COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL. D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
KENNETH A. MYERs, JR., Staff Director
ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director
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60
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108th
no. 34
Iſla LI1
CONTENTS
Page
American Association of Engineering Societies, Paul J. Kostek, chairman,
statement submitted for the record .................................................................... 67
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 22
Letter from Anthony Borden with additional responses on Iraq Media
and Information Strategies .......................................................................... 60
Borden, Anthony, executive director, Institute for War & Peace Reporting,
London, United Kingdom .................................................................................... 26
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29
“A New Voice in the Middle East: A Provisional Needs Assessment for
the Iraq Media" ............................................................................................. 29
Hamre, Dr. John, president and CEO, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC; accompanied by: Frederick Barton, co-director,
Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, CSIS; Bathsheba Crocker, Council on
Foreign Relations Fellow at CSIS; Dr. Johanna Mendelson-Forman, senior
program officer, United Nations Foundation; Dr. Robert Orr, vice president
and director of the Washington Program, Council on Foreign Relations ........ 6
Prepared joint statement ................................................................................. 8
“Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission—June 27–July 7, 2003”............. 10
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 4
“How Peace in Iraq Became so Continued—Violence and Chaos not Only
Jeopardize Troops but Also the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in the
Middle East,” article from USA TODAY, July 22, 2003, submitted
for the record ........................................................….......... 64


IRAQ: STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR
RECONSTRUCTION.—NEXT STEPS
WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 2003
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 3:53 p.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate
Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the com-
mittee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Brownback, Alex-
ander, Coleman, Sununu, Biden, Sarbanes, Feingold, Boxer, Bill
Nelson, and Corzine.
The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
We thank the witnesses for their promptness, and we regret that
Senators were called to the floor for a rollcall vote that is still in
progress, but we will be joined by our colleagues as they complete
their duties and come to the hearing.
Let me just say at the outset that we may at some point, provi-
dence willing, have a quorum of the committee present, and I want
to seize that opportunity when it comes to ratify five treaties, ad-
vance the Foreign Service list, and other purposes, which should be
unanimously received.
Let me simply say the Committee on Foreign Relations welcomes
Dr. John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and currently
the president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Accompanying Dr. Hamre is his team from the Commission on
Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dr. Robert Orr, Mr. Frederick Barton,
Dr. Johanna Mendelson-Forman, and Ms. Bathsheba Crocker. Also
with us today is Anthony Borden, executive director of the Institute
for War and Peace Reporting, and we welcome Mr. Borden's in-
sights on the media situation in Iraq.
Dr. Hamre, we are pleased especially to have you to be able to
discuss with you the excellent report you and your colleagues have
prepared on Iraq reconstruction." I commend Secretary Rumsfeld
and Ambassador Bremer for commissioning your mission to Iraq.
The resulting report, entitled “Field Review and Recommendations
on Iraq's Post Conflict Reconstruction,” was published last week by
the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It carefully out-
lines the difficult challenges our country faces in Iraq and makes
"The report referred to is included with Dr. Hamre's submitted statement and can be found
on page 10.
(1)


8
Obviously, we are hoping for a good donors' conference. There are
a lot of questions about the donors' conference. The donors them-
selves are going to be skeptical until we resolve the issue of prior
debt. That is a big issue. The other big issue for the donors' con-
ference is, is there a legitimate government that we can make an
agreement with? Right now they do not feel they want to make a
deal with the Coalition Provisional Authority. They want to have
an Iraqi Government and the question that you should be asking
is: will the governing council that Ambassador Bremer has created
be strong enough to become the basis for donor countries to make
contributions to in the October timeframe? A very important issue.
But I also just have to say you really need to start thinking we
are probably going to require another supplemental. I leave it to
the administration to decide what that is going to have to be and
when it is going to be, but there is not going to be enough money
in my personal view to carry us through the next 18 months until
you get significant oil revenues. And that should just be on the
table in your thinking right now.
One last statement, 30 seconds. Ambassador Bremer needs to
have more flexibility on how he spends his money and how he
makes contract actions than he has. I am afraid we are doing too
much business as usual for him. He needs to be given much more
authority to be able to do his job in theater, and I would ask you
and your very capable staff to look into that issue as well.
Let me now turn to my colleagues, and I think, Sheba, you were
going to be the next person.
[The prepared joint statement of Dr. Hamre, Mr. Barton, Ms.
Crocker, Dr. Mendelson-Forman, and Dr. Orr follows:]
JOINT STATEMENT BY JOHN HAMRE, FREDERICK BARTON, AND BATHSHEBA CROCKER,
CSIS; JOHANNA MENDELSON-FORMAN, UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION AND ROBERT
ORR, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the Committee on For-
eign Relations, it is an honor to testify before you today on the subject of Iraq's post-
conflict reconstruction. Together we recently visited Iraq and spent nearly two
weeks in comprehensive interviews on the progress in post-conflict reconstruction.
We went to Iraq at the invitation of the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator
of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Bremer.
We were invited to undertake this trip because of the extensive research we have
completed over the past two years on the post-conflict reconstruction challenges that
the world has faced during the past fifty years, and how the lessons from that anal-
ysis might be applied to the situation in Iraq. This work was undertaken by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the United
States Army, with support provided by the United Nations Foundation, and the Wil-
liam and Flora Hewlett Foundation.
Let me state that we were given complete cooperation and support by Adminis-
trator Bremer and his team in Baghdad. We have shared our findings with Admin-
istrator Bremer and with Secretary Rumsfeld. We have provided to the Committee
a copy of our report and would ask that it be included in the formal record of these
proceedings.
Mr. Chairman, we know that you, your colleagues, and staff have recently visited
Iraq, and we know that our trip report has been reviewed. Therefore, permit me to
summarize briefly a few key points so that we might quickly turn to your questions.
Despite the difficulties that we confront in Iraq at this time, we cannot fail in our
mission to create a new government in Iraq, a government that represents the peo-
ple of Iraq, embraces a constructive agenda of economic and social development and
establishes a set of positive security policies and programs in the region. While we
º fail in this task, success is far from certain. Indeed, the next 3-6 months are
Crucial.
There are seven points we would like to reinforce.


14
and well-organized irregular forces throughout the country, in addition to the Re-
publican Guard forces that may be awaiting a return. The new Iraqi security forces
(whether paramilitary, the new Iraqi army, the Facility Protection Service, or the
Iraqi police) will not be capable of handling security matters without significant
international oversight and rapid response capacity for at least two to five years.
Joint patrols with coalition forces and Iraqis should be initiated immediately. Inter-
national police trainers and monitors are also needed during this time to conduct
joint patrols with Iraqis, and train, oversee, and monitor the Iraqi police force.
Finally, battalion commanders and Iraqis throughout the country were uniform in
their assessment that without an overwhelming presence of coalition forces or inter-
national police, potential spoilers will move in, whether in the form of “self-demobi-
lized” soldiers or local militia members (e.g., the Iranian-backed Bad'r Corps, the
Kurdish Peshmerga, and smaller regional militias such as that operating in the
Maysan province). The CPA has not adequately addressed the need for demobiliza-
tion, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of Iraq's armed forces, in part because
of an assumption that the “self-demobilization” of the Iraqi army during and after
the conflict means that they are fully demobilized in actual fact. The CPA must
launch a major initiative to reintegrate these soldiers and militia members, in order
to minimize the opportunity for them to pose security threats in the future.
Recommendations
The coalition should reassess force composition and structure and troop levels,
commensurate with immediate needs, including that of improving street-level
visibility of coalition troops, particularly in Baghdad.
The United States could use contract private security forces to help rapidly ex-
pand security at low-risk installations, freeing up some coalition troops for other
security tasks. A standardized |. on uniforms and identification could help
alleviate concerns about the proliferation of private militias throughout Iraq.
The United States must recalibrate its expectations of how quickly Iraqis can
be expected to address the serious and growing security problems and must
plan for U.S. and UK forces to be available in a rapid response capacity wher-
ever Iraqi forces are being asked to take over security tasks. The CPA must also
raise and rationalize the salary structure of the Iraqi forces.”
The CPA should decentralize the process of training and equipping the Iraqi po-
lice force and Facilities Protection Service to allow for faster and more enduring
progress than the centralized training of thousands of police officers.
• The CPA must begin serious efforts to recruit international civilian police
(CIVPOL) and should open all possible spigots for such recruitment, including
the United Nations, the OSCE, and any potential bilateral contributors."
• The CPA must develop and implement a reintegration program that provides
opportunities for demobilized soldiers to gain counseling and placement, either
in the new Iraqi security forces or major public works projects or other jobs. Re-
integration programs must include all the different militias throughout the
country in order to protect against future problems these well-organized forces
could pose.
2. IRAQI OWNERSHIP
Iraqi responsibility for their own future must be firmly established at the na-
tional, provincial, and local levels. At the national level, ensuring the success of the
newly formed Iraqi Governing Council is crucial. The CPA runs the risk of over-
loading the new council by pushing too many controversial issues to it, which would
undermine this otherwise positive development.” The natural desire to draw anger
away from the coalition by putting an Iraqi face on the most difficult decisions must
be balanced by a realistic assessment of what the council can successfully manage.
The CPA has made great progress in establishing municipal and provincial polit-
ical councils throughout the country, but those councils need direction as to their
*For example, most CPA and coalition military officials we spoke to in the field thought that
the current police salary of $60/month was far too low to ensure a professional, corruption-free
police force.
*The United Nations has considerable experience in fielding CIVPOL forces. The Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) alone does not have the experience or recruiting
capability to manage a CIVPOL effort along the order envisioned for Iraq.
*These issues include: appointing a new cabinet; approving the national budget; initial prep-
arations and plans for a national constitutional process; food subsidies after the oil-for-food pro-
gram phases out in November 2003; salary levels; agricultural price supports; the size of the
new Iraqi army; de-Ba'athification follow-through; and currency problems.


18
project oversight by Washington. A process should be established to ensure ap-
propriate accountability for all spending, through regular reports from the CPA
back to Washington. Any funds appropriated in the future for Iraq reconstruc-
tion needs should not require prior notification of Congress. Congress could re-
quest quarterly reports detailing how appropriated funds have been spent on re-
construction activities in Iraq.
• The United States needs to ensure that Iraq's revenues are not encumbered by
past or future obligations. This will require resolving the debt issue within the
U.S. government, and pushing Iraq's creditors to forgive or significantly reduce
Iraq’s outstanding debt burden. The United States should also avoid encum-
bering future oil revenues to generate immediate income.*
• The relevant United States government agencies should deploy military and ci-
vilian contracting officers to the theater to streamline the contracting processes.
• The Department of Defense should create a strong office in Washington to sup-
port the CPA's needs, including recruiting of appropriate civilian personnel.
CONCLUSION
Eleven days in Iraq left indelible images in our minds. Fathers escorting young
girls to school; young men waiting in long lines everywhere jobs are announced;
young kids flashing the thumbs-up sign (and swarming around us asking for
money); a rebuilt prison with a newly installed manager; retrained Iraqi police offi-
cers directing traffic; snaking lines of cars at gas stations; a festive 4th of July party
thrown by the Kurds in the north (and celebrating 4th of July at Saddam's palace
in Baghdad); racing through small towns in heavily armed convoys; 19-year old
American soldiers standing out in 120 degree heat to guard Iraqi sites, and chatting
on street corners with Iraqi children; the blackness and heat of the night with
power shortages; the pleasure of a shower after days without running water; the en-
ergy, commitment, and intensity of Iraqis as they discussed their country's future;
the natural beauty of the mountains in the north and Iraq's fertile crescent; the
pride and professionalism of Iraqi members of newly established town councils; the
palpable fear of Iraqis out in the street after the sun wes down, and the security
bubble U.S. officials work in; the high expectations of Iraqis as to what the United
States can provide, and their frustration and anger over intermittent electricity and
water service; the resourcefulness of U.S. and British troops as they restart civil so-
ciety; the sincere efforts of civilians to forge ahead despite the looming insecurity;
devastated university buildings in Basra, completely ravaged by looters; the opu-
lence of Saddam's palaces; and Iraq's ancient history and cultural richness.
As we traveled throughout the country, it was impossible not to be impressed by
the character and drive of the coalition forces, the dedication and enthusiasm of the
CPA, the wearied endurance of the Iraqi people, and the enormity of the opportuni-
ties, challenges, and risks before them all.
The U.S. government has chosen to use a different model for post-conflict recon-
struction in Iraq. Not only is it being led by the United States, but it is being led
by an institution—the Department of Defense—with relatively untested capacities.
There has been progress to date, but using a new model heightens the challenges
and requires a new definition of relations and responsibilities.
The United States will need significant international assistance—from the United
Nations, other international organizations, and bilateral donors. Security forces,
CIVPOL, information flows, and ensuring a ready supply of CPA personnel with rel-
evant capabilities are just four such areas.
The U.S. government—both the executive branch and the Congress—must change
certain business as usual practices in order to maximize the CPA's opportunities to
be successful. The CPA needs more resources, personnel, and flexibility. We owe it
to our people in the field, and to Iraqis, to provide everything necessary to get this
right. U.S. credibility and national interest depend upon it.
*It will be critical that the CPA handle oil revenues as transparently as possible. Iraqis we
met with spoke of continuing suspicions about U.S. intentions with respect to their oil industry.
The CHAIRMAN. If I may interrupt now for just a moment. We are
going to have our magic moment of business, with consent of the
group. If members will bear with us for just a second, we will be
able to ratify five treaties, a Foreign Service officer list, and other
important issues.


28
lation to allay fears, provide basic information, and explain the
purpose and potential of its intervention. But independent and reli-
able reporting is entirely different and must be structurally sepa-
rate.
In particular, the Iraqi Media Network, which is the authority
media team, has been tasked both with broadcasting and with reg-
ulatory authority, with producing media and with providing infor-
mation for the CPA. Overall, IMN has simply not demonstrated the
:* and professional capacity to meet the major challenge it
aCeS.
Compounding the problem, interagency rivalry has contributed to
an absence of strategy, bad hiring and purchasing practices, and
debilitating internal dispute. TV programming, as my colleagues
mentioned, has in particular been poor. As a result the IMN tele-
vision news neither provides credible information to the population
nor serves as the flagship fresh face of a new and democratic Iraq.
An urgent step change is required in the structure and ambition
of U.S. media and information strategy, focusing on three main
points.
One, the CPA must create a professional and substantial infor-
mation operation to communicate basic facts to the population.
Treat Iraqi people with respect by speaking to them honestly, regu-
larly, and in their own languages about the challenges and pros-
pects for their country, and they will give their support. Keep them
in the dark or communicate through spin and half-truths, and frus-
tration and anger will grow.
Two, establish an independent Iraqi media commission to create
the legal framework and regulatory and other institutions nec-
essary for a free media environment. Superseding the existing Iraqi
Media Network, the new commission must include incubating an
Iraqi public broadcaster which itself would gain early independ-
eI) Ce.
Through an initiative of USAID and the U.S. organization
Internews, a framework for just such an approach has been drafted
and consensus at a senior level appears to be emerging. Yet, it is
important to emphasize that, as with IMN, the effort will falter if
right from the start it is not granted full independence from direct
CPA control or if ambitious multi-year resources are not reliably
pledged. The challenge of winning buy-in from Iraqis also remains.
Third and finally, empower Iraqi democrats. Draw on existing
professional talent, urgently launch training to develop new capac-
ity, and provide meaningful positions of responsibility for Iraqis in
all new institutions. It is their country and the only effective ap-
proach will be one that makes them direct stakeholders.
This should include a new Iraqi media institute as a coordinating
body for training and media development and for strengthening the
ties between emerging independent media and the broader Iraqi
civil society which must sustain and be sustained by it. This is the
area of focus of my organization, the Institute for War and Peace
Reporting, which with British support will be launching a signifi-
cant journalist training and humanitarian reporting project in the
coming weeks.
No one should under-estimate the extreme difficulties facing
Iraq, a civil society destroyed, an economy in ruins, communica-


32
vision channels, radio stations, newspapers and magazines emerged throughout the
territory, joined later by dynamic Web sites featuring reporting from the ground and
analysis and comment from Kurdish, Arabic and international experts around the
world. Nevertheless, Kurdish media was riven by the deep political divide between
the two main parties, and in a close-knit traditional society unaccustomed to inter-
nal criticism (much less leadership change), meaningful independent journalism
failed to emerge.
While media in government-controlled Iraq languished, many within a highly mo-
tivated and educated population followed reliable ex-territorial broadcasting services
such as the BBC World Service, and the US-funded Radio Sawa and Radio Free
Iraq. Iraqi journalists like to boast of the country's history of innovation in Arab
media, especially the supposed golden years before the 1950s. Iraqis have shown an
enduring desire, even #. the stultifying decades of Ba'athist rule, to be in-
formed. Despite the problems, the potential for a responsible media, and sophisti-
cated audience, is evident.
4. US MEDIA OPERATIONS
Planning for media policy and media development has been poor. As part of its
constitution-drafting effort, the US State Department's Future of Iraq project
sketched basic concepts of independent media, but did note elaborate detailed policy.
The Iraqi Media Network (IMN) was established in January 2003, led by Bob Reilly,
a former director of the Voice of America, and Mike Furlong, a long-time Defense
Department contractor who had worked on broadcasting issues in post-war Kosovo.
A budget of $15 million was confirmed in February, a month before fighting began.
The US assembled a diverse team of exile Iraqi consultants, to serve as an edi-
torial group to establish a TV station, a radio station and a newspaper, and to act
as a policy unit, to advise on media strategy. Several westerners were employed, to
§. journalism, technical and logistical support. Consultants were hired through
cience Applications International Corporation (SAIC), an employee-owned services
company with a long record as a Defense Department subcontractor. By mid-April,
the overall media team comprised more than two dozen people, largely based in Ku-
wait. Contracts were set to expire, and the entire operation due for review by the
coalition authority, on June 10.
During the war the US adopted a “psyops” strategy, broadcasting Towards Free-
dom, predominantly military information, from a converted cargo plane overflying
the country. Leaflets instructing Iraqis to remain at home were dropped on the ter-
ritory. An anti-regime station Radio Tikrit, named after Saddam's home town, was
initiated.
The IMN team began radio broadcasts from Um Qasr on mid-March (later moved
moved to Basra to improve country-wide coverage). With the collapse of the regime,
IMN's TV output was launched on May 13, from Baghdad. Al-Sabah, a CPA spon-
sored newspaper produced in Baghdad by a SAIC employed Iraqi exile, was
launched May 15. On May 28, the first issue of a second CPA sponsored newspaper,
Sumer, produced in Kuwait, was distributed in Baghdad.
In late May, IMN was considering options for the dispensation of a regulatory au-
thority, the licensing of newspapers and the establishment of the IMN as a public
service broadcaster. Plans were discussed for closing all non-US authorised broad-
casters (excluding Iraqi Kurdistan) and holding a frequency competition, with pro-
posals due in June and decisions for 90-day allocations to be taken in July. The
Iraqi Ministry of Information was abolished on late May, sacking its nearly 7,000
staff and handing its assets over to IMN.
The Authority's ruling giving the IMN responsibility for both overseeing regula-
tion and operations is problematic. It creates an unavoidable conflict of interest that
could spark considerable controversy. Recognising that ultimate decisions such as
the status and funding of the state broadcaster will be taken by a future Iraqi gov-
ernment, debate within IMN focused on whether to transfer responsibility for broad-
casting to an independent board outside of ministerial control, as with the BBC, or
to fold broadcasting within one of the emerging ministries, such as a ministry for
communications. Meantime, the confusion over its role as media and as a tool of
public diplomacy are enshrined in apparently contradictory requirements to
º . . . excellence” in journalism and to “provide an information service to
the ".
From the start, the media project was beset by problems. Bitter disputes erupted
between senior US representatives on the IMN, leading to chaotic and at times di-
rectly competitive decision-making. Hiring was ad-hoc, and although consultant sal-
aries were high, posts and experience levels were often not well matched. Equip-
ment purchases were poorly planned, Internet access was not established. Fierce in-


44
patrolling using these recycled policemen with U.S. MPs. Now, ob-
viously, it is not going to solve the problem of an absence of a legal
system, but you have got to create short-term interim solutions
that will give people confidence.
Senator BIDEN. Most of those MPs are reservists and National
Guard, and most of those MPs have no way of being extended, and
they are going to come home or they are going to be there for ex-
tended periods of time which is going to cause another problem.
Dr. MENDELSON-FORMAN. But I would suggest that in the inter-
nationalization issue, which you raised, Senator, there is a critical
need that could help draw the recruitment, and I suspect through
the European community, through NATO, through other forces, we
could get the number of people. It will not be the exact number
that we need right now, but I think Dr. Hamre, in fact, had done
a back-of-the-envelope calculation of how many we might possibly
get even from our coalition in Spain where they are a member of
the coalition, just to become members on the street. In fact, I got
a call from somebody in Bridgetown from the CARACOM people
saying, do you want us out in Iraq” So I think if there were an
internationalization, if the U.N. were asked or other institutions
were asked, people would send policemen forward.
Dr. HAMRE. Sir, may I just add to this that I think the case you
described where someone is murdered in the home and you need
to go investigate, those are fairly advanced police skills. Police
forensics are more advanced skills. It does not take nearly so much
effort to get a guy out there to stand in front of a building and
check an ID. It does not take nearly as much to do that.
Senator BIDEN. I agree with that.
Dr. HAMRE. So I think they are taking on the near-term security
challenge, and frankly, you could do rent-a-cops for some facilities.
We went to the tomb of the unknown soldier or whatever it was
called, and you could put a couple of rent-a-cops up there who
would be Iraqi citizens. They do not have to be finely skilled police
detectives who know good forensic skills.
So I think if we parse out the problem, I think we can advance
the domestic security agenda much more quickly.
To your point, though, we clearly need more carbinieri type ele-
ments, and I think the Europeans have those. We should be asking
them for them. I believe that the Italians are going to contribute
them. I think the Spanish intend to contribute some or at least are
prepared to be asked about it. We are going to need more than
5,000 in my view until we get our arms around the security envi-
ronment, and we do not have them around it yet, but they are
working on it.
Senator BIDEN. Well, to paraphrase the chairman on another
matter, I am anxious to see what the plan is. I would like to see
the administration let us know what they are asking because, as
Mr. Borden knows, in Bosnia we had a lot of experience in this and
it took a long time and it took a lot of effort.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Dr. Hamre, thank you, your associates, all the organizations that
are represented here at the table today. We know it is far and wide


58
would be taking this recommendation of setting up a backup office
for Ambassador Bremer in DOD, but that it would include people
from all of the relevant agencies. Since that time, I have had at
least two other agencies in town say, we are ready to put up our
person for that office. So I think it is in play, but it would be im-
portant to get it up and running very quickly. Those people should
not just be any old person from the agency. It should be the person
who is the talent scout in that agency that normally does that, that
knows how to look into the private sector, look into local govern-
ment, look into Federal Government to find those people.
Senator BIDEN. My time is about up. I want to end with you, Mr.
Borden, if I may. I think your recommendations are, as some of my
British friends might say, spot on. I think they are pretty darned
good here. I think what you have in mind is the game plan; your
three recommendations are the way to go, personally.
My problem is immediately. Again, we are running up against
this immediate crunch. What is left of this committee here and ev-
erybody there, I think we are all on the same page here on that
SCOTe.
Now, as long as this security vacuum exists, as we are trying to
fill this vacuum, it is going to hopefully get filled gradually day by
day. But as long as it exists, what can Jerry Bremer do now to bet-
ter communicate with the Iraqi people? I realize we need a long
term, and I am not trying in any way to diminish how consequen-
tial that is and we ought to be able to walk and chew gum at the
same time. Plan for that and get that underway. But what does
Ambassador Bremer do now—now, tomorrow—to say to the folks
he has on the ground now, this is how we are going to better com-
ºnicate beginning today? What kinds of things does he need to
O !
Mr. BORDEN. Thank you. With respect, I think if your own office
and department had the information campaign and information
strategy that he does, you would not be a Senator. You are a politi-
cian and you know about information. You know about commu-
nicating with the constituency. You know how important it is. It
is part of the democratic process. And I believe this is beginning
to be quite understood within Baghdad. They need a director of
communications and a proper information operation, which is very
robust, and begins immediately.
What I would urge them to do is to separate the understanding
of the information from the plumbing by which you communicate
it. They are, as they said, the government. Bremer does not need
a TV station. He just needs a microphone and a press conference
and people will come. Focus on getting the message out, figuring
out what the message is. And not to distinguish myself from my
colleagues, but I am a journalist by background. I would focus on
information and honest conveyance of, as you say, briefings and so
on. Marketing and all the rest has its role, but I do think the Iraqis
have a long history of, let us say, propaganda, and they want the
truth, and when they have the truth, I think they will understand
the difficulties and appreciate it and be generally on side.
Senator BIDEN. One last point, Mr. Chairman. I have been, as we
all have here, a strong supporter of our Board of International
Broadcasting. Our Board of International Broadcasting not only