearance last week the debate over Iraq has taken ad-
ditional twists and turns. This past weekend, Germany, Russia and France proposed
doubling or perhaps tripling international inspectors in Iraq with the support of
peacekeepers to enforce what some have termed “coercive inspections.” Unfortu-
nately this proposal, as its predecessors, will fail in the absence of Iraqi compliance
and cooperation. Hans Blix put it best when he said: “The principal problem is not
the number of inspectors but rather the active cooperation of the É. side.” Absent
Iraqi cooperation it is unclear what impact, if any, U–2 overflights and a law
against weapons of mass destruction will have with regards to compliance with UN
Resolution 1441.
Saddam Hussein has not complied with past U.N. Resolutions. He has not opened
his weapons programs to the independent auditors—the United Nations and the
IAEA. He continues defiant rhetoric and refuses to disarm. Today, fully 12 years
after Operation Desert Storm, the world continues to face threats posed by Iraq and
its ruler.
We have full confidence in the United States military, which is moving into the
region with its allies in a comprehensive manner. Tens of thousands of our Reserves
have been called up, including one from our own midst, Commander Patrick Garvey,
who will leave my staff next week to join the effort. With well over 100,000 troops
already in theater and perhaps as many more on the way, our men and women in
uniform and the technology and firepower they control will have every advantage.
There is still hope that military action can be averted.
Nevertheless, success in Iraq requires that the administration, the Congress and
the American people think beyond current military preparations and move toward
the enunciation of a clear post-conflict plan for Iraq and the region. We must articu-
late a plan that commences with a sober analysis of the costs and squarely address-
es how Iraq will be secured and governed and precisely what commitment the
United States must undertake.
Several groups of scholars and experts have produced blueprints for our post-con-
flict policy discussions. We will use these reports as a framework. I thank the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the


4
International Rescue Commission, the Brookings Institution, and others who have
wrestled with these issues.
In the same vein, the Washington Post posed several questions last Sunday that
have been the subject of much examination by this committee:
• Who will rule Iraq, and how?
• Who will provide security?
• How long might U.S. troops conceivably remain?
• Will the United Nations have a role?
• Who will manage Iraq’s oil resources?
Unless the administration can answer these question in detail, the anxiety of
Arab and European governments, as well as that of the American public, over our
“staying power” will only grow.
We want to work with the administration to formulate a clear post-conflict plan.
Such a plan must be embedded in a broader vision of how political liberalization
and economic development can be fostered in the aftermath of military conflict.
Today, we will lay out the overarching problems ahead and focus on the security
aspects. Forthcoming hearings will examine humanitarian assistance, reconstruc-
tion, public governance, economic development, and other critical issues.
We will have before us two distinguished panels. The first panel will feature
Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman and Under Secretary of Defense Doug
fºllº who will outline the administration's planning with respect to the future of
rao.
*he second panel of defense security experts will attempt to paint a picture of the
security challenges that the coalition will face should i. current regime be dis-
placed, by whatever means. We look forward to the insights to be provided by Gen-
eral Anthony Zinni, Colonel Scott Feil, and Professor Anthony Cordesman.
I look forward to consulting closely with the members of this committee and with
the administration on thoughtful preparations for a post-Saddam Iraq. Our security,
our alliances, and our credibility will depend on undertaking a vigorous effort to
move Iraq into the family of nations.
I welcome our witnesses.
The CHAIRMAN. I call now upon the distinguished ranking mem-
ber of our committee, Senator Biden.
Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for having
this hearing. I think in a sense you and I have been like a broken
record since last summer, attempting to focus on this subject.
All the members sitting here before you now are from a genera-
tion, the so-called Vietnam generation, we may have had different
views during the conduct of that war and we may have different
views as to the consequences of that war, but I suspect, without
talking to any of my colleagues, we would all agree on one thing:
that the one lesson universally learned from Vietnam is that a for-
eign policy, no matter how well or poorly articulated, cannot be
sustained without the informed consent of the American people.
There is no informed consent today. The American people have
no notion what we are about to undertake. They have focused on,
in my experience in my State and in my region and other parts of
the country, they have focused on the war in Iraq in terms of and
from the perspective of the last war in Iraq. I believe—and I do not
know what the polls would say, but I can tell you what my anec-
dotal evidence is, and I suspect my colleagues do not have very dif-
ferent views. I think most of our constituents think if we go to war,
the war will be swift and successful, as close to bloodless as they
have become accustomed to in Kosovo and in the last gulf war, and
that Johnny and Jane are going to come marching home again
quickly.
There has been an overwhelming reluctance on the part of the
administration to speak to, even acknowledge, in the witnesses we


5
had in the summer, the necessity to have a significant concentra-
tion of American forces in place in Iraq for some period of time.
We are going to hear from Colonel Feil, and Mr. Cordesman and
General Zinni. We have heard from them in the past. I believe they
were here about 5 months ago, 6 months ago, telling us: Get ready.
Not do not do it, but get ready. We are about to undertake an enor-
mous, an enormous, responsibility, not only for our own safety’s
sake, but for the region's. -
That is not a reason not to proceed against Saddam Hussein, but
it is a compelling reason to discuss in as much detail as possible
what we are about to ask of the American people. I think they are
fully prepared to do whatever is asked of them if it is rational. But
I am very concerned—and I will say this, although I do not speak
for the military. I had an opportunity to speak with a couple hun-
dred troops assembled in the gulf not long ago, and they wanted
to know whether or not, we were going to be there when it is over
and the guns go silent? Where are we going to be when it came
down to deciding we had to put another $10, $20, $30, $40, $50 bil-
lion—and the estimates vary greatly and it will depend on how the
fighting takes place if it occurs.
Are we going to make sure we do not do what we have done in
Afghanistan? We have now safely committed the fate of Afghani-
stan in large part to the warlords. I am told when I speak to mem-
bers of the administration things are all right in western Afghani-
stan, Ishmael Khan is in charge. I find that very reassuring. We
now have essentially a mayor of Kabul, a guy named Karzai, and
a struggle between what we have in Afghanistan and the warlords
for control of Afghanistan.
As far back as last spring, speaking to the French—speaking for
myself—speaking to the French Foreign Minister and Defense Min-
isters, the one thing that was most often raised with me was: All
right, we think he should go, but when he goes, what are you going
to do? Are you going to do what you are doing in Afghanistan?
We have authorized $3.3 billion for Afghan reconstruction and
security assistance over the next 4 years. But very little of this has
been appropriated. We are told we do not need any more in Af-
ghanistan.
To state the obvious, Iraq is a heck of a lot more complicated, a
heck of a lot more sophisticated, and they live in a neighborhood
that is very, very, very, very complex, and so I do not think we are
talking about the day after. I do not think we are talking about
post-conflict policy in terms of weeks. I think we are talking about
the decade after. That is just my view. I hope I can be dissuaded
that that is the extent of the commitment.
Mr. Chairman, maintaining a secure environment after a pos-
sible war with Iraq is going to be the sine qua non for any positive
change we wish to bring to Iraq. I suspect we will discover the defi-
nition of security will take on a very broad dimension: patrolling
cities and borders, mediating between rival groups, helping refu-
gees return peacefully, remaking a new Iraqi army, helping those
discharged find employment, and arbitrating the most mundane of
local disputes.
I predict to you that Kirkuk is going to make Metrovica look like
a picnic. When the Senator from Nebraska and I had our little 7,


6
8-hour car ride through the mountains of northern Iraq in the mid-
dle of the night to meet with the Kurds, they went way out of their
way to demonstrate to us how much progress they had made, and
it was obvious they had, in their semi-state of autonomy up there
since the “no-fly zone” has been imposed.
We also were impressed by how much out of the way they went
to tell us that the Barzani and Talibani clans were together and
they were united and they were resolved. But then they would say
as we were leaving: But by the way, Kirkuk. We have been eth-
nically expelled from Kirkuk for the past 20 years, methodically re-
placing Indo-European Kurd Sunni with an Arab Sunni. We are
going home.
The oil is a national asset, they quickly add, but Kirkuk is ours.
You are going to guarantee that for us, are you not?
So I just think, whatever we do, we have to understand we are
about to make a significant commitment. And I hope we will not
do the kinds of things we have done over the 30 years I have been
here, and that is, decide to leave the women and men, the soldiers,
after they do the fighting without a long-term commitment. We are
going to give them whatever they need, even if it means reducing
the tax cut, not having health care, not increasing money for edu-
cation, not moving to fix our highways, not doing anything else.
That is the single solitary first fundamental commitment we
make. And I quite frankly expect the President to keep the commit-
ment he made publicly, privately to a bunch of us, and to me per-
sonally, that he will tell the American people that is the deal, that
is the deal.
So I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my statement
be placed in the record. I can think of no more important hearing
than this at the moment, and I know you are going to follow
through on not just a generic look at this, but we are going to go
down the line to try to flesh this out. We do not expect all the an-
swers, but we do expect an acknowledgment that this is a gigantic
undertaking in what—a word that we do not like to hear—nation-
building, nation-building.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you for convening this hearing on a topic that could
not be more timely. It marks a continuation of the dialogue that you and I initiated
in the committee last summer to help the American people understand the enor-
mous challenges facing us in a post-Saddam Iraq.
It is appropriate that our first hearing on the “day after"—or more accurately the
“decade after”—concentrates on the critical questions of security and weapons of
mass destruction.
Mr. Chairman, it is essential that no one be under the illusion that if we go to
war, that the experience will be anything resembling Desert Storm. Indeed,
testimonials by many of the key participants in that last conflict with Iraq make
clear that the very thorny issues we will be discussing today go a long way in ex-
plaining why we stopped short of unseating Saddam Hussein. In General
Schwarzkopf's words: “Had we taken all of Iraq, we would have been like the dino-
saur in the tar pit.”
Mr. Chairman, if we want to avoid replacing a dictator with chaos . . . and precipi-
tating the very problem that may require war—namely, the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction from Iraq–then we have got to follow through.
I am confident that, if we act, our military will succeed swiftly and decisively. But
I'm concerned that the temptation will be there to declare victory and walk away


7
well before we should. Unfortunately, Afghanistan's deteriorating security situation
demonstrates what that kind of approach breeds.
I hope Iraq can emerge as a stable, pluralistic—even democratic society—in short
order. I hope that its rival ethnic communities, and those that seek retribution can
contain their anger and focus on building a new Iraq without any outside assistance.
But given Iraqi history and the stakes involved for the United States, basing our
lans on such a rosy outcome would be folly in my view. We can hope for the best,
ut we should prepare for the worst.
And those º, seek to make Iraq a model for democracy in the Arab world should
be the loudest voices in favor of a robust American military presence after a war
. . a major international civilian administration . . . and a massive infusion of as-
sistance.
Mr. Chairman, maintaining a “secure environment” after a possible war will be
the sine qua non for any positive change we wish to bring to Iraq. I suspect we will
discover the definition of security will take on very broad dimensions—patrolling cit-
ies and borders, mediating between rival groups, helping refugees return peacefully,
remaking a new Iraqi army, helping those discharged find employment, and arbi-
trating the most mundane local disputes.
And, of course, we cannot assume that a swift military victory will settle the ques-
tion of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
In the post-war chaos, unless and until we get our hands on all weapons strewn
around country, there is a real danger that they could be exported out of country,
sold to the highest bidder, or hidden away for later access.
Secretary Powell, in his presentation last week, said that Iraq possesses two of
the three key components to build a nuclear bomb—a cadre of scientists with exper-
tise and a bomb design. How does that change appreciably in the aftermath of a
war when there will be a natural relaxation of vigilance by the international com-
munity? What pressures will Iraq face to pursue weapons of mass destruction given
its neighborhood which includes a next door neighbor and former foe with its own
nuclear ambitions?
Disarming Iraq will require much more than a resounding military victory on the
battlefield and even the destruction of those weapons that we do find.
Mr. Chairman, it is critical that the American people be informed of the enormous
burden that they may soon be asked to shoulder. Colonel Scott Feil, who we will
hear from later today, told this committee last summer that a post-Saddam security
force would require 75,000 troops at a cost of over $16 billion for the first year
alone. Other independent studies have estimated that total security costs for the
“Decade After” will be between $75 and $200 billion.
The American people must know that this will be a major undertaking. Because
no foreign policy, no matter how brilliant, can be sustained without the informed
consent of the American people. I believe that the American people will support a
massive commitment to securing, disarming, and rebuilding a post-Saddam Iraq,
but only if they are informed ahead of time. Hopefully, we can begin the process
of informing them today.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the distinguished ranking member and
I assure him that his statement will be published in full. Further-
more, as we have indicated, this will be the first of our hearings
about the future of Iraq, with the other situations that you have
described certainly upfront in our attention as we proceed.
I am going to call now upon our witnesses for their statements
and then we will have a round of questioning by all Senators. It
is a pleasure to have both of you here, and I call first on Secretary
Grossman.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARC I. GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, members
of the committee. It is an honor to be here today and I join Under
Secretary Feith in thanking you for inviting us to be at this hear-
ing, to participate in this conversation, and to make this presen-
tation to you.


9
volved now in direct military planning for military assets. So if this
has to be done, I think it is important for you and for people to
recognize that there will be people with us.
Mr. Chairman, just to go down the issues that you listed, let me
highlight five subjects, all of them that you and the ranking mem-
ber talked about: First, I think it is important that we quickly go
through the guiding principles that we are working on as we move
forward in thinking about the future of Iraq; second, to stress, as
you did, the importance of ridding Iraq of its weapons of mass de-
struction; third, I want to report to you on where we stand in plan-
ning on the humanitarian issues; fourth, some words on planning
on reconstruction; and then fifth, as you said, to talk a little bit
* where we think politically we are headed in the future of
raq.
Mr. Chairman, if it is necessary for the United States to take
military action here are the principles that will guide our thinking.
First, we will demonstrate to the Iraqi people and to the world that
the United States wants to liberate Iraq, not to occupy Iraq or con-
trol Iraqis or their economic resources.
Second, we must—must—eliminate Iraq’s chemical and biological
weapons, its nuclear program, its related delivery systems, get at,
as you said, weapons of mass destruction.
Third, we must also eliminate Iraq's terrorist infrastructure and
its ties to terrorism.
Fourth, key to support and safeguard the territorial integrity of
Iraq, which goes to the point that Senator Biden was making, the
United States does not support Iraq's disintegration.
Fifth, to begin the process of economic and political reconstruc-
tion, working to put Iraq on the path to become prosperous and
free and, as you said, Mr. Chairman, part again of the inter-
national community. To Senator Biden I say that this job will take
a sustained commitment and we are committed, as the President
has said, as the Secretary has said, to stay as long as is necessary
in Iraq, but I should also say not one day more.
First, weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Chairman, it is clear
that our job one today, during conflict, and in post-conflict Iraq if
there is one will be to locate, secure, and dispose of Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction capabilities. That will be the most urgent pri-
ority. And we will focus on weapons, delivery systems, agents, re-
lated infrastructure, dual use infrastructure, and Iraq's technical
and scientific expertise. Under Secretary Feith will have a little
more to say on this.
But what I want to tell you is that there is a very active inter-
agency effort going on now, chaired by the National Security Coun-
cil, to make sure that we are working to decrease the possibility
of the Iraqi regime using WMD before or during any military ac-
tion and we are in discussions with a larger number of countries
to establish a program to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruc-
tion program after a regime change in Baghdad.
I also find it heartening that a number of countries are working
with us in this area, including to help our response to the possi-
bility that Saddam Hussein might use or provoke the use of these
weapons. As I say, Under Secretary Feith will have more to say on
this issue.


10
Next issue, meeting Iraq's humanitarian needs. You have both
raised this question. What are we doing? In the event of a military
conflict our immediate objective will obviously be to provide hu-
manitarian assistance to civilians. Those who flee their homes in
fear will have to be cared for. Potential supply lines for food, for
water, for medicine, fuel, will also have to be restored.
Mr. Chairman, I can report to you that all of the relevant U.S.
Government agencies are engaged in some very detailed planning
to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs and we are emphasizing the ab-
solutely necessary cooperation between civilian and military ele-
ments of our government. This effort is being led by the National
Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget. I can
tell you that the State Department and USAID are engaged in this
and are also engaged in a very large program of outreach with non-
governmental organizations and international organizations who
will be key partners in addressing Iraq's humanitarian needs.
We are working hard to make sure that civilian and military ele-
ments in this planning are consulting and coordinating.
President Bush has authorized $15 million to support this plan-
ning process and an additional $35 million has already been made
available for existing accounts to make sure we can get the where-
withal prepositioned and respond to the United Nations' requests
for preparedness. These areas are in food, are in shelter items,
water, and a substantial amount of work has been done on meeting
the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, and more will be done.
I understand that members of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee staff received a briefing at the end of last week which goes
into this in some considerable detail. I’m glad to talk about those
issues in Q's and A’s if that is useful to you.
Let me turn now, Mr. Chairman, to what comes after humani-
tarian assistance, and that is reconstruction. Iraqis will face the
task of reconstructing a country that has been subjected to decades
of neglect and mismanagement. Here again, I can report to you
that there is a very large interagency effort under way, again
chaired by the National Security Council and the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, to think through our reconstruction needs and
our reconstruction objectives.
This effort is focused on a number of priority areas: education,
health, water, sanitation, electricity, shelter, transportation, rule of
law, agriculture, communications, and economic and financial poli-
cies. I hope you will not be surprised to find that that list of prior-
ities of course tracks with work we are doing in the program on the
future of Iraq.
I hope you also will not be surprised that we are working in
these areas to set for ourselves very clear benchmarks, very clear
time lines, and very clear ways to see if this is necessary, if we are
succeeding.
With regard to the oil sector, Under Secretary Feith will talk
about this in some detail, but our guiding principle is that Iraq's
oil belongs to the Iraqi people, and we are committed to ensuring
that any action taken in this area is for the benefit of the Iraqi peo-
ple. Should military action be required, the United States will take
steps to protect and preserve Iraq’s oil sector and we will support
the efforts of Iraqis to restore production.


11
Mr. Chairman, you talked a bit and Senator Biden talked some
about what kind of political future is it that we want to work with
Iraqis. If we are going to rebuild this country or participate in re-
building this country physically, it is also important that we do so
politically. As you all know, last March the Bush administration
announced and has stepped out on what we call a Future of Iraq
Project. In consultations with Iraqis in the United States, Iraqis in
Europe, Iraqis outside of Iraq, we developed 17 working groups and
all 17 are listed in my statement. I will not go through them here.
But the purpose of these groups is to begin practical planning for
what might happen in Iraq after regime change. As I say, these
groups run everywhere from transitional justice to public outreach
to defense policy to foreign policy. Each of the groups has brought
together a number of Iraqi experts and those interested in these
issues, not to have an academic discussion but to consider thoughts
and plans for what can be done immediately.
I give you two examples. In the legal field, Iraqi lawyers and the
transitional justice working group have drafted 600 pages in Arabic
of proposed reforms in the criminal code, the criminal procedure
code, the civil code, nationality laws, and military procedures, and
more. So that there is a functioning body of law if there is regime
change.
The economy and infrastructure group has focused on public fi-
nance, water, agriculture, the environment, and also how to transi-
tion from the U.N. Oil for Food Program into something run by and
for Iraqis.
I want to make one other point in this area, though. I think it's
important. We are meeting with these Iraqis on a regular basis, on
an intensive basis. But we also make the point, and they make the
point as well, that Iraqis on the outside will not control the deci-
sions that will ultimately have to be made by all Iraqis. The people
we are working with are a great, great resource, but they know and
we all know that all Iraqis in the end must be able to talk freely
and work together to build a free and democratic Iraq.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with a short observation
about how we get to this future for Iraq, again recognizing that no
decisions have been made on structure or timing. I report to you
that the administration at the most senior levels is still considering
these issues and discussing these ideas with free Iraqis, political
opposition, technocrats, people like your second panel, and others.
We are consulting also with our close allies and with you.
Conceptually, getting to this future of Iraq there could be three
stages: first stabilization, where an interim coalition military ad-
ministration will focus on security, stability, and order, laying the
groundwork for what I might call stage two, which would be transi-
tion, where authority is progressively given to Iraqi institutions as
part of the development of a democratic Iraq. And finally, trans-
formation, after Iraqis have drafted, debated, approved a new
democratic constitution and held free and fair elections, which I
think you would agree is the way for any future Iraqi Government
to be truly legitimate.
Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, would you categorize or mention
the three stages again?


13
• 19 countries have offered us military assets or other resources. This number in-
cludes many countries that have granted us access, basing and overflight rights,
but also a number of additional countries.
Mr. Chairman, let me now highlight five subjects.
First, I want to offer some of the principles that guide our thinking about the fu-
ture of Iraq.
§." want to stress the importance of ridding Iraq of its weapons of mass
destruction.
Third, a report on what we are planning on the humanitarian front.
Fourth, some words on our planning for reconstruction.
Fifth, on the political front, I want to tell you about the work we have been doing
on what post-Saddam Hussein Iraq ought to look like.
I. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Mr. Chairman, if it should be necessary for the United States to take military ac-
tion, these principles will guide our thinking.
• First, we will demonstrate to the Iraqi people and the world that the United
States wants to liberate, not occupy Iraq or control Iraqis or their economic re-
Sources.
• Second, we must eliminate Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, its nuclear
program and its related delivery systems.
Third, we must also eliminate Iraq's terrorist infrastructure.
• Fourth, safeguard the territorial unity of Iraq. The United States does not sup-
port Iraq's disintegration.
• Fifth, begin the process of economic and political reconstruction, working to put
Iraq on a path to become a prosperous and free country.
This job will take a sustained commitment. The United States is committed to
stay as long as is necessary in Iraq, but not one day more.
II. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Mr. Chairman, President Bush is determined to see Iraq disarmed of its weapons
of mass destruction. That is job No. 1 today, during a conflict if there is one, and
in the days after.
Locating, securing and disposing of Iraq's WMD capabilities will be an urgent pri-
ority. We will focus on weapons and delivery systems, bulk agents, related infra-
structure, dual-use infrastructure, and Iraq's technical and scientific expertise.
Ensuring that the U.S. Government has the capacity to do all this is the work
of a broad interagency task force, chaired at the NSC. We are working to decrease
the possibility of the Iraqi regime using WMD before or during any military action,
and we are in discussions with other countries to establish a program to eliminate
the Iraqi WMD program after regime change in Baghdad. A number of our allies
are cooperating with us in this area, including helping prepare for a response to in-
cidents that Saddam Hussein might provoke.
Under Secretary Feith will have more to say on this.
III. MEETING IRAQ'S HUMANITARIAN NEEDS
Mr. Chairman, my third point is what we are planning to do to meet Iraq's hu-
manitarian needs.
In the event of a military conflict, our immediate objective will be to provide hu-
manitarian assistance to civilians. Those who have fled their homes in fear will
have to be cared for. Essential supply lines for food, medicine, water, and fuel will
have to be restored.
Mr. Chairman, U.S. Government agencies are engaged in planning to meet Iraq's
humanitarian needs with an emphasis on civilian-military coordination. This effort
is led by the National Security Council and OMB. USAID and State are engaged
with the non-governmental organizations and international organizations who will
be important partners in addressing Iraq's humanitarian needs. Civilian and mili-
tary officials regularly consult and coordinate plans.
President Bush has authorized $15 million dollars to support this planning proc-
ess and an additional $35 million has been made available from existing accounts.
Other donors are also responding to the UN's request for preparedness support. As
a result, food, shelter items and water bladders are ready. A substantial amount of
work has been done on meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, and
still more is being done by a number of agencies and organizations in Washington,
New York and around the world.


14
IV. RECONSTRUCTION
Mr. Chairman, let me turn to the fourth area: reconstruction. Iraqis will face the
task of reconstructing of a country that has been subjected to decades of neglect and
mismanagement. There has been a tremendous interagency effort, led by the Na-
tional Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget, to think through
reconstruction needs and objectives. The interagency effort has focused on a number
of priority program areas including education, health, water and sanitation, elec-
tricity, shelter, transportation, rule of law, agriculture, communications and eco-
nomic and financial policy. I hope you won't be surprised to learn that many of
these priority program areas overlap exactly with the working groups in the Future
of Iraq Project, which I will describe next.
With regard to the oil sector, our guiding principle is that Iraq’s oil belongs to
all of the Iraqi people. We are committed to ensuring that any action taken in this
area is for the benefit of the Iraqi people. Should military action be required in Iraq,
the U.S. will take steps to protect and preserve Iraq’s oil sector, and we will support
the efforts of Iraqis to restore production. Under Secretary Feith will have more to
stay on this.
V. THE POLITICAL FUTURE
The United States is committed to helping Iraqis rebuild their country politically
as well as physically.
Last March, the Bush Administration announced the Future of Iraq Project. In
consultations with “free Iraqis,” we developed 17 working groups. The purpose of
these is to begin practical planning for what could be done between now and the
date of a change of government in Baghdad, and in the immediate aftermath of a
transition. The subjects of the working groups include:
1. Transitional Justice
2. Public Finance
3. Democratic Principles
4. Public Health and Humanitarian Issues
5. Public Outreach
6. Water, Agriculture & the Environment
7. Economy and Infrastructure
8. Local Government
9. Defense Policy
10. Oil & Energy
11. Education
12. Anti-Corruption Issues
13. Civil Society-Capacity Building
14. Building a Free Media
15. Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
16. Foreign Policy
17. Preserving Iraq's Cultural Heritage
Each of the working groups brings together about 10-20 Iraqi experts to discuss
the Iraqis’ thoughts .#plans for what can be done now, and in the aftermath of
a change of government in Baghdad, to improve the lives of the Iraqi people.
Here are some examples of the work that Iraqi experts have done:
• In the legal field, for example, the Iraqi lawyers in the Transitional Justice
working group have drafted 600 pages, in Arabic, of proposed reforms of the
Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Civil Code, the Nationality
Law, the Military Procedure Code and more; proposals for the trial of Saddam
Hussein and his top associates; proposals for national reconciliation, and the re-
form of the police, the courts º the prisons.
• The Economy and Infrastructure; Public Finance; and Water, Agriculture and
the Environment working groups have prepared proposals for the transition of
the Oil-for-Food program to better meet the basic needs of food and medicine
of the Iraqi people. #. Iraqis also have plans for reconstruction of four key sec-
tors: Electricity, Communications, Water, and Agriculture.
Both we and the Iraqis we are meeting make the point that Iraqis on the outside
will not control decisions that will, ultimately, have to be made by all Iraqis. The
Iraqi diaspora is a great resource but not a substitute for what all Iraqis will need
to do together to work towards democracy in their country. Both we and free Iraqis
look forward to the day when all Iraqis are able to talk freely and work together
to build a free and democratic Iraq.


15
And while we are listening to what the Iraqis are telling us, at the end of the
day, the United States Government will make its decisions based on what is in the
national interest of the United States.
WHAT THE TRANSITION MIGHT LOOK LIKE
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with a short observation about how we get to this
future for Iraq, recognizing that no decisions have been made on structure or tim-
ing. The Administration is still considering these issues, and discussing ideas with
free Iraqis who are in the political opposition, technocrats, intellectuals and others.
We are also consulting with our close allies and with you.
Conceptually, there are three stages:
(1) Stabilization, where an interim coalition military administration will focus
on security, stability and order; laying the groundwork for stage 2.
(2) Transition, where authority is progressively given to Iraqi institutions as
part of the development of a democratic Iraq.
(3) Transformation, after Iraqis have drafted, debated and approved a new,
democratic constitution and held free and fair elections, the only way for any
future Iraqi government to be truly legitimate.
Mr. Chairman, I recognize my testimony today has been only the start of an effort
to answer your questions about the future of Iraq. There are many uncertainties.
What I am certain about is that we seek an Iraq that is democratic, unified,
multi-ethnic, with no weapons of mass destruction, which has cut its links to all ter-
rorists, and is at peace with its neighbors.
We expect to stay in close touch with you over the coming weeks.
The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much for the testimony and
those important assurances to the committee.
Secretary Feith, would you give us your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS J. FEITH, UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. FEITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to you and
to the members of the committee. I am pleased to have this oppor-
tunity to talk with you today about the efforts under way in the
Defense Department and in the U.S. Government generally to plan
for Iraq in the post-conflict period should war become necessary.
With your permission, I would like to submit my statement for
the record and just provide you now with a summary of it.
The CHAIRMAN. It will be published in full and please proceed
with the summary.
Mr. FEITH. Thank you.
If U.S. and other coalition forces take military action in Iraq,
they will, after victory, have contributions to make to the country's
temporary administration and to the welfare of the Iraqi people. It
will be necessary to provide humanitarian relief, organize basic
services, and work to establish security for the liberated Iraqis.
Our work will aim to achieve the objectives outlined by my col-
league, Under Secretary of State Grossman. I will not repeat those
initial five objectives that he mentioned, but they are very impor-
tant and I will just summarize them in a few words.
That we aspire to liberate, not occupy the country; that we are
going to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; and likewise
eliminate the terrorist infrastructure; safeguard Iraq's territorial
integrity; and begin the process of economic and political recon-
struction.
If there is a war, the United States would approach its post-war
work with a two-part resolve: a commitment to stay and a commit-


17
relief. That group is linked to the U.S. Central Command and has
established links with the U.N. specialized agencies and the NGOs
involved in humanitarian relief efforts.
It has developed a concept of operations that would facilitate
U.N. and nongovernmental organization provision of aid. It would
establish civil-military operations centers by means of which U.S.
forces would coordinate the provision of relief and restart the U.N.
ration distribution system using U.S. supplies until the U.N. sup-
plies and the NGO supplies can arrive.
There are other interagency groups planning for reconstruction of
post-Saddam Iraq, also planning for the vetting of current Iraqi of
ficials to determine with whom we should work, and working on
post-war elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The new
planning office's function is to integrate all of these efforts and
make them operational. It is building on the work done, not rein-
venting it.
I would like to spend a moment if I can stressing in particular
the crucial task of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. We
have begun detailed planning for this task, which includes secur-
ing, assessing, and dismantling Iraq's WMD capabilities, its facili-
ties and stockpiles. This will be a huge undertaking. The point that
Senator Biden made about the magnitude of the task is very well
º This is one of a number of tasks whose magnitude is very
arge.
The Defense Department is building the necessary capabilities
for this WMD elimination effort. We will have to first locate Iraq's
widespread WMD sites and then be prepared to secure the relevant
weapons or facilities or rapidly and safely disable them so they are
no longer a threat to coalition forces. This will have to be done in
many places and as quickly as possible.
The mission, though, does not end there. After hostilities we will
have to dismantle, destroy, and dispose of nuclear, chemical, bio-
logical, and missile capabilities and infrastructure. Equally impor-
tant will be plans to redirect some of Iraq's dual use capability and
its scientific and managerial talent to legitimate civilian activities
in a new Iraq.
Clearly, this will not be a mission that falls entirely on the U.S.
military forces. Other U.S. Government personnel can contribute.
Coalition partners can play an important role, and the United Na-
tions, IAEA, and other international organizations should be in a
position to contribute valuably. Of course, the new Iraqi Govern-
ment will also have a key responsibility here.
Eliminating all nuclear, chemical, and biological stockpiles, facili-
ties, and infrastructure will take time and we cannot now even
venture a sensible guess as to the amount of time.
Now, on the subject of oil infrastructure, the U.S. and its coali-
tion allies may face the necessity of repairing Iraq’s oil infrastruc-
ture if Saddam Hussein decides to damage it, as he put the torch
to Kuwait's oil fields in 1991. Indeed, as I am sure you know, we
have reason to believe that Saddam's regime is planning to sabo-
tage Iraq’s oil fields.
Detailed planning is under way for resumption of oil production
as quickly as possible to help meet the Iraqi people's basic needs.
The oil sector is Iraq's primary source of funding. As noted by


18
Under Secretary Grossman, the United States is committed to pre-
serving Iraq's territorial integrity, so we are intent on ensuring
that Iraq’s oil resources remain under national Iraqi control, with
the proceeds made available to support Iraqis in all parts of the
country.
As Senator Biden noted, there is an awareness even inside Iraq
of the importance of preserving those oil assets as national assets.
No one ethnic or religious group will be allowed to claim exclusive
rights to any part of the oil resources or infrastructure. In other
words, all of Iraq’s oil belongs to all of the people of Iraq.
The administration has decided that in the event of war the U.S.-
led coalition would protect Iraq’s oil fields from acts of sabotage
and preserve them as a national asset of the Iraqi people and rap-
idly start reconstruction and operation of the sector so that its pro-
ceeds, together with humanitarian aid from the United States and
others, can help support the Iraqi people's needs.
Just as we have warned Iraqis in a position to control the release
of weapons of mass destruction that they should not obey orders to
use WMD, we are warning them not to commit an atrocity in the
form of the destruction of Iraq’s oil infrastructure.
Now, again as Under Secretary Grossman stressed, we are work-
ing in an area now and we are discussing here today work where
important decisions have yet to be finalized within the administra-
tion. This is a good opportunity to have a real consultation and we
are eager for your input into all of these matters. We have not yet
decided on the organizational mechanisms, for example, to do this
work regarding the oil infrastructure. We will be consulting on
this, in addition to our consultations here with you and with other
Members of Congress, will be consulting with parties in various
countries, including Iraqi experts and groups.
Now, I think this may be a good point at which to address head-
on the accusation that in this confrontation with the Iraqi regime
the administration's motive is to steal or control Iraq’s oil. The ac-
cusation is common, reflected in the slogan “No War for Oil.” But
it is false and malign. If there is a war, the world will see that the
United States will fulfill its administrative responsibilities, includ-
ing regarding oil, transparently and honestly, respecting the prop-
erty and other rights of the Iraqi State and people.
The record of the United States in military conflicts is open to
the world and well-known. The United States became a major
world power in World War II. In that war and since, the United
States has demonstrated repeatedly and consistently that we covet
no other country's property. The United States does not steal from
other nations. We did not pillage Germany and Japan. On the con-
trary, we helped rebuild them after World War II. After Desert
Storm we did not use our military power to take or establish con-
trol over the oil resources of Iraq or any other country in the gulf
region.
The United States pays for whatever we want to import. Rather
than export its power to beggar its neighbors, the United States,
as probably no group of people more than this committee knows,
has been a source of large amounts of financial aid and other types
of assistance for many countries for decades.


20
gime. Also, town and district elections could be held soon after lib-
eration to involve Iraqis in governing at the local level.
In conclusion, regarding post-war planning, much preparatory
work has been done, but much more remains. The Office of Recon-
struction and Humanitarian Assistance will serve as the U.S. Gov-
ernment's nerve center for this effort going forward. We look for-
ward to consulting with this committee and the Congress generally
as we develop our ideas and plans for post-conflict Iraq reconstruc-
tion. War is not inevitable, but failing to make contingency plans
for its aftermath would be inexcusable.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feith follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS J. FEITH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY
POST-WAR PLANNING
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk with you today about efforts under-
way in the Defense Department and the U.S. Government to plan for Iraq in the
post-conflict period, should war become necessary.
If U.S. and other coalition forces take military action in Iraq, they will, after vic-
tory, have contributions to make to the country's temporary administration and the
welfare of the Iraqi people. It will be necessary to provide humanitarian relief, orga-
nize basic services and work to establish security for the liberated Iraqis.
Our work will aim to achieve the objectives outlined by my colleague, Under Sec-
retary of State Grossman:
• First, demonstrate to the Iraqi people and the world that the United States as-
pires to liberate, not occupy or control them or their economic resources.
• Second, eliminate Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, its nuclear program,
the related delivery systems, and the related research and production É. ities.
This will be a complex, dangerous and expensive task.
• Third, eliminate likewise Iraq's terrorist infrastructure. A key element of U.S.
strategy in the global war on terrorism is exploiting the information about ter-
rorist networks that the coalition acquires through our military and law en-
forcement actions.
• Fourth, safeguard the territorial unity of Iraq. The United States does not sup-
port Iraq's disintegration or dismemberment.
• Fifth, begin the process of economic and political reconstruction, working to put
Iraq on a path to become a prosperous and free country. The U.S. government
shares with many Iraqis the hope that their country will enjoy the rule of law
and other institutions of democracy under a broad-based government that rep-
resents the various parts of Iraqi society.
If there is a war, the United States would approach its post-war work with a two-
part resolve: a commitment to stay and a commitment to leave. ,
• That is, a commitment to stay as long as required to achieve the objectives I
have just listed. The coalition cannot take military action in Iraq–to eliminate
weapons of mass destruction and the Iraqi tyranny's threats to the world as an
aggressor and supporter of terrorism—and then leave a mess behind for the
Iraqi people to clean up without a helping hand. That would ill serve the Iraqis,
ourselves and the world.
• But it is important to stress also that the United States would have a commit-
ment to leave as soon as possible, for Iraq belongs to the Iraqi people. Iraq does
not and will not belong to the United States, the coalition or to anyone else.
As Iraqi officials are able to shoulder their country's responsibilities, and they
have in place the necessary political and other structures to provide food, security
and the other necessities, the United States and its coalition partners will want
them to run their own affairs. We all have an interest in hastening the day when
Iraq can become a proud, independent and respected member of the community of
the world's free countries.
U.S. post-war responsibilities will not be easy to fulfill and the United States by
no means wishes to tackle them alone. We shall encourage contributions and partici-


22
Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Detailed planning is underway for the task of securing, assessing and dismantling
Iraqi WMD capabilities, facilities and stockpiles. This will be a huge undertaking.
The Defense Department is building the necessary capabilities.
This will be a new mission for the Department and for our nation. It is complex
and will takeplace as part of military operations, continuing into the post-conflict
period.
We must first locate Iraq's widespread WMD sites. We must then be prepared to
secure the relevant weapons or facilities, or rapidly and safely disable them, so they
are no longer a threat to coalition forces. This will have to be done in many places
and as quickly as possible.
But the mission does not end there. After hostilities, we will have to dismantle,
destroy or dispose of nuclear, chemical, biological and missile capabilities and infra-
structure.
Equally important will be plans to re-direct some of Iraq's dual-use capability and
its scientific and ºn: to legitimate, civilian activities in a new Iraq.
Clearly, this will not be a mission that falls entirely to the U.S. military forces.
Other U.S. government personnel, including those within the DoD, the Department
of Energy's laboratory system, and in other government agencies can contribute.
Coalition partners, including many NATO Allies, have nuclear, chemical and bio-
logical defense-related .#. and expertise that can play an important role.
The UN, IAEA and other international organizations should be in a position to con-
* valuably to the elimination effort and perhaps to ongoing monitoring after-
WarC1.
The task of eliminating all nuclear, chemical and biological stockpiles, facilities
and infrastructure will take time. We cannot now even venture a sensible guess as
to the amount. The new Iraqi government will also have an important role to play.
Oil Infrastructure
The U.S. and its coalition allies may face the necessity of repairing Iraq’s oil infra-
structure, if Saddam Hussein decides to damage it, as he put the torch to Kuwait's
oil fields in 1991. Indeed, we have reason to believe that Saddam's regime is plan-
ning to sabotage Iraq’s oil fields. But even if there is no sabotage and there is no
injury from combat ºp. some repair work will likely be necessary to allow
the safe resumption of operations at oil facilities after any war-related stoppage.
Detailed planning is underway for resumption of oil production as quickly as pos-
sible to help meet the Iraqi people's basic needs. The oil sector is Iraq's primary
source of funding. As noted, the United States is committed to preserving Iraq's ter-
ritorial integrity. So we are intent on ensuring that Iraq’s oil resources remain
under national Iraqi control, with the proceeds made available to support Iraqis in
all parts of the country. No one ethnic or religious group would be allowed to claim
exclusive rights to any part of the oil resources or infrastructure. In other words,
all of Iraq’s oil belongs to all the people of Iraq.
The Administration has decided that, in the event of war, the U.S.-led coalition
would:
• protect Iraq’s oil fields from acts of sabotage and preserve them as a national
asset of the Iraqi people, and
• rapidly start reconstruction and operation of the sector, so that its proceeds, to-
gether with humanitarian aid from the United States and other countries, can
help support the Iraqi people's needs.
The Administration has not yet decided on the organizational mechanisms by
which this sector should be operated. We shall be consulting on this important mat-
ter with many parties in various countries, including Iraqi experts and groups.
“No War for Oil”
This is a good point at which to address head-on the accusation that, in this con-
frontation with the Iraqi regime, the Administration's motive is to steal or control
Iraq’s oil. The accusation is common, reflected in the slogan “No War for Oil.” But,
it is false and malign.
If there is a war, the world will see that the United States will fulfill its adminis-
trative responsibilities, including regarding oil, transparently and honestly, respect-
ing the property and other rights of the Iraqi state and people. The record of the
United States in military conflicts is open to the world and well known.
The United States became a major world power in World War II. In that war and
since, the United States has demonstrated repeatedly and consistently that we covet
no other country's property. The United States does not steal from other nations.
We did not pillage &. or Japan; on the contrary, we helped rebuild them after


23
World War II. After Desert Storm, we did not use our military power to take or es-
tablish control over the oil resources of Iraq or any other country in the Gulf region.
The United States pays for whatever we want to import. Rather than exploit its
power to beggar its neighbors, the United States has been a source of large amounts
of financial aid and other types of assistance for many countries for decades.
If U.S. motives were in essence financial or commercial, we would not be con-
fronting Saddam Hussein over his weapons of mass destruction. If our motive were
cold cash, we would instead downplay the Iraqi regime's weapons of mass destruc-
tion and pander to Saddam in hopes of winning contracts for U.S. companies.
The major costs of any confrontation with the Iraqi regime would of course be the
human ones. But the financial costs would not be small, either. This confrontation
is not, and cannot possibly be, a money-maker for the United States. Only someone
ignorant of the easy-to-ascertain realities could think that the United States could
profit from such a war, even if we were willing to steal Iraq’s oil, which we emphati-
cally are not going to do.
THE STRUCTURE AND FUNDING OF THE OFFICE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
Returning now to the new Pentagon Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance: There are three substantive operations within the Office, each under a
civilian coordinator: Humanitarian Relief, Reconstruction, and Civil Administration.
A fourth coordinator is responsible for communications, logistics and budgetary sup-
port. These operations are under the overall leadership of Jay Garner, a retired
Lieutenant General who held a senior military position in the 1991 humanitarian
relief operation in northern Iraq. He is responsible for organizing and integrating
the work of the three substantive operations and ensuring that the office can travel
to the region when necessary and plug in smoothly to CENTCOM's operations. His
staff consists of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice,
Treasury, Energy, and Agriculture, the U.S. Agency for International Development
and the Office of Management and Budget.
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance has only just begun
the task of estimating the cost of post-war humanitarian assistance. In addition, it
is working to identify the projected post-conflict costs of dealing with the Iraqi
armed forces, including the costs of disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating Iraqi
troops into civilian society.
Except for the Defense Department, the USG is currently operating under a FY
2003 continuing resolution. This has affected the level of funding that can be made
available now, as agencies have access only to limited amounts of money.
In any case, the overall Iraq reconstruction and relief budget would require a FY
2003 supplemental appropriation. Timing of a FY 2003 supplemental is important.
Delays would hinder relief and reconstruction programs.
As part of our post-war planning, CENTCOM has also established a Combined
Joint Task Force that will be responsible for U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq in the
immediate aftermath of a conflict. The task force will work closely with the Office
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to facilitate relief and reconstruc-
tion activities.
THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREE IRAQIS
Because the Commander of the U.S. Central Command will have a key role in
administration in Iraq, many have thought that our plans for Iraq are based on
what the Allies did in Germany after World War II. But that is not the case. Our
intention, in case of war, would be to liberate Iraq, not to occupy it.
Our administration would involve Iraqis as soon as possible, and we would trans-
fer responsibility to Iraqi entities as soon as possible. Following the initial period
of U.S./coalition military government, we envisage a transitional phase in which re-
sponsibility is gradually transferred to Iraqi institutions, leading to the eventual es-
tablishment of a new Iraqi government in accordance with a new constitution.
The following are examples of the ways in which Iraqis might play a progressively
greater role in administering the country. While final decisions have not been made,
and, in the nature of the case, cannot be made until the actual circumstances are
known, these examples illustrate various mechanisms under consideration:
• An Iraqi consultative council could be formed to advise the U.S./coalition au-
thorities.
• Ajudicial council could undertake to advise the authorities on the necessary re-
visions to Iraq's legal structure and statutes to institute the rule of law and to
protect individual rights.


24
• A constitutional commission could be created to draft a new constitution and
submit it to the Iraqi people for ratification.
• Major Iraqi governmental institutions—such as the central government min-
istries—could remain in place and perform the key functions of government
after the vetting of the top personnel to remove any who might be tainted with
the crimes and excesses ºpth. current regime.
• Town and district elections could be held soon after liberation to involve Iraqis
in governing at the local level.
Regarding post-war planning, much preparatory work has been done, but much
more remains. The Office of Reconstruction and humanitarian Assistance will serve
as the U.S. Government's nerve center for this effort.
We look forward to consulting with this Committee and with the Congress gen-
erally as we develop our ideas and plans for post-conflict Iraqi reconstruction. War
is not inevitable, but failing to make contingency plans for its aftermath would be
inexcusable.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Feith.
Let me mention we have once again great attendance by the
committee and I will ask unanimous consent that we have a 5-
minute rule. With 12 members currently present, that is at least
an hour of questions if members roughly respect the 5 minute pe-
riod. And we have a distinguished panel and another round fol-
lowing that. So I will begin, and please start the clock on me.
Secretaries, let me just mention specifically that in the New York
Times this morning there is criticism that NGOs, nongovernmental
organizations, are not able to get needed answers, support, and
other things. I am pleased to know the office was set up 3 weeks
ago, and clearly General Garner cannot do everything at once, but
at the same time we should note that a great deal of the money,
the international support—particularly in the initial feeding and
shelter—and other attentions to the humane situation, will come
not only from NGOs in our country and other countries, but is a
Yºmportant part of the budget, which is currently being formu-
ated.
The New York Times article this morning details the criticism.
Another New York Times story addresses the recruitment of a
leader who might take part in the Government of Iraq later on, but
also states that our government has come to the conclusion that we
will not support the idea of an initial government in exile to be
foisted upon the Iraqis.
Clearly, another London meeting may occur, where various con-
tentious groups may come together. We would like as a committee
to be briefed from time to time on what is going on with regard
to the murky shadows of exiled Iraqis, to their aspirations, and to
how Iraqis on the ground might feel about all this. This is the tran-
sition period, but we want to make sure the transition period is
just that—as opposed to some pre-transition or pre-military phase
or what have you, as you describe it.
Now, the oil question that you have raised, Secretary Feith, is
very important. The papers also have polls which you have cited
at least tangentially, that show large majorities of people in other
countries believe our sole objective in all of this is oil. That is
wrong. You have stated that categorically.
But the issue will not be cleared away without implementing a
policy for the admission of the oil fields including how the people
of Irāq are to receive the benefits, and in fact addressing how much
of this operation that you are describing might be paid for through


25
oil revenues. There is a distinct connection: if the oil wells are de-
stroyed, the revenues do not come in. That changes the budget sit-
uation, which the Iraqi people on the ground now ought to under-
stand, as well as the Russians, the French, all the people that like-
wise in a murky way we discuss as potential members of the coali-
tion, or the Security Council. All these parties are publicly dis-
cussing oil, and it really cannot be hidden behind the bushes.
Now, to the extent that there is a distinct plan on our part to
be, as you suggest, transparent, and to think in terms of the hu-
mane treatment of the Iraqi people and their future, that can be
stated and that can be organized. As you say, you cannot do every-
thing, but it is still out there. It needs to be finalized in a hurry
because that is in the nub of many of the consultations diplomati-
º at the U.N. now, and I am hopeful that everybody is mindful
Of that.
Let me just ask as my question: With this organization clearly
in the Department of Defense, but, not exclusively that, you have
detailed people from many departments, and that is important. You
establish a chain of command, General Franks and/or others who
are there on the ground, and they try to administer the country,
at least keep the territorial integrity, get to the weapons of mass
flººtion. You probably need military authority to do both of
those.
How do you begin the transition? In other words, how do you
begin to identify? Does General Franks identify political leader-
ship? Are there other persons in his administration who are de-
tailed to sort of scout the horizons for a President Karzai or for
whoever may arise or for a group of such promising people?
In other words, the audacious aspect of what we are attempting
in Iraq is not just eliminating weapons of mass destruction arising
from our September 11 genuine fear of weapons that may come and
be proliferated but likewise we are trying to create a changed State
in Iraq that will be different, that will offer some hope to all the
States in the surrounding territory, that will be so good that it ex-
ists and that it continues, as opposed to an experiment that fails
and becomes a vacuum, like the former Afghanistan.
How does this transition start? Who is responsible for it?
Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me start with a couple of an-
swers and then I would be glad, obviously, for Doug's assistance
here. Let me first, if I could, talk a little bit about the nongovern-
mental organizations since, as you raised it, they are extremely, ex-
tremely important. In fact, we believe as you look through all of the
effort that has been made on the humanitarian and the reconstruc-
tion areas, without NGOs this will not be possible, it will not be
possible to accomplish this task.
We have been focused on our relations with NGOs. There is now
a weekly meeting, civil, military, where we have about 30 NGOs
represented. So that coordination I think is happening in a much
more systematic way.
No doubt, though, sir, that there was—it was slow in getting
NGOs the licenses they need to go into Iraq. The reason this got
slowed down, as both Under Secretary Feith and I learned, is of
course the NGOs wanted to import or take things into northern
Iraq or into Iraq that of course were sanctioned, that were under


26
the Oil for Food Program, that were under OFAC licenses. And it
took us some time to work our way through that.
I can report to you now that, with good work between the State
Department, the Treasury Department, the Defense Department,
we have now cleared away a very large amount of that backlog for
our own people to work in Iraq, some NGOs to work in Iraq, and
we are down, at the State Department anyway, to a backlog of two
NGOs as opposed to about 25 a week or so ago.
So we are working on this. There is still more work to do. But
I just want to emphasize the importance of nongovernmental orga-
nizations.
Second, just to pick up the point that you made about where we
stand. We actually have come to the conclusion that now is not the
time to have a provisional government or a government in exile be-
cause, as I tried to say in my testimony, yes, we are working with
some extremely good, talented and wonderful people who are out-
side of Iraq, but we have to also take into account the views of peo-
ple inside Iraq.
I think, as Secretary Rumsfeld has said and I know Secretary
Powell has said, a lot of this has to come from the bottom up. That
is a very important answer to the question about how it will be
maintained and how it will go on for more than 6 or 8 or 10
months or even a year.
Finally, that leads me to say that how exactly this transition will
take place is, as you say, perhaps opaque at the moment. But what
we are planning for is with the Future of Iraq Project, with our ef-
forts to publicize our campaign inside of Iraq, with the fact that I
hope Iraqis will consider this, if there has to be a military oper-
ation, as liberation, that there will be people who will come up and
want to participate in the future of their government.
That is what we expect, that is what we hope, and that is what
we will be planning to achieve.
Mr. FEITH. Mr. Chairman, I think that much of the issue that
you have raised about how a transition would occur is not
knowable precisely right now. But what we have been working on
through the various groups that Under Secretary Grossman is talk-
ing about is developing principles and guidelines how we would ap-
proach the question of encouraging, cultivating, and permitting to
function new Iraqi leadership after a conflict.
It is not our thinking that we are going to be able to impose par-
ticular people or even a particular governmental system on the
Iraqis. I think that we recognize that it would not be a right thing
to do and it probably would not even be something that we could
pull off if we attempted it. The governmental structures that exist
right now may be, as I mentioned in my testimony, may be usable
to some extent within a reconfigured Iraq where the technocratic
aspects would be perhaps salvageable to some extent, even though
the fundamental politics of the country would no longer be tyran-
nical and would, on the contrary, we hope build democratic institu-
tions for the benefit of the people of Iraq.
The point that you made about oil, Mr. Chairman, is obviously
at the fore of everybody's mind. We have given a great deal of
thought to the importance of securing and, if necessary, repairing
and producing the oil. We do not have final decisions within the ad-


29
from our perspective I cannot answer the question yet of whether
we want to have a United Nations transitional authority until I
know what the United Nations is or is not going to do if there has
to be military conflict.
For example, if we go through, as the President said last week,
and he now welcomes and supports a second resolution and we are
successful in getting a second resolution and 15 to nothing or some-
thing less than 15 to nothing the United Nations says yes, Saddam
Hussein has not met his obligations under 1441, let us go, then the
United Nations' role possibly in a transition or in the first 6 or 8
weeks could be a big one.
Senator BIDEN. Marc, you are the single best negotiator I have
observed in my last 10 years here. You know darn well the way you
would be talking with the United Nations is to say: Look, if you
guys are in on the deal here this is what we would like you to do.
What they wonder about is whether or not you want them in on
§ deal. And if that does not work, you should be talking to the
You can walk and chew gum at the same time. You do not have
to wait to see what they are going to do. One of the problems is
they are worried that you all do not have a plan. Every European
leader I have met with in the last year is worried you do not have
any plan, because they have heard all this rhetoric about no na-
tion-building, heard all this rhetoric about we are warriors, we are
going to fight the war and we are going to leave.
They have heard all this rhetoric and, guess what, they believe
our rhetoric. Fortunately we do not, but they believe it.
Mr. GROSSMAN. Just let me come back. Let us say that the
opposite—
Senator BIDEN. I apologize for
Mr. GROSSMAN. No, you make a fair point. But in terms of a ne-
gotiation right now, the United Nations—this issue is to the United
Nations. It is to the Security Council. The Security Council has a
decision to make about whether it is going to back its 15 to nothing
vote under 1441. I will speak purely for myself here, and again I
say no decisions have been made.
But you can see a completely different path, Mr. Biden, if the
United Nations Security Council votes again 15 to nothing for a
new resolution. Then it seems to me we might consider a role or
some role for the United Nations. I say, no decisions have been
made. That is my view.
But if the United Nations does not meet its responsibilities, then
it is very much harder, I think, for us to come and argue in front
of all of you that in a part of phase one or part of phase two that
we would turn this over to some international body. I do not know
the answer to that question, but I just want to let you know that
it is not for lack of thinking about it. It is the fact that you have
got, from our perspective, you have got to get the sequence right.
I believe the same thing would apply to the European Union. I
would guess that if you went to an EU meeting today and you
made a proposition to them, the first thing they would say is, well,
when—is there going to be another U.N. Security Council resolu-
tion? We would say: We sure hope there is


30
Senator BIDEN. A 10-second interruption. We have had no trou-
ble saying all along: Look, we want the U.N. to go with us, we
want a U.N. resolution; if we do not get that U.N. resolution, we
will go ourselves. You could easily have been saying: We want you
all to participate in this, we want this to be a joint operation, we
want this to be a joint occupation, we want this to be run by the
United Nations, if in fact you say that. And by the way, if you do
#. then we may have to do it ourselves. You all have not done
that.
I have talked to several Foreign Ministers. I have talked to all
those foreign heads of state. Unless they are not telling me some-
thing you are telling them, I do not think you have told them any
of that.
Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, part of the I do not mean to get into a col-
loquy here, but part of the challenge of course is that we are here
today to talk to you about our plan for humanitarian reconstruc-
tion, for political reconstruction. I think it is right that we would
be consulting with the U.S. Senate before we do much more with
a lot of people outside of the United States.
So we are here
Senator BIDEN. You are good, pal. You are good.
Mr. GROSSMAN. We are here to do consultation and the is what
we are trying to do.
So I think people should be in no doubt about our plan. Let me
try to answer the question that you posed about every 6 months—
or for the first 6 months, excuse me. You hit I think all the impor-
tant ones: security; we both emphasized weapons of mass destruc-
tion; trying to bring basic human services to Iraqis. One of the
things that I think is very impressive, and we are glad to consult
further on this or provide further information, USAID for example
has laid out a very detailed plan for their operations in the first
months, months 1 to 3, 3 to 6, and areas of water, sanitation, pub-
lic health, humanitarian, sea port, airports, establishing food dis-
tribution, emergency electricity.
So as I said in my introduction, we now have a stack of these
plans that are not just ideas, but actually lay out 1, 3, and 6-month
timetables, and I would be glad to put them into the record and
I think you would be interested in them and take a look at them
and see the mile markers and you can see our goal is to make real
progress.
Senator BIDEN. That is two functions. You only named—are they
the only two functions? In other words, what two—you said hu-
manitarian. Are we going to secure the borders? Are we going to
secure the borders of Iraq” Is that a mission?
Mr. FEITH. Yes.
Senator BIDEN. Is that going to require troops on the Iranian
border? Is it going to—I mean, what is the mission? What are you
anticipating?
Mr. FEITH. Senator, it is hard to answer a lot of these what-ifs
because a lot depends on future events that we do not know. As
Secretary Rumsfeld likes to say, he says he does not know whether,
if there is a war, it is going to be “4 days, 4 weeks or 4 months.”
A lot depends on, if there is a war, what the nature of the war
is, how much destruction there is, how much cooperation one gets,


32
along with our coalition partners. I might read a Newsweek piece
that came off the wire yesterday, and it quotes a State Department
official, not by name. I know that is strange in this town. But let
me read it to you because, Secretary Grossman, you might know
about this. This Newsweek story that appeared on the wire yester-
day says:
“Administration officials are keenly wary of a long-term occupa-
tion in the heart of the Arab world, where anxieties about Western
invaders date back to the Crusades. ‘Every day you get past 3
months, you have got to expect peacekeepers to have a bullseye on
their head,” one State Department official tells Newsweek.
As you have laid out the framework for the office that we intend
to set up—again I go back to your original points—much of this is
uncertain. But can you tell this committee which nations specifi-
cally have committed specific resources to a post-Saddam Iraq.”
Surely you must have some budgetary numbers. You mentioned a
supplemental. Surely you must have some numbers of people it
would take. Uncertain, I know that.
But as much time and precision that you have put into this—ob-
viously you are proud of it and it is impressive—to disconnect that
from any budget numbers or timeframe or people seems to me not
to be very realistic.
So I would appreciate hearing from both of you on those ques-
tions. Thank you.
Mr. FEITH. Senator, the United States has been talking with
friends around the world on this subject for a long time. I hope that
Senator Biden's remarks do not lead anybody to think that we have
not been engaging our various potential coalition partners in dis-
cussions on this subject. We have been. I mean, I could understand
that
Senator BIDEN. Who?
Mr. FEITH. Well, I am reluctant to get into the who because of
the political realities and diplomatic realities, with which you are
all familiar.
Senator HAGEL. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. If you are having a
problem now getting into it, what the devil do you think you are
going to have a problem when we get in there?
Mr. FEITH. Well, Senator—
Senator HAGEL. With real men and women on the ground and in
a war and trying to rebuild Iraq. And if you cannot define any of
this now—
Mr. FEITH. Let me suggest the following way to think about it,
which is the way we have been thinking about it within the admin-
istration. We have been talking with scores of countries about this
whole issue of potential contributions to a coalition effort in Iraq
for many months now. As we have these discussions, the countries
in effect fall into different baskets.
There are some countries that say: We are with you in very spe-
cific ways no matter what. There are other countries that say: We
will be with you in certain ways, and the ways range from, as we
were talking about before, contributions of combat personnel or ac-
cess, basing, and overflight rights. or in some cases some countries
have specifically said: We are not interested in being involved in


39
throw down their arms and we all sing Kumbayah together. We
hope that. That would be the most wonderful thing, you know, to
have peace without fighting.
But if it goes wrong and we do kill so many people, as Senator
Feingold says, as we try to run this country how are they going to
look at our men and women in uniform? Will they see them as lib-
erators? Will we explain, gee, we had to do it; Saddam Hussein
would not disarm, so we had to kill 500,000 people? And will we
be alone?
I remember the first gulf war, how proud President Bush was,
and rightly so, President Bush I: These are the people who are
helping us, these are how many troops they are going in with, they
are going to be by our side. Here is how much money they are giv-
ing. And in the end, Mr. Chairman, 88 percent of the costs were
picked up by our friends.
I cannot tell my people at home what is going to happen. So do
we know if Saddam is going to use his weapons of mass destruc-
tion? CIA says yes. I do not know what your contingency calls for,
how we clean that up; whether he puts his oil fields on fire, what
is the ecodamage there; what happens next.
I just use this opportunity to say that our allies are trying hard
to resolve this another way. Speaking for myself, someone who be-
lieves that Saddam must be disarmed, he said he would be dis-
armed, he must act to disarm.
I do not think that we should be showing a lack of respect to our
allies, who today came out together, and one of them is a man of
whom President Bush said: “I looked the man in the eye. I found
him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. I was able to get
a sense of his soul. He is an honest, straightforward man.” That
is President Bush about Mr. Putin.
Well, Mr. Putin is standing today with several of our allies and,
as I understand it from today's news, 11 of the 15 Security Council
members say the same thing: Give inspections a chance.
Now, as for me, we will see the next report by Mr. Blix on Valen-
tine's Day and it is going to be very important to see what happens
from there. But as we look here at post-war Iraq, I have a gnawing
feeling that we are already agreeing that, even though the Presi-
dent said he has not decided to go to war, that we are going to go
to war, without a lot of our allies.
I have to use this opportunity to say that as I think of the bur-
dens that will be laid out, that will be on the shoulders of our men
and women there, without—“who knows” is your answer as to how
much help we get moneywise or with people, our friends helping
us in the field—I say there is a lot more work that I hope you will
do with us, in hearing us.
As it is, this would be a precedent-setting attack, the first time
the United States has launched a preemptive strike. I know the
President feels he has everything going for him to substantiate
that attack. But as I look at all the scenarios, I think the best one
is if we can avoid war. That is the best scenario, and that we can
work with the people of Iraq to form democracy. And I still come
back to that and I just may be in a minority here, but I want to
say that.
Thank you.


40
Mr. FEITH. Thank you, Senator. If I may, I would like to make
a distinction between plans and predictions. When we have been
asked here this morning in a number of respects to give our assess-
ment in the nature of a prediction of what is going to happen, how
long an occupation may take, how easily one might transition po-
litically and the like, and it is in that regard that I stressed uncer-
tainty, because we are not in the predicting business.
That is what I was referring to when I was talking about uncer-
tainties. On the other hand, planning we have to do. And I think
that Senator Chafee's point is a good one when he talks about
plans have to take into account a full range of possibilities, from
good case to really bad case.
I do want to assure the committee that when we talk about all
of the key functions that are going to need to be performed in post-
war Iraq, we have thought about them across the range from worst
case to very good case. In the case of oil, for example, if Saddam
utterly destroys Iraq’s oil infrastructure that is the worst case, and
that has been taken into account. That makes for a horrific prob-
lem for reconstruction. It's enormously expensive to repair it and
you do not have the oil revenues in the interim to repair it. But
we are planning with that in mind.
We have also planned for
Senator BOXER. How much will it cost to repair it?
Mr. FEITH. I think the estimates are in the neighborhood of I
do not have them precisely. I think they are in the neighborhood
of something like $8 to $10 billion.
Senator BOXER. And who is going to pay for it?
Mr. FEITH. Well, that is a question.
Senator BOXER. Thank you. There is uncertainties.
Mr. FEITH. I am not suggesting that—there are all kinds of ways
of handling that issue and we are studying the various ways of
handling the issue of oil and what kind of support there might be
in the world markets for investing in Iraqi oil after a conflict.
But oil is one example. Humanitarian relief, we have thought
through from best case to worst case the question of whether the
U.N. and other humanitarian relief agencies can get in quickly
with the large flow of food that they have been providing for years.
But we have also planned for a worst case where they stay out or
they are not in a position to provide food aid.
I do not want to belabor it by going through the long list of func-
tions that we are talking about, but I do want to assure you that
your point is very well taken on the importance of doing one's plan-
ning, not on the basis of a specific prediction, but on the basis of
having to deal with the range of possibilities from good to bad.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Grossman.
Mr. GROSSMAN. Just two points quickly. One is just to emphasize
the point that Doug just made and we have perhaps not made very
well today, that in all the areas, Senator, that you have talked
about—weapons of mass destruction, oil, humanitarian, reconstruc-
tion—there are very, very detailed plans that, as Doug says, run
from worst case to best case. As I was describing to Senator Fein-
gold, I picked one out on aid, on aid, water and sanitation, running
from immediate post-conflict to 18 months.


41
So those are all available to you. We are glad to provide them
and we are glad to brief them in detail, because there are just
stacks of these things and I think we are trying to do this seri-
ously.
Second, I just wanted to say that when you say that we would
like to disarm Saddam Hussein peacefully, that is of course our po-
sition as well. -
Senator BOXER. Good.
Mr. GROSSMAN. And I do not believe, Senator, that it is any dis-
respect to our allies that we have a disagreement about how to do
that, in the sense that we believe that the reason there are inspec-
tors in Iraq today is because the Security Council voted 15 to noth-
ing for Resolution 1441. And we believe that there would be disar-
mament of Saddam Hussein if
Senator BOXER. Mr. Grossman, my time is up, but can I say, you
say there is no disrespect. Listen to what they say, because I may
treat you in a way that I think is fair and you say, you know, the
Senator did not respect me at all. And I just think when you have
friends you have got to think about how they feel, OK, even if you
disagree. Maybe you call them “old Europe,” maybe it hurts their
feelings, you know.
Mr. GROSSMAN. I accept that. But there is one other group here
that deserves our respect and that is, in my view, the U.N. Secu-
rity Council. And we have a 15 to nothing vote in 1441 and we
want to try to get a second resolution. So I think part of the respect
that we are trying to give to the Security Council is respect that
is deserved from others as well, if I could put it that way.
Senator BOXER. Thank you. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Allen.
Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both these
gentlemen for your testimony here and your answers to these ques-
tions.
In looking at this issue of military action, everyone wants all
sorts of certainty in what is going to happen afterwards. It is abso-
lutely impossible to give an accurate projection or prediction as to
what will happen. This is akin to diagramming every play of a
rugby game. You do not know how it is going to come out, where
it is going to be fumbled, when you are going to have to pitch it
out and move forward.
I think that this uncertainty, though, should not paralyze us,
should not paralyze us from going forward with our goal, and that
is the disarmament of Saddam Hussein from these weapons of
mass destruction, the delivery systems, and his ties to terrorism.
War and its after effects are always situation-dependent. I am
one who likes to be guided by principles and I think that the prin-
ciples that Secretary Grossman went forward with—that this is a
war to liberate the people of Iraq, that we want to obviously elimi-
nate their chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction,
their nuclear programs and delivery systems. We want to eliminate
the terrorist infrastructure in Iraq, and of course safeguard the ter-
ritorial unity of the country.


43
breach any diplomacy or efforts, but if you have had those talks
how would you characterize those talks, because those individuals,
opposition leaders, can be very important in a post-Saddam Iraq.”
Mr. GROSSMAN. Do I take your question to be opposition leaders
inside of Iraq.”
Senator ALLEN. Well, opposition leaders—you are not going to
have many inside Iraq who are alive.
Mr. GROSSMAN. Right.
Senator ALLEN. I am talking about opposition leaders externally.
Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. We have had extensive conversations
with them. In fact, last August, Doug and I had the first meeting
with a group of six, a group of six opposition leaders, which we
thought was very successful, and we have continued on through the
President's Special Envoy, Zal Khalilzad, who is actually in the
area now talking to opposition leaders.
As Doug very rightly reminds me, of course we do have conversa-
tions with people who are opposed to Saddam Hussein in northern
Iraq because of the great work that our people do and that they
do in terms of what is going on there.
Senator ALLEN. If I may followup, in these discussions, whether
external or the three major groups in Iraq, are they in agreement
with the guiding principles that you have enunciated in your testi-
mony this morning?
Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, I think they are.
Senator ALLEN. That is important.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.
Senator Nelson.
Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Anticipating this post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, I ventured to Af-
ghanistan a couple of times last year, went to Bosnia, to see what
I could learn. And I was struck, first of all that it always takes
longer in occupation. We thought maybe we would be in Bosnia for
a year and we are now in the seventh year.
I was also struck in Bosnia that, even though we were there in
a rather substantial military presence, there are war criminals on
the loose, one we think in Bosnia, the other one perhaps in Serbia,
the two most notorious. And I am just curious as to your thoughts
of how that might be different in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.”
Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, we hope it would be different because we
hope that we would not X number of years later have these people
running around. As with everything else we have reported to you
today, there is a group of lawyers and law enforcement people
working on a plan to consider how to deal with Saddam Hussein,
his top lieutenants, his family, how to bring them to justice. That
is something that I know is very high on the priority list of our
military forces should military force be required.
These are decisions that also are headed toward our President,
but I believe you would find, Senator, if we had a chance to brief
you on them that the planning for this has been extremely well
done and is very well thought out.
Senator NELSON. Well, if that planning is well done and well
thought out and would be executed and be successful, perhaps you
ought to apply that planning to Bosnia.


45
Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, Senator. Let me take for the record the
exact number of NGOs. But what we are doing and have from the
very beginning is make sure that the NGO community and the
international relief organizations, some of them, the United Na-
tions for example, are very tightly tied together with General
Franks and with CENTCOM and with all of us.
As I said previously, there is a meeting each week among 30 non-
governmental organizations, that both the Pentagon and the State
Department, are represented. We are trying our very best to solve
their problems. They have been involved in the planning, in our
planning from the very beginning. President Bush in releasing $11
|ion to keep the planning going has been for precisely that ef-
ort.
As I said in answer to another Senator, these NGOs are abso-
lutely key to our ability to get this job done. We learned that in
northern Iraq, General Zinni and I, in 1991. Without the help of
the nongovernmental organizations and the international organiza-
tions like the World Food Program, we cannot accomplish this task.
This is a huge priority for us and, as I said to Senator Boxer, I
think if you went through all of the aid ideas, for example, on the
areas that are in their responsibility, you would find NGO, NGO,
NGO, international community.
So we are trying to be lashed up with them as successfully as
possible. But I will provide for the record an exact list of who at-
tends this meeting and what organizations they are.
[The following information was subsequently provided:]
NGOs in regular attendance at the State Department Bureau of Population, Refu-
gees, and Migration's meetings on humanitarian relief in Iraq:
InterAction, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps International, World
Vision, Refugees International, CARE, Kurdish Institute, Catholic Relief Services,
Church World Services, American Refugee Council, International Medical Corps,
American Friends Service Committee, International Aid, Northwest Medical Team,
and Air Service International.
Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Brownback.
Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here and sharing the nitty-gritties of this with
this really difficult process. I was looking at this, comparing it to
Afghanistan. The thing about Afghanistan that is different—there
are a number of things different, but there was a process, a local
process, that loya jirga process, that everybody kind of agreed to
as a way that you can come at some sort of governance in Afghani-
stan. You can have the local communities elect representatives and
send them to a national kind of convention that had a long-stand-
ing system, and set up an agreement and buy-in by the population
of Afghanistan, and you can arrive at a system of governance there.
Afghanistan has a number of other great problems, but there was
a system that people could agree to.
Iraq, I have not been able to identify one, and I am gathering
really it is tough for people to identify. I have worked with the
Iraqi opposition for a long period of time now, with the INC, Iraqi
National Congress. They have had their difficulties. I was in Lon-
don meeting with them in December. I know both of you gentlemen


46
have met with them. And they were really setting their differences
aside and doing a very nice job, I thought, of pulling together, and
a broad set of opposition groups.
These are exterior oppositions. They are working with people in-
terior, primarily in the north, some in the south. But I was quite
impressed at how far forward they had gone, how much they were
cooperating and working together and really pulling together.
I appreciate your working with them, with the INC and with
other groups, although I do note, as the chairman did when he first
started your questioning, which must seem to you guys like hours
ago—it is like coming up, being in a dentist's chair for hours, to
get us to press on you. There was a New York Times article today,
continuing to have this question of working with the INC versus
recruiting some additional new leadership.
To me this is the real nuts and bolts, one of the real nuts and
bolts tough problems in the transition period that you have talked
about. You have got a post-Saddam period and then within that
you have got to have some leadership arise, Iraqi leadership arise,
to run Iraq, because we do not want to run Iraq. We are not going
to run Iraq. It will be Iraqis that do this.
Is there still this level of debate within the administration on
whether to engage the INC or somebody else of leadership to come
forward from Iraq interior? Can you, if you can, disclose any of the
thinking that is going on about that very specific, yet critically im-
portant problem?
Mr. GROSSMAN. Let me try and then ask Doug for some help. The
answer to the question about whether there is still a big debate
going on in the administration about all this is no, sir. Doug and
I last July kind of looked up from our pencils and paper and said:
You know, why are we spending all this time fighting with each
other over what Iraqi opposition? We ought to do this together.
So you will recall perhaps that last August we invited the six
major groups, including, very much including the INC, to meet
with both of us together. And we tried to show them that we had
a unified front and we were hoping to encourage them therefore to
have a unified front. And I do not say it has anything to do with
us, but, like you, we see a lot of positives there.
So we are continuing to work with all of these groups. I know
that you know, Senator, since it is money that you all have author-
ized, we continue to provide the INC with a considerable sum of
money and am glad for the record to break that down over the last
few months. So the debate in this administration—
Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Secretary, could I on that point?
Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, of course.
Senator BROWNBACK. I do not mean to interrupt you, but I just
want to make sure to get this before my time is up. The TV Liberty
that they were operating is not operating now and they are saying
that their lack of funds for being able to operate that television and
radio, which I think would be a critical communication compo-
nent—I hope that can be resolved near-term.
Mr. GROSSMAN. We would like to get started with that TV and
radio right away again. We have money set aside for it. As I under-
stand it, and I will be glad to give you a further answer, is what


47
we need is a clean request for TV and radio and then it can be
funded. But we will work on that.
If I might just say one word about Afghanistan, Iraq, and the
question of governance. Absolutely right, you are faced in a sense
with mirrors here. In Afghanistan you had no bureaucracy to speak
of and you had no money to speak of, but there was a loya jirga
process so we could see our way forward.
In Iraq, of course, there is a talented bureaucracy that we hope
we can kind of take the top off of and then use, and of course there
is money, there is oil. Yet the way forward, as you describe it,
through an established loya jirga-like system is not there. But it
is one of the reasons that we have spent so much time and so much
effort on these Future of Iraq Projects, so that we have a way for-
ward, we have an idea for a constitution, we have an idea for laws.
Exactly as you say, those things then need to be legitimated in
some way by the people inside of Iraq. But we are not going to
show up there and then try to figure out what to do.
Senator BROWNBACK. I hope you will continue to work with these
outside oppositions along with inside oppositions. And I agree we
should not show up and say, OK, here is the new leader of Iraq,
but that we should use all of this talent that has been very dedi-
cated for a period of years to confront Saddam Hussein, to remove
Saddam Hussein, and to liberate the Iraqi people.
I think one of the things we lose sight of here is how much they
are and have suffered, the Iraqi people. Their worst nightmare is
what they have been living, and I hope we can identify and see and
work with them very closely as we move on forward.
Mr. FEITH. Senator, when you asked about the INC it reminded
me that Senator Allen had raised the question whether the prin-
ciples that we have laid out in general for the kind of government
we would like to see arise in Iraq are shared by Iraqi opposition
groups. One of the principal accomplishments of the INC was orga-
nizing conferences of multiple groups over the last 10 years or so
where they themselves promulgated principles that all of the major
Iraqi opposition groups now subscribe to, that are principles that
we support.
Now, I take Senator Chafee's point that you should not look at
that through rose-colored glasses. We do not in any way underesti-
mate how difficult the problems are going to be of getting these
people to actually work together and develop a kind of smooth co-
operation in a country that does not have a history of a democratic
pºlitical culture and the kind of cooperation that we would like to
oster.
It is going to be very difficult and we do not want to be overly
rosy in projections about it. But nevertheless, we should not be
blind to the good news that at least there have been accomplish-
ments at the level of principle, and the Iraqi opposition deserves
some credit for lining up behind the I think very admirable prin-
ciples.
Mr. GROSSMAN. May I say something? Just one other thing, Sen-
ator, and that is that Zal Khalilzad has been out for a couple of
weeks talking to Iraqi oppositionists and why do we not just offer,
either to members or staff as you wish, a briefing when he returns.
I think it would be helpful to put all this into perspective.


48
Senator BROWNBACK. I think that would be helpful. I would note,
those principles are democracy, human rights, an open economy. I
mean, they are the basic things that we stand for, is what this op-
position is pushing aggressively. These basic principles are ones
that will truly liberate the Iraqi people when they are imple-
mented.
[The prepared statement of Senator Brownback follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK
It is a true shame that France and Germany have dealt a blow to NATO's author-
ity by blocking efforts of the majority of members from helping Turkey defend
against a possible Iraqi attack. It is a real measure of the French and German de-
sire to undermine the American position that they are even willing to leave a fellow
ally out in the cold.
We have shown the world specific evidence of Saddam's intent to deceive inspec-
tors—with conversations between Iraqi military officials discussing the fact that
they are evacuating weapons and ammunition.
As if this is not enough, we have satellite photographs of the Iraqi military
digging holes, moving equipment or burying things at inspection sites shortly before
inspection teams arrived. This indicates that the Iraqis are aware of where inspec-
tors are going—and therefore, these inspections are not random, and allow Iraqis
to avoid detection.
It is clear that Saddam is not disarming, is not cooperating with inspectors and
remains a danger to the world community. We must work with the Iraqi opposition
groups to end this threat and end the brutality he has imposed on the Iraqi people.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Brownback. That would be
helpful, to alert the gentlemen on that briefing. I think this would
be of interest to us.
I would just mention parenthetically, the committee tomorrow at
9:30 will talk about Afghanistan, governance of Afghanistan, and
work along our way there.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, first let me in anticipation
commend you for holding that hearing tomorrow morning on Af-
ghanistan. I think it is extremely important, and I do not think we
are focusing sufficiently on that matter, and that an operation
which was initially largely successful may be slipping away from
us from lack of focus and lack of commitment of resources and sup-
port. I think it is a very important hearing.
Secretary Grossman, I have two questions I want to put to you
just very quickly. How many U.S. troops did we have in Europe
that we sustained there over a very long period of time? The figure
of about 300,000 seems to stick in my mind that we had in the re-
gion year in, year out, as part of the containment strategy of the
Soviet Union. Is that correct, that figure?
Mr. GROSSMAN. I think if you go back some years it is in the
300,000 range.
Senator SARBANES. Yes, it is down now.
Mr. GROSSMAN. I think it is considerably less today.
Senator SARBANES. I know, it is about 100,000 now, I think. But
for quite a sustained period of time when the tensions were up it
was at about 300,000, was it not?
Mr. GROSSMAN. That is my recollection.
Senator SARBANES. OK. And the other question I wanted to put
to you—I have been following the NATO issue right now dealing


53
is one of sort of a cobbled-together nation at the end of World War
I by the European powers, principally England. So you have taken
over the last 80 years basically tribal relationships and created a
nation State, and for the last 40 of it, half that time, under a dic-
tator.
When I read item No. 4 here, that is to safeguard the territorial
unity of Iraq, the United States does not support Iraq's disintegra-
tion or dismemberment, now that looks to me like you are going
to be a little longer there than 24 months when you consider the
factions that are going to emerge.
I wonder if you might address that point. And in conjunction
with that, there has been some troubling news that has come out
that some of the exile groups in Iraq are forging a relationship with
very conservative religious elements in Iran, and I am very inter-
ested in knowing whether or not the secular State of Iraq may be
forfeited to something along more conservative religious lines that
Iran is under today in the aftermath of our efforts there.
So I want you to go into the history a little bit and tell me why
you think that nation-building here and holding this together is
something that can be achieved in, using your response to Senator
Feingold, 2 years.
Mr. FEITH. First of all, Senator, the 2 years was my esteemed
colleague Under Secretary Grossman's estimate.
Senator DODD. You are passing the buck already.
Mr. FEITH. And I do not think I want to venture into the pre-
diction business. The question that you ask about keeping Iraq to-
gether is a serious question. You are correct that Iraq is a country
that was manufactured, as it were, by the victorious allies after
World War I. It did not exist as a country before that.
But there are many countries around the world that did not exist
before World War I and that have developed a sense of national
identity and unity. It is our policy that we favor preserving the ter-
ritorial integrity of Iraq and we think that that is important for the
stability of the region. There are many countries in the area that
have a strong interest in that and we share that interest. At the
same time, we do not
Senator DODD. This is even after the weapons of mass destruc-
tion—let us assume we have eliminated those. We are going to stay
around then and try and build this nation?
Mr. FEITH. As we have been discussing, we understand that we
have a responsibility, if there is a war and if we lead a coalition
that comes into control of Iraq, we have a responsibility to do the
kinds of things that you alluded to and that both Marc Grossman
and I talked about in your testimony.
Senator DODD. Even if it is not their will to do so? There may
be some who prefer not to necessarily be under the nation State
of Iraq, but might seek some other alternative political structure.
Mr. FEITH. Well, there is a country of Iraq. It is our position that
its territorial integrity, the preservation of its territorial integrity,
is in our interest, and we have been told by the various groups that
we have talked about across the spectrum of Iraqi politics to the
extent that we can tap into it that there is unanimity in favor of
preserving Iraq's territorial integrity among the major groups.


54
So I do not think that we have anybody that is arguing with us
in principle that Iraq should be broken apart.
Senator DODD. Could you touch on the comment just quickly on
the Iranian religious, to the extent is that report accurate? Are
there other communications, contacts, some relationship developing
between the Iraqi exile community and the religious conservatives
of Iran?
Mr. FEITH. There are. Iran is right next door and Iran has a
large number of Iraqi refugees in it and those refugees are con-
nected with Iraqi refugees and exiles in other countries. So those
kinds of contacts exist.
Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Grossman.
Mr. GROSSMAN. Senator, I feel the slight need to defend myself
against the charge of naivete here. Senator Feingold asked me if
I could name one date in one plan and I said 2 years, and the rea-
son I did that is a number of the plans, for example from AID
about the humanitarian issues, run from the end of conflict to 18
months to 24 months.
I think, as we answered Senator Nelson, though, and as I said
to Senator Lugar and Senator Biden, I think it would be a big mis-
take for us to set some kind of a date. That is why we set these
principles, and these are principles that are hard to achieve.
Senator DODD. I agree. I do not disagree with that. I just think
when you start, even using your 2 years—and I do not want to play
“catch you” with the 2-years. But I think we are talking about a
much longer time here.
Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.
Senator DODD. I think it is very important to be very level with
the American public about this. It is going to be very costly and
it is going to take a long, long time. And it is better to say that
up front in a way than to sort of delude people into believing some-
how that this is going to be a short-term deal at relatively low cost,
particularly if we have to pay the bill ourselves. It is going to be
very expensive, it is going to take a long, long time, and we are
going to be there for years in putting this together, particularly if
we are doing it alone. And it is going to be very difficult. It is not
easy to do it.
I think it is better to lay that out than to sort of create this illu-
sion somehow that this is going to be a relatively painless, short-
term deal. My sense is, while you are not necessarily saying that,
that is the impression that gets left. And I think that is a mistake.
I think it is dangerous.
Mr. GROSSMAN. Fair enough. If that is the impression we have
left, it is going to be hard and it is going to take long. In both of
our testimonies the phrase we used was, “we would stay there as
long as it took.”
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a state-
ment I would like to have inserted in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. It will be made a part of the record.
Senator VOINOVICH. As we continue to confront the challenges
presented by Saddam Hussein in his pursuit of weapons of mass


56
But I do believe that you need to talk more about how long you
are going to be there and be forthright, OK. I mean, we need to
do that. We need to level with the American people. We need to
let them know that if we go forward with this, it is going to be a
sacrifice and there are things in this country that we are not going
to be able to do because of our commitment there, because we think
it is important to secure the safety and well-being of people in our
country.
[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. During the past several weeks, this committee has
continued to closely examine developments in Iraq. We have heard from Secretary
of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and our Ambas-
sador to the United Nations, John Negroponte, concerning the reality of the dan-
gerous situation before us.
There is no doubt that the international community was loud and clear in its call
for Iraq to disarm last November, unanimously adopting UN Security Council Reso-
lution (UNSCR) 1441, giving Iraq one last chance to comply with its international
disarmament obligations. However, as confirmed by chief §§ weapons inspectors in
their January 27, 2003 report to the Security Council, despite our most sincere
hopes, Saddam Hussein has refused to disarm and continues to violate the terms
of UNSCR 1441.
Critical decisions will be made in the coming days and weeks. While the inter-
national community has yet to determine the next step it will take to address Iraq's
continued defiance of UNSCR 1441, the United States cannot and will not sit idly
by while Saddam Hussein continues to thumb his nose at the international commu-
nity. The time has come for the United Nations to stand up to the Iraqi dictator,
once and for all. As Secretary of State Colin Powell argued in his presentation be-
fore the United Nations last Wednesday, “Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession
of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option,
not in a post-September 11th world.”
As we continue to confront the challenges presented by Saddam Hussein and his
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, it is crucial that we give all due consider-
ation to what will be required in the aftermath of our efforts to disarm Iraq, wheth-
er through the use of military force or some other means.
The world will judge the success of any U.S.-led initiative not by what happens
to secure a military victory against Saddam Hussein, should the use of force be re-
quired, but instead by what is done to secure a new lease on life for the people of
Iraq and for Iraq's neighbors, who have had to live with the threat of Saddam Hus-
sein. It will also impact our efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. It is clear that this will involve considerable resources, financial and
otherwise. It will require not only the long-term commitment of the United States,
but also partnerships with the United Nations and our friends and allies abroad.
It will be costly, and we should not underestimate what will be required of us.
As we gather today, I am glad that we are continuing to raise and discuss impor-
tant questions about plans to restore stability and promote a better life for the peo-
ple of Iraq. There are long-term objectives to which we must commit ourselves, and
we must be prepared to see our efforts through during a period of time which will
likely span the course of many years, rather than months—with some saying it
could take at least ten years.
I again thank the chairman for scheduling this important hearing, and I thank
the witnesses for taking time to appear before the committee today. I look forward
to their testimony.
Senator BIDEN. Bingo.
Mr. GROSSMAN. Senator, may I, and on behalf of Doug, just
thank you very much for your comments on our testimony. We did
the very best we could and, as I said, this was really a consultation
rather than perhaps a different style hearing. I think we both also
would completely agree with the point that you make on the Mid-
dle East. If we could bring down levels of terrorism, which Iraq is
certainly a partner in this, of terrorism, we would all be a lot better


57
off and we would do much quicker the job toward getting toward
President Bush's vision of a Palestinian State and an Israeli State
living side by side in peace.
Might I also say to you, Senator, and to the chairman and the
ranking member, we both have taken clearly the request and the
admonition that we start being able to talk about numbers in open
and we will both take that back. As I said, we are trying to declas-
sify lots of this planning to propose it to you, and I recognize the
question of numbers.
Finally, I think it is very important that we be as straight as
possible with people about the enormity of this task. That is why
we both said we would stay there as long as it takes and why, Sen-
ator, I think it is important, as you said, that we set goals for our-
selves and not dates. Our job is to get this job done that we want
to in Iraq. And as long as it takes, that is what it will take.
Mr. FEITH. Senator, on your point about the effect on U.S. policy
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict of a possible war in Iraq, I think
there are a number of connections. One is the one that you high-
lighted, that the Saddam Hussein regime has been a supporter of
Palestinian terrorism and in particular some months ago Saddam
Hussein offered payments to the families of suicide bombers to en-
courage suicide bombing. And there are other connections that they
have in support, that Iraq has over the years and currently pro-
vides to Palestinian terrorist groups who are blocking any hope for
progress toward Arab-Israeli peace.
There is an additional point also and that is if it is possible to
realize some of the plans that we have discussed here today to en-
courage the creation of democratic institutions in Iraq, one effect
of that if we are successful would be I think to encourage, to in-
spire, Palestinians to create for themselves democratic institutions
that would help create the kind of interlocutor for the Israelis that
could make serious progress toward peace much more realistic.
I think that was an essential point in President Bush's June 24
speech of last year, when he talked about finding a way forward
for Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy through the creation of a new
leadership and better institutions on the Palestinian side so that
the Israelis have a proper interlocutor.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
I want to recognize the distinguished ranking member for a final
thought.
Senator BIDEN. I want to read a quote to you that was in a joint
session of Congress: “We of today shall be judged in the future by
the manner in which we meet the unprecedented responsibilities
that rest upon us, not alone in winning the war, but in making cer-
º that the opportunities for future peace and security shall not
e lost.”
That was Cordell Hull. That is from a report that I am sure,
knowing you both and as competent and bright as you are, you
have already read, by the Council on Foreign Relations.
What I was talking about, Marc, was not what exactly we are
going to do, but I was looking for the kind of chart that exists in
the back of this report, that lists out specifically key economic ob-
jectives, key security objectives. I know you have done that, and if
you have not done that you should all be fired. But I know you


58
have done that. We have a right to know what that is. We have
a right to know what that is.
The last point I will make: I remember, Marc, being with you
and then going down and seeing the President, and the President
said: “What do we do about Iraq'?” And I said: “Mr. President, you
have not laid out for our European friends your vision of a post-
Saddam Iraq. What is your vision of a post-Saddam Iraq'? Lay it
out in detail. What is your vision?”
I think the more you flesh this out publicly for the American peo-
ple and, quite frankly, to our allies, who you have shared some of
this with, the better chance we have of avoiding a war, because the
better chance we have of getting them, and if there is a war so we
do not leave General Zinni's successors high and dry 2 years from
now sitting in Baghdad wondering why in the world we are putting
money into a tax cut or into Medicare instead of giving them all
the money they need.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me just thank both of you for the generous
contribution of your time and thought to this. I would just com-
ment that much has been made of Bosnia and Afghanistan and the
learning experiences there, and likewise the problem of public opin-
ion with regard to both of those situations and this one. My view
is that we really have to outline, and you have helped us enor-
mously and hopefully will continue to do so, what the stakes are
for our country and the totality and responsibilities that entails.
I would just say that at least most of us around this table are
among the vanguard of the faithful who stood fast, whether Presi-
dent Clinton was threatened or President Bush was threatened
with a congressional vote to pull out. People who are exasperated
with having anyone left in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan make
these motions, and they arise suddenly. They are impulsive, they
are emotional, and they come from the people of the United States
who are tired, who did not understand why we were over there to
begin with and what we are doing.
Now, we know that, and we know that Iraq is a very, very large
undertaking, involving billions of dollars and many years. And if
there is not a buildup of public consensus now, maybe those of us
around the table, and the two of you, will be arguing strenuously
that we have let down the Iraqis, the world, the United States, and
so forth, and people will run right over us.
That is why it is so important—and you are doing this on behalf
of your principals and the President—to share with us as much as
you can, as quickly as possible. That is the reason the committee
has had four significant meetings in a week and a half and another
one tomorrow. We are pushing our members to the floor to get op-
portunities like this one. Now, 13 members have questioned you
today much more extensively in the 5 minutes they were allotted.
And your answers likewise have been extensive, as they should
have been.
So we are almost at the 3-hour mark in the hearing and we still
have a distinguished panel ahead of us. But we thank you very,
very much and ask for you to stay closely in touch.
Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.
Mr. FEITH. Thank you.


61
be the lead—developing the principles and procedures for estab-
lishing civil functions, dealing with procedures for accountability,
and coordinating the regional and international involvement that
we might have.
The third area was the economic area, and here I felt this would
involve dealing with issues such as energy production, employment
restructuring—just by the way, about 40 percent of the paychecks
come from the government in this country, and if the government
goes down where are the paychecks coming from?
In addition to that, we saw that regional economic impacts would
have to be taken into account. This is not only going to affect Iraq.
It is going to affect Jordan, it is going to affect Kuwait, it is going
to affect countries around the country and in the region economi-
cally, too.
We have to deal with the status of foreign debt and war repara-
tions. Everybody is talking about pumping oil and we will do this
to reconstruct the country. What about the foreign debt and the
war reparations that are still owed? There are others out there
that have claims to the money and the production. Who will sort
that out?
We have to restructure the economic base. I think that has been
addressed by the previous panel, about how it is not the kind of
economic base that will allow for a country that is solid in any way
economically for the future. And we are going to have to solicit and
manage donor contributions.
The fourth area I titled recovery and reconstruction. This begins
with the immediate and long-term humanitarian needs, and again
that has been described here and you can imagine what this could
be based on what kind of catastrophe the war causes and Saddam
generates. We are going to have to be involved in infrastructure re-
pair and replacement, consequence management, WMD account-
ability, and the reestablishment of services throughout the country.
Now, I wrote myself ten little lessons learned if I ever had to do
this and I would just like to go through these in conclusion. The
first thing I said to myself was each of these four areas needs a
separate structure. You cannot saddle the military with all these
functions and you cannot address these functions without an orga-
nization to deal with them. That does not mean that some parts
of the security organization, for example like the military, might
not help out in recovery or humanitarian needs. But you need a
separate, distinct organization that is running this on the ground.
The second point is everything has to be coordinated. I have seen
the disasters in Somalia and elsewhere when coordination mecha-
nisms fail. Those mechanisms for coordination have to be sold, they
have to be established from the lowest remote point on the ground
to the highest decisions that may be made back here or in New
York or Brussels or wherever.
The third point is that the resources and the organizations re-
quired must be identified, provided, and efficiently and effectively
managed. The military cannot be stuck with this problem. We do
not do economics and we do not do political business very well. We
will do the security piece and we hope we can train and pass that
off eventually, but it is going to be tough.


63
~
success, maybe even more so than the actions on the ground, and
all the explanations afterwards will not counter those first images.
The regional nations and agencies should be a part of this effort
if possible. We need Islamic agencies, Arab agencies, involved in
this process. At the same time, regional involvement that works
counter to the objective has to be prevented. Now, we are going to
have to pick and sort through those pretty carefully. There may be
a lot of regional powers and interests that rush in there that do
not have the same objective as we do.
The final point is that the decision on the scope of this vision has
to be made right away. Do you want a transformed Iraq or do you
want simply a transitioned Iraq” Everybody in the region, not to
mention the world, will be watching what we leave in this par-
ticular situation.
And we had not better disappoint the region, as we did when we
pulled out after the Soviets were expelled from Afghanistan. We
have a situation in Afghanistan where it is on the edge now and
people are watching that, old friends like Pakistan who felt dis-
appointed and betrayed—not necessarily they were; they feel that
way—and certainly Afghans that feel that way.
Reconstruction of a nation is a tough job. And I would just make
one pitch for my brothers that are still in uniform: Do not stick
them with this mission solely.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Zinni follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. ANTHONY C. ZINNI, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RET.)
While I was the commander of the U.S. Central Command, we ran an inter-agen-
cy exercise to address issues dealing with a post-war Iraq or an Iraq that imploded
and required our intervention. I did this because a number of leaders in the region
expressed concern about our ability to deal with these issues and because I felt we
had not planned for these as well as we should have. In addition, from my experi-
ences in a number of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in northern Iraq,
Somalia, Bosnia, the Former Soviet Union, and elsewhere, I knew that the possible
scope of the problems and the difficulty of the tasks required much more planning
and preparation. I also knew that other government agencies had to be involved in
this planning since the requirement is not solely a military one. My comments are
based on this background.
In addressing the issues that might be faced in a post conflict Iraq, the first ques-
tion that has to be answered deals with the end state envisioned or desired. Do we
want to transform Iraq or just transition it out from under the unacceptable regime
of Saddam Hussein into a reasonably stable nation. Transformation implies signifi-
cant change in forms of governance, in economic policies, in regional status, in secu-
rity structure, and in other areas. Without a determination of the scale and scope
of change desired, it is not possible to judge the cost and level of effort required.
Certainly there will not be a spontaneous democracy so the reconstruction of the
country will be a long, hard course regardless of whether a modest vision of the end
state is sought or a more ambitious one is chosen.
We should be careful whose predictions of potential outcomes of the situation that
we accept. No one can be sure about exactly what the scope of the problems will
be once military action begins. We can only provide a broad bracket of the scope
of the potential challenges we would face. The “it depends” answer to assessments
will be the best analysis we can offer in most cases. A reasonable middle of the road
assessment is probably prudent for planning. Overall it will not be as good as the
optimists predict or as bad as the pessimists describe.
A lot of thought has been given to the kinds of problems and tasks that we will
face in the aftermath. I have read several recent studies and pieces produced by
groups of knowledgeable people. Generally these works have, in my opinion, cap-
tured the broad requirements and the issues very well. Defining the problem, how-
ever, is only half the task. The other half deals with how you solve the problem.
I have not seen a lot of specifics in this area. By this I mean descriptions of the


68
This comprehensive approach to providing security for the popu-
lation requires significant interagency, NGO, and international
governmental organization involvement if the military is not to be
swamped. A deployable justice package must be organized now and
the personnel identified, organized, and trained. An inability to
provide a seamless security situation for the population of Iraq as
a State will produce conditions that will lead to crime, corruption,
alternative sources of political and economic power and rule-
making, and will undermine the eventual successor Iraqi adminis-
tration.
Finally and most important for the long-term viability of Iraq
and the legacy of the coalition, Iraq’s oil resources must be retained
and developed for the benefit of the people. Facilities must be se-
cured, including the fields and the associated infrastructure. Pos-
session of these untapped resources could confer extraordinary eco-
nomic and political power to various groups. Although military ac-
tion in Iraq does not constitute a war for oil, the peace achieved
and the type of governance attained will owe much to the way the
oil sector and Iraq’s external debt and reconstruction costs are
managed.
Finally, the borders must be protected, obviously. That is an inte-
gral task that goes along with preserving the territorial integrity
and also these other operations to get to the WMD programs, pre-
vent any leakage, and also detain the personnel that we think need
to be detained.
Given the enormity of these tasks, I still believe that a force of
about 75,000 American military personnel will be required for up
to 1 year as the minimum force to stabilize the situation, accom-
plish those tasks outlined above, and establish the conditions for
sustainable peace and a capable Iraqi State. This force can be re-
duced as the situation stabilizes. The rate of transformation, which
is what the Iraqis accomplish, and the rate of transition, which is
what we do, will determine our coalition withdrawal and the type
of forces that can be withdrawn first.
Much has been done to address these issues, but much more
operational movement must take place. The government has at-
tempted to pull together the requisite expertise to define the condi-
tions and the requirements for success. However, the effort to im-
plement procedures and organize resources is still fragmented and
there has been more activity than movement.
From an American perspective, what is needed is a clear articu-
lation of American goals for Iraq, the delineation of the tasks
America expects to accomplish, what America will assist with, and
what is expected of coalition and Iraqi partners and the subsequent
dedication of resources, i.e., people, equipment and funds, to the ef-
fort.
Finally, the United States must articulate its transition strategy.
The criteria that will govern the transition from military agency to
civilian agency and from outsider to insider in the execution of the
post-conflict reconstruction tasks must be developed, promulgated,
and integrated into the supporting plans. The United States must
articulate the balance between American responsibility as out-
siders, setting parameters and assisting the process, and the local
ownership of that process.


69
America must not let responsibility for the outcome become an
open-ended commitment on our part or let our presence create un-
necessary dependencies. Conversely, local ownership cannot become
a rationale or a buzz word for meager support and abandonment.
Once the process begins, dynamic assessments are required
based on measurable and previously established criteria. Substi-
tution of time lines for measurable progress in achieving the goals
of reconstruction has led the United States and the international
community to unsuccessful half-measures and minimalism in other
situations. Time lines are not an issue as long as the timeframe is
tied to some measure of performance and progress and is a real
part of the process.
We can be successful at this if success is adequately defined and
if the resources match the intent. However, my estimation is that
at this stage the planning process in this area has not kept pace
with the military preparations for the campaign and the agencies
. can resolve the outstanding issues are running out of time to
O SO.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Feil follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF COL. SCOTT R. FEIL, U.S. ARMY, (RET.)
SECURITY IN A POST-CONFLICT SITUATION IN IRAQ
Thank you Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to offer testimony to the committee
with respect to the security situation that would exist in Iraq should the United
States lead a coalition of military forces in deposing Saddam Hussein and disman-
tling his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.
Attached to this statement is a Report of a Commission on Post Conflict Recon-
struction, which is the result of a two and one half year study on the subject from
a general American policy standpoint, conducted by the Association of the U.S.
Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “A Wiser Peace,” a
report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which builds on the
project and commission report and addresses the situation in Iraq, is also attached.
These reports contain focused recommendations on the long-term implications of re-
peated engagement in post conflict reconstruction activities and the immediate issue
of Iraq. American and international involvement in these efforts can come about ei-
ther as a result of interventions to preserve peace and assist countries emerging
from conflict, as in the Balkans, ** East Timor, etc., or as a result of American
and multi-lateral military action as a victorious party to a conflict, i.e., in Panama
and Afghanistan.
The tremendous challenges that would face the United States and its partners in
Iraq can be organized into major analytical categories of executing tasks in pro-
viding security, economic and social well-being, justice and reconciliation, and gov-
ernance and participation. While these groupings are useful for analysis, organiza-
tion, and application of resources, it is imperative that any approach to Iraq in a
post conflict situation begins with a presumption that only a comprehensive, holistic
plan executed through integrated, yet decentralized actions will be successful. While
security is the foundation for post conflict reconstruction efforts, the other three
issue areas, or pillars, have direct impact on the long-term internal and external
security capabilities and situation of the nation.
In fact, the lack of planning and preparation for such integration and coordination
has bedeviled previous efforts in this area. The World Bank estimates that 50% of
countries that emerge from a conflict situation are back in a conflict status within
five years. That is a disturbing statistic given the stakes in Iraq. The coalition,
under American leadership, cannot leave the success of these efforts within that
country, with its population, strategic location, and resources to the odds of a coin
flip. The resources exist to enhance the probability of success. Much has been done
to marshal these resources, but much more remains to be done. The preparations
for a military campaign continue to capture the bulk of the attention of both the
populace and the government, while the less glamorous efforts to prepare for the
aftermath continue to lag. Americans will evaluate the effort much more on what


70
is accomplished in Iraq after a military campaign than what is destroyed during the
campaign. So will America's partners, the Iraqi people, and any potential adver-
saries around the world.
The tasks that need to be accomplished are well known.
First, the Iraqi regime must be deposed. The leadership must be found and if
alive, detained for the purposes of either standing trial as international war crimi-
nals, or participating in whatever justice mechanism the Iraqi people determine
meets their needs. Second, the security services must be dismantled and reorga-
nized. Full disbandment and detention of personnel must apply to those agencies
involved in repression and the protection of the regime. All ºŠajiaº special se-
curity organizations organized for the protection of the regime (the Military Intel-
ligence Service, the Military Security Service, the Special Security Service, the Gen-
eral Intelligence Directorate, the General Security Services, and the Special Protec-
tion apparatus, etc.) must be disbanded and their members detained and vetted.
This may number up to 50,000 personnel. Those security forces performing the day-
to-day enforcement of civil and bona fide criminal law, as op j to political repres-
sion, must have their leadership changed, but the bulk of the rank and file will be
essential to the preservation of order. The national police force and the frontier
guard, totaling perhaps an additional 70,000 men, must have their leadership re-
moved. The |.. down to which commanders are removed will vary based on their
record and policy. The leadership of the national police and border guard will be
new and their behavior should be constrained by thorough monitoring and joint op-
erations with international civilian police deployed throughout the country. The
process of recruiting, training and organizing those civilian police and police mon-
itors, numbering about 4000 to 5000 must begin now.
The Ba'ath party needs to be completely disbanded and its leadership detained
i. put through a vetting process before they are released to the general popu-
ation.
Within the context of dismantling the regime, the bureaucracy must be reorga-
nized. Those elements that were used as instruments of repression and to protect
the regime must be either disbanded or redirected. One of the first ministries to be
thoroughly revamped must be the Ministry of Information. Those involved in tech-
nical work or the provision of services must be vetted, retained, and used by the
military and civil administration to provide essential services to the population. As
examples, electricity, water, sanitation, transportation, etc., are sectors which can
be rapidly insulated from the political processes and continue to work.
Much of this will take civilian political and technical acumen, with partners from
the military coalition and partners the United States cultivates from the diaspora
and within Iraq. To date, there have been discussions and planning, but the most
glaring gap has been the hesitance to organize civilian police and police monitors
to integrate with the military to provide a seamless security structure.
The Iraqi Army must be reorganized. The Special Republican Guards and the Re-
publican Guards will have to be dismantled. The default assumption must be that
members of these organizations are not qualified to continue to serve in a reformed
Iraqi Army unless proven otherwise. The National Army will need new leadership,
but the rank and file should be amenable to retraining and reorientation under new
leadership. This is easier said than done and will require significant investment of
coalition forces in time and labor to conduct the disarmament and demobilization
of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, in a process that gathers information and re-
leases parolees (in the military use of the term) in an orderly fashion. That process
must be seamlessly connected to a reintegration program that puts former soldiers
back into society ready to be a productive citizen rather than an unemployed burden
on government services and a continuing security risk. Eventually, the reformed
Iraqi armed forces could number between 150,000 and 200,000, but the process of
creating a credible force of this size will take at least one to two years. The reduc-
tion in manpower means that about 300,000 to 400,000 men will be released into
the economy over that same period. In the interim, many of the soldiers in the Iraqi
Army, (excluding the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard) may be used
in supervised public works projects or closely monitored and supervised security
tasks.
Woven in with the dismantling of the regime and the restructuring of the security
services, the second major objective must be to seize and control the Iraqi weapons
of mass destruction, (WMD) program in its entirety. This objective will be a prima
effort during the military campaign, and it must continue at the same level regard-
less of the progress in any conventional combat. Just form the public record of what
Iraq has been unable to account for since 1998, this is a massive undertaking. The
number of munitions, the amount of chemicals and biological material will require
a significant search and security effort. It can be expected that, in addition to se-


71
lected targets comprising members of the regime, the effort to find and control
weapons of mass destruction would consume most of the committed special oper-
ations forces. Chemical units, after accompanying the combat elements through the
military campaign will then have to support this effort and it will take a significant
portion of American and coalition assets to accomplish this critical task. However,
in addition to controlling the weapons and the jºy systems themselves, facili-
ties and records will need to be secured when found during the campaign, and then
further coordinated efforts will need to be undertaken to ensure that the inter-
national community has a complete picture of the Iraqi programs. Records and
physical evidence of the programs and the location of the assets will be critical to
achieving one of the salient objectives. It is expected that almost 70 presidential
compounds alone may have evidence of the WMD programs. Securing and searching
those compounds §§. labor intensive and require significant ground forces to en-
sure entry and control. Finally, finding, detaining, and debriefing personnel involved
in the programs will be essential. It has taken us four months of inspections to
speak to a handful of the one thousand scientists and engineers believe to be en-
gaged in WMD programs. A comprehensive effort to secure the entire WMD pro-
gram places not only a physical burden on security forces, but also requires addi-
tional coordination measures with technical experts. The WMD search and seizure
effort will rely on intelligence provided by other agencies, and the operational work
will require teaming in the cities, the countryside and the borders to ensure that
weapons, documents, or personnel do not leak out of the country. America and the
international community cannot afford to repeat some of the mistakes and hesitancy
with regard to wanted personnel that were made in the Balkans.
This takes considerably more intelligence and technical expertise than exists
within the military. Military forces can seize and secure weapons, facilities, and per-
sonnel that are encountered and identified during combat and immediately there-
after, but to investigate and ferret out the entire network of programs will take a
combined civilian and military effort.
Security for the population is the third high priority task. Here, much depends
on the course of the fighting that results in achievement of the removal of Saddam
and the seizure of the WMD program elements. Clearly, the potential for a humani-
tarian crisis is large. There are several factors that contribute to this situation. Due
to the conditions imposed by a number of the UN Security Council resolutions, hu-
manitarian aid agencies do not have infrastructure established within Iraq, com-
parable to what they had in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Therefore the immediate
administration of humanitarian assistance will fall to the governmental agencies, ei-
ther military or civilian, that arrive during the course of combat operations. The re-
quirement to secure the largest cities and population centers will occupy a large
number of conventional ground forces, and in order to minimize numbers, the coali-
tion will have to rely on mobility advantages conferred by aviation. Maintaining the
ability to see, prevent, and if necessary, react, to impending population crises will
be essential.
The force must have the mandate and capability to regulate movement, both
across borders and within the country. This is not a requirement designed to inhibit
legitimate population movement covered under the Geneva Conventions and other
customary laws of war. However, to achieve the primary objectives of regime change
and disarmament, the security forces must have the ability to ensure that people
and material that must be controlled does not escape by taking advantage of these
laws.
A significant humanitarian risk exists on two dimensions. Should Saddam's forces
withdraw into the cities and conduct urban warfare, there will be increased civilian
casualties, which will put additional burdens on military and civilian medical as-
sets. This is a problem of scale, which can be accommodated with the deployment
of additional military and NGO medical capacity. However, a qualitatively different
problem is very possible with the spread of chemical or biological contamination.
This could come about as the result of overt employment by Saddam or his military
leaders. There is also the risk of inadvertent release based on actions by coalition
forces, given that will not have perfect and complete intelligence on the location of
Iraq's WMD and may destroy facilities containing unknown stocks of chemical or bi-
ological weapons. In either case, military assets for chemical and biological recon-
naissance and decontamination are limited and will be primarily occupied with sup-
orting coalition forces. There are no assets other than coalition military units that
ave the capability to assist a contaminated population. NGOs are not prepared to
provide services under contamination conditions, multiplying the problem. The de-
mand for action to assist populations may inhibit military operations, and it will
certainly become a first priority when hostilities cease, due to public pressure. It is
worth noting that a significant portion of these reconnaissance and decontamination


74
countries. Additionally, there have been informal and formal contacts with inter-
national government organizations. A lot of information has been exchanged and the
magnitude of the problem has been well defined.
But the effort to implement procedures and organize resources is still fragmented
and there has been more activity than movement. From an American perspective,
what is needed is a clear articulation of American goals for Iraq, the delineation of
the tasks America expects to accomplish, what America will assist with, and what
is expected of coalition and Iraqi partners, and the dedication of resources, i.e., peo-
ple, equipment and funds, to the effort. America will lead the effort. Difficult as it
may be, the United States needs to present a plan for comment, review, revision
and implementation. Experience shows that circulating a draft is more effective
than asking all concerned to start with a blank sheet of paper. At present the mili-
tary effort is as nearly ready for post-conflict as it is for the military campaign, and
the rest of government is supporting the military preparations for the campaign.
But with respect to post-conflict reconstruction, the United States and the inter-
national community are still “getting ready to get ready.” The President and the
Congress need to establish interagency authority and accountability now, and re-
sources need to be pre-positioned.
Finally, the United States must articulate its transition strategy. The criteria that
will govern the transition from military agency to civilian agency, and from outsider
to insider in the execution of all the post-conflict reconstruction tasks must be devel-
oped, promulgated, and integrated into the plan. The United States must articulate
the balance between American responsibility as outsiders setting parameters and
assisting the process and the local ownership of that process. America must not let
responsibility for the outcome become an open-ended commitment to establishing a
particular brand of representative government in a place where the history, culture,
and traditions may not furnish a suitable foundation. Conversely, “local ownership”
cannot become a rationale for meager support and abandonment. This balance can
only be achieved by working through the difficult planning and coordination efforts
and making decisions about the levels and types of support ahead of time. The idea
that “no plan survives first contact” only means that plans need adjustment. It does
not obviate the need for detailed planning and coordination. Good plans anticipate
change and have the resources and mechanisms available to take advantage of op-
portunities—reinforcing success and ameliorating setbacks.
Once the process begins, dynamic assessments are required—based on the cri-
teria. Substitution of timelines for measurable progress in achieving the goals of re-
construction has led the United States and the international community to unsuc-
cessful half measures and minimalism. Timelines are not an issue, as long as the
time expected is tied to some measure of performance and success—a real part of
the process.
Post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq can be successful—if success is adequately de-
fined and if resources match intent. But time is short, the planning process has not
kept pace with the military and diplomatic timeline, and the agencies who can re-
solve some of the outstanding issues are running out of time to do so.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel Feil.
Professor Cordesman.
STATEMENT OF PROF. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A.
BURKE CHAIR FOR STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. CORDESMAN. Thank you, Senator.
As I have listened to the testimony this morning, it has struck
me that one of the issues we have not really talked about is how
any kind of nation-building effort in Iraq will affect the broader
issues of regional security. I think unfortunately that is a serious
mistake. The reality is that, regardless of what happens in Iraq,
the broad problem of proliferation in the region will continue.
There are six other countries that will be actively involved.
We can have the best plan in the world to disarm Iraq and exe-
cute it, but the intellectual capital and skills to make weapons of
mass destruction will remain regardless of how many documents
We find or seize. Iraq will still have the dual use facilities to rap-


75
idly return to the production of chemical and biological weapons. It
will probably rapidly acquire the technology, if it wants it, for long-
range UAVs. You cannot disarm a sophisticated State. It is an
oxymoron.
And, if you do not think beyond that, you really do not under-
stand this region. We will also have to free the new Iraqi Govern-
ment at some point from sanctions. When we do so existing arms
control agreements, many of which have not been agreed to in
depth by other countries in the region, will be an issue.
I have never heard anyone who advocates this war—and I have
to say in general I do—explain to me why one of the other major
regional problems in this area of the Middle East will not be at
least as intense after this war as it is today. I see no one who has
ever explained in even the crudest way for any country in the Arab
world, or around Iraq, a single scenario as to how our creating a
new regime inside Iraq changes a single neighboring State, over-
comes its internal problems, leads to any broader implications.
I think it is inevitable that the moment this war is over we will
suddenly look at the near-civil war in Iran, at the problems of the
second intifada, at whatever the situation is in Islamic extremism,
and all of those problems will come to the surface.
Moreover, we need to remember our limited span of control. His-
tory goes on long after peace processes, and in some period 2, 3,
or 5 years from now Iraq will no longer be significantly under our
influence.
Now, let me add to that some other complications. We talk about
a “coalition of the willing.” Well, we have only one real ally here,
or at least the leadership of one real ally. That ally is Britain. We
have two regional allies which share our security objectives, Israel
and Kuwait. We have no regional ally in the gulf which fully
shares our values, which has our culture, or which seeks for democ-
racy as we want it.
Broadly speaking, in terms of public opinion throughout this re-
gion, we will be a “coalition of the unwilling.” Even in Kuwait there
are no public opinion polls which show broad support for this war.
Moreover, the administration statements earlier this morning come
far too late. We had a failed public diplomacy under Clinton. We
have had a failed public diplomacy under Bush. And, there are only
two public figures in the United States whose voices can matter on
an issue like the reconstruction of Iraq, the President and the Sec-
retary of State. Until they say what Under Secretary Grossman
and Under secretary Feith said here this morning, what was said
here will have almost no influence throughout the Middle East re-
g10n.
Now, having said that, we have to accept the fact that on the day
we go in—not the day when we win—but on the day we go in, we
will have the Arab world and every bit of the media in the Arab
world blaming us for everything wrong in Iraq. There will not be
any tolerance. It will not be an intellectual argument. We will in-
herit the wind: the results of 30 years of mismanagement by a
ruthless dictator.
We also have to face the fact that in this region people believe
in conspiracy theories. Moreover, public opinion poll after public
opinion poll shows only one polarizing issue in foreign policy, the


79
get away with because most of the world was suffering and because of the legacy
of anger towards Germany and Japan coming out of the war. We cannot possibly
expect such tolerance today.
Couple this to an unpredictable but inevitable level of collateral damage and civil-
ian casualties, to what the word “occupation” means in the Arab world because of
Israel, to the historical memory of the British mandate and U.S. ties to the Shah,
to Shi'ite tensions over U.S. relations with Iran and the Axis of Evil, and to factional
tensions in Iraq, and we are almost certain to face serious problems with at least
some major blocs of Iraqis.
No study or that which does not deal at length with these risks, or prepare for
them on a contingency basis, can do more good than harm. We should focus on giv-
ing Iraqis what they want, and not on giving Iraqis what we feel they want. Our
actions should be based on partnership and a high degree of humility, not on occu-
pation and arrogance.
3. The “We Lead and They Will Follow” or “Coalition of the Willing Syndrome”
Our coalition of the willing may well be much smaller than the coalition of the
unwilling. We need to understand just how deeply hostile the Arab world is because
of the Second Intifada and our ties to Israel. §.. show around 80% of Arabs,
and high percentages of other Islamic nations, see the Palestinians as the key issue
in politics and express anger at the U.S. over ties to Israel. We also need to under-
stand that in the Gulf, many Arabs also see the U.S. as responsible for the suffering
of the Iraqi people under sanctions.
The § d. shows we face a largely doubtful and antiwar world. In practical
terms, we will be subject to relentless Arab, regional, and global examination and
criticism from D-Day on. We cannot hope to get an Iraqi, regional, or world mandate
to act as occupiers. In fact, if we act in this way, we are certain to encounter mas-
sive problems.
Any humanitarian failures at any point will come back to haunt us. So will any
mistakes in dealing with Iraqi factions, any delays in transferring power, and any
deals with the outside the Iraqis and Arab world see as being at Iraqi expense.
We need to base our peace plans on the reality that we will be judged by their
success for years to come, and that any failures can have explosive regional impacts.
This time we virtually must succeed and we must be prepared to make the nec-
essary commitment in spite of the potential cost. At the same time, we need to un-
derstand just how firm and enduring the linkage will be to our success in dealing
with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Second Intifada. We may have the luxury of
fighting one war at a time, but we do not have the luxury of focusing on a single
peace.
4. The “Best Case War Syndrome”
Far too often, we now base our postwar plans only on fighting a best-case war.
We have no justification for such planning. We may get serious urban fighting. We
may see the use of WMD. We may have to sharply escalate and inflict serious collat-
eral damage. We may see factional struggles and warlords emerge, and we already
are caught up in a messy struggle between the Kurds and exile groups like the INC.
No plan is worth considering that does not explicitly examine what can go wrong
in the fighting and how it will impact on the post-fighting outcome.
5. The “Rebuilding Effort Begins After the War Ends Syndrome”
Our rebuilding effort in Iraq must begin on D-Day, not after the war. Everything
we do from bombing to the first ground contact with Iraqis will be conducted in a
media fishbowl, with the world observing and often searching for any fault or flaw.
We cannot be perfect, but we can be prepared and act with the knowledge that even
seemingly trivial actions during the war can have powerful global effect and shape
postwar attitudes.
We must realize that one day after our forces enter any area, the world will hold
us to blame for every bit of Iraqi suffering that follows, as well as for much of
Saddam's legacy of economic mistakes and neglect. The first minute of the war is
the beginning of the peace, and any plan that does not explicitly recognize this is
dangerous.
6. The “Let’s Ignore the Iraqi Media and Information Issue Syndrome”
It seems incredible, but a number of studies ignore the need to provide detailed
media coverage to the Iraqi public the moment we go to war, and then to imme-
diately take control of the Iraqi media and Ministry of Information and change them
to become legitimate sources of information. Even some good studies of psywar ef-
forts to deal with the Iraqi military treat the problem as one of dealing with the
career military and not the Iraqi people and the different factions within it.


80
We are already engaged in a battle for hearts and minds we have done little to
win. We will confront a desperate dictatorship in combat, and what we say over
radio and TV, and to the Iraqi people as we advance, may be critical in limitin
or avoiding urban warfare and prolonged resistance. We also have to be able to tal
to the faction in Iraq and reassure those we plan to work with. The Ministry of In-
formation, the state controlled radio and TV, and the press need to be reshaped the
moment we have access to them. The Ministry of Information, in particular, is one
of the worst single instruments of repression in Iraq and needs to be abolished or
restructured the moment we can do so.
7. The “Overthrow the Regime is Enough of a U.S. Policy Goal Syndrome”
Our failure to clearly define our postwar policy goals for Iraq is another area
where we need early action. In fact, the Bush Administration has already faltered
badly. There is serious confusion and hostility in the Arab world and much of the
rest of the world over our objectives in going to war.
We face an Arab world where many see us as going to war to seize Iraq’s oil, bar-
ter deals with the Russians and French, create a new military base to dominate the
region, and/or serve Israel's interest. Our lack of clear policy statements has encour-
aged virtually every negative conspiracy theory possible.
In short, our ultimate intentions in Iraq are already a major issue that vague
words cannot deal with. There is a critical need to clarify our intentions in enough
detail to show we really will act in the interest of the Iraqi people, to refute the
major conspiracy theories that have already developed, and prove we are not a “neo-
imperialist” or “occupier.” In fact, we need to act as soon as possible.
8. The “UN and the World Doesn't Matter in Shaping the Peace Syndrome”
We face a massive legal problem that many U.S. studies current ignore. A range
of UN resolutions already govern what can and should be done in Iraq, of which
“oil for food” is only the most obvious. In the real world, we have only the followin
options: (a) reject §: primacy of the UN and the UNSCR's dealing with oil for fo
and calling for democracy and human rights in Iraq and create our own plans and
structure; (b) rely on the UN to do what it is clearly prepared to do and act for us;
and (c) rely on an unpredictable mix of U.S., UN, and NGO institutions we will have
to build when and if war comes.
All of these options are bad, but (c) is best and we need to face this fact. We also
need to face the fact that we cannot pass our problems on to a non-existent inter-
national community that is willing to sweep up after our military parade. We may
well get UN and international cooperation but only if we lead and contribute ac-
tively. We have to stay as long as it takes, or at least until we can hand a mission
over to the Iraqis.
9. The “Democracy Solves Everything Syndrome”
Broad generalizations about democracy suddenly solving Iraq's problems are
mindlessly stupid. Iraq will benefit from added pluralism of the kind already called
for in UN resolutions. Moreover, Iraq already has provision for such steps in its ex-
isting and draft constitutions. However, the practice in Iraq has been strong men
and dictators for nearly half a century. Iraq has no viable political parties, no exile
or internal leaders with proven popular legitimacy, and deep ethnic, religious, and
tribal/clan divisions.
We also must deal with the different goals and priorities of Iraq's neighbors and
the UN. Turkey and Iran will be real constraints on how a future government deals
with the Kurds and Shi'ites. This means we already have “non-democratic” prior-
ities. We virtually must enforce territorial integrity, and limit Kurdish autonomy.
There will be no valid self-determination or democratic solutions to these issues.
Iraq is not going to become a model government or democracy for years. It faces
too many problems in internal power sharing, dealing with regional issues, and de-
veloping political parties that can look beyond selfish interests. It faces too many
other º: in terms of developing a rule of law, protecting human rights, and
dealing with urgent economic and security issues.
If we try to impose too much of our political system, we will also face growing
problems with both Iraqis and the Arab world the moment we try to tell Iraqis how
they should govern rather than help them find better solutions. Rather than cata-
lyze other Arab nations to become democratic, we will catalyze Pan-Arab hostility
and give the Arab world the impression that we have joined Israel as “occupiers.”
10. The “Limited Presence and Peacemaking Syndrome”
There are U.S. war plans that call for an early U.S. military presence in Kirkuk
to ensure that the Kurds do not attempt to seize it and to deter any Turkish move-
ments. It is less clear that the U.S. has clearly tailored plans to occupy Shi'ite areas


81
in ways that would block Iranian adventures and halt uprisings or efforts at control
by Shi'ite factions. There also are some who strongly oppose executing such efforts
because of the risk or cost, and who want to avoid a major U.S. military peace-
keeping role regardless of the risks.
Some form of clear peacemaking/peacekeeping strategy is vital and past wars pro-
vide the lesson that the earlier the U.S. forces are present, the easier the task and
the smaller the presence required. In the case of Iraq, this is needed to prevent civil
war, halt warlordism, and provide the security needed to rebuild the nation. If it
is not done, the alternatives will either be to come in later with much larger re-
sources, or fail in key aspects of shaping the peace.
The U.S. must be prepared from the start to deal with the broader territorial
issues—authority over the city of Kirkuk and its environs, shaping their ethnic mix,
and control of its key nodes of oil production and distribution. The U.S. must also
be prepared to help the Iraqis deal with the constitutional issue—what mix between
devolution and centralization will be acceptable to the Arabs and the Kurds alike?
(The last time, the issue went to arbitration under the League of Nations mandate,
took years and years to resolve, and eventually had to be enforced by the RAF using
poison gas. Scarcely the best precedent!)
11. The “Zero-Based Approach to Restructuring Iraq's Government Syndrome”
Iraq cannot be treated as an intellectual playground for political scientists or
ideologues, and must not be treated as if its people were a collection of white rats
that could be pushed through a democratic maze by a bunch of benevolent U.S. sol-
diers and NGOs. Iraq is a country of 24 million people with a history of more than
80 years. It has a constitution and a draft constitution. It has an existing National
Assembly structure, relatively modern legal system, and a history of past autonomy
agreements with the Kurds.
Iraq has a strong central structure based on a highly urbanized society. It is criti-
cally dependent on food imports and allocating the revenue from oil exports. It has
some 23 existing ministries. Some are now tools of repression and must be disman-
tled or totally rebuilt, but most are vital to running the country. Many of its urban
centers and complexes and governates are tailored to local needs. A standardized,
cookie cutter approach to local or regional government would fail dismally anywhere
in the world. It is a recipe for disaster in Iraq.
There is no Iraqi with real-world experience in governing Iraq in countless largely
technical areas vital to the needs of some 24 million people other than the existing
structure of government. The courts, the legal system, the lawyers have many flaws,
but they are also Iraqi. The rule of law and human rights, and security for the indi-
vidual, are actually far more important than democracy and they too must be built
on the existing Iraqi structure of government.
Yes, we need to work with Iraqis at every level to clean up the existing system.
We have to destroy the one existing political party, the Baath, and “de-Saddamize”
the existing government while establishing a modern rule of law and reforming the
economy. We need to give exiles a role, and not simply exile groups like the INC
that have more strength inside the beltway in Washington than anywhere in the
borders of Iraq. But, nothing can be zero-based.
12. The “Let’s All Form Another Giant Discussion Group Syndrome”
Iraq's mix of internal and external tensions make any slow, bottom-up, or “discus-
sion group”-oriented approach to restructuring power in Iraq a near certain recipe
for failure. We don't have time for time-consuming efforts to create consensus. Cos-
metic assemblies and advisory bodies are certain to produce a major backlash.
We may well have to push Iraqis into some new form of power structure within
weeks of the end of the fighting. W. certainly have no more than months. We don't
have time for long dialogue, although that can be used to adjust the initial arrange-
ments.
We need to take a hard look at Iraq's existing constitution and draft constitution,
and the idea of a constitutional convention and referendum creating a follow-on sys-
tem has worked elsewhere. This may also allow us to deal with the realities of
power struggles by changing Iraq's current constitution to deal with a tailored form
of republic or federalism plus some form of Kurdish-minority rights.
But, we don't have months in which to get started or more than a year in which
to get a new system working. Any peace plan that does not include clear and specific
goals from the start, and takes more than six months to get all of the key power
sharing arrangements in place, is a failure from the start.
We must find ways to produce rapid power sharing and to reallocate oil wealth
and do in ways that emphasize political stability rather than democracy per se. This


83
• Dependent on oil for food and “black” sector to operate. Heavily dependent on
food imports since late 1970s. Some estimate a 70% dependence on food imports
once the economy recovers.
• Medical and educational crisis.
• Many artifacts of a command economy that has been centered around a dicta-
torship for three decades. Some solid economic institutions but no real market
system in terms of distribution, banking, uniform commercial code, insurance,
interest.
• Industrial development is weak and has a poor history.
• Oil revenue and development issue is critical, as is sharing revenue, but NIOC
has its thugs and killers. Saybolt indicates waterflooding and overpumping; 24
of 73 fields working, and 20-40% of wells at risk.
Yes, money will be a serious problem, particularly if debt and reparations are not
forgiven.
17. The “Disarmament is Quick and Lasting Syndrome”
We need a clear policy towards Iraq's military industry and dual use facilities
from the start, and we need to understand that a postwar Iraq will exist in a still
threatening and proliferating region. Moreover, whatever we get rid of, the human
talent and major dual use facilities will remain. Getting rid of nukes also can just
push Iraq towards a reliance on biological warfare.
We need both a short term and long term plan to disarm Iraq. The long term plan
must include some way to use a combination of UNSCR and national action to limit
any risk of future proliferation and possibly some form of U.S. security guarantees
to limit the incentive to future regimes to proliferate.
18. The “No Exit Strategy Syndrome”
Every past peacemaking effort has shown that an explicit exit strategy is vital.
The key in this case is an entry strategy that makes a real peace possible, setting
modest and achievable objectives, treating the Iraqis as partners, and leaving when
they either want us to leave or are ready to have us leave. It is to avoid any chance
of civil war, clearly act in Iraq's benefit, and plan to leave early rather than late.
Curing the “Iraq War Peace Syndrome(s)”
The first step in curing a complex disease like the Iraq War Peace Syndrome(s)
is to recognize the nature of the disease. As the previous list shows, this often sug-
gests the cure. The fact remains, however, that we face at least a decade of further
instability in the Gulf Region, whether or not we go to war with Iraq, and no matter
how well the war goes. Getting rid of Saddam and Iraq's weapons of mass destruc-
tion is an important set of goals if the war goes well. No war, however, can do more
than provide a basis for making Iraq somewhat better and then giving the Iraqis
control over their own destiny. No outcome of the war can reshape the Gulf or the
Middle East.
The idea of instant democratization coming out of the war and spreading through-
out the region denies the laws of cause and effect and is ridiculous. So is the idea
we know enough about nation building to create an Iraqi United States.
The best we can do is minimize our mistakes and the effect of the law of unin-
tended consequences. To do this requires both realism and commitment. If we rely
on miracles and good intentions, or act as occupiers rather than partners, we are
almost certain to be far more unhappy on the tenth anniversary of the next war
as we were on the tenth anniversary of the Gulf War.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
I will ignore momentarily the sub rosa comment of my colleague.
Midwest, we will leave it there.
Senator BIDEN. I said it is in Indiana.
Mr. CORDESMAN. As a Chicagoan, Senator, I plead guilty.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you.
Let me begin another 5-minute round of questioning with our col-
leagues. I am struck by the difference in the testimony of the two
panels. Let me just say, without being defensive with regard to the
Under Secretaries of State and Defense, they come here obviously
at our request because we think this is very important. Senator
Biden and I and other Senators who are here have felt it was im-


85
do not plan to use them, but that is small consolation to the Japa-
nese or even the South Koreans or others in the area, in the same
way as terminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction will be.
These are very important questions. As you pointed out, there
are tribes and dissident sectors in the politics of Iraq now that we
really have not gotten to because none of us have been that com-
prehensive in this committee—maybe some of you have in your
scholarship—as to know how many things an administrator will
have to do.
Finally, the thought that General Franks cannot do just Iraq;
General Franks, CENTCOM, whoever commands that, has a lot of
responsibilities. So the question is, Who is in charge? Who is going
to be designated in a command chain from the President to the
Secretary of Defense to General Franks to there? What will be the
chain of command even in our own government? Is this something
where the President nominates, or makes several nominations, As-
sistant Secretaries or whoever in this immediate period, to handle
all these civil functions? This includes law and order as funda-
mental, the boundary integrity, plus all of the problems of adju-
dication and a legal system that does not exist—and yet must, be-
cause of personal security as well as country security.
So I have taken my 5 minutes of questions really simply to make
editorial comments. But I am excited about the hearing, about the
process at least that still exists in the Congress of raising these
questions and having able Americans who are offering us some
very substantial answers. You have stimulated this committee and
I hope the American people who listen to this hearing.
I turn now to my partner Joe Biden.
Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. As they say in this busi-
ness up here, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of
the chairman.
Fellows, I find myself perplexed. Over the last year roughly, al-
most year and a half, the President has been generous with his
time. He has been patient with me and I suspect, I know, with oth-
ers. He has had us down, he has had me down alone, he has had
the Senator down alone, he has had us down together. And he
genuinely is exploring. I believe and I have been saying publicly,
not making me the most popular person in the Democratic Caucus,
that I believe he has an open mind. I believe he is trying to find
the right answers. I believe his instincts are basically good. I do not
mean “basically.” His instincts are good.
He is obviously a good person. I mean his instincts on what to
do in these very difficult decisions he has to make.
The thrust of everything you three have said, with less articula-
tion and less of a base of knowledge, when the President has asked
me I have said. And I am sure I am not the only one who has sat
with him in the Oval Office, with Dr. Rice, with the Vice President,
and gone into these things in some detail.
I know, I have witnessed it with Senator Lugar, I know I am not
the only one that has raised these issues. And I walk away won-
dering, not that he listened, but this is obviously a group of very
bright women and men. Secretary Rumsfeld is an incredibly bright,
erudite fellow, and he really is. I am not being solicitous. The Vice
President is a very bright, hard-nosed guy. Dr. Rice, the Secretary


86
of State, the two people we heard here today, the No. 2 people—
the No. 3 and four, I should say.
And I walk away and I wonder, now why has none of this been
done?
Colonel Feil, in any other administration you were in, if you were
in the administration, in the Defense Department, I know every
commander, general, has to know that these are the questions that
have to be answered, whether the same 10, there may be 2, there
may be 14. But there is clearly—this is not rocket science, knowing
what the problem is.
Why has it not been done? I think it is because—and I would like
you to, if you feel free, I mean if you wish to comment, fine; if you
do not, I understand. One of you said—I think it was you, gen-
eral—is it transition or transformation? What is the goal? I think
there is a fundamental debate that still exists in this administra-
tion, whether it is transition or it is transformation we are commit-
ting to.
Because if that debate is settled, then we clearly have, with all
the bright people in this administration a much clearer, to use the
phrase used by our newest member on this committee, a road map.
You know, we would know what road we were going down. Because
these questions are so obvious, and the fact that they have not
been addressed contemporaneously with the military planning—
general, I was with your old military comrades, as I was—as Sen-
ator Hagel and I were. He is a military man, Senator Hagel. We
were both incredibly impressed, incredibly impressed, with the de-
tail of the planning and the various contingencies about how to
conduct this war.
Now, we are smart enough to do that. The idea, professor, we
have not addressed these other things is beyond my comprehen-
sion. And the only answer I can come up with is not that there are
not people who know what they are doing. They are people who
have not decided on transition or transformation. My sneaking sus-
picion is Cheney, Rumsfeld, and company, it is transition. State
and the President's occasional comments talk transformation.
I will conclude by saying the only reason why, were the President
to ask me, I am inclined to give, quote, “more time” to our U.N.
interlocutors has nothing to do with inspections, has nothing to do
whether or not we can put 50 times as many inspectors in, whether
they are going to find these weapons of mass destruction.
It has to do with we ain't ready yet. We have all the forces there
that we need. So I am told, general. You would know better than
any of us. We are fully capable of executing the first phase of this
operation. How much or how little bloodshed, how much damage
we politically as well as militarily have to take is a question. But
the reason why, if I were the President, I would be “rope-a-doping”
a little bit here and slowing up my deployment and making sure
that I talked more with the French about whether there is more
inspectors or whether there is not, knowing it is malarkey, is that
every one of you said directly or implied if this is not contempora-
neously undertaken, if the moment the gun goes off, general, and
the first missile, plane, troop flies we do not know darn well what
those things, colonel, you talked about and, professor, you talked
about, which I will not go into detail because my time is up, unless


87
they are decided upon at the front end it seems to me this is a pre-
scription for losing, losing overall, having our interests overall a
year from now being more in jeopardy in the world and the region
than they are now, even though he may be gone.
Because I always ask the rhetorical question when the President
says—and God love him, he makes these speeches, and some of
them are really good and some of them I walk away scratching my
head—when he makes these speeches and others do as well that
somehow this is going to answer or make us any safer, taking down
Saddam in the near term, from al-Qaeda, from terrorist attacks.
If the Lord Almighty came and sat right down where the photog-
raphers used to sit and said, look, folks, guarantee you this will all
be done, done quickly and done fine, are we not going to still be
on orange alert in this country? And by the way, if the rationale
as Mr. Feith offered, in part in fairness to him, was, look, this guy
you have to understand has been helping these Palestinians, the
road to peace in terms of the the extreme Palestinians—the road
to peace rests in getting rid of this guy, let me tell you: the Ira-
nians make him look like an amateur, the Syrians make him look
like a bumbler.
What trouble he has caused with Israel in the Middle East is in-
finitesimal in my view compared—and he does cause trouble—is in-
finitesimal compared to the trouble that the Iranians, the Syrians,
and others in the region have caused. So is the prescription mean-
ing, once we do that, now we have got to do Syria and Iran?
I just think that we are not ready right now, we are not ready
right now. And it worries the devil out of me, unless, unless, the
administration knows something none of you know, I can tell by
your testimony because I have heard you guys, and something we
do not know, that they do have a plan, they are ready to go. I did
not get any real sense of I did not get any real warm feeling from
the two who testified before, who are fine men on limited, on short
leashes, who are trying to declassify.
So I cannot thank you enough for your testimony. Hopefully it
will be sober enough to wake some people up and figure out we
have got to get these decisions made contemporaneous, contem-
poraneous with the execution of force.
I used up my more than 5 minutes, again not with a question.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I too add my
thanks to the three of you.
I think both the chairman and our former chairman spoke di-
rectly to the value of having the three of you up here and the pres-
entations that you have made. I wish all senior members of this
administration could have, and maybe they did, listen to what you
had to say, and I know we will have a record of your testimony.
But everything that Senators Lugar and Biden said in regard to
your testimony I agree with. It is not and never has been a ques-
tion of whether Saddam Hussein can be rehabilitated. He is a
threat. He is a problem. But it is more to the point of each of your
testimony, not only as to, as you said, General Zinni, the end
State—and Senator Biden spoke to that just a few minutes ago—


88
what it is that we wish to accomplish, how do we wish to accom-
plish it, with whom, all the questions that you have laid out.
And I would make one additional comment before I ask each of
you to respond to a question. As I listened to the three of you and
Senators Biden and Lugar, I was struck once again with, as we
went around the horseshoe here the last 3 hours with 13 Senators
asking these two very dedicated, bright public servants to explain
the administration's policy, I was struck with how many times
when the question was asked or references should have been used
to what is the purpose, what is the point of attacking Iraq or re-
placing Saddam Hussein, very few times was there any reference
to force Saddam Hussein to comply with 17 U.N. resolutions that
he has been guilty of violating since 1991.
On the one hand that is a stated objective publicly by the admin-
istration as to what we are about here. But as we went around the
horseshoe we had variations as to what the point is. As Senator
Biden pointed out, Secretary Feith talked about essentially some
believe that the Middle East peace process is through Baghdad,
and there were other variations of this. I do not happen to believe
that, but nonetheless what it says and what it reflects very clearly
on is what Professor Cordesman talked about as well, public diplo-
macy, explaining our purpose, explaining our intent, explaining our
use of power.
We have not only not answered the tough questions that you
three have put forward, but I think we are still rather murky in
explaining to America and the world what we are about to do and
why it is important.
Now, you have all laid out the questions, the concerns. I would
ask the three of you to give this committee your thoughts on how
we should proceed from here, assuming that the three of you agree
that Saddam is in violation of 17 U.N. resolutions and assuming
the three of you agree that he needs to be dealt with some way.
Maybe that is a leap of assumptions here, but I think I understand
where the three of you are.
But it would be helpful if the three of you would give us your
process, how you think we should move forward to deal with Sad-
dam Hussein. Thank you.
Senator BIDEN. Good question.
General ZINNI. Well, Senator Hagel, I think obviously we are
going down this path. The first thing I would say, which has been
said before, we need the international community and preferably
we need to work under international agencies and institutions in
much of what is described here, because the military piece and the
security piece is not going to be the important part of all this. It
is necessary, but not the most important.
What would worry me is, I can look at Tommy Franks and his
mustering of all the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and I think
everybody, including the two Senators who went out there, have
complete confidence in that aspect of this. I would hope you did.
But where is the counterpart economic, political, humanitarian,
and recovery?
If it is just a small group in the Pentagon, by the way led by a
very able individual in Jay Garner—I have the greatest respect for
him. We were together in northern Iraq. But a planning cell, an


89
interagency planning cell at the Pentagon—now, my career is defi-
cient in that I never served a tour there, but it does not do any-
thing for me on the ground.
Where is the CENTCOM counterpart to a political organization
that is going to come in? I think the two Secretaries this morning
talked about political committees, judicial committees. They are
necessary. In the early days of Somalia with Ambassador Bob Oak-
ley and others when we had a degree of success, these had to be
in place. But you need manpower and organization and structure
and authority and resources to make this work.
If you are going to go in and assume responsibilities—I will just
take a small thing, a small item, but it may point out how signifi-
cant something could be. This morning these two Secretaries men-
tioned that 60 percent of the Iraqi people eat off the Oil for Food
Program. There are 40,000 feeding stations there. Now, option one,
best case, all those—and Saddam's government runs these feeding
stations—they stay in place, nothing happens to them, the ware-
houses are sound and they continue to pump food. Good news, path
OIſle.
Path two, no, that half of them run away, some of the ware-
houses are destroyed. And then you could eventually get yourself
to path three, 40,000 feeding stations are abandoned, destroyed,
disrupted, and you have got to create 40,000 feeding stations from
nothing. Who does that?
We talked about NGOs. These NGOs are a disparate collection
of people that operate on their own with different charters, dif-
ferent motivations. Who pulls them together? Is there a humani-
tarian operations center under somebody from the U.N. or some-
where that is going to coordinate their efforts? Are we going to find
them all in the Shia area and none in the Sunni area? And who
fills in the blanks?
We need structure, we need organization, we need lines of au-
thority. The tasks are out there. All the books that we can pick up,
the work that people like Tony Cordesman have done, the CFR,
have identified what has to be done. I do not doubt that the prob-
lem has been scoped. There is a bracket. There is the 2-year plan,
which I doubt seriously, and there is the 10-year plan, which I will
tell you is more realistic.
But the tasks to be performed there, and the it-depends answer
is whether the 40,000 feeding stations are up and running or they
are totally destroyed or something in between, that can all be
mapped out, to use the phrase that Senator Coleman mentioned.
But the problem is who is going to do it, where are they? You
know, if you have hundreds of thousands of troops on the ground
formed up into divisions and wings and task forces at sea, where
is the counterpart on these other sides? It is not going to be a
handful of people that drive out of the Pentagon, catch a plane, and
fly in after the military piece to try to pull this together.
I mean, that is what I think the next step is.
Senator HAGEL. Thank you.
May I ask the other two to respond as well, Mr. Chairman, to
that, to my question, if I could?
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, briefly if you can.



94
Senator NELSON. And an additional threat, Mr. Chairman, per-
haps that some of these groups that would be stirred up by Iran
are also resident in the United States in some substantial num-
bers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Let me just make a summary comment that we have dem-
onstrated again how many problems the United States has if you
are a foreign policy person, or President of the United States.
These may not have been obvious prior to September 11. Perhaps
this triggered awareness on the part of the Senate, the people, ev-
erybody, that there are a lot of problems out in the world and a
good number have been moving on for quite a long while. We may
have been oblivious, now that we think of public diplomacy, of hun-
dreds of millions of people in the Near East or the Middle East.
But we are aware of them now.
My only hope would be that, even though there are so many
problems, this would not deter Americans from trying to solve any
of them. Some of the logic that I hear in the debate is to suggest
that when people are asked in polls whether Iraq is more of a prob-
lem than North Korea, al-Qaeda, whatever else somebody thinks
of, perhaps the Israeli-Palestinian thing, you can get a real division
of opinion. Finally, some come to the conclusion that they are all
problems and all insoluble. That, as Americans, we really find un-
acceptable.
So I appreciate the spirit of your testimony today. Although you
have differing viewpoints about the urgency of dealing with Sad-
dam Hussein or Iraq, none of you has argued that we ought to be
oblivious to this. And furthermore, you have offered at least some
guidelines that, if it is finally the will of our government to proceed
either with the United Nations, or with a coalition of the willing,
that there are some things we need to do very swiftly if we are to
have some measure of success and some modesty with regard to
how much is achievable in the process.
So I thank you for the wisdom and the thoughtfulness with
which you have approached that, as well as your lifetimes of serv-
ice to our country.
I thank all members for their constancy and all who have wit-
nessed 4 hours and 10 minutes of hearings on the future of Iraq.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
O