Sº at 7/28 tº toº-ºº
S. HRG. 108–276
IRAQ: NEXT STEPS–WHAT WILL AN IRAQ
5-YEAR PLAN LOOK LIKE?
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
SEPTEMBER 24, 2003
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
§3. RECORDSDOCUMENTS
º º FEB 2 5 2004
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º untºroº
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director
ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director
(II)


2
its effect on the broader political and economic dynamics in the
Middle East.
Personally, I have advocated a 5-year plan in Iraq, not because
I believe the United States must stay in Iraq for exactly that
length of time, but because I believe such a plan would dem-
onstrate commitment, promote realistic budgeting, and help pre-
vent policy drift.
A long-term plan, in my judgment, is crucial to reaffirm and to
maintain the support of the American and the Iraqi people, to
bring aboard more international partners. Iraqis must have con-
fidence that Americans and the world community will stay until a
self-sufficient, independent Iraq is realized. Our planning must re-
flect the promise to establish an Iraqi Government that is rep-
resentative, that is effective, and that is underpinned by protected
freedoms and a market economy.
Many Iraqis have had a difficult time understanding how the
most powerful nation in the world could defeat their Armed Forces
in 3 weeks and still have trouble getting the lights turned on. Yet
skepticism and frustration and extremely difficult conditions have
not eliminated hope among the Iraqi people. A recent poll con-
ducted by Zogby International, working with the American Enter-
prise Institute, found that 70 percent of Iraqis feel that their coun-
try will be better off in 5 years down the road. Seventy-one percent
believe that they personally will be better off in 5 years.
Iraqis, by a three-to-one margin, responded that politics, not eco-
nomics, will be the harder part of the reconstruction. Asked to
choose which government they saw as the best model for Iraq from
among the alternatives of Syria, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or the
United States, 37 percent picked the United States. Only 33 per-
cent said they preferred an Islamic government. Two-thirds said
that U.S. troops should remain in Iraq for at least another year.
Now, statistics can be misleading. But as a scientific survey,
these responses are encouraging. And I am hopeful you can shed
light on other positive developments of which the American people
are not aware, while keeping in mind that they worry about the
extreme dangers that persist; and in some cases seem to be in-
creasing, even as the summer heat dissipates.
To set the stage for our inquiries today, I would offer the fol-
lowing set of questions, which I believe are covered in your testi-
mony, to explore as Senators have opportunities:
What would a 5-year plan for Iraq look like and how much would
it cost?
How long will the $87 billion from the supplemental last?
Hºw long will the $21 billion of that targeted for reconstruction
last’.
Will the United States commitment help generate international
contributions at the Donor Conference in October or at other con-
ferences surely to come?
How does oil revenue fit into the projections of reconstruction fi-
nancing, quite apart from the overall budget of the country?
Do you have the right people in place in Iraq.”
Are there enough Arab linguists, international economists, public
diplomacy experts, development analysts, and technical experts?
What skills do our personnel lack?


4
A recent poll, conducted by Zogby International working with the American Enter-
prise Institute, found that 70 percent of Iraqis feel that their country will be better
off five years down the road, and 71 percent believe that they personally will be bet--
ter off in five years. Iraqis, by a three-to-one margin, responded that politics, not
economics, will be the harder part of the reconstruction. Asked to choose which gov-
ernment they saw as the best model for Iraq from among Syria, Iran, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia or the United States, 37 percent picked the United States. Only 33 percent
said they preferred an Islamic government. Two-thirds said that U.S. troops should
remain in Iraq for at least another year.
Statistics can be misleading, but as a scientific survey, these responses are en-
couraging. I am hopeful that you can shed light on other positive developments of
which the American people are not aware, while keeping in mind that they worry
about the extreme dangers that persist and, in some cases, seem to be increasing
even as the summer heat dissipates.
To set the stage for our inquiries today, I would offer the following set of ques-
tions:
(1) What would the five-year plan for Iraq look like and how much would it
cost? How long will the $87 billion from the Supplemental last? How long will
the $21 billion targeted for reconstruction last? Will this U.S. commitment help
generate international contributions at the donor conference in October? How
does oil revenue fit into projections of reconstruction financing?
(2) Do you have the right people in place in Iraq2 Are there enough Arab lin-
guists, international economists, public diplomacy experts, development ana-
lysts, and technical experts? What skills do our personnel lack? Can expanded
international involvement improve our capabilities?
(3) You have been tremendously upbeat regarding prospects for success in
Iraq. Although much progress has been made, what worries you about your
plans? What needs to be fixed within the Coalition Provisional Authority?
(4) Much has been made about transferring authority to the Iraqis quickly.
You envision turning power over to Iraqi leadership in stages, as institutions
become capable of taking on responsibilities. How do you plan to integrate Iraqi
government institutions into the Coalition's effort? Are there any areas or min-
istries where the transfer process will soon occur?
(5) Finally, as we look to our foreign policy equities, calling on your experi-
ence in diplomacy and terrorism, where does Iraq now fit in the Global War on
Terrorism? Are Middle East neighbors of Iraq providing sufficient cooperation?
Again, Ambassador BREMER, we thank you for joining us today, and we look for-
ward to your testimony and our continuing dialog on these issues.
The CHAIRMAN. I call now upon the distinguished ranking mem-
ber of our committee, Senator Biden, for his opening statement.
Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. I realize this has been an interesting
time coming back home. You are probably anxious to get back to
Iraq.
Ambassador BREMER. Well, I have better electricity supply in
Iraq, Senator.
Senator BIDEN. And probably fewer questions.
But, Mr. Ambassador, I want to thank you for being here and
thank you for making yourself available to some of my colleagues
yesterday, I assume, in informal sessions; you did it for both Demo-
crats and Republicans.
And I want to say at the outset that your being made available
is—we are thanking you for it but it is an absolute, positive neces-
sity. Failure to do so would not be in your thinking; the Congress,
as you can tell, is very concerned about what is going on.
I hope the vast majority of the Members of Congress and both
parties still have open minds. I, for one, think we need to stay the
course. And we need to fund this operation, as expensive as it is.


5
But I think you have probably gotten the message how intensely
some Members feel.
And you are here today. And you are going to return to Baghdad,
to what I believe is a situation not of your making, although made
much worse because of a failed plan for the aftermath of a bril-
liantly executed war; that is not your fault. You were brought in
to salvage a situation that was deteriorating dangerously by the
day. I remind myself, and everyone else, that you were not part of
the picture, initially. We had all these hearings and all the plan-
ning was—it was going to be Garner in charge, and Chalabi was
going to be airdropped in; and all was going to be well. That is a
bit of facetiousness on my part but you were not in the picture.
And I commend you for being willing to take on this job. I am
sure some of your friends had to counsel you it was a bad idea but
I am glad you did it. I commend you for the level of energy and
focus you have brought to this to turn around a situation that I
think is imminently salvageable.
You brought something else to the table, even more critical to the
willingness of the American people and the Congress to continue to
support this endeavor in Iraq; and that is honesty. You are the first
guy that told us the facts, told us the truth; the others did not lie,
the others just either did not know or did not say what they knew.
During your visit in July, you began to make clear what many
in this committee have been saying for the past year, that recon-
structing Iraq will be a lot more difficult than winning “the war”
and will take tens of billions of dollars over several years and re-
quire tens of thousands of American troops for an extended deploy-
ment.
Prior to that, we had heard obfuscation upon obfuscation, rosy
scenarios, and a word which has worked its way into the lexicon
of some in this administration: “unknowable.” If I hear the word
“unknowable” one more time from this administration, I would sug-
gest that they, in their effort to stay in power say: Vote for us, we
are the unknowables, we do not know anything.
In fact, the problem and the prescriptions for post-war Iraq were
absolutely knowable; not in detail but absolutely knowable. From
the hearings this committee convened well over a year ago under
both chairmanships, from the work of our leading think tanks, left,
right, and center, and from within the administration itself, thanks
to the State Department's Future of Iraq Project, which developed
detailed plans for post-war Iraq, a lot was knowable.
Instead, the administration waited until the eleventh hour to
begin planning. Its leading members believed we would find an oil-
rich, functioning country—that we would be met by cheering
crowds, that all we would have to do is sweep out the top Baathist
layers, implant our favorite exiles, and watch democracy take root,
as the bulk of our troops returned home by Christmas.
Well, the reality, as you know better than anyone in the whole
world, is quite different. You have seen it. You have experienced
it. And you have tried to deal with it. And as the chairman, Sen-
ator Hagel, and I have seen during our visit to Baghdad, you are
going at it full tilt.
Belatedly but thankfully in my view, the President made a suffi-
cient U-turn 2 weeks ago that hopefully finally sets us in the right


6
direction. First, he vowed to make Iraq the world’s problem, not
just our own, by going back to the United Nations and seeking sup-
port of its members for troops, police, and money.
Because this is a simple calculation. We have three options: one,
we leave and there is chaos and there is strategic debacle; two, we
stay and pay for everything; or three, we get other folks to pay.
This is not hard. This is not very difficult to understand. It took
awhile for the President, I think, to understand it but I do not get
it. This is real simple. We leave, we pay, or we get others to help
pay, in terms of their lives, in terms of their money, in terms of
their troops.
First, as I said, the President has come around. And he has said
he is going to seek that support by going back to the United Na-
tions, which he did yesterday. I regret that his speech, although,
I think, as they say in medicine, did no harm—I am not sure,
based on the accounts of today, that it did all that much good in
terms of its stated purpose, rallying the world to support us with
money and troops.
I think he should have made more clearly our willingness to
bridge the differences with our allies on a new U.N. resolution and
to grant the U.N. real authority, laid out some specifics, and asked
for help; and use the word “ask,” ask for help. I am not one of those
guys who thinks he should go and apologize for anything; he had
lºng to apologize for. But he could ask. You know? It is a useful
thing.
I met with one of our counterparts in the European Community
just before I went to see you about three months ago. And I asked,
“What do we have to do?” And this very pro-American, very signifi-
cant figure leaned over to me and said, “You’ve got to ask; not chal-
lenge, not demand, not offer to share, ask.”
So, I am left questioning the sincerity of the President's mid-
course correction. If we want the world to share the burden, we
have to share the authority in Iraq in a meaningful way. The play-
ers—the payers, they want to be players. If they pay, they want to
have something to say.
I cannot believe that we cannot find a compromise that meets
our rightful concerns about a premature transfer of power but also
empowers the U.N. and starts to put more power in the hands of
the Iraqi people. For example, what about double-hatting you?
What about double-hatting you additionally as a representative of
the international community. I know you know what I mean—that
you run the show under the U.N. auspices.
I am not sure exactly how it would work. But we both know from
past experience—mine is as long as yours. I have been doing this
31 years—the guy who pays the bill at the U.N. gets to call the
shots. The person who has all the troops on the ground gets to com-
mand the troops.
I mean, I do not know why we do not say to the French, You
want a piece of this? Fine. We put in $20 billion. You want to run
it. Let us see your $30 billion.
But the point I am trying to make is that I do not understand
why we cannot move in a way that is a little bit different than we
have until now. Instead of reporting to Mr. Rumsfeld, you report
to an international board of directors or the U.S. as the chairman


7
of the board, because we would be putting in most of the money.
I am not sure what is wrong with that idea. I would like to talk
to you about that.
Second, the President began to level with the American people
about the hard road ahead to win the peace, in terms of time,
troops, and treasures. Now, I hope the administration continues to
level with the American people. It is the only way to sustain their
Support.
But the approach to the supplemental concerns me on this ac-
count, as well. Mr. Ambassador, in your testimony before the Sen-
ate Appropriations Committee on Monday, you noted that the
World Bank estimates for the total cost of reconstruction, not dis-
similar to the ones that you have given, to be about $60 billion to
$70 billion over the next 4 or 5 years. This supplement request cov-
ers $20 billion of that total.
It begs a critical question. Where are we going to get the remain-
ing $40 billion to $50 billion? Where is it going to come from? I do
not expect you to have that answer. But again, back to the central
theme. Everybody acknowledges that is what we need. We are ei-
ther going to have to get it from the Iraqis, we are going to get it
from the international community, or it is going to come from us.
Will it come from the international community? Well normally,
that would be a reasonable expectation. The United States typically
covers about 25 percent of post-conflict reconstruction costs. By
that ratio we could expect $80 billion from the international com-
munity. But we so poisoned the well in the lead up to this war that
no one expects the international community to provide more than
$2 billion or $3 billion at the Donor's Conference next month.
That is a terrible indictment, in my view, of our foreign policy
and a harsh example of the price of unilateralism. Will the missing
money be generated by Iraqi oil revenues? That is what the admin-
istration led the American people to believe. In fairness, you did
not. In fact, if we are lucky, oil exports will generate just enough
money to pay for the government's operating costs this coming fis-
cal year; forget about paying for reconstruction.
Will the missing money be generated by other parts of the Iraqi
economy? Secretary Rumsfeld recently touted the potential of Iraq's
tourism industry. Well, the Banks of the Tigris May replace the
Outer Banks as a destination of choice some day but I do not think
it is going to happen any time soon.
Or maybe the missing money will come from the taxpayers, when
the administration comes back to Congress next year or the year
after. And if that is the plan, we should know relatively soon.
Mr. Ambassador, you know how critical it is for us to show Con-
gress and the American people your plan for turning things around
in Iraq, if we are going to give the administration the money it now
seeks. No one wants to be throwing money away and surely you do
not either, much less throw away American lives. So, we need to
be convinced you have a workable plan with clear benchmarks,
timetables, and accountability.
I do not want to minimize the successes you have already
achieved. The chairman, Senator Hagel, and I saw them during our
visit. We saw a local Council meeting taking place. Hopeful begin-
nings and grass-roots democracies have expanded all across Iraq.


10
Belatedly, but thankfully, the President made a significant U-turn two weeks ago
that finally sets us in the right direction.
First, he vowed to make Iraq the world's problem, not just our own, by going back
to the U.N. and seeking support of its members for troops, police and money. It's
a simple calculation. We leave and leave chaos in our wake. We º paying for ev-
º in tomes of lives and resources. Or, we get others to share the burden.
regret that his speech to the U.N. yesterday missed an opportunity to rally the
world to this cause. He should have made clear our willingness to bridge the dif--
ferences with our allies on a new U.N. resolution and to grant the U.N. real author-
ity, laid out some specifics, and asked—asked—for help. Not apologize—he had
nothing to apologize for—But ask.
So I'm left questioning the sincerity of the President's mid-course correction. If we
want the world to share the burden, we've got to share authority in Iraq in mean-
ingful ..º. The payers want to be players. And I can’t believe we can’t find a com-
promise that meets our º concerns about a premature transfer of power, but
that also empowers the U.N. and starts to put more power in the hands of the Iraqi
people. For example, what about “double hatting” you as the representative of the
international community. Instead of reporting to Mr. Rumsfeld, you'd report to an
international board of directors, with the U.S. as chairman of th: board because
we'd be putting the most into the pot. What's wrong with that?
§§ the President began to level with American people about the hard road
ahead to win the peace in terms of time, troops and treasure.
I hope the administration continues to level with the American people. It's the
only way to sustain their support. But the approach to the supplemental concerns
me on this account too.
Mr. Ambassador, in your testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee
on Monday, you noted that the World Bank estimates the total cost of reconstruc-
tion to be about $60 to $70 billion over the next four to five years. The º
request covers $20 billion of that total. That begs a critical question: where is the
remaining $40 to $50 billion going to come from?
Will it come from the international community? Normally, that would be a reason-
able expectation: the United States typically covers about 25 percent of post-conflict
reconstruction costs. By that ratio, we could expect about $80 billion from the inter-
national community for Iraq.
But we so poisoned the well in the lead up to this war that no one expects the
international community to provide more than two or three billion at the donors
conference next month. That's a terrible indictment of our foreign policy and a harsh
example of the price of unilateralism.
§ the missing money be generated by Iraq’s oil revenues? That's what the ad-
ministration led the American people to believe in fairness, you did not. In fact, if
we're lucky, oil exports will generate just enough money to pay for the government's
operating costs. Forget about oil paying for reconstruction.
Will the missing money be generated by others parts of the Iraqi economy? Sec-
retary Rumsfeld recently touted the potential of Iraq's tourism industry. The Banks
of the Tigris May replace the Outer Banks as a destination of choice someday, but
not any day soon.
Or maybe the missing money will come from taxpayers when the administration
comes back to Congress next year or the year after to ask for more. If that's the
plan, tell us now.
Mr. Ambassador, you know how critical it is for you to show Congress and the
American people your plan for turning things around in Iraq if we are to give the
administration the money it now seeks. No one wants to be throwing money—much
less American lives—down a black hole. So we need to be convinced you have a
workable plan with clear benchmarks, timetables and accountability.
I don’t want to minimize the successes you've already achieved. The chairman,
Senator Hagel, and I saw some of them during our visit. We saw a local Council
meeting taking place—the hopeful beginnings of grassroots democracy.
Schools are open around the country. Hospitals are caring for the sick. These are
major achievements and we do not read about them or see them on TV.
But Mr. Ambassador, all of this progress is jeopardized by our failure thus far
to get it right in two fundamental areas: security and basic services. And that fail-
ure is compounded by a huge expectations gap created when we toppled in three
weeks a tyrant who had plagued the Iraqi people for three decades.
The Iraqi people can’t understand why we can't restore a sense of personal secu-
rity, or turn the lights back on as quickly as we defeated Saddam. Just as impor-
tant, they do not seem to know what we are doing about these problems and when
!. will get better. That sense of uncertainty threatens to erode their good will
toward us.


16
cient and unreliable electric grid or in a security environment that
puts a stick in the spokes of the wheels of commerce.
Iraq cannot realize its potential to return quickly to the world
stage as a responsible player without the services essential to a
modern economy. We have made significant progress, as those of
you who have visited Iraq learned when you were there, in restor-
ing essential services. The widely predicted humanitarian crisis did
not happen. There was no major flow of refugees.
As you pointed out, all of Iraq's 240 hospitals and 90 percent of
its health clinics are up and running. The schools are open. The
universities held their exams. There is an adequate supply of food.
And there are no signs of epidemics. We have already cleared thou-
sands of miles of irrigation canals across the country. Electric serv-
ice—electric power service will reach pre-war levels within this
next month.
But the remaining demands are vast, which is why most of the
President's request for nonmilitary assistance is for infrastructure
programs.
On another front, there is already good news, as members of this
committee know. The democratization of Iraq, on which so much
global attention has been focused, is further advanced than many
casual readers of the newspapers might know; although I know
members of the committee, particularly those who were in Iraq,
who saw a town Council meeting, are aware of how far things have
COISLE.
We have encouraged a quick political transformation and laid out
a clear seven-step process leading to Iraqi sovereignty. Three of the
seven steps have already been taken. The Governing Council came
into being on July 13. Second, the Governing Council appointed a
preparatory committee to write a constitution. And on September
1, the Governing Council took the third step, appointing a very
able group of 25 ministers to run the ministries governments.
I might add here, Mr. Chairman, that I learned that of the 25
ministers, 17 have Ph.d.s, which must make it not only the best--
educated cabinet in Iraq's history but probably one of the world's
best-educated cabinets. And I do not know if any of the members
had a chance to meet two of the ministers who have been here this
week. If you did not, I regret it. The Minister of Public Works and
the Minister of Electricity have been here, both of whom are ex-
perts in their field. The Minister of Agriculture is an agronomist,
the Minister of Water Resources a water hydrologist. These are
people who really know what they are doing. They do not just have
a Ph.D. in some theoretical field, they have expertise in their min-
istries.
There are four remaining steps. The fourth step is writing a con-
stitution. We hope that the Iraqi Governing Council will move
quickly to convene a constitutional convention to write that con-
stitution. -
The fifth step is ratifying that constitution. The sixth step will
follow that ratified constitution with free democratic elections. And
the seventh step will be when we, the Coalition Authority, can
transfer all sovereignty back to an elected democratic Iraqi Govern-
ment. And I might add, Mr. Chairman, nobody looks more forward
to that day than I, except perhaps my wife.


20
Hitler's path to power. The giants of the post-World War II generation recog-
nized this and Marshall Plan assistance was overwhelmingly grant aid.
The President's first priority is security, security provided by Iraqis to and for
Iraqis. That security extends to our forces and changes Iraq from a logistics and
planning base for terrorists into a bulwark against them.
The President envisions three pillars of security
• Public safety—police, border enforcement, fire and a communications system to
link them.
• National defense—a new army and civil defense system.
• Justice system—courts and prisons.
This security assistance to Iraq benefits the United States in four ways.
First, Iraqis will be more effective. As talented and courageous as the Coalition
forces are, they can never replace an Iraqi policeman who knows his beat, who
knows his people, their customs, rhythms and language. Iraqis want Iraqis pro-
viding their security and so do we.
Second, as these Iraqi security forces assume their duties, they replace Coalition
troops in the roles that generate frustration, friction and resentment—conducting
searches, Manning check points, guarding installations.
Third, this frees up Coalition forces for the mobile, sophisticated offensive oper-
ations against former regime loyalists and terrorists for which they are best suited.
Finally, these new Iraqi forces reduce the overall security demands on Coalition
forces and speed the day when we can bring troops home.
Security is the first and indispensable element of the President's plan. It is not,
by itself, sufficient to assure success because a security system resting only on arms
is a security system that will fail. Recreating Iraq as a nation at peace with itself
and with the world, an Iraq that terrorists will flee rather than flock to, requires
more than people with guns.
A good security system cannot persist on the knife edge of economic collapse.
When Saddam scurried away from 8.i. forces he left behind an economy ruined
not by our attacks but by decades of neglect, theft and mismanagement.
Imagine the effect on the economy of operating without a budget for a quarter-
century. Saddam, who came to power in 1979, never prepared a national budget.
Ill-conceived and clumsily executed policies left Iraq with
• an oil industry starved nearly to death by underinvestment,
• thousands of miles of irrigation canals so weed-clogged as to be almost useless,
and
• an electrical system that can at best meet only two-thirds of demand.
Reflect, if you will, on that last item. As millions of American households (includ-
ing the BREMER household) have learned in recent days, it is almost impossible to
live in the modern world without dependable electricity. Think of what we would
be asking of Iraqis were we to suggest they fashion a new economy, a new democ-
racy, while literally in the dark eight hours per day.
The Iraqis must refashion their economy. Saddam left them a Soviet-style com-
mand economy. That poor model was further hobbled by cronyism, theft and
pharonic self-indulgence by Saddam and his intimates.
Important changes have already begun.
The Iraqi Minister of Finance on Sunday announced a set of market-oriented poli-
cies that is among the world's boldest.
Those policies include:
• A new Central Bank law which grants the Iraqi Central Bank full legal inde-
pendence, makes price stability the paramount policy objective, gives the Cen-
tral Bank full control over monetary and exchange rate policy, and broad au-
thority to supervise Iraqi Banks. This is rare anywhere in the world and unique
in the region.
• The Iraqi Governing Council proposed, and on Thursday I signed into law, a
program opening Iraq to foreign investment. Foreign firms May open wholly
owned companies or buy 100 percent of Iraqi businesses. Under this law foreign
firms receive national treatment and have an unrestricted right to remit profits
and capital.
• Tariff policy is equally simple. There is a two-year “reconstruction tariff” of five
percent on all but a few imports.
• Foreign Banks are free to enter Iraq and will receive equal treatment with Iraqi
Banks.


22
*. with other donors to avoid the near anarchy in which terrorists will feel right
at home.
When we launched military operations against Iraq we assumed a great responsi-
bility that extends beyond defeating Saddam's military.
We cannot simply pat the Iraqis on the back, tell them they are lucky to be rid
of Saddam and then ask them to go find their place in a global market—to compete
without the tools for competition.
To do so would invite economic collapse followed by political extremism and a re-
turn to terrorism.
If, after coming this far, we turn our backs and let Iraq lapse into factional chaos,
some new tyranny and terrorism, we will have committed a grave error.
Not only will we have left the long-suffering Iraqi people to a future of danger
and deprivation, we will have sewn the dragon's teeth which will sprout more ter-
rorists and eventually cost more American lives.
You May think I exaggerate. I ask you to look at what happened in Afghanistan,
another country which, after it was debilitated by decades of war and mismanage-
ment became easy prey for the Taliban and al Qaida.
The reconstruction of Iraq May seem distant from American concerns today. Eight
time zones and two continents separate the East Coast of the United States from
Iraq. The West Coast is effectively half a world away.
Two years ago on September 11, terrorists brought their threat home to us. From
a far-way corner of the world, they showed us that we must fight terrorism globally.
Iraq only seems far away. Today Iraq is a focal point in our global war on ter-
rorism. Failure there would strengthen the terrorists morally and materially.
Success tells not just Iraqis, but the world that there is hope, that the future is
not defined by tyranny on one side and terrorism on the other.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee we respectfully ask Congress to
honor the President's supplemental request, which responds to urgent requirements
in order to achieve the vision of a sovereign, stable, prosperous and democratic Iraq
at peace with us and with the world.
Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions.
The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask that the committee on the first
round have 7 minutes each. We have a number of members present
and others May arrive later. We hope we will not have interrup-
tions. We will have a second round with time remaining at that
point.
Let me commence the questions, Mr. Ambassador, by—
[Disturbance from a member of the audience.]
The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman please just leave peacefully,
so we can continue with the hearing? We would appreciate that.
[Pause.] -
The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador BREMER, essentially the plan for de-
mocracy that you have pointed out is an important one. As for the
timing, you have offered a rationalization. Let me just ask this: Es-
sentially, as the cabinet members have been appointed, the Gov-
erning Council is involved. You pointed out the essential aspect of
getting the lights on 24 hours a day. This involves huge invest--
ments in infrastructure. The reconstruction moneys we are in-
volved in are a large part of that.
Likewise, I appreciate the announcement of the end of the com-
mand economy and the announcement of market economic reforms,
which are really quite bold and very new, really, for the Iraqi econ-
omy. They have just come into being and May, in fact, provide a
remarkable change, not only in Iraq but for that matter in the en-
tire area, as would, in fact, a functioning democracy. It would be
a first.
As we shared, Senator Biden, Senator Hagel, and I were there
with you at the Dead Sea Conference, the World Economic Forum.


25
Congress in both parties. The polling data that was read, relative
to the attitude of the Iraqi people, could be overlaid with the poll-
ing data of the attitude of the American people. The American peo-
ple have gone from thinking this was a great idea to not such a
good idea to now 59 percent of the American people, if my memory
is correct, in a poll yesterday saying we should not appropriate this
money.
The reason I mention that to you is not to suggest the basis upon
which we should make our decisions. But you should understand
that time is not on our side. Time is not on our side. As the guy
behind you, Mr. Korologos knows—and he knows this place better
than anybody I know, and I mean that sincerely, when things go
south here, they go south quickly.
And so there needs to be, in my view, an incredibly sensitized
sense of urgency here. And that takes to this sort of straw man the
French have put up and this notion of Iraqi sovereignty. The impli-
cation the French make is that somehow we do not intend on turn-
ing over sovereignty to the Iraqis. We know, everybody here knows,
that is our desire for 50 different reasons.
But the reason I mention this is that I want to focus on one as-
pect of the plan as an illustration of what I believe to be the lack
of a sense of urgency and the lack of a willingness of the adminis-
tration to go beyond your pay grade, what needs to be done; and
that is that restoring a sense of security on the street to average
Iraqis.
Walt Slocombe, who is one of the most competent guys in the en-
tire defense establishment, told us, all your folks who were first
rate told us stories of Iraqis, even though the schools are open,
being fearful of letting their daughters go to school for fear of kid-
naping, waiting outside till their daughters come out so they can
take them home.
Yet we met with Mr. Kerik, who was the former commissioner
of New York City, and a really first-rate team of people who have
vast experience in Kosovo and Bosnia and Afghanistan, about how
to train the Iraqi police force. As we were told then, several months
ago, it would take up to 5 years to train the Iraqi police force,
which really was not a police force. These guys did not even know
how to go on patrol. The idea that there was an Iraqi police force
was a myth.
And what you had is a group of Iraqis who had uniforms, and
they did not know how to do investigative work. They took care of
traffic. If people did not show up, Saddam sent someone and killed
them. I mean, it was real simple. So we are really training from
the bottom up here.
And we were told there was a need for 5,800 European
carabinieri in there immediately. You got 300 from the Italians, an-
other 400 somewhere along the way. In my discussions with Dr.
Rice, in my discussions with the Secretary, in all of my discussions,
there was no sense of urgency of going out there and banging on
doors, dragging people out to train these Iraqis.
Now we have enough trainers that we could train—if my num-
bers are correct and I think they are—full bore; if we want, we can
train roughly 250 Iraqi police—is it a month?—per month, based
on the trainers we have.


26
Just real practical here. Why have we not made a deal? Why
have we not gone out of our way? Why have we not—or maybe you
have made the request—said, look, we will pay a premium. I mean,
hell we are paying Iraqis who are not working. We are paying Iraqi
military folks who were getting paid before and are not doing a
damn thing. Why not put out the word we need 1,000 American
cops to get these people trained? What is the deal here? Where is
the practical input of how to get this done? This is not rocket
science. Why? Why have we not done those kinds of things?
Ambassador BREMER. Well, thank you for those questions, Sen-
ator. In fact, there is a great sense of urgency. We do have a plan.
We have—I told Mr. Kerik and his colleagues that we could not
wait 5–actually, it was 6 years. It was 5.9 years, his plan, to get
us to a police force of 80,000, which is what we need.
We now have about 40,000 police on duty. They are former po-
liceman and therefore of questionable utility in the long run, which
is why each of them is being put through a refresher course that
tº: them, among other things, human rights and respect for
the law.
We have a plan to produce another 40,000. There is $2 billion in
this supplemental for it. It is one of the single largest pieces in this
supplemental. And the plan is to train those people in Jordan. We
plan to start training the trainers in 3 weeks. We will
Senator BIDEN. How many?
Ambassador BREMER. We will train
Senator BIDEN. How many trainers do you have?
Ambassador BREMER. We are going to need 1,500 trainers. Th
State Department has identified 1,000 trainers. We are ready to
º on those as soon as we get the money. We, under this
plan
Senator BIDEN. Where are we going to get those trainers?
Ambassador BREMER. They are being—through a contractor here
in Washington.
Senator BIDEN. So, they are going to be American trainers?
Ambassador BREMER. American. But we are also-we have re-
ceived offers form the Czech Republic, the British, the Italians. I
saw another cable this morning, I cannot remember which country;
there are lots of places.
Senator BIDEN. Roughly, what is the total of the European con-
tribution? We were told by the folks running the training facility
they needed 5,800 European cops.
Ambassador BREMER. No. We have reduced that number by run-
ning it in a different way. We are down to a 1,500 need. And we
will get the 1,500. That is not going to be the problem. Here is the
problem. Even going as fast as we can, and we will train 25,000
new police in a year, just to put that in perspective, Mr. Kerik, who
ran the largest training facility anywhere in the world, at a max-
imum trained 6,000 police in a year. We are going to be training
four times as many as have ever been trained anywhere in the
world in a year. That is a sense of urgency, I can tell you. And
there is $2 billion in here that makes that happen.
Senator BIDEN. Well, the sense of urgency is that you need train-
ers. This is something I do know a little about, chairing Judiciary
for years and writing the crime bills and working with Kerik and


27
all these mayors across the country and all these training pro-
grams. You cannot send these guys out by themselves. What they
need is to send out competent police officers from other countries
with the Iraqi police.
Ambassador BREMER. That is right. That is the plan.
Senator BIDEN. These guys are a joke. These guys are a joke.
Ambassador BREMER. That is the plan. The plan is that they do
joint patrols.
Senator BIDEN. Well, I will come back to that point and others.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have
a statement that I would ask to be included in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. It will be included in the record in full.
Senator HAGEL. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the next steps in Iraq.
These hearings are playing a critical role in helping Americans understand the chal-
lenges that we face in Iraq, and the resources and sacrifices that will be required
for success.
I would also like to thank Ambassador BREMER, our witness today, as well as his
colleagues at the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, and our men and women
in uniform for their service, commitment, and sacrifice in Iraq.
The Bush administration's $87 billion supplemental appropriations request was a
wake-up call for many Americans who expected only #. crowds and flowing
oil after Iraq's liberation. The first phase of the war in Iraq is over, but the peace
à not yet won. Peace and stability in Iraq will not come easy, and it will not come
cheap.
Americans are asking tough questions about the nature and cost of our commit--
ments in Iraq. What are the trade-offs that we must consider to pay for Iraq's recon-
struction? Furthermore, the Department of Defense reports that 80 Americans have
died as a result of hostile engagements in Iraq, and many more wounded, since
President Bush declared an official end to major hostilities on May 1. Many Ameri-
cans do not understand why Americans are still dying in a liberated country.
If these questions are not answered, we May lose a domestic consensus at home
that is necessary to stay the course in Iraq.
Yesterday, President Bush addressed the future of Iraq at the United Nations. He
asked for the support of the United Nations to help the U.S. rebuild Iraq. We must
internationalize our efforts in Iraq. It is in the interests of all nations that we are
successful in Iraq. Peace and stability in Iraq and the Middle East are in the inter-
est of the world. America must share the decision-making responsibilities, as well
as the burdens, in Iraq. If Iraq becomes a failed state, a haven for terrorists and
the intrigues of its neighbors, the world loses.
Rebuilding Iraq's economy is essential for a stable and hopefully democratic tran-
sition in Iraq, and by extension, for peace and stability in the Middle East. I support
the administration's request for $20.3 billion for Iraq's reconstruction, and I share
Ambassador BREMER's sense of urgency. But a window May be closing in Iraq. Our
time is short, and there is little margin for error.
There will be no economic windfall in Iraq in the near term. Iraq is a broken, in-
debted economy, with a devastated infrastructure and an estimated 60% unemploy-
ment rate. If Iraq's economy falters, the political transition will also pay a high
price. Stability and democracy are not assured.
Iraq needs the help of the international community. Iraq's foreign debt is esti-
mated to be $70–$120 billion. The international community must provide immediate
and generous debt relief for Iraq to have a chance for a democratic future. Oil reve-
nues through December 2005 are projected to be only $33.3 billion. My own back
of the envelope calculation is that even with the additional $20.3 billion supple-
mental appropriations that the President has requested for Iraqi reconstruction, and
in the absence of significant international support, we will fall at least $25-$50 bil-
lion short over the next few years of the projected reconstruction costs in Iraq.


29
And could you give us some detailed definition this morning, Mr.
Ambassador, as to where you would envision our allies, the United
Nations, could play specific roles, their roles of responsibility, in
helping restructure and rebuild Iraq” Included in that would be
what decisionmaking responsibilities authority are you willing to
give up, are we willing to give up, if we are to enlist specific allies,
as well as the United Nations, and fore-structures and money and
training and all that would come with that?
So, that is the one thing I have not heard much about from you,
the President, or the Administration. Thank you.
Ambassador BREMER. Thank you, Senator. And I will convey
your thanks to my colleagues when I return.
Senator HAGEL. Thank you.
Ambassador BREMER. I think the administration's policy on the
question of having international support has been all along that we
welcome it. I am sure members of the committee are familiar with
the fact that it is already a broadly international effort. We have
troops from 30 other countries on the ground with us.
Senator HAGEL. But we are paying for most of that.
Ambassador BREMER. Well, it is the price of being the world's
super power.
Senator HAGEL. But, I mean, let us be honest about it, Mr. Am-
bassador. We are paying for most of it. I am interested, if we are
going to go after United Nations' help and allies' help, the big al-
lies, what are we prepared to do in the way of sharing responsibil-
ities, decisionmaking authority?
You and I both know the facts of life here. These people are not
going to turn over troops to you, General Abizaid, or money, or re-
sources without some say in this; and they should have some. And
then it gets back to a question I have been asking: Why should this
country bear all the burden, or certainly 90 percent of that burden,
when it is in the interest of all the world to stabilize the Middle
East? So what are we willing to give up in the way of sharing?
Ambassador BREMER. Well, I think on the I see it as two sepa-
rate questions. On the question of the troops, I think there is broad
agreement that we must retain unity of command and that the
country with the largest contributors of troops should remain in
charge of those troops. As I understand it, though I am not inti-
mately involved in the negotiations in New York over a new Secu-
rity Council resolution, so I cannot comment in detail on that, but
I understand that—that particular concept seems to be understood.
So, there does not seem to be any contention over that question.
I would argue that the same has to apply on the question of recon-
struction. There must be some unity of command. We cannot have
people pulling right and left, which is why I established a Coalition
International Committee, which was established under the former
Polish Deputy Prime Minister Marek Belka, in July, to be available
to coordinate the efforts that are coming in. And there are 61 coun-
tries that are already contributing to Iraq's reconstruction, to make
coordination, so we do not have two countries, for example, wanting
to build a hospital in the same city or three people trying to build
the same school.
So, we already have a mechanism due to that coordination.
Whether, at the end of the negotiations in New York, we find a dif-


31
Ambassador BREMER. Well, less and less. Because we now have,
since July 13, we have a Governing Council. And since September
2, we have Iraqi ministers. So, more and more decisionmaking is
effectively collaborative since July.
Senator SARBANES. But the ultimate decisionmaking is yours; is
it not?
Ambassador BREMER. I would put it this way: The ultimate au-
thority is the coalition's but the decisionmaking is essentially done
in co-determination with relevant Iraqis. The authority, as a legal
matter, rests with the Coalition.
Senator SARBANES. And, therefore, rests with you?
Ambassador BREMER. That is right.
Senator SARBANES. Because in the end you make the decision for
the Coalition. I mean, it is a one-man show in that regard; is it not?
Ambassador BREMER. No, it is not a one-man show. I have two
very senior British diplomats, who work literally side by side with
me as the
Senator SARBANES. And if you and they disagree, what is the
outcome?
Ambassador BREMER. Well, actually, that has not happened yet.
So, I
Senator SARBANES. If it should happen, what would be the out--
come?
Ambassador BREMER. Well, I imagine there would be discussions
between London and Washington?
Senator SARBANES. I understand that. But assuming no con-
sensus can be achieved, how is that decision made?
Ambassador BREMER. Well, in the end
Senator SARBANES. I mean, if you are the ultimate
decisionmaker
Ambassador BREMER. Yes. In the end—
Senator SARBANES [continuing]. Why do you not say you are the
ultimate decisionmaker?
Ambassador BREMER. In the end, I have, as you said, the author-
ity.
Senator SARBANES. All right. Now, the supplemental request
from the Executive Office of the President has $65 billion for the
Department of Defense?
Ambassador BREMER. That is right.
Senator SARBANES. And then it has a heading, Coalition Provi-
sional Authority and Department of State, $21.4 billion. And then
they say the request provides $20.3 billion for the Iraq relief and
reconstruction fund for use by the Coalition Provisional Authority.
Then the small balance is for the State Department.
You basically will make the decision on the use of that money;
is that correct?
Ambassador BREMER. No. As a matter of fact, the $20 billion
supplement which is before the Congress was developed by the
Iraqi ministries, the related ministries, Minister of Electricity, Min-
istry of Water Resources, Ministry of Agriculture, and so forth, in
conjunction with my experts. It was put together basically to
meet


42
Senator Boxer.
Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you for holding this important hearing.
Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, is it your intention to bring
the Ambassador back?
The CHAIRMAN. No, it is not my intention. He is not going to be
available again to the committee.
Senator SARBANES. So it is just a one-shot appearance?
The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.
Senator BOXER. Can I ask that you reset that clock? Because I
have a lot to say in 5 minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We will start again with Senator Boxer.
Senator BOXER. Senator sarbanes has a good way of getting to
the heart of the matter. We have a lot of things to say. So, I will
cut to the Chase.
I want to back everything you said, Ambassador, about our men
and women in uniform. They are brave and courageous. And a lot
of them are my constituents. A lot of them who died were my con-
stituents. And I just want to read a little portion of a letter from
a mother of a soldier, who is over there now, from Fort Bragg, Cali-
fornia.
She writes, “This has been the worst possible nightmare for a
mother. There are many days that I completely fall apart and lose
control. I can’t take it another day. This is killing me. I’m going
crazy and at times feel suicidal. This is the worst kind of torture.
I can't function. I can’t go to work. I can't focus. I can't sleep or
eat. I’m a mess. I can't go 10 seconds without thinking about my
son. My life is on hold until he returns. Please get our troops re-
placed ASAP, whatever it takes.”
So I think that sense of where are we going, are we making the
improvements that we need to make over there is very real with
our people.
Now, Mr. Ambassador, your job is to rebuild Iraq. And by the
way, thank you for taking this on. And as I told you yesterday, I
pray for your safety and for your return home as soon as possible.
And my job is a little different than your job. On behalf of my con-
stituents, it is to make this country all it can be.
And I believe we have obligations abroad. That is why I went on
this committee. I think we need to do what we can do for others.
It is part of my upbringing. I could tell you one thing, though, after
we were attacked on our homeland on 9/11, I am ready and willing
to be obsessed about getting Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
But I do not think that our obligations in Iraq should turn into
an obsession. What we hear about from the President is, and very
eloquently, rebuilding Iraqi schools, hospitals, prisons, even build-
ing a witness protection program, a long-term military interven-
tion, to quote the President, “as long as it takes.” And my people,
frankly, are perplexed.
This administration is so focused on this Iraq situation but they
will not pay for it. The administration, at the same time, will not
fully fund our education bill, “No Child Left Behind.” We cannot
even build our roads and transit systems. Here is—I sit on this
committee, too. Delay of the road bill will cost the States. That is


59
Senator SARBANES. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator sarbanes.
Thank you again, Ambassador.
The committee will recess until 2:30, when we will again reas-
i.e to talk about Iraq. We thank all Senators and the Ambas-
SaOIOT.
Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador BREMER. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, to recon-
vene at 2:30 p.m. the same day.]
RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
RESPONSES OF HON. L. PAUL BREMER, III, ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR
RICHARD G. LUGAR
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR IRAQ
Question 1. What steps are you taking that will ensure that the reconstruction
efforts build an Iraqi capacity to carry on-maintain reforms after the U.S. and CPA
are gone?
Answer. The first step to ensure that reforms have permanence is to provide an
inclusive process wherein the Iraqi people participate in developing plans and pro-
grams for the reconstruction of Iraq. This is being accomplished through the func-
tioning of the Iraqi Ministries, which are working closely with the Coalition Provi-
sional Authority. Through close cooperation with the Iraqi Ministries, we are fos-
tering pride and ownership in the restoration projects, in addition to utilizing the
knowledge and experience of the Iraqi people. Secondly, a secure and stable environ-
ment plays an essential role in the reconstruction effort. We are in the process of
a recruitment and training program to enhance Iraqi security forces in five areas:
1) police officers, 2) border police, 3) civil defense forces, 4) facilities protection serv-
ices and 5) the New Iraqi Army. For reforms to endure, Iraqis must feel safe and
secure from terrorists, criminals and Ba'ath party loyalists. Also, the Iraqi people
must feel that theft borders are secure, without external threats, allowing for a
peaceful existence with neighboring countries. Finally, the Iraqi people must freely
elect their leadership under a fair and democratic process set forth in a constitution
that they will draft and ratify. Ownership and participation in the creation of a
democratic state will be a key to lasting reforms. It is the combination of all of these
initiatives, reconstruction, security and participative democracy that will anchor re-
forms into the future.
Question 2. How will laws or authorities you implement now—such as the ones
}. mentioned about taxes and foreign ownership—remain in place after CPA
eaves 1
Answers. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) works closely with the Gov-
erming Council, the interim Iraqi Ministers and private Iraqi citizens to develop reg-
ulations and orders that reflect Iraqi views regarding economic reform and other
matters. This collaborative process, therefore, will result in actions by a future
internationally recognized representative Iraqi government to preserve many of the
provisions of CPA orders or to enact such provisions through the Iraqi law-making
process.
In addition, the drafters of the new Iraqi constitution May incorporate into that
instrument certain fundamental concepts from CPA regulations and orders, as ap-
propriate.
The future Iraqi government's assumption of responsibilities from the CPA, as
contemplated by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483, will naturally require a
process of transition. We have placed great emphasis on ensuring that the CPA's
regulations and orders implement political and economic decisions shaped by Iraq's
interim leaders, and supported by the people of Iraq.


65
Answer. The tender approach used, as previously reported to Congress, ensured
a fair and level competitive basis. The intent of the tender was to be as technology
neutral as possible and to insure CPA received submissions, to include from U.S.
firms, which were compliant with meeting the telecommunication requirements for
Iraq. Since the submission of bids closed on 21 August, a team of experts drawn
from Iraq, the U.S. and the UK has analysed and compared proposals. A majority
of that team was made up of Iraqis; a panel consisting of two Iraqis and two CPA
officials made the final recommendation. 35 companies submitted a total of over 100
bids for the three licenses offered. The Iraqi Ministry of Communications assessed
the bids against a list of criteria prepared before the bids were received. The criteria
were designed to ensure an objective and fair assessment of the merits and failings
of each bid. On 6 October the Iraqi Ministry of Communications announced its selec-
tion of three consortia to provide initial wireless service in Iraq. While an American
firm did not win one of the bids, one of the winners already announced that an
American company would be one of its primary equipment suppliers; other Amer-
ican companies May also sub-contract to the winning companies.
RESPONSES OF HON. L. PAUL BREMER, III, ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR
JOHN F. KERRY
Question 1. In testimony earlier this week before the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee, you were asked if this was the last supplemental request that the Congress
will be asked to approve for Iraq or if you expect to be back asking for more next
year. And you responded to the effect that you don't anticipate coming back for an-
other supplemental “of this magnitude.” What magnitude do you anticipate?
Answer. The administration has said that it expects this to be the only FY 2004
supplemental for Iraq and Afghanistan. On September 7, 2003 the White House
issued a statement that said, “We believe our plan will obviate the need for future
requests, and certainly for requests of this magnitude. Future Iraq-related require-
ments we would hope to address as part of our regular foreign operations annual
request.”
Question 2. The World Bank, as you know, estimates that reconstruction in Iraq
will cost $65 to $70 billion over the next four to five years. The President, in this
supplemental, is asking for about $20 billion, and you have said that it is for emer-
gency needs. You and others in the administration have stated that you hope the
international community will cover the remaining needs through ledges at the up-
coming donor conference in October. What happens if they don't? Does the adminis-
tration have a game plan for that contingency?
Answer. The administration continues to expect that needed funding above the
$20 billion will come from the international community and Iraq's own resources.
The $20 billion the President requested is not intended to cover all of Iraq's needs.
The bulk of the funds for Iraq's reconstruction will come from Iraqis—from oil reve-
nues, recovered assets, international trade and direct foreign investment, as well as
from contributions we've already received and hope to receive from the international
community.
Question 3. Mr. Ambassador, in his speech yesterday at the United Nations, the
President made the point that as a young democracy, Iraq needs support. He said:
“And all nations of good will should step forward and º: that support.” How-
ever, the President offered very little to those nations who want the United Nations
to play a larger, more clearly defined role in Iraq's reconstruction and governance.
What is the objection to putting these processes under the authority of the
United Nations?
Wouldn't this significantly increase the prospects of getting other countries to
rovide the $40-$5O billion additional resources that Iraq will need, beyond the
§. billion the President is asking the American people to provide?
Is it really fair to put the American people in a position where they May have
to foot the entire bill for rebuilding the country because the administration re-
fuses to compromise?
Answer. More than 60 countries are already contributing to Iraq's future, and the
Coalition of nations now in Iraq is acting under international law and United Na-
tions Security Council Resolutions. Over thirty countries are providing military
forces, and the British and the Poles are leading two multinational divisions. Coali-